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Article in Journal of Research in Science Teaching · April 2016

DOI: 10.1002/tea.21324
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JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN SCIENCE TEACHING
Research Article
“ATon of Faith in Science!” Nature and Role of Assumptions in, and Ideas
About, Science and Epistemology Generated Upon Watching a Sci-Fi Film
John Y. Myers and Fouad Abd-El-Khalick
Department of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,

Champaign, Illinois
Received 6 October 2015; Accepted 14 March 2016
Abstract: This study (i) explicates the sorts of ideas about science and the nature of knowing that were
generated among participant graduate students who viewed the sci-fi film, Contact, and (ii) examines the
interactions between these ideas and ontic stances with which participants approached viewing the film.
Eleven doctoral students of various disciplinary backgrounds viewed Contact, wrote a film review in
response to a prompt, and were interviewed to clarify and further explore ideas mentioned in their review.
Participants’ most prevalent ideas generated upon viewing Contact were that scientific assumptions, and trust
in scientific knowledge and authority, are “faith-based”; theory-choice in science can be faith-based; science
requires empirical evidence; and females in science are severely misrepresented. Further, more participants
experienced such ideas as realistic rather than unrealistic representations of science, and some identified with
particular scenes from the film. These results do not empirically support pedagogical techniques
recommended by prior literature suggesting that science teachers who expose students to sci-fi film in the
classroom should focus specifically on what teachers deem scientifically inaccurate or misinformation. This
approach is rather limited and fails to consider ideas generated by students upon viewing films, which
teachers might not expect (e.g., relating science with faith). Rather, we recommend an open-ended, reflective
pedagogical approach to using sci-fi film where teachers, first, openly engage students with writing about and
discussing thoughts they generate upon watching a given film, and then move to address student ideas. Our
findings also indicate a critical need to expand the current consensus model for NOS in K-12 science
education—in particular, including and explicating the nature and role of assumptions in science as an
additional core dimension of currently accepted NOS models. Toward this end, we delineate the nature and
role of scientific assumptions by reference to the epistemological theory of coherentism. # 2016 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 9999:XX–XX, 2016
Keywords: nature of science; epistemology; philosophy of science; science fiction film; assumptions
The study of film, or motion picture (M€unsterberg, 1916), and its effects on science learning is
nearly as old as film itself. Yet it is a sparsely examined area. After the introduction of
synchronized sound and “talkies” to film in 1927 (Eyman, 1997), Clark (1932) was among the
very first to study the role of sound film as a teaching aid in science classrooms compared to silent
film. Instead of launching this domain of research, however, Clark’s study seemed to have marked
the outset of a capacious gap, and it was not until Collins (1987) investigated how television
Correspondence to: J. Y. Myers; E-mail: jymyers2@illinois.edu

DOI 10.1002/tea.21324
Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com).
# 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

2 MYERS AND ABD-EL-KHALICK
documentaries shaped public perception of science that academic interest was rekindled and more
noteworthy literature emerged. Still, this renewed interest primarily centered on science portrayal
in television programs and, later, other media (e.g., YouTube), which emerged from film, but
significant study has yet to focus on the impact of film as a unique medium on science teaching and
learning (e.g., Dani, Wan, & Henning, 2010; Dhingra, 2003; Jones & Cuthrell, 2011; Klosterman,
Sadler, & Brown, 2012; Schafer, 2011; Solomon, 1992).
Aikenhead (1988) may have inadvertently promoted the abovementioned focus by
blurring the line between television and film. Particularly, he underscored the influence of
television and film as a combined source, instead of individual sources, on 12th-grade
student views on scientific, technological, and societal issues. Aikenhead estimated that
television and film accounted for 46% of sources informing student beliefs about science,
as opposed to a meager 10% influence credited to science classrooms (see also Reis &
Galvao, 2004). Later, science education researchers took note of the quite evident
capability of film, as separate from television, to have a larger impact itself on student
learning than science teachers (e.g., Barnett et al., 2006). In particular, the National
Science Foundation’s (NSF) Science and Engineering Indicators (NSF, 2000, 2002)
underscored the importance of examining science fiction (sci-fi) film, among other media,
because of its tendency to distort the line between fact and fiction, promote pseudo- and
non-science, and ultimately harm public understanding of science.
Subsequently, more educational research started to investigate sci-fi film but mostly as an
instructional tool in the science classroom (e.g., Barnett & Kafka, 2007; Brake & Thornton, 2003).
Some of this work was related to a central component of scientific literacy, namely, student
understanding of nature of science (NOS), and associated conceptions of the epistemology of
science (American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS, 1990; National Research
Council, NRC, 1996; Next Generation Science Standards Lead States, NGSS Lead States, 2013).
Koehler, Bloom, and Binns (2013), for example, located NOS themes in Contact (Zemeckis &
Starkey, 1997) and Twister (Bryce, Crichton, Kennedy, & De Bont, 1996) to give science teachers
the means to present cinematic NOS “instances” to students. However, Koehler et al. did not
consider how teachers and students, as film viewers, might interpret those instances or other film-
related ideas. This interpretation might as well inform or misinform viewers’ comprehension of
the targeted NOS ideas and other ideas, which could be generated by teachers and students both
during the course of viewing the film or afterward reflecting on the viewing experience. Indeed,
very few studies have examined the effects of film, let alone sci-fi film, on the viewer. Thus, science
educators continue to use sci-fi film for instruction—and students continue to watch sci-fi film
inside and, more often, outside classrooms—without an empirical base, let alone a robust
understanding, about ways in which sci-fi film viewing impacts learners and learning. Such is the
focus of the present study.
Review of the Literature
Despite their scarcity, findings from the few studies that investigated the effects of film on
learning are informative. Barnett et al. (2006) particularly demonstrated how a single viewing of a
sci-fi film could negatively impact conceptions of scientific phenomena. For example, a single
viewing of The Core (Bailey, Foster, Layne, & Amiel, 2003) prompted 8th graders to genuinely
believe, despite prior Earth science instruction, that the Earth has a liquid instead of solid
inner core, and that the fundamental function of the Earth’s magnetic field is to block
microwave radiation. Barnett et al. attributed such misunderstandings to filmic plausibility,
entrusted onscreen scientific authority, and cinema being more memorable than hands-on
classroom experiences.
Journal of Research in Science Teaching
SCIENCE, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND SCI-FI FILM 3
Butler, Zaromb, Lyle, and Roediger (2009) tested the effects of short film clips on student
memories in the context of learning history. Their findings are nonetheless noteworthy and might
be fruitful for science education. Undergraduate students read various historically accurate texts
and later watched a series of clips from films like The Last Samurai (Zwick, 2003) and Amistad
(Allen, Wilson, & Spielberg, 1997), which depicted the same historical events from texts but with
variable historical accuracy. Prior to viewings, some student groups were given “specific
warnings” of precise instances of misinformation; other groups were given “general warnings”
that the films were fictionalized; and some groups received no warnings at all. Cue-recall tests
administered 1 week after viewings showed that film clips increased correct recall for information
consistent with texts compared to a control group that merely repeated text readings without
viewing film (see also Callender & McDaniel, 2009). Specific warnings aided in substantially
reducing false recall of misinformation. Groups who only received general warnings or no
warning at all, however, recalled only misinformation from films over historically accurate
information from texts, despite being explicitly told beforehand that such texts were historically
accurate. The authors argued that film, for better or for worse, essentially became reality for these
viewers, as propagation of (mis)information into memory appeared to be beyond viewer control.
Current psychological understanding of encoding variability and retroactive interference
may adequately explain how Barnett’s et al. (2006) and Butler’s et al. (2009) participants
involuntarily undermined scientifically and historically accurate information and propagated
false beliefs. These principles establish that the separate encoding of visual and verbal information
into memory, among other modes of encoding, can interfere with each other, even to the point of
one memory-type dominating another of the same event (Bower, 1972; Paivo, 1986), and that
exposure to misinformation about previously encoded information can lead to misremembering
such information (Rantzen & Markham, 1992). Such theory, however, only illuminates outcomes
of, for example, cinematic viewership. There is still little understanding of the intermediary
processes, like idea generation, that lead to such outcomes and could inspire fruitful pedagogical
interventions.
Additionally, the aforementioned studies specifically targeted content-dependent ideas (i.e.,
ideas specifically pertaining to earth science and American history). These studies did not address
the extent to which learners generate content-independent ideas, or how such ideas interact with
each other upon viewing film. While watching a sci-fi film involving biology, for example,
students might generate ideas about scientific inquiry or epistemology, instead of, or in addition
to, ideas solely pertaining to specific biological content. The former ideas would merit attention in
any science course, regardless of content area. Thus, there is a need for open-ended investigations
into what learners think about upon watching sci-fi film to help fill gaps in this line of research.
Purpose and Theoretical Framework
This study aimed to explicate the sorts of ideas about science and the nature of knowing that
were generated among participant graduate students who viewed the sci-fi film, Contact
(Zemeckis & Starkey, 1997), and examine the interactions between these ideas and ontic stances
(cf., Sobchack, 1992) with which participants approached viewing the film. The study, it should be
noted, was not focused on analyzing what the director and/or screenwriter of Contact may have
intended to convey, if anything, about science or epistemology, nor how “experts” would
characterize the film’s depiction of epistemological issues related to science and various ways of
knowing. We were specifically interested in ideas generated by participants upon watching the
film.
We took the nature of knowing to refer to epistemological characteristics related to the
justificatory sources of knowledge, which include, but are not limited to, sense-perception, reason,
intuition, faith, and authority (Huemer, 2001; Zagzebski, 2009). Ideas about science include, but
also are not limited to, conceptions of scientific content, views of scientific practices, and values
and beliefs inherent to the development of scientific knowledge—that is, “NOS” (Lederman &
Zeidler, 1987). For the purposes of this manuscript, the most pertinent NOS aspects regarding
participant ideas about science (given our findings) include the following beliefs: (i) scientific
claims rely upon empirical evidence (empirical NOS); (ii) scientists’ observations are always
motivated by and acquire meaning in light of certain theoretical perspectives (theory-laden NOS);
(iii) scientific knowledge is reliable and durable, but never absolute or certain (tentative NOS); (iv)
scientific theories are well-established, highly substantiated, predictive, and internally consistent
systems of explanation (nature of scientific theories); and (v) science affects and is affected by
various cultural elements and spheres, including political factors and power structures (social and
cultural embeddedness of science) (Abd-El-Khalick, 2012; Burgin & Sadler, 2016; Lederman,
Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Schwartz, 2002). It must be stressed, however, that while we were
mindful of these NOS aspects, we were also very cautious not to so readily confine our
interpretation of participants’ ideas about science to any one targeted framework or domain in
order to allow leeway for any personal, nuanced views from participants about science, whether
tenable or not, to come to full actualization, especially during participant interviews.
“Ontic stances” on film employ three perspectives from film theory of how spectators come to
experience a film’s reality—that is, metaphorically as a picture frame (film as unrealistic), window
(film as realistic), and/or mirror (film as something with which to identify or empathize)
(Sobchack, 1992). According to Sobchack, if spectators metaphorically view film as a “picture
frame,” film might be interpreted as unrealistic (a work of art), thus transforming or restructuring
objective reality, or imitating mental thought, hallucination, and/or dreams (M€unsterberg, 1916).
If approached as a “window,” spectators might view film as realistic (figuratively a hole in the wall
to the outside world), thus revealing and capturing objective reality. If viewed as a “mirror,”
spectators might see film from a Lacan-ian perspective (Lacan, 1968) in that their bodies are not
reflected in the film screen, yet they identify themselves in the film (as if it were a mirror) perhaps
when personally experiencing similar situations as portrayed onscreen (Benvenuto & Kennedy,
1986). The “mirror” ontic stance has been further developed by Marks (2000) into what is
commonly known in film studies as haptic theory, which accounts for how viewers empathetically
feel what onscreen characters feel. Such ontic stances are not mutually exclusive. For example,
viewers might experience one film scene from a “window” stance but partially or fully transition
to a “picture frame” stance when other scenes do not convince them that what they saw was “real.”
Comparable stances have been shown to directly affect how film is interpreted (Baudry &
Williams, 1974). Even though, presumably, spectators do not typically know or readily reflect
upon how they experience film, we argue that prompting viewers to think about and explicate how
they experienced notable parts of a film helped us better understand the ideas that they generated in
response to the film.
The following questions guided our study: (i) What ideas, both specific and broad, about
science and the nature of knowing are generated among participant graduate students upon
watching the sci-fi film, Contact? (ii) How do these ideas interact with ontic stances about film that
characterize participants’ approach(es) to viewing Contact?
Method
The study was qualitative in nature. Two main data sources were used to answer the guiding
research questions. The first was a “critical film review,” which participants wrote after viewing
Contact in response to a prompt that addressed a number of specified dimensions. The second was
a semi-structured, individual interview that explored the ideas explicated in participants’ film
reviews and prompted participants to discuss ideas about science and ways of knowing as these
related to their viewing experience.
Selection of the Sci-Fi Film

A number of criteria were used to select a sci-fi film for viewing in this study. The film had to:
(i) fulfill a comprehensive definition of the genre; (ii) portray science and scientists in action; (iii)
rank among the top 100 highest-grossing American sci-fi films of all time (an indication of mass
viewership and the film’s possible impact); and (iv) be released roughly in the last two decades (to
strike a balance between being relatively recent and having enjoyed wide viewership).
We precariously demarcated sci-fi from other fictional genres due to multiple, often
conflicting and rigid, “scholarly” interpretations (Stanfield, 2011). As could be expected, the
diversity of academic definitions of this genre was as problematic as it was helpful. For example,
to underscore a fantastical nature of the genre, Amis (1981) believed sci-fi to be a class of narrative
that presents extraordinary scenarios hypothetically based on scientific and/or technological
innovations (or pseudoscientific origins), which may never occur in the world we know. Hodgens
(1959) introduced the component of futurism to take sci-fi as an extrapolation and fictionalization
of scientific possibilities that naturally must take place in the future. A humanistic dimension was
added by Sturgeon (1995) to define the genre as a narrative with a human problem and solution, but
a narrative that would not have occurred without its science content, thus returning to Amis’ and
Hodgens’ definitions. Critics and writers have even brought religious overtones to the genre, like
Moskowitz (1990), who defined sci-fi as a branch of fantasy that eases “willing suspension of
disbelief” (Coleridge, 1817) to such an extent that it can promote unwavering belief in completely
fabricated scientific credibility involving inventive conjectures in physics, space, time, social
science, and philosophy. Such a definition is supported, for example, by the religious cultural
following of the Star Wars saga (Lyden, 2012).
Because of this plethora of definitions, many, like Clarens (1967), simply chose to concede
that sci-fi is just too difficult to define abstractly and that, on a visceral level, it should merely be
instantly recognizable when read or viewed. However, in the interest of this study, our definition
takes root in what Merril (1971) described as the overall essence of a consolidated sci-fi genre. She
identified three basic stories constituting the nature of sci-fi: (i) the teaching story, which centers
on teaching about science and technology; (ii) the preaching story, which warns and prophesizes
about the future; and (iii) the speculative fiction, which entices the characters, reader, and/or
viewer to ponder about the nature of humanity and its place in the universe and/or reality. All sci-fi
films that were considered for this study aptly fulfilled these three components of Merril’s
definition.
A handful of films emerged on applying our criteria to the Internet Movie Database and
scholarly sci-fi analyses (cf., Amis, 1981; Fraknoi, 2003; Frayling & Pieri, 2006; Sobchack, 1987;
Telotte, 2001; Vieth, 2001). These films included Jurassic Park (Kennedy, Molen, & Spielberg,
1993), Gattaca (DeVito, Shamberg, Sher, Lyon, & Niccol, 1997), The Day After Tomorrow
(Emmerich & Gordon, 2004), Avatar (Cameron & Landu, 2009), and Contact.1 Eventually,
Contact was chosen because it provided the most substantial focus on science, scientists, and
epistemological issues that endured throughout the film narrative.
The Story. Contact revolves around lead character Ellie Arroway (played by Jodie Foster), an
American astronomer near the turn of the millennium who was encouraged by her late father to
search for extraterrestrial intelligence. Upon securing funds and satellite time at the Very Large
Array from an eccentric billionaire, Arroway’s “faith” (as a few film characters see it) that there
must be extraterrestrial intelligence elsewhere in the Universe is rewarded, as her team discovers
an alien signal in the form of prime numbers from the direction of star system Vega. As her team
unearths the signal’s message, which communicates blueprints to build an interstellar transport to
Vega, Arroway unfortunately finds herself amidst a power struggle with David Drumlin (played
by Tom Skerritt), who repeatedly uses his dictatorial status as Science Advisor to the President to
succeed at stealing credit for Arroway’s work and discovery. Drumlin is indeed so politically
savvy that eventually he, not Arroway, is selected to be the first human ever to travel to Vega in the
alien interstellar transport, once built. Regrettably for Drumlin, a fundamentalist radicalized
Christian, who did not wish scientists to prevail, blows up the newly built transport killing
Drumlin. Another transport is built, however, and Arroway is selected to go to Vega. Equipped
with audio-visual recording equipment, Arroway is secured inside the transport’s pod, dropped
into what she experiences as a wormhole to Vega, and lands on a fantastical beachfront vista that
appears uncannily like a picture she drew as a child with her father shortly before he died. A
doppelganger of Arroway’s father then appears to her, explains that he is actually an alien probing
her memories, discusses the next steps for humanity’s place in interstellar travel, and then sends
Arroway away in her pod on another wormhole back to Earth. Meanwhile, people on Earth, not to
mention all recording devices external to the transport pod, merely observe Arroway’s pod
dropping straight down into a safety net in a matter of seconds, and not venturing into some kind of
wormhole to Vega like Arroway’s testimony later describes. Arroway insists to a congressional
committee that she not only went to Vega, but she also perceived the entire trip to take
approximately 18 hours, despite her audio-visual equipment merely recording static. The National
Security Advisor asks Arroway to apply Ockham’s razor (a precept Arroway uses throughout the
movie) to her own testimony, specifically to consider the plausibility of two claims: (i) Arroway
was whisked off to a star system 26 light years away in a matter of hours, which defies Arroway’s
science, to have a reunion with her dead dad; or (ii) Arroway’s experience was a hallucination and
the alien signal an elaborate hoax orchestrated by Arroway’s eccentric funder. Arroway indeed
deems the second claim more plausible but is compelled to deny it in light of her seemingly “real”
experience of going to Vega, thus forcing all, including herself, to take her testimony on faith.
Unbeknownst to Arroway, the film ends with the U.S. government maintaining the secret that,
while Arroway’s recording device aboard the pod only generated static, it recorded approximately
18 hours of it.
Participants
Purposive sampling was used to recruit participants with an eye for generating richness
and optimizing variation in the data to address the guiding research questions. Indeed, since
the present study initiates exploration of the vastly broad range in which ideas can be
generated while viewing sci-fi film, doctoral students were sought over undergraduate or
secondary students to capitalize upon their advanced communication, critical thinking, and
reflective skills. A sample of secondary students, for example, might not offer any more than
a few ideas about science and knowing upon viewing such film, much like in Barnett et al.
(2006), thus, not providing proper awareness about the sheer variety of potential ideas that
viewers might generate. Further, doctoral students have successfully completed K-12 science
education, and some would have completed various science courses of study at the
undergraduate and/or graduate levels. Accordingly, a purposeful sample of doctoral students
would provide diversity in terms of both scientific literacy and scientific expertise, thus,
optimizing the potential richness of data. The film Contact also lends itself to examining a
number of themes including, among other things, science and scientists, science in society,
epistemology, religion and theology, film theory, literary theory, science education,
psychology of learning, and sound/image studies. Thus, we recruited doctoral students with a
wide variety of disciplinary expertise to enable exploring the interactions between ideas about
science and ways of knowing generated by participants and their disciplinary backgrounds.
Specifically, participants were 11 doctoral students (six female) attending a large research
university in the Midwestern United States. Five of the participants (three female) had advanced to
the PhD candidacy level, while the others were at various earlier stages of their doctoral programs.
Their respective major disciplines and pseudonyms are astronomy (Aden), communication and
media studies (Carl), educational psychology (Pam), English with emphasis in film (Faye),
epistemology (Evelyn), language and literacy education (Lara), music (Mark), science education
(Sean), philosophy of education with emphasis in dance (Diane), philosophy of science (Patrick),
and teacher education (Tammy). It should be noted that some participants had disciplinary
expertise that were directly relevant to themes addressed in Contact and this study (e.g.,
philosophy of science, science education, film), while others had less directly relevant expertise
(e.g., language and literacy, teacher education, dance). The latter variation was intentionally
sought, and aimed to gauge reactions to viewing Contact from disciplinary perspectives that were
as varied as possible.
Procedures
Participants were provided with, and viewed, the film Contact at their homes to emulate the
main medium (home entertainment systems) in which Contact would be viewed today. Next, they
wrote a four or less double-spaced page “critical review” of the film within 24 hours of viewing it.
A written prompt facilitated the process. It asked participants to: (i) briefly summarize the film
storyline; (ii) express likes and dislikes about the film; (iii) describe what general messages
Contact communicated; and (iv) explain what the film communicated about what science is and
how we come to know about the world. The first two items intended to prime participant memories
of the film narrative and cinematography, and identify the most memorable (and possibly most
impactful) components of the narrative, before leading them to engage with thinking about the
latter two items.
The researchers analyzed the critical film reviews and identified participant statements, ideas,
and/or themes for follow-up during individual interviews. The primary author interviewed each
participant individually within 2 weeks of viewing the film to clarify and follow up on the
identified statements and ideas. Participants were provided their unmarked film reviews at the
outset of the interview and given time to refresh their memories on what they had written. They
were informed that the interview provided an opportunity for reflection, and that we were as much
interested in their tacit and formative ideas, as with their explicit and firm thoughts. We also noted
that any seeming inconsistencies between written film reviews and utterances during the interview
were as important as agreements (Wasser & Bresler, 1996). Next, participants were asked a set of
probing questions that pertained to the statements and ideas articulated in their film reviews (e.g.,
“When you wrote, ‘Contact portrayed to me that even scientists need to take some things on faith,’
what did you mean by faith?”). Also, participants were asked how they viewed the film during
scenes that prompted such ideas. For example, did participants “view” certain memorable events
as realistic, as if such events were mere fabrications of reality (like art), or as if they identified with
the particular context(s) of the film (cf., Sobchack, 1992)? Participants’ lines of thinking often
were followed beyond the prepared questions in the case of most interviewees. Interviews
typically lasted about an hour. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis.
Data Analysis
Data were analyzed by generating and comparing organizational, substantive, and theoretical
categories of coding (Maxwell, 2013). Organizational codes preceded data collection and
included base categories, specifically student backgrounds (philosophy of science, science

education, etc.) and ontic stances of viewing film—that is, film as “window” (realistic), film as
“picture frame” (unrealistic), and film as “mirror” (something with which to identify or
empathize). These codes served as symbolic “bins” in which emergent substantive and theoretical
codes were later placed (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001). Substantive codes included broad
messages about the film and ideas about science and knowing that participants articulated. All
substantive codes were justified by quotes from film reviews and interviews. Theoretical codes
included links between background knowledge that the authors possess and ideas about science
and knowing, along with broad messages about Contact, that participants articulated. For
example, if a participant articulated that Contact portrayed assumptions made in science as faith-
based, and that susceptibility to “falsifiability” differentiated such assumptions in science from,
say, assumptions made in religion, then this idea was given the theoretical code “Popper” due to its
link to Karl Popper’s (1959, 1992) falsifiability as a criterion to demarcate science from other
modes of inquiry.
The primary author and a graduate student formally coded the film reviews and interviews.
Both coders have a solid background in NOS, and the primary author also brings knowledge of
epistemology and film theory. One participant’s data were randomly chosen and jointly coded by
both analysts. Once it was clear how to locate and highlight prominent ideas in both the film review
and interview transcripts, and code them as concisely as possible, the data for the remaining 10
participants were randomly split and analyzed separately by the two coders. Once completed, all
eleven participants’ data were coded and ready for a second round of analysis. Table 1 provides an
overview of the coding scheme used to analyze the data, coupled with definitions and clarifications
of the various organizational, substantive, and theoretical coding structures.
During the second round of analysis, the authors and graduate student jointly examined all
coded film reviews and interviews. The second author has a background in NOS, and history and
philosophy of science. Each code was scrutinized for clarity, simplicity, accuracy, and precision.
Codes that were extraneous or unclear were deleted. Sections of text that were overlooked or un-
coded during the first round of analysis were coded (only two such instances occurred). The
second round of analysis was not complete until each code was rejected or accepted by all
analysts.
The authors then noticed common substantive and theoretical codes present in most, and in
some cases all, participants’ film reviews and interviews. Such codes (articulated in the findings
section) were compiled and counted. Participant quotes substantiating these codes were compared
and examined on a spreadsheet. Pertinent passages from these quotes are displayed below.
Validity threats were minimized with long, intensive interviewing, which enabled the
generation of rich data that were detailed and varied enough to provide a revealing “picture” of
participant thoughts (Becker, 1970). Further, researcher bias was decreased by engaging in two
rounds of coding analysis with three analysts who scrupulously scrutinized all codes.
Findings
Ideas About Science and the Nature of Knowing Generated by Participants
We originally anticipated that the diversity of expertise among participants would provide an
array of ideas about science and ways of knowing that would be generated after viewing Contact,
and that these ideas would be explicable on participants’ disciplinary backgrounds. Instead, a
small number of shared ideas consistently emerged in the case of 10 or more of the 11 participants.
We also found one gender-specific idea that was common to all six female participants but not
evident in the case of all their male counterparts. This is not to say that minor differences did not
Table 1
Coding scheme used to analyze data
Major
Organizational Substantive Major Theoretical
Codes Codes Definition Codes
Teacher education Faith-based Assumptions provide the base foundation AAAS (1990); NGSS
doctoral student scientific of all scientific knowledge and are (2013)
(example) assumptions justified not by empirical evidence but
rather on faith (“belief without
evidence”).
Trust in Scientific knowledge is often uncritically “Durable but
scientific accepted as “fact” just like religious tentative” AAAS
knowledge authority is blindly accepted. (1990)
faith-based
“Theory” choice Choosing the simplest of two “theories” Ockham’s Razor;
in science based on simplicity alone is faith-based “Value judgment”
faith-based because the value of simplicity is not Kuhn (1977)
characteristically empirical.
Empirical Science relies upon empirical evidence Kuhn (1962)
evidence and is distinguished from other ways of
component of “knowing” via this reliance.
science
Females in The female scientist is portrayed as Kaplan (2013);
science: “strange,” “antagonistic,” “emotional,” Mulvey (1975);
unfavorable “marginalized,” and/or “inferior to Steinke (1999,
portrayal men.” 2005)
Picture frame Unrealistic Generated idea about film unrealistic. Sobchack (1992)
Window Realistic Generated idea about film realistic. Sobchack (1992)
Mirror Identify or Generated idea about film identified or Sobchack (1992)
empathize empathized with.
occur depending on a participant’s disciplinary background. For example, the astronomy student
predictably focused on some astronomy-related themes in Contact. He was the only participant to
articulate, for instance, how he enjoyed the opening sequence of the film, which aesthetically
depicts just how small the Earth is in comparison to an assumed infinite Universe—indeed a tribute
to Carl Sagan’s (1994) popular Pale Blue Dot. Also predictably, the philosophy of science and
epistemology students emphasized themes in Contact that were largely epistemological in nature.
For example, they both indicated that the film strongly pushed the message that all modes of
inquiry (e.g., science, religion, postmodernism) are equally valid. They determined this message
to be “preposterous” and, as the philosophy of science student wittily said, “merely sentimentally
appealing to those who once got their feelings hurt by valid scientific findings” (Patrick,
interview), an assertion that is unapologetically defended by Boghossian’s (2006) equally witty
Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism.
Nevertheless, such examples of varied ideas, which were quite dependent on disciplinary
background, were not as surprising as uncovering two broad themes that were widely shared
among all participants. All female participants uniquely articulated an additional third theme.
Thus, the following sections explicate the shared themes, which were evident in the overwhelming
majority of participants’ film reviews and interviews. These were related to the role of faith (with
three sub-ideas) and empirical evidence in science, as well as the representation of females in
science.
Faith as a Component of Science

Ten of eleven participants thought that Contact portrayed science as being principally based
on, not only empirical evidence, but also faith. This theme included three sub-ideas, namely, that
scientific assumptions, trust in scientific knowledge and authority, and theory choice in science
are largely faith-based. When asked what was meant by “faith,” all participants arrived at
definitions that were similar to Tammy’s (teacher education). That is, faith is “belief without
evidence,” which was purportedly not exclusive to religion. Evidence, which is addressed in
greater detail below, had been described mostly as sensory, which serves as a basis for reason-
based justification, as compared to intuition or authority-based justification (Huemer, 2001;
Zagzebski, 2009).
Scientific Assumptions as Faith-Based. Nine participants generated the idea of faith-based
scientific assumptions upon viewing Contact. This idea entails that there are assumptions, which
provide the base foundation for scientific knowledge, that are justified, not by “empirical evidence,
or our senses, or any of that stuff” (Patrick, philosophy of science, interview), but rather solely
justified on faith. This notion was largely brought about by Contact’s lead character’s (Ellie
Arroway, the astronomer) staunch, and apparently faith-based, assumption that there must be
extraterrestrial life in the Universe—an assumption on which she based her entire life and career.
Mark (music) summarized the majority of participant ideas about scientific assumptions with the
following remarks during his interview:
Science has to use faith to work. There’s a ton of faith in science [participant emphases] . . .
You have your theories and laws, but if the laws of physics suddenly changed, our science
would be totally different. So, science is all based on faith that the world will continue on the
way that it is.
Mark’s statement that “the world will continue on the way that it is” does bear resemblance to
the NGSS Lead States’ claim (2013), “Scientific knowledge is based on the assumption that
natural laws operate today as they did in the past and they will continue to do so in the future”
(Appendix H). Indeed, even Bertrand Russell (1912, 2008) warned against the follies of lending
too much credence to the future utility of scientific principles, “unless the inductive principle is
assumed” (p. 44). However, it would be difficult to argue that Russell and, most definitely, the
NGSS Lead States would have firmly rooted such scientific assumptions in what participants
labeled as “faith.”
Further, most participants did not attempt a nuanced approach to “faith in scientific
assumptions” as compared, for instance, to religious faith. The exception was Patrick (philosophy
of science) who articulated more nuanced ideas by identifying a sort of Popperian falsifiability
(Popper, 1959, 1992) as a distinguishing criterion of scientific assumptions:
Patrick: I don’t hesitate to call scientific assumptions, like Arroway’s assumption, faith-
based. It’s just a different sort of faith. So if you say that God exists . . . that kind of faith is
different from faith in physical laws being uniform throughout the Universe.
Interviewer: How? How is it different?
Patrick: Because we can have reason to doubt the latter example [that physical laws are
uniform throughout the Universe]. It’s kind of hard to doubt that God exists . . . There’s no
evidence either way. But, almost always you will have these really basic, but falsifiable,
assumptions that are the basis of all scientific claims . . . I think it’s these assumptions that
either make science work or not. And the nice thing about the scientific assumption is that,
again, it can be rejected.
Like Mark’s statement, Patrick’s discussion of “physical laws being uniform throughout
the Universe” bears striking resemblance to the NGSS Lead States’ (2013) claim, “Science
assumes basic laws of nature are the same everywhere in the universe” (Appendix H), or
AAAS’ (1990) assertion, “Science also assumes that the universe is, as its name implies, a
vast single system in which the basic rules are everywhere the same” (p. 2). That this
“falsifiable” scientific assumption, as Patrick claimed, could be “rejected” speaks to a criterion
that might demarcate assumptions used in science from assumptions used in other spheres,
like religion, much like Popper (1959, 1992) attempted to demarcate science from other
modes of inquiry. Specifically, Popper argued that what chiefly distinguishes science from,
say, religion or pseudoscience, is its reliance upon falsifiability as the characteristic “method”
of producing and substantiating (or not) scientific knowledge, thus repudiating Francis Bacon’s
(1620, 1996) induction as the characteristic “method” of science. An empirically based claim
made in science, like “the Earth revolves around the Sun,” is open to attempts at falsification
(not that it ever would be falsified), unlike a claim made in postmodernism, like “all progress
is an illusion,” as the postmodernist claim is so far steeped in its own subjective, unempirical
definitions that it is rendered unfalsifiable (and unverifiable) and, to Popper, unscientific.
Popper, indeed, had difficulty reconciling falsifiability with how scientific theories can and do
develop and thrive despite seeming inconsistencies with nature. Quantum theory’s inability (to
date) to reconcile contradictions with general relativity, for example, does not drive quantum
theorists to falsify their theory. Thus, as we expand upon such criteria on the nature and role of
scientific assumptions in the discussion section below and how, despite Patrick’s and other
participants’ ideas, it is untenable to base such assumptions on faith, or “belief without evidence,”
we do not include Popper’s falsifiability as the main criterion of the scientific assumption but
rather include, as our NOS framework emphasizes, an empirical aspect.
Trust in Scientific Knowledge and Authority as Faith-Based. Eight of the eleven participants
analogously related faith in religious doctrine to the notion of faith in scientific knowledge and
authority. The basic assertion that summarizes this idea is that many people uncritically accept
scientific knowledge as fact just as much as many people blindly accept religious authority. Participants
chiefly generated this idea in reaction to Ellie Arroway, at the end of Contact, “finally” questioning the
once unquestionable scientific knowledge on which she had built her life and career after being forced
to take her experience of so quickly travelling to a distant star, Vega, on faith—an experience that, if
true, violated known laws of physics. Many participants noted that, throughout the film, Arroway
had been “hypocritically” accusing those who have religious faith as being credulous, only to
have realized the hubris of her accusations during the film finale. Participants elaborated upon this
issue of unevaluated belief in scientific knowledge much like Carl (communications and media):
Religion requires faith to believe in this fanciful story, but science also requires faith. It
requires scientists to believe in facts . . . But, how were these facts made? Who created them?
Facts are not objective . . . you basically can’t have anything in reality that’s not influenced
by the people who found them. So it all requires faith . . . [And] come 20, 30, 40 years from
now it will be completely debunked. Science changes, and it’s funny to me that no one ever
considers that to be a problem. How can we deny that science includes faith in its own claims
when we see it debunking itself time and time again.
There clearly is a significant conceptual jump in tying the “durable but tentative” nature of
scientific knowledge (AAAS, 1990) with the notion that claims to scientific knowledge are
partially or solely justified on faith. Yet, this was the case even for participants who noted that
scientific knowledge draws on significant empirical bases and much reasoning, in addition to other
less systematic factors. For instance, the emphasis on faith in scientific knowledge as cautionary
due to its tentative and theory-laden nature was echoed by many participants, including Patrick
(philosophy of science). Patrick clearly understood the inevitable tentative nature of scientific
claims because of the impossibility of attaining certain or absolute knowledge. Still, he found
himself having to conclude this exposition—based on Larry Laudan’s (1981) notion of pessimistic
meta-induction—during his interview noting, “We still rest a lot of our scientific beliefs and
claims on a bit of faith”:
Larry Laudan makes us look back at the history of science to see that we’ve always been
wrong. So why should we think that science today gives us anything resembling a true theory
of the world? We’ve always had to change theories radically. We’ve even had to change our
assumptions about the world . . . So, as long as science is practiced by humans, it’ll always
change. I don’t think it’s possible, at least in the realm of science, to ever absolutely know
something . . . And I guess that’s also why we can come back to faith. We still rest a lot of our
scientific beliefs and claims on a bit of faith.
“Theory” Choice in Science as Faith-Based. Nine participants noted how Contact shows that
choosing a “theory” in science can be faith-based. (Note: participants often used “theory”
interchangeably with hypothesis, explanation, and/or opinion). The idea was mainly motivated by
Contact’s synopsis of William Ockham’s razor, which was summarized by Ellie Arroway: “All
things being equal, the simplest explanation tends to be the right one.” Faye (English with an
emphasis in film) captured this theme regarding faith as the basis of scientists’ facility to choose
among competing or alternative explanations:
Faye: Faith ultimately supports the believability of science, providing the well-trodden road
that makes one option seem more simple than the other in Ockham’s razor, the philosophical
problem that Arroway explains to Joss [Matthew McConaughey] early in the film.
Interviewer: What do you mean by this, that faith ultimately supports the believability of
science?
Faye: Ockham’s razor says that the simplest explanation tends to be the right one. Since the
characters in the movie are driven to accept the simplest conclusion, there is this context of
faith. There is faith that the simplest explanation tends to be the right one. It’s encoded in
how decisions are made in science.
Diane (philosophy of education with an emphasis in dance education) noted that science’s
“chief code,” Ockham’s razor, worked against scientist Ellie Arroway at the finale of Contact. Yet,
Diane was puzzled about how Ockham’s razor was ever derived and incorporated into science:
What Ellie was doing was definitely not simple, so the principle, Ockham’s razor, didn’t
really work out for her in the end. And how many experiments were necessary for scientists
to come up with that principle? For that principle to hold any value, you’d have to be able to
say, okay, we’ve done this many experiments and our findings show that, when it comes
down to it, it’s the simplest explanation that tends to be true. Like we have proof. So it’s
that—the math or the probability that makes it better than faith. But again, I don’t know if
they did those experiments or if it’s even based on math, because when Arroway comes back
to Earth from Vega, it [Ockham’s Razor] works against her . . . And it was curious to me that
Carl Sagan [author of the novel, Contact, and film advisor] would bring that out as
something that both works for her and against her.
Diane was not alone. When asked about the justification underlying Ockham’s razor, even
Evelyn (epistemology) did not seem to understand how such a principle was derived:
People really do accept the principle. It’s really old, so that’s justification for some people
[Evelyn laughs]. Perhaps it’s been evident over time, especially in science . . . Otherwise I
have no idea . . . Scientists, philosophers, anybody—we often use principles like this and
have little idea about what justifies them. But we use them because we believe they work,
which leads to faith—a central theme of Contact. We have faith that these principles work
or, more generally, we just have faith that our beliefs are true. But justification, well good
justification, cannot come from faith.
To be sure, much philosophical literature has been dedicated to the very complex question of
theory-choice in science. Nonetheless, while philosophical discussions do invoke attributes, such
as the role of scientists’ “good sense” (Duhem, 1954) or value judgment (Kuhn, 1977) in theory-
choice, “faith” is very seldom, if ever, brought to bear on the question.
Also interesting was that, for most participants, Contact’s representation of Ockham’s razor
as an actual or prominent operating principle in science made it a “reality” or commonplace of
scientific practice. However, there is little evidence from history of science to suggest proper and/
or successful use of Ockham’s razor (Bauer, 1992; Bunge, 1963; Westrum, 1978). Indeed, the
debatably beneficial value of simplicity, as applied within whatever theory, “paradigm” (Kuhn,
1962, 1996), or “research programme” (Lakatos, 1978) in which scientists worked, often cast
more complex, supposedly dis-unifying explanations as unfavorable even when, as history later
learned, they were more valid than their intuitively “simpler” counter-explanations (Gernert,
2000). For example, despite at least three renowned chemists producing oxygen prior to its
“discovery” and acceptance, the existence of oxygen was erroneously rejected and misclassified
as an already well-known gas of the time (Gernert, 2009). Further, many scientists and
philosophers alike, even William Ockham’s contemporary and fellow in the Franciscan order,
Walter of Chatton, rejected support of too staunchly adhering to simplicity: “If three things are not
enough to verify an affirmative proposition about things, a fourth must be added, and so on” (p.
134).
The only evidence in favor of Ockham’s razor comes in the form of Bayes’ rule, which can
mathematically predict that the simpler of two competing “theories” (theory is used here in its lay
connotation) of equal empirical success tends to be the more successful. Due to Karl Menger’s
(1960) “law against miserliness,” however, which describes the problem of including too many
concepts into one variable, application of Bayes’ rule to validate Ockham’s razor breaks down
when applied to anything larger than the philosopher’s or theologian’s notion of a “theory,” which
undoubtedly includes scientific theories. Thus, Ockham’s razor, as defined by Ockham himself
(not to be confused with the subsequent concept of parsimony), effectively has not been applied,
and cannot easily apply, to scientific practice despite its apparent “scientific” portrayal in Contact
and popular conceptions of how science works.
Empirical Evidence (“Proof”) as a Component of Science
All eleven participants articulated thoughts about empirical evidence being a dominant
component of science that distinguishes it from other ways of “knowing,” like philosophy and
religion. For participants, Contact motivated this idea through the portrayal of Ellie Arroway’s
unwavering commitment to empirical evidence for most of the film’s duration—that is, until she
could not provide such evidence for her alleged interstellar trip. Unbeknownst to Arroway, there
existed an 18-hour recording of static that partially corroborated her purported voyage to Vega, but
the US government secretly withheld the recording from her, thus promoting the idea among
participants, as succinctly expressed by Pam (educational psychology), that “For Ellie, she does
not know that the 18-hour record exists, which would have provided her with scientific, empirical
evidence, so she has to take her experience on faith [Pam’s emphasis] that she went to Vega.”
According to participants, lack of evidence for a belief amounts to justification by faith. Yet,
had the 18-hour footage of static been revealed to Arroway, her belief would have been justified (at
least partially) by empirical evidence. Sean (science education) built on this idea:
Sean: The fact that the recording of Ellie’s alleged trip had 18 hours of static means it
qualifies as observable, empirical evidence. But Ellie is left with a different kind of belief—
intuition, faith—however you want to think about it, because she doesn’t have access to that
evidence. So, her whole adventure, to say that it was empirical just by her faith was not
enough.
Interviewer: What would make it “enough” then?
Sean: The 18 hours would be strong, but to an outside observer this could just be an anomaly
because, to them, the trip to Vega happened instantaneously . . . There needs to be an element
of reproducibility. Just observing data or word-of-mouth is not enough in this case . . . To
give this story credibility, there would need to be more reproducibility, which means
someone else would need to go [to Vega].
Other participants shared Sean’s idea of reproducibility as a component of empirical evidence

through social confirmation, that is, through the availability of evidence for public inspection and
acceptance. Many participants also equated ideas of “enough” evidence and social confirmation
with the idea of “proving” scientific claims. For instance, when asked about what she meant by
“proving” a claim, Tammy (teacher education) replied, “Arroway had a lot of faith in
extraterrestrials, but she had no proof. There was no documentation. There were not other people
who had seen what she saw. So I guess what I mean by prove is confirmation from others.” Tammy
later applied this idea of “proving” to Contact’s finale, as well as to other scientific claims, when
asked if Arroway’s alleged 18-hour adventure to Vega was “empirical”:
Tammy: The way I think about empirical evidence, she had no way to prove her experience.
She has nothing else other than her own feeling and her own memory that this occurred. And
in that way, no, she had no empirical evidence.
Interviewer: If Arroway was given the 18 hours of static shown only to viewers at the end of
the film, would that be considered as empirical evidence?
Tammy: Yes. That is empirical evidence, because it’s documentation that can be shared by
multiple people for confirmation.
Interviewer: And would these 18 hours of static be enough to prove her trip to Vega?
Tammy: I think that’s enough to support it [Tammy’s emphasis]. I think that’s certainly
enough to not label her as a crazy person.
Interviewer: Is there ever enough evidence to prove anything?
Tammy: If she had her own experience, plus the 18 hours of static, plus video, plus having
someone else in that machine to share her experience, I feel like that would have begun to
prove the thing.
Interviewer: Begun to prove?
Tammy: OK, we know that cigarettes cause lung cancer. But, I thought that I had read
somewhere that there isn’t anything that conclusively proves that cigarettes cause lung
cancer. But, there are so many correlative studies that link cigarettes and lung cancer that
you’d be silly to deny it. And that is in the domain of proving. I mean, any other option
begins to be sort of ridiculous . . . When you have all of this preponderance of evidence over
here that says yes, yes, yes, this happened to Ellie Arroway, of course there are still going to
be deniers, but I do feel like that’s in the domain of proving.
Interviewer: And can proven claims ever change?
Tammy: No. We’ve established so well that they’ve been proven with all of this evidence
that, again, we’d be silly to think otherwise.
Other studies have documented the multiple meanings that college students ascribe to the
terms “proof” and “proven,” which range from referring to evidence in support of a claim to
conferring a status of certainty or near certainty to scientific claims (e.g., Abd-El-Khalick, 2004).
Participants’ notion that proven scientific claims never change, of course, contradicted the idea
expressed by many of them that all scientific knowledge is open to change. Nevertheless, the idea
that empirical evidence requires recordable observation was ubiquitously shared by all participants,
and seven participants additionally shared the idea that social inspection and confirmation must
be an element of empirical evidence for it to be considered as a valid source of knowing.
Females in Science
All six female, yet no male, participants brought up that Contact portrayed women in science
(namely, Ellie Arroway) as “strange,” “antagonistic,” “emotional,” “marginalized,” and/or
“inferior to men.” We included this idea in the study not only because it is an idea about science, or
more specifically about unfortunate social-cultural issues that are deep-seated in the scientific
enterprise, but also because it exposes how participant background (gender in this case) can play a
role in how ideas are experienced from a film. As revealed later in the findings, female participants
sorely identified with Contact’s notion that women in science are treated unfairly. Tammy (teacher
education) summarized this idea of the negative portrayal of females in science as follows:
I think it’s really unfair that there’s this societal perception that men are rational; women are
irrational. It sort of leads to, the sciences are for men; the sciences are not for women . . . I
think that the idea that a girl can do science but look rational and look for evidence and not let
that sort of stereotypically emotional girly thing get in the way, I think that’s a real thing. But
when I was watching the movie, I saw Ellie Arroway being sort of pushed out of her world,
you know? It’s not because she was odd; it’s because people considered her an odd woman.
Other female participants, like Lara (language and literacy education), further elaborated
upon this idea of females in science as marginalized and patronized:
Ellie was being marginalized . . . she was being patronized by, like, everyone. I think there
were really patronizing gender structures . . . But I think the institution of science and
politics were pointedly patronizing toward marginalized voices.
Faye (English with emphasis in film), by far, held the gravest contempt for the way females
were portrayed in Contact:
While Contact clearly engages with the opposition of faith and reason, it does so by way of a
series of messages about traditional gender roles. Arroway, while a dedicated scientist, is
also a woman; as such, the film tells us, she is predisposed to emotional outbursts. For
instance, when seeking funding for her pet project, Arroway begins yelling to a panel of
suited, male observers about the importance of her project . . . [so] while the film’s main
message is that humankind is formed through a fragile union between reason and faith, its
other agenda is enforcing traditional gender roles through Arroway’s and Joss’s romance.
Indeed, much of Joss’s function in the film is to feminize and temper Arroway . . . Even in the
film’s final moments, when Arroway returns to work . . . her profession has been “feminized”
from hard science to teaching young children . . . Contact tells its viewers a familiar story
about gender: even reasonable women are plagued by pesky emotions, and the man is
ultimately right (and has something to teach his female counterpart about the world) (Film
review).
Faye’s and other female participants’ comments are well documented in sci-fi film literature
on the damaging portrayal of female scientists in film, most notably by Steinke (1999), who
highlighted “the pervasiveness of media depictions of women scientists that reinforces a
masculine image of science . . . gender discrimination that exists within the scientific community,
and the conflicts between women scientists’ professional and personal lives” (p. 113). Indeed,
these depictions can be particularly harmful to adolescent students, particularly females, who
often erroneously believe that they must fit in to “masculine” scientific settings, or be less “girly”
and more “scientific,” thus not fulfilling their own, unique female agencies in science (Carlone,
Johnson, & Scott, 2015).
Participant Ontic Stances While Viewing Contact

The following sections explicate how the shared themes articulated by participants interacted
with various ontic stances about film that characterize their approaches to viewing Contact. That
is, participants experienced these shared themes as unrealistic (“picture frame”), realistic
(“window”), and/or even phenomena with which to identify or empathize (“mirror”) (cf.,
Sobchack, 1992).
Scientific Assumptions as Faith-based

Four of the nine participants (i.e., science education, philosophy of science,
epistemology, and astronomy students), who articulated that Contact portrayed Ellie
Arroway making a “faith-based” scientific assumption about the existence of extraterres-
trial life, found Contact’s alleged portrayal of faith, in this regard, unrealistic. Instead, they
attributed her assumption to really being based on mathematics and probability (see the
Drake Equation in Drake, 2013). However, the remaining five participants (i.e., the
English, music, teacher education, philosophy of education, and language and literacy
education students) thought that this portrayal was realistic. They furthermore found the
idea of faith-based scientific assumptions in general to be realistic. Tammy (teacher
education) effectively summarized these participants’ views:
Tammy: For scientists to be able to make an assumption like, “The world is

understandable”—well, it isn’t understandable given our current knowledge. I suppose
there is a great amount of faith given to thinking that we’ll be able to understand the
world . . . But this is something science really relies on, I believe. And I mean this is
the same thing as Arroway thinking there’s life out there. She doesn’t know! But she
keeps saying there must be something out there.
Interviewer: So this was not an unrealistic portrayal to you in the film?
Tammy: Oh no. I would say it was realistic. Like I said, it’s in line with being able to make a
claim that the world is understandable.
The conceptual jump from relating the scientific, and quite inductive, assumption that
the world is understandable (AAAS, 1990) to some kind of a “faith-based scientific”
assumption is quite a leap. Nonetheless, it would seem that understanding NOS and the
nature of inductive reasoning does not disqualify one from believing that assumptions
made in science are, indeed, faith-based. For example, Patrick (philosophy of science),
despite thinking that Arroway’s assumption about the existence of alien life was
probability-based, still felt that, in general, the scientific assumption itself “seems like it is
faith-based. It certainly feels like there’s some kind of social tension created when you say
‘faith-based,’ but it seems like that tension should not be a reason why we should not
admit that these assumptions are actually faith-based.”
Trust in Scientific Knowledge and Authority as Faith-based

Eight participants took Contact’s purported portrayal of faith in scientific knowledge and
authority as partially, if not fully, realistic. We say partially because Aden (astronomy) believed
that not all knowledge used within scientific practice lies on such supposedly shaky foundations:
“It is given that science does not prove; it only disproves. But it does use math, which, like
Pythagorean theorem, you can prove. So you can at least trust that.”
In addition to believing Contact’s portrayal of scientific knowledge and authority to be
realistic, Carl (communications and media) was the only participant to identify with such
portrayal. He discussed how, especially in academia, researchers often uncritically base their
studies on prior literature that they assume to be “fact,” even when, in his view, we cannot really
know what is “fact”:
On the basis of what I’ve studied so far, it seems to me that it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to argue that any piece of knowledge that we have has not been distorted by
interpretations of the people who thought out that knowledge . . . It’s not like these things are
just fully formed; they are created through interpretation—created through the experiences
[Carl’s emphasis] of the people who find them. But, since we are currently in an academic
building where academe is the official language, then, of course, we’ll continue to . . . just
trust in past literature so we can move forward with our own. And, like us, that’s exactly what
Arroway does, too, until the end [of the film] at least.
Carl’s connection and identification with Arroway’s “scientific practices” connotes his
own reliance on academic knowledge and authority as supposedly “fact,” which might
have appeared differently to him had Carl received explicit framing of the tentative and
theory-laden NOS, as presented in many science education reform documents (e.g., AAAS,
1990; NRC, 1996). Indeed, using the NOS framework from the present study, Carl might
understand that, while scientific knowledge is never absolute or certain (as he would
agree), it is nevertheless reliable and durable. For example, Darwinian evolution by natural
selection may be reinterpreted time and time again by authority figures in the future of
biological science, say, in light of new evidence or theoretical background, but it is
nonetheless highly substantiated, explanatory and predictive of biological phenomena, and
thus exceedingly reliable and durable.
“Theory” Choice in Science as Faith-based
Five of nine participants found Contact’s depiction of faith-based “theory” choice in science
as realistic. Again, those participants, it should be noted, used theory, hypothesis, explanation,
and/or opinion interchangeably. For example, upon expounding, “There is faith that the simplest
explanation tends to be the right one. It is encoded in how decisions are made in science,” Faye
(English with emphasis in film) was asked if such a portrayal were realistic: “Yes, I could see it as
being realistic. It is this faith that supports the believability of claims made in science. I mean,
certain theories are more believable.”
The remaining four participants did not find the depiction completely unrealistic, but also not
fully realistic. Some, like Aden (astronomy), thought that very rarely, if ever, would two
competing theories require Ockham’s razor in science, which he said “differs from other modes of
inquiry [like philosophy] that might differently use the term theory.” Others, like Evelyn
(epistemology), did not even think that Ockham’s razor was used in philosophy:
People try to do this all the time in philosophy, [but] I generally think that it’s hardly ever the
case where you have two theories that equally well explain the data. Because that’s a
condition of Ockham’s razor . . . and then the simpler of the two is chosen. And I guess if you
could actually find two theories that actually explained all relevant data equally well, then
sure. Maybe use Ockham’s razor. But I just think this is so rare in philosophy, and especially
in science. So I think the way Contact depicted Ockham’s razor was realistic, but I don’t
think it’d be used the way they made it look, because it’s, well, never used.
Thus, these four participants thought that the depiction in Contact of Ockham’s razor in
principle was realistic, but the use of it by the scientists and National Security Council in the film
was not.
Empirical Evidence (“Proof”) as a Component of Science
All eleven participants determined Contact’s portrayal of empirical evidence as a chief
component of science to be realistic. For example, Pam (educational psychology) expanded
upon the apparent realism regarding social confirmation as a requirement for evidence to
be empirical:
Contact did a really good job portraying science’s reliance on empirical evidence. Like it
realistically showed not only how the world rotates when the scientists [in the U.S.] were
losing the signal from Vega, but also that other scientists around the world could and needed
to verify the same signal from Vega.
Aden (astronomy) seemed to identify with Ellie Arroway’s dependence on empirical

evidence as the most valuable form of justification for claims:
Handing off the data collection to another telescope as Vega set was a nice bit of realism . . .
It’s very important to do, obviously, and something we do in the field . . . I also liked
Contact’s portrayal of the use of primes [prime numbers] when receiving the signal from
Vega. I definitely felt their pain in decoding the signal.
However, Aden did not find the entirety of Contact’s portrayals of scientists fiddling with
evidence as realistic, despite finding the overarching portrayal of empirical evidence as a chief
component of science to be as such:
I would have expected the scientists to be doing more math [Aden laughs]. But I understand
that math is not all that awesome to watch on screen! . . . Furthermore, I don’t think the
astronomers needed to move every single dish at the VLA [Very Large Array] in one
direction. The mechanics were a bit off when collecting their data . . . And listening for
signals in real time looks cool, but Arroway should have just written a program that would
measure the data with greater sensitivity and allow her to search more efficiently.
Females in Science
All six female participants identified and empathized with lead character Ellie Arroway upon
viewing Contact. Indeed, when asked whether she identified with any character from Contact,
Lara (language and literacy education) aptly summarized female participants’ views:
I totally empathized with Ellie on multiple occasions. Men were in a privileged position.
That Drumlin guy [Tom Skerritt] was able to play the system using his power. Like he knew
what the majority wanted, and he gave that to them through his persona. Ellie just couldn’t
do that. On top of that she was in an uphill battle with the privileged males. And I feel that
everyday.
It is not that male participants found such a portrayal as unrealistic, but no male participants
even brought up the idea of gender in science, which, given the literature, is not surprising. Steinke
(2005) particularly highlighted how creators of popular films, like Contact, are exceptionally
savvy at playing upon tacit, intuitive cultural and social assumptions and stereotypes about, in this
case, the role of women in science, romance, and positions of power (and subordination). Such
stereotyping, especially those depicting a sort of patriarchal order of society, has propagated in
cinema since its inception (Mulvey, 1975), due mainly to male directors and screenwriters
(Kaplan, 2013). We, of course, are not accusing the present study’s male participants of engaging
in and perpetuating these stereotypes, but rather claiming that, as a male experiencing Mulvey’s
and Kaplan’s male-dominated, patriarchal society and filmic worlds, it is not only easy to exercise
bias concerning what is noticed on film (and what is not), but also expected by the creators of
popular films. We conjecture that, had the male participants been asked about Contact’s portrayal
of females in science, they might have then acknowledged and deemed its portrayal regrettably
realistic, at least given female participants “feeling” the realism of it.
Overall, though, and in answering how participant ideas interacted with ontic stances about
film, there were more participants in number, as demonstrated above, who experienced shared
themes found in Contact as realistic (“window”)—some of whom even identified with scenes
from the film (“mirror”)—than participants who found such portrayals unrealistic (“picture
frame”).
Discussion and Recommendations

Irrespective of their disciplinary expertise, almost all participants generated shared and
strikingly similar ideas about science and the nature of knowing. These ideas, furthermore, were
often imprecise, at best, and na€ıve, at worst. In essence, Contact strongly and realistically
suggested to the majority of these viewers that science was, essentially, not unlike religion in its
reliance on faith to justify its driving assumptions, ascribe status and authority to its claims, and
guide its practitioners’ choice between competing theories. Suggesting such parallelism is not
new, and no one less than Thomas Kuhn has been similarly accused of reducing science to no more
than theological doctrine (cf., Watkins, 1993/1970). Participants, and rightly so, noted that
Contact acknowledged a role for empirical evidence in science. Nonetheless, they were not able to
reconcile their seemingly fluid, even contradictory, statements about the ways in which such
“evidence” and “faith” interacted toward making claims to scientific knowledge, or discuss ways
in which Contact portrayed such an interaction. Unlike Kuhn, our participants did not make the
“empirical” as distinguishing a characteristic of science as Kuhn (1996/1962) had explicitly
acknowledged when he noted: “Observation and experience can and must drastically restrict the
range of admissible scientific belief, else there would be no science [our emphasis]” (p. 4). Kuhn,
it should be noted, did conclude his assertion by emphasizing that observation and experience
“cannot alone determine a particular body of such belief” (p. 4) to problematize the relationship
between empirical evidence and justified belief while maintaining a crucial role for the former in
science.
The significant point here, however, is not the critique that we or other researchers could
produce of the ideas about science and knowing that participants derived upon viewing Contact.
Our participants were quite thoughtful and reflective in their thinking about the film. Given the
diverse backgrounds and disciplinary expertise of our participants, and the mostly realistic ontic
stance from which they approached the content and messages that they derived from the film, we
endeavor to conjecture that a wide swath of the adult viewership of Contact would reproduce the
shared ideas that our participants generated, and that these ideas would, for them, represent real
scientific practice. The crucial point, then, is that sci-fi films likely will generate consistent images
about science and its “real” workings among students and the general public (see also Barnett
et al., 2006), and that these ideas could as well be rather na€ıve, thus, negatively impacting public
understanding of science as suggested by NSF (2000, 2002). This could be the case even among
viewers who are scientifically literate, as were many of our participants. Indeed, it would appear
that even if viewers of sci-fi film possess a relatively rare and sophisticated level of education
(much like the present study’s participants), and if they generate ideas upon viewing such film like
science being not unlike religion in its reliance on faith (which the present participants did), and if
they further cannot “shield” themselves from viewing such ideas as realistic (instead of what they
are: unrealistic), then it is not a stretch to surmise that the public at large also might not “shield”
themselves from seeing such ideas and viewing them as realistic, especially in light of prior
literature and empirical findings (e.g., Barnett et al., 2006; Butler et al., 2009; NSF, 2002).
These findings raise three questions with significant implications for science education: Why
would sci-fi films have such a lasting and overriding impact on viewers’ conceptions of science,
even among those who are deemed scientifically literate or sophisticated viewers? What
pedagogical implications would such an impact have for using, or dealing with the impacts of,
sci-fi film in science education? What are the curricular implications of such an impact?
Why the Lasting and Overriding Impact of Sci-Fi Film
To address this first question, we endeavor to initiate a process of theory-building from the
present study that might continue into future works. Specifically, we attempt to consolidate
various psychological theories used in prior literature and, from the present study, film theory to
eventually build a more robust theory about learning from film that could further illuminate future
findings in sci-fi film (and other screen media) studies related to science education.
Drawing from the literature, Butler et al. (2009) used retroactive interference (Rantzen &
Markham, 1992) and went beyond Mayer’s (2009) cognitive theory of multimedia, and Moreno
and Mayer’s (2007) cognitive affective theory of learning with media, to explain how multimodal
memories derived from film could dominate and interfere with memories derived from classroom
learning, which Moreno and Mayer’s theories fail to adequately address. Barnett et al. (2006) used
the “cold” Conceptual Change Model (Vosniadou, 1991) to explain how students adopted more
intuitive, easy-to-understand models of scientific content from sci-fi film as opposed to more
difficult-to-understand scientific models from classroom experiences. Barnett et al. additionally
credited sci-fi film as being more memorable and perhaps pleasurable than classroom instruction,
which very implicitly samples from “warmer,” perhaps “hot” conceptual change models (e.g.,
Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993). Additionally, Barnett et al.’s claim had
been moderately corroborated by film theorist Gunning’s (1989) cinema of attractions theory, in
which the film is a window that opens to a new reality—namely, a voyeuristic, pleasurable
experience. Such theory eventually led to Sobchack’s (1992) phenomenology of film experience,
which helped derive the ontic stances about film used in the present study. A consolidation of such
theories might take the form of the following thesis, which we advance here: An idea that is
experienced as realistic and/or empathetically felt is more efficiently recalled and integrated into a
worldview than an idea to which one has no ontic or empathetic attachment. Thus, an idea, whether
true or false, is more likely to be meaningful and recalled if derived from a subjectively realistic
and/or empathy-producing multimodal source, like motion picture.
Such a thesis and consolidation of theories, if valid, would do well to explain and predict,
principally, what types of memories are more likely to interfere and undermine others within a
worldview upon watching film—specifically, memories that are produced by and/or generate
ideas that are experienced as realistic or empathetically felt. This thesis, which might aptly be
called the ontic thesis of learning with motion picture, would indeed require indirect testing in
future studies via experimental conditions. Yet, if this thesis is eventually substantiated, it could
help science teachers determine how to probe students while discussing a sci-fi film, which leads
to the second question that arose in this discussion: What pedagogical implications are appropriate
for the use, and dealing with the impacts, of sci-fi film in science education?
Pedagogical Implications
In light of prior literature that recognized film as a more impactful influence than classroom
experiences on memory and sense-making and, indeed, a leading culprit in undermining hours of
science classroom instruction (Aikenhead, 1988; Barnett et al., 2006; Butler et al., 2009; NSF,
2000, 2002; Reis & Galvao, 2004), the present study’s findings might make it appear that any
attempt at pedagogical intervention would prove of little help. If doctoral students, let alone K-12
students, perceive a fantastical, fictional filmic reality as realistic and/or something with which to
identify, especially a reality that might instill na€ıve understandings of science, then the present
findings would pose a serious problem for promoting public understanding of science.
Prior researchers have indeed worked toward addressing this problem, particularly by
focusing on learning outcomes resulting from cinematic viewership (Barnett et al., 2006;
Butler et al., 2009) and explaining such outcomes using the aforementioned psychological
theories—that is, encoding variability, retroactive interference, and the Conceptual Change
Model (i.e., Bower, 1972; Rantzen & Markham, 1992; Vosniadou, 1991). The pedagogical
techniques and recommendations for teachers, however, which were derived from such
explanations, might not have been the most revealing or robust. For example, to curtail the
interference of a dominant memory derived from misinformation in film with a weaker memory
derived from classroom experience, Butler et al. recommended that teachers warn students of
these specific instances of misinformation in film that conflict with classroom content. Such a
technique, in theory, would derive a third, more dominant memory (namely, one that undermines
passively assimilated misinformation) so that it beneficially interferes with misinformation.
Barnett et al. similarly, recommended that science teachers encourage students to specifically
target and reflect on scientific accuracy and plausibility portrayed in sci-fi film—that is, if students
even know what to look for. These pedagogical interventions have some merit in the sense of
targeting specific ideas. However, they are rather limited because they fail to consider that—as
was the case in this study—students generate their own ideas, which might be irrelevant to a given
sci-fi film in a science teacher’s mind but actually relevant in students’ minds (e.g., unexpectedly
relating science with faith). In other words, Barnett’s et al. and Butler’s et al. recommendations
may help science teachers mitigate the negative influences of some misinformation portrayed in a
given film, but the teacher would have little or no idea what else students would see and learn in
such a plethora of moving pictures and sounds. In some significant sense, these recommendations
seem to factor out the most noteworthy factor underlying conceptual change theories, namely, that
learners’ prior ideas do interact with any planned instructional sequence and content in ways that
cannot be fully anticipated prior to engagement with learning.
For example, in the present study, six female yet no male participants thought that Contact
portrayed women in science as “strange,” “antagonistic,” “emotional,” “marginalized,” and
“inferior to men,” which is corroborated in literature by Steinke (1999). We especially chose this
example because a study by Koehler et al. (2013) specifically indicated that Contact portrayed
females in science in a more positive light than other sci-fi films. We do not claim that our six
female participants’ ideas generalize to what all other female students would see, but rather claim
that Koehler’s et al. recommendation of Contact as an educational film for science teachers to use
in classrooms to improve upon the image of females in science is a bit precarious—especially if
science teachers should think, based on Koehler et al.’s work, that they ought to explicitly tell their
students that Contact empowers young women to go into science. In light of the present findings,
and with corroboration by Steinke, this claim would be problematic. Yet, it is a claim that was
derived on the assumption that subjectively targeting ideas from Contact, despite what students
might independently think, serves adequately as a pedagogical approach to sci-fi film.
In addition, even though we reported on major ideas articulated by participants, the reader
may have noticed subtler ideas sprinkled within such articulations. For example, when
expounding upon empirical evidence being a chief component of science, Tammy (teacher
education) spoke about the ideas of proof, proving, and tentativeness in science—many of which
NOS researchers would deem na€ıve (e.g., Abd-El-Khalick, 2004). Nuance in student ideas is key,
and teachers would not be able to access and address such nuance, let alone na€ıve nuances, if they
solely use Barnett et al. (2006) and Butler’s et al. (2009) targeted pedagogical techniques.
Thus, we recommend what we call an open-ended, reflective approach to sci-fi film as a
pedagogical tool (similar to the present study’s film review and interview discussion). That is,
teachers might want, first, to allow students to openly write and talk about thoughts that were
generated upon watching a given film. We are in full agreement with Barnett et al. (2006), who
recommended that science teachers expose students to sci-fi film rather than shelter them from it.
Students, after all, are often exposed to these films regardless of classroom avoidance (Aikenhead,
1988; NSF, 2000, 2002; Reis & Galvao, 2004). And, upon purposefully exposing film to students,
an open-ended, reflective approach might make teachers more aware of various unanticipated
ideas that students might otherwise have tacitly generated while viewing. Next, teachers could
address such ideas during class time, instead of targeting pre-planned ideas on which students
presumably would have focused, which, in light of the unexpected findings of the present study,
would prove fairly ineffective.
For example, if a student explicates an idea that was generated upon viewing a sci-fi
film about trust in scientific knowledge and authority being faith-based, then the teacher
might want, especially in light of the ontic thesis of learning with motion picture, to ask
the student how (s)he experienced this idea—as if it were realistic, unrealistic, or perhaps
felt. Ideas that are experienced as realistic or empathetically felt might be red flagged and
discussed to a larger extent in class, as students might commit their beliefs to such “real”
and/or “felt” experiences. This teacher might then probe what the student meant by “trust”
and “faith.” The student might connote trust in line with, for example, Wilholt’s (2013)
epistemic trust, which entails a sort of reliance that all practicing scientists’ epistemic
endeavors are geared toward truth. Such a reliance, which cannot be based on any
knowledge or evidence of the true intentions of most scientists or actual integrity of their
findings, is required for the successful operation of the scientific enterprise. If knowledge
or evidence is not required for such a trust, it might be interpreted that this trust is based
on faith, or “belief without evidence,” as the present study’s participants defined it.
However, such a claim of faith-based “epistemic trust” derives from a misunderstanding of
induction and the social negotiation, scrutiny, and often independent corroboration of
scientific findings within the wider scientific community (see consilience in Wilson, 1999),
which can surely be taught by any science teacher knowledgeable about NOS.
A student might agree with the above reasoning but still assert that other ideas derived from
sci-fi film, like “theory” choice in science being based on faith, are realistic. After all, Duhem and
Quine’s underdetermination of theory by evidence (e.g., Klee, 1992), which entails that any
evidence available at a given time might be insufficient to determine what beliefs to hold toward
any theory, demonstrates, at least to some, that the act of choosing one theory among two
competing theories of equal empirical success seems quite akin to a faith-based decision. Even
Maxwell (1999, 2005, 2009), who has championed the idea for decades that choice between two
competing scientific theories of equal empirical success is achievable and not based on faith, has
not once had his principles of scientific theory-choice supported by the philosophy of science or
epistemology community (Miller, 2006). Maxwell confidently asserted that such a choice should
never be a problem if scientists would just adhere to Ockham’s razor, Bayes’ Rule, and the values
of simplicity and unity. These principles and values, however, are either unfounded due to
inconsistency in epistemological backing (Muller, 2008) or unpracticed due to the theory-laden
and -driven nature of scientific knowledge (Abd-El-Khalick, 2012, 2013). Quite possibly the best
way to address such a student’s idea, then, is for a science teacher to reflect upon, with students, the
apparent lack of evidence in history suggesting that any two competing theories in science were
ever actually of equal empirical success (Bauer, 1992; Bunge, 1963; Westrum, 1978), thus
negating the requirement altogether for an alleged “faith-based” value (simplicity) integral to
science.
Curricular Implications: Expanding the Current Consensus Model for NOS in K-12
The present findings have a significant curricular implication, which is related to the
seemingly lasting and overriding impact of sci-fi film on viewers’ conceptions of science. This
implication chiefly speaks to a critical need to expand the current, widely accepted NOS consensus
models and frameworks for K-12 science education (e.g., AAAS, 1990; Abd-El-Khalick &
Lederman, 2000; NRC, 1996; NGSS Lead States, 2013); namely, the need to attend to, and
explicate, the nature and role of assumptions in science. All shared ideas expressed by our
participants upon viewing Contact, except ideas related to scientific assumptions being faith-
based, are adequately addressed and, for those na€ıve or imprecise ideas, ameliorated by current
NOS models and frameworks.
To be sure, the centrality of assumptions to NOS frameworks has long been emphasized by
science education researchers (e.g., Billeh & Hasan, 1975; Welch, 1966). Lederman (1992)
defined NOS as “the values and assumptions inherent to the development of scientific knowledge”
(p. 331), albeit he did not articulate those assumptions. The AAAS (1990) framework for NOS
explicated a number of assumptions underlying the scientific worldview. These included that
science “presumes that the things and events in the universe occur in consistent patterns that are
comprehensible through careful, systematic study” and “assumes that the universe is, as its name
implies, a vast single system in which the basic rules are everywhere the same,” as well as that
“scientists assume that even if there is no way to secure complete and absolute truth, increasingly
accurate approximations can be made to account for the world and how it works” (AAAS, 1990, p.
2). More recently, Abd-El-Khalick (2012) mentioned—but like Lederman did not explicate—
other sorts of assumptions that underlie two crucial components of science, namely, observation
and theory. Abd-El-Khalick noted that “observations are almost always . . . mediated by the
assumptions underlying the functioning of ‘scientific’ instruments, and/or interpreted from within
elaborate theoretical frameworks” (p. 357), and that “theories often are based on assumptions or
axioms and posit the existence of non-observable entities” (p. 358). These examples are by no
means exhaustive. Other NOS researchers have highlighted one subset or another of the
assumptions that lie at the foundation of science and scientific inquiry (see Abd-El-Khalick,
2014). However, to the best of our knowledge, no past or current frameworks for NOS in science
education incorporate a systematic exposition, and surely no explication, of the nature and role of
these crucial assumptions. The present findings press the urgent need for expanding current
frameworks for NOS (especially the NGSS Lead States, 2013) to specifically include such a
treatment of assumptions and their role in science.
Attempts to expand current NOS frameworks to address “scientific assumptions” could
depart from Ennis’ (1982) definition, which we slightly modify to characterize an assumption as a
propositional and empirically based claim that, through induction, is tentatively taken for granted.
This definition, or some form of it, would ameliorate any intuition that a student might have about
an assumption being based on faith, or “belief without evidence.” After all, an empirically based
claim quite obviously does not satisfy the conditions of an unempirical mental state, like faith.
Furthermore, a scientific assumption can be directly or indirectly tested and, for all intents and
purposes, rejected because it is indeed empirically based (Delin, Chittleborough, & Delin, 1994;
Maxwell, 1999), unlike assumptions made in religion about, for example, the existence of a deity.
It might prove fruitful to provide examples of basic scientific assumptions in any NOS
framework to demonstrate the effectiveness of this modified Ennis (1982) definition. For example,
a basic scientific assumption like “the world is understandable” (AAAS, 1990), on which all of
science stands (Maxwell, 1999), can seemingly be entirely based on faith to students, like our
participant Tammy. Discussions between science teachers and students about such assumptions in
science, then, would do well to lead into the nature of inferences in science, particularly of
induction, for explanations as to how statements like “the world is understandable,” in actuality,
came to be. In this case, we know, empirically, that at least a portion of the world is understandable.
If a portion of the world is understandable, it follows that the world itself, through induction, is
likely understandable. Stemming from this inductive, inferential claim (that the world is likely
understandable), we can then construct the assumption that the world is, indeed, understandable,
not because we know it is but, again, because we assume it is; it is an empirically based claim that is
tentatively taken for granted until demonstrated otherwise—just like most claims to scientific
knowledge.
Regarding the role of assumptions in science, we argue that science requires assumptions to
be a coherent system of knowing (see also coherentism, which holds that the structure of a justified
belief system is an interlocking web of beliefs that all mutually support each other; cf., Joachim,
1906; Zagzebski, 2009). Consider again the assumption: The world is understandable. If the world
were not understandable (e.g., if it were some kind of whimsical world), then science would lose
its power to explain and predict natural processes. For example, suppose that we have a simple
pendulum (a spherical weight, or “bob,” that can freely swing on some kind of line attached to a
pivot). In an understandable world, a physicist can boldly, without moving, hold the bob to her
nose so that the line is taut, release the bob, and confidently watch it swing away and back toward
her nose without flinching. Indeed, she would genuinely be unsurprised when nature does not
permit the bob to strike her in the nose because she knows that the bob cannot gain kinetic energy
(via conservation of energy) on its return without an additional force acting upon it. In a whimsical
world, however, the bob held taut to this physicist’s nose might swing away and back, after being
released, with additional kinetic energy to hit her in the nose if, say, a rival physicist who did not
like this physicist prayed to such a whimsical world to violate what is characterized as the law of
conservation of energy. Luckily, there is no evidence, empirical or otherwise, to suggest that we
live in such a whimsical world. Thus, we can continue to hold the assumption in science that the
world is understandable, not whimsical, because it continues to maintain the integrity of a
coherent system of knowing. And we argue that other assumptions made in science fulfill the same
role—for example, the Universe consists of point-atoms that interact at a distance by means of
unyielding, spherically symmetrical forces, not cubically symmetrical forces, to be absurdly
simplistic; or the Universe consists of a unified quantum field; or, to enter a different paradigm in
science, the Universe consists of quantum strings (Maxwell, 1999). All of these scientific
assumptions are proposed to maintain the integrity of a coherent system of knowing within
whatever theory, “paradigm” (Kuhn, 1962, 1996), or “research programme” (Lakatos, 1978) in
which scientists operate, thus fulfilling their role.
Lastly, we must reiterate that students should learn from any NOS framework that all
assumptions made in science, even those crucial to the very existence of science, are tentative and
open to rejection, which could do well to connect with other related scientific assumptions and
NOS aspects, like the tentative and theory-laden NOS (Abd-El-Khalick, 2012). Students might
then learn how such assumptions lay the groundwork for scientific practices without making their
own, perhaps intuitive, unempirical assumptions regarding faith being a chief component of
science. It does not escape our attention that care must be taken to ensure that any treatment of
assumptions in an expanded NOS framework needs to be carefully transformed and tailored to be
accessible to K-12 students, and that such a treatment will likely feature some form of
progressively more elaborate ideas, which need to be matched with students’ developmental
levels and intertwined with equally accessible science content ideas, as well as scientific processes
and practices.
Conclusion
The realism of popular sci-fi film has evolved greatly since its inception in 1902 with
A Trip to the Moon. Silent films eventually gained synchronous sound; black-and-white
films eventually gained Technicolor; two-dimensional films eventually became three-
dimensional; and aspect ratios continually grow wider to reflect the range of human vision.
With this increase in sci-fi film realism, “willing suspension of disbelief” becomes riskier
in terms of its potential impact on public understanding of science. It is our hope that,
with more literature in the present study’s line of research, science teachers and students
alike will develop proper interventions to grow a deeper, more reflective awareness that
permits enjoyment of sci-fi film (and other screen media) for its entertainment value
without believing, often involuntarily, in its augmented scientific realities.
Note
1
Note that upon completion of data collection for the present study, one additional sci-fi film
was released that fulfilled our criteria: Interstellar.
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See

“A ton of faith in science!” nature and role of

Article in Journal of Research in Science Teaching · April 2016

John Y Myers Fouad Abd-El-Khalick

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Representations of Nature of Science in School Science Textbooks View project

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Department of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,

Received 6 October 2015; Accepted 14 March 2016

Correspondence to: J. Y. Myers; E-mail: jymyers2@illinois.edu

# 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Selection of the Sci-Fi Film

included base categories, specifically student backgrounds (philosophy of science, science

Faith as a Component of Science

Interviewer: How? How is it different?

Interviewer: What would make it “enough” then?

Other participants shared Sean’s idea of reproducibility as a component of empirical evidence

Interviewer: Is there ever enough evidence to prove anything?

Interviewer: Begun to prove?

Interviewer: And can proven claims ever change?

Participant Ontic Stances While Viewing Contact

Scientific Assumptions as Faith-based

Tammy: For scientists to be able to make an assumption like, “The world is

Interviewer: So this was not an unrealistic portrayal to you in the film?

Trust in Scientific Knowledge and Authority as Faith-based

Aden (astronomy) seemed to identify with Ellie Arroway’s dependence on empirical

Discussion and Recommendations

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Journal of Research in Science Teaching

Journal of Research in Science Teaching

Journal of Research in Science Teaching

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