Suzette Nicolas vs Alberto

Romulo
October 29, 2011

578 SCRA 438 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Ratification of a Treaty –

Validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement
**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria
Arroyo
On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against
Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer
imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal
laws and the crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the
VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody
over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC
assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by
the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its
provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out
obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of
fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying
with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose
and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act
within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that
the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the
Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done
through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of
its provisions.

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR

151434, 3 March 2004]
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name
to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA
04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course
or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2)
even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the
birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days
later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on
6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of
the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include
GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the
President of the Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to
include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ
appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born”
citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor
(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the
birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe
was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ,
and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74,
of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The
petitions were dismissed.

RENALD F. VILANDO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES,
RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her
opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against
Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines
because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her
Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father. During the pendency of
the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were cast.
Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing
declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC
declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however,
notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a
proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This
is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending
the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong
asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the
HRET which has the jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed
with Limkaichong.

Issues:

WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.

WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.

WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines

Held:

1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the
COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated
directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively
suspended the execution of the COMELEC’s Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the
Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of
Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

2. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has
invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a
proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide
a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election,
returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral
Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9,

1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET,
therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21,
1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition
and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent
Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father
acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission
through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with
the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished

voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad,
Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The
case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions
indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally
elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered
as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935
Constitution.

The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the March 24, 2010
Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House
of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

In Re: Vicente Ching

January 6, 2013

Legal Profession – Admission to the Bar – Citizenship Requirement

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He
eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino
citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen
but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963.
Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the
foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered
himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for
Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese
and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within
7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in
1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).

Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in
1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General
recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot
agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and it’s
way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is
originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further).
Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his
life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country.
The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he
belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought
he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of
the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Republic vs. Sagun Case Digest

Facts: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national,
and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and
did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of
33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized but was not recorded and
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the
citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her
election of Philippine citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a
registered voter in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in
the Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively
elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so
as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and declaring Sagun a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition for review on certiorari, pointing out
that while Sagun executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no
affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which
was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already
33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority.

Issues:
1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship procedurally
and jurisdictionally permissible?

2. Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine
citizenship?

Held:
1. No. There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration
of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution
of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was
erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.

2. When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Being a
legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless
upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. For respondent to be
considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4),
[S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed
and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the
oath with the nearest civil registry.

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under

C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the
requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be
required to register as an alien. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is
required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau
of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his
aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the
evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is
elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes
the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the
courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested
party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election,
loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts
conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the
records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for
a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her
election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent
in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years
after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its
execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority
and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No.
625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there
was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to
register with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere
exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar
acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of
Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention
of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied. (Republic vs.
Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012)