Oposa vs Factoran
The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio
Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations
yet unborn, and represented by their parents against
Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements
(TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens
patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant
in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of
the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2.
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class
suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme
Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come
MMDA vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB)
filed an action for mandamus to compel the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and other government
agencies to clean up the Manila Bay. CROMB argued that the
environmental state of the Manila Bay is already dangerous to
their health and the inaction of MMDA and the other
concerned government agencies violates their rights to life,
health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by the
Constitution. CROMB also averred under the Environmental
Code, it is MMDA’s duty to clean up the Manila Bay.
The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al
to clean up the Manila Bay. MMDA assailed the decision on
the ground that MMDA’s duty under the Environmental Code is
merely a discretionary duty hence it cannot be compelled by
mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the RTC’s order was
for a general clean up of the Manila Bay yet under the
Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to attend to
specific incidents of pollution and not to undertake a massive
clean up such as that ordered by the court.
under the law is already discretionary. Looking closer,
MMDA’s function to alleviate the problem on solid and liquid
waste disposal problems is a ministerial function. In short,
MMDA does not have the discretion to whether or not alleviate
the garbage disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in
the Manila Bay area. While the implementation of the MMDA’s
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus.
Anent the issue on whether or not MMDA’s task under the
Environmental Code involves a general clean up, the Supreme
Court ruled that MMDA’s mandate under the Environmental
Code is to perform cleaning in general and not just to attend to
specific incidents of pollution. Hence, MMDA, together with the
other government agencies, must act to clean up the Manila
Bay as ordered by the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by

mandamus to clean up Manila Bay.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement laws

like the Environmental Code, the process of implementing
usually involves the exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up
landfills. But this does not mean that their function or mandate
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape
Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, G.R. No. 180771
(April 21, 2015)
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the
legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract
allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait
during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one
exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of
resident marine mammals in the Tañon Strait by two
individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the
marine mammals. The second petition was filed by a non-
governmental organization representing the interests of
fisherfolk, along with individual representatives from fishing
communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. The
petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began
drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of
the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil
exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court
consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.
In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the
important procedural point of whether the case was moot
because the service contract had been terminated. The Court
declared that mootness is “not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.” Id., p.
12. Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and
paramount public interest in the case, not to mention the fact
that the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court
found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though
the particular service contract had been terminated. Id.
Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the
Supreme Court narrowed them down to two: 1) whether
marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing
to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract
violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws. Id.,
p. 11.
As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of
standing beyond natural and juridical persons, even though it
recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence
“moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating
court access in environmental cases.” Id., p. 15. Instead, the
Court explained, “the need to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to
bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.” Id., p. 16-17.
The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized
Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did
not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract
for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president
and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was
executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to
the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.
In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
(NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural
resources in protected areas. In order to explore for resources
in a protected area, the exploration must be performed in
accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA).
The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys
before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was
unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a
NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy
resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the
Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not specifically
authorized the activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that
no energy exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p.
34.
Resident Marine Mammals vs Reyes
A novel case was recently decided by the Supreme Court
where a suit was filed by resident marine mammals, like
whales, dolphins, etc. in order to prevent the exploration,
development and exploitation of petroleum resources within
Tanon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the
islands of Negros and Cebu. One of the basic questions is
whether they have the capacity to sue or otherwise known in
constitutional law as locus standi.
This case arose when DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration
Co. Ltd. (JAPEX) entered into an agreement for the
exploration, development and production of petroleum
resources at the offshore of Tanon Strait.
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards,
“claimed” that they have the legal standing to file this action
since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
this suit. Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also asserted their
right to sue for the faithful performance of international and
municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for
their benefit. In this regard, they propounded that they have
the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted
to them in multilateral international instruments that the
Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of
stipulation pour autrui.
The Stewards contended that there should be no question of
their right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they
have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build
awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and
as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the
Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment
pursuant to the public trust doctrine. (See: Oposa case).
They also contended that the Court may lower the benchmark
in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. (See:
Oposa case).
Public respondents argued that the Resident Marine Mammals
have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or
juridical persons.
They also contested the applicability of Oposa, pointing out
that the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit
some of them were still unborn.
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise
challenged their claim of legal standing on the ground that they
are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action.
Moreover, the public respondents argued that the Stewards
are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how
they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this
case.
Since the petition was not brought in the name of a real party-
in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action.
Ruling in favor of the petitioners, the Supreme Court
Held: Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A
ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime
purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical
law - is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its
cases. The ordinary corporation is a “person” for purposes of
the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary,
spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers,
lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland,
or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern
technology and modem life. The river, for example, is the living
symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic
insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all
other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who
enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff
speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those
people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water—
whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a
logger—must be able to speak for the values which the river
represents and which are threatened with destruction.
The primary reason animal rights advocates and
environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects
standing is due to the need to comply with the strict
requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of
Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates
the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-
interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the
effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
it has been consistently held that rules of procedure “may be
retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch
as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.”
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (399 Phil.
721 (2000) held that:
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent, x x x.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases became effective, the Court had already
taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the Court allowed the suit to
be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”
Furthermore, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a
right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution
as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine

Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to
bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth
noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean
species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having
shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of
laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals,
are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this
petition. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tanon Strait, E.G. Toothed Whales, Dolphins,
Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, Joined in and
Represented by Human Beings Gloria Ramos & Rose Liza
Eismia-Osorio, etc. v. Sec. Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No.
180771, April 21, 2015 & companion cases, Leonardo-De
Castro, J).