Union of Concerned Scientists and Elizabeth Anne Sheppard V Scott Pruitt, 18-10129

Case 1:18-cv-10129 Document 1 Filed 01/23/18 Page 1 of 33
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS;

and ELIZABETH ANNE SHEPPARD,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 18-10129___________
v.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
E. SCOTT PRUITT, in his official capacity as AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency; and UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY,
Defendants.
1. Science conducted by independent, unbiased scientists plays a critical role in a
functioning democracy. It helps lawmakers identify policy priorities. It informs government
agencies’ actual adoption and implementation of policy. Perhaps most importantly, it provides
evidence against which government action can be measured, and that the public can use to assess
whether our leaders are doing their jobs. Anti-democratic governments, which thrive on
obfuscating truth, seek to delegitimize and suppress scientists and other authoritative voices that
offer accurate information that can be used to hold the government to account.
2. For decades, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has relied on
balanced, independent advice from eminent scientists and experts. These individuals are leaders
in their fields and are frequently affiliated with preeminent universities and not-for-profit research
institutions. They have counseled the EPA on scientific and policy matters through their service
on a variety of EPA federal advisory committees (“FACs” or “advisory committees”), including
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the Science Advisory Board, the Board of Scientific Counsellors, and the Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee, among others. Because the FACs help shape EPA policy, the EPA has
historically worked scrupulously to ensure that they are fairly balanced, impervious to
inappropriate influences, and focused on evaluating and presenting the best-available science so
that the agency can make informed decisions about science policy.
3. This Complaint arises from a recent purge of eminent scientists from the EPA’s
advisory committees resulting from a Directive issued by Administrator E. Scott Pruitt. The
Directive, which is further explained in an EPA Memorandum, prohibits scientists and experts
who are recipients of EPA grants from serving on FACs, exempting employees of state, local, and
tribal governments. See E. Scott Pruitt, Strengthening and Improving Membership on EPA
Federal Advisory Committees (Oct. 31, 2017), attached hereto as Exhibit A.1 The effect of the
ban, which has no precedent and no counterpart at any other federal agency or department, is to
single out academic scientists and experts by excluding them from serving EPA in the public
interest.
4. Although the Administrator’s stated goal was to strengthen the “independence” of
FAC members, the Directive does no such thing. The Memorandum explaining the Directive cites
no evidence that the receipt of EPA grants causes any actual or potential conflict of interest.
Indeed, no such evidence exists. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has concluded,
“Working for or receiving a grant from [an agency], or co-authoring a paper with a person
affiliated with the department, does not impair a scientist’s ability to provide technical, scientific
peer review of a study sponsored by . . . one of its agencies.” Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173
F.3d 323, 339 (5th Cir. 1999). To the contrary, if an agency “were required to exclude from peer
1
The EPA has issued two documents pertaining to the Directive: the Directive itself and a Memorandum setting forth
the purported rationale for the Directive. Both are included in Exhibit A.
2
review committees all scientists who somehow had been affiliated with the department, it would
have to eliminate many of those most qualified to give advice.” Id. The U.S. Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) has reached—and advocated for—the same conclusion. For example, DOJ
recently argued that the fact that EPA has awarded grants to FAC members “does not establish
that those members lack independence.” Department of Justice, Memorandum of Points and
Authorities In Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 34, Energy & Envt’l Legal Inst. v.
U.S. EPA, Civ. Ac. No. 16-0915 (TSC) (D.D.C. July 15, 2016), ECF No. 11-1.
5. The Administrator’s Memorandum, moreover, wholly fails to explain why
scientists and experts who receive similar grant funding from other sources—for example,
scientists affiliated with private industry and local government—fall outside the Directive’s scope.
Indeed, by effectively singling out academic members of the scientific community who are
receiving EPA grants, and by making no effort to exclude others who stand to benefit far more
significantly from agency action (or inaction), the Directive lays bare its real function: to stack the
deck against scientific integrity.
6. The EPA has already used the Directive to begin reshaping the EPA’s advisory
committees in a meaningful way by replacing impartial, well-qualified scientists affiliated with
academic and not-for-profit institutions. The effect is that private industry views will be over-
weighted and the affected FACs will no longer be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
represented.
7. The Directive is impeding the EPA’s FACs from providing the valuable scientific
and policy advice to the federal government for which they were created, all in contravention of
EPA’s ostensible purpose to constitute these committees with “qualified and knowledgeable
candidates.” Exhibit A at 3. It has harmed, and will continue to harm, the careers of countless
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not-for-profit and university-affiliated scientists and experts who wish to lend their expertise to
impact science policy at a national level and serve their country on advisory boards, but are now
barred from doing so.
8. Finally, the Directive is an attack on science itself, as it portrays legitimate,
independent scientists—who provide accurate, evidence-based information backed by verifiable,
peer-reviewed research in order to inform environmental policy—as just another interest group
seeking to advance an agenda. The open exchange of accurate information is a touchstone of a
functioning democracy, and required for ordinary citizens to participate in robust public discourse
and hold government leaders accountable. This unprecedented Directive is an attempt to
delegitimize and suppress the role of academic scientists advising the agency and, by extension,
the results of their research.
9. The intent and effect of the ban is to disproportionately discount the viewpoints of
academic scientists to the detriment of neutral, evidence-based science. Accordingly, the Directive
is unlawful.
THE PARTIES
I. The Plaintiffs
A. Union Of Concerned Scientists
10. The Union of Concerned Scientists (“UCS”) is a not-for-profit organization with
the mission of conducting scientific analysis and research in the public interest, and representing
the interests of the scientific community before all levels of the U.S. government. UCS seeks to
ensure that the views of its 540,000 supporters and the broader scientific community, including
those of the academic and not-for-profit scientific community, are fairly represented in government
and on FACs. Through the UCS Center for Science and Democracy, UCS works to highlight the
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role of impartial, consensus-driven science in solving the nation’s most critical problems, and to
strengthen the overall partnership between science and democracy. One of UCS’s programs is the
UCS Science Network, a membership organization for scientists with or working toward advanced
degrees in life, physical, mathematical, or social sciences; professionals with or working towards
advanced degrees in medicine or public health; engineers; and people with expertise in science
history or science policy.
11. As an organization that seeks to ensure that the views of the scientific community
are represented in government, UCS has a direct interest in ensuring that the advice given to the
EPA and the Administrator by FACs fairly reflects the experience and expertise of UCS members
and the scientific community as a whole, including the views of academic and not-for-profit
scientists. Since the Directive precipitates the formation of FACs that do not fairly represent
academic and not-for-profit scientists, the Directive has inhibited UCS from accomplishing its core
mission of advancing and supporting the scientific community’s interests in government. The
Directive likewise has ensured that UCS’s own views on and analysis of pressing issues—which
are informed by the work of academic and not-for-profit scientists—will not be fairly represented
on the EPA’s FACs. The Directive thereby has caused injury to UCS.
12. UCS also seeks to advance the interests of its individual members and the members
of the UCS Science Network, many of whom have been injured by the Directive and would benefit
from the removal of the Directive. Numerous UCS members or members of the UCS Science
Network are academic scientists who currently hold EPA grants and desire to serve on EPA FACs
in the future, but are barred from doing so by the Directive. Other UCS members or members of
the UCS Science Network currently serve on EPA advisory committees and would otherwise apply
for or hold EPA grants, but are barred from doing so by the Directive. All told, approximately
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fifteen members of the UCS Science Network were among the latest pool of 132 nominees to the
Science Advisory Board (“SAB”); approximately 90 UCS Science Network members are current
EPA grant recipients; and approximately 80 UCS Science Network members are currently on EPA
advisory committees. In other words, UCS members and members of the UCS Science Network
are directly affected by the Directive.
13. Staffing EPA’s FACs in accordance with law is germane to the purpose of UCS.
UCS advocates for evidence-based scientific research to inform government decisions, and that
mission is advanced by fairly balanced and qualified EPA FACs. Fairly balanced FACs that
include leading voices from all areas of the scientific community strengthen the relationship
between science and the federal government that UCS seeks to build.
14. Neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested in this Action requires that
UCS’s individual members or members of the UCS Science Network participate directly. This
Action concerns the validity of an agency-wide Directive affecting numerous UCS members, each
in substantially the same way, and seeks relief that will remediate their injuries on a collective
basis.
B. Dr. Sheppard
15. Dr. Elizabeth Anne (“Lianne”) Sheppard is Professor and Assistant Chair of
Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences and Professor of Biostatistics at the University
of Washington. Her expertise includes observational study methods, the health effects of air
pollution, exposure modeling, and measurement error in health effects studies. She currently
serves as one of the seven members of the EPA Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
(“CASAC”) as a special government employee. She is eligible to be reappointed to an additional
three-year term on the CASAC when her current term concludes.
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16. Before the Directive was issued, Dr. Sheppard served on the CASAC and
simultaneously held an EPA grant. As a result of the Directive, she was forced to give up her role
as Co-Investigator on an EPA grant awarding approximately $3 million for research on health
effects of air pollution. Dr. Sheppard has not sought EPA grant funding for any future research.
17. If the Directive were rescinded, it is likely that Dr. Sheppard could reassume her
role as Co-Investigator on the EPA grant that she gave up.
18. Dr. Sheppard would like to be considered for EPA research grant funding in the
future and to continue serving on the CASAC. She views her participation on an EPA FAC as an
important form of public service.
II. The Defendants
19. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) is the agency of the federal
government of the United States tasked with protecting human health and the environment. The
EPA oversees and, through its Administrator, appoints and removes members of FACs on which
UCS members have served and wish to serve.
20. Defendant E. Scott Pruitt is the Administrator of the EPA. He is sued in his official
capacity.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
21. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has remedial
authority pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
22. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C) because UCS resides in this
District. Specifically, UCS is headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
I. The EPA And Federal Advisory Committees
23. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 1 et seq.,
governs the establishment and operation of FACs across the federal government.
24. The EPA utilizes almost two dozen FACs consisting of eminent scientists and
experts on topics relevant to the EPA’s mission.
25. FACs provide crucial high-level scientific and policy advice that helps guide the
EPA’s decision-making on a wide range of topics. For instance, the CASAC, as its charter
explains, advises on the Clean Air Act and ambient air quality standards and criteria. See CASAC
U.S. EPA Charter (2017), attached hereto as Exhibit B. The SAB, per its charter, provides advice
and recommendations on “[t]he adequacy and scientific basis of any proposed criteria document,
standard, limitation, or regulation under the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, or any other authority of the Administrator.” See SAB U.S. EPA
Charter at 1-2 (2017), attached hereto as Exhibit C. And the Board of Scientific Counsellors
(“BOSC”), according to its charter, provides advice and recommendations on, inter alia, the EPA
Office of Research and Development’s “research programs,” “research management practices,”
“program development, progress, and research program balance.” See BOSC U.S. EPA Charter
at 1 (2016), attached hereto as Exhibit D.
26. The EPA’s FACs have helped guide the EPA’s response to some of today’s most
pressing problems. In 2013, for example, the SAB advised the EPA on the preferred model for
evaluating the health effects of perchlorate, a chemical that can cause cancer and reproductive
8
health and hormonal problems. That advice was used by the agency to help create a new standard
for perchlorate in water, which is pending.2 FACs also serve as a valuable check on the EPA’s
actions. For example, in 2016, the SAB concluded that the EPA did not use the required “best
available science” standard when assessing whether natural gas exploration impacted drinking
water supplies.3
27. The EPA’s FACs do not award grants to scientists. On information and belief, the
EPA’s FACs have not historically made recommendations to EPA about who should receive
grants.
28. Members of the EPA’s FACs are appointed by the Administrator and typically
serve terms of a defined length, usually either two or three years. Members normally are
reappointed for a second term on their committee as a matter of course. The membership of EPA
FACs includes subject-matter experts from varied backgrounds, including from the business and
government sectors. Prior to the Directive, EPA FACs were well-balanced, representing the
interests of a variety of viewpoints.
29. Traditionally, the FACs’ membership comprises individuals with scientific training
and has included numerous scientists affiliated with academic and not-for-profit institutions.
Indeed, many FACs supervised by the EPA explicitly call for such representation. For example,
the CASAC’s charter requires that members “be persons who have demonstrated high levels of
competence, knowledge, and expertise in scientific/technical fields relevant to air pollution and air
quality issues.” Exhibit B at 3. Similarly, the SAB’s charter stipulates that members be
2
U.S. EPA, Perchlorate in Drinking Water, https://www.epa.gov/dwstandardsregulations/perchlorate-drinking-water
(last visited Jan. 22, 2018).
3
Brady Dennis, EPA’s Science Advisers Challenge Agency Report On the Safety of Fracking, Wash. Post (Aug. 12,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/08/11/epas-science-advisers-challenge-
agency-report-on-the-safety-of-fracking/?utm_term=.3f1954a5d93c.
9
“independent experts in the fields of science, engineering, and economics and other social sciences
to provide a range of expertise required to assess the scientific and technical aspects of
environmental issues.” Exhibit C at 3.
30. The views of leading independent scientists and experts are necessary and crucial
to operation of the EPA’s FACs. FACs cannot provide expert, fairly balanced guidance on, for
instance, the proper standards or limits under the Clean Air Act without the input of scientists who
have devoted their lives to researching and understanding the effects of particulate matter in the
air on human health. Likewise, FACs cannot provide expert, fairly balanced guidance on scientific
criteria and standards under the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, and many more important subjects without scientists who have meaningful scientific
experience in fields such as biology, medicine, and toxicology. While the FACs provide high-
level advice to policymakers, their advice is informed by and predicated on scientific expertise
that only trained, independent scientists can adequately provide.
31. Leading scientists aspire to, and do, serve on the EPA’s FACs. Prior to the
Directive, members included faculty from Harvard University, Stanford University, the Keck
School of Medicine at the University of Southern California, and the University of Washington.4
They included a member of the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine, a Fulbright
Scholar, and winners of the Francis Foundation Parker B. Francis Award, the Loveless Foundation
Mary Hewitt Loveless Award, the 2017 Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and
Engineers, the CHRP Pediatric Research Award, and the University of Michigan School of Public
4
See Sharon B. Jacobs, Advising the EPA: The Insidious Undoing of Expert Government, Harv. L. Rev. BLOG (Dec.
6, 2017), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/advising-the-epa-the-insidious-undoing-of-expert-government/.
10
Health Excellence in Research Award.5 These are all highly-qualified scientists committed to
serving the public interest.
32. In addition to monetary compensation, which the EPA offers to members of some
committees (including Dr. Sheppard for her work on the CASAC), service on an EPA advisory
committee offers a unique opportunity for scientists to help shape public policy and contribute to
the public good.
II. The Directive
33. On October 31, 2017, Administrator Pruitt promulgated a Directive and
accompanying Memorandum titled “Strengthening and Improving Membership on EPA Federal
Advisory Committees.” Exhibit A at 2-6. The Directive and Memorandum contain a set of
principles and instruction governing the composition of the FACs. One of those instructions
provides as follows: “[I]t shall be the policy of the Agency that no member of an EPA federal
advisory committee currently receive EPA grants, either as principal investigator or co-
investigator, or in a position that otherwise would reap substantial direct benefit from an EPA
grant.” Exhibit A at 4.
34. At a minimum, thousands of scientists affiliated with academic and not-for-profit
institutions, who currently are in receipt of EPA grants, are no longer eligible to serve on FACs
pursuant to the Directive. The EPA is administering 8,048 grants to individuals or groups affiliated
5
Robert J. Johnson curriculum vitae, http://www2.clarku.edu/departments/economics/facultyvita/Johnston.pdf;
Catherine Karr curriculum vitae,
https://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/supported/translational/peph/currentissue/lists/2_17/catharine_karr_m.d._ph.d._r
eceives_presidential_early_career_award_for_scientists; Kari Nadeau curriculum vitae,
https://med.stanford.edu/profiles/kari-nadeau?tab=bio; Ana V. Diez Roux curriculum vitae ,
http://drexel.edu/dornsife/academics/faculty/Ana%20Diez%20Roux/; Kiros T. Berhane curriculum vitae,
https://keck.usc.edu/faculty/kiros-t-berhane/.
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with public institutions of higher learning, private universities, and not-for-profit organizations.6
Substantially all individuals serving as a principal investigator or co-investigator on these grants
are ineligible to serve on EPA FACs—an outcome that is not at all necessary from the
circumstances and one for which the pre-Directive conflict of interest scheme properly accounts.7
A. The Directive Is An Unexplained Departure From Long-Standing EPA Policy and

Practice.
35. The Directive breaks with longstanding EPA policy and practice. For decades,
scientists in receipt of EPA grants have served without incident on EPA committees. Indeed,
guidance from EPA grant recipients has proven highly valuable to the EPA precisely because EPA
grant recipients, collectively, are some of the brightest minds and most uniquely qualified scientists
in the United States.
36. The EPA’s Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) has laid out the EPA’s policy
of allowing grant-holders to serve on EPA FACs. In a 2013 report, the OIG stated: “The EPA
does not consider a prospective or current member’s receipt of an agency or other federal research
grant to create the basis for a financial conflict of interest.” 8 The OIG further explained that “[t]his
[policy] is consistent with other federal guidance in this area. For example, OMB’s Final Bulletin
on Peer Review states that . . . ‘When an agency awards grants through a competitive process that
includes peer review, the agency’s potential to influence the scientist’s research is limited. As
6
U.S. EPA, Grant Awards Database, https://www.epa.gov/dwstandardsregulations/perchlorate-drinking-water
https://yosemite.epa.gov/oarm/igms_egf.nsf/recipient2?OpenView (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).
7
Neither the Directive itself nor the accompanying Memorandum specify how it will be determined whether a FAC
member is subject to the Directive and who will make that determination. Likewise, neither document says anything
about what actually constitutes a “substantial benefit” that would render an individual unable to serve on a FAC under
the Directive. The documents do not offer any reasoned explanation for this lack of clarity, or offer any guidance on
how it will be resolved. The ambiguity contrasts with the EPA’s longstanding policy on scientific integrity, which
commits the EPA to “transparency in its interactions with all members of the public.” U.S. EPA, Scientific Integrity
Policy, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-02/documents/scientific_integrity_policy_2012.pdf.
8
Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Report No. 13-P-0387 at 9 (Sept. 11, 2013)
(“OIG Report”), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/20130911-13-p-0387.pdf.
12
such, when a scientist is awarded a government research grant through an investigator-initiated,
peer-reviewed competition, there generally should be no question as to that scientist’s ability to
offer independent scientific advice to the agency on other projects.’”9 The EPA’s Peer Review
Handbook articulates the same view as the OMB Final Bulletin on Peer Review.10
37. Additionally, prior to the Directive, the EPA already had detailed practices for
identifying and addressing conflicts of interest. For example, whenever an individual is appointed
to a FAC as a special government employee (how outside scientists typically are appointed)11, he
or she must fill out the Confidential Financial Disclosure Form for Environmental Protection
Agency Special Government Employees, EPA Form 3110-48, attached hereto as Exhibit E. That
disclosure form calls for detailed information regarding a candidate’s assets, employment,
consulting work, paid expert testimony, and research or project funding. Exhibit E at 4-9. With
respect to project funding, all prospective and active FAC members serving as special government
employees (“SGEs”) must report any research grants awarded during the past two years, identify
whether the grant was awarded competitively or not, and provide the start and completion dates of
the project. Those grants are reviewed as part of the process for identifying possible ethical
conflicts. Exhibit E at 7. Additionally, an entire section of the Form 3110-48 addresses FAC
candidates’ impartiality. Exhibit E at 10 (asking, for example, “Do you know of any reason that
you might be unable to provide impartial advice on the matter to come before the
panel/committee/subcommittee or any reason that your impartiality in the matter might be
9
Id. at 9-10.
10
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology Policy Council Peer Review Handbook at 77 (4th
ed. 2015).
11
See CASAC Charter, Exhibit B at 3 (“Members will generally serve as Special Government Employees”); SAB
Charter, Exhibit C at 3; BOSC Charter, Exhibit D at 3 (“Most SAB members will serve as Special Government
Employees”); BOSC Charter, Exhibit D at 3 (members “will serve as Special Government Employees”).
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questioned?”). Active FAC members “must also update their forms annually as well as before any
particular matter is considered by a given member.”12 In its 2013 report, the OIG reviewed this
protocol and determined that “The EPA has adequate procedures for identifying financial conflicts
of interest.”13
38. Neither the Directive nor the accompanying Memorandum provide a reasoned
explanation for the EPA’s change in policy, nor for why the OIG’s 2013 conclusions no longer are
valid.
39. The Memorandum’s discussion of the shift in policy consists of three sentences:
“Non-governmental and non-tribal members in direct receipt of EPA grants while serving on an
EPA FAC can create the appearance or reality of potential interference with their ability to
independently and objectively serve as a FAC member. FAC members should be motivated by
service and committed to providing informed and independent expertise and judgment. Ensuring
FAC member independence strengthens the integrity, objectivity and reliability of EPA FACs.”
Exhibit A at 4.
40. For his part, Administrator Pruitt has relied on the Bible to justify the Directive.
He has stated: “Joshua says to the people of Israel: choose this day whom you are going to serve.”
“This is sort of like the Joshua principle—that as it relates to grants from this agency, you are
going to have to choose either service on the committee to provide counsel to us in an independent
fashion or chose [sic] the grant.”14
12
OIG Report at 9; see also Exhibit E at 1.
13
OIG Report at 10.
14
Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: Pruitt Cites Bible In Ending Way EPA Committees Staffed, Wash. Post (Nov. 1,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2017/11/01/the-energy-202-pruitt-
cites-bible-in-ending-way-epa-committees-staffed/59f8f39c30fb0468e7653f76/.
14
41. On information and belief, no other agency or department that uses FACs has
adopted a policy analogous to the Directive.
B. The Directive Singles Out And Targets Academic Scientists.
42. For reasons that are not clearly articulated, the Directive excludes “state, tribal or
local government agency recipients of EPA grants” from its prohibition on FAC membership.
Exhibit A at 4. In other words, scientists who are affiliated with state, tribal, or local governments
and receive EPA grants may continue to serve on EPA FACs, but scientists who are affiliated with
academic or not-for-profit institutions and receive EPA grants may not continue to do so.
43. The Directive also does not include any equivalent instruction covering scientists
employed in private industry. Thus, a scientist employed by a company that is directly affected
by the work of an EPA FAC may serve on that FAC consistent with the Directive, but a scientist
who receives an EPA grant may not serve on any FAC under the Directive, even one that has
nothing to do with his or her grant.
44. The Directive itself has practically no effect on scientists working in the private
sector, as such individuals almost never receive EPA grants. (Presently, just three for-profit
organizations are in receipt of EPA grants.)15 Accordingly, a natural result of the Directive is that
there will be substantially more seats on the EPA’s FACs held by private industry representatives
with a profit motive to advise the EPA to reach certain conclusions, while substantially fewer seats
will be held by academic and not-for-profit scientists. The Memorandum offers no explanation
for Defendant Pruitt’s failure to issue an equivalent restriction covering scientists affiliated with
private industry.
15
U.S. EPA, Grant Awards Database, https://yosemite.epa.gov/oarm/igms_egf.nsf/recipient2?OpenView (last visited
Jan. 22, 2018).
15
45. These features of the Directive demonstrate that it singles out academic and not-
for-profit scientists. As past actions of Defendants make clear, this purpose and effect aligns with
other actions that have limited the influence of independent academic scientists, and their research,
within the EPA and in the federal government generally. For instance, in June 2017, Administrator
Pruitt gave notice to dozens of members of the BOSC that their terms would not be renewed.16
And in August 2017, the Administration disbanded the Advisory Committee for the Sustained
National Climate Assessment, a panel chartered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration that was working on an important report dealing with climate change.17 The
Directive is in the same vein as these actions.
46. The Directive is consistent with broader actions to amplify the influence of
regulated industries at the EPA at the expense of the environment and public health. For instance,
in the approximately ten months since Administrator Pruitt took charge of the agency, he has met
with environment and public health groups twelve times. During the same time period, he has met
with representatives of regulated industry 218 times.18 By bringing about the replacement of
academic researchers with representatives of regulated industries, the Directive furthers the EPA’s
promotion of regulatory capture rather than serving as a guard against it.
16
Chris Mooney & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Just Gave Notice To Dozens of Scientific Advisory Board Members That Their
Time Is Up, Wash. Post (June 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/06/20/trump-administration-to-decline-to-renew-dozens-of-scientists-for-key-epa-advisory-
board/?utm_term=.02fccc71e7c4.
17
Juliet Eilperin, The Trump Administration Just Disbanded a Federal Advisory Committee on Climate Change,
Wash. Post (Aug. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/08/20/the-trump-
administration-just-disbanded-a-federal-advisory-committee-on-climate-change/.
18
Brandy Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, How Scott Pruitt Turned the EPA into One of Trump’s Most Powerful Tools,
Wash. Post (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/under-scott-pruitt-a-year-of-
tumult-and-transformation-at-epa/2017/12/26/f93d1262-e017-11e7-8679-
a9728984779c_story.html?utm_term=.c4a34d213b70.
16
47. The result of the Directive is to undermine scientific integrity. As numerous studies
have shown, industry-affiliated scientists are more likely to reach pro-industry conclusions than
are their non-industry-affiliated counterparts. Research has demonstrated, for example, that “the
only factor associated with [a review article] concluding that passive smoking is not harmful was
whether an author was affiliated with the tobacco industry”;19 that industry-associated trials found
a lower probability that dental implants would fail;20 and that industry-funded spine research
demonstrated a statistically greater likelihood of reporting positive results.21 Although issued in
the name of “integrity, objectivity and reliability,” the Directive is having the opposite effect.
Exhibit A at 4.
C. Separate Federal Laws And Regulations Governing Conflicts Of Interest Permit

Grant Holders To Serve On FACs And Conflict With The Directive.
48. Apart from the Directive, separate federal laws governing ethics and conflicts of
interest have long regulated, and continue to regulate, the participation of most scientists on FACs.
Federal law sets out a comprehensive scheme for ensuring that government employees are free
from conflicts of interest. This regime applies to all government employees, including both regular
government employees (“RGEs”) and SGEs. The vast majority of scientists serving on FACs do
so as SGEs or (less commonly) as RGEs, so this regime applies to the vast majority of scientists
serving on EPA advisory committees.
19
Deborah E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Why Review Articles on the Health Effects of Passive Smoking Reach Different
Conclusions, 279 JAMA 1566 (1998), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9605902.
20
Antoine Popelut et al., Relationship Between Sponsorship and Failure Rate of Dental Implants: A Systematic
Approach, PLoS ONE, Apr. 21, 2010, http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0010274.
21
Rahul V. Shah, Industry Support and Correlation To Study Outcome for Papers Published In Spine, 30 Spine 1099
(2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15864166.
17
49. Before the Directive was issued, the only financial limitations on SGEs’ service on
EPA FACs were those imposed by uniform federal ethics rules.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 208 is the primary statutory source of conflict-of-interest prohibitions
applicable to FACs. Section 208(a) establishes a broad criminal prohibition on financial conflicts
of interest, and § 208(b) establishes exceptions to that prohibition.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 208(d)(2) authorizes the Office of Government Ethics (“OGE”) to
promulgate “uniform” regulations to implement the provisions of § 208(b). Such regulations
“shall . . . list and describe exemptions” and “provide guidance with respect to the types of interests
that are not so substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services the
Government may expect from the employee.” 18 U.S.C. § 208(d)(2).
52. Executive Order 12731 further reinforces OGE’s authority to promulgate uniform
federal ethics rules. That Executive Order directs OGE to establish ethics regulations for executive
branch employees, which constitute “a single, comprehensive, and clear set of executive-branch
standards of conduct.” Exec. Order No. 12,731 § 201(a), 55 Fed. Reg. 42, 547 (Oct. 17, 1990).
53. In 18 U.S.C. § 208, Congress set up a carefully articulated scheme designed to
strike a delicate balance between protecting against conflicts of interest and ensuring that talented
individuals can continue to serve in government. Indeed, the statute’s legislative history states that
the statute seeks to balance the goals of “protecting government integrity” and of enabling agencies
to harness the best available “skill, talent, and experience” in hiring part time employees.22
Likewise, soon after the statute was enacted, the Attorney General promulgated a memorandum
that described the statute’s purpose as “to help the Government obtain the temporary or
intermittent services of persons with special knowledge and skills whose principal employment is
22
S. Rep. No. 87-2213 at 6-7 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3855-56.
18
outside the Government,” and positioned the statute as a departure from prior requirements which
were “unnecessarily severe” and “impeded the departments and agencies in the recruitment of
experts for important work.”23
54. The existing laws and regulations make clear that individuals holding EPA grants
can serve on FACs without creating a conflict of interest, and the Directive inexplicably
contravenes this statutory scheme.
55. First, 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) prohibits an executive branch employee from participating
“personally and substantially” in any “particular matter” in which he or she has a “financial
interest.” See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.402(a). Regulations promulgated by the Office of Government
Ethics have elaborated on this prohibition.
a. A “particular matter encompasses only matters that involve deliberation, decision,
or action that is focused upon the interests of specific persons, or a discrete and
identifiable class of persons.” It “does not extend to the consideration or adoption
of broad policy options that are directed to the interests of a large and diverse group
of persons.” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.402(b)(3) (emphases added).
b. A violation occurs only where the particular matter will have a “direct and
predictable” effect on the employee’s financial interest. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.402(a). A
direct and predictable effect is one that has “a close causal link” between the
decision made and a financial effect, and where there is a “real, as opposed to a
speculative possibility that the matter will affect the financial interest.” 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635.402(b)(1).
23
Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum Regarding Conflict of Interest Provisions of Public Law 87-849, 28 Fed. Reg. 985
(Feb. 1, 1963).
19
56. These provisions typically pose no barrier to an EPA grantee who wishes to serve
on a FAC as an employee. The work of EPA FACs by nature, and by general mandate, is focused
on providing high-level scientific and policy advice. Typically, it does not relate to discrete
persons, classes of persons, or particular scientific grants, and generally does not have a “direct or
predictable” effect on any particular grant.
57. Second, regulations promulgated by OGE explicitly authorize individuals classified
as SGEs to serve on FACs, notwithstanding most financial conflicts of interest. The OGE
regulations state that “[a] special [g]overnment employee serving on an advisory committee within
the meaning of the Federal Advisory Committee Act . . . may participate in any particular matter
of general applicability where the disqualifying financial interest arises from his non-Federal
employment . . . provided that the matter will not have a special or distinct effect on the employee
other than as part of a class.” 5 C.F.R. § 2640.203(g).
58. The Directive blatantly conflicts with this provision. Virtually all scientists serving
as SGEs on EPA-organized FACs, including Dr. Sheppard and members of UCS, fall into this
carve out because EPA-organized FACs almost never take actions that have “special or distinct
effect[s]” on committee members.
59. Third, the OGE regulations lay out the situations in which executive branch
employees, such as scientists serving as SGEs on FACs, are prohibited from engaging in outside
activities. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.802. Such activities are prohibited only when they “conflict with an
employee’s official duties,” which occurs only when: (a) the activity “is prohibited by statute or
by an agency’s supplemental regulation,” or (b) when the activity would give rise to a conflict of
interest requiring the employee’s disqualification from matters such that the employee’s ability to
discharge his duties would be materially impaired. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.802(a)-(b). Neither of
20
those situations routinely apply to EPA grant-holders because the EPA has not promulgated any
supplemental regulation covering grant holders, see infra paragraphs 60-61, and conflicts of
interest based on EPA grants requiring recusal are rare, see supra paragraph 56. Accordingly, the
Directive has the effect of banning a kind of outside activity for EPA FAC members that the Office
of Government Ethics has indicated does not conflict with an employee’s official duties.
60. Fourth, the OGE regulations provide a process for an agency to add additional
ethics requirements for its employees, which the EPA did not follow in issuing the Directive. The
regulations state that “[a]n agency that wishes to supplement this part shall prepare and submit to
the Office of Government Ethics, for its concurrence and joint issuance, any agency regulations
that supplement the regulations contained in this part.” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.105(a). They further state
that “[a]fter concurrence and co-signature by the Office of Government Ethics, the agency shall
submit its supplemental agency regulations to the Federal Register for publication and codification
. . . . Supplemental agency regulations issued under this section are effective only after
concurrence and co-signature by the Office of Government Ethics and publication in the Federal
Register.” Id. § 2635.105(b). In promulgating this regulation, OGE explained that the
“uniformity” required by law “cannot be achieved if agencies can pick and choose which
provisions they adopt or override.” Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch, 57 Fed. Reg. 35,006, 35,010 (Aug. 7, 1992).
61. Neither the Memorandum accompanying the Directive, nor the Directive itself, was
co-signed by the Office of Government Ethics or published in the Federal Register.
62. Neither the Memorandum accompanying the Directive, nor the Directive itself,
makes mention of the applicable statutes and regulations or of the Office of Government Ethics.
21
Neither document provides any explanation whatsoever for the apparent conflict with the rules
promulgated by the Office.
III. Implementation Of The Directive
63. Defendants have used the Directive to purge scientists affiliated with academic and
not-for-profit institutions from the EPA’s FACs. Numerous scientists have been removed or
forced to resign from the EPA’s most critical FACs and have been replaced, pursuant to the
Directive, with individuals who are associated with state and local governments and private
industries directly affected by the work of the EPA.
64. For example, shortly after the issuance of the Directive, on November 3, 2017, Dr.
Robyn Wilson—a member of the SAB and an EPA grant holder—received an email from an EPA
employee thanking her for her service and implying that she was to be removed pursuant to the
Directive.
65. Dr. Wilson responded and stated that she would not resign and that Defendants
instead should formally terminate her. The EPA has since promulgated a roster of SAB members
that does not include Dr. Wilson.24 Additionally, an EPA spokesman, Liz Bowman, has stated to
the Washington Post in reference to Dr. Wilson that “The Administrator has issued a directive
which clearly states his policy in this regard.”25
66. Similarly, on October 23, 2017, about a week before the Directive issued, Plaintiff
Dr. Sheppard received an email from an EPA employee, Aaron Yeow, requesting that she inform
him if she was the recipient of a current EPA grant. Mr. Yeow forwarded Dr. Sheppard an email
24
Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, ‘Mr. Pruitt Is Welcome To Officially Fire Me’ – As EPA Carries Out Controversial
Policy, One Scientist Balks, Wash. Post (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/11/10/epa-extends-controversial-conflict-of-interest-policy-to-nearly-two-dozen-advisory-
boards/?utm_term=.d9e758df519b.
25
Id.
22
written by another EPA employee that stated: “The EPA Administrator is in the process of making
final decisions on SAB and CASAC membership and additional clarification is needed.
Membership selection will reflect potential policy changes concerning whether the member or
candidate has a current active EPA grant.”
67. On October 24, 2017, Dr. Sheppard replied to Mr. Yeow that she did hold an EPA
grant whose funding was set to expire on November 30, 2017 and offered to step off that grant.
Mr. Yeow did not respond.
68. On November 29, 2017, Mr. Yeow wrote to Dr. Sheppard and again asked whether
she held a current EPA grant. Mr. Yeow forwarded an email drafted by an EPA employee that
stated: “The EPA Administrator has issued a new directive on federal advisory committee
membership . . . . As a result, membership on current SAB and CASAC panels will reflect this
policy change if the member has a current active EPA grant.”
69. On December 1, 2017, Dr. Sheppard replied and stated that she had been offered a
new EPA grant, but that she had declined support from that grant. Dr. Sheppard declined to receive
funding from the grant because she wanted to remain a member of CASAC and believed that
accepting the grant would render her ineligible under the Directive.
70. Purges of EPA FAC members have continued since the Directive was issued. In
mid-December 2017, for example, at least four members of Science Advisory Board
subcommittees were instructed that they must surrender their seats in order to keep their grant
funding.26
26
Sean Reilly, Pruitt Sweeps More Scientists Off Advisory Panels, E&E News (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060069799.
23
71. Before the Directive was issued, scientists serving on EPA FACs typically were
reappointed to a second term as a matter of course. After the Directive was issued and as relevant
herein, EPA did not reappoint grantees who had been serving on EPA advisory committees.
72. The Directive has had and will continue to have a profound effect on the EPA’s
FACs. Countless environmental scientists in the United States who are affiliated with academic
and not-for-profit institutions hold, at some point will hold, or aspire to hold EPA grants.
Accordingly, the Directive effectively ensures that the academic and not-for-profit scientists who
have expertise in matters related to the work of the EPA will not and, indeed, cannot have
meaningful representation on the EPA’s FACSs.
73. As Thomas A. Burke, a former science adviser and deputy head of research at the
EPA, has explained, the Directive excludes “a subset of the best and brightest minds in
environmental science from participation in which should be the highest science advisory role in
the country.”27 Similarly, Ana Diez Roux, a past chairperson of CASAC, has stated: “The top
scientists, the ones most qualified to provide objective and transparent scientific advice to EPA,
are of course the scientists who will likely be most successful at obtaining highly competitive
grants.” She has further noted that “[i]t would be a disservice to the American public to exclude
those most qualified from serving on these panels.”28
74. Already, the Directive has resulted in numerous individuals being removed from
FACs. Of those individuals, virtually all are scientists affiliated with academic or not-for-profit
institutions. On information and belief, the EPA is applying the Directive in its selection of new
27
Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Pruitt’s Grant Ban Stokes Concerns About EPA’s Integrity, Law360 (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/980575/pruitt-s-grant-ban-stokes-concerns-about-epa-s-integrity.
28
Hannah Northey & Sean Reilly, Proposal To Ban EPA Grantees from Agency Science Advisory Boards Stirs
Controversy, Science (Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/10/proposal-ban-epa-grantees-agency-
science-advisory-boards-stirs-controversy.
24
members of its FACs and may also be continuing to remove members of FACs pursuant to the
Directive. As a result, there already has been a significant increase in the number of FAC members
affiliated with private industry and a decrease in members who are academic or not-for-profit
scientists.
75. For instance, since the Directive issued, two of the seven members of the CASAC
have been removed by Defendant Pruitt. Each of the three replacements (including one
replacement for a vacant seat) named by Defendant Pruitt in accordance with the Directive is
affiliated with a private sector or local or state government entity.29
76. Similarly, Defendant Pruitt has removed at least six members of the SAB whose
terms were incomplete, all of whom were affiliated with academic institutions. Approximately six
other members were not selected to serve a second term on the SAB. Of the approximately 18
new members selected thus far by Defendant Pruitt pursuant to the Directive, only five are
affiliated with academic or not-for-profit institutions and none are currently directly receiving EPA
funding. One recent estimate, from The Center for Science and Democracy, estimates that on the
SAB alone, the number of academic researchers has been cut nearly by half while the number of
committee members affiliated with private sector organizations has tripled.30
77. Because of the Directive, the EPA’s FACs will continue to become less balanced
as new members are appointed pursuant to the Directive. Scientists affiliated with academic and
not-for-profit institutions often are best equipped to help EPA FACs provide advice based on the
29
Sean Reilly & Kevin Bogardus, EPA Unveils New Industry-Friendlier Science Advisory Boards, Science (Nov. 3,
2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/11/epa-unveils-new-industry-friendlier-science-advisory-boards.
30
See Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, ‘Mr. Pruitt Is Welcome To Officially Fire Me’ – as EPA Carries Out
Controversial Policy, One Scientist Balks, Wash. Post (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/10/epa-extends-controversial-conflict-of-
interest-policy-to-nearly-two-dozen-advisory-boards/?utm_term=.f2a12f70f80e.
25
best available science, but they effectively have been barred from meaningfully participating in
the committees. Moreover, the replacement of scientists removed under the Directive with
individuals affiliated primarily with private companies means that the views of academic scientists
who remain on the committees will be reduced, and the views of private industry will be amplified.
78. The imbalance created by the Directive has serious consequences for FACs. In
addition to providing experience and perspectives that are critical to the operation of FACs,
academic and not-for-profit scientists are necessary to balance out the presence and perspectives
of individuals affiliated with private industry and local government. As discussed supra paragraph
47, there is a substantial body of evidence on “funding-induced bias,” which shows that industry-
funded studies tend to have conclusions favorable to industry.31 By effectively prohibiting large
numbers of academic scientists from serving on its FACs, the Directive has made it likely that the
views and preferences of private industry will be reflected in the work of the EPA’s FACs to the
31
Sheldon Krimsky , Do Financial Conflicts of Interest Bias Research?: An Inquiry into the “Funding Effect”
Hypothesis, 38 Sci., Tech., & Human Values 566 (2013),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0162243912456271; Maira Bes-Rastrollo et al., Financial Conflicts of
Interest and Reporting Bias Regarding the Association between Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A
Systematic Review of Systematic Reviews, PLOS Medicine, Dec. 2013,
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001578;
David Krauth et al., Nonindustry-Sponsored Preclinical Studies on Statins Yield Greater Efficacy Estimates Than
Industry-Sponsored Studies: A Meta-Analysis, PLOS Biology, Jan. 2014,
http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1001770; M. Abdel-Sattar et al., The
Relationship Between Risk of Bias Criteria, Research Outcomes, and Study Sponsorship In a Cohort of Preclinical
Thiazolidinedione Animal Studies: A Meta-Analysis, 1 Evid.-based Preclinical Med. 11 (2015),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ebm2.5/abstract;jsessionid=893D2956392DB6978B012C83E7540A0E.f
04t03?systemMessage=Wiley+Online+Library+usage+report+download+page+will+be+unavailable+on+Friday+24
th+November+2017+at+21%3A00+EST+%2F+02.00+GMT+%2F+10%3A00+SGT+%28Saturday+25th+Nov+for
+SGT+; Rahul V Shah, Industry Support and Correlation To Study Outcome for Papers Published In Spine, 30 Spine
1099 (2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15864166; Antoine Popelut et al., Relationship Between
Sponsorship and Failure Rate of Dental Implants: A Systematic Approach, PLoS ONE, Apr. 21, 2010,
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0010274; Deborah E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Why
Review Articles on the Health Effects of Passive Smoking Reach Different Conclusions, 279 JAMA 1566 (1998),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9605902; Veronica Yank et al., Financial Ties and Concordance Between
Results and Conclusions In Meta-Analyses: Retrospective Cohort Study, 335 BMJ 1202 (2007),
http://www.bmj.com/content/335/7631/1202.
26
exclusion of the views and experience of the scientific community. The resulting FACs will
imperil scientific integrity and threaten public health.
79. Finally, and fundamentally, the Directive is an attempt to delegitimize and suppress
the role of academic scientists in advising the agency and, by extension, the results of their
research. This is troubling not just because of the importance of objective science to the EPA’s
mission, but also because American policymakers, businesses, and the American public must be
able to trust that the government’s policies are grounded in fact-based analysis. Government
suppression of scientists and scientific research impedes the American public’s ability to
knowledgably engage with pressing national issues—a core requirement of any
functioning democracy.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT ONE
(Administrative Procedure Act/Arbitrary and Capricious)
80. Plaintiffs reallege the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein.
81. The EPA’s Directive is a final agency action. It is the consummation of the EPA’s
process on this matter. The agency has nothing further to do in order to issue direction to agency
officials. Furthermore, rights and obligations have been determined by the Directive and legal
consequences flow from it. The agency has removed and will continue to remove individuals from
FACs as a result of the Directive.
82. Under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), an agency may not take an action that is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
83. The Directive’s instruction that individuals may not serve on an EPA-administered
FAC if they are in receipt of or are in a position that “would reap substantial direct benefit” from
27
an EPA grant, is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with
law. Exhibit A at 4.
84. The policy is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in
accordance with law because it (a) is not an exercise of reasoned decision-making because it failed
to consider reasonable alternatives and failed to articulate a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made; (b) is a sub silentio departure from a previously established agency
policy without adequate explanation; (c) conflicts with and is unnecessary in light of 18 U.S.C.
§ 208 and the applicable regulations promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics; and (d)
amounts to a clear error in judgment.
COUNT TWO
(Administrative Procedure Act/Excess of Statutory Authority)
86. The EPA’s Directive is a final agency action. It is the consummation of the EPA’s
process on this matter. The agency has nothing further to do in order to issue direction to agency
officials. Furthermore, rights and obligations have been determined by the Directive and legal
consequences flow from it. The agency has removed and will continue to remove individuals from
FACs as a result of the Directive.
87. Under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), an agency may not take an action that is “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.”
88. FACA delegates authority to the Administrator of the General Services
Administration (“GSA”) to “prescribe administrative guidelines and management controls
applicable to advisory committees.” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 7(c).
89. FACA directs each agency head to “establish uniform administrative guidelines and
management controls for advisory committees established by that agency” and mandates that such
28
guidelines and controls “be consistent with directives of the Administrator [of GSA] under section
7 and section 10 [of FACA].” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 8(a).
90. Pursuant to its authority under FACA, the GSA has directed agency heads to
“[a]ssure that the interests and affiliations of advisory committee members are reviewed for
conformance with applicable conflict of interest statues, regulations issued by the U.S. Office of
Government Ethics (OGE) including any supplemental agency requirements, and other Federal
ethics rules.” 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.105(h).
91. The EPA Directive exceeds statutory authority because it is not “consistent with
directives of the Administrator [of GSA],” as FACA requires. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 8(a). Specifically,
it is not consistent with the GSA directive to review FAC eligibility in “conformance with
applicable conflict of interest statutes, regulations issued by the U.S. Office of Government Ethics
(OGE) including any supplemental agency requirements, and other Federal ethics rules” because
it mandates that FAC eligibility be reviewed based on criteria that conflict with those rules and
requirements. 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.105(h).
92. For example, the EPA Directive attempts to override the exemption for SGEs set
out in 5 C.F.R. § 2640.203(g) by not allowing EPA grant recipients to participate in the types of
matters that the regulation expressly authorizes. The EPA Directive thus conveys Defendants’
refusal to assure that review of FAC candidates will be accomplished in conformance with
applicable conflict of interest rules. Such a refusal is in excess of the authority Congress granted
to Defendants in 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 8(a).
COUNT THREE
(Administrative Procedure Act/Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5(b)(2))
29
94. The EPA FACs are “federal advisory committees” within the meaning of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 1 et seq.
95. FACA provides that FACs should be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee.” 5 U.S.C. App. 2
§ 5(b)(2). It additionally states that this requirement “shall be followed by the President, agency
heads, or other Federal officials in creating an advisory committee.” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(c).
FAC if they are in receipt of or are in a position that would reap substantial direct benefit from an
EPA grant is in violation of FACA, 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2), because it creates FACs that are not
“fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed by
the advisory committee.” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2). The Directive creates FACs that are not
fairly balanced because it disproportionately excludes scientists affiliated with academic and not-
for-profit institutions from service on the EPA’s FACs.
97. EPA FACs presently are not fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
represented because, pursuant to the policy, they disproportionately exclude scientists affiliated
with academic and not-for-profit institutions.
98. By promulgating a policy in violation of 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2), the EPA has
taken action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)).
99. There is a “meaningful standard against which to judge” the legality of the Directive
under 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2). Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). By specifying
that FACs must be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented,” FACA provides a
meaningful standard. See Public Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for
30
Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 422-23 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Friedman, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
433-34 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nat’l Anti–Hunger Coal. v. Exec.
Comm., President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1983). Specifically, “[t]he appropriate inquiry in determining whether the Committee’s
membership satisfies the ‘fairly balanced’ standard in section 5(b)(2) is whether the Committee’s
members ‘represent a fair balance of viewpoints given the functions to be performed.’” Public
Citizen, 886 F.2d at 423 (Friedman, J., concurring in the judgment (citation omitted)); see also
Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2004); Cargill, Inc. v. United
States, 173 F.3d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 1999); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Dep’t of Interior,
26 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 1994).
COUNT FOUR
(Administrative Procedure Act/Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5(b)(3))
101. The EPA FACs are “federal advisory committees” within the meaning of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 1 et seq.
102. FACA provides that FACs must “not be inappropriately influenced by the
appointing authority or by any special interest, but will instead be the result of the advisory
committee’s independent judgment.” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(3). It additionally states that this
requirement “shall be followed by the President, agency heads, or other Federal officials in creating
an advisory committee.” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(c).
FAC if they are in receipt of or are in a position that would reap substantial direct benefit from an
EPA grant is in violation of FACA, 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(3), because it creates FACs that are
“inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest.”
31
104. EPA FACs presently are inappropriately influenced by Defendant Pruitt, the
“appointing authority,” in violation of 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(3), because the Directive
promulgated by Defendant Pruitt was established for an improper purpose and is arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
105. EPA FACs presently are inappropriately influenced by special interests, in
violation of 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(3), because they are disproportionately composed of
representatives of private sector industry and state and local governments.
106. By promulgating a policy in violation of 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(3), the EPA has
taken action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)
107. There is a meaningful standard against which to judge the legality of the Directive
under 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(3). See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830. Much like Section 5(b)(2) of
FACA, Section 5(b)(3) includes a meaningful standard by specifying that a FAC must not be
“inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest.” See Public
Citizen, 886 F.2d at 425-26 (Friedman, J., concurring in the judgment) (reaching merits of claim
under § 5(b)(3)); see also Cargill, 173 F.3d at 338-39 (reaching merits of a claim under § 5(b)(3)).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court:
A. Declare that the EPA’s policy of removing and refusing to appoint to FACs
individuals in receipt of an EPA grant or who “would reap substantial direct benefit” from an EPA
grant is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise in violation of law.
32
B. Enjoin the EPA and its employees, officers, and agents from implementing the
policy of removing from FACs, and refusing to consider for positions on FACs, individuals in
receipt of an EPA grant or who “would reap substantial direct benefit” from an EPA grant.
C. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
D. Award any other relief the Court deems just and proper
January 23, 2018

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Justin Florence

Justin Florence (MA Bar No. 667129)
Benjamin L. Berwick (MA Bar No. 679207)*
The Protect Democracy Project
10 Ware St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
(909) 326-2911
justin.florence@protectdemocracy.org
Jamila G. Benkato*
The Protect Democracy Project
2020 Pennsylvania Ave., NW #163
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 751-4058
jamila.benkato@protectdemocracy.org
Lindsay C. Harrison*
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Ave., NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 639-6000
lharrison@jenner.com
*Pro Hac Vice motions forthcoming
Counsel for Plaintiffs
33
Case 1:18-cv-10129 Document 1-1 Filed 01/23/18 Page 1 of 7
Exhibit A
Page 1
E. ScoTT P1H TrT

An\ l l >J I STR:\TOH
SUBJECT: Strengthening and Improving Membership on EPA Federal Adv isory Committees
The U.S . Environmental Protection Agency relies on independent, expert advice from a variety of federal
advisory committees to help inform sound decision-making and fulfil l its core mission of protecting
human health and the environment. Given the critical role these comm ittees play, it is in the public
interest to select the most qualified, knowledgeable, and experienced cand idates. In order to strengthen
and improve the independence, diversity and breadth of participation on EPA federa l advisory
committees, the Agency shall, consistent with applicable laws and regulations, apply the fo llowing
principles and procedures when establishing the membership of such committees:
i. Strengthen Member independence: Members shall be independent fro m EPA, which sha ll include a
requi rement that no member of an EPA fed eral advisory committee be currently in receipt of EPA
grants, either as principal investigator or co-i nvestigator. or in a position that otherwise wou ld reap
substantial direct benefit from an EPA grant. This principle shall not apply to state, tribal or local
government agency recipients of EPA grants.
2. increase State, Tribal and Local Government Participation: In the spirit of cooperative federalism
and recognition of the unique experience of state, tribal and local government officials, committee
balance should reflect prominent participation from state, tribal and local governments. Such
participation should be appropriate for the committee's purpose and fun ction.
3. Enhance Geographic Diversity: Given the range of environmental and public health considerations
across the country. membership should be balanced with individuals from different states and EPA
regions. Emphasis should be given to individuals from historically unrepresented or underrepresented
states and regions.
4. Promote Fresh Perspectives: To encourage and promote the inclusion of new candidates with fresh
perspectives and to avoid prolonged and continuous service, membersh ip shou ld be rotated regularly.
This directive is intended to im prove the internal management of EPA and does not create a right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party aga inst the United States, EPA,
its officers or ernployees, or any other person. Where appropriate or to be consistent with applicable law, I
reserve the right to exercise my discretion to depart from the procedures set fort h in this directive.
With these improvements to EPA's federal advisory comm ittees, the Agency is taking another step to
provide the publ ic with a better, more effective government.
E. Scott Pruitt
October 3 I, 2017
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E. ScoTr PR ll ITT
\n~I L'\ ISTR.\ TO R
TO: Assistant Administrators

Regional Administrators
Office of General Counsel
FROM: E. Scott Pruitt

Administrator
DATE: October 31, 2017
SUBJECT: Strengthening and Improving Membership on EPA Federal Advisory Committees
Federal Advisory Committees (FA Cs) serve important and influential roles for federal agencies -
particularly the U.S . Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1 EPA ' s FACs presently provide
advice on a broad array of subjects, including pesticides,2 drinking water quality,3 air quality, 4
rural community welfare,5 and children 's health. 6 FACs can be established by statutory
requirement, at the discretion of federal agencies, or through presidential directive. 7 Currently,
EPA manages 22 FACs that provide valuable expertise, insight and recommendations that guide
the Agency's decision-making in fulfilling its core mission of protecting human health and the
environment. 8
1
"Advisory committees have played an important role in shaping programs and policies of the federal government
from the earliest days of the Republic. Since President George Washington sought the advice of such a committee
during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, the contributions made by these groups have been impressive and diverse."
FACA I0 I, https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/federa l-advisory-committee-management/finding-
information-on-faca-committees/faca- I 0 I.
2 Pesticide Program Dialogue Committee (PPDC), https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-advisory-comminees-and-
regulatory-partners/pesticicle-program-dialogue-committee-ppdc.
3 National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC), https://www.epa.gov/ndwac.
4
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC).
https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabpeople.nsf/WebCommittees/CASAC.
5 Farm, Ranch, and Rural Communities Advisory Committee (FRRCC), https://www.epa.gov/faca/frrcc.
6
Children's Health Protection Advisory Comminee (CHPAC). https://www.epa.gov/children.
7 The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) was established under the Clean Air Act. The Board of
Scientific Counselors (BOSC) was established by EPA. The Good Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB) was
established by presidential authority.
8 All Federal Advisory Committees at EPA. https://www.epa.gov/faca/all-federal-advisory-committees-epa.
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A1n11~1sTRATOR
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (F ACA) 9 generally requires that FACs operate in an
°
independent, orderly, balanced, and transparent manner. 1 Critical to the integrity of FA Cs is the
selection of qualified and knowledgeable candidates. Since each F AC serves a unique purpose,
FA Cs differ in specific composition requirements, 11 but all FACs must be "fairly balanced in terms
of the points of view represented and fu nctions to be perfo rmed by the committee." 12 The EPA
Administrator should choose qualified candidates to serve on the EPA· s F ACs. 13 Jn addition to
knowledge and expertise, other qualifications should also factor strongly into selecting FAC
members. Candidates should be independent from the Agency, must avoid any conflicts of interest
within the scope of their review, and should be fully committed to objectively serving the Agency
and public.
In the spirit of cooperative federalism and recognition of the unique experience of state, tribal and
local government officials, committee balance should refl ect prominent participation from state,
tribal and local governments. Such participation should be appropriate fo r the comm ittee's
purpose and function. Furthermore, FAC membership should be balanced with persons from
different parts of the country to create geographic diversity. Finally, in order to ensure broader
participation in FACs, and to ensure that advancements in scientific and technological thinking
continually factor into committee reviews, regular rotation of members to assure fresh perspectives
should also guide the Agency's choice of FAC members.
This memorandum accompanies, and explai ns the principles underlying, a set of directives
intended to strengthen and improve the composition of EPA's FACs in ways that advance the
Agency's mission to protect public health and welfare, that are consistent with the principles of
cooperative federali sm, and that fo llow the rul e of law and agency directives and guidance.
9
5 U.S.C. app., https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/FACA-Statute-2013.pdf.
° FACA Essentials at EPA for Federal Advisory Committee Members,
1
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-02/documents/faca_essentials_ for_20 16_pending.pdf.
11 For example, the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) is comprised of seven members, including
one physician, one state air pollution control agency representative, and one member of the National Academy of
Sciences. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2). However. not all FACs have statutory membership requirements.
12
5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b}(2).
13
4 1 CFR I02-3.60(b)(3) ("Fairly balanced membership. A description of the agency's plan to attain fairly balanced
membership. The plan will ensure that, in the selection of members for the advisory committee, the agency will
consider a cross-section of those directly affected, interested, and qualified, as appropriate to the nature and
functions of the advisory committee.") (emphasis added).
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E. SCOTT PIW ITT

AD~ ll :\ I ST H J\TO H
A. Stre11gthe11 Member /11 depe11de11ce
A vital part of ensuring integrity and confidence in EPA's FACs comes fro m guaranteeing that
FAC members remain independent of the Agency during their service. EPA FAC members should
avoid financial entanglements with EPA to the greatest extent possible.
Non-governmental and non-tribal members in direct receipt of EPA grants while serving on an
EPA FAC can create the appearance or reality of potential interference with their ability to
independently and objectively serve as a FAC member. F AC members should be motivated by
service and committed to providing informed and independent expertise and judgment.
Ensuring FAC member independence strengthens the integrity, objectivity and reliability of EPA
FACs. Accordingly, in addition to EPA's existing policies and legal requirements preventing
conflicts of interest among the membership of the Agency's FACs, it shall be the policy of the
Agency that no member of an EPA federal advisory committee currently receive EPA grants, either
as principal investigator or co-in vestigator, or in a position that otherwise wou ld reap substantial
direct benefit from an EPA grant. This principle should not apply to state, tribal or local
government agency reci pients of EPA grants.
B. Increase State, Tribal and Local Government Participation
EPA alone cannot fully meet the environmental challenges this country faces. Under the principle
of cooperative federalism, environmental protection is a duty shared between state, tribal, local
and federal governments. EPA relies on states, tribes and local communities to assist in, and in
some cases assume primary responsibility for, planning and overseeing environmental
protection. 14 Rather than solely rely on the opinions of federal officials in Washington, D.C., the
Agency should seek the expertise and unique perspectives of public servants at all levels of
government across the country. Cooperative federalism underlies many of the environmental
statutes passed by Congress since states, tribes and local governments have a better understanding
of, and are well-positioned to address, their environmental challenges.
Therefore, state, tribal and local government officials should figure prominently in FAC
membership. Increasing state, tribal and local government participation on FACs strengthens EPA
decision-making through enhanced public inclusion in EPA policy and programs choices, and joint
accountability at all levels of government.
14
The Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act contain provisions giving states and tribes
primary responsibility for environmental protection .
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A I) .\I I:'\ ISTll:\TO R
C. Enhance Geographic Diversity
EPA's FACs should be balanced to ensure the inclusion and consideration of different viewpoints,
consistent with a fundamental goal of FACA. 15 Participation of members from a broad range of
geographic regions - especially areas that have historically been unrepresented or
underrepresented - should prominently factor into creating balanced membership on FACs. 16 The
distinctive experiences, cl imates and environmental issues facing citizens spread across the United
States naturally necessitates strong geographic diversity so that extensive regional perspectives are
represented on FACs. 17
Accordingly, with the exception ofFACs established to specifically address regional/area specific
issues, EPA shall seek to ensure that FAC membership is geographically diverse. Emphasis should
be given to candidates from states or EPA regions that are unrepresented or underrepresented on
EPA FACs.
D. Promote Fresh Perspectives
Experts serving on FACs should regularly rotate on and off committees to allow for new opinions
and fresh ideas. Members who serve on FACs for an extended and continuous period of time risk
minimizing viewpoints, lessening di versity, and preventing other qualified candidates from
serving. EPA acknowledges the importance of fresh perspectives in its peer review handbook to
"keep balance" and "avoid repeated use" of persons that could diminish original feedback. 18
15
"(a) The Congress finds that there are numerous commiltees, boards, commissions, councils, and
similar groups which have been established to advise officers and agencies in the executive branch
of the Federal Government and that they are frequently a useful and beneficial means of furnishin g
expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions to the Federal Government." 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(a),
https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/FACA-Statute-20 13 .pdf (emphasis added).
16
"The composition of an advisory committee's membership will depend upon several factors, including: (i) The
advisory committee's mission; (ii) The geographic, ethnic, social, economic, or scientific impact of the advisory
committee' s recommendations... " 41 C.F.R. Part 102-3, App. A to Subpart B (emphasis added);
https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstat ic/FACA FinalRule_ R2 E-cN Z_OZ5 RDZ-i34 K-pR.pdf.
17
See CASAC Membership Balance Plan stating that '·Geographic location may be considered" as an "important"
factor in achieving a balanced FAC, https://www.facadatabase.gov/committee/charters.aspx?cid=634&aid=5 1;
Board of Scientific Counselors stating that "Balances in disciplines. work sector (i.e.. academia, government -
federal/state/local, industry, environmental associations), diversity, and geographic distribution area are also
considered." https://www.facadatabase.gov/committee/charters.aspx?cid= I 577&aid=5 1.
18
Peer Review Handbook, Science and Technology Policy Council, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/fi les/20 16-03/documents/epa_peer_review_ handbook_4th_ ed ition.pdf.
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AD~ ll ~ISTH:\TOH
New members also help to ensure that FACs remain current with innovative and new scientific
and technological expertise. Membership should therefore be dynamic and open to a broad,
diverse array of experts who can potentially provide unique and informative new perspecti ves. 19
Conclusion
EPA's FAC members provide essential and inva luable advice and support to the Agency.
Strengthening F AC membership independence from EPA, increasing state, tribal and local
government participation, and emphasizing geographic diversity and fresh perspectives, to the
greatest extent practicable. serve to enhance the diversity of viewpoints and thereby provide robust
and appropriately balanced advice to EPA. These changes also further help EPA meet its core
mission of providing the American people with clean air. land, and water.
19
EPA 's Peer-Review Handbook considers adding fresh perspectives through new peer reviewers an "important
qualificat ion" to add balance of views and avoid the repeated use of the same persons. See
htrps://www.epa.gov/sites/production/tiles/20 16-03/documents/epa_peer_review_handbook_4th_edit ion.pdf.
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Exhibit B
Page 1
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CHARTER

__________________________________________________________________________
CLEAN AIR SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE

__________________________________________________________________________
1. Committee's Official Designation (Title):

Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC)
2. Authority:
The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) is required by Section 109 of the Clean
Air Act (CAA) enacted on August 7, 1977 (42 U.S.C. § 7409). This charter renews the CASAC
in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C.
App. 2. The charter has been renewed every two years, with the last renewal on July 29, 2015.
3. Objectives and Scope of Activities:

Section 109 of the CAA specifically directs the EPA Administrator to review the air quality
criteria published under section 108 and the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)
promulgated under section 109 and to make such revisions in such criteria and standards and
promulgate such new standards as may be appropriate no later than every five years. Section 109
also directs the Administrator to establish this committee to review the criteria and standards
promulgated, and provide other related scientific and technical advice.
4. Description of Duties:
The duties of CASAC are to provide advice and recommendations to EPA. The CASAC is
identified as a scientific/technical advisory committee. As required by CAA section 109(d), the
CASAC will:
a. Review the criteria published under section 108 of the Clean Air Act and the
national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards and recommend to the
Administrator any new national ambient air quality standards and revisions of
existing criteria and standards as may be appropriate;
b. Advise the Administrator of areas in which additional knowledge is required to
appraise the adequacy and basis of existing, new, or revised national ambient air
quality standards;
c. Describe the research efforts necessary to provide the required information;
d. Advise the Administrator on the relative contribution to air pollution
concentrations of natural as well as anthropogenic activity; and
e. Advise the Administrator of any adverse public health, welfare, social,
economic, or energy effects which may result from various strategies for
attainment and maintenance of such national ambient air quality standards.
Page 2
5. Agency or Official to Whom the Committee Reports:

The Committee will submit advice and recommendations and report to the EPA Administrator.
6. Support:
EPA will be responsible for financial and administrative support. Within EPA, this support will
be provided by the EPA Science Advisory Board Staff Office, Office of the Administrator.
7. Estimated Annual Operating Costs and Work Years:

The estimated annual operating cost of the CASAC is $1,500,000, which includes 5.0 work-
years of support.
8. Designated Federal Officer:
A full-time or permanent part-time employee of EPA will be appointed as the Designated

Federal Officer (DFO). The DFO or a designee will be present at all meetings of the advisory
committee and subcommittees. Each meeting will be conducted in accordance with an agenda
approved in advance by the DFO. The DFO is authorized to adjourn any meeting when he or she
determines it is in the public interest to do so, and will chair meetings when directed to do so by
the official to whom the committee reports.
9. Estimated Number and Frequency of Meetings:

The CASAC and its subgroups expect to meet a total of approximately twelve (12) to fifteen (15)
times a year. Meetings may occur approximately once every four (4) weeks or as needed and
approved by the DFO. EPA may pay travel and per diem expenses when determined necessary
and appropriate.
As required by FACA, CASAC will hold open meetings unless the EPA Administrator
determines that a meeting or a portion of a meeting may be closed to the public in accordance
with 5 U.S.C. 552b(c). Interested persons may attend meetings, appear before the committee, or
file comments with the CASAC.
10. Duration:
Continuing.
11. Termination:
This charter will be in effect for two years from the date it is filed with Congress. After this two-
year period, the charter may be renewed in accordance with section 14 of FACA.
12. Membership and Designation:
CASAC will be composed of seven (7) members. The Administrator will appoint a Chairperson
Page 3
and six members including, as required by CAA section 109(d), at least one member of the
National Academy of Sciences, one physician, and one person representing State air pollution
control agencies. Members will be persons who have demonstrated high levels of competence,
knowledge, and expertise in scientific/technical fields relevant to air pollution and air quality
issues. Members will generally serve as Special Government Employees (SGE).
13. Subcommittees:
EPA, or CASAC with the Agency’s approval, may form subcommittees or workgroups for any
purpose consistent with this charter. Such subcommittees or workgroups may not work
independently of the chartered committee and must report their recommendations and advice to
the chartered CASAC for full deliberation and discussion. Subcommittees or workgroups have
no authority to make decisions on behalf of the chartered committee, nor can they report directly
to the EPA.
14. Recordkeeping:
The records of the committee, formally and informally established subcommittees, or other
subgroups of the committee, will be handled in accordance with NARA General Records
Schedule 6.2 and EPA Records Schedule 1024 or other approved agency records disposition
schedule. Subject to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, these records will be
available for public inspection and copying, in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee
Act.
May 23, 2017

Agency Approval Date
June 5, 2017
Date Filed with Congress
Exhibit C
Page 1
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CHARTER

______________________________________________________________________________
EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD

______________________________________________________________________________
EPA Science Advisory Board
2. Authority:
The EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB) charter is renewed in accordance with the provisions of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App. 2. The SAB was created in 1978
pursuant to the Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act
(ERDDAA) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 4365). The SAB’s charter has been renewed every two years,
with the last renewal on October 30, 2015.
The SAB is identified as a scientific/technical advisory committee. The objective of the SAB is
to provide independent advice and peer review to EPA's Administrator on the scientific and
technical aspects of environmental issues. While the SAB reports to the EPA Administrator,
congressional committees specified in ERDDAA may ask the EPA Administrator to have the
SAB provide scientific advice on a particular issue. The SAB will review scientific issues,
provide independent scientific and technical advice on EPA's major programs, and perform
special assignments as requested by Agency officials.
As appropriate, the SAB will consult and coordinate its work with the Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee, the National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and Technology,
the Children’s Health Protection Advisory Committee, the Office of Chemical Safety and
Pollution Prevention’s FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel and Science Advisory Committee on
Chemicals, the Office of Research and Development’s Board of Scientific Counselors, and other
Federal Advisory Committees.
4. Description of Duties:
The duties of the SAB are solely to review and provide EPA advice and recommendations on:
a. The adequacy and scientific basis of any proposed criteria document, standard,
limitation, or regulation under the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution
Page 2
Control Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, or
any other authority of the Administrator;
b. The scientific and technical adequacy of Agency programs, guidelines,

documents, methodologies, protocols and tests;
c. New or revised scientific criteria or standards for protection of human health and
the environment;
d. New information needs and the quality of Agency plans and programs for
research, development and demonstration; and
e. The relative importance of various natural and anthropogenic pollution sources.
5. Agency or Official to Whom the Committee Reports:
The SAB will report its advice and recommendations to the EPA Administrator. When an SAB
report addresses a request for scientific advice from one of the congressional committees
specified in ERDDAA, the EPA will forward the SAB’s advice to the requesting congressional
committee.
6. Support:
EPA will be responsible for financial and administrative support. Within EPA, this support will
be provided by the Office of the Administrator.
7. Estimated Annual Operating Costs and Staff Years:
The estimated annual operating cost of the SAB is $3,000,000 which includes 13.0
staff years of support.
The SAB Staff Director will appoint full-time employees of EPA as the Designated Federal
Officers (DFO) for the SAB and its committees and panels. A DFO (or a designee) will be
present at all meetings. The DFO will approve the meeting agenda in advance and ensure that
each meeting is conducted in accordance with FACA, including availability of meeting
materials. The DFO has the authority to adjourn any meeting when he or she determines it is in
Page 3
the public interest to do so, and will chair meetings when directed to do so by the official to
whom the committee reports.
There will be approximately 6-8 meetings of the SAB each year. Meetings may occur as needed
and approved by the SAB Staff Director. In addition, there will be approximately 20-25 meetings
of SAB’s committees and panels each year, as needed and approved by the SAB Staff Director.
The SAB uses the term “committee” to mean a standing subcommittee of the chartered SAB.
EPA may pay travel and per diem expenses when determined necessary and appropriate.
As required by FACA, SAB meetings will be open to the public unless the Administrator
determines that a meeting or a portion of a meeting may be closed in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552b(c). Consistent with EPA policy, SAB committee and panel meetings generally will be open
to the public. Interested persons may attend meetings, appear before, or file comments with the
SAB, and its committees and panels.
10. Duration:
Continuing.
11. Termination:
This charter will be in effect for two years from the date it is filed with Congress. After this two-
year period, the charter may be renewed in accordance with Section 14 of FACA.
12. Membership and Designation:
The SAB will be composed of about 45 members. The number of members may be adjusted as
necessary to provide leadership to SAB committees and panels. Most SAB members will serve
as Special Government Employees. Members will be independent experts in the fields of
science, engineering, and economics and other social sciences to provide a range of expertise
required to assess the scientific and technical aspects of environmental issues. In addition, the
chair of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee will be an SAB member.
13. Subcommittees:
Pursuant to 42 USC 4365 (e)(2), EPA, in consultation with the SAB, established a standing
agriculture –related committee to provide scientific and technical advice to the chartered SAB
relating to matters referred to the SAB that are determined, in consultation with the Secretary of
Page 4
Agriculture, to have a significant direct impact on farming- and agriculture-related industries.

EPA, in consultation with the SAB, may form additional committees, panels, or workgroups for
any purpose consistent with this charter. Such committees, panels or workgroups may not work
the chartered SAB for full deliberation, discussion and approval. Each committee, panel or
workgroup will be chaired by a member of the chartered SAB. Most members of SAB
committees, panels, and workgroups will serve as Special Government Employees. Committees,
panels, and workgroups have no authority to make decisions on behalf of the SAB and may not
report directly to the Agency.
14. Recordkeeping:
Act.
August 23, 2017

September 12, 2017

Exhibit D
Page 1
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

______________________________________________________________________________
EPA BOARD OF SCIENTIFIC COUNSELORS

______________________________________________________________________________
EPA Board of Scientific Counselors
2. Authority:
The EPA Board of Scientific Counselors (BOSC) charter is renewed in accordance with the
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App. 2. The BOSC is in
the public interest and supports the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in performing
its duties and responsibilities.
The BOSC will provide advice and recommendations on all aspects (technical and management)
of the Office of Research and Development’s (ORD) research program. As appropriate, the
BOSC will consult and coordinate its work with the Science Advisory Board.
The major objectives are to provide advice and recommendations on:
a. ORD’s research programs and research management practices and actions to

improve research program quality, relevance, and performance, as well as
program structure, scientific leadership, research coordination, communication,
and outcomes;
b. ORD's program development, progress, and research program balance, which

may include evaluation of ORD’s Strategic Research Action Plans and Cross-
cutting Research Roadmaps;
c. Use of peer review within ORD to sustain and enhance the quality of science in
EPA;
d. Scientific and management issues specific to ORD Offices, National Laboratories,

and Centers; and
e. ORD’s human resources planning, such as scientist career development and

rotational assignment programs, and the appropriate scope and design of training
programs for environmental research professionals.
Page 2
4. Description of Committees Duties:
The duties of the BOSC are solely to provide advice to EPA.
5. Official(s) to Whom the Committee Reports:
The BOSC will submit advice and recommendations and report to the EPA Administrator,
through the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Research and Development.
6. Agency Responsible for Providing the Necessary Support:
The EPA will be responsible for financial and administrative support. Within EPA, this support
will be provided by the Office of Research and Development.
7. Estimated Annual Operating Costs and Work Years:
The estimated annual operating cost of the BOSC is $627,500 which includes 2.0 person-years of
support.
A full-time or permanent part-time employee of EPA will be appointed as the Designated

Federal Officer (DFO). The DFO or a designee will be present at all meetings of the advisory
committee and subcommittees. Each meeting will be conducted in accordance with an agenda
approved in advance by the DFO. The DFO is authorized to adjourn any meeting when he or she
determines it is in the public interest to do so and will chair meetings when directed to do so by
the official to whom the committee reports.
The BOSC expects to meet approximately two (2) to three (3) times a year. Meetings may occur
approximately once every four (4) to six (6) months, or as needed and approved by the DFO.
EPA may pay travel and per diem expenses when determined necessary and appropriate.
As required by FACA, the BOSC will hold open meetings unless the EPA Administrator
determines that a meeting or a portion of a meeting may be closed to the public in accordance
with 5 U.S.C. 552b(c). Interested persons may attend meetings, appear before the committee as
time permits, and file comments with the BOSC.
10. Duration and Termination:
The BOSC will be examined annually and will exist until the EPA determines the committee is
no longer needed. This charter will be in effect for two years from the date it is filed with
Congress. After the initial two-year period, the charter may be renewed as authorized in
accordance with Section 14 of FACA.
Page 3
11. Member Composition:
The BOSC will be composed of approximately twenty (20) members who will serve as Special
Government Employees (SGEs). In selecting members, EPA will consider candidates from the
environmental scientific and technical fields, human health care professions, academia, industry,
public and private research institutes and organizations, and other relevant interest areas.
12. Subgroups:
The EPA, or the BOSC with EPA approval, may form BOSC subcommittees or workgroups for
any purpose consistent with this charter. Such subcommittees or workgroups may not work
the chartered BOSC for full deliberation and discussion. Subcommittees or workgroups have no
authority to make decisions on behalf of the chartered committee nor can they report directly to
the Agency.
13. Recordkeeping:
Act.
April 22, 2016

April 27, 2016

GSA Consultation Date
May 9, 2016
Exhibit E
OMB Control NO. 2090-0029 Page 1
Approval Expires 02/28/2018
Confidential Financial Disclosure Form for Environmental Protection

Agency Special Government Employees (EPA Form 3110-48)
A. Why You Must File

Public service is a public trust. In order to uphold that trust, the Government must obtain certain confidential financial
information to ensure that there are no conflicts between your public service and your private interests.
B. Who Must File

This form is used by the Agency for Special Government Employees (SGEs) as defined under 18 U.S.C. 202 and candidates
to be SGEs.
C. Privacy Act Statement

Title I of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), Executive Order 12674 (as modified by Executive Order
12731), and 5 CFR Part 2634, Subpart I, of the Office of Government Ethics regulations require the reporting of this information. The
primary use of the information on this form is for review by Government officials of your agency, to determine compliance with
applicable Federal conflict of interest laws and regulations. Additional disclosures of the information on this report may be made: (1)
to a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency if the disclosing agency becomes aware of a violation or potential violation of law
or regulation; (2) to a court or party in a court or Federal administrative proceeding if the Government is a party or in order to comply
with a judge-issued subpoena; (3) to a source when necessary to obtain information relevant to a conflict of interest investigation or
decision; (4) to the National Archives and Records Administration or the General Services Administration in records management
inspections; (5) to the Office of Management and Budget during legislative coordination on private relief legislation; (6) to the
Department of Justice or in certain legal proceedings when the disclosing agency, and employee of the disclosing agency, or the
United States is a party to litigation or has an interest in the litigation and the use of such records is deemed relevant and necessary to
the litigation; (7) to reviewing officials in a new office, department or agency when an employee transfers from one covered position
to another, (8) to a Member of Congress or a congressional office in response to an inquiry made on behalf of an individual who is the
subject of the record, and (9) to contractors and other non-Government employees working for the Federal Government to accomplish
a function related to an OGE Government-wide system of records. This confidential report will not be disclosed to any requesting
person unless authorized by law.
D. Paperwork Burden Disclosure Notice

The public reporting and recordkeeping burden for this collection of information is estimated to average one hour per
response. Send comments on the Agency’s need for this information, the accuracy of the provided burden estimates, and any
suggested methods for minimizing respondent burden, including through the use of automated collection techniques to the Director,
Collection Strategies Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Mail Code 2822T), 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW,
Washington, D.C. 20460. Include the OMB control number in any correspondence. Do not send the completed form to that address;
instead, send your completed form as directed by the Agency official who sent it to you.
E. When to file
Candidates and newly-appointed special Government employees must fully complete this form before performing any work
for EPA. Subsequently, you must file a new form annually or as instructed by your agency ethics official. PLEASE NOTE: It is your
responsibility to notify the appropriate EPA ethics official of any changes to the information you provide in this form.
F. Where to file
Send your report to the address specified by the Agency or by the Agency ethics official. You may use additional blank
pages in any section if needed. Please note your name and supplemental page number on the continuation pages.
Penalties
Falsification of information or failure to file or report information required to be reported may subject
you to disciplinary action by your employing agency or other authority. Knowing and willful
falsification of information required to be reported may also subject you to criminal prosecution.
EPA Form 3110-48 ) 1

G. What is a Special Government Employee (SGE)?

The SGE category was created by Congress to employ individuals who provide important, but limited, service to the
Government. These employees are subject to a limited set of conflict of interest requirements. SGEs provide temporary service to the
Government (not to exceed 130 days during any period of 365 consecutive days with or without compensation). SGEs are often
recruited because they provide outside expertise or perspectives that might be unavailable among an agency's regular employees.
SGEs are generally used as advisory committee members, individual experts or consultants. However, some SGEs serve on Boards or
Commissions and are brought on pursuant to applicable statute. (See 18 U.S.C. §202(a) for more information.)
H. What is a conflict of interest?

18 U.S.C. §208 prohibits all employees (including SGEs) from participating in any particular Government matter that will
have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interests. It also prohibits employees from acting in Government matters that will
affect the financial interests of others with whom they have certain relationships. These relationships are:
• Spouse
• Minor child
• General partner
• Organization in which the individual serves as officer, director, trustee, general partner or employee
• Person or organization with which the employee is negotiating or has an arrangement concerning prospective employment.
I. What is a particular matter?

The term "particular matter" includes deliberations, decisions, or actions that are focused upon the interests of specific
persons or entities or an identifiable class of persons or entities. A particular matter does not extend to broad policy options or
considerations directed toward the interest of a large and diverse group of people. A particular matter may involve specific parties
(e.g., a contract, grant or case in litigation) or it may be a particular matter of general applicability that is focused on the interests of a
discrete and identifiable class of persons (such as an industry).
J. What is a direct and predictable effect?

A particular matter will have a direct effect on a financial interest if there is a close causal link between any decision or action
to be taken in the matter and any expected effect of the matter on the financial interest. However, a particular matter will not have a
direct effect on a financial interest if the link is attenuated, or is contingent upon the occurrence of events that are speculative, or that
are independent of, and unrelated to, the matter. Furthermore, a particular matter that has an effect on a financial interest only as a
consequence of its effects on the general economy is also not considered to have a direct effect on a financial interest. A particular
matter will have a "predictable" effect if there is a real (as opposed to speculative) possibility that the matter will affect a financial
interest. It is not necessary to know the magnitude of the loss/gain, and the dollar amount is immaterial.
K. What is an appearance of a loss of impartiality?

5 C.F.R. Part 2635, Subpart E contains provisions intended to ensure that an employee takes appropriate steps to avoid an
appearance of a loss of impartiality in the performance of his/her official duties. Where an employee knows that a particular matter
involving specific parties is likely to have a direct and predictable effect on the financial interest of a member of his/her household, or
knows that a person with whom he/she has a covered relationship is or represents a party to such a matter, and where the person
determines that the circumstances would cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts to question his/her
impartiality in the matter, the employee should not participate in the matter unless he/she has informed the agency designee of the
appearance of a problem and received authorization from the agency designee.
EPA Form 3110-48 2

OMB Control NO. 2090-0029
Page 3
SECTION 1: Identifying Information and Record of Agency Review
Your Name:
Last Name: First Name: Middle Initial:
Your Certification:
I certify that information I have provided on this form and all attachments is true, complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Signature of Reporting Individual Date:
Date Received by the Agency (for Agency use only):
Agency Review (for Agency use only):
Panel Name/Employing
Office
Intermediate Reviewer
Signature, Date
Final Reviewing Official
Signature, Date
Comments:
Office:
Signature, Date
Signature, Date
Comments:
Office:
Signature, Date
Signature, Date
Comments:
Office:
Signature, Date
Signature, Date
Comments:
EPA Form 3110-48 3

SECTION 2: Your Employment/Consulting/Volunteer Work
Report any employment or consulting, whether or not for compensation, for you and/or your spouse for the last two years preceding
the date of filing. Do not include any compensated expert testimony as these are reported in another part of this form. Don’t forget
to include your current employer as well as your spouse’s employer. You may indicate (S) for employment of your spouse. You
should report any of the following positions that you hold, whether or not for compensation: employee, officer, director, trustee,
general partner, proprietor, representative/executor of any business, consulting firm, non-profit, labor organization, or educational
institution. Also include any organization or person with whom you are negotiating or have an arrangement concerning prospective
employment. You may exclude unpaid positions with any religious, social, fraternal or political entities, or those solely of an
honorary nature, but you have to include any positions held with professional societies. You may add additional pages as necessary.
If you have NO employment at all, enter NONE below.
Organization (Name, Name of position and description of work. If you are employed by a consulting firm, indicate the firm’s
City, State). If reporting major practice areas, categories of principal clients, and the clients you or your spouse have dealt with
consulting, Name of directly or derived compensation from. If reporting independent consulting, provide a description and
Project and Client. date(s) of the project.
Example: East-West Example: Dean, School of Environmental Studies.
University, Anywhere,
KS
Example: ABC Example: Consultant on toxicological effects of heavy metals in wastewater from company facilities.
Corporation, Smallville, July 2007-July 2011.
VA
EPA Form 3110-48 4

Continuation of Section 2 (if needed). Otherwise, continue to Section 3
Organization (Name, Name of position and description of work. If you are employed by a consulting firm, indicate the firm’s
City, State). If reporting major practice areas, categories of principal clients, and the clients you or your spouse have dealt with
consulting, Name of directly or derived compensation from. If reporting independent consulting, provide a description and
Project and Client. date(s) of the project.
EPA Form 3110-48 5

Page 6
SECTION 3: Compensated Expert Testimony
Report any expert testimony for you or your spouse for the last two years preceding the date of filing. You may indicate (S) for
spouse. If you have NO compensated expert testimony, enter “NONE” below.
Client Name, City, State Description & Date of Testimony. Include citation if available.
Example: XYZ law firm, Example: Provided expert testimony for ABC corporation (plaintiff) on effects of heavy metals
Anytown, CA in wastewater from company facilities. ABC Corporation v. XYZ, Civil Action No. 07-1234,
Superior Court of Anywhere, July, 2007.
EPA Form 3110-48 6

SECTION 4: Research Support/Project Funding
Report any source of research or project funding (e.g., grants, contracts, or other mechanism) that you or your spouse have received in
the last two years preceding the date of filing from any source (including state, federal or local government, private sector companies,
or non-profit organizations). You may indicate (S) for research support or project funding received for your spouse. Add any
additional pages as necessary. If you have NO research support or project funding, enter “NONE” below.
Funding Exact Title of Project. Include start and completion dates. Please also indicate whether funded through
Organization grant, cooperative agreement, or contract. If a grant, include whether awarded competitively or not. If an
(Name, City, State) EPA grant include Project Officer and grant number.
If EPA, include
Office
Example: Example: Competitive Grant: “Mitigation Technologies for Volatile Organic Compounds” July 2007-July
Foundation for a 2011.
Cleaner Tomorrow,
Washington, DC
Example: EPA, Example: Competitive Grant: “Health Effects of Long-Term Exposure to Air Pollutants in Nonsmoking
Office of Research Virginia Residents” Project Officer: Jane Doe. EPA Grant Number R123456. March 2000 – Feb. 2003
and Development,
Cincinnati, OH
EPA Form 3110-48 (8-11) 7

SECTION 5: Assets
Report for yourself, spouse, and dependent children any assets currently held for investment that are valued at more than $1,000 or
that generate more than $200 per year in income. You may distinguish any entry for a family member by preceding it with (S) for
spouse, (DC) for dependent child, or (J) for jointly held. You may also add additional pages if needed. If you have NO reportable
assets, enter “NONE” below.
Types of assets to report include (but are not limited to):

• Stocks, bonds, annuities, trust holdings, partnership interests, life insurance, investment real estate or a privately-held trade or
business. For real estate or a privately held business, report the type and city/state of the entity.
• Sector mutual funds, which are funds invested in a particular industry, business, or location such as ABC Electronics Fund or
XYZ Canada Fund. Please report the full name of the fund, not just the general family fund name.
• Individual holdings of retirement plans like 401(k)s or IRAs. List each holding except diversified mutual funds (see below)
• Holdings of investment life insurance or variable annuities
• Defined benefit pension plans (include name of employer)
Do NOT report:
• Certificates of deposit, savings accounts or checking accounts or any deposit in a bank, credit union or similar financial
institution
• Term life insurance
• Money market mutual funds or money market accounts
• Your personal residence (unless you rent it out)
• Diversified mutual funds, such as ABC Equity Value Fund or XYZ Large Capital Fund
• U.S. Government securities (e.g., treasury bonds, treasury bills, treasury notes, U.S. savings bonds or any securities issued by
U.S. Government agencies or Government sponsored corporations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority)
• Money owed to you, your spouse, or dependent child by a spouse, parent, sibling, or child
• Social Security Benefits
• Federal Government salary or retirement benefits
• Veterans’ benefits
• Alimony
• Child Support
• Underlying holdings of a trust that was not created by you, your spouse or dependent children and for which you, your
spouse and dependent children have no past or present knowledge of the holdings or sources of income
Definitions:
Dependent Child: A son, daughter, stepson or stepdaughter who is either: (1) unmarried and under age 21 and living in the filer’s
house, or (2) considered dependent under the U.S. tax code.
Diversified Mutual Fund: A mutual fund that does not have a policy of concentrating its investments in an industry, business, single
country other than the United States or single state within the United States.
Full Name of Asset. Include stock ticker symbol or other identifying information as appropriate.
Example: DEF Corporation (DEFC)
Example: JKL Energy Fund (JKLE)
EPA Form 3110-48 8

Continuation of Section 5 (if needed). Otherwise, continue to Section 6.
Full Name of Asset. Include stock ticker symbol or other identifying information as appropriate.
EPA Form 3110-48 9

Page 10
SECTION 6: Supplemental Ethics Questions for Special Government Employees Serving on Advisory
Panel/Committees/Subcommittees
If you are serving or are a candidate to serve on an advisory panel/committee/subcommittee, please answer the following questions:
Do you know of any reason that you might be unable to provide impartial advice on the matter to come before the
panel/committee/subcommittee or any reason that your impartiality in the matter might be questioned?
Have you had any previous involvement with the review document(s) under consideration including authorship, collaboration with the
authors, or previous peer review functions? If so, please identify and describe that involvement.
Have you served on previous advisory panels, committees or subcommittees that have addressed the topic under consideration? If so,
please identify those activities.
Have you made any public statements (written or oral) on the issue that would indicate to an observer that you have taken a position
on the issue under consideration? If so, please identify those statements.
You may attach extra sheets if needed.
EPA Form 3110-48 10

Union of Concerned Scientists and Elizabeth Anne Sheppard V Scott Pruitt, 18-10129

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Case 1:18-cv-10129 Document 1 Filed 01/23/18 Page 1 of 33

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS;

1. Science conducted by independent, unbiased scientists plays a critical role in a

functioning democracy. It helps lawmakers identify policy priorities. It informs government

on a variety of EPA federal advisory committees (“FACs” or “advisory committees”), including

4. Although the Administrator’s stated goal was to strengthen the “independence” of

5. The Administrator’s Memorandum, moreover, wholly fails to explain why

deck against scientific integrity.

committees in a meaningful way by replacing impartial, well-qualified scientists affiliated with

barred from doing so.

8. Finally, the Directive is an attack on science itself, as it portrays legitimate,

independent scientists—who provide accurate, evidence-based information backed by verifiable,

seeking to advance an agenda. The open exchange of accurate information is a touchstone of a

and hold government leaders accountable. This unprecedented Directive is an attempt to

the results of their research.

A. Union Of Concerned Scientists

10. The Union of Concerned Scientists (“UCS”) is a not-for-profit organization with

history or science policy.

are directly affected by the Directive.

(“CASAC”) as a special government employee. She is eligible to be reappointed to an additional

three-year term on the CASAC when her current term concludes.

as Co-Investigator on an EPA grant awarding approximately $3 million for research on health

role as Co-Investigator on the EPA grant that she gave up.

important form of public service.

II. The Defendants

UCS members have served and wish to serve.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

authority pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

District. Specifically, UCS is headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

I. The EPA And Federal Advisory Committees

experts on topics relevant to the EPA’s mission.

Office of Research and Development’s “research programs,” “research management practices,”

at 1 (2016), attached hereto as Exhibit D.

interests of a variety of viewpoints.

environmental issues.” Exhibit C at 3.

that only trained, independent scientists can adequately provide.

serving the public interest.

the public good.

II. The Directive

33. On October 31, 2017, Administrator Pruitt promulgated a Directive and

accompanying Memorandum titled “Strengthening and Improving Membership on EPA Federal

34. At a minimum, thousands of scientists affiliated with academic and not-for-profit

Substantially all individuals serving as a principal investigator or co-investigator on these grants

A. The Directive Is An Unexplained Departure From Long-Standing EPA Policy and

in the United States.

such, when a scientist is awarded a government research grant through an investigator-initiated,

peer-reviewed competition, there generally should be no question as to that scientist’s ability to

panel/committee/subcommittee or any reason that your impartiality in the matter might be

fashion or chose [sic] the grant.”14

adopted a policy analogous to the Directive.

B. The Directive Singles Out And Targets Academic Scientists.

nothing to do with his or her grant.

Directive is in the same vein as these actions.

promotion of regulatory capture rather than serving as a guard against it.

demonstrated a statistically greater likelihood of reporting positive results.21 Although issued in

C. Separate Federal Laws And Regulations Governing Conflicts Of Interest Permit

serving on EPA advisory committees.

EPA FACs were those imposed by uniform federal ethics rules.

50. 18 U.S.C. § 208 is the primary statutory source of conflict-of-interest prohibitions

of interest, and § 208(b) establishes exceptions to that prohibition.

51. 18 U.S.C. § 208(d)(2) authorizes the Office of Government Ethics (“OGE”) to

promulgate “uniform” regulations to implement the provisions of § 208(b). Such regulations