TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A.

Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22,
1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997,
Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him
of bigamy.

HELD:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a
naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a
divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,

October 2, 2001

FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In
1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994,
he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other
hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage
was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared
that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was
forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26
of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws.
Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is
not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of
petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its
admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under
Australian law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In
this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to
a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent
might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other
evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence
conclusively showing the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’
marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.
Quita vs Court of Appeals
December 22, 1998

Fact of the Case:

Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married inthe Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23,
1954.Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children.

On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to whowill be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case
held thatthe divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in
the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they are valid according to
their national law. The petitioner herselfanswered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino
at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no longer a Filipino citizen.

The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net hereditary estatewas ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo.
Blandina and thePadlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsiderationwas granted declaring the Padlan children, with
the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not
declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared voidsince it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.Blandina and
her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
(1)Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio.

(2)Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo.

Held:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here
sinceshe was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountry’s national law.

Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be theprimary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo

FE DE QUITA V. CA

FACTS:

1. Fe D. Quita and Arturo Padlan were married in the Philippines. They have no children. However, their relationship turned sour. Fe sued Arturo for divorce
in San Francisco, California.She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from
each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties.
a. The divorce was granted. Fe subsequently married Felix which also ended in divorce. Undeterred, she married for the third time to Wernimont.
2. Arturo died leaving no will. Javier filed a petition with RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company.
3. Blandina Dandan opposed the motion claiming that she was the surviving spouse of Arturo and that they had 6 children.
4. Ruperto, brother of Arturo, claimed that he was the sole surviving brother of Arturo.
5. Petitioner Fe, however, moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent. The trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the
6 children, however, the records were not submitted.
6. TC: Fe and Ruperto are the only heirs.
a. Divorce in a foreign jurisdiction is not recognized in the PH, therefore, the divorce of Fe and Arturo is disregarded.
b. The extrajudicial settlement entered into by Fe and Arturo is not valid due to lack of judicial approval.
c. It was not proven that the 6 children were acknowledged by Arturo.
7. MR: partially granted. The children are considered as heirs.
8. Blandina appealed contending that the case was decided without hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the
law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
9. CA: agreed with Blandina. Remand the case to the TC.

ISSUE: WON the case should be remanded to the TC, there being a controversy?

HELD:

1. Although there is no dispute that exists as to the right of the children, there is still a controversy that remains which is: who is the legitimate surviving
spouse.
2. The Trial court relied on the doctrine in Tenchavez v. Escao, wherein a divorce on foreign jurisdiction shall not be recognized in the PH.
3. However, based from the admissions of Petitioner that Arturo remained a Filipino, it can be implied that petitioner may not be a Filipino Citizen during her
divorce with Arturo.
a. In the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.
4. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and
Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the
time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court.
5. While it is to be remanded, the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the
prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages
and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal
disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in
January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an
affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce
was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse
and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and
a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal
Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that,
while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended
the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing
the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of
jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their
residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A
suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and
prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations
to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON

G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?

HELD:
Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint…

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce
of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of
the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.