Angara

 v.  Electoral  Commission,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐45081,  July  15,  1936  

 
I.            THE  FACTS  
 
Petitioner   Jose   Angara   was   proclaimed   winner   and   took   his   oath   of   office   as   member   of   the   National   Assembly   of   the  
Commonwealth   Government.   On   December   3,   1935,   the   National   Assembly   passed   a   resolution   confirming   the   election   of   those  
who  have  not  been  subject  of  an  election  protest  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  said  resolution.  
 
On   December   8,   1935,   however,   private   respondent   Pedro  Ynsua   filed   an   election   protest   against   the   petitioner   before   the  
Electoral   Commission   of   the   National   Assembly.   The   following   day,  December   9,   1935,  the   Electoral   Commission   adopted   its   own  
resolution  providing  that  it  will  not  consider  any  election  protest  that  was  not  submitted  on  or  before  December  9,  1935.  
 
Citing   among   others   the   earlier   resolution   of   the   National   Assembly,   the   petitioner   sought   the   dismissal   of   respondent’s  
protest.  The  Electoral  Commission  however  denied  his  motion.  
 
II.        THE  ISSUE  
 
Did   the   Electoral   Commission   act   without   or   in   excess   of   its   jurisdiction   in   taking   cognizance   of   the   protest   filed   against   the  
election  of  the  petitioner  notwithstanding  the  previous  confirmation  of  such  election  by  resolution  of  the  National  Assembly?  
 
III.      THE  RULING  
 
[The  Court  DENIED  the  petition.]  
 
NO,  the  Electoral  Commission  did  not  act  without  or  in  excess  of  its  jurisdiction  in  taking  cognizance  of  the  protest  filed  
against   the   election   of   the   petitioner   notwithstanding   the   previous   confirmation   of   such   election   by   resolution   of   the   National  
Assembly.  
 
The   Electoral   Commission   acted   within   the   legitimate   exercise   of   its   constitutional   prerogative   in   assuming   to   take  
cognizance  of  the  protest  filed  by  the  respondent  Ynsua  against  the  election  of  the  petitioner  Angara,  and  that  the  earlier  resolution  
of  the  National  Assembly  cannot  in  any  manner  toll  the  time  for  filing  election  protests  against  members  of  the  National  Assembly,  
nor  prevent  the  filing  of  a  protest  within  such  time  as  the  rules  of  the  Electoral  Commission  might  prescribe.  
 
The  grant  of  power  to  the  Electoral  Commission  to  judge  all  contests  relating  to  the  election,  returns  and  qualifications  of  
members  of  the  National  Assembly,  is  intended  to  be  as  complete  and  unimpaired  as  if  it  had  remained  originally  in  the  legislature.  
The   express   lodging   of   that   power   in   the   Electoral   Commission   is   an   implied   denial   of   the   exercise   of   that   power   by   the   National  
Assembly.  xxx.  
 
[T]he   creation   of   the   Electoral   Commission   carried   with   it  ex   necesitate   rei  the   power   regulative   in   character   to   limit   the  
time  with  which  protests  intrusted  to  its  cognizance  should  be  filed.  [W]here  a  general  power  is  conferred  or  duty  enjoined,  every  
particular   power   necessary   for   the   exercise   of   the   one   or   the   performance   of   the   other   is   also   conferred.   In   the   absence   of   any  
further   constitutional   provision   relating   to   the   procedure   to   be   followed   in   filing   protests   before   the   Electoral   Commission,  
therefore,   the   incidental   power   to   promulgate   such   rules   necessary   for   the   proper   exercise   of   its   exclusive   power   to   judge   all  
contests   relating   to   the   election,   returns   and   qualifications   of   members   of   the   National   Assembly,   must   be   deemed   by   necessary  
implication  to  have  been  lodged  also  in  the  Electoral  Commission.  
 

 
 Case  Digest:  Dante  O.  Casibang  vs.  Honorable  Narciso  A.  Aquino  
20  August  1979  
 
FACTS:  
 
Yu  was  proclaimed  on  November  1971  as  the  elected  mayor  of  Rosales,  Pangasinan.     Casibang,  his  only  rival,  filed  a  protest  against  
election  on  the  grounds  of  rampant  vote  buying,  anomalies  and  irregularities  and  others.  During  the  proceedings  of  this  case,  the  
1973  Constitution  came  into  effect.     Respondent  Yu  moved  to  dismiss  the  election  protest  of  the  petitioner  on  the  ground  that  the  
trial  court  had  lost  jurisdiction  over  the  same  in  view  of  the  effectivity  of  the  new  Constitution  and  the  new  parliamentary  form  of  
government.  
 
ISSUES:  

1. Whether  Section  9,  Article  XVII  of  the  1973  Constitution  rendered  the  protest  moot  and  academic;  and  
2. Whether   Section   2,   Article   XI   thereof   entrusted   to   the   National   Assembly   the   revamp   of   the   entire   local   government  
structure.  

RULING:  

1. As   stated   in   Santos   vs.   Castaneda,   “the   constitutional   grant   of   privilege   to   continue   in   office,   made   by   the   new   Constitution  
for   the   benefit   of   persons   who   were   incumbent   officials   or   employees   of   the   Government   when   the   new   Constitution   took  
effect,   cannot   be   fairly   construed   as   indiscriminately   encompassing   every   person   who   at   the   time   happened   to   be  
performing   the   duties   of   an   elective   office,   albeit   under   protest   or   contest"   and   that   "subject   to   the   constraints   specifically  
mentioned  in  Section  9,  Article  XVII  of  the  Transitory  Provisions,  it  neither  was,  nor  could  have  been  the  intention  of  the  
framers  of  our  new  fundamental  law  to  disregard  and  shunt  aside  the  statutory  right  of  a  candidate  for  elective  position  
who,  within  the  time-­‐frame  prescribed  in  the  Election  Code  of  1971,  commenced  proceedings  beamed  mainly  at  the  proper  
determination  in  a  judicial  forum  of  a  proclaimed  candidate-­‐elect's  right  to  the  contested  office.”  
2. Section   2   of   Article   XI   does   not   stigmatize   the   issue   in   that   electoral   protest   case   with   a   political   color.   For   simply,   that  
section  allocated  unto  the  National  Assembly  the  power  to  enact  a  local  government  code  "which  may  not  thereafter  be  
amended   except   by   a   majority   of   all   its   Members,   defining   a   more   responsive   and   accountable   local   government   allocating  
among   the   different   local   government   units   their   powers,   responsibilities,   and   resources,   and   providing   for   their  
qualifications,   election   and   removal,   term,   salaries,   powers,   functions   and   duties   of   local   officials,   and   all   other   matters  
relating  to  the  organization  and  operation  of  the  local  units"  but  "...  any  change  in  the  existing  form  of  local  government  
shall  not  take  effect  until  ratified  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  a  plebiscite  called  for  the  purpose."    

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Vera  vs  Avelino  Case  Digest  
FACTS:  
 
Commission  on  Elections  submitted  last  May  1946  to  the  President  and  the  Congress  of  the  Philippines  a  report  regarding  
the  national  elections  held  the  previous  month.  It  stated  that  by  reason  of  certain  specified  acts  of  terrorism  and  violence  in  
the   province   of   Pampanga,   Nueva   Ecija,   Bulacan   and   Tarlac,   the   voting   in   said   region   did   not   reflect   the   true   and   free  
expression   of   the   popular   will.  
 
During   the   session,   when   the   senate   convened   on   May   25,   1946,   a   pendatum   resolution   was   approved   referring   to   the  
report  ordering  that  Jose  O.  Vera,  Ramon  Diokno  and  Jose  E.  Romero  –  who  had  been  included  among  the  16  candidates  for  
senator   receiving   the   highest   number   of   votes,   proclaimed   by   the   Commissions   on   Elections   –   shall   not   be   sworn,   nor  
seated,   as   members   of   the   chamber,   pending   the   termination   of   the   of   the   protest   lodged   against   their   election.  
 
Petitioners   thus   immediately   instituted   an   action   against   their   colleagues   responsible   for   the   resolution,   praying   for   an  
order   to   annul   it   and   compelling   respondents   to   permit   them   to   occupy   their   seats   and   to   exercise   their   senatorial  
prerogative.  They  also  allege  that  only  the  Electoral  Tribunal  had  jurisdiction  over  contests  relating  to  their  election,  returns  
and   qualifications.   Respondents   assert   the   validity   of   the   pendatum   resolution.  
 
ISSUES:  
 
1.Whether  the  Commission  on  Elections  has  the  jurisdiction  to  determine  whether  or  not  votes  cast  in  the  said  provinces  
are   valid.  
 
2.Whether   administration   of   oath   and   the   sitting   of   Jose   O.   Vera,   Ramon   Diokno   and   Jose   Romero   should   be   deferred  
pending   hearing   and   decision   on   the   protests   lodged   against   their   elections.  
 
RULING:  
 
The   Supreme   Court   refused   to   intervene,   under   the   concept   of   separation   of   powers,   holding   that   the   case   was   not   a  
“contest”,   and   affirmed   the   inherent   right   of   the   legislature   to   determine   who   shall   be   admitted   to   its   membership.  
 
Case  dismissed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ABUEVA  vs  WOOD  G.R.  No.  L-­‐21327  January  14,  1924  
 The  parties:  

Petitioners   are   members   of   the   Independence   Commission.   The   creation   of   the   commission   was   ratified   and   adopted   by   the  
Philippine  Legislature  on  the  8th  day  of  March,  1919.  Twenty  six  of  the  petitioners  are  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  
and    four  are  members  of  the  Senate  of  the  Philippine  Islands  and  they  all  belong  to  the  democratic  party;  

Respondents  are  Leonard  Wood,  the  Governor-­‐General  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  Manuel  L.  Quezon  and  Manuel  Roxas,  Presidents  of  
the  Independence  Commission.  Sued  as  well  are  the  Acting  Auditor,  the  Executive  Secretary    and  the  Secretary  of  the  Independence  
Commission.  

This   is   an   original   action   commenced   in   the   Supreme   Court   by   the   petitioners   for   the   writ   of   mandamus   to   compel   the   respondents  
to   exhibit   to   the   petitioners   and   to   permit   them   to   examine   all   the   vouchers   and   other   documentary   proofs   in   their   possession,  
showing  the  disbursements  and  expenditures  made  out  of  the  funds  of  the  Independence  Commission.  

FACTS:  

By  Act  No.  2933  the  Legislature  of  the  Philippine   Islands   provided    for   a   standing   appropriation   of   one   million   pesos(P1,000,000)   per  
annum,  payable  out  of  any  funds  in  the  Insular  Treasury,  not  otherwise  appropriated,  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  Independence  
Commission,  including  publicity  and  all  other  expenses  in  connection  with  the  performance  of  its  duties;  that  said  appropriation  shall  
be  considered  as  included  in  the  annual  appropriation  for  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives,  at  the  rate  of  P500,000  for  
each  house,  although  the  appropriation  act  hereafter  approved  may  not  make  any  specific  appropriation  for  said  purpose;  with  the  
proviso  that  no  part  of  said  sum  shall  be  set  upon  the  books  of  the  Insular  Auditor  until  it  shall  be  necessary  to  make  the  payment  or  
payments  authorized  by  said  act  

Petitioners   averred   that   as   members   of   the   Independence   Commission   they   are   legally   obliged   to   prevent   the   funds   from   being  
squandered,   and   to   prevent   any   investments   and   illicit   expenses   in   open   contravention   of   the   purposes   of   the   law.   Petitioners   have  
verbally   and   by   writing   requested   the   respondents   to   permit   them   to   examine   the   vouchers   and   other   documentary   proofs   relating  
to  the  expenditures  and  payments  made  out  of  the  funds  appropriated  for  the  use  of  the  Independence  Commission.  

Respondents  have  denied  and  continue  denying  to  permit  the  petitioners  from  examining  said  vouchers  and  documentary  proofs.  

ISSUE:    Can  the  Court  compel  the  respondents  to  address  the  claims  of  the  petitioners  

HELD:  

1. Leonard   Wood,   as   Governor-­‐General   of   the   Philippine   Islands   and   head   of   the   executive   department   of   the   Philippine  
Government,  is  not  subject  to  the  control  or  supervision  of  the  courts.  
2. Manuel   L.   Quezon   and   Manuel   Roxas,   as   Chairman   of   the   Independence   Commission,   are   mere   agents   of   the   Philippine  
Legislature  and  cannot  be  controlled  or  interfered  with  by  the  courts.  
3. As  for  the  auditor,  the  court  has  no  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  of  the  action  because  section  24  of  the  Jones  Law  provides  
that:   “The   administrative   jurisdiction   of   the   Auditor   over   accounts,   whether   of   funds   or   property,   and   all   vouchers   and  
records  pertaining  thereto,  shall  be  exclusive”  
The  determination  of  whether  the  accounts  of  the  expenses  of  the  Commission  of  Independence  should  be  shown  to  the  plaintiffs  or  
not  is  a  question  of  policy  and  administrative  discretion,  and  is  therefore  not  justiciable.  
 Tanada  vs  Cuenco,    103  Phil.  1051  
 
After  the  1955  national  elections,  the  membership  in  the  Senate  was  overwhelmingly  occupied  by  the  Nacionalista  Party.  The  lone  
opposition  senator  was  Lorenzo  Tañada  who  belonged  to  the  Citizen’s  Party.  Diosdado  Macapagal  on  the  other  hand  was  a  
senatorial  candidate  who  lost  the  bid  but  was  contesting  it  before  the  Senate  Electoral  Tribunal  (SET).  But  prior  to  a  decision  the  SET  
would  have  to  choose  its  members.  It  is  provided  that  the  SET  should  be  composed  of  9  members  comprised  of  the  following:  3  
justices  of  the  Supreme  Court,  3  senators  from  the  majority  party  and  3  senators  from  the  minority  party.  But  since  there  is  only  one  
minority  senator  the  other  two  SET  members  supposed  to  come  from  the  minority  were  filled  in  by  the  NP.  Tañada  assailed  this  
process  before  the  Supreme  Court.  So  did  Macapagal  because  he  deemed  that  if  the  SET  would  be    dominated  by  NP  senators  then  
he,  as  a  member  of  the  Liberalista  Party  will  not  have  any  chance  in  his  election  contest.  Senator  Mariano  Cuenco  et  al  (members  of  
the  NP)  averred  that  the  Supreme  Court  cannot  take  cognizance  of  the  issue  because  it  is  a  political  question.  Cuenco  argued   that  
the  power  to  choose  the  members  of  the  SET  is  vested  in  the  Senate  alone  and  the  remedy  for  Tañada  and  Macapagal  was  not  to  
raise  the  issue  before  judicial  courts  but  rather  to  leave  it  before  the  bar  of  public  opinion.  

ISSUE:  Whether  or  not  the  issue  is  a  political  question.  

HELD:  

No.  The  SC  took  cognizance  of  the  case  and  ruled  that  the  issue  is  a  justiciable  question.  The  term  Political  Question  connotes  what  it  
means  in  ordinary  parlance,  namely,  a  question  of  policy.  It  refers  to  those  questions  which,  under  the  Constitution,  are  to  be  
decided  by  the  people  in  their  sovereign  capacity;  or  in  regard  to  which  full  discretionary  authority  has  been  delegated  to  the  
legislative  or  executive  branch  of  the  government.  It  is  concerned  with  issues  dependent  upon  the  wisdom,  not  legality,  of  a  
particular  measure.  

In  this  case,  the  issue  at  bar  is  not  a  political  question.  The  Supreme  Court  is  not  being  asked  by  Tañada  to  decide  upon  the  official  
acts  of  Senate.  The  issue  being  raised  by  Tañada  was  whether  or  not  the  elections  of  the  5  NP  members  to  the  SET  are  valid  –  which  
is  a  judicial  question.  Note  that  the  SET  is  a  separate  and  independent  body  from  the  Senate  which  does  not  perform  legislative  acts.  

But  how  should  the  gridlock  be  resolved?  

The  nomination  of  the  last  two  members  (who  would  fill  in  the  supposed  seat  of  the  minority  members)  must  not  come  from  the  
majority  party.  In  this  case,  the  Chairman  of  the  SET,  apparently  already  appointed  members  that  would  fill  in  the  minority  seats  
(even  though  those  will  come  from  the  majority  party).  This  is  still  valid  provided  the  majority  members  of  the  SET  (referring  to  
those  legally  sitting)  concurred  with  the  Chairman.  Besides,  the  SET  may  set  its  own  rules  in  situations  like  this  provided  such  rules  
comply  with  the  Constitution.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Daza  v.  Singson  
G.R.  No.  86344  December  21,  1989  
Cruz,  J.  
 
Facts:  
 
                                The  House  of  Representatives.  Twenty  four  members  of  the  Liberal  Party  formally  resigned  from  that  party  and  joined  the  
LDP,  thereby  swelling  its  number  to  159  and  correspondingly  reducing  their  former  party  to  only  17  members.  
 
On   the   basis   of   this   development,   the   House   of   Representatives   revised   its   representation   in   the   Commission   on  
Appointments  by  withdrawing  the  seat  occupied  by  the  petitioner  and  giving  this  to  the  newly-­‐formed  LDP.  On  December  5,  1988,  
the   chamber   elected   a   new   set   of   representatives   consisting   of   the   original   members   except   the   petitioner   and   including   therein  
respondent  Luis  C.  Singson  as  the  additional  member  from  the  LDP.  
 
The   petitioner   came   to   the   Supreme   Court   to   challenge   his   removal   from   the   Commission   on   Appointments   and   the  
assumption  of  his  seat  by  the  respondent.  Acting  initially  on  his  petition  for  prohibition  and  injunction  with  preliminary  injunction,  
we   issued   a   temporary   restraining   order   that   same   day   to   prevent   both   the   petitioner   and   the   respondent   from   serving   in   the  
Commission  on  Appointments.  
 
Briefly   stated,   the   contention   of   the   petitioner   is   that   he   cannot   be   removed   from   the   Commission   on   Appointments  
because  his  election  thereto  is  permanent.  His  claim  is  that  the  reorganization  of  the  House  representation  in  the  said  body  is  not  
based  on  a  permanent  political  realignment  because  the  LDP  is  not  a  duly  registered  political  party  and  has  not  yet  attained  political  
stability.  
 
Issue:  
 
                               whether  the  question  raised  by  the  petitioner  is  political  in  nature  and  so  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  
 
Held:  
 
                               No.  The  Court  has  the  competence  to  act  on  the  matter  at  bar.  The  issue  involved  is  not  a  discretionary  act  of  the  House  of  
Representatives   that   may   not   be   reviewed   by   us   because   it   is   political   in   nature.   What   is   involved   here   is   the   legality,   not   the  
wisdom,  of  the  act  of  that  chamber  in  removing  the  petitioner  from  the  Commission  on  Appointments.  
                               
The   term  political   question  connotes,   in   legal   parlance,   what   it   means   in   ordinary   parlance,   namely,   a   question   of   policy.   In  
other   words,   it   refers   to   those   questions   which,   under   the   Constitution,   are   to   be   decided   by   the   people   in   their   sovereign   capacity,  
or   in   regard   to   which   full   discretionary   authority   has   been   delegated   to   the   Legislature   or   executive   branch   of   the   Government.   It   is  
concerned  with  issues  dependent  upon  the  wisdom,  not  legality,  of  a  particular  measure.  
 
                                Even   if   we   were   to   assume   that   the   issue   presented   before   us   was   political   in   nature,   we   would   still   not   be   precluded   from  
resolving  it  under  the  expanded  jurisdiction  conferred  upon  us  that  now  covers,  in  proper  cases,  even  the  political  question.  Article  
VII,  Section  1,  of  the  Constitution  clearly  provides:  
 
Section  1.  The  judicial  power  shall  be  vested  in  one  Supreme  Court  and  in  such  lower  courts  as  may  be  established  by  law.  
 
Judicial  power  includes  the  duty  of  the  courts  of  justice  to  settle  actual  controversies  involving  rights  which  are  legally  demandable  
and   enforceable,   and   to   determine   whether   or   not   there   has   been   a   grave   abuse   of   discretion   amounting   to   lack   or   excess   of  
jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  any  branch  or  instrumentality  of  the  Government.  
 
 TANADA  v.  ANGARA  

272  SCRA  18,  May  2,  1997  

Facts  :  
This  is  a  petition  seeking  to  nullify  the  Philippine  ratification  of  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  Agreement.  Petitioners  question  
the  concurrence  of  herein  respondents  acting  in  their  capacities  as  Senators  via  signing  the  said  agreement.  

The  WTO  opens  access  to  foreign  markets,  especially  its  major  trading  partners,  through  the  reduction  of  tariffs  on  its  exports,  
particularly  agricultural  and  industrial  products.  Thus,  provides  new  opportunities  for  the  service  sector  cost  and  uncertainty  
associated  with  exporting  and  more  investment  in  the  country.  These  are  the  predicted  benefits  as  reflected  in  the  agreement  and  
as  viewed  by  the  signatory  Senators,  a  “free  market”  espoused  by  WTO.  

Petitioners  on  the  other  hand  viewed  the  WTO  agreement  as  one  that  limits,  restricts  and  impair  Philippine  economic  sovereignty  
and  legislative  power.  That  the  Filipino  First  policy  of  the  Constitution  was  taken  for  granted  as  it  gives  foreign  trading  intervention.  
 
Issue  :  Whether  or  not  there  has  been  a  grave  abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  the  
Senate  in  giving  its  concurrence  of  the  said  WTO  agreement.  

Held:  
In  its  Declaration  of  Principles  and  state  policies,  the  Constitution  “adopts  the  generally  accepted  principles  of  international  law  as  
part  of  the  law  of  the  land,  and  adheres  to  the  policy  of  peace,  equality,  justice,  freedom,  cooperation  and  amity  ,  with  all  nations.  
By  the  doctrine  of  incorporation,  the  country  is  bound  by  generally  accepted  principles  of  international  law,  which  are  considered  
automatically  part  of  our  own  laws.  Pacta  sunt  servanda  –  international  agreements  must  be  performed  in  good  faith.  A  treaty  is  not  
a  mere  moral  obligation  but  creates  a  legally  binding  obligation  on  the  parties.  
Through  WTO  the  sovereignty  of  the  state  cannot  in  fact  and  reality  be  considered  as  absolute  because  it  is  a  regulation  of  
commercial  relations  among  nations.  Such  as  when  Philippines  joined  the  United  Nations  (UN)  it  consented  to  restrict  its  sovereignty  
right  under  the  “concept  of  sovereignty  as  autolimitation.”  What  Senate  did  was  a  valid  exercise  of  authority.  As  to  determine  
whether  such  exercise  is  wise,  beneficial  or  viable  is  outside  the  realm  of  judicial  inquiry  and  review.  The  act  of  signing  the  said  
agreement  is  not  a  legislative  restriction  as  WTO  allows  withdrawal  of  membership  should  this  be  the  political  desire  of  a  member.  
Also,  it  should  not  be  viewed  as  a  limitation  of  economic  sovereignty.  WTO  remains  as  the  only  viable  structure  for  multilateral  
trading  and  the  veritable  forum  for  the  development  of  international  trade  law.  Its  alternative  is  isolation,  stagnation  if  n ot  
economic  self-­‐destruction.  Thus,  the  people  be  allowed,  through  their  duly  elected  officers,  make  their  free  choice.  
Petition  is  DISMISSED  for  lack  of  merit.  

Forbes  vs.  Chuoco  Tiaco  (16  Phil  534)  

 
1  
The   three   plaintiffs   in   error   severally   sued   the   defendants   in   error,   alleging   that   Mr.   Forbes   was   the   governor   general   of   the  
Philippines,  Trowbridge  chief  of  the  Secret  Service  of  Manila,  and  Harding  chief  of  police  of  the  same;  that  the  plaintiff  was  a  Chinese  
person,  lawfully  resident  in  the  Philippines,  and  that  the  defendants  forcibly  deported  the  plaintiff  to  China,  and  forcibly  prevented  
his  return  for  some  months;  that  the  plaintiff  returned  on  March  29,  1910,  and  that  the  defendants  threatened  and  were  trying  to  
expel  the  plaintiff  again,—Trowbridge  and  Harding  acting  throughout  under  the  order  of  the  defendant  Forbes.  There  was  a  prayer  
for   an   injunction   and   damages.   The   defendants   demurred,   but   the   demurrer   was   overruled   and   a   temporary   injunction   granted.  
Thereupon  Forbes,  Harding,  and  Trowbridge  sued  for  writs  of  prohibition  against  the  judge  and  the  respective  plaintiffs,  alleging  that  
the  expulsion  was  carried  out  in  the  public  interest  and  at  the  request  of  the  proper  representative  of  the  Chinese  government  in  the  
Philippines,   and   was   immediately   reported   to   the   Secretary   of   War.   The   complaints   were   demurred   to,   but   the   supreme   court  
overruled   the   demurrers,   granted   the   prohibition,   and   ordered   the   actions   dismissed.   The   judge,   having   declined   to   join   in   the  
applications   for   writs   of   error,   was   made   a   respondent,   and   the   cases   are   here   on   the   ground   that   the   plaintiffs   have   been   deprived  
of  liberty  without  due  process  of  law.  Act  of  Congress,  July  1,  1902,  chap.  1369,  §  5,  32  Stat.  at  L.  691,  692.  
2  
The  purpose  of  the  first  suits,  of  course,  was  to  make  the  governor  general  personally  answerable  in  damages  for  acts  done  by  him  
by  color  of  his  office  and  in  pursuance  of  what  he  deemed  to  be  his  duty,  as  well  as  to  prevent  his  exercising  similar  power  in  the  
future.  This  sufficiently  appears  by  the  declarations,  which  suggest  and  do  not  exclude  official  action,  and  is  alleged  in  the  complaints  
for  prohibition.  On  April  19,  1910,  in  less  than  three  weeks  after  the  original  suits  were  brought,  the  Philippine  legislature  passed  an  
act   which,   reciting   that   the   governor   general   had   authorized   the   deportation   ‘in   the   exercise   of   authority   vested   in   him   by   law,’  
enacted  that  his  action  was  ‘approved  and  ratified  and  confirmed,  and  in  all  respects  declared  legal,  and  not  subject  to  question  or  
review.’  So  that,  if  ratification  by  that  body  can  dispose  of  the  matter,  no  court  has  authority  to  entertain  the  suits.  

3  
The  first  doubt  that  naturally  would  occur  is  whether,  if  a  right  of  action  had  vested  previously,  it  could  be  taken  away  by  such  a  
statute.  But  it  generally  is  recognized  that  in  cases  like  the  present,  where  the  act  originally  purports  to  be  done  in  the  name  and  by  
the   authority   of   the   state,   a   defect   in   that   authority   may   be   cured   by   the   subsequent   adoption   of   the   act.   The   person   who   has  
assumed   to   represent   the   will   and   person   of   the   superior   power   is   given   the   benefit   of   the   representation   if   it   turns   out   that   his  
assumption  was  correct.  O’Reilly  de  Camara  v.  Brooke,  209  U.  S.  45,  52,  52  L.  ed.  676,  678,  28  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  439;  United  States  v.  
Heinszen,   206   U.   S.   370,   382,   51   L.   ed.   1098,   1102,   27   Sup.   Ct.   Rep.   742,   11   Ann.   Cas.   688;   The   Paquete   Habana,   189   U.   S.   453,   465,  
47  L.  ed.  901,  903,  23  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  593;  Phillips  v.  Eyre,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.   1,  23,  10  Best  &  S.  1004,  40  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S.  28,  22  L.  T.  N.  S.  869;  
Secretary  of  State  v.  Kamachee  Boye  Sahaba,  13  Moore,  P.  C.  C.  22,  86,  7  Moore,  Ind.  App.  476.  Compare  West  Side  Belt  R.  Co.  v.  
Pittsburgh  Constr.  Co.  219  U.  S.  92,  55  L.  ed.  107,  31  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  196;  Dunbar  v.  Boston  &  P.  R.  Corp.  181  Mass.  383,  385,  386,  63  N.  
E.  916.  

4  
Therefore   the   deportation   is   to   be   considered   as   having   been   ordered   by   the   governor   general   in   pursuance   of   a   statute   of   the  
Philippine   legislature   directing   it,   under   their   combined   powers,   and   it   is   unnecessary   to   consider   whether   he   had   authority,   by  
virtue  of  his  office  alone,  as  declared  by  the  statute,  or  whether,  if  he  had  not,  he  had  immunity  from  suit  for  such  an  official  act  
done  in  good  faith.  The  former  matter  now  is  regulated  by  a  later  statute  providing  for  a  hearing,  etc.  No.  2113.  February  1,  1912.  On  
the  question  thus  narrowed  the  preliminaries  are  plain.  It  is  admitted  that  sovereign  states  have  inherent  power  to  deport  aliens,  
and  seemingly  that  Congress  is  not  deprived  of  this  power  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Fong  Yue  Ting  v.  United  States,  
149  U.  S.  698,  707,  728,  37  L.  ed.  905,  911,  918,  13  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1016;  Wong  Wing  v.  United  States,  163  U.  S.  228,  231,  41  L.  ed.  140,  
141,  16  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  977;  Fok  Yung  Yo  v.  United  States,  185  U.  S.  296,  302,  46  L.  ed.  917,  920,  22  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  686;  United  States  ex  
rel.  Turner  v.  Williams,  194  U.  S.  279,  289,  290,  48  L.  ed.  979,  983,  984,  24  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  719.  Furthermore,  the  very  ground  of  the  
power  in  the  necessities  of  public  welfare  shows  that  it  may  have  to  be  exercised  in  a  summary  way  through  executive  officers.  Fong  
Yue  Ting  v.  United  States,  supra;  United  States  v.  Ju  Toy,  198  U.  S.  253,  263,  49  L.  ed.  1040,  1044,  25  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  644;  Moyer  v.  
Peabody,  212  U.  S.  78,  84,  85,  53  L.  ed.  410,  29  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  235.  So  that  the  question  is  narrowed  further  to  the  inquiry  whether  the  
Philippine  government  cannot  do  what  unquestionably  Congress  might.  

5  
As   Congress   is   not   prevented   by   the   Constitution,   the   Philippine   government   cannot   be   prevented   by   the   Philippine   Bill   of   Rights  
alone.   Act   of   July   1,   1902,   chap.   1369,   §   5,   32   Stat.   at   L.   691,   692.   Deporting   the   plaintiffs   was   not   depriving   them   of   liberty   without  
due  process  of  law,  unless  on  other  grounds  the  local  government  was  acting  beyond  its  powers.  But  the  local  government  has  all  
civil  and  judicial  power  necessary  to  govern  the  Islands.  Act  of  March  2,  1901,  chap.  803,  31  Stat.  at  L.  895,  910,  act  of  July  1,  1902,  
chap.  1369,  §  1,  32  Stat.  at  L.  691.  The  forms  are  different,  but  as  in  Hawaii,  the  proximate  source  of  private  rights  is  local,  whether  
they   spring   by   inheritance   from   Spain   or   are   created   by   Philippine   legislation.   See   Kawananakoa   v.   Polyblank,   205   U.   S.   349,  354,   51  
L.   ed.   834,   836,   27   Sup.   Ct.   Rep.   526;   Perez   v.   Fernandez,   202   U.   S.   80,   91,   92,   50   L.   ed.   942,   945,   946,   26   Sup.   Ct.   Rep.   561.   It   would  
be  strange  if  a  government  so  remote  should  be  held  bound  to  wait  for  the  action  of  Congress  in  a  matter  that  might  touch  its  life  
unless   dealt   with   at   once   and   on   the   spot.   On   the   contrary,   we   are   of   opinion   that   it   had   the   power   as   an   incident   of   the   self-­‐
determination,  however  limited,  given  to  it  by  the  United  States.  

6  
By  §  86  of  the  act  of  July  1,  1902,  all  laws  passed  by  the  Philippine  government  are  to  be  reported  to  Congress,  which  reserves  power  
to  annul  them.  It  is  worthy  of  mention  that  the  law  under  consideration  was  reported  to  Congress  and  has  not  been  annulled.  The  
extension  of  the  Chinese  exclusion  and  immigration  laws  to  the  Philippine  Islands  has  no  bearing  on  the  matter.  The  right  to  remain,  
for   instance,   under   the   act   of   April   29,   1902,   chap.   641,   §   4,   32   Stat.   at   L.   176,   U.   S.   Comp.   Stat.   Supp.   1911,   p.   524,   does   not   prevail  
over  a  removal  as  an  act  of  state.  

7  
It  is  held  in  England  that  an  act  of  state  is  a  matter  not  cognizable  in  any  municipal  court.  Musgrave  v.  Pulido,  L.  R.  5  App.  Cas.  103,  
108,   49   L.   J.   P.   C.   N.   S.   20,   41   L.   T.   N.   S.   629,   28   Week.   Rep.   373.   And   that   was   the   purport   of   the   Philippine   act   declaring   the  
deportation   not   subject   to   question   or   review.   As   the   Bill   of   Rights   did   not   stand   in   the   way,   and   the   implied   powers   of   the  
government   sanctioned   by   Congress   permitted   it,   there   is   no   reason   why   the   statute   should   not   have   full   effect.   It   protected   the  
subordinates  as  well  as  the  governor  general,  and  took  jurisdiction  from  the  court  that  attempted  to  try  the  case.  

8  
Whether  prohibition  is  technically  the  proper  remedy,  historically  speaking,  we  need  not  inquire.  On  such  a  matter  we  should  not  
interfere  with  local  practice  except  for  good  cause  shown.  In  substance  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  right.  

9  
Judgment  affirmed.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 AYTONA  VS  CASTILLO  
4  SCRA  1  G.R.  No.  L-­‐19313  January  19  1962  [Midnight  Appointment]  

FACTS:  

On  December  29,  1961,  Outgoing  President  Carlos  Garcia  appointed  petitioner  Dominador  Aytona  as  ad  interim  Governor  of  the  
Central  Bank.  Aytona  took  the  corresponding  oath.  On  the  same  day,  at  noon,  President-­‐elect  Diosdado  Macapagal  assumed  office;  
and  on  the  next  day,  he  issued  administrative  order  no.  2  recalling,  withdrawing,  and  cancelling  all  ad  interim  appointments  made  by  
former  President  Garcia.  There  were  all-­‐in  all,  350  midnight  or  last  minute  appointments  made  by  the  former  President  Garcia.  On  
January  1,  President  Macapagal  appointed  Andres  Castillo    as  ad  interim  Governor  of  the  Central  Bank.  Aytona  instituted  a  case  (quo  
warranto)  against  Castillo,  contending  that  he  was  validly  appointed,  thus  the  subsequent  appointment  to  Castillo  by  the  new  
President,  should  be  considered  void.  

ISSUE:  

Whether  or  not  the  350  midnight  appointments  of  former  President  Garcia  were  valid.  

RULING:  
No.  After  the  proclamation  of  the  election  of  President  Macapagal,  previous  President  Garcia  administration  was  no  more  than  a  
care-­‐taker  administration.  He  was  duty  bound  to  prepare  for  the  orderly  transfer  of  authority  the  incoming  President,  and  he  should  
not  do  acts  which  he  ought  to  know,  would  embarrass  or  obstruct  the  policies  of  his  successor.    It  was  not  for  him  to  use  powers  as  
incumbent  President  to  continue  the  political  warfare  that  had  ended  or  to  avail  himself  of  presidential  prerogatives  to  serve  
partisan  purposes.  The  filling  up  vacancies  in  important  positions,  if  few,  and  so  spaced  to  afford  some  assurance  of  deliberate  
action  and  careful  consideration  of  the  need  for  the  appointment  and  the  appointee's  qualifications  may  undoubtedly  be  permitted.  
But  the  issuance  of  350  appointments  in  one  night  and  planned  induction  of  almost  all  of  them  a  few  hours  before  the  inauguration  
of  the  new  President  may,  with  some  reason,  be  regarded  by  the  latter  as  an  abuse  Presidential  prerogatives,  the  steps  taken  being  
apparently  a  mere  partisan  effort  to  fill  all  vacant  positions  irrespective  of  fitness  and  other  conditions,  and  thereby  deprive  the  new  
administration  of  an  opportunity  to  make  the  corresponding  appointments.  

 
 

 
 

 
 Alejandrino  v  Quezon  G.R.  No.  L-­‐22041.  September  11,  1924  
 

Facts:  "Resolved:  That  the  Honorable  Jose  Alejandrino,  Senator  for  the  Twelfth  District,  be,  as  he  is  hereby,  declared  guilty  of  disorderly  
conduct  and  flagrant  violation  of  the  privileges  of  the  Senate  for  having  treacherously  assaulted  the  Honorable  Vicente  de  Vera,  Senator  
for  the  Sixth  District  on  the  occasion  of  certain,  phrases  being  uttered  by  the  latter  in  the  course  of  the  debate  regarding  the  credentials  of  
said  Mr.  Alejandrino.  
 
Issue:  Whether  resolution  above  quoted  is  unconstitutional  and  entirely  of  no  effect,  for  five  reasons.  He  prays  the  court:  
(1)  To  issue  a  preliminary  injunction  against  the  respondents  enjoining  them  from  executing  the  resolution;    
(2)  to  declare  the  aforesaid  resolution  of  the  Senate  null  and  void;  and    
(3)  as  a  consequence  of  the  foregoing,  to  issue  a  final  writ  of  mandamus  and  injunction  against  the  respondents  ordering  them  to  recognize  
the  rights  of  the  petitioner  to  exercise  his  office  as  Senator  
   
Held:  As  it  is  unlikely  that  the  petition  could  be  amended  to  state  a  cause  of  action,  it  must  be  dismissed  without  costs.  Such  is  the  
judgment  of  the  court.  So  ordered.  
   

Ratio:  We  rule  that  neither  the  Philippine  Legislature  nor  a  branch  thereof  can  be  directly  controlled  in  the  exercise  of  their  legislative  
powers  by  any  judicial  process.  The  court  accordingly  lacks  jurisdiction  to  consider  the  petition  and  the  demurrer  must  be  sustained.  
 
The  power  to  control  is  the  power  to  abrogate  and  the  power  to  abrogate  is  the  power  to  usurp.  Each  department  may,  nevertheless,  
indirectly  restrain  the  others.  It  is  peculiarly  the  duty  of  the  judiciary  to  say  what  the  law  is,  to  enforce  the  Constitution,  and  to  decide  
whether  the  proper  constitutional  sphere  of  a  department  has  been  transcended.  The  courts  must  determine  the  validity  of  legislative  
enactments  as  well  as  the  legality  of  all  private  and  official  acts.  To  this  extent,  do  the  courts  restrain  the  other  departments.  
   
In  view  of  the  propriety  of  mandamus  
Mandamus  will  not  lie  against  the  legislative  body,  its  members,  or  its  officers,  to  compel  the  performance  of  duties  purely  legislative  in  
their  character  which  therefore  pertain  to  their  legislative  functions  and  over  which  they  have  exclusive  control.  The  final  arbiter  in  cases  of  
dispute  is  the  judiciary,  and  to  this  extent  at  least  the  executive  department  may  be  said  to  be  dependent  upon  and  subordinate  to  the  
judiciary.  .  .  .  It  is  not  the  office  of  the  person  to  whom  the  writ  of  mandamus  is  directed,  but  the  nature  of  the  thing  to  be  done,  by  which  
the  propriety  of  issuing  a  mandamus  is  to  be  determined."    

In  view  of  the  Organic  Law  vs  Power  to  Discipline  House  Members  
On  the  merits  of  the  controversy,  we  will  only  say  this:  The  Organic  Act  authorizes  the  Governor-­‐General  of  the  Philippine  Islands  to  appoint  
two  senators  and  nine  representatives  to  represent  the  non-­‐Christian  regions  in  the  Philippine  Legislature.  These  senators  and  
representatives  "hold  office  until  removed  by  the  Governor-­‐General."  (Organic  Act,  secs.  16,  17.)    
 
They  may  not  be  removed  by  the  Philippine  Legislature.  However,  to  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives,  respectively,  is  granted  
the  power  to  "punish  its  members  for  disorderly  behavior,  and,  with  the  concurrence  of  two-­‐thirds,  expel  an  elective  member."  (Organic  
Act,  sec.  18.)  Either  House  may  thus  punish  an  appointive  member  for  disorderly  behavior.  Neither  House  may  expel  an  appointive  
member  for  any  reason.  As  to  whether  the  power  to  "suspend"  is  then  included  in  the  power  to  "punish,"  a  power  granted  to  the  two  
Houses  of  the  Legislature  by  the  Constitution,  or  in  the  power  to  "remove,"  a  power  granted  to  the  Governor-­‐General  by  the  Constitution,  it  
would  appear  that  neither  is  the  correct  hypothesis.  The  Constitution  has  purposely  withheld  from  the  two  Houses  of  the  Legislature  and  
the  Governor-­‐General  alike  the  power  to  suspend  an  appointive  member  of  the  Legislature.  
   
In  view  of  effects  of  punishment  
Punishment  by  way  of  reprimand  or  fine  vindicates  the  outraged  dignity  of  the  House  without  depriving  the  constituency  of  
representation;  expulsion,  when  permissible,  likewise  vindicates  the  honor  of  the  legislative  body  while  giving  to  the  constituency  an  
opportunity  to  elect  anew;  but  suspension  deprives  the  electoral  district  of  representation  without  that  district  being  afforded  any  
means  by  which  to  fill  the  vacancy.  By  suspension,  the  seat  remains  filled  but  the  occupant  is  silenced.  Suspension  for  one  year  is  
equivalent  to  qualified  expulsion  or  removal.  
   
In  view  of  no  remedy  
Conceding  therefore  that  the  power  of  the  Senate  to  punish  its  members  for  disorderly  behavior  does  not  authorize  it  to  suspend  an  
appointive  member  from  the  exercise  of  his  office  for  one  year,  conceding  what  has  been  so  well  stated  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  
petitioner,  conceding  all  this  and  more,  yet  the  writ  prayed  for  cannot  issue,  for  the  all-­‐conclusive  reason  that  the  Supreme  Court  does  not  
possess  the  power  of  coercion  to  make  the  Philippine  Senate  take  any  particular  action.  If  it  be  said  that  conclusion  leaves  the  petitioner  
without  a  remedy,  the  answer  is  that  the  judiciary  is  not  the  repository  of  all  wisdom  and  all  power.    
  
Osmena  vs  Pendatun  (G.R.  No.  L-­‐17144)  
 

FACTS:  Congressman   Osmena   petitioned   for   declaratory   relief,   certiorari   and   prohibition   with   preliminary   injunction   against  
Congressman   Pendatun   and   14   others   in   their   capacity   as   member   of   the   Special   Committee   created   by   House   Resolution   #   59.  
Specifically,   petitioner   asked   for   the   annulment   of   the   resolution   on   the   ground   of   infringement   of   his   parliamentary   immunity;   and  
asked  the  member  of  the  Special  Committee  be  enjoined  from  proceeding,  as  provided  by  Resolution  #  59,  requiring  the  petitioner  
to   substantiate   his   charges   against   the   President   during   his   privilege   speech   entitled   “A   Message   to   Garcia”   wherein   he   spoke   of  
derogatory  remarks  of  the  President’s  administration  selling  pardons.  For  refusing  to  provide  evidence  as  the  basis  of  his  allegations,  
Osmena  was  suspended  for  15  months  for  the  serious  disorderly  behavior.  

ISSUES:  
1.  Whether  or  not  petitioner  has  complete  parliamentary  immunity  as  provided  by  the  Constitution.  
2.  Whether  or  not  petitioner’s  words  constitute  disorderly  conduct.  
3.  Whether  or  not  the  taking  up  of  other  business  matters  bars  the  House  from  investigating  the  speech  and  words  of  Osmena.  
4.  Whether  or  not  the  House  has  the  power  to  suspend  its  members.  

HELD:  
1.  Petitioner  has  immunity  but  it  does  not  protect  him  from  responsibility  before  the  legislative  body  itself  as  stated  in  the  provision  
that  “xxx  shall  not  be  questioned  in  any  other  place”.  

2.  What  constitutes  disorderly  conduct  is  within  the  interpretation  of  the  legislative  body  and  not  the  judiciary,  because  it  is  a  matter  
that   depends   mainly   on   the   factual   circumstances   of   which   the   House   knows   best.   Anything   to   the   contrary   will   amount   to  
encroachment  of  power.  

3.   Resolution   #   59   was   unanimously   approved   by   the   House   and   such   approval   amounted   to   the   suspension   of   the   House   Rules,  
which  according  to  the  standard  parliamentary  practice  may  be  done  by  unanimous  consent.  

4.   For   unparliamentary   conduct,   members   of   the   Congress   have   been,   or   could   be   censured,   committed   to   prison,   even   expelled   by  
the  votes  of  their  colleagues.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Arnault  v.  Nazareno,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐3820,  July  18,  1950  
 
I.            THE  FACTS  
 
The   Senate   investigated   the   purchase   by   the   government   of   two   parcels   of   land,   known   as   Buenavista   and   Tambobong  
estates.   An   intriguing   question   that   the   Senate   sought   to   resolve   was   the   apparent   irregularity   of   the   government’s   payment   to   one  
Ernest  Burt,  a  non-­‐resident  American  citizen,  of  the  total  sum  of  Php1.5  million  for  his  alleged  interest  in  the  two  estates  that  only  
amounted   to   Php20,000.00,   which   he   seemed   to   have   forfeited   anyway   long   before.   The   Senate   sought   to   determine   who   were  
responsible  for  and  who  benefited  from  the  transaction  at  the  expense  of  the  government.  
 
Petitioner  Jean  Arnault,  who  acted  as  agent  of  Ernest  Burt  in  the  subject  transactions,  was  one  of  the  witnesses  summoned  
by  the  Senate  to  its  hearings.  In  the  course  of  the  investigation,  the  petitioner  repeatedly  refused  to  divulge  the  name  of  the  person  
to  whom  he  gave  the  amount  of  Php440,000.00,  which  he  withdrew  from  the  Php1.5  million  proceeds  pertaining  to  Ernest  Burt.  
 
Arnault  was  therefore  cited  in  contempt  by  the  Senate  and  was  committed  to  the  custody  of  the  Senate  Sergeant-­‐at-­‐Arms  
for  imprisonment  until  he  answers  the  questions.  He  thereafter  filed  a  petition  for  habeas  corpus  directly  with  the  Supreme  Court  
questioning  the  validity  of  his  detention.  
 
II.        THE  ISSUE  
 
1.    Did   the   Senate   have   the   power   to   punish   the   petitioner   for   contempt   for   refusing   to   reveal   the   name   of   the   person   to   whom   he   gave  
the  Php440,000.00?  
2.      Did  the  Senate  have  the  authority  to  commit  petitioner  for  contempt  for  a  term  beyond  its  period  of  legislative  session?  
3.        May  the  petitioner  rightfully  invoke  his  right  against  self-­‐incrimination?  
 
III.      THE  RULING  
 
[The  Court  DENIED  the  petition  for  habeas  corpus  filed  by  Arnault.]  
 
1.        Yes,   the   Senate   had   the   power   to   punish   the   petitioner   for   contempt   for   refusing   to   reveal   the   name   of   the   person   to  
whom  he  gave  the  Php440,000.00.  
 
Although  there  is  no  provision  in  the  [1935]  Constitution  expressly  investing  either  House  of  Congress  with  power  to  make  
investigations   and   exact   testimony   to   the   end   that   it   may   exercise   its   legislative   functions   as   to   be   implied.   In   other   words,   the  
power   of   inquiry   –   with   process   to   enforce   it   –   is   an   essential   and   appropriate   auxiliary   to   the   legislative   function.  A   legislative   body  
cannot   legislate   wisely   or   effectively   in   the   absence   of   information   respecting   the   conditions   which   the   legislation   is   intended   to  
effect  or  change;  and  where  the  legislative  body  does  not  itself  possess  the  requisite  information  –  which  is  not  infrequently  true  –  
recourse   must   be   had   to   others   who   do   possess   it.   Experience   has   shown   that   mere   requests   for   such   information   are   often  
unavailing,   and   also   that   information   which   is   volunteered   is   not   always   accurate   or   complete;   so   some   means   of   compulsion   is  
essential  to  obtain  what  is  needed.  
 
                       xxx                                                            xxx                                                            xxx  
 
[W]e  find  that  the  question  for  the  refusal  to  answer  which  the  petitioner  was  held  in  contempt  by  the  Senate  is  pertinent  
to   the   matter   under   inquiry.   In   fact,   this   is   not   and   cannot   be   disputed.   Senate   Resolution   No.   8,   the   validity   of   which   is   not  
challenged   by   the   petitioner,   requires   the   Special   Committee,   among   other   things,   to   determine   the   parties   responsible   for   the  
Buenavista   and   Tambobong   estates   deal,   and   it   is   obvious   that   the   name   of   the   person   to   whom   the   witness   gave   the   P440,000  
involved  in  said  deal  is  pertinent  to  that  determination   —  it  is  in  fact  the  very  thing  sought  to  be  determined.  The  contention  is  not  
that  the  question  is  impertinent  to  the  subject  of  the  inquiry  but  that  it  has  no  relation  or  materiality  to  any  proposed  legislation.  We  
have   already   indicated   that   it   is   not   necessary   for   the   legislative   body   to   show   that   every   question   propounded   to   a   witness   is  
material  to  any  proposed  or  possible  legislation;  what  is  required  is  that  is  that  it  be  pertinent  to  the  matter  under  inquiry.  
 
xxx                                                            xxx                                                            xxx  
 
If  the  subject  of  investigation  before  the  committee  is  within  the  range  of  legitimate  legislative  inquiry  and  the  proposed  
testimony   of   the   witness   called   relates   to   that   subject,   obedience,   to   its   process   may   be   enforced   by   the   committee   by  
imprisonment.  
 
 2.        YES,   the   Senate   had   the   authority   to   commit   petitioner   for   contempt   for   a   term   beyond   its   period   of   legislative  
session.  
 
We  find  no  sound  reason  to  limit  the  power  of  the  legislative  body  to  punish  for  contempt  to  the  end  of  every  session  and  
not  to  the  end  of  the  last  session  terminating  the  existence  of  that  body.  The  very  reason  for  the  exercise  of  the  power  to  punish  for  
contempt   is   to   enable   the   legislative   body   to   perform   its   constitutional   function   without   impediment   or   obstruction.   Legislative  
functions  may  be  and  in  practice  are  performed  during  recess  by  duly  constituted  committees  charged  with  the  duty  of  performing  
investigations   or   conducting   hearing   relative   to   any   proposed   legislation.  To   deny   to   such   committees   the   power   of   inquiry   with  
process   to   enforce   it   would   be   to   defeat   the   very   purpose   for   which   that   the   power   is   recognized   in   the   legislative   body   as   an  
essential  and  appropriate  auxiliary  to  is  legislative  function.  It  is  but  logical  to  say  that  the  power  of  self-­‐preservation  is  coexistent  
with  the  life  to  be  preserved.  
 
But  the   resolution   of   commitment   here   in   question   was   adopted   by   the   Senate,   which   is   a   continuing   body   and   which   does  
not  cease  exist  upon  the  periodical  dissolution  of  the  Congress  .  .  .  There  is  no  limit  as  to  time  to  the  Senate’s  power  to  punish  for  
contempt  in  cases  where  that  power  may  constitutionally  be  exerted  as  in  the  present  case.  
 
3.        NO,  the  petitioner  may  NOT  rightfully  invoke  his  right  against  self-­‐incrimination.  
 
Since   according   to   the   witness   himself   the   transaction   was   legal,   and   that   he   gave   the   [P440,000.00]   to   a   representative   of  
Burt  in  compliance  with  the  latter’s  verbal  instruction,  we  find  no  basis  upon  which  to  sustain  his  claim  that  to  reveal  the  name  of  
that  person  might  incriminate  him.  There  is  no  conflict  of  authorities  on  the  applicable  rule,  to  wit:  
 
Generally,  the  question  whether  testimony  is  privileged  is  for  the  determination  of  the  Court.  At  least,  it  is  not  enough  for  
the  witness  to  say  that  the  answer  will  incriminate  him  as  he  is  not  the  sole  judge  of  his  liability.  The  danger  of  self-­‐incrimination  
must   appear   reasonable   and   real   to   the   court,   from   all   the   circumstances,   and   from   the   whole   case,   as   well   as   from   his   general  
conception  of  the  relations  of  the  witness.  Upon  the  facts  thus  developed,  it  is  the  province  of  the  court  to  determine  whether  a  
direct   answer   to   a   question   may   criminate   or   not.   .   .  The   fact   that   the   testimony   of   a   witness   may   tend   to   show   that   he   has   violated  
the  law  is  not  sufficient  to  entitle  him  to  claim  the  protection  of  the  constitutional  provision  against  self-­‐incrimination,  unless  he  is  at  
the  same  time  liable  to  prosecution  and  punishment  for  such  violation.  The  witness  cannot  assert  his  privilege  by  reason  of  some  
fanciful  excuse,  for  protection  against  an  imaginary  danger,  or  to  secure  immunity  to  a  third  person.  
 
It   is   the   province   of   the   trial   judge   to   determine   from   all   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   whether   the   witness   is  
justified   in   refusing   to   answer.   A   witness   is   not   relieved   from   answering   merely   on   his   own   declaration   that   an   answer   might  
incriminate  him,  but  rather  it  is  for  the  trial  judge  to  decide  that  question.  

 
 Philippine  Bar  Association  (PBA)  vs.  COMELEC  
 
FACTS:    
 
11  petitions  were  filed  for  prohibition  against  the  enforcement  of  BP  883  which  calls  for  special  national  elections  on  February  7,  
1986  (Snap  elections)  for  the  offices  of  President  and  Vice  President  of  the  Philippines.  BP  883  in  conflict  with  the  constitution  in  that  
it  allows  the  President  to  continue  holding  office  after  the  calling  of  the  special  election.  
 
Senator  Pelaez  submits  that  President  Marcos’  letter  of  conditional  “resignation”  did  not  create  the  actual  vacancy  required  in  
Section  9,  Article  7  of  the  Constitution  which  could  be  the  basis  of  the  holding  of  a  special  election  for  President  and  Vice  President  
earlier  than  the  regular  elections  for  such  positions  in  1987.  The  letter  states  that  the  President  is:  “irrevocably  vacat(ing)  the  
position  of  President  effective  only  when  the  election  is  held  and  after  the  winner  is  proclaimed  and  qualified  as  President  by  taking  
his  oath  office  ten  (10)  days  after  his  proclamation.”  
 
The  unified  opposition,  rather  than  insist  on  strict  compliance  with  the  cited  constitutional  provision  that  the  incumbent  President  
actually  resign,  vacate  his  office  and  turn  it  over  to  the  Speaker  of  the  Batasang  Pambansa  as  acting  President,  their  standard  
bearers  have  not  filed  any  suit  or  petition  in  intervention  for  the  purpose  nor  repudiated  the  scheduled  election.  They  have  not  
insisted  that  President  Marcos  vacate  his  office,  so  long  as  the  election  is  clean,  fair  and  honest.    
 
ISSUE:    
 
Is  BP  883  unconstitutional,  and  should  the  Supreme  Court  therefore  stop  and  prohibit  the  holding  of  the  elections  
 
HELD:    
 
The  petitions  in  these  cases  are  dismissed  and  the  prayer  for  the  issuance  of  an  injunction  restraining  respondents  from  holding  the  
election  on  February  7,  1986,  in  as  much  as  there  are  less  than  the  required  10  votes  to  declare  BP  883  unconstitutional.  
 
The  events  that  have  transpired  since  December  3,as  the  Court  did  not  issue  any  restraining  order,  have  turned  the  issue  into  a  
political  question  (from  the  purely  justiciable  issue  of  the  questioned  constitutionality  of  the  act  due  to  the  lack  of  the  actual  vacancy  
of  the  President’s  office)  which  can  be  truly  decided  only  by  the  people  in  their  sovereign  capacity  at  the  scheduled  election,  since  
there  is  no  issue  more  political  than  the  election.  The  Court  cannot  stand  in  the  way  of  letting  the  people  decide  through  their  ballot,  
either  to  give  the  incumbent  president  a  new  mandate  or  to  elect  a  new  president.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DE  CASTRO  VS.  JBC  
ARTURO  M.  DE  CASTRO  vs.  JUDICIAL  AND  BAR  COUNCIL  (JBC)  and  PRESIDENT  GLORIA  
MACAPAGAL  –  ARROYO  
G.R.  No.  191002,  March  17,  2010  
 
FACTS:  The  compulsory  retirement  of  Chief  Justice  Reynato  S.  Puno  by  May  17,  2010  occurs  just  days  after  the  coming  presidential  
elections  on  May  10,  2010.  
These  cases  trace  their  genesis  to  the  controversy  that  has  arisen  from  the  forthcoming  compulsory  retirement  of  Chief  Justice  Puno  
on  May  17,  2010,  or  seven  days  after  the  presidential  election.  Under  Section  4(1),  in  relation  to  Section  9,  Article  VIII,  that  “vacancy  
shall  be  filled  within  ninety  days  from  the  occurrence  thereof”  from  a  “list  of  at  least  three  nominees  prepared  by  the  Judicial  and  
Bar  Council  for  every  vacancy.”  Also  considering  that  Section  15,  Article  VII  (Executive  Department)  of  the  Constitution  prohibits  the  
President  or  Acting  President  from  making  appointments  within  two  months  immediately  before  the  next  presidential  elections  and  
up  to  the  end  of  his  term,  except  temporary  appointments  to  executive  positions  when  continued  vacancies  therein  will  prejudice  
public  service  or  endanger  public  safety.  

The  JBC,  in  its  en  banc  meeting  of  January  18,  2010,  unanimously  agreed  to  start  the  process  of  filling  up  the  position  of  Chief  
Justice.  

Conformably  with  its  existing  practice,  the  JBC  “automatically  considered”  for  the  position  of  Chief  Justice  the  five  most  senior  of  the  
Associate  Justices  of  the  Court,  namely:  Associate  Justice  Antonio  T.  Carpio;  Associate  Justice  Renato  C.  Corona;  Associate  Justice  
Conchita  Carpio  Morales;  Associate  Justice  Presbitero  J.  Velasco,  Jr.;  and  Associate  Justice  Antonio  Eduardo  B.  Nachura.  However,  
the  last  two  declined  their  nomination  through  letters  dated  January  18,  2010  and  January  25,  2010,  respectively.  
The  OSG  contends  that  the  incumbent  President  may  appoint  the  next  Chief  Justice,  because  the  prohibition  under  Section  15,  
Article  VII  of  the  Constitution  does  not  apply  to  appointments  in  the  Supreme  Court.  It  argues  that  any  vacancy  in  the  Supreme  Court  
must  be  filled  within  90  days  from  its  occurrence,  pursuant  to  Section  4(1),  Article  VIII  of  the  Constitution;  that  had  the  framers  
intended  the  prohibition  to  apply  to  Supreme  Court  appointments,  they  could  have  easily  expressly  stated  so  in  the  Constitution,  
which  explains  why  the  prohibition  found  in  Article  VII  (Executive  Department)  was  not  written  in  Article  VIII  (Judicial  Department);  
and  that  the  framers  also  incorporated  in  Article  VIII  ample  restrictions  or  limitations  on  the  President’s  power  to  appoint  members  
of  the  Supreme  Court  to  ensure  its  independence  from  “political  vicissitudes”  and  its  “insulation  from  political  pressures,”  such  as  
stringent  qualifications  for  the  positions,  the  establishment  of  the  JBC,  the  specified  period  within  which  the  President  shall  appoint  
a  Supreme  Court  Justice.  

A  part  of  the  question  to  be  reviewed  by  the  Court  is  whether  the  JBC  properly  initiated  the  process,  there  being  an  insistence  from  
some  of  the  oppositors-­‐intervenors  that  the  JBC  could  only  do  so  once  the  vacancy  has  occurred  (that  is,  after  May  17,  2010).  
Another  part  is,  of  course,  whether  the  JBC  may  resume  its  process  until  the  short  list  is  prepared,  in  view  of  the  provision  of  Section  
4(1),  Article  VIII,  which  unqualifiedly  requires  the  President  to  appoint  one  from  the  short  list  to  fill  the  vacancy  in  the  Supreme  
Court  (be  it  the  Chief  Justice  or  an  Associate  Justice)  within  90  days  from  the  occurrence  of  the  vacancy.  
 
ISSUE:  Whether  the  incumbent  President  can  appoint  the  successor  of  Chief  Justice  Puno  upon  his  retirement.  
 
HELD:  
Prohibition  under  Section  15,  Article  VII  does  not  apply  to  appointments  to  fill  a  vacancy  in  the  Supreme  Court  or  to  other  
appointments  to  the  Judiciary.  

Two  constitutional  provisions  are  seemingly  in  conflict.  

The  first,  Section  15,  Article  VII  (Executive  Department),  provides:  Section  15.  Two  months  immediately  before  the  next  presidential  
elections  and  up  to  the  end  of  his  term,  a  President  or  Acting  President  shall  not  make  appointments,  except  temporary  
appointments  to  executive  positions  when  continued  vacancies  therein  will  prejudice  public  service  or  endanger  public  safety.  

The  other,  Section  4  (1),  Article  VIII  (Judicial  Department),  states:  Section  4.  (1).  The  Supreme  Court  shall  be  composed  of  a  Chief  
Justice  and  fourteen  Associate  Justices.  It  may  sit  en  banc  or  in  its  discretion,  in  division  of  three,  five,  or  seven  Members.  Any  
vacancy  shall  be  filled  within  ninety  days  from  the  occurrence  thereof.  
Had  the  framers  intended  to  extend  the  prohibition  contained  in  Section  15,  Article  VII  to  the  appointment  of  Members  of  the  
Supreme  Court,  they  could  have  explicitly  done  so.  They  could  not  have  ignored  the  meticulous  ordering  of  the  provisions.  They  
would  have  easily  and  surely  written  the  prohibition  made  explicit  in  Section  15,  Article  VII  as  being  equally  applicable  to  the  
appointment  of  Members  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Article  VIII  itself,  most  likely  in  Section  4  (1),  Article  VIII.  That  such  specification  
was  not  done  only  reveals  that  the  prohibition  against  the  President  or  Acting  President  making  appointments  within  two  months  
before  the  next  presidential  elections  and  up  to  the  end  of  the  President’s  or  Acting  President’s  term  does  not  refer  to  the  Members  
of  the  Supreme  Court.  

Had  the  framers  intended  to  extend  the  prohibition  contained  in  Section  15,  Article  VII  to  the  appointment  of  Members  of  the  
Supreme  Court,  they  could  have  explicitly  done  so.  They  could  not  have  ignored  the  meticulous  ordering  of  the  provisions.  They  
would  have  easily  and  surely  written  the  prohibition  made  explicit  in  Section  15,  Article  VII  as  being  equally  applicable  to  the  
appointment  of  Members  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Article  VIII  itself,  most  likely  in  Section  4  (1),  Article  VIII.  That  such  specification  
was  not  done  only  reveals  that  the  prohibition  against  the  President  or  Acting  President  making  appointments  within  two  months  
before  the  next  presidential  elections  and  up  to  the  end  of  the  President’s  or  Acting  President’s  term  does  not  refer  to  the  Members  
of  the  Supreme  Court.  

Section  14,  Section  15,  and  Section  16  are  obviously  of  the  same  character,  in  that  they  affect  the  power  of  the  President  to  appoint.  
The  fact  that  Section  14  and  Section  16  refer  only  to  appointments  within  the  Executive  Department  renders  conclusive  that  Section  
15  also  applies  only  to  the  Executive  Department.  This  conclusion  is  consistent  with  the  rule  that  every  part  of  the  statute  must  be  
interpreted  with  reference  to  the  context,  i.e.  that  every  part  must  be  considered  together  with  the  other  parts,  and  kept  
subservient  to  the  general  intent  of  the  whole  enactment.  It  is  absurd  to  assume  that  the  framers  deliberately  situated  Section  15  
between  Section  14  and  Section  16,  if  they  intended  Section  15  to  cover  all  kinds  of  presidential  appointments.  If  that  was  their  
intention  in  respect  of  appointments  to  the  Judiciary,  the  framers,  if  only  to  be  clear,  would  have  easily  and  surely  inserted  a  similar  
prohibition  in  Article  VIII,  most  likely  within  Section  4  (1)  thereof.    

 
 

 
 Avelino  vs  Cuenco  (G.R.  No.  L-­‐2821)  
 

FACTS:  The   petitioners,   Senator   Jose   Avelino,   in   a   quo   warranto   proceeding,   asked   the   court   to   declare   him   the   rightful   Senate  
President   and   oust   the   respondent,   Mariano   Cuenco.   In   a   session   of   the   Senate,   Tanada’s   request   to   deliver   a   speech   in   order   to  
formulate  charges  against  then  Senate  President  Avelino  was  approved.  With  the  leadership  of  the  Senate  President  followed  by  his  
supporters,   they   deliberately   tried   to   delay   and   prevent   Tanada   from   delivering   his   speech.   The   SP   with   his   supporters   employed  
delaying  tactics,  the  tried  to  adjourn  the  session  then  walked  out.  Only  12  Senators  were  left  in  the  hall.  The  members  of  the  senate  
left  continued  the  session  and  Senator  Cuenco  was  appointed  as  the  Acting  President  of  the  Senate  and  was  recognized  the  next  day  
by  the  President  of  the  Philippines.  

ISSUES:  
1.   Whether   or   not   the   court   has   jurisdiction   of   the   case.  
2.  Whether  or  not  Resolutions  67  &  68  was  validly  approved.  

HELD:  
1.  The  Court  has  no  jurisdiction  of  the  case  because  the  subject  matter  is  political  in  nature  and  in  doing  so,  the  court  will  be  against  
the  doctrine  of  separation  of  powers.  To  the  first  question,  the  answer  is  in  the  negative,  in  view  of  the  separation  of  powers,  the  
political  nature  of  the  controversy  (Alejandrino  vs.  Quezon,  46  Phil.  83;  Vera  vs.  Avelino,  77  Phil.  192;  Mabanag  vs.  Lopez  Vito,  78  
Phil.  1)  and  the  constitutional  grant  to  the  Senate  of  the  power  to  elect  its  own  president,  which  power  should  not  be  interfered  
with,   nor   taken   over,   by   the   judiciary.   We   refused   to   take   cognizance   of   the   Vera   case   even   if   the   rights   of   the   electors   of   the  
suspended   senators   were   alleged   affected   without   any   immediate   remedy.   A   fortiori   we   should   abstain   in   this   case   because   the  
selection  of  the  presiding  officer  affect  only  the  Senators  themselves  who  are  at  liberty  at  any  time  to  choose  their  officers,  change  
or  reinstate  them.  Anyway,  if,  as  the  petition  must  imply  to  be  acceptable,  the  majority  of  the  Senators  want  petitioner  to  preside,  
his  remedy  lies  in  the  Senate  Session  Hall  —  not  in  the  Supreme  Court.  

2.   It   was   held   that   there   is   a   quorum   that   12   being   the   majority   of   23.   In   fine,   all   the   four   justice   agree   that   the   Court   being  
confronted  with  the  practical  situation  that  of  the  twenty  three  senators  who  may  participate  in  the  Senate  deliberations  in  the  days  
immediately  after  this  decision,  twelve  senators  will  support  Senator  Cuenco  and,  at  most,  eleven  will  side  with  Senator  Avelino,  it  
would  be  most  injudicious  to  declare  the  latter  as  the  rightful  President  of  the  Senate,  that  office  being  essentially  one  that  depends  
exclusively  upon  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  senators,  the  rule  of  the  Senate  about  tenure  of  the  President  of  that  body   being  
amenable   at   any   time   by   that   majority.   And   at   any   session   hereafter   held   with   thirteen   or   more   senators,   in   order   to   avoid   all  
controversy  arising  from  the  divergence  of  opinion  here  about  quorum  and  for  the  benefit  of  all  concerned,the  said  twelve  senators  
who  approved  the  resolutions  herein  involved  could  ratify  all  their  acts  and  thereby  place  them  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt.    

 
 
 

 
 Teodosio  Lansang  vs  Garcia  (G.R.  No.  L-­‐33964)  
 

Abandonment  of  the  Doctrine  Held  in  the  Barcelon  Case  &  the  Montenegro  Case  
 
FACTS:  Due  to  the  throwing  of  two  hand  grenades  in  a  Liberal  Party  caucus  in  1971  causing  the  death  of  8  people,  Marcos  issued  PP  
889  which  suspended  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  Marcos  urged  that  there  is  a  need  to  curtail  the  growth  of  Maoist  
groups.  Subsequently,  Lansang  et  al  were  invited  by  the  PC  headed  by  Garcia  for  interrogation  and  investigation.  Lansang  et  al  
questioned  the  validity  of  the  suspension  of  the  writ  averring  that  the  suspension  does  not  meet  the  constitutional  requisites.  
 
 
 
ISSUE:  Whether  or  not  the  suspension  is  constitutional.  

HELD:  The  doctrine  established  in  Barcelon  and  Montenegro  was  subsequently  abandoned  in  this  case  where  the  SC  declared  that  it  
had  the  power  to  inquire  into  the  factual  basis  of  the  suspension  of  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  by  Marcos  in  Aug  1971  
and   to   annul   the   same   if   no   legal   ground   could   be   established.   Accordingly,   hearings   were   conducted   to   receive   evidence   on   this  
matter,  including  two  closed-­‐door  sessions  in  which  relevant  classified  information  was  divulged  by  the  government  to  the  members  
of  the  SC  and  3  selected  lawyers  of  the  petitioners.  In  the  end,  after  satisfying  itself  that  there  was  actually  a  massive  and  systematic  
Communist-­‐oriented  campaign  to  overthrow  the  government  by  force,  as  claimed  by  M  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
  
LAMP  VS.  SEC  OF  BUDGET  AND  MANAGEMENT  
LAWYERS  AGAINST  MONOPOLY  AND  POVERTY  (LAMP),  represented  by  its  Chairman  and  counsel,  CEFERINO  PADUA,  Members,  ALBERTO  ABELEDA,  JR.,  ELEAZAR  
ANGELES,  GREGELY  FULTON  ACOSTA,  VICTOR  AVECILLA,  GALILEO  BRION,  ANATALIA  BUENAVENTURA,  EFREN  CARAG,  PEDRO  CASTILLO,  NAPOLEON  CORONADO,  
ROMEO  ECHAUZ,  ALFREDO  DE  GUZMAN,  ROGELIO  KARAGDAG,  JR.,  MARIA  LUZ  ARZAGA-­‐MENDOZA,  LEO  LUIS  MENDOZA,  ANTONIO  P.  PAREDES,  AQUILINO  PIMENTEL  
III,  MARIO  REYES,  EMMANUEL  SANTOS,  TERESITA  SANTOS,  RUDEGELIO  TACORDA,  SECRETARY  GEN.  ROLANDO  ARZAGA,  Board  of  Consultants,  JUSTICE  ABRAHAM  
SARMIENTO,  SEN.  AQUILINO  PIMENTEL,  JR.,  and  BARTOLOME  FERNANDEZ,  JR.  
vs.  
THE  SECRETARY  OF  BUDGET  AND  MANAGEMENT,  THE  TREASURER  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  THE  COMMISSION  ON  AUDIT,  and  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  SENATE  and  the  
SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  in  representation  of  the  Members  of  the  Congress  
 
FACTS:  For  consideration  of  the  Court  is  an  original  action  for  certiorari  assailing  the  constitutionality  and  legality  of  the  
implementation  of  the  Priority  Development  Assistance  Fund  (PDAF)  as  provided  for  in  Republic  Act  (R.A.)  9206  or  the  General  
Appropriations  Act  for  2004  (GAA  of  2004).  
Petitioner  Lawyers  Against  Monopoly  and  Poverty(LAMP),  a  group  of  lawyers  who  have  banded  together  with  a  mission  of  
dismantling  all  forms  of  political,  economic  or  social  monopoly  in  the  country.  According  to  LAMP,  the  above  provision  is  silent  and,  
therefore,  prohibits  an  automatic  or  direct  allocation  of  lump  sums  to  individual  senators  and  congressmen  for  the  funding  of  
projects.  It  does  not  empower  individual  Members  of  Congress  to  propose,  select  and  identify  programs  and  projects  to  be  funded  
out  of  PDAF.  

For  LAMP,  this  situation  runs  afoul  against  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers  because  in  receiving  and,  thereafter,  spending  funds  
for  their  chosen  projects,  the  Members  of  Congress  in  effect  intrude  into  an  executive  function.  Further,  the  authority  to  propose  
and  select  projects  does  not  pertain  to  legislation.  “It  is,  in  fact,  a  non-­‐legislative  function  devoid  of  constitutional  sanction,”8  and,  
therefore,  impermissible  and  must  be  considered  nothing  less  than  malfeasance.  

RESPONDENT’S  POSITION:  the  perceptions  of  LAMP  on  the  implementation  of  PDAF  must  not  be  based  on  mere  speculations  
circulated  in  the  news  media  preaching  the  evils  of  pork  barrel.  

ISSUES:  
 1)  whether  or  not  the  mandatory  requisites  for  the  exercise  of  judicial  review  are  met  in  this  case;  and  2)  whether  or  not  the  
implementation  of  PDAF  by  the  Members  of  Congress  is  unconstitutional  and  illegal.  
 
HELD:  
I.  
A  question  is  ripe  for  adjudication  when  the  act  being  challenged  has  had  a  direct  adverse  effect  on  the  individual  challenging  it.  In  
this  case,  the  petitioner  contested  the  implementation  of  an  alleged  unconstitutional  statute,  as  citizens  and  taxpayers.  The  petition  
complains  of  illegal  disbursement  of  public  funds  derived  from  taxation  and  this  is  sufficient  reason  to  say  that  there  indeed  exists  a  
definite,  concrete,  real  or  substantial  controversy  before  the  Court.  
LOCUS  STANDI:  The  gist  of  the  question  of  standing  is  whether  a  party  alleges  “such  a  personal  stake  in  the  outcome  of  the  
controversy  as  to  assure  that  concrete  adverseness  which  sharpens  the  presentation  of  issues  upon  which  the  court  so  largely  
depends  for  illumination  of  difficult  constitutional  questions.  Here,  the  sufficient  interest  preventing  the  illegal  expenditure  of  
money  raised  by  taxation  required  in  taxpayers’  suits  is  established.  Thus,  in  the  claim  that  PDAF  funds  have  been  illegally  disbursed  
and  wasted  through  the  enforcement  of  an  invalid  or  unconstitutional  law,  LAMP  should  be  allowed  to  sue.  

Lastly,  the  Court  is  of  the  view  that  the  petition  poses  issues  impressed  with  paramount  public  interest.  The  ramification  of  issues  
involving  the  unconstitutional  spending  of  PDAF  deserves  the  consideration  of  the  Court,  warranting  the  assumption  of  jurisdiction  
over  the  petition.  

 
II.  
The  Court  rules  in  the  negative.  
In  determining  whether  or  not  a  statute  is  unconstitutional,  the  Court  does  not  lose  sight  of  the  presumption  of  validity  accorded  to  
statutory  acts  of  Congress.  To  justify  the  nullification  of  the  law  or  its  implementation,  there  must  be  a  clear  and  unequivocal,  not  a  
doubtful,  breach  of  the  Constitution.  In  case  of  doubt  in  the  sufficiency  of  proof  establishing  unconstitutionality,  the  Court  must  
sustain  legislation  because  “to  invalidate  [a  law]  based  on  x  x  x  baseless  supposition  is  an  affront  to  the  wisdom  not  only  of  the  
legislature  that  passed  it  but  also  of  the  executive  which  approved  it.”  

The  petition  is  miserably  wanting  in  this  regard.  No  convincing  proof  was  presented  showing  that,  indeed,  there  were  direct  releases  
of  funds  to  the  Members  of  Congress,  who  actually  spend  them  according  to  their  sole  discretion.  Devoid  of  any  pertinent  
evidentiary  support  that  illegal  misuse  of  PDAF  in  the  form  of  kickbacks  has  become  a  common  exercise  of  unscrupulous  Members  
of  Congress,  the  Court  cannot  indulge  the  petitioner’s  request  for  rejection  of  a  law  which  is  outwardly  legal  and  capable  of  lawful  
enforcement.  

PORK  BARREL:  

The  Members  of  Congress  are  then  requested  by  the  President  to  recommend  projects  and  programs  which  may  be  funded  from  the  
PDAF.  The  list  submitted  by  the  Members  of  Congress  is  endorsed  by  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  to  the  DBM,  
which  reviews  and  determines  whether  such  list  of  projects  submitted  are  consistent  with  the  guidelines  and  the  priorities  set  by  the  
Executive.”33  This  demonstrates  the  power  given  to  the  President  to  execute  appropriation  laws  and  therefore,  to  exercise  the  
spending  per  se  of  the  budget.  

As  applied  to  this  case,  the  petition  is  seriously  wanting  in  establishing  that  individual  Members  of  Congress  receive  and  thereafter  
spend  funds  out  of  PDAF.  So  long  as  there  is  no  showing  of  a  direct  participation  of  legislators  in  the  actual  spending  of  the  budget,  
the  constitutional  boundaries  between  the  Executive  and  the  Legislative  in  the  budgetary  process  remain  intact.    

 
 

 
 
 Greco  Belgica  vs  Executive  Secretary  Paquito  Ochoa  
710  SCRA  1  –  Political  Law  –  Constitutional  Law  –  Local  Government  –  Invalid  Delegation  
Legislative  Department  –  Invalid  Delegation  of  Legislative  Power  
 
This  case  is  consolidated  with  G.R.  No.  208493  and  G.R.  No.  209251.  
The   so-­‐called   pork   barrel   system   has   been   around   in   the   Philippines   since  about   1922.   Pork   Barrel   is   commonly   known   as   the   lump-­‐
sum,   discretionary  funds  of  the  members  of  the  Congress.   It   underwent   several   legal   designations  from   “Congressional   Pork   Barrel”  
to  the  latest  “Priority  Development  Assistance  Fund”  or  PDAF.  The  allocation  for  the  pork  barrel  is  integrated  in  the  annual  General  
Appropriations  Act  (GAA).  

Since  2011,  the  allocation  of  the  PDAF  has  been  done  in  the  following  manner:  

a.  P70  million:  for  each  member  of  the  lower  house;  broken  down  to  –  P40  million  for  “hard  projects”  (infrastructure  projects  like  
roads,   buildings,   schools,   etc.),   and   P30   million   for   “soft   projects”   (scholarship   grants,   medical   assistance,   livelihood   programs,   IT  
development,  etc.);  

b.  P200  million:  for  each  senator;  broken  down  to  –  P100  million  for  hard  projects,  P100  million  for  soft  projects;  

c.  P200  million:  for  the  Vice-­‐President;  broken  down  to  –  P100  million  for  hard  projects,  P100  million  for  soft  projects.  

The   PDAF   articles   in   the   GAA   do   provide   for  realignment   of   funds  whereby   certain   cabinet   members   may   request   for   the  
realignment   of   funds   into   their   department   provided   that   the   request   for   realignment   is   approved   or   concurred   by   the   legislator  
concerned.  

Presidential  Pork  Barrel  

The  president  does  have  his  own  source  of  fund  albeit  not  included  in  the  GAA.  The  so-­‐called  presidential  pork  barrel  comes  from  
two  sources:  (a)  the    Malampaya  Funds,  from  the  Malampaya  Gas  Project  –  this  has  been  around  since  1976,  and  (b)  the  Presidential  
Social  Fund  which  is  derived  from  the  earnings  of  PAGCOR  –  this  has  been  around  since  about  1983.  

Pork  Barrel  Scam  Controversy  

Ever   since,   the   pork   barrel   system   has   been   besieged   by   allegations   of   corruption.   In   July   2013,   six   whistle   blowers,   headed   by  
Benhur  Luy,  exposed  that  for  the  last  decade,  the  corruption  in  the  pork  barrel  system  had  been  facilitated  by  Janet  Lim  Napoles.  
Napoles   had   been   helping   lawmakers   in   funneling   their   pork   barrel   funds   into   about   20   bogus   NGO’s   (non-­‐government  
organizations)  which  would  make  it  appear  that  government  funds  are  being  used  in  legit  existing  projects  but  are  in  fact  going  to  
“ghost”  projects.  An  audit  was  then  conducted  by  the  Commission  on  Audit  and  the  results  thereof  concurred  with  the  exposes  of  
Luy  et  al.  

Motivated   by   the   foregoing,   Greco   Belgica   and   several   others,   filed   various   petitions   before   the   Supreme   Court   questioning   the  
constitutionality  of  the  pork  barrel  system.  

ISSUES:    

I.  Whether  or  not  the  congressional  pork  barrel  system  is  constitutional.  

II.  Whether  or  not  presidential  pork  barrel  system  is  constitutional.  

HELD:    

I.  No,  the  congressional  pork  barrel  system  is  unconstitutional.  It  is  unconstitutional  because  it  violates  the  following  principles:  

a.  Separation  of  Powers  

As  a  rule,  the  budgeting  power  lies  in  Congress.  It  regulates  the  release  of  funds  (power  of  the  purse).  The  executive,  on  the  other  
hand,  implements  the  laws  –  this  includes  the  GAA  to  which  the  PDAF  is  a  part  of.  Only  the  executive  may  implement  the  law  but  
under  the  pork  barrel  system,  what’s  happening  was  that,  after  the  GAA,  itself  a  law,  was  enacted,  the  legislators  themselves  dictate  
as   to   which   projects   their   PDAF   funds   should   be   allocated   to  –   a   clear   act   of   implementing   the   law   they   enacted   –   a   violation   of   the  
principle  of  separation  of  powers.  (Note  in  the  older  case  of  PHILCONSA  vs  Enriquez,  it  was  ruled  that  pork  barrel,  then  called  as  CDF  
or  the  Countrywide  Development  Fund,  was  constitutional  insofar  as  the  legislators  only  recommend  where  their  pork  barrel  funds  
go).  

This  is  also  highlighted  by  the  fact  that  in  realigning  the  PDAF,  the  executive  will  still  have  to  get  the  concurrence  of  the  legislator  
concerned.  

b.  Non-­‐delegability  of  Legislative  Power  

As  a  rule,  the  Constitution  vests  legislative  power  in  Congress  alone.  (The  Constitution  does  grant  the  people  legislative  power  but  
only   insofar   as   the   processes   of   referendum   and   initiative   are   concerned).   That   being,   legislative   power   cannot   be   delegated   by  
Congress  for  it  cannot  delegate  further  that  which  was  delegated  to  it  by  the  Constitution.  

Exceptions  to  the  rule  are:  

(i)  delegated  legislative  power  to  local  government  units  but  this  shall  involve  purely  local  matters;  

(ii)  authority  of  the  President  to,  by  law,  exercise  powers  necessary  and  proper  to  carry  out  a  declared  national  policy  in  times  of  war  
or  other  national  emergency,  or  fix  within  specified  limits,  and  subject  to  such  limitations  and  restrictions  as  Congress  may  impose,  
tariff  rates,  import  and  export  quotas,  tonnage  and  wharfage  dues,  and  other  duties  or  imposts  within  the  framework  of  the  national  
development  program  of  the  Government.  

In  this  case,  the  PDAF  articles  which  allow  the  individual  legislator  to  identify  the  projects  to  which  his  PDAF  money  should  go  to  is  a  
violation  of  the  rule  on  non-­‐delegability  of  legislative  power.  The  power  to  appropriate  funds  is  solely  lodged  in  Congress  (in  the  two  
houses  comprising  it)  collectively  and  not  lodged  in  the  individual  members.  Further,  nowhere  in  the  exceptions  does  it  state  that  
the  Congress  can  delegate  the  power  to  the  individual  member  of  Congress.  

c.  Principle  of  Checks  and  Balances  

One  feature  in  the  principle  of  checks  and  balances  is  the  power  of  the  president  to  veto  items  in  the  GAA  which  he  may  deem  to  be  
inappropriate.  But  this  power  is  already  being  undermined  because  of  the  fact  that  once  the  GAA  is  approved,  the  legislator  can  now  
identify  the  project  to  which  he  will  appropriate  his  PDAF.  Under  such  system,  how  can  the  president  veto  the  appropriation  made  
by  the  legislator  if  the  appropriation  is  made  after  the  approval  of  the  GAA  –  again,  “Congress  cannot  choose  a  mode  of  budgeting  
which  effectively  renders  the  constitutionally-­‐given  power  of  the  President  useless.”  

d.  Local  Autonomy  

As  a  rule,  the  local  governments  have  the  power  to  manage  their  local  affairs.  Through  their  Local  Development  Councils  (LDCs),  the  
LGUs   can   develop   their   own   programs   and   policies   concerning   their   localities.   But   with   the   PDAF,   particularly   on   the   part   of   the  
members  of  the  house  of  representatives,  what’s  happening  is  that  a  congressman  can  either  bypass  or  duplicate  a  project  by  the  
LDC  and  later  on  claim  it  as  his  own.  This  is  an  instance  where  the  national  government  (note,  a  congressman  is  a  national  officer)  
meddles   with   the   affairs   of   the   local   government   –   and   this   is   contrary   to   the   State   policy   embodied   in   the   Constitution   on   local  
autonomy.  It’s  good  if  that’s  all  that  is  happening  under  the  pork  barrel  system  but  worse,  the  PDAF  becomes  more  of  a  personal  
fund  on  the  part  of  legislators.  

II.  Yes,  the  presidential  pork  barrel  is  valid.  

The  main  issue  raised  by  Belgica  et  al  against  the  presidential  pork  barrel  is  that  it  is  unconstitutional  because  it  violates  Section  29  
(1),  Article  VI  of  the  Constitution  which  provides:  

No  money  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  Treasury  except  in  pursuance  of  an  appropriation  made  by  law.  

Belgica   et   al   emphasized  that   the   presidential   pork   comes   from   the   earnings   of   the   Malampaya   and   PAGCOR   and   not   from   any  
appropriation  from  a  particular  legislation.  

The  Supreme  Court  disagrees  as  it  ruled  that  PD  910,  which  created  the  Malampaya  Fund,  as  well  as  PD  1869  (as  amended  by  PD  
1993),  which  amended  PAGCOR’s  charter,  provided  for  the  appropriation,  to  wit:  

(i)  PD  910:  Section  8  thereof  provides  that  all  fees,  among  others,  collected  from  certain  energy-­‐related  ventures  shall  form  part  of  a  
special   fund   (the   Malampaya   Fund)   which   shall   be   used   to   further   finance   energy   resource   development   and   for   other   purposes  
which  the  President  may  direct;  
(ii)  PD  1869,  as  amended:  Section  12  thereof  provides  that  a  part  of  PAGCOR’s  earnings  shall  be  allocated  to  a  General  Fund  (the  
Presidential  Social  Fund)  which  shall  be  used  in  government  infrastructure  projects.  

These  are  sufficient  laws  which  met  the  requirement  of  Section  29,  Article  VI  of  the  Constitution.  The  appropriation  contemplated  
therein  does  not  have  to  be  a  particular  appropriation  as  it  can  be  a  general  appropriation  as  in  the   case  of  PD  910  and  PD  1869.