Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985

ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner,

vs.
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and BERFOL CAMORO, respondents.

Valentin A. Zozobrado for petitioner.

Ruperto N. Alfarara for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review, on questions of law, of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu which reversed the decision of the City Court of Cebu and exonerated the respondents from
any liability arising from a vehicular accident.

The background facts which led to the filing of a complaint for breach of contract and damages
against the respondents are summarized by the Court of First Instance of Cebu as follows:

The facts established after trial show that the plaintiff was a passenger of the public
utility jeepney bearing plate No. PUJ-71-7 on the course of the trip from Danao City
to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by defendant Berfol Camoro. It was registered
under the franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by
defendant Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right
rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who
was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Upon landing on the
ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses,
he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. Aside from this, he
suffered injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back. (Exh. "D"). Because of
his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered
that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately
entered the Danao City Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his
father-in-law to proceed immediately to the place of the accident and look for the
watch. In spite of the efforts of his father-in-law, the wrist watch, which he bought for
P 852.70 (Exh. "B") could no longer be found.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed Civil Case No. R-17378 for breach of contract with damages before
the City Court of Cebu City, Branch I against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and Berfol
Camoro.
The respondents filed their answer, alleging inter alia that the accident that caused losses to the
petitioner was beyond the control of the respondents taking into account that the tire that exploded
was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up.

After trial, Judge Romulo R. Senining of the Civil Court of Cebu rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner and against the respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants and the latter are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P750.00 as reimbursement for the lost Omega wrist watch, the sum of
P246.64 as unrealized salary of the plaintiff from his employer, the further sum of
P100.00 for the doctor's fees and medicine, an additional sum of P300.00 for
attorney's fees and the costs.

The respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIV.

Judge Leonardo B. Canares reversed the judgment of the City Court of Cebu upon a finding that the
accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered exonerating the defendants from any

liability to the plaintiff without pronouncement as to costs.

A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of First Instance.

The petitioner raises the following alleged errors committed by the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
appeal—

a. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to take
cognizance of the fact that defendants and/or their employee failed to exercise
"utmost and/or extraordinary diligence" required of common carriers contemplated
under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

b. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion by deciding the
case contrary to the doctrine laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case
of Necesito et al. v. Paras, et al.

We find the petition impressed with merit.

The City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu found that the right rear tire of the passenger
jeepney in which the petitioner was riding blew up causing the vehicle to fall on its side. The
petitioner questions the conclusion of the respondent court drawn from this finding of fact.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu erred when it absolved the carrier from any liability upon a
finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event. The Court of First Instance of Cebu ruled that:

After reviewing the records of the case, this Court finds that the accident in question
was due to a fortuitous event. A tire blow-out, such as what happened in the case at
bar, is an inevitable accident that exempts the carrier from liability, there being
absence of a showing that there was misconduct or negligence on the part of the
operator in the operation and maintenance of the vehicle involved. The fact that the
 right rear tire exploded, despite being brand new, constitutes a clear case of caso
fortuito which can be a proper basis for exonerating the defendants from liability. ...

The Court of First Instance relied on the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez v. Red Line
Transportation Co., CA G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, where the Court of Appeals ruled that:

A tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and
should not have been used at all. Indeed, this would be a clear case of fortuitous
event.

The foregoing conclusions of the Court of First Instance of Cebu are based on a misapprehension of
overall facts from which a conclusion should be drawn. The reliance of the Court of First Instance on
the Rodriguez case is not in order. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v. De Jesus, et al. (17
SCRA 23), we held that:

Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no
liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez v. Red
Line Transportation Co., CA G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People v.
Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings, however, not only are
not binding on this Court but were based on considerations quite different from those
that obtain in the case at bar. The appellate court there made no findings of any
specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to the
question of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to
the causative factors, would generate liability. ...

In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The records
show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear
tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed
before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running
at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also
evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The
petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front seat and fourteen (14) passengers
in the rear.

While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still
visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was
presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were
taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden
blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire
coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.

In Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657), we laid down the following essential characteristics of caso fortuito:

xxx xxx xxx

... In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso

fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to
foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must
be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor)
 must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor. (5 Encyclopedia Juridica Espanola, 309.)

In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of
the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of
mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their
vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when
a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. Relative to the contingency of
mechanical defects, we held in Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al. (104 Phil. 75), that:

... The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is

entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an
appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would
have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which
under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and
application of the necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the
manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far
as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the good
repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability' (10 Am. Jur. 205,
s, 1324; see also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451; 20 L. Ed. 141; Southern
R. Co. v. Hussey, 74 ALR 1172; 42 Fed. 2d 70; and Ed Note, 29 ALR 788.: Ann.
Cas. 1916E 929).

The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice
nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances
in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of
the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier
usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the
safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his
equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. ...

It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of
carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a
due regard for all the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met by the
respondents.

The respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any amount for failure to prove
such damages during the trial. The respondents submit that if the petitioner was really injured, why
was he treated in Danao City and not in Mandaue City where the accident took place. The
respondents argue that the doctor who issued the medical certificate was not presented during the
trial, and hence not cross-examined. The respondents also claim that the petitioner was not wearing
any wrist watch during the accident.

It should be noted that the City Court of Cebu found that the petitioner had a lacerated wound on his
right palm aside from injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back, and that on his way back to
Danao City, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. These are findings of facts of the
City Court of Cebu which we find no reason to disturb. More so when we consider the fact that the
Court of First Instance of Cebu impliedly concurred in these matters when it confined itself to the
question of whether or not the tire blow out was a fortuitous event.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IV appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the City Court of Cebu, Branch I is
REINSTATED, with the modification that the damages shall earn interest at 12% per annum and the
attorney's fees are increased to SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00). Damages shall earn interests
from January 27, 1975.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2075 November 29, 1949

MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants-appellees.

Nicolas P. Nonato for appellant.

Gellada, Mirasol and Ravena for appellees.

REYES, J.:

This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that
the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their
carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored
by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to
his own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him
for support.

Before filing their answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of
action, and the motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal.

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may
cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from
the fault of the person who may have suffered it.

The question presented is whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its
caretaker.

The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the owner of
an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the
caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under
article 1902 of the same code. Claiming that the lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff
contends that the article 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker and
makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. For authority counsel cites
the following opinion which Manresa quotes from a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court:

El articulo 1905 del codigo Civil no consienta otra interpretacion que la que, clara y
evidentemente, se deriva de sus terminos literales, bastando, segun el mismo, que un
animal cause perjuicio para que nasca la responsibilidad del dueno, aun no imputandose a
este ninguna clase de culpa o negligencia, habida,sin duda, cuenta por el lgislador de que
tal concepto de dueno es suficiente para que arrastre las consecuencias favorables o
 adversas de esta clase de propiedad, salvo la exception en el mismo contenida. (12
Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish CivilCode, 573.)

This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a case where an animal caused injury to a
stranger or third person. It is therefore no authority for a case like the present where the person
injured was the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is important. For the statute names
the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for
the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is
therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.

In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid
for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from
causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.

In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12, p.
578), the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to
his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be "a veritable accident of labor" which should
come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905 of the Civil Code. The present action,
however, is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there being no allegation that,
among other things, defendant's business, whatever that might be, had a gross income of P20,000.
As already stated, defendant's liability is made to rest on article 1905 of the Civil Code. but action
under that article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be
based on article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of
the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no
allegation on those points.

There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, but without
costs in view of the financial situation of the appellant.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.