[G.R. No. 190846. February 3, 2016.

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., petitioner, vs. JOSE G. HOSANA, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 challenging the August 28, 2009 decision 2 and November 17,
2009 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645.

The Facts

The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on January 14, 1979. 4 During
their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21229. 5

On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as
evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor. 6 The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was
P200,000.00. 7 After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the name of
Tomas. 8

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and
Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City. 9 The complaint was filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan,
Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose's signature
making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas. 10

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. 11 Before he paid the full
consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the
subject lot was authentic and in order. 12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the
property was annotated at the back of the title. 13

Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory and moral damages, attorney's fees, and
expenses for litigation, in the event that judgment be rendered in favor of Jose. 14 ScHADI

The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to Jose's complaint and Tomas'
cross-claim. 15 On the other hand, it dismissed Tomas' complaint against the Register of Deeds since it was only a
nominal party. 16

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. 17

Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio testified that he learned of
the sale of the subject property from Milagros' son. 18 When Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get angry
because of the sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property because she needed the money. Bonifacio immediately
informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the sale. 19

Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified with
the Register of Deeds and discovered that the title covering the disputed property had been transferred to Tomas. 20
 Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was forged. 21 Bonifacio presented documents
containing the signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA
dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen signatures, and
a handwritten letter. 22

On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by Rosana Robles (Rosana), his
goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to confirm if Jose
knew about the sale transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose who
confirmed that he was aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale. Rosana informed
Tomas of Jose's confirmation.23

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and
another P350,000.00 upon the execution of theDeed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the
consideration written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written
consideration was lower than the actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to save on taxes.
Tomas also learned from Milagros that she needed money badly and had to sell the house because Jose had stopped
sending her money. 24

The RTC Ruling

In its decision dated December 27, 2006, 25 the RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject
property to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros
as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.

Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00 as
temperate damages. 26
 The CA Ruling

Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.

In a decision dated August 28, 2009, 27 the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were
void. However, the CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the award of temperate damages;
and second, by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest,
under the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot,
the CA found that there was no convincing evidence that established this claim. 28

Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00
as reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot was insufficient and not supported by the evidence
formally offered before and admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that the actual amount he paid as consideration
for the sale was P700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the RTC. 29

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in a resolution dated November 17, 2009. 30

The Petition

Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling which ordered the
reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase price he paid in the amount of P700,000.00. 31

Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the consideration stated, cannot
be used as evidence since it was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was not specifically offered to prove
the actual consideration of the sale; 32 third, his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of P700,000.00
paid was uncontroverted; 33 and, fourth, Jose must return the full amount actually paid under the principle
of solutio indebiti. 34
 Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning the purchase price indicated in the
deed of sale for failing to immediately raise this question; and second, the terms of an agreement reduced into writing
are deemed to include all the terms agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted other than the terms of the
agreement itself. 35

The Issues

The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of consideration paid;
and (2) whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase price of the sale.

OUR RULING

We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.

Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a question of fact not proper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the correctness of the appellate court's factual findings are not
the functions of this Court, as we are not a trier of facts. 36 aICcHA

This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on "the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts," 37 except in the following cases:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings,
the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
 the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record. 38

The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject property is a factual question that
the CA had already resolved in the negative. 39The CA found Tomas' claim of paying P700,000.00 for the subject
property to be unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his claim.

We uphold the CA's finding.

In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. 40 Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. 41

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." 42 Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. 43

We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be
considered as proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish this claim. Tomas' bare allegation,
while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.

It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; 44 the burden rests on
the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. 45 A mere allegation is not
evidence, 46 and the person who alleges has the burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum
of evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.

The force and effect of a void

contract is distinguished from
its admissibility as evidence.

The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00,
which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale, based on the principle of unjust enrichment.

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in the deed of sale as basis for
the reimbursable amount because a null and void document cannot be used as evidence.

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.

A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. 47 This rule applies to contracts
that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other
spouse's written consent. 48 A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. 49 It
cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. 50 When, however, any of the terms of a void contract have
been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under
it. 51

It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of what has been given is in
order." 52 This principle springs from Article 22 of theNew Civil Code which states that "every person who through
an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense
of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Hence, the restitution of what each party has given
is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract.
 While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not
preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the
contract, i.e., what each party has given in the execution of the contract.

Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned
by the Rules of Court. 53 The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter
at issue, which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.

The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the
consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce
the terms written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather,
is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of
what each party has given under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment. EHaASD

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. 54 There is
no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that
the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility. 55

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain
the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.

It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be of doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds,
but admit them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them
beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them. 56

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law prohibiting the
sale of conjugal property without the spouse's consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid
the consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of
the court to admit the evidence which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.

An offer to prove the regular

execution of the deed of sale
is basis for the court to
determine the presence of
the essential elements of
the sale, including the
consideration paid.

Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual consideration of the sale and,
hence, cannot be considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.

The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as evidence. 57 Tomas, in fact, formally
offered it for the purpose of proving its execution and the regularity of the sale. 58

The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed the lower courts to consider the terms
written therein to determine whether all the essential elements 59 for a valid contract of sale are present, including
the consideration of the sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void does not prevent the court from relying
on consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount paid by the petitioner for the purpose
of preventing unjust enrichment.

Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of the sale is not necessary since
it is necessarily included in determining the regular execution of the sale.

The consideration stated in the

notarized Deed of Sale is prima
facie evidence of the amount
paid by the petitioner.

The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein. 60

Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment
of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense
and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. 61

In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount
paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut
or contradict the consideration stated as the actual consideration and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.

The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the consent of both spouses
for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the presence of the consideration of the sale, except
with respect to the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima
facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.
 As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of P700,000.00,
instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or testimonial evidence to prove
payment of the higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of payment
is self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject property.

Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount the
petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned under the principle of unjust enrichment. DaIAcC

Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good
conscience." 62 The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is based on Article
22 of the Civil Code.63

The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros received under the void contract
which presumably benefitted their conjugal partnership.

Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P200,000.00 since this the consideration
stated in the Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his comment
that Tomas is entitled to recover the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated August 28, 2009 and
the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Tan, Jr. v. Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, [February 3, 2016])

 [A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004.]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA,

SR., and NELSON B. MELGAR, complainants,vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.

R E S O L U T IO N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista,
Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.

Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned
his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon
G. Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy.
Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente;
respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that they were married
on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while in respondent's Certificate of
Candidacy filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia;
in respondent's certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such
declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification
of public documents; and respondent's acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute grounds for his
removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his political opponents in Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them; complainants
illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such
documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not participate in the preparation and submission with the local
civil registry of subject birth certificates; respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he has always declared
that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have used this issue against him during
elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended
the public's sense of morality.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.

Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their direct testimony
and were subjected to cross-examination by respondent's counsel. IcTEaC

Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows respondent for they both reside in Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent
has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife, and
from their cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in 1995, he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a concerned
citizen, informing him that respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980,
but respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a
Certification issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage between respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also
received information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos,
as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the Civil Register. Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy
filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas Valderia. In respondent's Certificate of
Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated. Respondent has represented to
all that he is married to Marilyn dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent holds the position
of Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela
Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.

On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the former mayor of Naujan and he and respondent
belong to warring political parties. It was not respondent who told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of
the present case. Although he received the letter of a concerned citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent
as far back as 1995, he did not immediately file a case for disbarment against respondent. It was only after respondent
filed a criminal case for falsification against him that he decided to file an administrative case against respondent. 1

On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who were against the open relationship
between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite
the fact that they are both still legally married to other persons, and so someone unknown to him just handed to their
maid copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina. 2

The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, is practically identical to that of witness
Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies
of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza, as somebody just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter
of a concerned citizen regarding respondent's immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take any action against
respondent at that time. 3

Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted by
respondent's counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one
Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of respondent's immoral acts, 4 the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia, 5 the
Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza, 6 the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina
dela Fuente Mendoza, 7 the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995, 8 the Certificate of Candidacy
of respondent dated March 25, 1998, 9 Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated
October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos, 10 and the
editorial page of the Naujanews (February–March 1999 issue), 11wherein it was stated that respondent has two
daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.

Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum expounding
on his arguments that the testimonies of complainants' witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their
documentary evidence have no probative weight.

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondent's violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza
 is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer
cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such immoral course of conduct.

Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the above-quoted
Resolution was based, read as follows:

FINDINGS:

The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a) the testimonies of Nelson Melgar
and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits executed under oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their
documentary evidence consisting of their Exhibits "A" to "H".

Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or offer any evidence. Respondent opted
not to present his evidence anymore because according to him "there is none to rebut vis-à-vis the evidence
presented by the private complainants." Respondent instead submitted a memorandum through counsel to argue
his position. As can be seen from the comment and memorandum submitted, respondent's counsel argues that the
complaint is politically motivated since complainants are political rivals of respondent and that the birth certificates
Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which were offered to show that respondent sired the children namely Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his cohabitation with
Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible because they were allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No.
1, Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to respondent. TDcHCa

The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand, categorically state in their affidavits
[Exhibits "A" and `B"] particularly in paragraph 2 that "Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with
Marilyn de la Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife." In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the
witnesses also categorically state that "respondent has even represented to all and sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente
is his wife." These categorical statements made under oath by complainants are not hearsay and remain un-rebutted.
Respondent chose not to rebut them.

Exhibit "E," the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that respondent is married to one, Felicitas
V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit "H", a marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos.
Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have been presented by complainants.

With respect to Exhibits "D" and "D-1", we believe that they are competent and relevant evidence and admissible
in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule which bars admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more
appropriately to evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant case cannot be analogous
to an illegal search or seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited
by respondent risks the penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the document so issued
inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present case. Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which are duly certified
birth certificates are therefore competent evidence to show paternity of said children by respondent in the absence
of any evidence to the contrary.

By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo,
and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with
a certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two children.
These facts we repeat have not been denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis of
the improper motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the documents presented.
Complainants have presented evidence sufficient enough to convince us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting
publicly with a person who is not his wife. The evidence taken together will support the fact that respondent is not
of good moral character. That respondent chose not to deny under oath the grave and serious allegations made
against him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped his position before the Commission. As between
the documents and positive statements of complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments of
respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath by respondent himself, we are
inclined and so give weight to the evidence of complainants. The direct and forthright testimonies and statements
of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is not hearsay.
The witnesses may have admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tell them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente
was his paramour (for why would respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their
affidavits under oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not respondent's wife. Again
their categorical statements taken together with the other documents, are enough to convince us and conclude that
respondent is not of good moral character.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral character is a continuing condition
for membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition
for remaining in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680
(1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes "mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage" [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274
SCRA 1 (1997)].

In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the fundamental institution of marriage.
Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit "F" that he is separated from his wife. This fact and statement without
any further explanation from respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral character which good moral
character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member to remain in good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent has violated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.

We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978)
that courts should not be used by private persons particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on
 members of the Bar through unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the charges can hardly
be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence presented. The evidence presented shows that
respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral character necessary as a condition for him to remain a member
of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the practice of law.

We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the pleadings and evidence on record, and,
hence, approve and adopt the same. CSDAIa

The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings which
is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conviction. 12

Witness Melgar's testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife is
corroborated by the contents of an article in theNaujanews, introducing respondent as one of Naujan's public servants,
and stating therein that respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente. 13 It
should be noted that said publication is under the control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board thereof.
Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that if he contested the truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews,
or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning
portions of said article to be edited out.

With regard to respondent's argument that the credibility of witnesses for the complainants is tainted by the fact that
they are motivated by revenge for respondent's filing of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses
Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be discounted as they are fully supported
and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May
22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an entry of a marriage between respondent
and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public documents and are prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein, as provided for under Article 410 14of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M.
Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in violation ofRule
24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, which provides as follows:

Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. —

(1) The records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information relating thereto shall be
issued except on the request of any of the following:

a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;

b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or other official
proceedings to determine the identity of the child's parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and

c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.

(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least two months or a fine
in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant
to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the
rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said
rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides
for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however,
that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the
government or the state. 15 In People vs. Hipol, 16 we explained that:

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its
agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended
to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant
at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches
and seizures. CDAHIT

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence
against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.

Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for
the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and
should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondent's Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent
himself declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public
documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still
legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.

In Bar Matter No. 1154, 17 good moral character was defined thus:

. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law.

In Zaguirre vs. Castillo, 18 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree
or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring
a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every
lawyer. 19
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit
with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent
should keep in mind that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal
profession. 20 In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr., 21we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney
is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this
Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits
satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.

Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last known address and entered in his record as
attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for
their information and guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the country. SDECAI

SO ORDERED.

||| (Tolentino v. Mendoza, A.C. No. 5151, [October 19, 2004], 483 PHIL 546-560)
 [G.R. No. 124514. July 6, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTORIANO GARCIA 1 and BERNARDINO

CARANGUIAN y PINAPIN, accused.

BERNARDINO CARANGUIAN y PINAPIN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, herein appellant, together with
Victoriano Garcia, was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of Ben Lumboy. They were also charged with
frustrated murder for the wounding of William Capili. Only appellant Caranguian was arrested. Co-accused Garcia
remained at large. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. After trial on the merits,
appellant was acquitted for frustrated murder but convicted of murder. Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay the costs of suit. Aggrieved, herein appellant appealed, questioning the
decision of the trial court.

The Supreme Court found the appeal meritorious. The Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that it was appellant who perpetrated the killing. While it is accepted that the testimony of a sole
eyewitness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, it bears stressing that such testimony
must be clear, positive and credible. Hence, an identification of the appellant as the gunman based on hearsay does not
suffice for conviction. Furthermore, it did not appear that appellant had a motive for killing the victim. While generally,
the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven, proof of the same becomes
relevant and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question. A finding of guilt must rest on
the prosecutions' own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. Accordingly, the
assailed decision was reversed and set aside. Appellant was acquitted for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that he
committed the crime charged.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; QUANTUM OF PROOF; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; EXPLAINED. — The
quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides that "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof as, excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind." The task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove that a crime was committed, and
second, that accused is the person responsible. Thus, the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. The reason for requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt is simply this — "In a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it
enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited command of means; with counsel usually
of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, and therefore speaking semi-judicially, and with an
attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting
struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no
conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
2. ID.; ID.; HEARSAY RULE; MULTIPLE HEARSAY IS NO MORE COMPETENT THAN SINGLE HEARSAY. — The
information given by either Lumboy or Palos to PO3 Birung as to the identity of appellant is hearsay. The hearsay rule
bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. Section
36 of Rule 130 provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the rules. In fact, PO3 Birung's testimony
is even double or multiple hearsay, since it is based upon "third-hand" information related to the witness by someone
who heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single hearsay.

3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; IDENTIFICATION OF THE GUNMAN BASED ON HEARSAY DOES NOT
SUFFICE FOR CONVICTION. — While it is accepted that the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if positive and credible, is
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, it bears stressing that such testimony must be clear, positive, and credible.
Hence, an identification of the appellant as the gunman based on hearsay does not suffice for conviction. ETAICc

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — It does not appear appellant has a motive for killing the
victim. While generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven, proof
of the same becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question. A finding
of guilt must rest on the prosecution's own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.
It is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak, as in this instance, that the defense of alibi assumes importance and
becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. Under our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Here,
doubt as to the identification of appellant as the guilty person has not been overcome.

D E C IS IO N
QUISUMBING, J : p

On appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 2022,
convicting appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the
costs.

The facts, based on the records, are as follows:

On August 1, 1991, at around 7:30 A.M., Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) members Ben Lumboy and William
Capili informed PO3 Edwin Birung, Detachment Commander at Barangay La Suerte, that they sighted two (2) former
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) agents at nearby Barangay Catarauan, in Amulung, Cagayan. Acting
on the information, PO3 Birung formed a team to track down the two former CAFGUs. LexLib

Composed of PO3 Birung, Lumboy, Capili, Cesar de los Santos, Carlito Ramirez, Guillermo Mauricio, and Reynaldo
Agpalza, the team proceeded to Barangay Catarauan. In single file, with Capili and Lumboy in the lead, they crossed
an improvised wooden bridge over a creek. Suddenly, Capili and Lumboy came under gunfire. The team members
immediately returned fire. An exchange of gunfire ensued. After about thirty (30) minutes, the firing ceased. The
gunmen withdrew in the direction of Barangay Baccring.

PO3 Birung ordered his men to rescue Lumboy and Capili. Capili was still alive and was rushed to the Cagayan Provincial
Hospital at Tuguegarao, Cagayan for treatment. Unfortunately, Lumboy was already dead. His body was brought to his
house. The following day, a civilian informer named Palos informed PO3 Birung that the two former CAFGUs the CVOs
sighted were Bernardino Caranguian and Victoriano Garcia, herein appellant and co-accused. 2

After preliminary investigation, 3 both Caranguian and Garcia were charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case
No. 2022, for the killing of Lumboy. They were also charged with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2008, for
the wounding of Capili. Appellant was acquitted of frustrated murder but convicted of murder. Only the murder case
is now before us. Cdpr

The Information for murder states: 4

"I N F O R M A T I O N

"The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Victoriano Garcia and Bernardino Caranguian of the crime of
Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about August 1, 1991, in the Municipality of Amulung, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Victoriano Garcia and Bernardino Caranguian y Pinapin, both armed
with guns, conspiring together and helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one, Ben Lumboy
inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Tuguegarao, Cagayan, February 5, 1992."

Only appellant, Caranguian, was arrested. Co-accused Garcia remains at-large to date. Upon arraignment, appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. 5 Trial ensued. 6

During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Dr. Cirilo Pintucan, resident physician at the
Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital, who treated the gunshot wound of Capili; (2) Dra. Dulce Donato-Baculi, retired
Municipal Health Officer of Amulung, Cagayan, who conducted the autopsy on the exhumed body of Lumboy; and (3)
PO3 Edwin Birung, eyewitness to the shooting incident.
Dr. Pintucan testified that Capili sustained a gunshot wound on the right side of the abdomen, the point of entry of
which was 0.5 cm and the point of exit 4 cm. Without immediate medical treatment, this tangent wound would have
caused a tetanus infection which could lead to death. 7

Dra. Donato-Baculi conducted a post-mortem examination on the exhumed cadaver of Lumboy on September 2, 1991,
a month after the incident. She testified that the cause of death was 'shock due to massive hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wounds.' 8 LibLex

For his defense, appellant invoked denial and alibi. He testified that he was a CAFGU member assigned in Tabang, Sto.
Niño, Cagayan. To prove his membership in the CAFGU, he presented the memorandum receipt issued for his gun. He
claims that on the day of the shooting incident, he was at his post the whole day. He knows accused Garcia as a fellow
CAFGU, but they were not together on the day of the incident. He was surprised to find himself arrested on February
1, 1992, for the shooting incident. 9

On August 11, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision, 10 the pertinent dispositive portion of which states:

"2. Sentencing Bernardino Caranguian in Criminal Case No. 2022 for Murder to a prison term of reclusion
perpetua.

3. Ordering said accused to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED."

Hence, the present appeal.

In his brief, appellant raises the sole issue that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime of murder
in connection with the death of Ben Lumboy. 11 He claims that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He assails the credibility of prosecution witness Birung since the latter did not even know the names
of appellant and co-accused at the time of the incident. Further, the testimony of Birung lacks corroboration. Lastly,
appellant claims an alibi, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis since he was about 15
kilometers away at the time of the shooting incident.

For the State, the Solicitor General contends that the sole eyewitness testified in clear and unequivocal terms as to the
identity of the assailants. It is well-settled that between a positive and categorical testimony and a denial, the former
should. Hence, appellant's bare denials and alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification, according to the Solicitor
General. prLL

The crucial issue in this appeal pertains to the sufficiency of evidence to convict appellant. More particularly, we have
to inquire whether there has been sufficient identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the offense.

The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court provides that "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof as, excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind." The task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove that a crime was committed, and
second, that accused is the person responsible. Thus, the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. 12 The reason for requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt is simply this —

"In a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory
finding in its hands; with unlimited command of means; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are
regarded as public officers, and therefore speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often
in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life.
 These inequalities of position the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction when there is a
reasonable doubt of guilt." 13

In the case before us, the prosecution presented proof that Lumboy was killed during the shooting incident on August
1, 1991. However, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was appellant who
perpetrated the killing. cdtai

On direct examination, PO3 Birung testified that Lumboy and Capili informed him that they sighted two former
CAFGUs in Catarauan. 14 On cross-examination, PO3 Birung testified, however, that Lumboy did not actually see the
two former CAFGUs but merely heard the news from his place. 15 Further, Lumboy did not categorically tell PO3 Birung
that the two persons sighted were former CAFGUs, only that said persons were armed. 16 PO3 Birung testified that he
merely heard from the people of Barangay Catarauan that there were two dismissed CAFGUs in the vicinity. 17 Further,
PO3 Birung testified that he was not even authorized by the army to catch the dismissed CAFGUs, and that Catarauan
was not part of his jurisdiction. 18 PO3 Birung testified that the day after the incident, a civilian informer named Palos
told him the names of the appellant and accused. 19 But Palos did not even witness the shooting incident. He merely
executed an affidavit during preliminary investigation but did not testify in court. Hence, his affidavit is hearsay and
has no probative value. 20

Clearly, the information given by either Lumboy or Palos to PO3 Birung as to the identity of appellant is hearsay. The
hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in
writing. 21 Section 36 of Rule 130 22 provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the rules.
In fact, PO3 Birung's testimony is even double or multiple hearsay, since it is based upon "third-hand" information
related to the witness by someone who heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single
hearsay. 23

PO3 Birung insists that he saw the appellant and accused "walking" during the incident. 24 After the initial shots rang
out, however, the team members immediately sought cover. Thus, it is highly unlikely that PO3 Birung was able to
sufficiently recognize the gunmen. Further, the other members of the team, including the injured Capili, did not testify
as to the identity of the appellant. The trial court even observed in its decision that Capili "deliberately chose not to
appear in court for 18 times when cited to appear during the hearing."

While it is accepted that the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment
of conviction, 25 it bears stressing that such testimony must be clear, positive, and credible. Hence, an identification of
the appellant as the gunman based on hearsay does not suffice for conviction.

Further, it does not appear appellant has a motive for killing the victim. While generally, the motive of the accused in
a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven, proof of the same becomes relevant and essential when,
as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question. 26 A finding of guilt must rest on the prosecution's own evidence,
not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. 27 It is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak,
as in this instance, that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal
liability. 28 Under our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 29 Here, doubt as to the
identification of appellant as the guilty person has not been overcome. LLpr

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant BERNARDINO Y PINAPIN
CARANGUIAN is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of murder. The
Director of Prisons is hereby directed to cause forthwith the release of appellant unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause, and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

||| (People v. Caranguian, G.R. No. 124514, [July 6, 2000], 390 PHIL 519-529)

[G.R. No. 179940. April 23, 2008.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NORBERTO DEL MONTE y GAPAY @

OBET, accused-appellant.

D E C IS IO N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

Assailed before Us is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007
which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78,
in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty of violation of
Section 5, 3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the
information reads:
 That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of
law and legal justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away,
dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing 0.290 gram. 4

The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan and docketed as Criminal Case No.
3437-M-02.

When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the
charge. 5 On 17 February 2003, the pre-trial conference was concluded. 6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. cTECHI

The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr., the poseur-buyer in the
buy-bust operation conducted against appellant, and a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 3/Special Enforcement Unit (SEU) stationed at the
Field Office, Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan.

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant went to the office
of the PDEA SEU in Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan and reported that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt
of said information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted. The team was composed
of SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team leader, PO1 Gaudencio Tolentino, Jr. as the poseur-buyer, and PO1 Antonio
Barreras as back-up operative. After the briefing, the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to
Poblacion Dike for the execution of the buy-bust operation.
 When the team arrived at appellant's place, they saw the appellant standing alone in front of the gate. The
informant and PO1 Tolentino approached appellant. The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his
friend, saying "Barkada ko, user." PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of three marked P100
bills. 7 The bills were marked with "GT JR", PO1 Tolentino's initials. Upon receiving the P300.00, appellant took out
a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit
a cigarette signifying that the sale had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and recovered
from the latter the marked money.

The white crystalline substance 8 in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1 Tolentino was forwarded to PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of the
any dangerous drug. The request for laboratory examination was signed by SPO2 Maung. 9 Per Chemistry Report No.
D-728-2002, 10 the substance bought from appellant was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.

The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who examined the substance bought from
appellant, was dispensed after both prosecution and defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on the fact
that the drugs subject matter of this case was forwarded to their office for laboratory examination and that
laboratory examination was indeed conducted and the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 11

For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together with his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza;
and nephew, Alejandro Lim.

From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like this: CTAIDE

On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister's house in Poblacion Dike when a commotion woke
him up. His nephew, Alejandro Lim, was shouting because the latter, together with appellant's common-law wife,
Amelia Mendoza, and a niece, was being punched and kicked by several police officers. When appellant tried to pacify
the policemen and ask them why they were beating up his common-law wife and other relatives, the policemen
arrested him, mauled him, punched him on the chest, slapped him and hit him with a palo-palo. He sustained
swollen face, lips and tooth. His common-law wife was likewise hit on the chest with the palo-palo.

The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house located in the middle of a field where
the former demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty. The next day, appellant was brought to the police station.

Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the police officers who manhandled them and
who demanded P15,000.00 so that she and appellant could go home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her
child and cousin arrived with the P15,000.00. She was released but appellant was detained. She does not know why
the police officers filed this case against appellant. What she knows is that they were asking money from them.

Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant and Amelia Mendoza.

On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00. The
dispostive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused Norberto del Monte y Gapay @ Obet GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P5,000,000.00. With cost.

The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government. The Branch of this Court
is directed to turn over the same to the Dangerous Drugs Board within ten (10) days from receipt hereof for proper
disposal thereof. 12
 The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr. to be credible and straightforward.
It established the fact that appellant was caught selling shabu during an entrapment operation conducted on 10
December 2002. Appellant was identified as the person from whom PO1 Tolentino bought P300.00 worth
of shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002. On the other hand, the trial court was not convinced
by appellant's defense of frame-up and denial. Appellant failed to substantiate his claims that he was merely sleeping
and was awakened by the screams of his relatives who were being mauled by the police officers. DTaAHS

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004. 13 With the filing thereof, the trial court directed the
immediate transmittal of the entire records of the case to us. 14 However, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo, 15 the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. 16

On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but reduced the fine imposed on
appellant to P500,000.00. It disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision dated March 8, 2004 of the RTC, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine imposed upon him is reduced from
P5,000,000.00 to P500,000.00. 17

A Notice of Appeal having been timely filed by appellant, the Court of Appeals forwarded the records of the case
to us for further review. 18

In our Resolution 19 dated 10 December 2007, the parties were notified that they may file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. Both appellant and appellee opted not to file a
supplemental brief on the ground they had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in their respective briefs and
the filing of a supplemental brief would only contain a repetition of the arguments already discussed therein.

Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM FOR FAILURE OF THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 21 OF R.A. 9165. 20

Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen's failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of him together with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken
immediately upon his arrest as shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds that PO1 Tolentino
and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police officers who had initial custody of the drug allegedly seized and confiscated,
did not conduct a physical inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their
failure to abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence adduced against
him. CEDScA

At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers' alleged non-compliance with Section
21 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to
do so. In People v. Sta. Maria 22 in which the very same issue was raised, we ruled:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse
the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain
unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed,
the police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the
trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the
trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary
 value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal. (Emphases supplied.)

In People v. Pringas, 23 we explained that non-compliance with Section 21 will not render an accused's arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of the drug
that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject matter of this case was forwarded to PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination which examination gave positive
result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the drug seized from appellant not to have been compromised.

We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory
and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence.
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that
will accorded it by the courts. One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein
a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to be altered after its execution, in
a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the
document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the rules. HCSDca

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility
of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue
therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight — evidentiary merit or
probative value — to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each case.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 24 What is material
to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. 25

All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs
actually happened and that the shabusubject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer
positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic Chemical
Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1 Tolentino from
appellant in consideration of P300.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together with the dangerous drug taken from
appellant, more than sufficient to prove the crime charged. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold
and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial court, which had the
distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental rule that
findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no
glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be
gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility
of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. 26
 The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of
Appeals. 27 Finding no compelling reason to depart from the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
we affirm their findings.

Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that he was framed, the evidence against him being
"planted", and that the police officers were exacting P15,000.00 from him. cDaEAS

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject of a buy-bust operation. Having
been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any
credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail. 28 Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this
Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense
in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 29 For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a
regular and proper manner. 30 This, appellant failed to do. The presumption remained unrebutted because the
defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty
or that they were inspired by an improper motive.

The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his nephew, Alejandro Lim, to support his
claims fails to sway. We find both witnesses not to be credible. Their testimonies are suspect and cannot be given
credence without clear and convincing evidence. Their claims, as well as that of appellant, that they were maltreated
and suffered injuries remain unsubstantiated. As found by the trial court:

The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to exculpate himself from liability raised the defense of frame-up.
He alleged that at the time of the alleged buy bust he was merely sleeping at the house of his sister. That he was
 awakened by the yells and screams of his relatives as they were being mauled by the police officers. However, this
Court is not convinced. Accused failed to substantiate these claims of maltreatment even in the face of his wife's
and nephew's testimony. No evidence was presented to prove the same other than their self-serving claims. 31

Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that the witnesses for the defense
cannot even agree on what time the arresting policemen allegedly arrived in their house. It explained:

To elaborate, appellant testified that it was 3 o'clock in the afternoon of December 10, 2002 when he was
roused from his sleep by the policemen who barged into the house of his sister (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 2). His
common-law wife, however, testified that it was 10-11 o'clock in the morning when the policemen came to the
house (TSN, Oct. 13, 2003, p. 6). On the other hand, Alejandro Lim testified that he went to sleep at 11 o'clock
in the morning and it was 10 o'clock in the morning when the policemen arrived (TSN, Feb. 2, 2004, p. 6). He
thus tried to depict an absurd situation that the policemen arrived first before he went to sleep with
appellant. 32 aITECD

Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the illegal sale of drugs, we are
constrained to uphold appellant's conviction.

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Said section reads:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
 Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity, is punishable by life
imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1
Tolentino, and there being no modifying circumstance alleged in the information, the trial court, as sustained by the
Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in accordance with Article 63 (2) 33 of the
Revised Penal Code.

As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court pegged the fine at P5,000,000.00 which the
Court of Appeals reduced to P500,000.00. Both amounts are within the range provided for by law but the amount
imposed by the Court of Appeals, considering the quantity of the drugs involved, is more appropriate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007, sustaining the conviction of appellant Norberto Del
Monte, a.k.a. Obet, for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

||| (People v. Del Monte y Gapay, G.R. No. 179940, [April 23, 2008], 575 PHIL 576-591)
[A.C. No. 6470. July 8, 2014.]

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J : p
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita de Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell
Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and
unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged
that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that
falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury
and for sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned. HcDSaT

Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial problems. One
contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the
lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her
copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered
by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala)
on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the
property was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers of
Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant's
secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the
named attorney-in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino's Affidavit corroborated complainant's allegations
against respondent. 2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to submit her
comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice. 3 cHaADC

In her Comment, 4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of complainant and
that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so
the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondent's computer, and the phrase "absolute
and registered owner" was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because
complainant constructed the subject public market stall under a "Build Operate and Transfer" contract with the local
government unit and, technically, she could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract
over the same property in which complainant was represented as the property's absolute owner, but she did not
complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of herself as owner
of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was
even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with
the previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was
actually new. She gave the court's copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter's request for an
extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant's assurance that the lessees
would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged
on her promise.

As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant was an
experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the
purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing
about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the
subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence were
properly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before
respondent; hence, the notarization was limited to the former's participation in the execution of the document.
Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized in the principal's place of residence.

An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional Evidence. 5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized
by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming
Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact;
(3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease
contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form
(Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned
Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption. aESICD

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers. 6 Notably,
respondent's Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached to complainant's
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion. aDHScI

THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate
revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her
violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly
appeared before her. He accepted respondent's explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the
three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract
was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon 18 7and Rule 18.03 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for six months. 9

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for one year. 10

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration 11 and Second Motion for Reconsideration. 12 She maintained that
the additional documents submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the
procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice). 13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was
prohibited under the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to
question those documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner should have expunged the documents from the records,
instead of giving them due course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the
following: absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional problems;
timely goodfaith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to
the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and
remoteness of prior offenses. TSIEAD

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied respondent's motion
for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBP's findings. 14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago — through a letter
addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio — transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment
Complaint against respondent. 15

THE COURT'S RULING

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties' submissions in this case, the
Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.

Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural
matters raised by respondent.

Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for having
been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was
raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza, 16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his
illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation Rule
24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. 17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are
relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of
said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1993. AHCaES

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating
the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation
of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only
 provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be
emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person
from interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained that:

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual
and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the
individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government
and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged
"warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly
fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth
records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does
not apply.

Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide
for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible
and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent. 18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in
violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by
complainant as additional evidence.

Respondent's argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading must fail
as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary
pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same
subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint. 19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the
Urgent Ex-ParteMotion filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is
that the latter notarized incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of
her complaint. AICDSa

Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she committed misconduct and
grievously violated her oath as a notary public.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. 20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the
instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the
notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 In this case,
respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all,
it only heightens the latter's liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent's conduct amounted to a breach
of Canon 1 22and Rules 1.01 23 and 1.02 24 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ACIDTE
Respondent's explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in September
1999 25 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees' signatures, she could have given
complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in respondent's
practice as a notary public. Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22
documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document may be a ground
for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her
presence. 26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed
it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. 27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated
Rule 10.01 28 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood. 29

Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several instances, the Court
did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries
public. 30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 31 The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary
public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public. cDHAES

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, isIMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and furnished
to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

||| (De Jesus v. Sanchez-Malit, A.C. No. 6470, [July 8, 2014], 738 PHIL 480-494)

[G.R. No. 134530. December 4, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SAMONTAÑEZ y DELA

VEGA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

In the early morning of November 25, 1995 Corazon delas Alas saw her 18-year old daughter, Lolita off to school from
their residence. That was the last time she saw her daughter alive because in the evening of the same day Lolita's lifeless
and naked body was found in the middle of the sugar cane plantation. She was apparently raped before the attacker
ended her life. Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly crime. However, police investigation revealed that
the accused-appellant was seen around 6 in the evening of November 25, 1995 while he was coming out of the sugar
cane plantation near the place where the body of Lolita was found. Also follow up investigation led to the recovery of
the victim's personal belongings inside the accused bag left at his work place. Samontañez was formally charged in court
with the crime of rape with homicide. He originally pleaded not guilty to the crime charged but later changed it to that
of guilty. Trial ensued, and thereafter the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged
and was sentenced to death. The case reached the Court on automatic review.

According to the Supreme Court, the trial court failed to mention and explain clearly to the appellant the elements of
the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the information. As a result the appellant was not properly accorded his
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him, which is an integral part of the
due process clause under the Constitution. Also the trial court considered pieces of evidence that were inadmissible in
evidence for being proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for the crime charged
rested primarily on his plea of guilty that appeared to be improvidently made. The decision of the trial court was
annulled and set aside by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded to the court of origin for proper arraignment
and trial.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE; DUTIES OF THE TRIAL COURT.
— Section 3 Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically mandates the course that trial courts
should follow in case where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, as follows: SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital
offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. Based on the aforecited
rule, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered by the accused:
1. The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea; 2. The trial court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability through the requisite quantum of evidence; and 3. The trial court must ask the accused
if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. It must be emphasized that the said
procedure is mandatory and any judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where
the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is
irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose is to
avoid improvident pleas of guilty on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since by admitting his guilt
before the court, he would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and
consequence of his plea.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCHING INQUIRY; CONSTRUED. — Also, the trial court should have probed deeper to the extent of
securing every material detail of the crime in its lengthy inquiries to the appellant subsequent to his re-arraignment.
Questions tending to elicit corroborative responses to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should have been asked
of the appellant. Although there is not definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of
a proper "searching inquiry," it would be well for the trial court, for instance, to require the appellant to fully narrate
the incident that spawned the charges against him, or by making him re-enact the manner in which he perpetrated
the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance in order to determine,
once and for all, his liability for the crime. As it is, the Decision of the trial court is devoid of any factual finding relative
to the actual commission of the crime of rape with homicide by the appellant. In the final analysis, it is the quality rather
than the number of questions propounded during the inquiry that serves the task of ascertaining the voluntariness and
full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.

4. ID.; ID.; CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; EVIDENCE GATHERED THRU ILLEGALLY OBTAINED CONFESSION,
INADMISSIBLE; THROUGH CASE AT BAR. — Lastly, the trial court lamentably considered pieces of evidence that are
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." The facts show that the appellant Roberto
Samontañez was actually arrested by police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas on November 28, 1995 at his workplace
in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. It does not appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his
constitutional rights during the police custodial investigation which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of
the 1987 Constitution. It also does not appear that he was assisted by counsel during the said custodial investigation.
In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from the appellant during the police custodial investigation
relative to the crime, including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in evidence
even if the same was not objected to during the trial by the counsel of the appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of
the victim namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring and Joop cologne were recovered and found inside the bag of the
appellant when the police authorities returned to the appellant's place of work at the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay
Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite after they illegally obtained a confession from the appellant. In the case of People vs. Alicando,
the Court had opportunity to reiterate the rule that evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is
inadmissible, thus: We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted
the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the " fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the
"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is
also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the
" fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The " fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence
taints all evidence subsequently obtained. EDIHSC

D E C IS IO N

DE LEON, JR., J : p

Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangas dated May
15, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the appellant, Roberto V. Samontañez, of the crime of rape with
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

In the early morning of November 25, 1995, Corazon delas Alas saw her daughter, eighteen (18) year-old Lolita delas
Alas, off to school from their residence in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. That was the last time
Corazon had seen her alive because at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day Lolita's lifeless and naked body was
found in the middle of a sugar cane plantation in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. Lolita was
apparently raped before the attacker ended her life.

Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly crime. However, police investigation reveals that Roberto
Samontañez was seen at around 6:30 o'clock in the evening on November 25, 1995 while he was in the act of coming
out of the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas near the place
where the dead body of Lolita delas Alas was later found. It also appears that earlier, at around 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, Roberto passed by the house of Melecio Mendoza in Sitio Bulanggutan, Barangay Bunducan and he headed
eastward to the direction of the sugar cane plantation of Desacola. Thirty (30) minutes later, Lolita was also spotted,
and she was likewise heading eastward to her house in Sitio Ilaya. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Roberto
returned heading westward and he passed through the same path along the cane field.

On November 28, 1995, Roberto was fetched by the police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas from his workplace at
Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. During the investigation at the Nasugbu Police
Headquarters in Nasugbu, Batangas, Roberto admitted to the police that the other personal belongings of Lolita delas
Alas were inside his bag that was left at his workplace in Mendez, Cavite. A follow-up investigation conducted by the
Nasugbu police authorities at Hermogenes Trading in Mendez, Cavite led to the recovery of the said personal belongings
of the victim.

On January 11, 1996, Roberto Samontañez was formally charged in court with the crime of rape with homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information that reads:

That on or about the 26th day of November, 1995, at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Ilaya, Brgy.
Bunducan, Municipality of Nasugbu, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of Lolita delas Alas y Andino against her will and consent and by reason or on
occasion of the said rape accused with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangled the said Lolita delas
Alas y Andino with the use of the latter's T-shirt which directly caused her instantaneous death. Further, the
personal properties of Lolita delas Alas y Andino consisting of a gold ring and a wrist watch in an undetermined
amount were taken by the accused.
 Contrary to law. 2

Upon being arraigned on February 1, 1996, accused Roberto Samontañez, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered the plea
of "Not guilty" to the Information in this case.

Pre-trial was scheduled and terminated on March 14, 1996. Before trial on the merits could ensue the accused,
through counsel, manifested his intention of changing his earlier plea of not guilty to that of guilty. Accordingly, the trial
court ordered that the accused be re-arraigned in Tagalog, a dialect which he understood, and the said accused then
pleaded guilty to the charge of rape with homicide as stated in the instant information. After being satisfied that the
accused entered a voluntary and informed plea by asking some questions, the trial court required the prosecution to
adduce evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability pursuant to Rule 116, Section
3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3

The evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 26, 1995, the victim, Lolita delas Alas alias Betia, left their
house in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning to attend her classes
at Kim Harold Computer School in Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas. She was expected to return home at 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of the same day. Having failed to come home on time, the victim's mother, Corazon delas Alas, decided
to meet Lolita in Barangay Pantalan which was her usual route in going home from school. Upon her arrival in Barangay
Pantalan however, Corazon was informed that Lolita had already passed by, and that by then she must have reached
their home. Corazon returned to Sitio Ilaya but found that Lolita was not yet home. Filled with apprehension, Corazon
sought the assistance of her neighbors, Renato Bauyon and Dalmacio Salao, to locate her daughter's whereabouts. At
8:00 o'clock in the evening Corazon fainted upon being informed by Bauyon and Salao that the dead body of Lolita was
found in the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola. The body of her dead daughter was already inside the house when
she regained consciousness. 4
Corazon gave her sworn statement 5 to the police on December 8, 1995 in connection with the rape-slay case of her
daughter Lolita delas Alas. She knew accused-appellant Roberto Samontañez for the reason that he was a resident of
Sitio Balanggutan, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. The death of her daughter was very painful to Corazon and
that she spent about P40,000.00 in connection with her wake and funeral. 6

It appears that on November 26, 1995, Carlito Samontañez, who is a first cousin of both the accused-appellant and
the victim, was on his way home after gathering fodder for his animals when, at a distance of twenty (20) arms length,
he chanced upon Roberto at around 6:30 o'clock in the evening while the latter was coming out of the sugar cane
plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. Carlito and Roberto were coming
from opposite directions. However, when they came close to two (2) arms length with each other, Carlito observed that
Roberto, who was naked from waist up with his T-shirt placed on his shoulder, was perspiring, somewhat surprised and
looked pale ("medyo po namumutla"). Carlito greeted Roberto and asked him where he just came from, but the latter
did not answer and left hurriedly. Carlito dismissed his cousin's reaction, thinking that he (Roberto) may have been
merely drunk. 7

After reaching his house, Carlito joined in the search for Lolita upon learning that she was missing. At 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, the victim was found dead in the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya. Lolita was lying
on her stomach, naked and a black T-shirt was tied around her neck. 8

Another prosecution witness, Melecio Mendoza, who is an uncle of Roberto Samontañez by affinity, saw Roberto walking
eastward to Sitio Ilaya in Barangay Bunducan at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon on November 26, 1995. Melecio
also saw Lolita at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day walking home to Sitio Ilaya. Subsequently, at 7:00
o'clock in the evening, Melecio again saw Roberto passed by his house, this time heading westward to Sitio Balanggutan
in Barangay Bunducan. Roberto was naked from waist up with his T-shirt placed on his shoulder. 9
Melecio joined in the search for Lolita after having been requested by Renato Bauyon. Lolita was totally naked and
already dead when they found her in the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya which was
approximately one hundred (100) meters away from his house in Sitio Balanggutan. 10

Acting on the report that a dead woman was found in Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas, SPO2 Buenaventura
Masikat and other police officers of Nasugbu, Batangas, together with Dra. Estela Hizon, proceeded to the crime scene
in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas where the victim, Lolita delas Alas, was found dead and lying
on her stomach totally naked with a black T-shirt tied around her neck. A panty was stuffed in her anal area. Her hands
were stretched upward and her bra was half removed. 11

Dra. Estela Hizon, M.D., Municipal Health Officer of Nasugbu, Batangas, conducted a post-mortem examination on the
cadaver of Lolita delas Alas which was already in a state of rigor mortis. Her findings are contained in her post-mortem
certification 12 dated November 26, 1995, thus:

1. Contusion around the left eye.

2. Contused wounds at the upper and lower lips

3. Presence of mark of strangulation around the neck.

4. Multiple contusions at the anterior aspect of the chest.

5. Multiple laceration of the hymen.

Cause of death : Asphyxia by Strangulation.

Dra. Hizon also prepared an anatomical sketch of the human body 13 showing the location of the injuries indicated in
her post-mortem report and another anatomical sketch showing the hymenal lacerations 14 in the vaginal canal of the
victim. She explained that the contusion on the left eye, the contused wounds on the upper and lower lips with swelling
and blackish discoloration as well as the multiple contusions at the anterior aspect of the chest of the victim may have
been caused by fist blows. The horizontal skin depressions around the victim's neck was caused by ligature possibly with
the use of a piece of cloth or a rope. The protruding tongue of the victim may have been caused by constriction around
her neck. The multiple fresh lacerations of the hymen may have been caused by forcible penetration of the victim's
vaginal canal. There was watery bloodied fluid coming out of the victim's vagina. Finally, the cause of death of the victim
was asphyxia by strangulation. 15

Meanwhile, SPO2 Masikat found two (2) short pants and one (1) piece of slipper that belonged to Lolita delas Alas. 16 On
the other hand, SPO2 Dionisio Calara took pictures 17 of the deceased victim and the scene of the crime on the same
evening. On November 27, 1995, police officers Masikat and Calara returned to the crime scene and found the black
bag of the victim containing a lotion, a pair of maong pants and a pair of shoes. 18 They also found the brown bag of
the victim which contained her Kim Harold identification card, coin purse, hair pin, powder kit and powder puff. 19 In
addition, they prepared a sketch of the scene of the crime 20 and its vicinity. Thereafter, SPO2 Masikat conducted
interviews of the persons in the vicinity among whom were the prosecution witnesses, Carlito Samontañez and Melecio
Mendoza. During the interview, SPO2 Masikat learned, among others, that the suspect, Roberto Samontañez, could
possibly be located at Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite where he worked. 21

On November 28, 1995, SPO2 Masikat, together with police officers Ramos, Malinay, Ocoma, Lejano and Ilao, all of
the Nasugbu, Batangas police found Roberto Samontañez at the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez,
Cavite. After talking to his employer, they invited Roberto to the Nasugbu Police Headquarters. During the interrogation
at the police headquarters, Roberto informed SPO2 Masikat and SPO2 Calara that some of the personal belongings of
Lolita delas Alas were inside his bag that was left at his workplace in Mendez, Cavite. 22
On December 4, 1995 SPO2 Masikat and his group returned to Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez,
Cavite and inquired from Mr. Nelson Hermogenes about the bag of Roberto. Accordingly, Mr. Hermogenes produced a
black bag purportedly belonging to Roberto containing an Omax wrist watch, a Joop cologne and a pawnshop receipt
for a gold ring that was subsequently redeemed by SPO2 Masikat for P500.00. The three (3) articles were positively
identified during the trial of the case by Corazon delas Alas as belonging to her daughter, Lolita delas Alas. The police
also found a fan knife (balisong) and a Barangay Clearance inside the black bag of Roberto Samontañez. 23

The prosecution rested its case on November 30, 1997. During the scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998
for the presentation of evidence of the defense, the accused took the witness stand and reiterated his previous plea of
guilty to the crime charged in the information. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused Roberto Samontañez is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal, of the crime of Rape with Homicide as thus penalized and is hereby sentenced to DEATH, together with
the accessory penalties provided for in Article 40 of the same code. The accused is further condemned to pay to the
heirs of the victim the amount of P40,000.00 by way of compensatory or actual damages; P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death; and P100,000.00 as and for moral damages. The accused should pay costs.

SO ORDERED. 24

In his Brief, appellant Roberto Samontañez assails the validity of his plea of guilty to the charge in the information in
this case for having been improvidently made. On the other hand, the People belie the claim of the appellant by citing
portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing during the appellant's re-arraignment on March 14,
1996 and that of the scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998 to show that he voluntarily entered the plea
of guilty to the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the information and with full knowledge of the consequences
of his plea of guilty. It averred that the guilt of the appellant was also established beyond reasonable doubt by
independent evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial of the instant case. aDIHTE

The record shows that the trial court relied on a) the appellant's plea of guilty to the crime of rape with homicide as
charged in the information and b) the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial of the instant case.

Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically mandates the course that trial courts should
follow in case where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, as follows:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present
evidence in his behalf.

Based on the aforecited rule, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense
is entered by the accused: 1. The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The trial court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability through the requisite quantum of evidence; and
3. The trial court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires. 25 It must be emphasized that the said procedure is mandatory and any judge who fails to observe it commits
grave abuse of discretion. 26

The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown
that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilty on
the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since by admitting his guilt before the court, he would forfeit
his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. 27

The Court notes the trial court's efforts to ensure the propriety of appellant's plea of guilty to the crime of rape with
homicide as evidenced by its lengthy inquiries to the appellant in separate hearings, the transcript of which were
reproduced in its assailed Decision. Hence, during the scheduled hearing on March 14, 1996, the following proceedings
transpired, to wit:

Court:

Ready?

Atty. Exchaure:

Your honor, just a moment ago I informed the accused the fact that we will now proceed with the trial on the merits
of the case, but as usual, the accused intimated to this representation that he will be pleading guilty to the
offense charged against him. I informed him the gravity of the offense as well as the corresponding severe
penalty attached to the offense which is death, considering that there is a new law. But the accused insists on
his desire to plead guilty, in fact I brought that desire of his to the attention of his mother who is present, as
well as his aunt, and grandmother, and according to them, that is the wish of the accused to plead guilty to
the charge against him.

Court:

The Court is asking the accused.

Q: Is the manifestation of your counsel, Atty. Exchaure true and correct that you have now made up your mind to
plead guilty to the offense as charged?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are doing that with your clear mind, nobody forced you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And did you reveal before to your counsel your decision to plead guilty?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where is the mother of the accused?

Atty. Exchaure:

She is here, your honor.

Court: (To the mother Teresita Samontañez)

Q: Are you related to the accused?

A: He is my son, your honor.

Q: Now, is it true that your son has decided to plead guilty?

A: Yes, your honor.

Q: And as mother, did you counsel your son that pleading guilty will mean his guilt as charged?

A: Yes, your honor.

Court:

The accused can now be re-arraigned, but after his plea of guilty, the prosecution still has to present evidence as
required by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Prosecutor Marajas:
Yes, your honor.

Court:

Make your motion, Mr. defense counsel.

Atty. Exchaure:

Your honor, the accused, a moment ago, intimated to this representation that he is changing his former Plea of
Not Guilty to that of Guilty, for which reason, your honor, I move that the accused be re-arraigned so that
he could properly enter his Plea of Guilty.

Court:

Re-arraign the accused.

(The Court Interpreter read the information in Pilipino to the accused.)

Court Interpreter:

(After reading the Information in Pilipino.)

Your honor, the accused entered a Plea of Not Guilty.

Court:

Place the accused on the witness stand. I want to clear this matter very well, because of the gravity of the offense.

Court:

(To the accused)

Q: Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this case?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

A: ROBERTO SAMONTAÑEZ, 26 years old, single, laborer in a construction, and a resident of Barangay Bunducan,
Nasugbu, Batangas.

Q: You were re-arraigned this morning by reading to you an information in Pilipino, did you understand the
information as read to you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you are a Tagalog speaking because you were born and grew up in Brgy. Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you know that by pleading guilty as you did awhile ago, the Court will impose on you the death penalty as
provided for by law for this offense?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And your pleading guilty was nobody's liking but of your own volition and spontaneous decision?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did your mother tell you to plead guilty?

A: No, sir.

Q: Did your counsel, Atty. Exchaure tell you to plead guilty?

A: No, sir.

Q: Did the prosecutor tell you to plead guilty?

A: No, sir.
Q: Did anybody for that matter tell you to plead guilty?

A: None, sir.

Q: When you pleaded guilty, you were in your right senses?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What grade did you finish in school or what is your educational attainment?

A: Grade IV, sir.

Q: But you can read and write?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: As in fact, you are a registered voter, as you did vote in the last election?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where did you vote?

A: Brgy. Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas, sir.

Q: In other words, you are admitting to have raped and killed the victim in this case, Lolita delas Alas on that date
in question and as charged in the information?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Nobody gave or promised you any reward for your act of pleading guilty?

A: None, sir.

Q: Did anybody threaten or coerce or cajole you to do so?

 A: None, sir.

Q: When you pleaded guilty awhile ago, whose decision is that?

A: It's my own decision, sir.

Q: Do you know the consequences of your pleading guilty?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What is the consequence of your pleading guilty?

A: I will be punished with a grave penalty, sir.

Q: Do you have an idea as to the grave penalty that the Court may impose on you?

A: None, sir.

Q: Now, I am sternly and emphatically reminding you that the Court may impose on you the severe penalty of death
if you still maintain your plea of guilty?

A: Yes, sir, despite that I am not changing my plea of guilty, sir. My conscience is bothering me, for what I did to
the victim, sir.

Q: Alright, you sign on the notes together with the assistance of your counsel?

A: (The accused affixed his signature on the notes together with his counsel.) 28

During the scheduled hearing on January 14, 1998 for the presentation of evidence of the defense, the following
proceedings were duly recorded, to wit:

Atty. Exchaure:
The witness, your honor, is the accused himself. Although he pleaded guilty to the crime imputed against him, he
will explain to the Honorable Court the reasons and circumstances, if any, why he pleaded guilty when he was
re-arraigned.

Court:

Proceed.

Atty. Exchaure:

Q: Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that when you were re-arraigned, you pleaded guilty to the charge against you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And in fact, you were asked by the Honorable Court if your having pleaded guilty is of your own voluntary act?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, up to the present time, do you confirm the fact that you pleaded guilty to the charge against you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: At the time you pleaded guilty, nobody forced or coerced you to plead guilty?

A: Yes, sir.

Court:

Q: And even now, nobody is threatening you?

A: Nobody, sir.

Atty. Exchaure:

Q: Are you aware of the consequences of your having pleaded guilty?

A: No, sir.

Court:

Q: Why do you say you don't know the consequences?

A: I don't know what will happen to me, sir.

Q: Don't you understand that by pleading guilty, the Court will just penalize you for the crime that you admitted?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And in fact, the charge to which you pleaded guilty calls for the supreme penalty of death?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And still you insist on or maintain your plea of guilty made before and you are confirming the same this morning?

A: Yes, sir.

Atty. Exchaure:

Q: And you are willing to accept whatever will be the penalty will be imposed by the Honorable Court for having
pleaded guilty, which you still maintain up to now?

A: Yes, Sir.

Court:

Are you remorseful for the crime imputed to you and which you admitted to have committed?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You just pray to God that in the final day of reckoning, God will still forgive you?
 A: Yes, sir. 29

Also, on January 29, 1998, the following verbal exchange were recorded, thus:

Court: (To the accused)

Q: Roberto Samontañez, your counsel this morning manifested that you cannot furnish him any evidence at least
to mitigate the imposable penalty, now under your same oath, do you confirm that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: In other words, you have nothing more to say regarding your plea of guilty?

A: None, sir.

Q: You have nothing more to present at least to mitigate your liability for the offense which you admitted to have
committed?

A: I was then high on marijuana, sir.

Q: Were you a user of marijuana?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you were repentant of what you did to the victim?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you know that your repentance cannot bring back the life of the victim?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you leave your fate to this Court?

 A: Yes, sir. 30

Nevertheless, We are not convinced that such lengthy inquiries conducted by the trial court during the re-arraignment
of the appellant as well as during the subsequent hearings for the presentation of evidence of both the prosecution and
the defense sufficiently established voluntariness and full comprehension of the appellant of his plea of guilty to the crime
charged in the Information. It may be noted that the appellant earlier entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the Information
in this case during his arraignment on February 1, 1996. Subsequently, the appellant manifested, through his
counsel de officio, his intention to change his previous plea to that of a plea of guilty to the crime charged in the
Information. After having entered the plea of guilty on re-arraignment, the trial court proceeded to propound questions
on the appellant during which affirmative responses were elicited from the appellant apparently to show that his
subsequent plea of guilty was his own voluntary decision. The trial court per its Decision under review, however, failed
to dwell on a significant development that transpired during the scheduled hearing on November 13, 1997 when the
appellant revealed in open court, through counsel, that his subsequent plea of guilty was prompted by "pressure" from
a certain policeman so that he (appellant) agreed to admit the commission of the offense charged. The pertinent portion
of the transcript is quoted hereunder, to wit:

Court:

The prosecution having rested, the Court wants to hear from the defense what it has to offer.

Atty. Exchaure:

I am now in dilemma, your honor, considering that the accused has already pleaded guilty to the charge against
him and the accused intimated to me this morning that he is changing his plea of guilty because according to
him when he testified before this Honorable Court admitted and pleaded guilty (sic), he was under pressure
by a certain policeman to admit the commission of the offense.
 Court:

Well, that is your point, you have to present your evidence.

Atty. Exchaure:

In that case, your honor, considering the recent development on the intention of the accused, may I be allowed to
confer first with the accused and ask the Honorable Court to have this case to move for continuance to give
us time to present the accused himself at the next schedule hearing.

Court:

Granted.

Prosecutor Marajas:

I just manifest for the record that the accused is a detention prisoner if what the defense counsel stated were true
and correct that Mr. Roberto Samontañez was just pressured, the more he should present the . . .

Court:

Precisely, that's why he is asking for postponement. 31

The trial court perfunctorily brushed aside the aforesaid disclosure from the appellant that he was pressured by a
policeman to change his earlier plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the charge in the information. It did not propound
any clarificatory questions about the matter on the same occasion such as the identity of the concerned policeman, the
nature of the pressure and the circumstances under which the alleged pressure was applied on the appellant. Although
further inquiries were undertaken by the trial court in the subsequent hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998, the
questions addressed to the appellant were primarily aimed at eliciting affirmative responses or confirmations of his plea
of guilty. The statement of the appellant that he was pressured by a certain policeman apparently escaped the memory
or concern of the trial court as it did not crop up in its inquiry during those subsequent hearings. Left unventilated, the
appellant's allegation of pressure generates doubt on the voluntariness of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.

Certain other considerations pose nagging doubts on the clarity of appellant's grasp of the true meaning, full significance
and consequences of his plea of guilty. The trial court failed to mention and explain clearly to the appellant the elements
of the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the Information. 32 As a result, appellant was not properly accorded
his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him, which is an integral aspect
of the due process clause under the Constitution.

Notably, the appellant who reached grade IV only stated that he did not know the consequences of his plea of guilty
during the hearing on February 14, 1996 and again, during the hearing on January 14, 1998. While the trial court
informed the appellant that his plea of guilty meant that he admitted liability for the crime of rape with homicide, as
charged in the information, which carries the penalty of death, it failed to emphasize that his said plea of guilty would
not, under any circumstance, affect or reduce the death penalty, the imposition of which is mandatory under Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659. 33 In which event, the appellant must be made to understand in plain and simple
language the precise meaning of the term "mandatory." 34 Additionally, the trial court failed to apprise the appellant
of the civil liability (e.g. indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages) arising from the crime of rape with
homicide which shall be imposed on him as perpetrator of the crime. 35Despite appellant's apparent willingness to
accept the penalty for his crime, it is not farfetched to say that appellant was actually led to believe that the penalty
for his crime may still be reduced upon his plea of guilty thereto especially when the trial court informed the appellant,
through counsel, that he should adduce evidence.

Also, the trial court should have probed deeper to the extent of securing every material detail of the crime in its lengthy
inquiries to the appellant subsequent to his re-arraignment. Questions tending to elicit corroborative responses to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should have been asked of the appellant. Although there is no definite and
concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry," it would be well for the
trial court, for instance, to require the appellant to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him,
or by making him re-enact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain
to the court missing details of significance in order to determine, once and for all, his liability for the crime. 36 As it is,
the Decision of the trial court is devoid of any factual finding relative to the actual commission of the crime of rape with
homicide by the appellant. In the final analysis, it is the quality rather than the number of questions propounded during
the inquiry that serves the task of ascertaining the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the
consequences of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.

Lastly, the trial court lamentably considered pieces of evidence that are inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
" fruit of a poisonous tree." The facts show that the appellant Roberto Samontañez was actually arrested by police
authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas on November 28, 1995 at his workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. It
does not appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights during the police custodial
investigation which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution. 37 It also does not appear that
he was assisted by counsel during the said custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession
obtained from the appellant during the police custodial investigation relative to the crime, including any other evidence
secured by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not objected to during the trial
by the counsel of the appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of the victim namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring and
Joop cologne were recovered and found inside the bag of the appellant when the police authorities returned to the
appellant's place of work at the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite after they illegally obtained
a confession from the appellant. In the case of People vs. Alicando, 38 the Court had opportunity to reiterate the rule
that evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is inadmissible, thus:
 We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian
exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source(the "tree") is shown
to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at
least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle
that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies of Carlito Samontañez and Melecio Mendoza, both of
which merely seek to establish the presence of the appellant near the vicinity of the crime scene on or about the time
when the crime took place. Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for the crime charged in the case at bar rested
primarily on his plea of guilty which appeared to have been improvidently made and hence, contrary to the letter and
spirit of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, supra. CaSHAc

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangas dated May 15, 1998 in
Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the appellant, Roberto V. Samontañez, of the crime of rape with homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the case is remanded
to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused until terminated.

SO ORDERED.

||| (People v. Samontañez, G.R. No. 134530, [December 4, 2000], 400 PHIL 703-727)
 [G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999.]

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 1994 which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City dated July 27, 1992 finding petitioner Felipe Navarro
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to suffer ten years of prision mayor, as minimum and
fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, but increased the death indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim, from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. In this appeal, petitioner contended that the
appellate court had decided the case not in accord with law and with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
Its conclusions were based on speculation, surmise and conjecture and its judgment was based on a misapprehension of
facts; its finding was contradicted by evidence on record; and its finding was devoid of support in the record. cAaTED

The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal was without merit. Petitioner had not shown that the trial court erred in
giving weight to the testimony of the prosecution witness. In fact, the prosecution witness' testimony was confirmed by
the voice recording he had made which established that (1) there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro
and the victim Lingan on the placing of the police blotter of an entry against him and reporter Jalbuena; and (2) that
some form of violence occurred involving petitioner and the victim Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed with the modification that petitioner is sentenced to
suffer the term of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS WHO HAS AN
INTEREST IN THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT, FOR THIS REASON ALONE, UNRELIABLE; CASE AT BAR.
— Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness,
having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for
this reason alone, unreliable. Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions, gestures, and
tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given
credence. In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the
testimony of Jalbuena.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; WIRE TAPPING ACT; THE LAW PROHIBITS THE OVERHEARING, INTERCEPTING, OR RECORDING
OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS; CASE AT BAR. — Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording
he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides: SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device
or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in
the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record,
or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in
the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation
or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. . . . SEC. 4. Any communication
or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or
any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act
shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

3. ID.; REVISED PENAL CODE; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION; DEFINED; TO BE

SUFFICIENT, IT MUST BE ADEQUATE TO EXCITE A PERSON TO COMMIT THE WRONG, WHICH MUST ACCORDINGLY
BE PROPORTIONATE IN GRAVITY; CASE AT BAR. — It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated
in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party;
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede
the act. To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be
proportionate in gravity. And it must immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the
provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused. In the present case, the remarks
of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso, we
appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had
repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of
petitioner Navarro. DHaECI

4. ID.; ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; AS THERE WERE TWO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND ONE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD BE FIXED IN ITS MINIMUM PERIOD; CASE AT BAR. — The crime committed
as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

D E C IS IO N

MENDOZA, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner
Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, but
increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00. LLphil
The information against petitioner alleged —

That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena
Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike
Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their
duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell,
by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral
concussion and shock which directly caused his death.

The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan,
who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table
and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her
brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. 2 dctai

At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded
to know why he took a picture. 3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job." 4 Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him. 5 When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out
his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions. 6

Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty, including
petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to
join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and
Sioco arrived on a motorcycle. 7
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen
minutes. 8 Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina,
kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?" 9 Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his
firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said, "Ano, uutasin na kita?" 10

At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan, pumarito kami para
magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate." 11 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo." 12 He
then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan. 13 cda

This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan." 14 Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko." 15 The
two then had a heated exchange. 16 Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at
magsuntukan na lang tayo." 17 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?" 18

As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow.
Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on
the forehead which floored him. 19

Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon." 20 He said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike
Lingan ang naghamon." 21 He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the
blotter. 22 Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. 23
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casañada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been
taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries. 24 cdll

Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
deceased. 25 The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:

Lingan:

Pare, you are abusing yourself.

Navarro:

Who is that abusing?

Lingan:

I’m here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the problem.

xxx xxx xxx

Navarro:

Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . . .

Lingan:

Kalaban mo ang media, pare. Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came here to ayusin
things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .

Navarro:

Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
Lingan:

I'm brave also.

Navarro:

Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon
sa serbisyo ko. LibLex

Lingan:

You are challenging me and him. . . .

Navarro:

Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda. Pambihira
ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.

Lingan:

Pati ako kalaban ninyo.

Navarro:

Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!

Lingan:

You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?

Navarro:

Pulis ito! Aba!

Lingan:
 Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.

Navarro:

Mayabang ka ah!

(Sounds of a scuffle) LibLex

Navarro:

Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko.
Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis
tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare,
hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.

Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck
both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete. 26

In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:

After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court
finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral
certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible. dctai

The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance overturn the strength of
the prosecution's evidence.

This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false
accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or
injury.
 Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed
account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries.

Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that
the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's falling down on the concrete pavement head first. LLpr

The Court of Appeals affirmed:

We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the conflicting
versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the trial court's factual conclusions to have better
and stronger evidentiary support.

In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellant's aggression does not impair the
probative worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far from proving his innocence,
appellant's unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually admitted, clearly betrays his violent
character or disposition and his capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same motivation that led him into assailing
Jalbuena must have provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and humiliated him
and further challenged him to a fist fight.

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, appellant's explanation as to how Lingan was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be accepted.
It is in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingan's injuries as shown in the post-mortem report
(Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced in the course of boxing the
appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right
eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E). Certainly, these injuries could not have
resulted from Lingan's accidental fall. LLpr

Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:

 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION,
SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS
FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE
RECORD.

The appeal is without merit.

First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased
witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused
is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. 27 Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions,
gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony
should be given credence. 28 In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according
weight to the testimony of Jalbuena. cdphil

Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is
admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described: dctai

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
 prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation
or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. 29 Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness
(1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3)
that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. 30 In the instant case, Jalbuena testified
that he personally made the voice recording; 31 that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; 32 and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. 33 A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication
of the tape presented by the prosecution. LLpr

Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form
of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued a medical
certificate, 34 dated February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:

Post Mortem Findings:

= Dried blood, forehead & face

= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth

= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right

= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral, eyebrow, Left

= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right eyebrow

= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left

= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes

CAUSE OF DEATH:

= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK

= BLOW ON THE HEAD

Dr. Yamamoto testified:

Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which is oozing of blood from the
forehead?

A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.

Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1?
A It is possible, sir.

Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?

A Possible, sir.

FISCAL:

What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?

WITNESS:

It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.

Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor? cdasia

A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.

Q How about this findings No. 4?

A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.

Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?

A Same cause, sir.

Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?

A Same thing, sir.

Q How about this last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have caused it doctor?

WITNESS:

It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.

FISCAL:

In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion
and Shock, will you explain it?

A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of the brain, sir.

Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?

A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.

Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?

A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir. LLphil

Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?

A May be, sir.

Q How about shock?

A Yes, sir.

FISCAL:

Which of these two more likely to cause death?

WITNESS:

Shock, sir.
 Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?

A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL:

Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have caused shock? Cdpr

WITNESS:

Possible, sir.

How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?

A Possible, sir. 35

The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his
pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist. prLL

Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to
be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. 36 The
provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act. 37 To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite
a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. 38 And it must immediately
precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party and the commission
of the crime by the accused. 39

In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient
provocation. In People v. Macaso, 40 we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman,
who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating
circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro. Cdpr

Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the
scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating
circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner
Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. 41 In People v. Castro, 42 the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.

However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged
in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed
right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public functions. 43

The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under
Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and one
aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period. 44 Applying theIndeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its
minimum period. 45 cdasia

The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with current
jurisprudence. 46
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro
is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, [August 26, 1999], 372 PHIL 21-38)