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FIRST APPEAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& - and
AIR – All India Reporter
AP – Andhra Pradesh
FB – Full Bench
Gau – Gauhati
Kar– Karnataka
Mad - Madras
P&H – Punjab & Haryana
p. – Page
Pat - Patna
PC – Privy Council
s. - Section
SCC – Supreme Court Cases
SCR – Supreme Court Reporter
TABLE OF CASES
Atma Ram Properties (p) ltd v. Federal Motors (p) Ltd, (2005) 1 SCC 705........................... 16
Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma, AIR 2003 SC 225 ................................................... 4
Banarasi v. Ram Phal, AIR 2003 SC 1989 ............................................................................... 3
Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, AIR 2005 SC 626 ....................................................... 5
Dayawati v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423 .................................................................................. 1
Giriyappa Siddappa Beerannavar v. Balagappa Ramappa Bhavani, AIR 2001 SC 2003 ...... 3
Laxmappa Bhimappa Hulsgeri v. Janamappa Shellappa Korwar, AIR 2004 SC 2445 ........... 3
Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ................................................................................ 3
Moore v. Akesseh, AIR 1935 PC 5 ............................................................................................ 1
P. Kiran Kumar v. A.S. Khadar, AIR 2002 SC 2286 ................................................................ 5
P.V. Hemalatha v. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda, AIR 2002 SC 2445 ................ 10
Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, AIR 2006 SC 2628..................................................... 6
Ram Niwas v. Bano, (2000) 6 SCC 685..................................................................................... 2
Shankar v. Krishnaji, AIR 1970 SC 1 ....................................................................................... 1
Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, AIR 2003 SC 2434 ...................... 4
Shyam Sundar Sarma v. Pannala Jaiswal, (2004) 9 SCALE 27 ............................................... 5
Shyam Sunder Sarma v. Panna Lal Jaiswal,AIR 2005 SC 226 ................................................ 7
Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim, AIR 2001 SC 2062 ............................................ 10
State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 652 ........................................................ 2
Venkantrao Anantdeo Joshi v. Molatibai, AIR 2003 SC 267.................................................... 8
INTRODUCTION –
The expression ‘appeal’ has not been defined any where under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. However, it may be defined as “the judicial examination of decision by a
Higher Court of the decision of an inferior court”.1 The Privy Council in Nagendra Nath
v. Suresh Chandra2 held that “any application by a party of an Appellate Court, asking to
set aside or reverse a decision of a subordinate court, is an appeal within the ordinary
meaning of the term. It is a right of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and
interposition to redress an error in the Court below”.3 It has been stated under Section 96
of the Code of Civil Procedure (herein referred to as ‘CPC’) as:-
“(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law
for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court
exercising original jurisdiction the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of
such Court.
(2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte.
(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.
(4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature
cognizable by Courts of Small Cause, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the
original suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees.”
1
Chamber's 21st Century Dictionary (1997, Edn.), p. 59.
2
AIR 1932 PC 165.
3
Dayawati v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423: (1966) 3 SCR 275.
4
Shankar v. Krishnaji, AIR 1970 SC 1: (1970) 1 SCR 322.
5
Section 2(2) of the CPC.
6
Moore v. Akesseh, AIR 1935 PC 5.
law and that explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute.7 Where a
legal right is in dispute, the courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable
thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right
claimed arises under statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal.8
The law provides the remedy of an appeal because of the recognition that those
manning the judicial tier too commit errors. A Court of appeal has right and is indeed under
an obligation to appraise the conclusions reached by the Court of the first instance so as to set
right what are the errors of t fat as also of law. A well restraint which Courts of appeal place
upon themselves is the inadvisability of rushing into a substitute a finding in conformity with
the material on record, merely because the Court of Appeal left to itself or functioning as the
Court of the first instance, would have come to a different conclusion. The Court of appeal
will not interfere with a higher place in the judicial hierarchy. He who comes in appeal has to
establish that the error on facts is of such a character as to necessitate intervention by the
court of appeal, because the error left uncorrected would constitute a blot on the fair name of
justice.
It is the duty of the first appellate Court and the High Court to see that perverse
findings not based upon legally acceptable evidence and which are patently contrary to law
declared by the Supreme Court cannot have any immunity from interference in the hands of
the appellate authority.9 In a suit for specific performance it is the duty of the first appellate
court to record finding as to the validity/genuineness of the agreement for sale. 10 An appeal
under Section 96 lies only from a decree. The right of appeal against decrees passed in
execution would accrue on the date of the institution of the execution application and not on
the date of institution of suit.11
Court has undoubtedly jurisdiction to construe Section 96 and even if its construction
be erroneous it is not a nullity and cannot be attacked collaterally.12 Under rules made by
Section 19 Defence of India Act no appeal lies against an award of an Arbitrator where the
compensation does not exceed Rs.5,000.13 Sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of
the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording
its findings. First appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on
7
Ganga v. Vijay, AIR 1974 SC 1126.
8
Adaikappav. Chandrasekhara, AIR 1948 PC 12.
9
State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 652.
10
Ram Niwas v. Bano, (2000) 6 SCC 685.
11
Pratapv. Ragho, AIR 1970 AP 15 (FB).
12
Isherv. Sarwan, AIR 1965 SC 948.
13
Soorajmalv. S, AIR 1963 SC 393.
questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the
issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings.14
COMPETENCY OF APPEAL –
Where a legal right to a dispute, has to be adjudicated by courts of ordinary civil jurisdiction
ordinary rules of civil procedure become applicable, and an appeal lies. 15 Whether an appeal
is valid or competent can be determined only after an appeal is heard, but there is nothing to
prevent the filing of an appeal which may ultimately be found to be incompetent.16 If a court
entertains an appeal which does not lie, a second appeal lies.17 Where the earlier judgment
rendered in appeal is recalled, the entire judgment stood upset and is no longer available for
deciding the appeal either to concur or accept the reasoning given in the judgment recalled.18
MAINTAINABILITY OF APPEAL –
Where during the pendency of the appeal, the sole defendant dies, hislegal representatives are
not brought on the record, the order/judgment passed in the appeal is the nullity, second
appeal against such order/judgment is not maintainable.19
14
Madhukarv. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756.
15
Deep Chand v. LAO, AIR 1994 SC 1901.
16
Kulkarni v. Staet, AIR 1954 SC 73.
17
Arjun v. Krishna, AIR 1942 P 1 (FB).
18
LaxmappaBhimappaHulsgeriv. JanamappaShellappaKorwar, AIR 2004 SC 2445.
19
Giriyappa Siddappa Beerannavar v. BalagappaRamappaBhavani, AIR 2001 SC 2003.
20
Bilindiv. Thero, AIR 1946 PC 38.
21
Jagatdhishv. Jawaharlal, AIR 1961 SC 832.
22
Banarasiv. Ram Phal, AIR 2003 SC 1989.
23
Sashibhusanv. Babuaji, AIR 1970 SC 809.
24
Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma, AIR 2003 SC 225.
25
Banarsiv. Ram Phal, AIR 2003 SC 1989.
26
AdiPherozshah v. H.M. Seervai, AIR 1971 SC 385.
27
Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma, AIR 2003 SC 225.
28
Ganga v. Vijai, AIR 1974 SC 1126.
29
AIR 1974 SC 1126.
30
Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, AIR 2003 SC 2434.
31
S v. KMC Abdulla, AIR 1965 SC 1585.
32
Ashruffunnisav. Lehareaux, 8 C 272.
ex partedecree under Section 96.33 The Bombay High Court dissenting from the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Sumera v. Madanlal34 has held that an appeal against ex-parte decree
filed after dismissal of restoration application under Order 9 Rule 13 is maintainable.35 In an
appeal under Section 96(2) an error, defect or irregularity which has affected the decision of
the case can be challenged but in such an appeal it cannot be urged that theex parte
proceedings were wrongly taken.36
When an appeal is filed against an ex parte decree, nor it be converted into an appeal
under order XVIII Rule 1(d).37 When an ex parte decree is passed, the defendant has two
clear options, one, to file an appeal and another to file an application for setting aside the
order in terms of Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He can take recourse to
both the proceedings simultaneously but in the event the appeal is dismissed, as a result
whereof the ex parte decree passed by the Trial Court merges with the order passed by the
Appellate Court, having heard to the explanations appended to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, a petition under Order 9 Rule 13 would not be maintainable. However,
the Explanation 1 appended to the said provision does not suggest that the converse is true.38
The dichotomy can be resolved by holding that whereas the defendant would not be
permitted to raise a contention as regards the correctness or otherwise of the order posting the
suit for ex parte hearing by the Trial Court and/or existence of a sufficient case for non-
appearance of the defendant before it, it would be open to him to argue in the first appeal
filed by him against Section 96(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the merit of the suit so
as to enable him to contend that the materials brought on record by the plaintiffs were not
sufficient for passing a decree in his favor, or the suit was otherwise not maintainable. Lack
of jurisdiction of the court can also be a possible plea in such an appeal. The ‘explanation’
applied to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall receive a strict construction.39
33
Jhaharmal Panda v. Bhagawati Prasad Kedia, AIR 1990 Gau 35.
34
AIR 1989 MP 224.
35
KhurshedBanoov. Vasant MallikarjunManthalkar, AIR 2003 Bom 23.
36
Maya Devi v. Mehria Gram Dall Mill, AIR 1988 P&H 176.
37
Laxmibaiv. Keshrimal Jain, AIR 1995 MP 178.
38
Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, AIR 2005 SC 626.
39
P. Kiran Kumar v. A.S. Khadar, AIR 2002 SC 2286. See also ShyamSundarSarmav. Pannala Jaiswal, (2004)
9 SCALE 270.
between parties super-imposed with the seal of approval of the court. Validity of a
consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which
it is made.”
LIMITATION –
Condonation of delay in filing appeal without recording satisfaction of reasonable or
satisfactory explanations for the delay is not proper and judicious.46 Where an appeal is filed
along with an application for condonation of delay in filing that appeal, the dismissal of
appeal on the refusal to condone the delay is nevertheless a decision in appeal.47
46
P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276.
47
Shyam Sunder Sarmav. Panna Lal Jaiswal,AIR 2005 SC 226.
48
Motiram Yeswant Gaikwad v. AkkataiUttamTrimukhe, AIR 2003 Bom 325.
INTRODUCTION –
“Appeal from final decree where no appeal from preliminary decree - Where any party
aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of this Code does not
appeal from such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal
which may be preferred from the final decree.”
49
Tapan Kumar Bhattarcharjeev. Ratan Kumar Bhattacharyee, AIR 2004 Gau 27.
50
Kaushalyav. Baijnath, AIR 1961 SC 790.
51
Venkata Reddy v. Pethi, AIR 1963 SC 992.
52
Mool Chand v. DDC, AIR 1995 SC 2493.
53
VenkantraoAnantdeo Joshi v. Molatibai, AIR 2003 SC 267.
54
Vamanacharjyav. Govind, AIR 1924 Bom 33.
55
Jagatdhishv. Jawaharlal, AIR1961 SC 832.
56
AIR 1924 Bom 33.
57
AIR 1967 SC 1470.
58
AIR 1968 Ker 182.
INTRODUCTION –
“Decision where appeal heard by two or more Judges –
(1) Where an appeal is heard by a Bench of two or more Judges, the appeal shall be decided
in accordance with the opinion of such Judges or of the majority (if any) of such Judges.
(2) Where there is no such majority which concurs in a judgment varying or reversing the
decree appealed from, such decree shall be confirmed:
Provided that where the Bench hearing the appeal is 1[composed of two or other even number
of Judges belonging to a Court consisting of more Judges than those constituting the Bench]
and the Judges composing the Bench differ in opinion on a point of law, they may state the
point of law upon which they differ and the appeal shall then be heard upon that point only by
one or more of the other Judges, and such point shall be decided according to the opinion of
the majority (if any) of the Judges who have heard the appeal including those who first heard
it.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to alter or otherwise affect any provision of the
letters patent of any High Court.”
59
Tej Kaur v. Kirpal Singh, AIR 1995 SC 1681.
60
P.V. Hemalathav. KattamkandiPuthiyaMaliackalSaheeda, AIR 2002 SC 2445.
61
Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim, AIR 2001 SC 2062.
but to state their point of difference after expressing their opinions. If the point of difference
is not stated, it will be for the third judge to whom the case is referred to ascertain the same
and to give his opinion thereon. 62 The word “may” in the proviso cannot be read as
equivalent to “shall”. It is discretionary.
62
Shriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1996 All 135 (FB).
63
Bokaro&Ramgur Ld. v. S, AIR 1966 Pat 154.
64
Bhaidasv. Bai Gulab, AIR 1921 PC 6.
65
Dhanarajuv. Balkishen, AIR 1929 Mad 641.
66
AIR 1998 SC 1978.
INTRODUCTION –
It has been stated under Section 99 which ash been stated as :-
“Section 99 - No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting
merits or jurisdiction - No decree shall be reversed or “substantially varied, nor shall any case
be remanded in appeal on account of any mis joinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of
action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the
merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. Provided that nothing in this section shall
apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.”
67
Kiran SInghv. Chaman, AIR 1954 SC 340.
68
Virendrav. Vimal, AIR 1976 SC 2169.
69
George v. Thekkekkara, AIR 1979 Kar 1 (FB).
70
Maddanappav. Chandramma, AIR 1965 SC 1812.
71
Shanmughav. Subbaraya, AIR 1922 Mad 317.
72
Amichandv. Raoji, AIR 1930 Mad 714; Rajabibi v. S Ameerali, AIR 1974 Kar 115.
FollowingKanakarathanmmal v.Loganath, AIR 1965 SC 271.
73
Devachandv. Hirachand, (1889) 13 Bom 49.
74
Hulas v. Mohan lal, AIR 1960 Raj 94.
75
WomesChunder .v. Chundee Churn, (1881) 7 Cal 293.
76
Makundv. Bohari Lal, (1881) 3 All 824.
77
Sheoramv. Thakur, (1908) 30 All 136.
78
HirabaiGendalalv. BhagirathRamchandra, AIR 1946 Bom 174.
79
New Mofussil Co. v. Shankerlal, AIR 1941 Bom 247.
80
HudiGoshaonv. SudiGoshaon, AIR 1962 Punj 467.
81
Jang Bahadur v. Bank of Upper India Ltd., AIR 1928 PC 162.
INTRODUCTION –
“Power of Appellate court.-
(1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall
have power-
(a) to determine a case finally;
(b) to remand a case;
(c) to frame issues and refer them for trial;
(d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken.
(2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as
nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of
original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.”
SUB-SECTION (1) –
First appellate court is competent to enter into all questions of fact and record a final finding
on all those questions including the appreciation of the trial evidence. 82 If the essential
ingredients necessary for finding of a fact of sub-tenancy have not in fact been found by the
Courts below even the Supreme Court is bound to examine the question where injustice or
wrong is done.83 Before reversing a finding of fact, the appellate court has to bear in mind the
reasons ascribed by trial court.84 An appeal is a continuous of a suit or proceedings wherein
the entire proceedings are gonna left open for consideration by the appellate authorities,
which has the power to review the entire evidence subject, of course, to the prescribed
statutory limitations. But in the case of revision whatever powers the revisional authority may
have, it has no power to reassess and reappreciate the evidence unless the statute expressly
confers on it that power. That limitation is implicit in the concept of revision.85 The appeal
being a proceeding in continuation of the original suit, the first appellate Court is vested with
a similar power as of the Court of original jurisdiction.86 The only rule of practice which it
has to bear in mind is that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter
82
Sarjugv. Bhagwan, AIR 1975 Pun 162.
83
Dipak Banerjee v.Lilabati Chakraborty, AIR 1987 SC 2055.
84
S.V.R. Mudaliarv. RajabueBuhari, (1995) 4 SCC 15.
85
LachhmanDass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201.
86
Vasant Ganesh Damle v. ShrikantTrimbakDatar, AIR 2002 SC 1237.
in issue and the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses, then caped the trial judge’s
notice or there is sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion where the
credibility lies the appellate court should not interfere with the findings of the trial court on a
question of fact.87 The appellate court can remand the case for recording further evidence.88
If the new law speaks in language which, expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even in
pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an
intention so expressed and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the
judgment of the court of first instance.89
87
Madhusudan v. Narayani, AIR 1983 SC 144.
88
Thachara Bros. v. M.K. Marymol, (1999) 1 SCC 298.
89
Dayawati v.Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423.
90
Mahendtrav. Sushila, AIR 1965 SC 364.
91
Steel Authority of India v.New Marine Coal Co. Ltd, AIR 1996 SC 1250.
92
Thatchara Bros. v. M.K. Marymol, (1999) 1 SCC 298.
93
Order 43 , Rule 1(u).
94
ViswanathaAchariv. Kanakasabapathy, AIR 2005 SC 3109.
SUB-SECTION (2) –
Thepowers of an appellate or revisional authority, unless stated otherwise in the governing
statute, are co-extensive with those of original authorities.97Section 107(2) does not have the
effect of rendering an appellate court a court of original jurisdiction when exercising its
powers to pass incidental orders. All that Section 107(2) states is that subject to limitation
contained in the Code the powers of the appellate Court shall be co-extensive with the powers
and obligations conferred and imposed upon the courts of original jurisdiction in respect of
suits filed before them. Such orders passed in interlocutory applications will be orders passed
in appeal.98 The appeal is considered to be an extension ofthe suit because under Section 107
of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate Court has the same powers as are confined by
the Code onthe Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Such a
power can be exercised by the appellate Court “as nearly as may be” exercised by the trial
Court under the Code. If the powers conferred upon the Trial Court are under a specified
statute and not under the Code, it has to be ascertained as to whether such a power was
95
MahabirSInghv. Naresh Chandra, AIR 2001 SC 134.
96
Rule 27(1)(a), (aa) & (b).
97
Prabhakarv. Union, AIR 1970 Bom 285.
98
C Kalahastiv. Munuswami, AIR 1975 Mad 3.
99
Vasant Ganesh Damlev. SrikantTrimbakDatar (Sethi, J.), (2002) 4 SCC 183.
FORM OF APPEAL –
The memorandum sets forth, concisely and under distinct heads, the grounds of objection to
the decree appealed from, without any argument or narrative, such grounds being numbered
consecutively.100 Where the appeal is against a decree for payment of money, the appellant
shall, within such time as the appellate court may allow, deposit the amount disputed in the
appeal or furnish such security in respect thereof as the court may think fit. 101The appellant
shall not, except by leave of the court, urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection
not set forth in the memorandum of appeal; but the Appellate Court, in deciding the appeal,
shall not be confined to the grounds of objection set forth in the memorandum of appeal or
taken by leave of the court under this rule: Provided that the court shall not rest its decision
on any other ground unless the party who may be affected thereby has had a sufficient
opportunity of contesting the case on that ground.102The appellant court however is entitled to
decide an appeal even on a ground not set forth in the memorandum of appeal. 103Where the
memorandum of appeal is not drawn up in the manner hereinbefore prescribed, it may be
rejected, or be returned to the appellant for the purpose of being amended within a time to be
fixed by the court or be amended then and there; where the court rejects any memorandum, it
shall record the reasons for such rejection. Where a memorandum of appeal is amended, the
Judge, or such officer as he appoints in this behalf, shall sign or initial the
amendment. 104 When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation
specified there for, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting
forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for
not preferring the appeal within such period.If the court sees no reason to reject the
application without the issue of a notice to the respondent, notice thereof shall be issued to
the respondent and the matter shall be finally decided by the court before it proceeds to deal
with the appeal under rule 11 or rule 13, as the case may be.Where an application has been
made under sub-rule (1), the court shall not make an order for the stay of execution of the
decree against which the appeal is proposed to be filed so long as the court does not, after
100
Order XLI, Rule 1 (2-3).
101
Order XLI, Rule 1 (3).
102
Order XLI, Rule 2.
103
YeshwantDeorao v. WalchandRamchand, AIR 1951 SC 16.
104
Order XLI, Rule 3.
hearing under rule 11, decide to hear the appeal. 105 In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Pradeep
Kumar, the object of this provision is two-fold; firstly, to inform the appellant that the
delayed appeal will not be entertained unless it is accompanied by an application explaining
the delay; and secondly, to communicate to respondent that it may not be necessary for him
to get ready on merits as the court has to first deal with an application for condonation of the
delay as a condition precedent. The defect is curable.106Where there are more plaintiffs or
more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceed on any ground
common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the
defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and thereupon the Appellate Court may
reverse or vary the decree in favor of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may
be.107Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree
appealed from proceed on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants,
any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and
thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favor of all the plaintiffs or
defendants, as the case may be.108
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS –
An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from
except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by
reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may
for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree.Explanation An order by the
Appellate Court for the stay of execution of the decree shall be effective from the date of the
communication of such order to the court to first instance, but an affidavit sworn by the
appellant, based on his personal knowledge, stating that an order for the stay of execution of
the decree has been made by the Appellate Court shall, pending the receipt from the
Appellate Court of the order for the stay of execution or any order to the country, be acted
upon by the court of first instance.(2) Stay by court which passed the decree :—Where an
application is made for stay of execution of an appealable decree before the expiration of the
time allowed for appealing there from, the court which passed the decree may on sufficient
cause being shown order the execution to be stayed.No order for stay of execution shall be
made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the court making it is satisfied—(a) that
105
Order XLI, Rule 3-A.
106
(2000) 7 SCC 372.
107
Lal Chand v. Radha Krishna, (1977) 2 SCC 88.
108
Order XLI, Rule 4.
substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is
made; (b) that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and(c) that security
has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree of or as may
ultimately be binding upon him.Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3), the court may make
an ex parte order for stay of execution pending the hearing of the application.(5)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-rules, where the appellant fails to
make the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) of rule 1, the court shall not
make an order staying the execution of the decree. 109(1) Where an order is made for the
execution of a decree from which an appeal is pending, the court which passed the decree
shall, on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant, require security to be taken for the
restitution of any property which may be or has been taken in execution of the decree or for
the payment of the value of such property and for the due performance of the decree or order
of the Appellate Court, or the Appellate Court may or like cause direct the court which
passed the decree to take such security. (2) Where an order has been made for the sale of
immovable property in execution of a decree, and an appeal is pending from such decree, the
sale shall, on the application of the judgment debtor to the court which made the order, be
stayed on such terms as to giving security or otherwise as the court thinks fit until the appeal
is disposed of.110 The powers conferred by rules 5 and 6 shall be exercisable where an appeal
may be or has been preferred not from the decree but from an order made in execution of
such decree.111
SUMMARY DISMISSAL –
The Appellate Court, after fixing a day for hearing the appellant or his pleader and hearing
him accordingly if he appears on that day may dismiss the appeal; If on the day fixed or any
other day to which the hearing may be adjourned the appellant does not appear when the
appeal is called on for hearing, the court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed; The
dismissal of an appeal under this rule shall be notified to the court from whose decree the
appeal is preferred; Where an Appellate Court, not being the High court, dismisses an appeal
under sub-rule (1), it shall deliver a judgment, recording in brief its grounds for doing so, and
a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment.112 The discretion however must
be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. Such power should be used very sparingly and
109
Order XLI, Rule 5. See also Atma Ram Properties (p) ltd v. Federal Motors (p) Ltd, (2005) 1 SCC 705.
110
Order XLI, Rule 6.
111
Order XLI, Rule 8.
112
Order XLI, Rule 11.
only in exceptional cases. When an appeal raises triable issues, it should not be summarily
dismissed. 113 Every appeal shall be heard under rule 11 as expeditiously as possible and
endeavour shall be made to conclude such hearing within sixty days from the date on which
the memorandum of appeal is filed.114
PROCEDURE AT HEARING –
Right to begin –
On the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant
shall be heard in support of the appeal. The court shall then, if it does not dismiss the appeal
at once, hear ... respondent against the appeal and in such case the appellant shall be entitled
to reply.115
Dismissal for default and restoration –
Where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the
appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the court may make an
order that the appeal be dismissed. Explanation: Nothing this sub-rule shall be construed as
empowering the court to dismiss the appeal on the merits. Hearing appeal ex parte. — Where
the appellant appears and the respondent does not appear, the appeal shall be heard ex
parte.116The appeal, however, cannot be dismissed although the notice has not been served
upon the respondent, if the respondent appears when the appeal is called on for hearing.117
Where an appeal is dismissed under rule 11, sub-rule (2) or rule 17 [***, the appellant may
apply to the Appellate Court for the re-admission of the appeal; and, where it is proved that
he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal was called on for
hearing or from depositing the sum so required, the court shall re-admit the appeal on such
terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit.118Where the appeal has been dismissed for
default or for non-payment of process fees, the appellant may apply to the appellate court for
restoration of the appeal. On sufficient cause being shown, the appellate court shall restore
the appeal on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit.119
Ex Parte hearing and rehearing –
113
MahadevTukaramv. Sugandha, (1973) 3 SCC 746.
114
Order XLI, Rule 11-A.
115
Order XLI, Rule 16.
116
Order XLI, Rule 17.
117
Proviso Rule 18.
118
Order XLI, Rule 19.
119
Rafiqv. Munshilal, (1981) 2 SCC 788.
Where an appeal is heard ex parte and judgment is pronounced against the respondent, he
may apply to the Appellate Court to re-hear the appeal; and, if he satisfies the court that the
notice was not duly served or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when
the appeal was called on for hearing, the court shall re-hear the appeal on such terms as to
costs or otherwise as it thinks fit to impose upon him.120
Addition of respondent –
Where it appears to the court at the hearing that any person who was a party to the suit in the
court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, but who has not been made a party to the
appeal, is interested in the result of the appeal, the court may adjourn the hearing to a future
day to be fixed by the court and direct that such person be made a respondent. No respondent
shall be added under this rule, after the expiry of the period of limitation for appeal, unless
the court, for reasons to be recorded, allow that to be done, on such terms as to costs as it
thinks fit.121 The object is to protect parties to the suit who have not been made respondents
in the appeal from being prejudiced by modifications being made behind their back in the
decree under appeal.122
CROSS – OBJECTIONS –
The Supreme Court examined the nature and scope of cross-objections as provided in Order
41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in Superitending Engineer &Ors. v. B.Subba
Reddy123. The Principles applicable to cross-objections are reproduced as:
“12. In SahaduGangaramBhagadev. Special Deputy Collector.Ahmadnagar and Anr.124, this
Court was considering the question of nature of cross-objections in the context of payment of
court fee under the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. It was submitted that Article 3 of Schedule
1 of the said Act was inapplicable because that article referred to "plaint, application or
petition (including memorandum of appeal), to set aside or modify any award otherwise than
under the Arbitration Act, 1940" and that no court fee was payable on cross-objections, This
Court held as under Before Article 3 of Schedule 1 can be attracted, there must be (1) a
plaint, application or petition (including a memorandum of appeal); (2) in that plaint,
application or petition (including memorandum of appeal), there must be a prayer to set aside
or modify any award; and(3) the award in question must not be one under the Arbitration Act,
120
Order XLI, Rule 21.
121
Order XLI, Rule 20.
122
Subramaniamv. Veerabhadram, (1908) 31 Mad 442.
123
AIR 1999 SC 1747.
124
AIR 1971 SC 1887.
1940. There is no dispute that the proceedings with which we are concerned in this case fulfil
two out of the three requirements enumerated above. The award concerned in the proceedings
is not one made under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and through his cross-objection the appellant
seeks to get the award modified. The only point in controversy is whether the cross-objection
filed by the appellant can be considered as “application or petition” within the meaning of
Article 3 of Schedule I. The words in the bracket “including memorandum of appeal” in our
opinion refer to the word ‘petition’ immediately preceding those words. In other words the
word 'petition' includes the memorandum of appeal as well. The question is whether a cross-
objection filed by a respondent in an appeal can be considered as a memorandum of appeal.
We have no doubt that it is a memorandum of appeal in substance though not in form. It is a
right given to a respondent in an appeal to challenge the order under appeal to the extent he is
aggrieved by that order. The memorandum of cross-objection is but one form of appeal. It
takes the place of a cross-appeal. It is true that while Article 1 of Schedule 1 refers to 'cross-
objection', Article 3 of that Schedule does not refer to cross-objection as such but that in our
opinion make no difference. It is only an inartistic drafting.
13. In Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd.125, the appellant was aggrieved by the order of
the Allahabad High Court directing that a petition filed under Section 20 of the Arbitration
Act, 1940 in a subordinate court be returned to him for presentation to the proper court. This
Court upheld the order of the High Court and said, with reference to Section 41 of the Act,
that the Code in its entirety applied to proceedings under that Act and that the jurisdiction of
the courts under the Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award was accordingly
governed by the provisions of the Code.
14. InN. Jayaram Reddy and Anr.v. Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer,
Kurnool126, this Court was considering the nature of cross-appeals and cross-objections. It
said:Cross-appeal and cross-objections provide two different remedies for the same purpose
and that is why under Order 41, Rule 22, cross-objections can be preferred in respect of such
points on which that party could have preferred an appeal. If such be the position of cross-
objections and cross-appeal a differentiation in the matter of their treatment under Rules 3
and 4 cannot be justified merely on the ground that in case of cross-objections they form part
of the same record while cross-appeals are two independent proceedings.To say that cross-
appeals are independent of each is to overlook the obvious position which parties adopt in
cross-appeals. Interdependence of cross-appeals is the same as interdependence appeal and
125
AIR 1971 SC 740.
126
AIR 1979 SC 1393.
cross-objections because as in the case of appeal and cross-objections a decision with regard
to appeal would directly impinge upon the decision in cross-objections and vice versa.
Indubitably the decision in one of the cross-appeals would directly impinge upon the decision
in the other because both ultimately arise from the same decree. This is really the
interdependence of cross-appeals and it is impossible to distinguish cross-appeals from
appeal and cross-objections".This Court then said that the cases which have taken the view
that the view in cross-appeals the position is different than the one in appeal and cross-
objections do not proceed on any discernible legal principle. Nor can they be explained by
any demonstrable legal principle but in fact they run counter to the established legal
principle.
15. InMs. H.M. Kamaluddin Ansari & Co. v. Union of India and Ors.127, this Court was again
considering the ambit and scope of Section 41 of the Arbitration Act. It said:The appellant in
the instant case took the stand that there was no concluded contract between the parties
including arbitration. Therefore, the order of injunction passed in the instant case could not be
for the purpose of and in relation to arbitration proceedings. Faced with this difficulty Shri
S.N. Kaicker, learned Counsel for the appellant, fell back upon Clause (a) of Section 41 to
content that Clause (a) makes the CPC applicable to all proceedings before the court and to
all appeals under the Act and, therefore, the appellant was entitled to invoke Order 39 of the
Code to get an injunction order even if the conditions of Clause (b) of Section 41 were not
satisfied. We are afraid this contention cannot be accepted.Clause (a) of Section 41 makes
only the procedural rules of the CPC applicable to the proceedings in court under the
Arbitration Act. This Clause does not authorise the court to pass an order of injunction. The
power is conferred by Clause (b) of Section 41. The source of power, therefore, cannot be
traced to Clause (a). If the contention of Shri Kaicker is accepted, the appeals would lie under
Sections 96, 100 or 104 of the CPC but the Arbitration Act itself provides for appeal under
Section 39. Besides, if Clause (a) of Section 41 gave wide powers to pass an order of
injunction, Clause (b) of Section 41 would become otiose.
16. InAlopiNath and Ors. v. Collector, Varanasi128, this Court in a brief order said:We have
heard learned Counsel for the parties. The short question is as to the admissibility of the
cross-objection under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar MahapalikaAdhiniyam, 1959
where an appeal against quantum has been filed and the respondent has not preferred an
appeal. We have looked into the provisions of Sections 377, 379 and 381 of the Act and are
127
AIR 1984 SC 29.
128
[1986] Supp. SCC 693.
inclined to take the view that the provision of Order 41 Rule 22 of the CPC would be
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act inasmuch as an appeal is admissible only by a
certificate or special leave as provided in provisions (a) and (b) respectively of Section
381(1). It is difficult to contend that a cross-objection is anything other than an appeal as
generally understood in law. In the circumstances, benefit of Section 377 or of Sub-section
(4) of Section 381 of the Act is not available. The appeal therefore fails. There is no order as
to costs.
17. InR. Mcdill& Company Pvt. Ltd. v.Gouri Shankar Sarda and Ors.129, one of questions
before the Court was whether the provisions of Order 23 of the Code apply to an application
for stay of suit filed under Section 34 of the Act. It referred to Section 41 of the Act which
provided that provisions of the Code shall apply to all proceedings before the court subject of
course to the provisions of the Arbitration Act and of any rules made thereunder. This Court
in that case referred to a commentary by R.S. Bachawat on the Law of Arbitration wherein
the author with reference to various decisions of the High Court pointed out as to which
provisions of the Code have been held to be applicable to proceedings under the Act.
Reference was also made to some early decisions of this Court and it was held that provision;
of Order 23 of the Code were applicable in view of Section 41 of the Act.
18. InRamanbhaiAshabhai Patel v.DabhiAjitkumarFulsinji and Ors.130, the main question for
consideration before this Court was whether the appellant could be said to be guilty of a
corrupt practice as contemplated by Section 123(3) of the Representation of People Act,
1951. When counsel for the respondent referred to the finding of the High Court regarding
the validity of the second respondent's nomination paper, counsel for the appellant raised a
preliminary objection to the effect that the first respondent was not competent to challenge
the correctness of the finding as he had not preferred an appeal therefrom. In the course of
discussion in the judgment, this Court observed:Apart from that we think that while dealing
with the appeal before it this Court has the power to decide all the points arising from the
judgment appealed against and even in the absence of an express provision like Order XLI,
22 of the CPC it can devise the appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing. There
could be no better way of supplying the deficiency than by drawing upon the provisions of a
general law like the CPC and adopting such of those provisions as are suitable. We cannot
lose sight of the fact that normally a party in whose favour the judgment appealed from has
been given will not be granted special leave to appeal from it. Considerations of justice,
129
(1991) 2 SCC 548.
130
AIR 1965 SC 669.
therefore, require that this Court should in appropriate cases permit a party placed in such a
position to support the judgment in his favour even upon grounds which were negatived in
that judgment.
19. Following this decision, this Court again in Bhanu Kumar Shastriv. Mohan Lal Sukhadia
and Ors.131, on the question of challenging of findings without preferring an appeal observed
that the considerations of justice required that " this Court should in appropriate cases permit
a party placed in such a position to support the judgment in his favour even upon grounds
which are negatived in that judgment.
20. However, both the above cases are not the cases where the Court was considering the
scope and substance of cross-objection.
21. We may also refer to two decisions of the High Courts -one of the Patna High Court and
the other of the Calcutta High Court. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in
Ramasray Singh v. Bibhisan Sinha, was considering the objection that though statutory right
of appeal is given under Section 38(3) of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, there is no right
given to file cross-objection and that if a litigant is aggrieved by a decision of any court under
Section 38 of the said Act his remedy is to file an appeal. High Court negatived the
contention and held:It is to be observed that by Section 38, Bengal Money-Lenders Act, a
right of appeal is given in express terms. By Sub-section (3) of Section 38, a declaration
under that section is to be subject to an appeal, if any, as if it were a decree of the Court. The
right of appeal, under that section is given to an established Court, namely, the Court of the
District Judge. Nothing is stated expressly in the Sub-section as to the procedure regulating
such appeal. In our view, where nothing is stated expressly as to the procedure of an appeal
before a District Judge, the law will import that the ordinary procedure of that Court on
appeal will apply. The ordinary procedure of an appeal is that the respondent has the right to
file cross-objection and therefore it is quite clear that the respondent has the right to file a
cross-objection.
22. In Bihar State Electricity Board v.Khalsa Bros., a Division Bench of the Patna High
Court speaking through L.M. Sharma, J. (as His Lordship then was) said:The Supreme Court
cases arose under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Calcutta case under the
Bengal Money Lenders Act. The observations made- in these cases support the principle
which Mr. Chatterjee is relying. So far the arbitration Act is concerned, the view in favour of
the maintainability of a cross-objection appears to be stronger inasmuch as Section 41 of the
131
AIR 1971 SC 2025.
Act says that subject to the provisions of, and the rules made under the Act, the Civil
Procedure Code shall apply to all proceedings before the court and to all appeals under the
Act. There does not appear to be any provision inconsistent with the application of the Civil
Procedure Code. The decision of the Court so far it has gone against the plaintiff-respondent
is clearly appealable under Section 39 and I therefore, hold that the cross-objection is
maintainable.
23. While there was no provision like Section 41 of the Arbitration Act in the Bengal Money
Lenders Act in the Calcutta case. Patna case was under the Arbitration Act itself. As we will
presently see Patna case does not appear to lay good law.
24. From the examination of these judgments and the provisions of Section 41 of the Act
and Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code, in our view, following principles emerge:(1) Appeal
is a substantive right. It is a creation of the statute. Right to appeal does not exist unless
it is specifically conferred.(2) Cross objection is like an appeal. It has all the trappings of
an appeal. It is filed in the form of memorandum and the provisions of Rule 1 of Order
41 of the Code, so far as these relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of
appeal apply to cross-objection as well.(3) Court fee is payable on cross-objection like
that on the memorandum of appeal. Provisions relating to appeals by indigent person
also apply to cross-objection.(4) Even where the appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for
default, cross-objection may nevertheless be heard and determined.(5) Respondent even
though he has not appealed may support the decree on any other ground but if wants to
modify it, he has to file cross-objection to the decree which objections he could have
taken earlier by filing an appeal. Time for filing objection which is in the nature of
appeal is extended by one month after service of notice on him of the day fixed for
hearing the appeal. This time could also be extended by the Court like in appeal.(6)
Cross-objection is nothing but an appeal, a cross-appeal at that. It may be that the
respondent wanted to give quietus to whole litigation by his accepting the judgment and
decree or order even if it was partly against his interest. When, however, the other party
challenged the same by filing an appeal statute gave the respondent a second chance to
file an appeal by way of cross-objection if he still felt aggrieved by the judgment and
decree or order.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sarkar, S.C., Sarkar’s The Law of Civil Procedure, Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, 11th
Edition, 2006.
Mulla, Sir Dindhah F., Prasad, B.M., Mohan, Manish, Mulla The Code of Civil
Procedure, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur, 18th Edition, 2011.
Takwani, C.K., Civil Procedure, Eastern Book Company, 6th Edition, 2011.
WEBOGRAPHY
http://www.legalblog.in/2010/12/cross-objections-under-code-of-civil.html