HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Historical Aspects of Intelligence Analysis

Cletus Subetiq Nachelle

September 20, 2013

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Historical Aspects of Intelligence Analysis

Introduction

Intelligence analysis entails the process of taking available and well known information

about entities and situations with the purpose of characterizing or predicting future situations.

Usually, entities that are subject of intelligence analysis happen to be those that have a strategic,

operational, and tactical significance. In the United States, the mandate of intelligence analysis

lies with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which seeks to enhance security by protecting

the country from attacks. The job of an intelligence analyst mainly involves sifting all the

possible deceptive information so as to get the truth of a particular situation to enable the

relevant agencies provide and take care of any imminent attack. Without doubt, intelligence

analysis has been here for a long time though not in the current mode and form. This process has

evolved to match the continually dynamic environment which poses different challenges at

different times. Owing to globalization and advances in technology, security threats faced by

countries and more so the United States are fundamentally different from those that faced the

country years ago. Consequently, it becomes imperative to examine the historical aspects or

roots of the process of intelligence analysis and how it has mutated to its current state (Marrin,

2012).

Significance of the Historical aspects

Experiences of past generations are relevant to present and future policies and

intelligence analysis. The tendency to ignore the historical perspective or aspects of intelligence

analysis leads to an ineffective intelligence system since past events in history do affect the form

and mode of intelligence. The notion that the latest information is the most advanced form of

intelligence information must be discarded in view of the several years that followed the decline
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of the Roman Empire where it took nearly one and half thousand years for the western plumbers

to put into place what had been built by the Romans. More so, the understanding of present and

future intelligence system requires an analysis of not only of the recent past but the whole

historical past (Lahneman, 2010). For instance, persons who were able to display the best

understanding of the threat posed by transnational terrorism before the September 2001 attacks

were those who took a keen interest in the historical aspects of intelligence analysis. Indeed, the

nature of the threat posed by terrorists has been continually changing thereby necessitating the

need to have a historical perspective of intelligence analysis. In particular, and in the past

generation, terrorism was understood to be geared towards achieving publicity rather than

intended to kill or exterminate the enemy. Until the 19th century, most terrorism activities were

aimed at achieving publicity on the part of terrorists. That position has shifted in the last few

decades of the 21st century where terrorism is now concerned with killing rather than terrifying.

The last three decades have witnessed a resurgence of religious based and cult-based terrorism

which aims at exterminating the enemy from the face of the earth. The words of former

Hezbollah leader in this respect are illuminating where he is quoted as saying that his group was

not fighting so as to obtain anything from the enemy but rather to wipe out the enemy. An

indicator that transnational terrorism and the changing nature of the threat posed by terror was

not taken into account by nations until the September 2001 attack is evidenced by the dearth of

articles relating to terrorism in the respected Journal of Strategic Studies and International

Security Journal which points to a lack of urgency and appreciation of the threat (Walton, 2010).

Methodologies

A number of methodologies do exist which provide a platform for learning from

experience of long term intelligence. One of the system of methods that can be employed is the
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lesson learnt approach which borrows mainly from reports made after a particular action takes

place. Additionally, lesson learnt approach seeks to shed light on what may have gone wrong,

what went according to plan, and the reasons for the same. The most promising program initiated

so far in the United States and which is built around this lesson learnt approach is the one

recently formulated by the CIA’S Centre for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) which endeavors to

bring together historians, analysts and other intelligence in a bid to analyze the past and the

recent happenings in the security world. In fact, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks of

the United States laid the blame for the September 2001 attacks on the lack of a lessons learnt

program similar to the one recently undertaken by the CIA. The Commission launched its

attacking pad against the paucity of the program by stating that the community had not

institutionalized a process of learning from its failures and successes. The Commission further

decried the lack of an after-action review conducted after both the October 2000 U.S.S Cole

attack and 1998 Embassy attack. Much as this case study or approach may be material in

enhancing intelligence analysis, there is a propensity to miss long term trends. Therefore, trends

need to be backed up by another methodology that takes care of all intelligence cycles

(Rolington, 2013).

As already evident, the history of intelligence development is crucial in ensuring an

efficient intelligence arm and analysis. However, official history of intelligence that is critical for

use in the analysis must meet a number of conditions for it to be efficient. The first criterion is

that the history must be based on full access to files notwithstanding the need to protect sources

and methods used. In addition, official historians documenting the information must have all

freedom required to make whatever deductions consistent with the evidence they obtain in much

the same way, intelligence analysts are able to tell policy makers. Another essential criterion is
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ensuring that histories of intelligence deal with the overall intelligence cycle including the much

needed interaction with policy makers. Questions need be asked and answered as to the attitude

of the current world leaders towards intelligence (Spielmann, 2012).

Assessment of the opposition or enemy

An assessment as to the opposition and the conduct of a retrospective analysis over the

same is crucial in enabling the intelligence system of a nation identify the strengths and

weaknesses of such a nation. For instance, history of previous regimes of most dictatorial

regimes especially in countries which were a one party state indicates that intelligence agencies

usually tell their leaders of whatever they desire to hear. In the Soviet Union nations in

particular, these agencies acted as a conduit through which they reinforced the misconceptions of

the regime about the outside world. This position is anchored further by the Iraqi intelligence

files that became available in the 1990s following the Gulf War which should have surely

informed the mindset of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In just the same fashion the materials availed

after the 2003 Iraq War provided an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the

intelligence systems, so does the 1990 files. It is the argument that had the intelligence agencies

sensed the urgency and value of the 1990 intelligence files obtained from the Gulf War. They

would have had the capture of similar intelligence files in the 2003 Iraqi War as a priority as the

same would have offered intelligence on whether Iraqi possessed any weapons of mass

destruction. This glaring failure displayed itself by way of failure to secure intelligence

headquarters following the fall of Baghdad, thus allowing looters to get away with otherwise

important information (Johnston, 2006).

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World war and intelligence analysis

The ability of the American and the British intelligence system to detect the capacity and

deployment of enemy armed forces had the effect of shortening the Second World War and

stabilizing the Cold war. In addition, this ability has propelled America to several military

victories ever since. An efficient intelligence analysis seeks to understand the mindset of the

opponent. This in particular was lacking in the United States intelligence in both the Cold War

and the Second World War. The Western intelligence was unable to unearth the mindset of their

opponents specifically fanaticism which appeared to drive their actions and which to this very

day continues to play an essential role in terror threats. Indeed, as stated by Nobel Laureate

holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, the most significant challenge in this century is how to deal with

fanaticism armed with power. Some of the vilest atrocities and persons who committed mass

murders were fanatics armed with power such as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong.

Those who pose serious threats to the security of nations in this modern age are fanatics who

have power. The dangers wrought by fanaticism armed with power in the 20th century was more

dangerous than it is today primarily because less fanatics are now armed with power owing to

advances in democracy. The growth of democratic ideals and good governance in the 21st

century has made it difficult for fanatics to ascend to power which they occupied in the previous

century. As a result, the historical aspect of intelligence analysis must be looked at if the

intelligence agencies and system are to be efficient. Being the case that the political capital of

fanatics has substantially reduced owing to advancement of democracy, it is likely that the

emergence of weapons of mass destruction will be the significant tool used by fanatics in the

future. Consequently, intelligence analysts need to take heed of this historical aspect to plan for

the future and ensure the monitoring of preparation of weapons of mass destruction. Being the
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case that historical aspects of intelligence analysis cannot be ignored, it is significant to explore

how fanaticism which is responsible for significant security threats can be checked form a

historical perspective. It is the case that fanaticism, which is at the kernel of modern day

transnational terrorism, can only be understood and interpreted from a long-term perspective.

Fanatics are usually conspiracy theorists who have extreme hatred for persons they seek to

destroy. All significant terrorists and persons who have committed atrocities have been

conspiracy theorists such as Osama Bin Laden, Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler (Lefebevre, 2007).

Intelligence analysts

Intelligence analysts are professionals who research, analyze and represent findings to the

Central Intelligence Agency so as to forge a clear picture concerning the intelligence signals and

situation. The responsibilities are wide ranging and broad as evident from the critical role that

intelligence analysis plays, coupled with its ever evolving nature. As such, noting the historical

aspect of the whole process of intelligence analysis, intelligence analysts need to possess an

interest into the relationship of history to current events as well as appreciate the socio-political

issues that influence events in the world. It cannot be gainsaid that there lies great importance in

studying historical events so as to learn and indeed inform current analysis of an intelligence

issue (Hendrickson, 2008).

Conclusion

As already set out, intelligence analysts need to ensure that they are well versed with the

historical intelligence events so as to enable them conduct an efficient analysis. More so, there is

a need for them to make a conscious and deliberate effort to remove any analytical bias on their

part. Despite the ingrained sense of analytical bias in a person’s mental faculties, it is required

there be a continuous and deliberate effort to rid the mind of such. In this vein, an agreement by
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a whole team of analysts over a recent development must be treated with great circumspection

and so should a prediction about a future happening based on earlier experiences. Cognitive bias

on the part of intelligence analysts can be remedied by expressing assumptions that have been

proved to work and then challenging them satisfactorily.

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References

Hendrickson, N. (2008). Critical Thinking in Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence , 679-693.

Johnston, R. (2006). Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic

Study. Online Information of the Defense Community , 21-74.

Lahneman, W. J. (2010). The Need for A New Intelligence Paradigm. International Journal of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence , 201-225.

Lefebevre, S. (2007). A Look At Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and

Counterintelligence , 231-264.

Marrin, S. (2012). Is Intelligence Analysis an Art or a Science? International Journal of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence , 529-545.

Rolington, A. (2013). Strategic Intelligence for the 21st Century: The Mosaic Method. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Spielmann, K. (2012). Strengthening Intelligence Threat Analysis. International Journal of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence , 19-43.

Walton, T. (2010). Challenges in Intelligence Analysis: Lessons From 1300 BCE To The

Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.