1

SWAT DERADICALIZATION MODEL: PROSPECTS

OF REHABILITATING MILITANTS OF WAZIRISTAN
M.PHIL THESIS

BY

RASHIDULLAH KHAN
NDU-PCS/M.P-13/F-181

Research Supervisor
Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Chaudhry

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies

National Defence University
Islamabad Pakistan
2015
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................... 1
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 3
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4
Research Problem .......................................................................................................... 7
Hypothesis ..................................................................................................................... 7
Objective of the Study ................................................................................................. 8
Research Question ......................................................................................................... 8
Significance of the Study ............................................................................................... 8
Research Limitation ....................................................................................................... 9
Research Methodology .................................................................................................. 9
Literature Review........................................................................................................... 9
Deradicalization Models ..................................................................................................... 20
Conceptual Understanding ........................................................................................... 21
Saudi Arabia’s Deradicalization Program ................................................................... 25

Indonesia’s Disengagement Program .......................................................................... 29

Yemen Deradicalization Program ................................................................................ 33
Sri Lanka’s Deradicalization Model & Program ......................................................... 39

Swat Deradicalization Model (SDM) ................................................................................. 47

Adults Module. ............................................................................................................ 53
Sabaoon – Juveniles Module. .............................................................................................. 59

Historical Perspective .......................................................................................................... 74

Swat.............................................................................................................................. 74
Waziristan .................................................................................................................... 87

Prospects of Rehabilitating Militants of Waziristan ........................................................ 96

Radicalization in Swat and Waziristan ........................................................................ 96
Recommendation ....................................................................................................... 106

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 120

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 122
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Abstract

Radicalization has emerged as a phenomenon which of late has been the reason

behind violence and terrorism especially linked with Muslims. A host of factors and causes

has lead to the radicalization of masses specially Youth in Pakistan, the most prominent

being the misuse of Religion by the State and Terrorists / Militant organization. Poverty,

illiteracy, unemployment and under development are the other breeding ground for the

spread of radicalization. Events of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror saw a surge of

terrorist / militant activities and attacks in Pakistan specially FATA and Swat. Swat saw a

reign of terror and brutalities at the hands of Tehreek i Taliban (Swat) – TTP(S), until June

2009, once Pakistan Army cleared it from TTP(S). This resulted in capturing of thousands of

militants which chiefly comprised Juveniles. Decision was taken to reintegrate them back to

society. After detailed deliberation on various deradicalization models / programs; a unique

model catering the challenges to deradicalize ex militant i.e Swat Deradicalization Model

was devised including the aspect of religion, socio-cultural and psychological issues. This

model had different programmes for Juveniles, Adult and for ex Militants’ Families. The

results were outstanding in deradicalizing the ex militant. The causes and factors responsible

for the radicalization of people in Swat and Waziristan are identical. With few changes in

program the prospect of rehabilitating militants of Waziristan are extremely high and thus

the hope of saving thousands of lives.

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Introduction

Radicalization of individual / masses has brought with itself more often than not the

menace of violent behaviour leading to terrorism. Mostly Young men (also women) and

teenagers being of emotional, impressionable age and full of energy has been the focus of

radical groups to meet their political objectives through violent means. In the last one and half

decade, the government’s policy makers and LEAs, have shifted their paradigm from hardcore

anti terrorists / extremists focusing mainly on Kinetic operations to soft core approach in

handling with violent extremists and terrorists. After a large number of studies and research

focusing on the causes of radicalization, the focus has shifted to more important and effective

way of making the former militants leave the path of violence and rehabilitated through

deradicalization.

One of the early changes in the paradigm shift and the strategy came from the early

programs of deradicalization with different names practiced in mainly Islamic countries. The

purposes of these program was to prevent the rise of radicalization in the potential groups and

individuals; and bringing back the radicalized militants, extremists and terrorists to the society

by rehabilitating them through deradicalization programs and reintegrating them into the

society. The basic emphasis of these programs was the soft approach by using the logic,

reasoning and different psychological tools to put them out of radical thoughts and ideology.

Countries from Algeria to Egypt started their programs with the Islamic radicalized individuals

and groups through religious debate abandoning the violent means to achieve their objectives.

Yemen to Indonesia countered the radicalized groups with their unique set of processes in their

programs to renounce violence. These programs with their successes attracted the academics,

policy makers, practitioners and LEAs alike, to study them and replicate them to suit their

culture, economic situation and society. These programs have given hope to people everywhere

about the way back of radicalized people back to normal life and reintegration into the society.
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Fighting violent extremism and terrorism emerging through various stages and means

of radicalization requires broad based, multi-faceted and wholesome strategy. That strategy

should not only be encompassing hardcore kinetic approach but also countering it with soft

core non-kinetic approach i.e ‘deradicalization strategies’. Most often than not the first step

toward that strategy is disassociation and distancing from the extremist behaviour leading to

the violent acts perpetrated in the name of religion and other motives and ideology. This is one

of the toughest step in moving away from radicalization because that has been the sole purpose

of committing to the radical ideologies leading to militancy. To counter and prevent the

reoccurring of militant tendencies and creation of militants / terrorists, the reintegration of

militants back into the society as a rehabilitative measure, has become one of the corner stone

of non-kinetic strategy towards tackling terrorism and radicalization. Prison based

deradicalization programs have emerged to be one of the best strategies to counter the

radicalization among the captured militants, as has been practised by variety of countries in the

past in European, African and Asian countries including the Muslim countries. The prison

based strategy to counter the radicalization has two distinct reasons behind that: first being, the

cut off environment from the rest of the society with plenty of time gives the opportunity to

reflect back on the life and ideologies that they followed and it gives the edge in reshaping the

thought process which can counter the radical thoughts through new found thinking pattern.

The second being related to the realm of security, it implies that if the detainees’ activities are

not monitored and they are not involved in positive and constructive engagements, there is

more likely a chance where they can regroup again and become more radicalized than before.

So, the prison based programs provide a unique opportunity to transform themselves in a

manner where they renounce the radical ideas and abandon the violent means to achieve their

objective, hence moving in the direction of effective deradicalization and rehabilitation.

Swat remained hub of Terrorists activities during most part of the last decade. Radical

thoughts and extremism prevailed in the area, which remained the major cause of locals joining
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hands with the Terrorists. Military operations were successful in evicting Terrorists hold in

Swat. The operations resulted into apprehension of number of individuals with varying nature

of involvement in Terrorists activities. Pakistan Army with the collaboration of Khyber

Pakhtunkhwaa Government arranged a three day seminar on deradicalization in which scholars

from across the country participated. People from every walk of life were also invited to step

fwd and suggest solutions for maintenance of peace in the region and to avoid radical trends in

any form. The seminar also focused on controlling and elimination of actual causes of terrorism

from the society. The relevant aspects discussed during the Seminar have been appropriately

incorporated in the deradicalization program. To reintegrate these radicalized individuals back

in society and avert chances of joining hands with Terrorists again, an effective

Deradicalization Model with different Programs were conceptualized and adopted. Religion

may be a motivating factors but not the primary one for the individual to join Terrorism.

However, other contribution factors were ignorance, poverty, illiteracy and social compulsions

of the people is Swat. The Swat Deradicalization Model catered for all of the aspects of

radicalization of the militants captured or surrendered after the successful counter militancy

campaign in Swat. Different facilities were established for adult and juveniles categories. Adult

module started at Mishal in Sep 2010 (PAITHOM, Swat) and Rastoon (Barikot, Swat). Juvenile

module started at Sabaoon in Sep 2009 (Malakand). Mishal (PAITHOM) is only for the low

risk category and Sabaoon is for low, med and high risk categories.

2014 saw a massive successful Zarb e Azb operation in North Waziristan. This resulted

in capturing and surrendering of thousands of militants. The extensive interrogation and

investigation of every detained militant bore striking resemblance with the militants of Swat in

terms of their major factors leading to militancy / radicalization. During the course of this study

Swat Deradicalization Model will not only be studied for the results / successes it has achieved

but also for the opportunities it provides and the prospect of rehabilitating detainees of
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Waziristan. The study will try to bring it in the end a ray of hope for the detainees’ future basing

on the successes of Swat Deradicalization Model’s Programs.

Research Problem. The scourge of terrorism has led to a considerable effort

in identifying the various aspect of radicalization that leads to violent extremism and terrorism

but a scarce work on the phenomenon of deradicalization. Pakistan didn’t have an experience

with running deradicalization programs or knowledge base about countering radicalization.

Successful operation against militants of Swat led to capture and surrender of thousands of

militants (mainly juvenile), this led to the thinking of saving their lives by rehabilitating them

through deradicalization. The concept move ahead with studying/analysing various

contemporary deradicalization models (mostly prison based) from Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka.

In this back drop, Government of Pakistan and KP, Pakistan Army started a comprehensive

deradicalization program in Swat along with Swat (Social Welfare Academics and Teaching

for Pakistan, an NGO). Swat Deradicalization Model’s Programs has often been repeated

success by everyone connected with it, it however has to be seen whether its emulation in

Waziristan will be able to rehabilitate militants captured in operations by Pakistan Army. The

positive outcome / prospect will give a great hope for the thousands of detainees specially the

juveniles to have a fresh start in life.

Hypothesis

Militants of Waziristan can be rehabilitated by deradicalization through Swat

Deradicalization Model
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Objective of the Study

This study attempts to examine the Swat Deradicalization Model’s Program and its

future implementation over the militants of Waziristan in order to rehabilitate and reintegrate

them back in the society. The objective of this study is:-

 To ascertain the prospect of rehabilitating militants of Waziristan through Swat

Deradicalization Model’s Programs.

 To describe / compare the history and root causes of radicalization in Swat and

Waziristan.

 To describe various contemporary deradicalization models in the world.

 How successful has been the Swat Deradicalization Model/Program in deradicalizing

militants of Swat?

Research Question

1. What are contemporary deradicalization models / programs in the world?

2. What is the history, root causes of radicalization in Swat and Waziristan?

3. Enumerate Swat Deradicalization Model / Programs and its successes in deradicalizing

militants of Swat?

4. What are the prospects of deradicalizing, rehabilitating Waziristan’s militants basing

on Swat Deradicalization Model’s programs?

Significance of the Study

Deradicalization programs present great opportunities for the militants to be

rehabilitated and reintegrated back into the society. Although successes of Swat

Deradicalization Model made splashes on the news in electronic media in the past but there

was a dearth/non existence of research on this important aspect in our fight against the terrorism
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and extremism. This study is an attempt in this direction to provide an opening in understanding

the programs that have been and still deradicalizing the militants. It will provide insight into

the program through comprehensive data regarding the various components of the

deradicalization program, which is lacking in the scant material regarding Swat

Deradicalization Program. This study will try to examine the prospects of rehabilitating the

Waziristan’s militants through deradicalization model of SDM. This will go a long way in

saving precious lives especially of Juvenile militants by deradicalizing them and reintegrating

them back into the society to lead a normal life again.

Research Limitations

The major limitation of the research has been the sensitive nature of the data pertaining

to the detainees (militants held captive with LEAs) and beneficiaries (militants

undergone/undergoing deradicalization programs) of Swat and Waziristan. The interviews with

detainees and beneficiaries were done off the record for better understanding and getting insight

into the processes of radicalization and the effects of deradicalization on them. Exact figures

regarding certain aspects of detainees and beneficiaries could not be published due to security

reasons. Care was taken to overcome it by using percentages instead of exact figures.

Research Methodology

This study has been undertaken by using qualitative methods based on the description

and analysis of the success of SDM in deradicalizing and rehabilitating militants of Swat,

history/root causes of the radicalization in Swat and Waziristan and the prospects of

rehabilitating Waziristan’s militants through SDM’s program. Quantitative methods have been

used in order to ascertain the success of Swat Deradicalization Model’s Programs success in

mathematical terms. Both primary and secondary resources were used in conducting this study.

Open ended interviews were carried out to have better understanding of the perspective and
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insight of the interviewee. Effort was made to read and consult all concerned publications

relating to the research / study for enhancing the standard of research.

Literature Review

Deradicalization of radical elements of the society, organizations and groups is not a

new phenomenon in the contemporary world especially the Islamist Militants. But there has

not been extensive research on the deradicalization and its various models adopted by the

countries around the world, especially those one targeting radicalized Islamic militants.

According to Omer Ashour, in his book ‘The De-Radicalization of Jihadists’.

Transforming armed Islamist movements’ he opines that the study and researches on the

radicalization and particularly concerning Islamic has been more focused on the causes and

factor leading up to the radicalization. He points out to the factors that lead to the interest of

the world towards the phenomena of radicalization, which included events which put the spot

light on the causes of these radical thoughts from Iranian Revolution to assassination of Egypt’s

President to the surge of Taliban and the horrors of 9/11. They brought to light the

discontentment to the ultimate violent extremism leading to terrorism in the Muslim societies.

He does acknowledge the factors leading to radicalization through the use of structural

psychology but he does find the shortcomings in addressing the various cases not covered by

it. He finds the political and structural psychology in unison for the factors and conditions

leading to the radicalization and then the various methods to counter them to achieve

disengagement and deradicalization.

Dr. Hassan Abbas in his South Asia Journal’s article “The Roots of Radicalization in

Pakistan” has attributed the start of religious radicalization to the formative years of Pakistan, once the

state used the religion resulting into the slow radicalization of the society, which was otherwise quite

tolerant and homogenous in nature.

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Ishtiaq Ahmed while analysing the causes of radicalization in his article “Radicalization

and De-Radicalization in Singapore and Pakistan: A Comparison” published in PIPS research

journal’s Peace and Conflict Studies, has pointed out to the draconian era of General Zia, as

the main contributor of radicalization of the society in general and FATA in particular. He used

the religion to cling on to the power and used it for political mileage. He used Jihad for

legitimizing his government with the western powers, accruing financial and economic

benefits.

Ayesha Jalal in ‘Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia’, and, ‘Self and Sovereignty:

Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850’ has described on how the modern

religious radicalization started from the events of Battle of Balakot between Sikhs and few

Hundred Muslims in mid 19th Century.

Mujtaba Rathore and Abdul Basit in their PIPS research journal’s article ‘Trends and

Patterns of Radicalization in Pakistan’ have deliberated on various causes that led to the

radicalization of society ranging from misinterpretation of religion to poverty to illiteracy

basing on various surveys and publications.

Christine Fair in her paper, “Who are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” has

discussed some important aspects regarding socio-cultural factors of radicalization in Pakistan.

Muhammad Azam while deliberating in the article “Radicalization in Pakistan:

Sociocultural Realities” on the phenomenon of radicalization has dwelled on the various

aspects of conflicts in the society leading to radicalization in the society. They range from

moderation to radical interpretation of religion and from culture to religious belief getting the

upper hand in the society. It is irresistible to disagree with Robert Kemp’s assertion that “the

rise of radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakhtun tribal areas of Pakistan is rooted in the

disintegration of tribal and state structures; and the increased influence of religiously orthodox

foreign elements.”
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Moeed Yusuf in his research paper ‘Radicalism among Youth in Pakistan: Human

Development gone Wrong’ has tackled the issue of Youth Radicalization by analyzing the

enablers like Flawed Education System (including curriculum), misconstrued Politico-

Ideological Environment and Socio-Economic Deprivations.

Safiya Aftab in her article ‘Poverty and Militancy’ has took up the issue of militancy

being the violent form of radicalism with its nexus with the poverty prevalent in the society in

general and militancy prone/ militancy hotbeds in particular.

C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra & Jacob N. Shapiro (2010) while analysing a survey

of 6,000 respondents cross Pakistan in their article, “Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan:

Insights From a National Sample.” points out to the political reasons as well as religious

sentiments (used by religious motivated militants) for the radicalization and support for

militancy. It was also highlighted that support for Sharia Law and its implementation clearly

doesn’t mean the support for the militant organizations and terrorist acts perpetuated by them,

rather it’s for the social justice, corruption free society, personal safety and security, peace and

stability, and efficiency and good governance by the state. However, these sentiments can

easily be played out by the militants and the impressionable Youth can easily be trapped by the

militants to be used for their nefarious design to achieve their political objectives and power.

But, as the survey was carried out in 2009 before the peace agreement between Government of

Pakistan and Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (Swat), the overall support for militant / terrorist

organizations appealing for Sharia implementation has drastically came down.

Husain Haqqani, in his book “Magnificent Delusions Pakistan, the United States, and

an Epic History of Misunderstanding” has opined that Pakistan’s State used the radicalized

youth, trained and radicalized in Madaris under the supervision of State against USSR and as

proxy for strategic gains.

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Victor Asal , C. Christine Fair & Stephen Shellman (2008), in their interesting and very

insightful study, “Consenting to a Child's Decision to Join a Jihad: Insights from a Survey of

Militant Families in Pakistan”, has pointed out that poverty and economics does play a vital

role in the recruitment and radicalization of the Youth to be used by the terrorists and militants

organizations. Moreover, Madaris does have a role in radicalizing students who attends these

seminaries by preaching violent means to achieve political objectives. They for the most of the

number, been responsible for radicalizing population, especially in FATA by exploiting

poverty, unemployment and illiteracy through abuse of religion.

Muhammad Feyyaz in his insightful article, “Political Economy of Tehrik-i-Taliban

Swat”, explores the how the poverty and illiteracy were targeted by the militant organization

to abuse religion in acquiring political power by radicalizing populace of Swat. Mis-

interpretation of religion was used to get the political economy going and grabbing power.

Feriha N. Peracha , Raafia R. Khan , Arooj Ahmad , Sadia J. Khan , Sahar Hussein &

Haroon Rashid Choudry (2012), who had worked in the ground breaking work of

deradicalizing Juvenile militants in Swat, had in depth analysis of the juveniles and detainees

had opined in their article “Socio Demographic Variables in the Vulnerable Youth Predisposed

Towards Militancy (Swat, Pakistan)”, they have pointed out to the various psychological issues

leading up to and compounding the processes of radicalization. They have found out that

radicalization apart from religious misinterpretation is increased by poverty, illiteracy and poor

standard of life.

Shehzad H. Qazi in his study in “A War without Bombs: Civil Society Initiatives against

Radicalization in Pakistan” has pointed out to various factors which contributed to the

phenomenon of radicalization ranging from various government’s abuse of religion for political

use especially in FATA to poverty to illiteracy. He has pointed out to various anti radicalization

trends in the surveys, which he believes is a positive sign, but more is needed to be done in
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terms of mass scale anti radicalization / extremism campaigns through all forms of media and

also through formal and informal educational system via curricular and co-curricular activities

also incorporating texts books.

Sultan-i-Rome in “Swat A Critical Analysis” has given the historical perspective of the

radicalization in Swat with respect to factors like mullahs and maddrassas, the flawed judicial

system after the merger of Swat state with Pakistan, the use of religion by the state to achieve

their political/foreign policy objectives in neighbouring countries and Tehreek i Nifaz e Shariat

e Mohammadi (TNSM).

Helge Lurås and Khalid Aziz, while analyzing the radicalization and militancy in their

study, “Swat: Main Causes of the Rise of Militancy” has termed the (mis)use of religion,

illiteracy, poverty and governance to be the prime factor behind the creation, nurturing and rise

of militancy and radicalization in Swat.

Sadaqat Khan, in his MPhil dissertation “The Root Causes of Militancy in FATA (A

Case Study of Khyber Agency)”, has concluded that the militancy raging in FATA has been

caused by the multiple factors from destroying its age old socio-politico-cultural structure

resulting in radicalizing the masses, religious sentimental exploitation by the state and later by

no-state actors, low literacy rate, bad to non existence of governance and poverty.

Saifullah Mahsud, in “Combating Militancy in Bajaur and North- Waziristan Agency

in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan- A Comparative Analysis” has

highlighted by analyzing various surveys the pattern of radicalization in North Waziristan to

be different in certain aspects as compared to Bajaur agency but had resemblance with Swat

and South Waziristan in terms of the abuse of religion and lack of economic opportunities.

Robert Lane Sammon in his master’s thesis, ‘Mullas And Maliks: Understanding The

Roots Of Conflict In Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas’ has termed the rise of
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radicalization and the conflict to the deliberate demise of Maliki system in the favour of

Mullahs which was started and given strength by General Zia’s administration in the 1980s.

Arshi Saleem Hashmi in her insightful research paper, “The Arabist Shift from Indo-

Persian Civilization & Genesis of Radicalization in Pakistan”, highlighted the role played by

the Saudi and Gulf States’ petro dollar during the Russia-Afghan War in 1980s in radicalizing

populace of Pakistan through Wahabi/Deobandi Madaris, by preaching misconstrued ultra

orthodox version of Islam with the state’s patronage.

Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, while writing in a paper for Journal of Pakistan Institute of

Peace Studies, “Understanding FATA”, has written the background of radicalization in the

FATA, especially Waziristan with respect to extreme poverty, illiteracy, religious sentiments

and socio-cultural.

Magnus Norell (Ed.) in “Militancy in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal

Areas (FATA) and Afghanistan” has pointed out to the various factors responsible for

promotion of militancy through radicalization of populace including the country’s premier

intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence since 1980s in one way or the other.

Naveed Ahmed Shinwari, in his prolific and insightful research study, “Understanding

FATA (Vol I and IV)” has deliberated and analysed through various surveys the attitudes of

populace of FATA including Waziristan regarding Governance, Religion and their role in

exacerbating the overall state of radicalization and militancy in the historical perspective as

well. He pointed out to the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and bad governance adding fuel

to the radicalization and militancy in the regions.

Manzoor Ahmad, “Insurgency in Fata: Causes and a Way Forward” has found political

vacuum along with FCR, past government policies towards using religion as a tool to accrue

strategic objectives, unemployment and underdevelopment as the main causes for the rise of

radicalization and insurgency/militancy in FATA particularly Waziristan.

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Zahid Ullah Wazir, “Indigenous Factors Responsible for the Rise of Militancy in

FATA” has pointed out to the government use of religion to radicalized populace and used it

for foreign policy objectives, tribal autonomous status and negligence towards its all aspect of

development, maddrassas, poverty and anti US sentiments.

A policy report published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation

and Political Violence (ICSR) titled “Prisons and Terrorism - Radicalisation and De-

radicalisation in 15 Countries” has deliberated on the survey and empirical data gathered from

15 countries to get insight into the prison radicalization, individual and group deradicalization

in the prisons. The report opined that terrorists held captive can be disengaged from their

violence. They can be deradicalize to be reintegrated back into the society.

Mark Dechesne, in the article “Deradicalization: not soft, but strategic” has deliberated

on the aspect of physical disengagement from the violence, behavioural changes leading to

deradicalization and the thought pattern renouncing the ideology.

John Horgan, “Deradicalization or disengagement? A process in need of clarity and a

counterterrorism initiative in need of evaluation” has clarified the difference between them. He

opines that disengagement is the renouncement of violence but may not be the renouncement

and changes in the ideology. However, deradicalization is not only the renouncement of

violence but also leaving the ideology of violence for achieving the political objectives.

Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Petty john, Jeremy J. Ghez, Christopher Boucek,

“Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists” explores the various aspects of disengagement and

deradicalization and their programs. They have analysed various deradicalization programs

round the world from Middle East to South East Asia and Europe. But, due to the less or

nonexistent data regarding detainees who went through the deradicalization programs and

especially the post deradicalization reintegration into the society, the study did bring about very
 17

pertinent lessons for the policy makers handling the deradicalization programs but it does lack

the necessary data to evaluate the programs.

Dr. Alex P. Schmid, in The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The

Hague’s research paper “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A

Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review”, has given an in depth analysis of the various

phenomena related to radicalization and deradicalization. Various programs pertaining to

deradicalization and counter radicalization are discussed with the short comings and critique

of them.

Omer Ashour, in “The Deradicalization of Jihadists” has found out that the important

water shed in the start of the deradicalization involves changes in behaviour that starts with the

renouncement and leaving of violence. That also entails the changes in the ideological thinking

which are based on the legitimisation of the use of violence and terrorism, which in Islamic

militants are the misconstrued concepts about the Jihad and use of religion for political

objectives and power grabbing. He also reviews the various deradicalization programs and the

short comings / failures in them.

Omar Ashour, in his article “Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and

Failures” had highlighted the reasons for the successes of the Algerian deradicalization

programs. He also pointed out to the failure of deradicalizing certain groups because of the

leadership and factionalization in those groups regarding the deradicalization.

Magnus Ranstorp, in “Preventing Violent Radicalization and Terrorism - The Case of

Indonesia” presents an overview of the deradicalization program of Indonesia pertaining

mainly to the deradicalization efforts directed at Jemmah Islamiyyah, the home grown terrorist

organization with tentacles sometimes reaching various parts of the globe. However, the report

doesn’t give the detail of the various methods used in the deradicalization programs or

empirical data to support it.

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John Horgan a & Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in

Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs” in their excellent analysis has

enumerated the challenges being faced in judging the successes of deradicalization programs.

They have offered Multi Attribute Utility Technology (MAUT). It helps in the identification

and evaluating through the accomplished tasks / objectives which are set up by the organization

responsible for undertaking the programs and related objectives.

Marisa L. Porges, in her article “Deradicalisation, the Yemeni Way” has discussed in

brief the highlights of the Yemeni deradicalization program and the problems / flaws in it. She

pointed out to the lack of institutional backing and support for the program from the

government as has been in other programs. The glaring flaw she saw in the program was that

the program aimed at taking pledges from the detainees about renunciation of hostile attitudes,

terrorist acts targeted at government but did nothing about the overall behavioural change

towards violence and terrorism. The result was high percentage of recidivism and joining

terrorist’s outfits in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iromi Dharmawardhane, in “Sri Lanka’s Post-Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for

Rebels and Rebuilding of Conflict-affected Communities” has given the historical perspective

of the LTTE’s insurgency and its defeat in 2009. She has deliberated on the post conflict

rehabilitation of detainees through deradicalization by means of psychological manner via

different programs and its outstanding success in deradicalizing militants.

John Horgan and Mary Beth Altier, in their article “The Future of Terrorist

Deradicalization Programs” has pointed out to the flaws in the deradicalization programs.

Clarifying between disengagement and deradicalization, they have pointed out that most of the

programs are focusing on just the disengagement of detainees. They should rather focus on

changing detainees’ behaviour towards the ideological thinking which pushed them towards

violence.
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UNDP’s report on “Perception survey on reconciliation in Malakand Division” has

highlighted the overwhelming majority of Malakand Division in support of reconciliation. The

survey brought to light the areas which if not addressed will rekindle the conflict in Malakand

which ranges from education to poverty to unemployment.

Sobia Abbasi, in one of the rare work on Swat deradicalization titled, “De-radicalization

Strategy: Prospects for Rehabilitation of Ex-Militants” has given the genesis of the

deradicalization program and the various strategies adopted by other countries in running these

programs. She has recommended covering the entire deradicalization model through

constitutional backing to be used in future, which will go a long way in making the entire

processes more effective and accountable. Muhammad Amir Rana, while analysing the SDM

has compare it with different programs run around the world and their compulsion for Pakistan.

Gaps in the Literature

Although there has been a substantial amount of research work done on the subject of

radicalization, but there has been very less quality work on Islamist’s deradicalization with the

exception of Omer Ashour and John Horgan. Mostly the phenomena of disengagement and

deradicalization have been mixed by especially in various deradicalization programs.

Unfortunately, due to security and host of other reasons, there has not been any analytical,

academic work on the working of Swat Deradicalization Program. This study in its humble

capacity will try to add some knowledge in this regard, which will act a step in the right

direction for the future academicians and research scholars alike.

 20

DERADICALIZATION MODELS

“Deradicalization is an imp contributor towards achieving human security. Such efforts are
to be expressed through attempts to correct the behaviour, primarily by rehabilitating and
deradicalizing” – General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, COAS Pakistan Army.1

Radicalization of society or certain segments of society has been a long-term problem faced by

many nations especially less developed and developing ones. It has often resulted in different

forms of violence, terrorism being one of the deadliest. Radicalization came into forefront in

the form of terrorism after the horrific incident of 9/11. The immediate response to terrorism

has been in the form of hard aspect of counter terrorism strategy. Counterterrorism campaigns

in many theatres around the world have resulted in a huge number of Islamist extremists

detainees. These detainees present a dual dilemma/issue for the states that have them in

custody. “First, most states do not want to hold the growing numbers of extremists in their

prisons indefinitely, and, in many cases, they lack the resources to do so. They have therefore

searched for a way to rehabilitate these prisoners so that they can be released without posing a

threat to society. Second, many states have recognized that prisons are often incubators of

radicalization, and in an effort to stymie this process, they have sought to tackle radicalization

in their penitentiaries by reforming extremist detainees.”2

"To establish the issues of inconclusive confinement and radicalization, various states made

projects to change caught fanatics. In the Center East and Southeast Asia, these projects were

commonly started on the idea that the fanatics had been deceived into taking after an erroneous

translation of Islam; consequently, the jail based projects looked to re-teach prisoners. The

aggressors' perspective was talked about and negated through a religious dialog, normally

1
Addressing National Seminar on Deradicalization Seminar 2011 , in Mingora, Swat.
2
Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the Challenge of Extremist and
Radicalized Prisoners, Santa Monica, California, RAND Corporation, 2008.
 21

directed by standard ministers. Notwithstanding the religious talks, some of these projects

planned to help the ex-activists in reintegrating into society”.3

These restoration projects saw detainment at this very moment impetus for separation

and deradicalization. Detainment may have set off a time of addressing by a percentage of the

aggressor Islamists who could be distinguished and after that occupied with discourses to

empower their questions. The deradicalization models/programs saw confinement of the ex

members of militants/terrorist groups, their segregation into groups suitable for those

programs. These programs aimed at addressing the issue of radicalization and

terrorism/extremism produced cost effective results contrary to the kinetic methods to eliminate

the terrorists and not the cause. It is prudent to have explanation of few important terms related

to deradicalization programs before analysis of various deradicalization models adopted

globally be taken in the ensuing pages.

CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTNDING

Extremism. “The term can be used to refer to political ideologies that oppose a

society’s core values and principles. In the context of liberal democracies, this could be applied

to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles

of democracy and human rights. However, the term can also be used to describe the methods

through which political actors attempt to realise their aims, that is, by using means that ‘show

disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others”.4 Many states refer to terrorists as

‘violent extremists.

Violent Extremism. “Extremist groups operate on the fringe of accepted political spectra.

According to the Crown Prosecution Service, violent extremism can be regarded as the

demonstration of unacceptable behaviour by using any means of medium to express which

3
Jessica Stern, “Mind over Martyr,” Foreign Affairs, Vol 89, no. 1, January–February.”
4
Roger Scruton, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2007).
 22

foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs; seek to provoke

others to terrorist acts; foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to

serious criminal acts; or foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence. Of course,

different types of violent extremism may fester in prison. However, in the context of the

contemporary discussion about challenges concerning prison radicalisation and rehabilitation

of violent extremist offenders, violent Islamist extremism has been of prominent concern and

will be a central focus in the UNICRI initiative. This does not negate the fact that significant

expertise has been build up in rehabilitating and reintegrating other types of violent extremist,

like right-wing and left-wing extremists – experiences that may provide useful indicators and

good practices for this initiative”.5

Radicalization. “Most of the definitions currently in circulation describe radicalization

as the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and

(ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims. Some authors refer to ‘violent

radicalisation’ in order to emphasise the violent outcome and distinguish the process from non-

violent forms of ‘radical’ thinking”.

Terrorism. “The definitional problem, which has haunted terrorism research for decades, is

unlikely to be resolved by this report6. As a tactic, terrorism typically consists of symbolic acts

of violence which are intended to influence the political behaviour of a target group via the

deliberate creation of fear.7 The formula which many governments and international

organisations have chosen to adopt describes terrorism as politically motivated violence that

intentionally targets civilians and/or non-combatants.8 For the purposes of this report, the term

terrorist is used for all individuals who have been charged with, or convicted of, offences that

are proscribed under their countries’ anti-terrorism laws”.

5
http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Background-Paper-Rehab-Core-Principles-Good-Practices.pdf)
6
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc/Articles/4/1.pdf
7
Peter Neumann, Old and New Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), Chapter 1.
8
Ibid.
 23

Politically Motivated Offenders. “The principal difference between politically

motivated offenders and ‘ordinary’ criminals lies in their intention. While ‘ordinary’ criminals

commit crimes in pursuit of selfish and/or personal goals, politically motivated offenders

believe that they are acting on behalf of a certain group, society or humanity as a whole.

Politically motivated offenders commonly distinguish between ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’,

arguing that breaking the law is justified when a particular policy or the entire political or legal

system are illegitimate9. Not all politically motivated offenders are terrorists, but all terrorists

are politically motivated offenders”.

Deradicalization and Disengagement. “The terms deradicalization and

disengagement describe processes whereby individuals (or groups) cease their involvement in

organised violence and/or terrorism. However, while de-radicalisation aims for substantive

changes in individuals’ (or groups’) ideology and attitudes, disengagement concentrates on

facilitating behavioural change, that is, the rejection of violent means. According to John

Horgan, ‘the disengaged terrorist may not be “deradicalize” or repentant at all. Often physical

disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in ideological

support”.10 Additionally, many authors distinguish between collective and individual de-

radicalisation and/or disengagement, depending on whether the process is led by, or aimed at,

individuals or entire groups.11 Moreover, “the terrorism and violent extremism literature makes

a distinction between disengagement and de-radicalisation, which can both occur at the

individual as well as collective level. Individuals or movements disengage when they reduce

or stop using violent methods. Disengagement may or may not involve de-radicalisation, which

requires not only a change in behaviour but also a change in belief. Reintegration – In broad

terms, rehabilitation programmes aim to prepare inmates to return safely to society and live as

law-abiding citizens. More specifically, reintegration includes a safe transition to the

9
Nikos Passas, “Political Crime and Political Offender: Theory and Practice”, Liverpool Law Review, 8, no. 1(1986).
10 John Horgan, “Individual disengagement: a psychological analysis” in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind
(London and New York: Routledge 2009): 27.
11
Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists (London: Routledge, 2009).
 24

community as well as a change of attitudes and behaviour that led the individual to violent

extremist activities in the first place. The following elements are not discussed in a particular

order of chronology or importance”. Yet for the purpose of clarity, “the principles and good

practices will be clustered into different subsections, including (1) Goals and objectives; (2)

Prison context; (3) The role of different actors in prisons, and (4) Reintegration components”.
12

Rehabilitation. “Rehabilitation is the act of restoring something to its original state, like

the rehabilitation of the forest that had once been cleared for use as an amusement park. The

noun rehabilitation comes from the Latin prefix re-, meaning “again” and

habitare, meaning “make fit.” Rehabilitation generally centre around three core concepts: (1)

rehabilitation is a purposeful, planned intervention rather than an accidental occurrence; (2)

which aims to change characteristics of the offender (attitudes, cognitive skills and processes,

personality or mental health, and social, educational or vocational skills) that are believed to

be the cause of the offenders criminal – or in the present discussion violent extremist –

behaviour, and (3) which aims to reduce the chance that the individual will re-offend. In the

context of rehabilitating violent extremist offenders, the offender’s ideological belief system

plays an important role in the rehabilitation process. To what extent rehabilitation initiatives

should prioritise changing extremist attitudes or extremist behaviour – or both – has been the

subject of larger debate on the issue.”13

12
http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Background-Paper-Rehab-Core-Principles-Good-Practices.pdf
13
Ibid.
 25

DERADICLIZATION MODELS / PROGRAMS

Deradicalization programs has emerged over a long period of time, although sparsely used and

adopted as a dominant response to counter trends of extremism, violent behaviours and

terrorism. The deradicalization programs have been used in almost all parts of the world to

deradicalize inmates/beneficiaries from political extremist to more violent terrorists. Although

different deradicalization programs were studied but in this chapter focus is on terrorism related

deradicalization models (especially Islamist Terrorism) of Middle East and Asia with

additional mention of Sri Lanka’s Deradicalization Model.

Saudi Arabia’s Deradicalization Program

In spite of the fact that Saudi Arabia has confronted maintained residential rebellion for quite

a while, just after the deadly attacks in the capital during May 2003, KSA moved towards

organizing a program that would be making peace and security more durable.14

Notwithstanding customary counterterrorism routines, the Saudis built up a progression of

measures proposed to de-legitimize as per the KSA which it pointed out the purposefully wrong

interpretation of mistaken, merciless illustrations of the Ku'ran. 15 The fight against the

terrorism saw a wide range of concepts to deal with it from cognitive domain to kinetic

operations to cyber domain, one of those concept/techniques had the saw the progression of an

one of a kind framework anticipated that would change radical/extreme behaviour through a

mixture of wide arrays of open dialog focussing religion, social issues and culture and it had

sessions specifically focussing on the psychological domain as well.16 In spite of the fact that

the system was begun in mystery, it has subsequent to wind up surely understood both inside

and outside the kingdom. Dissimilar to Yemen's RDC, the Saudi project (named the ''Report

14
Terrence Henry, ‘‘Get Out of Jihad Free.” The Atlantic, (June 2007). www.theatlantic.com/doc/200706/saudi-jihad
15
Christpher Boucek, ‘‘Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia.’’Terrorism Monitor, 5, no. 16, (2007).
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=4213
16
Ibid. See also Christopher Boucek, ‘‘Jailing Jihadis: Saudi Arabia’s Special Terrorist Prisons.’’ Terrorism Monitor, 6, no. 2 (2008).
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373926 ; Christopher Boucek, ‘‘Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’
CounterterrorismStrategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare.’’ Carnegie Papers, 97 (2008) ; and Jeffrey Fleishman, ‘‘Saudi Arabia
Tries to Rehab Radical Minds.’’ The Los Angeles Times, Dec. 21,2007, sec. A.
 26

Advisory group Advising System'') works in a more professionally formal way unlike the open

dialog process, with the direct funding and support of the interior ministry and ministry of

religious affairs as well. The KSA demonstrated their importance attached to the program by

appointing Prince Muhammed bin Nayef, the third-most noteworthy positioned authority in the

state, supervises the deradicalization programs. He has turn out to be devoted to battling

terrorism inside the Kingdom. According to Christopher Boucek’s17 had done an extensive

writing on what he describe as the deradicalization program focused around the concept and

vision of the Prince’s office, which is directly looking over the program named as Anticipation,

Recovery, and Aftercare (PRAC) programs. The main role/objective that has been expected

and performed by the Guiding System is to overall ensure that the deradicalization of the

detainees and beneficiaries takes place in the right direction as had been envisioned and that

the deradicalized individuals are reintegrate back into the society after a careful review of the

their past record, their record and progress at program and whether they have shun the extreme

radicalized ideology and have disengaged from their terrorists outfits before they can be sent

back to the society without fear of recidivism. Despite the fact that people who effectively did

a terrorist assault (i.e., the individuals who have ''blood staring them in the face'') are qualified

to take an interest in the project, they are not qualified for right on time discharge (in opposition

to a significant part of the famous editorial about this program). Boucek and Murphy depicted

four subcommittees that make up the advising system.18 “These subcommittees incorporate the

Religious Subcommittee, the Mental and Social Subcommittee, the Security Subcommittee,

and the Media Subcommittee. Each is accused of diverse parts of the directing procedure.19

The Religious Subcommittee is practically identical to the Yemeni RDC in that it is made out

of religious leaders/prayer leaders, different religious specialists, and college researchers

accused of connecting with the members in open exchange about their encounters and

17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/Derad.pdf
 27

translations of the Qu'ran and Islamic obligation. The Mental and Social Subcommittee is

contained clinicians and therapists who assess members for mental issues and gage member

consistence with the advising. Also, they find out members' necessities and family needs as a

consequence of the member's confinement. One of the foundations of the advising project is to

help reintegrate the member into society through ideological change, as well as regarding

viable logistic backing too.”

“The Security Subcommittee is in charge of checking project prisoners amid and after their

investment in a joint effort with the Religious and Mental Social Subcommittees, the Security

Subcommittee makes proposals on which detainees are sheltered to discharge. Besides, the

Security Subcommittee prompts program members about how to abstain from rehashing the

activities that got them into inconvenience”.20 Most of the guiding is performed by the

Religious Subcommittee. “Upon their initially meeting with members, members are informed

that they may participate in a recovery program and revoke the terrorist development of which

they are a section or acknowledgment in jail. On the off chance that members decide to

experience the recovery process, individuals from the Bulletin Board of trustees guarantee them

that they are not authorities from the Service of the Inside or security authorities; however are

autonomous researchers that wish to help them. Despite the fact that threatening vibe between

system members and guides was at first boundless, as the notoriety of the Bulletin Panel and

Saudi Arabia's projects turned out to be all the more surely understood, the enmity of members

toward instructors dispersed. Since members in the project are dealt with as casualties as

opposed to guilty parties, the Report Board's first request of business is to just listen to

members.21 Advisory group individuals offer organized reactions to members by clarifying

how their understanding of Islam is confused and in this manner start the procedure of showing

members the Saudi-affirmed elucidation of the Qu'ran. The other system is much the same as

20
Ibid.
21
Anthony Horowitz, ‘‘What’s the Best Way to Stop Terrorism? (a) Political Intervention, (b) Torture, (c) Pampering: The
Saudi Government Believes It’s Found the Answer.” The Sunday Telegraph, July 13, 2008, sec. 7, London edition.
 28

a six-week workshop in which two religious ministers and a social researcher work with up to

twenty members.22 Over the span of this six-week class, members are taught about pertinent

themes, for example, faithfulness, terrorism, and the state-authorized guidelines of jihad. At

the finish of the six-week course, members are given an exam and a mental assessment. In the

event that they pass both, they continue to the program's aftercare stage. A few sources reported

that the aftercare program itself is embodied different activities, each of which is intended to

meet a particular need. Members are taken to an outer recovery office the Consideration

Restoration Center (CRC) where prisoners appreciate a more casual setting. Prisoners have

admittance to outside air all the time; they live collectively with different detainees, play wears

on the office grounds, and take part in craftsmanship training.23 Because Saudi authorities

perceive that people get to be radicalized for distinctive arrangements of reasons, the CRC

treats people on an exceptionally individualized premise.” Case in point, prisoners at the middle

comprise of residential wrongdoers, warriors going to (or coming back from) Iraq and other

remote areas, and previous Guantanamo prisoners. Though local guilty parties and those

making a beeline for Iraq invest their energy in dialog with guides, the individuals who were

confined in Guantanamo are managed both this and exceptional guideline proposed to

reintegrate them into a Saudi Arabia that may have changed since they were imprisoned. In

aggregate, “the CRC exists presently expansion of the six-week advising project, yet members

are managed open doors that they would not generally get. Notwithstanding the mental and

social backing on offer, portray how graduates are served to secure business, transportation,

trusts, and a spot to live. Members' families are likewise selected as a hotspot for their

recuperation and are utilized as a part of two ways: (a) the Service of the Inside offers social

bolster projects to members' families and outings to visit prisoners and (b) families are

considered monetarily and socially dependable if a member falls again into terrorism. The

Saudi project is maybe most openly connected with deradicalization endeavors in no little part

22
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/Derad.pdf
23
Ibid.
 29

because of exceedingly plugged cases of accomplishment and also broad media consideration

paid to the substance of the aftercare stage. Saudi authorities have said that members are

effectively restored 80–90% of the time.24 The individuals, who don't effectively restore, it is

contended; either decided to do without the recovery project or successfully hoodwink the

system (e.g., were screened out for untrustworthiness). Of the more or less 3,000 people to take

an interest in distinctive segments of the advising system, it was asserted in 2008 that 1,400

have surrendered their terrorist convictions and were consequently discharged, while another

1,000 stay in the project. Ruler asserted that less than 35 people fell into recidivism, making

for a rate of fewer than 3 percent. Precise figures date from November 2007, so the

advancement of the system keeps on being firmly viewed, especially to distinguish samples of

recidivism. It shows up, from preparatory study, that the Guantanamo returnees have higher

backslide and re-capture rates than others. In totality the KSA project has given promising hints

and a hint of something better over the horizon for handling the danger of Terrorists.”25

Indonesia’s Disengagement Program

Indonesia over the period of time had seen extremism and radicalism surging in its

society, it employed various aspects of its comprehensive strategy to fight the terrorism

emanating from radicalism ranging from hard core military counter terrorism operations to

employing more soft approaches of deradicalization, it has unobtrusively advanced a specially

appointed, police-centred withdrawal activity because of proceeded with terrorist action inside

and around the state. The famous person to become the poster boy for the deradicalization

became Ibne Abbass who had been an active leader of the extremist outfit and radical group

Jemah Islamiyah (JI). Ibne Abbas has been the one who not only stood against the wrong

ideology of the radicalized groups but also stood against the famous terrorist Abu Bakr Bashir

24
Ibid.
25
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/Derad.pdf
 30

and all those who were faithful to Bashir.26 He remained a figure of hatred toward the JI leaders

and their followers because of his open rebuttal of their radical ideology. He has been credited

with changing the mindset of radical Jihadists to the true learning and knowledge of Islam.

The BBC’s Peter Taylor27 has also supported the above mentioned views and the effectiveness

of Ibne Abbass’s influence on the radical minds during the deradicalization program in turning

the extremist mindset people back to normal thinking by dispelling the wrong concepts held

by the ex members of terrorists organizations and groups. Moreover, it created the impression

that Bin Abbas helped Indonesian police compels in their looks for his previous companions,

notwithstanding going with police on assaults and being available in transactions to offer a

consoling face to his previous friends who may be examining admission. Regardless of the

customary risk of brutality from JI, even at this very moment 1995, and acknowledgment of

the advantage offered by chatting with caught individuals from JI (as episodic confirmation

from Ibne Abbas and the police—essentially Separation 88 (Indonesia's counter-terrorism

unit)— would propose), Indonesia has not looked to asset or standardize its endeavors. This is

likewise regardless of the late improvement of exceptionally pitched comparable projects in

close-by Malaysia and Singapore.28

Another prominent/famous figure is Ali Imron, detained as far as concerns him in the 2002

Bali shelling. Saved capital punishment for communicating regret for his part in the assault,

Imron furnished police with broad logistic and strategic data about JI.29 In a 2007 meeting with

the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Imron uncovered the degree to which he

collaborated with authorities, guaranteeing he ''know[s] how they will attempt to get their

weapons and explosives . . . what sort of spot they will focus for what sort of activity and I

26
Nasir bin Abbas, Interview by Peter Cave, AM Show, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, March 10, 2006.
http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2006/s1588419.htm
27
Peter Taylor,‘‘The Jihadi who Turned ‘Supergrass’.’’ BBC Online, September 13,2006.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/5334594.stm
28
Zachary Abuza, ‘‘The Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in South East Asia: A Preliminary Assessment.’’ in “Leaving
Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement”,ed. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, (New York: Routledge, 2009): 193–211.
29
Di Martin. “Bali Bomber Now Campaigns to Stop Terrorism.” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, Sept. 20, 2007.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/09/20/2039099.htm
 31

know how they would complete that.'' Imron likewise guaranteed to be mindful of ''how the

terrorists enlist new individuals and who is most defenseless against the radical message.'' To

counter JI's ""message,"" Imron composed a book, delivered tape tapes, and freely depicted

how he would enlighten family and companions concerning the ""oversights"" he made.

Likewise, and inside of the limitations his confinement30, Imron has worked firmly, much the

same as Bin Abbas, with Separation 88 to ''deprogram other imprisoned terrorists.'' Select

Separation 88 staff, while working predominantly in their part as a tip top counter-terrorism

unit inside of the Indonesian National Police, have likewise been included in the endeavored

de-radicalization of those it catches.31 JI master Zachary Abuza ascribed quite a bit of

Separation 88's prosperity to the religiosity of its administration. Brigadier General Surya

Dharma has sorted out petition to God sessions among caught JI individuals. Such shows of

adherence to Islam and common appreciation have astounded a few detainees—presently the

operations of Ali Imron and his work with the unit, Indonesian authorities accept that the

achievement of their project is vigorously dependent upon the association of previous JI staff.32

Notwithstanding helping police examinations, Ibne Abbas was included in the ''re-

instruction'' of captured JI agents. In a meeting with Tony Jones (ABC), Australian

Government Police Chief (AFP) Mick Keelty asserted that Receptacle Abbas' previous position

in JI (operational officer of JI's Mantiqi and director of the Hudaibiyah preparing office) yields

regard from those that have been caught. Keelty argues that such respect can be harnessed to

‘‘convert the others.’’ These cases seem established. While giving affirmation against one of

the draftsmen of the second Bali shelling, the litigant grinned and shook the hand of Ibne Abbas

as an indication of appreciation. It was affirmed that once JI individuals are captured, Ibne

Abbas holds chats with them. Strangely, he can even spend up to a week with caught

individuals before Indonesian police get critical access to them. Amid that time, Ibne Abbas

30
‘‘Another Success for Detachment 88,’’ Asia Times Online, June 16,2007.
31
Robert Karniol, ‘‘De-radicalisation Strategies Worldwide,’’ The Straits Times,March 31, 2008.
32
Mick Keelty, interview by Tony Jones, Lateline, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, March 8, 2006.
http://www.abc.net.au/reslib/200603/r75311_212476.asx
 32

difficulties prisoners' Islamic avocations for furnished activity against regular people, and tries

to get prisoners to chip in with police examinations.33

The powers recognize the significance of modifying both mentality and conduct through

detainee engagement. In spite of the fact that examinations with Ibne Abbas and disclosures of

good treatment from police can demonstrate supportive in changing the conviction structures

of caught JI individuals (Bin Abbas himself recalled his disorientation at not being tortured by

the authorities upon arrest), Indonesian authorities have given logistic and money related

backing to detainees in return for participation. Habitually, travel costs are secured for the

families trying to visit detained friends and family and they are furnished with facilities upon

landing. This is notwithstanding livens for prisoners, for example, access to separation

instruction. The Indonesian withdrawal activity resists straightforward portrayal. It is maybe

best considered a freely sew exhibit of distinctive delicate line approaches, the different

components of which are significant and powerful at specific stages and for specific

individuals. Abuza depicts the project at this very moment, ''and not unpleasantly

standardized’’.34

By late 2007, more than 300 people were in Indonesian detainment facilities for terrorism

related exercises. Albeit clashing reports exist on the quantity of prisoners that experienced

"treatment," it appears that the quantity of prisoners that will fully decided to participate in the

process was low. Abuza noticed that there is really no confirmation to recommend that the

individuals who have been discharged because of sentence reductions or acquittals were truly

presented to any sort of de-radicalization endeavors of the Indonesian government. Further, it

was guaranteed that the choice to deny fanatic perspectives is generally an after-effect of money

related motivation instead of de-radicalized demeanour or insights, proposing that the greater

part of those that do leave jail do as such with their radical perspectives in place. Yet, authorities

33
John Horgan a & Kurt Braddock, “Terrorism and Political Violence”, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Pennsylvania State
University , University Park, Pennsylvania, 09 Mar 2010.
34
Laurel Teo, ‘‘Winning Hearts, Minds Next Step in Combating Terror: Governments Agree to Promote dialogues within and across
Different Religions,’’ The Business Times Singapore, March 7, 2007, Indonesia section.
 33

keep on stating achievement. In his discussion with Southeast Asian security personnel,

Oorthijam35 reported that just a few of the 458 captured on terrorism charges in Southeast Asia

swung back to terrorism. Whatever figures are discharged, it stays misty what Indonesian

authorities mean by recidivism and the absence of straightforwardness encompassing authority

measurements all the more by and large raise doubt about this.

The Indonesian activity stays one of a kind in its usage of ex-terrorists right now the withdrawal

procedure. This manages authorities a level of understanding they would presumably not have

possessed the capacity to develop something else. Further, because of the validity and

appreciation ordered by Imron and Bin Abbas, they have been in a deliberately successful

position to urge prisoners to completely separate. It is likely erroneous and absolutely untimely

to consider this genuine ''deradicalization.'' In the previous two years, nonetheless,

infrastructural issues with the jail framework have restricted the size of these inventive

endeavors, while all the more damagingly, short jail terms and abatements discredit the impetus

to share in a restoration program that remunerates prisoners with shorter sentences.

Yemen Deradicalization Program

The history of people following radical Islamic thoughts in Yemen, Islamist violent radicalism

is the eventual outcome of a lengthy and bewildered history spanning over centuries due to a

mix of complexities comprising internal and external factors and actors.36 A far reaching

number of Yemeni nationals shared the experience of joining in the Holy War against the

USSR's control of Afghan territories in the midst of the late 1970s and 80s. Around the end of

that Jihad in Afghanistan, the Yemeni government asked its citizens fighting in Afghanistan to

leave it and come back and live in Yemen once again. Quite a long while later, in any case, an

age group split which emerged after different radical movement saw the emergence of groups

35
Santha Oorjitham, ‘‘Persuading Terrorists to ‘disengage’,’’ New Straits Times, October 5, 2008, Local section, Malaysia edition.
36
Eric Watkins, “Landscape of Shifting Alliances,” Terrorism Monitor, 2, No. 7, April 8, 2004.
36
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous,” Weekend Edition,
August 21–22, 1993, p. 3.
 34

of more energetic youths extremist in thoughts and action; not captivated by orchestrating with

what they viewed presently and renegade government.37 A few jail getaways of experienced

and unsafe agents further stimulated this more youthful group, which propelled another battle

of brutal assaults against oil offices, outside inhabitants and travellers, and government security

targets.38

Decades followed and the pattern of radicalization and the behaviour changed dramatically,

be that as it may, a change in the new younger radicals/extremists and the earlier ones saw the

development of a gathering of more youthful radicals not inspired by arranging with what they

viewed as an illegal, un-Islamic and backslider rulers. A few jailbreaks of old/experienced and

lethal extremists further empowered this more youthful group, which propelled another battle

of brutal assaults against petroleum offices, wells etc, inhabitants of foreign descendants and

voyagers, and state's security apparatus.39

Methodology

The 9/11 attacks brought changes not only in the entire world but also to the areas such as

Yemen. Yemen's state security forces captured a large figure of radical Islamist fighters who

had direct linkages or actively participated in the violent form of terrorism. The radical inmates

comprised people blamed for associations with the shelling of the USS Cole and different

assaults.40 Additionally kept were people who had set out to terrorist hotbeds like Af-Pak

ungoverned areas. As weight became inside Yemen to finish confinement, President Ali

Abdullah Saleh attempted to a way to deal with the release of those individuals, few of them

had not really moved against their native land's rules and laws. Subsequently, the state's

security and LEAs moved toward the initiation of its deradicalization program through

37
Michael Knights, “Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism in Yemen,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2006; “Arab Veterans
of Afghanistan War Lead New Islamic Holy War,” Compass, October 28, 1994; and Watkins, 2004.
38
Gregory Johnsen, “Yemen Faces Second Generation of Islamist Militants,” Terrorism Focus, 4, No. 27, August 14, 2007.
39
Ibid.
40
Shazadi Beg,Christopher Boucek, and John Horgan, “Opening Up the Jihadi Debate: Yemen’s Committee for Dialogue,” in Tore Bjørgo
and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, New York: Routledge, 2008.
 35

dialogue program. The undertaking was to search for sureties that detainees would not take

part in violence inside Yemen consequently for being released from prison and reintegrated

back into the society. At the start of the 6th yearly gathering meeting of Yemen's decision

General Individuals' Congress on August 24, 2002. A few days after the fact, Saleh gathered a

one to one briefing/presentation of experience religious scholars, ullemaa to look at the

establishment of the deradicalization program aiming at deradicalizing and reintegrating the

radicals caught through dialog program. Amid that session, the Panel for Religious Dialog41

was formally given the go ahead to be instituted toward achieving the aim of deradicalizing the

violent extremists and fighters and its objectives were framed to be achieved at the end of that

program. The eminent assembly of Ullemaa had couples of brainstorming sessions to select the

right kind of people from the advisory group. As per previous Preeminent Court Equity

Hamoud al-Hitar, various the ullemaa communicated anxiety at the thought of taking part in

dialog with fanatics for a few reasons, including worries about individual security and

apprehensions of being blamed for being devices of the administration. Eventually, the main

researcher who consented to cooperate along with the detainees had been Aal-Hittaar; almost

a dozen of the religious scholars of Islam refused to have an enthusiasm for the program.

Although the Advisory group for Religious Dialog was built up under the protection of the

Yemeni state, it was not really regulated, but instead depended totally on Aal-Hittaar in

September 2002, the leading group of trustees, that embodied Aal-Hittaar and 3 distinguished

scholars, had a one on one briefing with the detainees who were to be deradicalized through

the program.42

The judge recognized, notwithstanding, that once the project began, a percentage of the

members were, indeed, people who had slaughtered individuals in different terrorist assaults.

These people were perceived as having a more intense requirement for recovery to keep them

41
“ Head of Yemeni Dialogue Committee Interviewed on Work with Afghanistan Returnees,” Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), March 4, 2004.
42
Hamoud Abdulhameed Al-Hitar, Dialogue and Its Effects on Countering Terrorism: The Yemeni Experience, p. 16.
 36

from coming back to savagery. Hence, it was chosen that those declared guilty homicide would

be obliged to finish their sentence preceding discharge.43

Release of Detainees

A total of 364 prisoners were discharged through the system in the wake of finishing the dialog

procedure, drawn from a mixed bag of foundations and speaking to various associations.

Members went in age from 18 to 40 years of age. As indicated by the Yemeni government,

pretty nearly 90 percent of the individuals who participated in the system were conceived

outside of Yemen to Yemeni people.44 The outside factor in the radicalization was observed to

be the main cause of radicalization especially the young generation, that too in the expatriate

majority of whom had some connection to Saudi Arabia, having pointed out that still in

different nations also, and a significant number of the prisoners had invested energy in

Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Upon discharge from guardianship, members in the project were observed by the powers,

ordinarily for a trial time of one year. Allegedly, this observing was regulated by an exceptional

board of trustees inside of the National Security Department. As per Outside Clergyman Abou-

baqer aal-Kirbii, the state insight as well as LEAs members were accused of directing

discharged prisoners, and various those discharged by the venture were provided and offered

positions with the armed forces in order to better watch and surveil the detainees so that the

transformation of those to be deradicalized could be done in easier and authentic/credible way.

Aal Hiitatar communicated that a segment of the released detainees chatted with others after

their discharge to influence them to revoke terrorism, violent extremism and ruthlessness. The

same was represented by the country's media that one past detainee passed vital intelligence /

information to the LEAs and the program's security establishment that led to the exposure of

huge arms, explosives, ammunition stashed at different locations by the terrorist outfits. Certain

released detainees have obviously given rare insight into the working and organizational

43
Ibid.
44
Peter Willems, “Unusual Tactics,” Middle East, October 2004, p. 66.
 37

intelligence and information which was never given before to the security organizations, due

to that information and in depth knowledge, in this manner, resulted into the very important tip

off that materialized in the apprehensions of various most wanted terrorists, for instance,

Muhammad Haammadii, responsible for the plotting and targeting USS Cole attack.

Evaluation

Information regarding the evaluation of the Yemeni Board for Dialogue is not available to the

tune it should have been for researchers to give a clear verdict of the program. The unlucky

deficiency of solid information about how the system functioned confuses evaluations and

assessments.45 In knowledge of the past, it now gives the idea that Yemen's fleeting restoration

system was unsuccessful, if achievement is characterized at this very moment perspective. A

few onlookers have proposed that the dialog sessions were intended for securing the prisoners'

passive consent on a few key focuses; including perceiving the authenticity of the Yemeni

government and getting certifications from project members that they would not take part in

savagery inside Yemen. For instance, subsequent to taking part in the rebuilding, rehabilitation

and re-integrating program of the overall deradicalization strategy / program and were released,

Nasseir aal-Baahhrii, OBL's past bodyguard, rebuked the program for being a demonstration

and ensured that no long or complicated discussions in the program of deradicalization or trade

of perspectives occurred.

The failure of the Yemeni government to give satisfactory post discharge consideration

was vital for the deradicalization process to fail. It has been also stated that with the passage of

time the changing way of the prisoner populace additionally assumed a huge part. Early

program members were more seasoned era Islamic activists. As per Yemeni authorities, these

men could be arranged with and comprehended progressions, situated to some degree all alone

encounters in activist associations. Yemeni authorities have recommended that, right now

process went on, more youthful people—radicalized in an alternate connection— had shown

45
Quoted in Tim Whewell, “Yemeni Anti-Terror Scheme in Doubt,” BBC News, October 11, 2005.
 38

signs of lesser preparedness to orchestrate with the lawmaking body. Inside and out, close to

400 people had been released after going through the deradicalization program; there have been

reiterated reports that some have moved up again to folds of violence and extremist mindset

and had been reported to joined other Jihadists groups in trouble spots like Iraq, Syria and

Afghanistan and had been involved in attacks inside their own country. The biggest flaw in the

program has been attributed to the sole focus on terrorists acting inside Yemen and didn't give

attention to the fighters committing violence outside Yemen.46 For example, Aal Hiittaar

mentioned it to a newspaper columnist about the deradicalization program that "resistance in

Iraq is genuine, however we can't separate in the middle of terrorism and resistance in Iraq's

circumstance on the grounds that things are not clear for this situation.”

Analyzing and moving ahead, it will be fascinating to perceive how the country's

arrangements come to bear fruits as it endeavors to again continue its stopped deradicalization

program through dialog process to manage future returnees coming from prison US custody in

Gitmo. It creates the impression that the U.S. government's absence of trust in Yemen's

capacity to satisfactorily watch previous prisoners has brought about not very many Yemeni

nationals being discharged from Gitmo after they couldn't be put through justice system of

USA. To secure the arrival of its remaining nationals, Yemen has expressed that it will restart

the Committee for Dialog. The Yemeni government has purportedly recognized the area of the

proposed office at a Yemeni army installation only outside of Sana'a. While an area may have

been found, there has been no substantive chip away at the stray pieces of the system.

Moreover, there has been no work to focus the educational program of the arranged focus, to

recognize the educators and laborers, or to add to a procedure to gauge the accomplishment of

the arrangement in deradicalizing and re-integrating terrorists.

Sri Lanka’s Deradicalization Model & Program

46
“Yemen’s Passive Role in the War on Terrorism,” Terrorism Monitor, 4, No. 4, February 23, 2006.
 39

The island of Sri Lanka has seen violence for several decades resulting in deaths of

thousands of people and destruction of infrastructure. The society after the complete

destruction of LTTE was ready for the rehabilitation phase of the militants. It has embraced the

therapeutic equity display instead of embracing the excellent retributive equity demonstrate

(The retributive equity model includes discipline by sentencing. The remedial equity model

advances apology and change). The then Attorney General (AG) Mohhan Peiirriss created the

legitimate structure for restoration. Sri Lanka is multi-ethnic and multi cultural society with its

root in the non violence and harmony with other groups living one next to the other for a

considerable length of time. Sri Lanka is a diverse country with multiple ethnic identities and

religion.47 The militants and terrorists hailing from the ethnic minority group of LTTE threw

way people who were not from their ethnicities i.e Sinnhaalese and Musalmaans tenants, who

lived in their dominated areas and were forcibly, removed those who decided against moving

out. The expulsion of Muslim inhabitants was carried out by the LTTE in the northern

territories in 1990 and the eastern areas in 1992). Sri Lanka had a background marked by

restoring brutal young men and women at the end of revolts in the southern portion of the

country in 1970s and late1980s. Its first direct and meaningful exposure was in deradicalization

and re-integration efforts once the LEAs and armed forces decimated the People groups

Freedom Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna- JVP).48 In spite of the fact that the projects were

not at this very moment the contemporary project, there was not really any recidivism among

the members. After a time of imprisonment, the state did not contradict and now and again

encouraged a portion of the main stake holders of JVP to shun violence in the favour of political

reconciliation and joining mainstream politics. This was followed up the more important step

in the right direction by the establishment of Department of the Official General of Restoration

(BCGR) at this very moment state power in charge of the recovery, deradicalization program

aimed at finally reintegrating the extremist and radicalized portion of the society. It was

47
Bandarage, A., “Sri Lanka Towards Peace: An Alternative Perspective,” India Quarterly, 68, no. 2, 2012, 103-118.
48
Ibid.
 40

deliberated upon well on how to address the issue of deradicalization and the central goal was

the establishment in Thelippalai on 1 May 1998 and which was tasked to analyze the whole

program and the results/goals it had achieved. With the passage of time, the deradicalization

program remained in place even when the active operations didn’t achieved the final victory

against LTTE in Pallekelle in 2007, with the overall supervision and governance of Mr

Sohaadaa Gaammalaath. After the review of conditions prevailing in the detention centre

exclusively for the beneficiaries of deradicalization program in Pallekelle, as not conducive for

the sensitive process of deradicalization, which led to the opening of new venue and location

for the program. Right now expanded to oblige the swelling number of prisoners, a few focuses

were situated up in the Weliikaanda and Vaavuniyyaa areas.49 The new department established

was named as Defensive Convenience and Recovery Focuses (PARCs), pleasing almost 11,500

prisoners that either surrendered or were distinguished while taking on the appearance of Inside

Dislodged Persons [IDPs] toward the end of the contention.

More or less 254 staff50 meets expectations inside of the recovery focuses, taking care

of the welfare prerequisites of the recipients and in addition encouraging the restoration

programs. The state did everything possible to make this program success and didn’t let the

finances to drag the program and had spent almost 15 billion rupees till 2014, to deal with the

recovery focuses.51 The figure spent yearly vacillated taking into account the quantity of

recipients inside of the focuses. This figure does exclude the expenses acquired by authorities,

well-wishers, Philanthropies, NGOs, INGOs, Government foundations, and Services in

directing the few projects inside of the focuses. Recovery from militant mindset was focused

with a perspective to deradicalize and reintegrate the previous LTTE from groups to single

individuals. Recipients inside the deradicalization program were exposed to different array of

deradicalizing techniques ranging from psychological to discussions around belief system. The

49
Ibid.
50
Ibid
51
According to the BCGR statistics, Sri Lanka’s deradicalization has cost around $105 Million till end of 2013.
 41

aim was to expose the beneficiaries to shun the militant mindset and to move way from

extreme/radicalized belief system focused on other ethnicities and religion. The recruitment

process was reversed through psychological counselling to discover new significance and the

meaning of their individual /collective lives. The aim52 of the program was certainly to instil

the different levels and perspectives of conflict resolution and peace building to overcome the

past and move towards a brighter future and conjunction supplanting detest, outrage, and the

mono-ethnic single account. Most of the recipients were reintegrated inside of the commanded

24-month period and at this very moment 2012 roughly 11,044 recipients were reintegrated.53

An aggregate of 594 kid recipients were reintegrated after their participation in the

deradicalization program. The BCGR had a gigantic task of ensuring the deradicalization of

the terrorists, militants and extremists to undergo the program, review their progress and their

reintegration back in to the society. Up till Feb 2014, the BCGR stays in charge of the

restoration of pretty nearly 160 recipients distributed through Courts.54

Effectiveness of Deradicalization Program. Four mainstays of appraisal

served to get an expansive comprehension of the person. In the first place of the program, the

program monitors had interviews with the detainees/surrendered, second part was pertaining

to the assessing/analyzing of the detainee’s record of their past, third one was the

perceptions/views/belief as observed by the staff/people associated with the deradicalization

program and fourth, the final formal evaluation of the entire stay of the detainees, their past

and their monitoring reports by the staff and all the psychological tools available to finally

arrive at the conclusion of whether to reintegrate the individual back to the society or otherwise.

In this system for evaluation guarantees a far reaching procedure to overcome trickiness.

Appraisal ought to be a progressing procedure to catch recipient mentality and feelings as they

52 LTTE propagated an agenda that revolved round the Tamil community and it was against the other ethnicities, contradicting the
requirement of a multi ethnic, multi cultural and multi religious society.
53 Bureau for the Commissioner General for Rehabilitation, November 2012.
54
Ibid.
 42

have a tendency to have a change of heart and mind at any point in time. There were few short

comings in how the data was collected and collated regarding the detainees undergoing the

deradicalization program, however, notwithstanding, with more prominent trust in the process

the recipients gave more exact and itemized data. Accordingly, the timing of evaluation and

progressing appraisal was a critical piece of the system. The notoriety of very much oversaw

recovery focuses had a huge effect on the way terrorist/militants/sympathisers/extremists

because of their choices whether to leave the fighting and join the deradicalization program or

continue fighting, the onus of making a rationale decisions toward re-integration into the

society and living the normal life was with them. The treatment meted out to the ones who

underwent these programs had a profound impact on their others members of LTTE who were

in the process of making that crucial decision of joining the program. 55 These detainees who

chose to be the beneficiaries of the program had then moved on to encouraged the members of

their outfits of terrors to renounce violence/terrorism and embrace the

deradicalization/rehabilitation program to transform themselves and be integrated into the

society, completing their rehabilitation.

Deradicalization: Working it out with Beneficiaries. Deradicalization

programs can not yield the best outcome till the time engagement with the Beneficiaries is of

optimum level. It is the best approach to understanding, comprehending and digging deep into

someone's mindset towards a particular issue, belief or a concept, which holds good for the

terrorists/extremists having radical ideas and belief. Mental process including the thought

process/illustrations is slippery. the thinking and its processes could be seen and observed

through various methods involving different mediums and areas/discipline of studies but

cautioned must be exercised while evaluating such intangibles attributes and there is a

requirement to observe perspectives, for example, trickiness and social allure.56 The

55
Interview with a beneficiary, January 1, 2010 by Malkanthi Hettiarachchi for article for PRISM of NDU, Sri Lanka .
56
Interview with Sri Lankan officer attending NSWC at NDU, Islamabad on 2 June 2014.
 43

notoriousness of the Tamil terrorists being ruthless towards other ethnicities was quite known

and leaving the organization was unthinkable. Even before the complete destruction of the

LTTE, the LEAs along with experts were able to convince the members of the LTTE to enter

into the deradicalization programs. The case in point is the similar examples of detainees

undergoing the deradicalization program can be seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the results

showed that ex members of terrorists/militants outfits of who joined the deradicalization

program with the US military and other different programs run and funded by organizations,

have shown their negative results towards deradicalizing them and achieving the goals sets for

them. Above however, cannot be said in the case of deradicalization program in the Sri Lankan,

at the moment as the program is still going and conclusive evidence regarding the exact

effective is yet far away, but still the results as claimed by the Sri Lanka are quite impressive

to suggest encouraging signs of deradicalizing of militants/terrorists who underwent the

program. Extra time, recipients comprehended the restoration process. They turned out to be

not so much restless but rather more sure about the procedure. Presently pondered their past,

they dismisses brutality and grasped peace. They will fully gave more exact and point by point

data.

These progressions happened inside of the PARC climate that was casual with no

trepidation of response. These exposures were taken presently the recuperating procedure. Be

that as it may, those beneficiaries who tried to hoodwink the system by initially agreeing to the

deradicalization program but tried to hide information and knowledge were put through

different tests to come up with the truth that haunted them.57 Those beneficiaries who tried to

withhold the information were later to be found to the fear of execution for the crimes they had

committed in the past.58

Along these lines it is indispensable that the staff connecting with the recipient inside of

recovery don't work in an investigative limit. It was important to keep the examination and

57
Ibid.
58
Interviews with rehabilitation officials, May 15, 2010 by Malkanthi Hettiarachchi for article for PRISM of NDU, Sri Lanka.
 44

restoring procedures separate to guarantee compelling engagement. Administration work force

who connected with recipients inside of recovery concentrated on their welfare and on

supporting the administration suppliers to convey powerful projects. The military that was in

charge of the security of the edge did not interface with the recipients, and kept up the security

of the premises. Officers in control had an unmistakable comprehension of what was needed

at every level.59

Successful engagement obliged staff preparing, direction and order. Albeit some staff were

actually arranged towards engagement and did not oblige preparing, staff direction and order

was viewed as a basic.

Conclusion of Deradicalization Programs

Disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) has been, viewed as a critical

stage in the move from clash to peace, since the 1990s. One of the pre-essentials for post-clash

security is the deradicalization and reintegration procedure of previous soldiers. Reintegration

is a to some degree general term that is for the most part connected with recovery. In the

connection of national and worldwide security, the expressions "deradicalization &

reintegration" ordinarily alludes to the procedure by which governments arrange and

coordinate endeavors to kill agitators, and slowly actualize a progression of endeavors and

projects to help them in their move from insurrection to non military personnel life while

minimizing recidivism. Deradicalization is the procedure of changing a singular's conviction

framework. There can be withdrawal without radicalization however not deradicalization

without separation.

A man could leave a radical association and avoid viciousness however by the by hold

a radical perspective. Deradicalization, actually, may be especially troublesome for Islamist

fanatics in light of the fact that they are propelled by a belief system that is established in a

59
Ibid.
 45

noteworthy world religion. The necessities of the philosophy are viewed right now. By the by,

deradicalization may be important to for all time defuse the danger postured by these people.

On the off chance that an aggressor separates singularly for instrumental reasons, when the

circumstances change, the activist may at the end of the day rise up.

As this research has documented, the illustrations of deradicalization projects in Saudi

Arabia, Indonesia, and Yemen have given counter-uprising partners with samples of both

triumphs and disappointments in the worldwide push to change activists into gainful regular

people. From one viewpoint, Saudi Arabia had the capacity give the world an illustration of a

generally fruitful deradicalization process. Alternately, the illustrations of Yemen remind

counter-rebellion spectators and partners how difficult the procedure of deradicalization can

be; authorities in these social orders have not been presently persuading activists to surrender

their arms. Deradicalization projects can possibly be of huge advantage to governments around

the world. For sure, fruitful projects can urge previously unsafe people to stay far from

terrorism and radical associations; permit withdrew people to yield important knowledge and

proof against dynamic terrorist bunches. Besides, the projects permit people who have

abandoned brutal fanaticism to separate themselves freely from such causes (subsequently

decreasing backing for and believability of gatherings) and to meet casualties of roughness,

and even request absolution. Also, given that deradicalization projects are generally less

expensive than different ways to deal with counterterrorism, such procedures are developing

in ubiquity. One sample is of the US's assessed use in the "war on fear": $150 billion for each

year; in correlation, the Saudi deradicalization project costs just $12 million for every year.

While the last is utilized as a part of pair with a hard way to deal with counter terrorism and

such correlations are risky for different reasons, members appeared to concur that

deradicalization speaks to a more practical way to deal with counter terrorism.

Deradicalization programs have amply proved the fact that deradicalization of

extremists, terrorists is possible and their rehabilitations can be done through a well
 46

chalked out programs based on sound Models catering for countering all aspects of

radicalization.

‘Deradicalization models/programs round the globe have proved their efficacy as a cost

effective way in changing the views / life of those involved in extremism, violence and

terrorism.’
 47

SWAT DERADICALIZATION MODEL (SDM)

Swat remained hub of terrorists’ activities during most part of the last decade. Radical

thoughts and extremism prevailed in the area, which remained the major cause of locals joining

hands with the terrorists. Military operations were successful in evicting Terrorists hold in

Swat. The operations resulted into apprehension of number of individuals with varying nature

of involvement in terrorists’ activities. Religion may be a motivating factors but not the primary

one for the individual to join terrorism. However, other contributing factors were ignorance,

poverty, illiteracy and social compulsions of the people is Swat.

Deradicalization, as a program, has picked up prominence and importance in various

parts of the world including developed, developing and underdeveloped countries. There is a

developing agreement in countries around the globe that the national security and its aspects

related to human security are best achieved by de-indoctrinating, re-incorporating and

reintegrating the radicalized part of the society back into the general public. Radicalism is a

socio-psychological procedure of one’s commitment/duty to radical patterns, ideologies which

might be encompassing aspect related to religious, psychological/mental or political.

Radicalism is, in this manner, a dangerous cancer that can change an individual, group or a

society into savagery and push social orders into anarchic situation.

Pakistan Army with the collaboration of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government arranged a

three day seminar on deradicalization in July 2011, in which scholars from across the country

participated. People from every walk of life were also invited to step fwd and suggest solutions

for maintaining peace in the region and to avoid radical trends in any form. The seminar also

focused on controlling and elimination of actual causes of terrorism from the society. An

effective De-radicalization and Emancipation Program was conceptualized and adopted and

relevant aspects discussed during the seminar were appropriately incorporated in devising the

Swat Deradicalization Model (SDM) and its relevant deradicalization program.

 48

Some of the deradicalization studies carried out by the Government of Pakistan and Pakistan
Army along with highly qualified Psychologist and scholars are appended below and their
comparisons with different Deradicalization Models and consequences for Pakistan are as
following:-

Different deradicalization approaches adopted by countries while focusing on different

objectives and causes of radicalization

Deradicalization Programs: Models in Muslim Countries

 49

Deradicalization Models Developed by Non-Muslim Countries

Deradicalization exertion was an aftereffect of the interest shown by the Pakistan Military

and asserted by prominent scholars like Dr Muhammed Farooq and NGOs soon after the

successful completion of military operations against Tehreek i Taliban Pakistan (Swat chapter)

- TTP(S). Hundreds of terrorists nabbed during military operation were detained and it was

decided to segregate through a very refined process, all those fit for deradicalization process

and reintegrated back into the society, the deradicalization model was programmed around 4

basis/pillars:-

 “Deradicalization of juveniles.

 Deradicalization of selected "reconcilable" detainees.

 Deradicalization of families of selected detainees to which they would fall back

on release.

 Deradicalization of certain villages in general, from which the bulk of militants

had originated”.60

Swat Deradicalization Model’s program was set off with the help of Government of Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa and certain NGOs, in specifically formed infrastructure and programs to meet

the special requirement of deradicalization. While addressing the seminar on deradicalization

60
COAS General Ashfaque Kayani key note address in National Seminar on Deradicalization at Mingora Swat On 6 July 2011
(https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2011/7/6 accessed on 6 Jul 2015).
 50

at Mingora Swat, COAS Pakistan Army General Ashfaque Kayani said, “It will be prudent for

all elements of National power and the National to take a holistic view of, National Security,

within the purview of 'State as well as Human Security' in modern times, no single organ of

the State, is configured to mount a wholesome response to the challenges confronting National

Security. All instruments of state and society have a role to play. Deradicalization is an

important contributor towards achieving human security. Such efforts are to be expressed

through attempts to change behaviours, primarily by rehabilitating through deradicalization.

The effort, therefore, has a larger context and merits time resources and commitment. To

sustain these undertakings, the State and the society, have to provide enabling ideological,

political and socio-economic safeguards integrated into a well thought-out, encompassing

National policy with the ultimate goal of achieving counter-radicalization of the society at large

in the long term. Pakistan Army being a National Army derives its strength from the people of

Pakistan and is answerable to the people and their representatives in the Parliament.

Accordingly, Pakistan Army considers peoples' support vital for its operations against

terrorists, and believes that only the people of Pakistan can determine the National interest and

Army's role in their achievement. Army is following a well thought out campaign plan, which

is succeeding and providing space to other organs of State which must expeditiously build on

military success to achieve during peace and stability.”61

“Restoration of Self Respect, Removal of Psychological Burden Caused by Ideological

Exploitation and Understanding True Perspective of Life & Islam.”62

Foundation of Swat deradicalization program and its process rests upon removal of negative

religious perceptions of the ‘detainees’ in light of core principles of Islam and inscriptions from

Holy Quran and Hadith. Deradicalization programme has been conceptualized to assist

beneficiaries in realization of a healthy life perspective in light of religious and social

61
COAS General Ashfaque Kayani key note address in National Seminar on Deradicalization at Mingora Swat On 7 July 2011
(https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2011/7/6 accessed on 18 Jul 2015).
62
The Concept of SDM presented to PM Nawaz Shareef on 15 Jan 2014 on his visit to Sabaoon Deradicalization Centre.
 51

obligations. Countering radical Islamist ideology is the hallmark of de-radicalisation process.

Religious discourse, lectures and discussions aimed at developing a better and deeper

understanding of Islam must be conducted by credible and inspiring personalities.

Deradicalization strategy must employ such interlocutors whom the beneficiaries view

as credible. Beneficiaries of de-radicalization process must benefit from a continuous economic

and psycho-social support. Deradicalization programmes must help ex-militants and their

families in providing alternative means of income, housing, health care and education. Pakistan

Army launched an initiative in shape of De-radicalization and Emancipation Program (DRAP)

which along with different other program known to be as Swat Deradicalization Model (SDM),

for rehabilitation of number of detainees, who were held in the custody. Through SDM, the

target categories included: -

 Detainees and their families.

 Terrorists at large and their families (potentially to be surrendered /

apprehended).

 Specific villages from where terrorists originated.

The programme had an inbuilt mechanism to monitor and support rehabilitated individuals

after their release and integration into their respective communities. To ensure strategic victory

in combating terrorism and terrorists’ outfits, deradicalization program was deemed an

important corner stone and found imperative in achieving long-term peace and stability in the

area (which is not possible with stand alone application of military power/aspect/prong only).

Program was aimed at contributing in stabilizing society through deradicalizing society’s

radicalized elements, hence creating environment conducive for sustained peace and stability.

Deradicalization Program was basically perceived to assist ‘Beneficiaries’ (selected

apprehended terrorists, certain families of terrorists and radicalized juvenile) in understanding

the true perspective of life in the light of true religious and social obligations. The primary

focus of the de-radicalization was on the detainees and their families through a well organized
 52

and well articulated psycho - religious cum social therapy. It was visualized reintegrate these

radicalized individuals back in society and avert chances of joining hands with terrorists again.

The mission63 statement of SDM is:-

“64Provide an environment conducive for restoration of self respect of selected individuals

(adult detainees and juveniles) with a view to remove their psychological burden caused

by ideological exploitation and / or coercion so as to make them and their families useful

Pakistani citizens, causing no threat to society”.65

The core objectives66 were:-

 Create conducive environment.

 Deradicalize and remove psychological burden.

 Vocational training - helping them to earn a respectable living.

 Create a nucleus for subsequent national efforts towards deradicalization.

 Prepare individuals towards economic emancipation and social responsibility.

63
Interview with Officials of SDM by the researcher.
64
Ibid.
65
Stabilising Pakistan through Police Reforms ( available at http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/as_pakistan_police_reform.pdf).
66
Objectives set for SMD at the time on inception (Interview with Officials of SDM by the researcher).
 53

Outline of Swat Deradicalization Model and its Progarms67

SWAT DERADICALIZATION
MODEL

Adult Juvenile

Mishal Rastoon Naway Sehar Heila Sabaoon

(743) (450) (146) (100) (154)

Low Risk Only Detainees (Apprehended & Surrendered) Low & High Risk

67
Interview of Officials of SDM,by the researcher.
 54

Implementation of SDM Strat / Modules

Flow Chart – Deradicalization Program68

Deradicalization Activities & Events Responsibility

Stage
Arrival at local Apprehended
Army Units & LEAs
Volunteered
Surrendered
Initial Screening By Local Army Units
Categorization By LEAs
Recommendation for SDM
Arrival at MTF & Interviews
Swat
Case Studies
Re-Categorise / Risk Stratification
Transfer to Swat Case Analysis
Interviews
Risk Stratification & Induction By Swat
Deradicalization By Swat Experts (Social Welfare
Module
Academics and Teaching for
Pakistan)
Reintegration Joint Finalization of Cases for
Process
Reintegration
Oath taking/Graduation Ceremony
Jointly by
Joining Community/Society LEAs +
Post Reintegration Swat Monitoring Cell Swat
Monitoring Local LEAs
Report/Feedbacks from Community,
VDCs etc
Note: Swat is Social Welfare Academics and Training for Pakistan is Pakistani NGO running
Deradicalization program in Swat.

Adults Module. The concept was formally launched in 2010, after due approval of PC-

1 costing Rs. 230 Millions by Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The program was

conceptualized initially for a period of one year and was due to be revised in Februry 2011.

68
By the author basing on the information gained from the interview of SDM’s officials .
 55

Initially, the program included Mishal (Paithom, Charbagh; September 2010) and Rastoon

(Barikot, February 2010). Financial support for running of DRAP has been provided by the

Government of KP.

 Constituents of Deradicalization Program69

 Scope

 Correct religious orientation and inculcation of national spirit.

 Restoration of self-respect.

 Identify thinking patterns and help remove depression, remorse and regret.

 Vocational skills in selective modules and general awareness.

 Implementation Stages

 Selection Stage. This stage involves identification of

psychological willing participants through the process of input from

elders, concerned Army unit and the psychologist / psychiatrist.

 De-radicalization Therapy Stage. This stage involves housing the

participants in respectable living environment and exposing them to

correct religious ideology, psychological treatment, families’

engagement, and structured interface with elders, dev of national spirit,

co-curricular activities and vocational training.

 Pre Reintegration - Assessment Stage. This is a concurrent process

running throughout the first two stages to evaluate the level of fitness

and suitability for re-integration.

69
Ibid.
 56

 Post Reintegration - Monitoring Stage. This is meant to ensure that

the re-integration Beneficiaries remain in the mainstream and protected

from the negative influences of militant elements in the society.

 Conduct Paradigm. In conduct of DRAP, there were four major steps:-

 Psychological Conditioning & Correction.

 Correct Reflection of Social & Religious Aspects.

 Skill Enhancement (Economic Empowerment).

 Family De-Radicalization Program.

(Graph depicting various portion of the time & effort of given above

mentioned steps in earlier DRAP and then SDM program covering

different deradicalization program is given below)

(% Distribution of Swat Deradicalization Model’s Program time/Effort)70

70
Briefing to US Ambassador during his visit to the Sabaoon facility of Swat Deradicalization Model on 16
August 2013.
 57

 Conduct Modalities

 Step-I (Psychological Conditioning & Correction)

 The first step is psychiatric module which involves transition of

minds of the inmates so as to be receptive of social and religious

education.

 Psychiatric therapy of rigid minded individuals is undertaken by a

dedicated and highly qualifies psychiatric team comprising civil and

military doctors.

 In order to assess an individual’s behavior with his group/section,

frequent interactions of the psychiatric team during off hours are

also planned.

 Time is devoted for lectures and discussions through dedicated

faculty of Army and local/ civil psychiatrists.

 Step -2 (Social and Religious module). It is aimed at helping them realize

their social obligations thus becoming useful members of the society and

correcting the misunderstandings related to basic Islamic concepts.

 Purpose is to bring a change in their attitude towards a modern and

civilized life which is within the bounds of the true religious

teachings.

 Regular lectures by the influential guest speakers are conducted in

the program.

 Imparting of Quranic education to the Beneficiaries is also given

due consideration.
 58

 One complete day is planned every week for a monitored group

discussion in the presence of complete psychiatric and training

team.

 Members of MISHAL are also allowed to socialize with their

families once a week thus making them aware of their civic

responsibilities.

 Overall a very conducive living environment is provided in the

program, where all the beneficiaries are treated with dignity and

respect.

 Step -3 (Vocational Training). It is, imparting of the Vocational

Training to all beneficiaries, which is aimed at facilitating their after-

release employment. In MISHAL (Paithom), this module encompasses

various disciplines as shown on the screen. For vocational modules,

MISHAL is affiliated with Government Technical and Vocational Centre

Swat-KPK (GTVC).

 Step 4 (Family Deradicalization). Involves Family

Deradicalization, which is another significant facet of the program. It is

being done on weekly basis through lectures and discussion by eminent

religious scholars and notables from the society on all visitors’ days.

 Post Deradicalization Reintegration

 Rehabilitation. Concerted efforts are lacking towards Post

Deradicalization Stabilization. Reintegration efforts only dilate on

imparting tech skills through vocational trg with no fin asst for

rehabilitation.

g
 59

 Monitoring. Decentralized monitoring of the rel Beneficiaries is

conducted by the concerned units (involving police, VDCs and sources) for

a period of 1year by calling/ reporting of Beneficiaries.

 Beneficiaries Settlement in Society. Following data highlights that the

reversion of SDM’s Beneficiaries towards radical tendencies remained minimal71:-

Total Settled in Rejoined % age Remarks

community
Terrorists

1192* 1144 48** 4.19% * 8 x TB patient were

released

** 37 x re-apprehended

11 x presumably joined
Terrorists

Sabaoon - Juveniles Module

The only Juveniles institution ‘SABAOON’; Pashto language word meaning Leading

Ray of Sunlight at Daybreak’ was established in Swat in September 2009. ‘Sabaoon” marks a

fresh start for the helpless/vulnerable youth of Malakand Division in an attempt/effort to open

fresh avenues for their brighter future. Sabaoon is the only facility for rehabilitation of juveniles

(12-17 yrs) apprehended or surrendered during Opertion Rah-e-Rast. It was established in Sep

2009 with an initial intake of 22 Juveniles. The end state envisaged was “To Launch Sabaoon

as a Pilot Proj and subsequently hand it over to an Non Government Organization

(NGO)”. The institution was handed over to Hum Pakistani Foundation (Lahore based NGO)

in Nov 2009. Later, facility was handed over to Social Welfare Academics and Training (Swat)

for Pakistan with security / adm resp with Army in May 2011. The str has since grown to 195

71
Ibid.
 60

x Juveniles, 154 x Juveniles have been re-integrated in Six Batches and present str at Sabaoon

is 41 x Juveniles. Stay of particular juvenile in Sabaoon is not time specific rather it is progress

based. Fin sp for running of Sabaoon is being provided by an NGO (Swat).72

 Selection of Beneficiaries. The selection of beneficiaries was carried out

with utmost care and deliberated in detail through well laid out program. Special focus

of attention was on Juvenile detainees who were deemed necessary to go through the

deradicalization program. The selection of beneficiaries was carried as following:-

 Initial screening on the basis of age, gender, detention period, behaviour

and verification by Police / Political Agent was carried out.

 Selection of individuals amongst the detainees was carried out in

coordination with local Jirgas and concerned security elements.

 Pre-induction examination by psychologist was undertaken by utilizing

different psychometric screening techniques.

 Aspects of social intervention by families and community were duly

considered during selection.

 Detainees once selected for the program were referred as “Beneficiaries”.

 Motivation.73 The underling motivation of the detainees who were

related to violence and acts of terrorism became a corner stone and building block of

the deradicalization module of SDM. It provided the officials related to deradicalization

the best chance at rectifying the reasons which led to the radicalization of the detainees.

Following is the percentage of different reasons of radicalization:-

Data gathered from interrogation of

detainees
72
Data presented to PM Nawaz Sharif on his visit to Sabaoon. Interview with Officials of SDM by the researcher.
73
Ibid.
 61

Art as Medium of Expression for Psychological Profiling

Name: The Foot Prints.74

Condition: Children at Sabaoon undergoing deradicalization were asked to walk

across the canvas with black colour on their feet and then told to walk back with the

colour of their choice.

74
Picture shared with author by the officials of SDM.
 62

Lesson: There is always a way to redeem oneself from past actions and

SABAOON provides that opportunity.

Remarks: Painting captures the spirit of training with regards to the status of children

on arrival and departure; interestingly the children opted for very bright

colours signifying happiness and optimism.

 Education Profile. Swat despite having a better literacy rate as compared to

FATA, it was mainly the less literate population which made the core foot soldiers of

TTP(S).75 It helped in the deradicalization process of the beneficiaries.

 Children Profile

 Induction Period. The pd of induction is as under

 Sep-09 - 32

 Oct-09 - 53

75
Data shared with author by the officials of SDM.
 63

 May-Aug 10 - 64

 2011/ 12 - 35

 2013 - 11

 Status on arrival. The details are as under:-

 Apprehended - 40%

 Surrendered - 20%

 Voluntarily Turned in by Parents - 40%

 Risk Stratification. The stratification of children is carried out on the basis of

activities performed by them with Terrorists. Pattern of activities are as under:-

 Low Risk

 Cleaning utensils and rooms.

 Giving information about security forces.

 Administrative couriers.

 Medium Risk. Carrying and cleaning weapons.

 High Risk

 Strong suggestion of physical abuse.

 Potential suicide attacks.

 Fighting as foot soldiers.

 Training Activities with Terrorist. The pattern of training

activities with Terrorist is as under:-

 Physical fitness.

 Handling of weapons.

 Field craft.

 Firing.

 Torture / terrorist activities.

 64

 Age Profile. The profiling of the detainees showed that a huge number a huge

number of children who were radicalized in the Swat were between 15 – 17 Yrs

of age. Total of more than 75 % children belonged to that group. The high

percentage of Juvenile entailed starting new program focusing only on them,

the overall percentage of various age groups of detainee are as following76:-

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
Below 15 15 Yrs 16 Yrs 17 Yrs 18 Yrs &
Yr Above

76
Data collected by the author from authorities at SDM.
 65

 Birth Order. 55 % of the children are middle child because they re felt

to expandable.

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
Youngest Child Middle Child Eldest Child

 Large Family Size. Age size of the family is from 7-8 Children.

 Absence of Father Figure.

 65% did not have significant caregivers (absent fathers) who could

provide protection.

 35% fathers were present to look after the family.

 Economic Profile. 60% of the children are from poor family and parent feel

difficulty in feeding these children.

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
POOR LOWER MIDDLE
MIDDLE
 66

 Area Profile77. The area from where these children belong to

are, as under:-
Area Strength
Swat 179
Hangu / Kohat / South Waziristan Agency 8
Peshawar 2
Bajaur / Orakzai / Khyber Agencies 3
Swabi / Mardan Districts 2
Mohmand Agency 1
Total 195

 Vocational training of Beneficiaries. Vocational Training plays an

important role towards rehabilitation of uneducated or less educated

beneficiaries. Short listing of deserving candidates is carried out on the basis of

their in education/professional aptitudes, psycho-social evaluation,

perception/opinion by experts/group reviews and familial engagements.

77
Data provided to author by SDM in Feb 2014.
 67

Post Release Monitoring Mechanism

In case of juveniles, low risk juveniles were re-integrated first with the following variables in

place:-

 Psychological adjustments.

 No association/relationship of family members with militants.

 No presence of militants in the community.

 Availability of schools / education facilities in their area.

If school was not an option then, loans were granted to start small businesses. In case of

vocational skills, loans were facilitated to start small enterprises in their respective local areas.

Post Deradicalization’s Release Mechanism

 Released on the advice of area notables to a specific ‘Guarantor’ with assurance from

his immediate family.

 Periodic feedback of released beneficiaries is received from the respective Law

Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and concerned social circles. The data is collected,

collated and analysed for initiating any action or assistance required by the

beneficiaries.

 Monitoring Safeguards. Decentralized monitoring of released beneficiaries is carried

out by concerned LEAs with following safeguards in place for every reintegrated

individual.

 Monitoring is exercised for a period of 1 year by re-calling beneficiaries at regular

intervals as under:-

 Initial 6 Months

 1st Half: On weekly basis.

 2nd Half : On fortnightly basis.

 After 6 Months: On monthly basis.

 68

 Registration of released beneficiaries with concerned local Police stations.

Overview of SDM various Program78

Location Funding Source Graduated Status

Mishal, Paithom, Malakand Govt of KPK 743 Functional

Sabaoon, Pirano, Malakand NGO (Swat) 154 Functional

(juveniles)
Heila, Tank Govt of KPK 100 Functional

Nawa-e-Sehr, Khar, Bajaur FATA SECT 146 Functional

Rastoon, Barikot - 450 Closed

Feast (Sparley), Malakand - 110 Closed

Zarghoona, Malakand - 8 Closed

Ghalanai, Mohmand - 32 Closed

Mishal, Barikot - 520 Closed

2263
Total of 2263 individuals deradicalized 48 x individuals suspected of return to militancy (2.12%)79
Post Reintegration Profile of Juveniles Graduated from Sabaoon80

60

50

40

30
51 49
20

10 21 20
8 8 8
0
Employed as Employed College / School Technical Unemployed Family
Skilled Abroad University Education Training Business
Labour Education

78
Data gathered by the author.
79
Ibid.
80
Data provided by the SDM.
 69

Deradicalization – Psychological Impacts

INITIAL SPM
80 SPM is a Nonverbal
assessment to assess
70 logical reasoning and
60 rational thinking
abilities.
50
40 As the results show,
SPM that 95% of the
30 Sabaoon population
20 lies at or below the
10th Percentile, where
10 50th Percentile is
0 considered the
5th PR 10th PR 25th PR 50th PR 75th PR average.

Initial SPM Assessment of Beneficiaries of Sabaoon in SDM

Comparison of Sabaoon Population with Mainstream Government Schools in Lahore81

80

70

60

50

40 Swat
Lahore
30

20

10

0
5th Percentile 10th Percentile 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 90th Percentile
Rank

81
Briefing to US ambassador on visit to SDM’s facility – Sabaoon on 16 August, 2013
70
 71

Logical Reasoning: SPM & RE-SPM

(PRE INTERVENTION VS. 8 MONTHS AFTER INDUCTION)

80

60

40 SPM
Re SPM
20

0
5th PR 10th PR 25th PR 50th PR 75th PR
Improvement on the test scores is apparent, given the comparative graph above.

Before Joining SDM. A painting made by a beneficiary before undergoing process of

deradicalization showing violent psychological profile due to excessive use of black

and red colours signifying bombs and blood respectively.

 72

After Joining SDM. A painting made by a beneficiary after undergoing

process of deradicalization showing positive psychological change with windows, flag

and greenery reflecting balanced mind with positive outlook towards life.

Drawing by one of the Beneficiary at the completion of deradicalization program at SDM

Success of Swat Deradicalization Model’s Programs

SDM’s Programs have deradicalized 2263 militants and 2215 out of them were

successfully reintegrated into the society. The recidivism is just 2.12% which clearly shows

the outstanding results achieved by the deradicalization program Out of the 2215 each and

everyone has either been continuing their education or doing decent jobs in various parts of the

country and in the foreign, leading a decent, moderate life with their families in their

communities. Their education profiles as shown above through graphs clearly manifest the

success of the programs in inducing the urge to get formal education, which they used to

despise and destroyed the schools. It is no mean achievement that the same militants after being

deradicalized are studying in those same schools which they used to bomb. The fact that 2215

militants out of 2263 are well settled and reintegrated into the society as normal members even

after 5 years (after graduation from deradicalization program) in itself is the success of the

program.
 73

Conclusion

The Swat deradicalization program, like other overall deradicalization projects, is like

the restoration recuperation models utilized frequently as a part of secure criminological

doctor's facilities and jail settings, the main contrast being that "confidence is the fundamental

motor of progress" when contrasted with the behavioural adjustment subject connected to

change the mentality and criminal practices of the guilty parties in legal healing centres and

penitentiaries. A late visit by PM Nawaz Sharif and comparable visits by previous executive

Yousaf Raza Gillani amid his term of office mirror that Pakistan's administration is

demonstrating intrigue or is obliged to show results from the restoration and reintegration of

the activists through the deradicalization program, which is in both ways vital. In the wake of

reporting empowering early results that more than 2,200 adolescent have reintegrated,

assessment of "wrap around administrations" is obliged to pick up framework accreditation

demonstrating inspiration, change in the reaction of restored activists and a lessened recidivist

rate.

“I have visited deradicalization initiatives all over the world, and I can say without

hesitation that the initiative at Sabaoon is one of the most promising I have seen anywhere.

I was exceptionally encouraged by the intersection of the efforts of Swat with the Pakistan

Army. Perhaps the unique strength of Sabaoon for me was the focus and attention placed by

the staff on post-release monitoring and assessment”.

Dr John Horgan

Director, International Centre for the Study of Terrorism

Associate Professor of Psychology, Affiliate Professor of International Affairs

The Pennsylvania State University & Associate Editor, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict
 74

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

SWAT

The remarkable Swat, frequently contrasted with Switzerland for its regular excellence

and pleasant scene is positioned in a geo-strategically significant area of the world, where the

important areas of Asia — South Asia, China and Central Asia, joins. Swat, which is currently

a section of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)

Province of Pakistan, has all through its recorded history, held noticeable place in the region.

It has been the support of an incredible human advancement (Gandhara Civilization).

The region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – K P (ex N WF P) located in the middle of Indus River

in the east and the Suleiman mountainous area in the western direction, covering an a total of

almost 75,000 sq. km. It has Eighteen dist and areas of PATA, having agency of of Maalaakand

, whose regions are Upper & Lower Dir, Chittraal, Swat, Buneir, Shaangla and ranges of Kaala

Dhaaka. Swat being the dist of the agency of Maalaakand. Swat is an uneven rocky area with

fluctuating rises from 2000 feet to 18,000 feet from sea, in north upto the foothills of

mountainous range of Hinduu-kush. The area of Swat is rewarded by nature with wealth of

water in the lush green valleys in the form of Swat fast flowing River. It likewise has jungles,

rich green plains surrounded by lofty mountains, fields, lakes, streams waterfalls and ice

covered mountainous tops. The Swat valley is rich in widely varied vegetation. It is popular

for its mixture of organic products, restorative herbs and natural plants. It has a wide range of

varieties of flora and fauna. The aggregate territory of Dist Swat is Five thousands three

hundred and thirty seven square km, its 2 tehhsiils, Mattaa (Six hundred and eighty three square

km) and Swat (Four thousands six hundred and fifty four square km).The aggregate area

covered by the Jungle spread over almost 500,000 acres of land which comprises of different

types of Pine trees.

 75

The Dist HQ of Swat is Saiiduu Shareef, yet the principle town in the region is Maingoaraa.

Saiiduu Shareef is almost 125 km from KP provincial HQ of Peshaawarr, towards the northeast,

and 170 km from Islamabad, capital of Pakistan. Other prominent areas in District Swat are

Chaar bagh, Thaana, Kabbal, Khwazakheayla, Madain, Bah'raiin, Kaalaam and Mangaltan etc.

As per the populace census of 1998, aggregate populace of dist Swat was 1.25 Million, with a

dense population of 300 people/square miles and a normal increase in the populace at the rate

of 3.5 % ranging in the span of almost two decades from 1980 to 2000. It is estimated that the

population of the district of Swat has swelled upto almost 2.1 Million by the time the major

offensive by the Pakistan Army started against Talibans of Swat in 2009/2010. Due to

mountainous region, most of the population resides in small scattered villages in the rural set

ups in excess of 70 % of the population of 2.1 Million. A relatively very small portion of the

population forms part of the urban centres of the district Swat i.e 20 - 30 %. Swat is a

heterogeneous societies of ethnic clans, including Pashtuns (for the most part of the population

belongs to Yousafzai tribes), Kohistaan (of Dardic origin) and Gujaars. Pakhtou or Pashhtou is

the languaged talked majority in Swat, and is comprehended and utilized by approximately 90

% of the populace as their first language. A mixed bag of different dialects are likewise spoken

as a part of the range, as Toorwaali, Kaalaamii and Khwaar, talked by the Kalam and Kohistani

individuals in the Northern regions of Swat; Gujrouu, a blend of Pashto and Punjaabii, talked

by the Aajarr and Gujjarr tribes. The prevalent religion in Swat is Islam, with almost 99 % of

the individuals alluding to themselves as Musalmans. A small portion of the populace is from

different minority religions, i.e Christianity, Hinduism.

The Swat district has been dotted with monuments from ancient history in the form of

archaeological sites and remains of ancient civilization dating back to two thousand years. It

was known to be Udyana in that era of the history. The position of Swat, its rich civilization,

point of learning and knowledge in the area shaped the situation so that it became critical

halting point for some of the invading armies to include Greek legendary ruler and conqueror:
 76

Alexander the Great and the fearsome warriors like Mehmood Ghaznavi of present day

Afghanistan. 82

Around the turn of 200 BC, Swat had turned into a pinnacle of the Gandhara human

advancement and became a civilization which has evolved with absorption of different

civilizations of the world mainly that was a Buddhist and the invading Greece armies which

came along Alexander the Great. It became a homogenous society with a blend of Buddhist

and Greece societies' values and traditions. Swat was a focal point of Hinnaayyaana's

Buddhist/their traditions and of the Maahha'yana traditions/thoughts and beliefs from which

they were created and later on thrived to form into strong belief and tradition system moving

across the sub continent and attracting scholars of Buddhism from as far as Korea and Japan.

The Chinese traveler Fa-Hsien, a devout pilgrim and a scholar of Buddhism travelled to the

present day Swat around 4th Century AD, according to him the area was a bastion of Buddhism

knowledge and had numerous schools of learning known as Monasteries. He had put the

numbers of them around five hundreds. These monasteries had a great close coordination and

connections to Monasteries in the region of Tibet.83

The start of the eighth century AD brought the introduction of religion Islam to the area,

the Musalmaans from Arabian Peninsula, started showing up as intruders in the present day

areas of Iran and Afghanistan and the population started changing their religion to the religion

of their conquerors and preachers who accompanied them to the religion to Islam. The start of

the last Millennia saw the warriors like, Sultan Mehmood Ghaznavi started his attacks of India,

he carried out numerous attacks some historians put it as high as two dozen in numbers. He

brought into control Swat amongst different regions and it went under the tenet of the Afghans

who were Muslims by that time. Yousuoafzaais had defeated the tolerant peaceful local

82
Sultan-i-Rome, Swat State (1915-1969): From Genesis to Merger, An Analysis of Political, Administrative, Socio-
Political, and Economic Developments (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008): 21-48.
83
Ibid
 77

populace and supplanted them by a Yousuoafzaais alliance by the end of 15th Century. The

native tenants of the area abandoned away into the nearby regions mainly mountains to stay

away from the scourge of the invading tribes around Swat and adjoining areas of Mansehra

where they started to be called Swatis or Kouhistaaniis (The individuals from the mountains).

The populace of Swat are accordingly became heterogeneous mix of basically Pashtuns,

Kouhistaaniis and Gujjarrs. Some have extremely unmistakable elements of their facial and

bodily characteristics making them distinct from the people in the near by regions that includes

Golden colour of hair and Blue/Green eyes potentially of Dardic lineage while numerous

others have assertion of having a direct lineage of the armed force of the Greek emperor and

conqueror: Alexander the Great.

The majority of the recorded history of Swat (although it is very less documented) and

the traditions told from generations to generations, it is widely believed and known that Swat

has stayed as a free, sovereign or possibly semi autonomous region/state. It was conquered by

the Yousuofzaai of Afghanistan descendants in the 16 century AD, absorbed the areas and

administered them; resultantly they developed into the prevailing and majority portion in the

areas which constituted the region of Swat. The Yousuofzaai, on the other hand, being the

administrator did not build up an effective administration or built a society bounded by then

modern states but rather they continued with the age old tribal system of governance,

effectively partitioned Swat into two opposing sections called daalaay (solitary daalaa).84

In the course of last quarter of 19th Century AD, Khan of the adjoining areas of Diir

possessed and controlled the Eastern-bank Swat and at the end of the 19th Century, the British

Raj in India took over the Western-bank Southern portion of Swat under their territory of Raj

and thinly sway control with the development of the region of Diir and Swat and making them

agencies separate, to which Chittraal was included before 1900. The organization of the

84
Ibid. 48-80
 78

statehood governing Swat in its initial days in the mid twentieth century, managed and

governed intermittently by religious pioneers who were known as Akhund or the devout and

educated. The State of Swat was for the first time built around the name of Islam in mid

Nineteenth Century with the Muslim fighters of Sayyid Akbar Shah as the King following the

Islamic Jurisprudence also known to be the Shariah.85

Enraged and angry over the oppressive approach of the administrators and rulers of Diir

and the overbearing of his tax authorities, the populace of the Shaamiizai, Seboujjnii and

Niikkpia Kheil localities of the Eastern-bank of Swat river came to the right conclusion of

standing up to the cruelties of the rulers of Diir under the support and guidance of a religious

leader Wallii Ahmed famously know by the name Sandaa kai Baabaa, in the year of the start

of Worl War I. There were many skirmishes and small scales battles, they were able to vanquish

and removed the military and administrators hailing from the Diir out of the region of Swat.

The liberators framed a 5 elder’s committee/board to deal with the issues of the freed zone and

finally introduced Sayyad Abdul Jabbar Shah, in the start of 1915, as their ruler. Abdul Jabbaar,

but after two years;on the other hand, was requested to give up his kingship and authority and

be banished from Swat. It is of importance to be known that on the other hand, that his' space

of influence did not cover the whole Swat as well. So that step although had an impact did not

change the overall political scenario and landscape. Despite being the follower of religion of

the area, there was clash in the area with Diir and the range stayed aggravated from mid

nineteenth Century to early part of the Twentieth Century. Sayyid AbdulJabbar was made the

administrator by a nearby jirga and experienced difficulty practicing and exerting his rule over

the area for which he was selected to rule. Toward the start of 1918 another Jirga was convened

for selection of new ruler for the Swat to be given the title of Waal e Swat, the new jirga then

selected Mian Gul AbdulWadud. The British Raj in India recognized the Swat as almost

autonomous state by 1926 and included it in its ever expanding empire especially towards the

85
Ibid.
 79

frontiers regions near Durand Line. After the dethroning of Abdul Jabbar Shah, Mian Gull

AbdulWadood (the grandson of famous Abdul Ghaafoor also known as the Saaidou Baabaa)86

was introduced and made the new ruler of Swat. Mian Gull Abdul Wadood later to be famous

as Bacha Sahib87 was having the traits of a good leader and great administrator. He was alert

and lively and extended and solidified the state amid his rule and during his tenure as a ruler

the state thrived .88 The assertiveness, farsightedness and positive approaches of the new ruler

made Swat a shining example of a model of prosperity, good governance, justice and a

sustainable peace in the entire region specially the Pukhtun tribal zones which were famous for

destabilising factors and backwardness; and a unimaginable feeling of peace and admiration

for89 the power of the state won in an overwhelmingly uneducated tribal society. Under the

term of an unskilled, however illuminated individual, Swat turned into 'a remarkable State';

and an example to follow, an example of prosperity, an example of sustainable peace, calmness

and advancement in the Pushtoon tribal communities and small states.90 Soon after the

Independence of Pakistan, by the end of 1949/50, Bacha Sahib relinquished his kingship and

rule for his son and beneficiary obvious, Mian Gul AbdulHaq Jahan Zeb. Mian Gul Jahan Zeb

was also known to be Waali Saa'hib's 91 endeavors gave a stimulus to formative work with need

to the training in the field of knowledge/education/literacy, communication infrastructure and

road network and wellbeing of the citizens through health care areas. In addition, he tried to

westernize the state and society.92 While the Swat remained resolute and made headways in all

fields in spite of the restriction and frictions from inside and outside; a few factors, at last built

up and finally finished in the declaration made on 28 July 196993, with respect to state merger

86
Sultan-i-Rome, “Abdul Ghaffur (Akhund): Saidu Baba of Swat: Life,Career and Role,”Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society,
Karachi, 40, no. 3, July 1992): 299-308.
87
Sultan-i-Rome, ‘Miangul Abdul Wadud’ in Celebrities of NWFP, Vol. 1 & 2, edited by Parvez Khan Toru and Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat
(Peshawar: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2005), pp. 69-93.
88
Sultan-i-Rome, Swat State (1915-1969): From Genesis to Merger, pp. 87-125.
89
Ibid, pp 48-80.
90
James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, reprint (Karachi: Indus Publication, 1985): 223.
91
Wali (meaning ruler) was the title with which the British recognized the ruler of Swat State. However, in Swat only the last ruler Miangul
Jahanzeb was called Wali Sahib.
92 Sultan-i-Rome, Swat State (1915-1969): From Genesis to Merger, chap. 9.
93
Sirajuddin, “Swat, Sarguzasht-e-Swat (Urdu) (Lahore: Al-Hamra Academy, 1970): 94.
 80

by the then Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan. Waali Saahib was

officially stripped of his forces on 15 August 1969.94 After conveying an end to the state, the

previous State (which was ruled by the Wali in the interest of the legislature of Pakistan as

overseer for the said region) and Kalam zones were made a region (headed by a representative

official) and some piece of the Maala'kand (lead by the office of the Commissioner-ate). He

handpicked the enormous proprietors with him by giving them an offer of the harsh taxes that

he forced and these cronies would gather it for him mainly the Khans. In the meantime the

ruler won over the religious and clergy components that incorporated the prayer leaders of

mosques also known as mullah and the educated religious legal scholars by naming them as

Qazis of Justice system furthermore paying them salaries. Despite giving them position of

power and authority in the state, the ruler held the religious clergy and in court under tough

grip.95 The ruler of Saawaat marked a Supplementary Instrument of Accession through which

the matchless quality of the Pakistani law was acknowledged by the Wali in 1954.96 He was

obliged to delegate a consultative committee made out of chose and named individuals and a

Chief Minister. However no Chief Minister was selected just like the case with other august

states. The ruler was permitted to run autocratically. Pakistani laws and courts were banned

from practicing their jurisdiction in the state. In a nutshell Government in the Pakistan being a

dictator in this manner turned into an accomplice with the ruler and the landed nobility in

sustaining their hold in Swat until its confounded reconciliation into Pakistan in 1969.97 The

populace of Swat today are still nostalgic about the times of peace amid the Wali's chance. Be

that as it may, the fundamental shameful acts endured by the less special were stifled. It might

be said that the circumstance was awful for Pakistan at the season of Independence henceforth

the state was not blended. Then again, why was the issue of Swat and other royal States of

94
Ibid
95
Frederick Barth, Political Leadership among the Swat Pathans (London: Athalone, 1959).
96
Abdul Wadud, The story of Swat as told by the founder (Peshawar: Ferozesons, 1962).
97
Sultan-I-Rome, “Administrative system of the princely state of Swat,” Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, Lahore, Vol. XXXXIII,
Dec 2006.
 81

Malaa’kand left uncertain for twenty two years since 1969 after merger?98 This is a substantial

inquiry and the answer lies in the motion of different reasons. However the most critical one to

my psyche is the poor inability to arrange deliberately the incorporation of Swat & FATA into

a firm state. The standard explanation behind Pakistan's drop into debilitated institutional

confusion was an after effect of strife between the establishments of common power and the

military. No nation can construct its organizations, if effective bodies inside of the state are set

on usurping power as opposed to focusing on state building and tolerating the standard of law.

The steady cycle of disturbance of the state by Martial Laws and command of advantage as the

favored method of leading state art brought about ruinous policies. The political advancement

of Swat was no special case.99

“Shift in Religious Authority: Formation of TNSM in Malakand’’100. According to

Brigadier (Retired) Mehmood Shah ex Secretary FATA, the economic migrant from Pakistan

specially from FATA and particularly of Malkand Division, after finding new wealth while

working in Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, returned with new version of Islam, Wahabism;

stranger to the area. With new found wealth and new version of Islam up their sleeves, they

wanted power and prestige, which they have longed for a long time being from lower middle

and poor strata of the society. The power elite didn’t yield to recognising their position and

stature in the society, which was fast moving toward the path of radicalization by those having

religious background backed by the one having found new wealth. The power elite exerting

administrative and social status and power in the society remained aloof to the changing socio,

cultural, legal and administrative realities in the society. The events taken a turn when TNSM’s

chief left JI and joined Council of Dir’s District. He administered a Maddrassah in Dir, which

will later be used by him to radicalized large number of young student getting religious

98
Shamshad Ahmad, “Crisis of State and Government in Pakistan,” Criterion, Jan-March 2010, Vol 5, No 1, Rawalpindi, P. 46.
99
Ibid.
100
Khadim Hussain, “Modes and Scale of Conflict in Pakistan’s Swat Valley (1989-2008)”, “Conflict and Peace Studies,
Islambad, Volume 4 Number 2, Jun 2011, pp 70-73.
 82

education from there. In 1980s and even in 1990s, Deobandi school of thought’s seminaries

were sending young radicalized men to fight in Afghanistan with Gulf and Saudi’s funding and

Pakistan’s patronage. These seminaries not only exerted power and position across the border

but also in the areas where they were situated in Pakistan particularly Pashtun areas of KP.

Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan gave these seminaries gave great leverage to them

against the traditional power houses of socio-economic and administrative importance. Before

the traditional power houses could assimilate the gravity of the situation and gauge the extent

of the power of these new challenges, they already stunned them with the virtual halt of

everything in the entire Malakand Division in 1994 in the name of imposition of Sharia law in

the entire Malakand Division. It was shock to the administration. Instead of extending the

Pakistan normal laws to the Division after the PATA rules nd regulation were annulled by the

Supreme Court, the administration introduced Shariah Nizam-i-Adl Ordinance in 1994,

acquiescing to the demagogic antics of the TNSM and compounding the confusion created by

the provincial bureaucracy . The ordinance made it compulsory for the civil courts to seek the

assistance of a Muawin Qazi, who was a cleric, and an Aalim Wakil, learned in Islamic law.

The advice of the cleric, however, was not binding on the civil courts. 101 The TNSM objected

to this arrangement and the federal government promulgated the Shariah Nizam-i-Adl

Regulation 1999, thereby increasing the clerics’ influence in the courts. The caretaker

provincial government proposed the ill-advised Shariah Nizam-i-Adl Regulation 2008 that

would make the courts subservient to the clerics while the revenue and executive authority

would be exercised by the local administration. The TNSM was active in Dir, Buner and Swat

even before the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled on the federal government’s appeal against

the Peshawar High Court verdict on the PATA Regulation. It is now a well-known fact that a

deputy commissioner of Lower Dir remained in close contact with Sufi Muhammad, who

established and strengthened his organization with the help of the local administration and local

101
Ibid.
 83

notables. In the early 1990s, Sufi Muhammad had established links with Mufti Abdur Rashid

of Al-Rashid Trust and Maulana Masud Azhar, head of Jaish-e-Muhammad. A year after

Masud Azhar announced the launch of Jaish-e-Muhammad, he visited Swat to meet Sufi

Muhammad. In a large public gathering in Mingora, Sufi Muhammad and Masud Azhar

pledged to thunderous applause of their supporters to wage jihad against the infidels. This

explains the pouring in of the Jaish activists into Swat to help local militant leader Fazlullah in

his war against the state. The links also speak volumes of the militants’ networking in the

Pashtun belt. Sufi Muhammad had passed a decree that military training was a religious

obligation for all Muslims of the Swat valley.102 The training was carried out through the

networking mentioned above. This decree, along with the decrees of other jihadist ideologues,

such as Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, Mufti Abdur Rashid, Masud Azhar and Maulana Tahir

Panjpeeri, brought about a substantial shift in religious authority by effectively constructing a

Salafi jihadist ideology and by communicating it to a larger audience through various channels

of communication, including illegal FM radio channels and pamphlets. The principles of jihad,

thus, underwent a substantial change with respect to its mode and nature. 103 Firstly, the

principle of declaration of jihad by the ‘Ulul Amr’ (the sanctioning authority of the

government) was rationalized by arguing that as there was no genuine ‘Ulul Amr’ in Pakistan

and Afghanistan, one could wage jihad against the two states to bring about Shariah rule in

these states. Second, the principle of jihad to be waged only by the rightful authority in defense

of the Muslim norms and symbols was sought to be rationalized by making the argument that

in the absence of a rightful authority it was obligatory for every adult Muslim to wage jihad

under an organization. The power politics and the shift in religious authority took a new turn

after these administrative, judicial, social and religious developments. A vacuum was created

not by the Supreme Court decision on the PATA Regulation but the collusion of the

administration with Sufi Muhammad, who wreaked havoc in Malakand Division, according to

102
Ibid.
103
Interview with Brigadier (Retired) Mahmood Shah, ex Secretary FATA, January 2014.
 84

interviews with knowledgeable circles of Swat. The political administration of the time allowed

Sufi Muhammad a free hand to regain the power he had lost throughthe Supreme Court

decision. One of the major reasons for the turmoil in the Swat valley through 2006-08 can be

traced back to this confusion created by the local elite and the state. The key to understanding

the internal factors lies in understanding the composition of Fazlullah’s supporters. The

majority of them belonged to the lower rung of the social structure—mainly groups that lacked

a share in land holding in the area. Fazlullah communicated with them in their language through

his FM radio channel, giving voice to their frustrations, and owning them as his own. That gave

Fazlullah’s supporters in the marginalized groups a sense of empowerment. Both the state and

the traditional and political elite of the valley failed to respond to the aspirations of those who

remained marginalized.104 The modern educated clergy and the new aspirants for socio-

cultural recognition became wealthy but had no social credibility, even political parties

hesitated to award them tickets to contest elections. Awareness raising and other activities by

a wave of non-governmental organizations in the early 1990s as well as the process of

urbanization contributed to the erosion of the traditional power bases and cultural space began

to be occupied by the above mentioned classes105. The clergy had gained political influence

after the Soviet-Afghan war. The student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a right- wing

political party, had started occupying the public educational spaces. Wahabi intrusion in the

valley through madrassas in the late 80s and the early 90s along with the influence of Jaish-e-

Muhammad on the TNSM and subsequently on Shaheen Force of Fazlullah and the Swat

chapter of the TTP all played a role in the lead up to the Fazlullah-led insurgency against the

Pakistani state. The shift in religious authority became complete after the Wahabi intrusion in

the valley as a result of the dissemination of the discourse of jihad by the TNSM besides the

104
Khurshid Khan (Assistant Professor, Department of History, Degree College, Mingora), interview by the author in Mingora (Swat),
December 2014.
105
Interview with Brigadier (Retired) Mahmood Shah, ex Secretary FATA, January 2014.
 85

virtual occupation of public educational institutions such as colleges and universities by the

JI.106

On the basis of interviews with close relatives of Fazlullah107, it is not very difficult to

discern the dynamics of his rise and the evolution of his militia. Fazlullah was born and brought

up in Imam Dherai, a village to the north of Mingora, the main business hub of Swat, across

the River Swat. The area was home to the Nepkikhels, a sub-clan of the Yousufzai tribe.

Fazlullah passed his 12th grade exam from Government Jahanzeb College Swat in the late

1980s when the Afghan war was at its peak. His father, who had sold almost all his property

and was landless for all practical purposes, came under the influence of Sufi Muhammad of the

TNSM and sent Fazlullah to Sufi Muhammad’s madrassa in Dir. There Fazlullah developed

cordial relations with Sufi Muhammad’s family and was later married to one of his daughters.

Fazlullah actively participated in the insurgency orchestrated by Sufi Muhammad’s TNSM in

1994. The insurgency brought Malakand Division to a standstill and ended with the

promulgation of the Nizam-i Adl Regulation of 1995. Later, when Sufi Muhammad led a

militia of some 10,000 men from Malakand Division to Afghanistan in October 2001 to fight

alongside the Taliban, Fazlullah accompanied his father-in-law. After the international forces

dismantled the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah were

arrested on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and imprisoned. Fazlullah was

released from prison a year later.108 Fazlullah then settled in his native town but had no job and

started working as a chair-lift operator in a concern established by his cousin, Sirajuddin, who

later became his spokesperson. With the help of the local population and the financial and

technical support of a native of Kuza Bandai, a village adjacent to Imam Dherai, he started an

illegal FM radio channel in 2004.109 The support was rendered by Habib Khan, who had made

106
Ibid.
107
Khurshid Khan (Assistant Professor, Department of History, Degree College, Mingora), interview by the author in Mingora (Swat),
December 2014.
108
Ibid.
109
http://dx.doi.org/10.6007/IJARBSS/v3-i8/109
 86

his fortune while working in Britain, and was known in the locality as a staunch Wahabi

jihadist. Around this time, Fazlullah developed contacts with the late Maulana Abdur Rashid

of Lal Masjid in Islamabad. He later declared himself a disciple of Abdur Rashid. The discourse

Fazlullah constructed revolved around jihad, martyrdom, revival of the glory of Islam, anti-

modernism and anti-women and anti-state narratives. The illegal FM radio proved to be an

effective tool to disseminate the discourse because it was inexpensive and easily accessible in

the upper valley in particular and in the lower valley generally. During the social contagion

stage, Fazlullah identified the US and the state of Pakistan as the enemy, acknowledged and

highlighted the lot of the marginalized, established a madrassa and markaz or centre for

ideological persuasion at Imam Dherai on communal land with the local population’s support

and started to help the people resolve their daily problems and conflicts.110 Fazlullah developed

a strong local resource base by persuading the natives working in the Middle East and in the

West to donate generously to the newly established madrassa. During the stage of social

control, Fazlullah established a loose militia, called Shaheen Force which was later merged

into the TTP, established a parallel judicial system, and started targeting those who were

socially, culturally and politically influential in the upper valley. His militia also co-opted

criminal gangs in and around Swat that provided him with trained hands in gun-running.

Throughout this time, Fazlullah continued to develop his organizational structure. 111 He

gradually isolated the community by banning television, Internet and girls’ education. The

target killing and virtual slaughtering of those suspected to be ‘spying’ for the authorities, also

inculcated fear in the community.”112

110
Interview with Brigadier (Retired) Mahmood Shah, ex Secretary FATA, January 2014.
111
Ibid.
112
http://www.san-pips.com/download.php?f=121.pdf
 87

WAZIRISTAN

Waziristan is the heart of FATA and it does shape the environment in entire FATA in

all fields, similarly Waziristan cannot be separated for the effects in FATA. To fully understand

Waziristan, understanding the dynamics of FATA is must. The Pashtuns of FATA and the

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (early known to be NWFP), alongside their one third populaces

in Baluchistan territory and Karachi city in the Sindh area, represent almost 41-42 million

individuals. FATA has over thousand kilometre wedge in the middle of Afghanistan and the

urban areas of KP province. As indicated by the last census, near 3.3 million individuals (the

present appraisal is 4 million) resided in the areas comprising FATA113, it is around 27,000

square kilometres. The Durand Line isolated Pakhtun areas (specially its fiercely independent

tribes) between British Raj western territories in India and Afghanistan in last years of

Nineteenth Century, and from that point forward this outline, division and border has been seen

with extraordinary hatred and disdain by Pakhtuns, specially the key tribes of FATA and KP.114

“Waziristan, located on Pakistan’s north-western border with Afghanistan, is part of the

Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), an area only nominally controlled by the

Pakistani government. Waziristan is administratively divided into two agencies and

encompasses 11,326 square kilometres. North Waziristan has a total of 4,707 square

kilometres, while South Waziristan has a total area of 6,619 square kilometres.115

Approximately ninety-six kilometres at its widest point, Waziristan is a rough

parallelogram, which extends 144 kilometres from the Gumal and Sawa rivers in the south to

the Kaitu (or Ketu) and Kurram Rivers in the north. Bordered by Afghanistan to the west and

the Bannu basin and the Derajat on the east, the terrain is mountainous in the south; the hills

rise gradually from east to west, reaching heights of more than 3,000 meters. Pre-ghar is the

113
Interview with Brigadier (Retired) Mahmood Shah, ex Secretary FATA, January 2014.
114
Ibid.
115
http://www.ifad.org/english/indigenous/pub/documents/tnotes/pakistan.pdf
 88

highest mountain peak at 3,513 meters.116 The northern part of Waziristan is more open and

contains valleys separated by high hills. The rugged terrain not only made Waziristan difficult

for outside armies to occupy but it also inhibited economic development by the indigenous

population”.117 “North Waziristan is divided into three sub-divisions and a total of nine tehsils.

The Miranshah sub-division comprises the Miranshah, Ghulam Khan, and Datta Khel tehsils.

The Mirali sub-division contains the Mirali, Spinwam, and Shewa tehsils. The Razmak sub-

division consists of the Razmak, Dossali, and Garyum tehsils. South Waziristan has three sub-

divisions (Sarwakai, Ladha, and Wana) and eight tehsils: Sararogha, Makin, Ladha, Sarwekai,

Tiarza, Birmal, Wana, and Toi Khullah”. 118

“The political agent of each agency has a security force consisting of Khassadara (local

police) and Scouts. Local tribes contribute men to the Khassadars who protect roads and

bridges, escort government officials, and help maliks carry out government orders.119 Scouts

provide general security for the entire agency. South Waziristan has 3,689 Khassadars and each

tribe contributes”.120

Historical Perspective

North Waziristan being one of the largest and South Waziristan being the southernmost

area touching settled districts of Balochistan and KP, are located in the special areas having

different and uniquely governed Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Their share of

Pak-Afghan border comes up to almost half and area wise covers almost half portion of FATA

and fringe straightforwardly with Afghanistan. The areas of Waziristan is surrounded and

overlooked by mighty Hinduu-kushh which makes the environment and habitat challenging.

Though the greater part of the district comprises of barren valleys and brutal harsh mountain

116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.
118
Syed Mazhar Ali Shah. Waziristan Tribes. (Peshawar: Provincial Service Academy, 1991):288-9.
119
Ibid.
120
http://www.fatagov.com . Accessed on July 20, 2015.
 89

regions,its centre has a couple of rich locales in Birmaal, a backwoods region which underpins

potato crops, and the Wana cultivated areas supporting crops and natural vegetation as well.

Likewise the climate is harsh and is tough in summer being hot and very cold in winter. The

tenants of Waaziristaan belong to the ethnic group of Pakhtuns.121 The main two groups of

people's tribe represent the two portion of Waziristn, the Waaziiris or Waaziir in North

Waaziristaan and the Mehsoods or Mehsuuds in South Waaziristaan.122 Mehsuuds had been in

the tribe of Waziirs but got their separate identity as tribe in eighteenth or nineteenth century

A.D.

The name of the tribe to which majority of the people of Waziristan (from which it got

its name) i.e Waziirs is taken from the Afghan tribe which served the Kings of Afghanistan

(Kabul) as ministers, yet the exact timeframe is not known. As late as in 20th Century A.D and

sometimes even now, the Waziirs are known as Drwesh Khel, linking their lineage with a saint

with the name of Darwesh Musa.123 The people of Waziristan being Pashtuns follow the age

old honour code of living commonly known as Pashtunwali, rather they had been following it

in true letter and spirit. This code consists of four main features: tora (courage), badal (revenge),

melmastia (hospitality), nanawatee (granting peace to a defeated enemy) and following the

verdict given by the jirga, the council of the elders and respected ones from noble and powerful

families and tribes.124 Although this alternative traditional judicial system seems very odd

basing on the strength and power of the influential, but it has been able to provide speedy

resolution of conflicts and abiding verdict for the varying parties to the dispute. Women

unfortunately in such chauvinistic society are not treated at par with other members of the

society; rather they are subjugated and are traditionally marginalised.125

121
http://www.apsa.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SSA-1.pdf
122
Lieut-Colonel C.E. Bruce, Waziristan(1936-37), London: Gale & Polden, Ltd, Wellington Works, 1938.
123
Ibid.
124
Interview with Brigadier (Retired) Mahmood Shah, ex Secretary FATA, January 2014.
125
Ahmed, Akbar S, Resistance and Control in Pakistan, New York 2004:166.
 90

In the 19th century, British Raj saw India as "the jewel in the crown" of its subjugated

belongings and had a forceful position toward any apparent risk emanating in the direction

toward its Raj mainland. Apprehension of Russian supreme infringement made the current

FATA territories in the middle of Indo-Afghan main domain according to the Raj being a

strategic buffer zone.126 In spite of the fact that the alleged "Great Game" in the middle of

Russo-Raj and prompted the "First Anglo-Afghan war (1839-42)", strains in this way

facilitated to permit the Raj to oversee management of the territories of current FATA including

the North and South Waaziristaan, by means which were not directly related to the Raj, making

it unique area in the entire Raj127. Though the Raj lacked the monetary assets or man power

and its allied components expected to govern/subdue the FATA areas situated in the

troublesome landscape circumscribing Afghan territories.128 The primary objective of the Raj

was to debilitate those border areas of Waziristaan striking into region specifically controlled

by the Punjab’s capital Lahore. The Raj dispatched reformatory endeavors in Waziristan in

1850s and 1860s to rebuff Pakhtuns areas for striking and interfering into Raj domain of control

and influence.129

The general public of Waziristan is in somewhat sense controlled, governed and ruled

by the Tribal Chiefs commonly known as the Masaharaan (Elders) and the fighting force

comprising warriors. The part played by the religion in Waziristan is imperative and central to

their daily lives. The overwhelming majority of the population of Waziristan is Muslims

(Sunni) and follow the strict version of it, especially after the Afghan Jihad in which the

Deobandi Maddrassas preached even the harsher version of Islam i.e Wahabism. Still the Islam

has been used by them to further their political power and used it as a symbolic gesture. The

name of Islam and the most abused term Jihad has always been used to accrue all sorts of gains

ranging from power to financial benefits and sometimes just to settle the score with old rivals.

126
Interview with Brigadier (Retired) Mahmood Shah, ex Secretary FATA, January 2014.
127
Ibid.
128
Kai Fürstenberg, “Waziristan: Solutions for a Troubled Region” http://www.apsa.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SSA-1.pdf
129
Ibid.
 91

The age old cultural and traditional aspects of their society has over a period of time found the

harmony with the religion that their Pashtunwali compliments their religion Islam and not

collusion with tenets of Islam. They use it interchangeably to their advantage when the situation

arises.

They portray to follow their daily affairs in the realm of their religion but not long ago,

the value accorded to the prayer leader or religious man or mulla in the tribal societies were

minimum. The real power houses were the Maliks and Elders who would yield automatic

respect in the society. But the power centres were changed deliberately to suit the geo-political

objectives in the area via empowering the mulla of the area through money by operating

maddrassas and by granting power by sometimes subordinating administrative machinery to

them or placing them at their disposal, altering the power equilibrium and tilting it in the favour

of mullahs.130

Taking after Russian suggestions to Kabul in the last quarter of Nineteenth century, the

Raj dispatched a campaign into Afghan territories bringing about the "2nd Anglo-Afghan War

(1878-80)". The British Raj in India introduced and implemented a unique system in the

Frontier Regions which constituted North and South Waziristan, after fighting bitter wars and

battles against the tribes of Waziristan in the last decade of Nineteenth Century. The colonial

power implemented that political system to rule Waziristan’s tribe. The formal outline of the

Afghan/Indian border came about the Raj's Durand commission in 1895 prompted further

clashes in the outer fringes of the Raj's North West territories mostly now part of the FATA,

KP and Baluchistan areas. This new limit saw inadmissible by most of the Pashtuns because

of the apparent encroachment of their autonomous status and the partition from their ethnic

tribal brothers in neighbouring Afghan territories, brought about a noteworthy rebellion against

the Raj along the whole Durand Line two years after its demarcation. Subsequently, the Raj

couldn't totally had sway in Waazirstaan until the early years of 20th century. 131

130
Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, London, 2007:147.
131
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA436296
 92

The Raj in this way directed a few more corrective/aggressive campaigns in

Waaziristaan and it continued till Pakistan's creation. The imposing territory and aggressor

characteristics of the Pakhtun tribes gave the Raj organization huge difficulties all through its

experience for a century. One of the great religious legendary figure specifically, the Faqir of

Ipi, menaced Raj powers in Waaziristaan for a long time amid the second quarter of the 20th

century.132 The Raj never caught or executed the elusive figure in spite of their figuratively and

mechanical favourable circumstances.133

Miraan-shah is the regulatory focal point of North and Waana is the office central

station for Southern portion of the Waziristan. Normally the people would sometime be moving

towards the Frontier Region of Tank in the harsh winter condition. Waziristan was divided into

two agencies basing on the geographical location i.e North and South. Each was divided into

administrative units to be administrated by Federal Government representative. They are

Tehsildars, Assistant Political Agents and Political Agents with levy or Khasadars as the

administrative force as LEAs. To help the federal government’s administrative machinery,

another unconventional mechanism was adopted i.e Maliki System. The system revolves

around is a male representative acting between government and the tribal society from

honourable family, especially designated by the government. There are also special people

acting as representative being in lower shade known as Lungi Holder. They also form part of

the Jirga to settle the issues in the tribal society from individual level to inter tribal disputes,

forming the main system of resolving conflict.134 There is no Pakistan’s criminal justice

applicable in the tribal area, which is governed by the traditions and culture to be known as

Riwaj, which was collected to form Laws to be known as Frontier Criminal Rules (FCR) of

1901. These rules covered the cases pertaining to civil and criminal issues. These cases are

132
Mathew W. Williams, “The British colonial experience in Waziristan and its applicability to current operations”, Master Thesis, United
States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2005.
133
Interview with Brigadier (Retired) Mahmood Shah, ex Secretary FATA, January 2014.
134
Ibid.
 93

decided by the Political Agents while the political disputed are settled by the Jirga. This was

the system which was adopted by the British Raj which is still followed by Pakistan.135

As some research states as shown in the chapter of Ahmed's book “The emergence of

the Mullah, the new dimension is the international Jihadism”, introduced in the 1980s by

foreigners. The natural location and geographically contiguity of the FATA region and specilly

the areas of Waziristan made it an ideal area to have hideouts of afghan fighters fighting Soviets

in Afghanistan. The mountainous ranges, valleys and inaccessible areas provided perfect places

for setting up training camps outside Afghanistan, yet at the same time they were close by to

carry out their operations and fall back to the safety on the other side of the Durand Line.

Muslims from across the globe would come to these areas to get training and then wage global

Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The fighters from Arab countries and Central Asia

would often marry women from these areas. Many young men from these very poor and

desolate villages and towns will find themselves in the maddrassas, getting militant training

under the watchful eyes of Pakistani state’s ISI and USA’s CIA. These young men being very

traditional were easily radicalized in the name of the religion and used to carry out violent acts

against the Soviets.

After the defeat of USSR in Afghanistan, the soviets left the country in haste, leaving

the warring faction to fight for the control of power in the capital, Kabul. Many of the fighters

from Arab and specially the fighters from Central Asia settled in Waziristan and became part

and parcel of the local population, more often than not money paving the way for it. The

Taliban taking control of the Afghanistan in mid 1990s saw another wave of recruitment and

radicalization in the area. Many of the young men would then serve in the ranks and file of

Taliban, bringing back home the harshest of versions of Islam. As Pakistan or other Islamic

countries didn’t cater for the deradicalization and rehabilitation of those militants who were

radicalized and fought Afghanistan war, they literally became ticking bombs. Poverty,

135
Ibid.
 94

illiteracy, unemployment and bad governance played its role in exacerbating the conditions and

making it suitable to be exploited in the name of Islam. 9/11 changed the geo-strategic situation

in the area for good. Pakistan abandoned its support of the Taliban regime and chose USA in

the war on terror. USA and NATO forces along with Northern Alliance of Afghanistan over

threw the Taliban regime from Kabul and were defeated elsewhere in Afghanistan. Many of

the fighters came to Waziristan during and after the fighting and they were received with open

arms.136 Those fighters found a safe haven and a great place of refuge in FATA especially

Waziristan, as Pakistan Army and the Government embroiled in its tension on its Eastern Front.

Soon after the tension on Eastern Front will be eased, Waziristan will see the area being

deployed with Pak Army troops for the first time, not even during the Afghanistan War. 137

Army initially was suspected but was never attacked till the time would reach in late 2004,

once the initial resistance in some areas would turn out to be full fledge day attacks, raids and

ambushes. With the passage of time the support of these militants who would radicalize the

masses through the conditions suitable for such activities.138 The money and use of religion

will play a vital part in that change of heart and stance. The former Taliban commanders got

together militia of their own from local and foreign fighters mainly from Uzbekistan. The first

one to fight the Army and at times had peace deal with them was the ex governor in Taliban’s

government in Afghanistan was Nek Mohammad.139 He was executed through Predator

Drone’s Hellfire missile, and he won’t be the last one. That led to the infighting among his

militia. The militia along with the Al Qaeda wanted to transform the North Waziristan into an

Islamic State.140

The later months and year would see the spike in violence as more and more people

would be radicalized specially after the Lal Mosque operation, which sparked the greatest form

136
Interview with Brigadier (Retired) Mahmood Shah, ex Secretary FATA, January 2014.
137
Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, “Understanding FATA Vol IV”, Islamabad, 2010.
138
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, “Understanding FATA”, Journal of PIPS, Islamabad, 2010.
139
Ibid.
140
Ibid.
 95

of violence not only in the tribal areas particularly Waziristan but also in all Pakistan. The rise

of Pakistan version of Taliban sprouts in FATA and Swat in the shape of Tehreek i Taliban

Pakistan (TTP) and TTP – Swat. TTP came into being from Nek Mohammad’s militia and was

led initially by Baitullah Mehsud. The TTP after the incident of Lal Mosque stepped up their

militancy and terrorism campaign basing their headquarters in Waziristan. The recruitment and

support for the militant / terrorist organization – TTP was immense due to the excellent

conditions prevailing in that time: Power Vacuum, Poverty, Unemployment, Bad/Non-existent

governance and Religious emotions.141 TTP – Swat under Fazlullah used almost the similar

conditions to rule Swat with atrocious consequences to the population, until they were ousted

by massive operations done by the Army. TTP was headed by Baitullah Mehsud who was yet

again killed by Drone attacks. He was succeeded by Hakeemullah Mehsud meeting the same

fate as his predecessor. After him Fazlullah of TTP – Swat was selected as the new leader to

lead the Terrorist organization. In 2014 Government after failed negotiations with TTP for a

peace agreement launched a major offensive in North Waziristan against all terrorist and

militant organizations and groups especially focusing on TTP with the name of Operation Zarb

e Azb. This resulted into thousands of militants being captured or surrendered.142

141
Interview with Brigadier (Retired) Mahmood Shah, ex Secretary FATA, January 2014.
142
Ibid.
 96

PROSPECTS OF REHABILITATING MILITANTS OF WAZIRISTAN

Radicalization in Swat and Waziristan

Radicalization of Pakistan’s society has been attributed to multiple factors by the social

scientists ranging from governance to poverty to misconstrued religious interpretation to state’s

encouragement. Although the history/start of radicalization process in Swat and Waziristan is

quite different. However, the factors contributing to the rise of the phenomena of radicalization

in both these regions over the period of time has been found similar in many contexts. Some

of the common factors which contributed to the radicalization in Swat and Waziristan are

discussed below for establishing its pattern and addressing them.

Misinterpretation of Islam. The most significant of the factor contributing to

the increase in radicalization of the people in both areas of Waziristan and Swat has been the

‘Misinterpretation of Islam’ for political use to grab power from the vacuum left by the

traditional centres of power in those areas. The recent use of Islam for political use in these

troubled areas was done by the state in early 1980s, by the then dictator General Zia, with the

help of USA to drive erstwhile USSR out of Afghanistan. It is quite evident how the dictator

used the religion through ‘Mullah-Military’ alliance by indoctrinating people through

misinterpretation of Islam and radicalizing the youth specially studying in Madrassahs. The

seminaries not only proved vital in recruiting mercenaries for the war against USSR waged in

the name of Jihad but also a source of minting petro dollars from Gulf countries in the name of

Islam. This also gave the immense leverage to the dictator to hold on to the power. The flow

of cash, weapons and the narrow minded interpretation of Islam were the hallmark of the so

called Jihad, which in turn started the disturbance of the traditional balance of power in these

areas in the favour of Mullah who had no significant role and power in the society prior to the

Jihad in Afghanistan. The strict interpretation of Islam which was introduced by the dictator

and funding by the Gulf States was different from the one practiced in these regions which was

more inclusive, moderate and followed the Sufi traditions of Islam responsible for the major
 97

spread of Islam in the sub continent. As the Jihad against USSR established the base for the

radicalism of the tribal areas of Pakistan, the decade long war made a permanent mark on the

society of the tribal areas specially Waziristan. The follow up decades and the creation of

Talibans in Afghanistan by Pakistan ensured the sustainability of the radical thoughts and

radicalization of the tribal areas specially Waziristan entrenching the narrow and strict

misinterpretation of Islam and Jihad. The same radicalized individuals were used to wage a

new Jihad in the shape of Kashmir. Again the religion was used to further the political

objectives of the state at the huge cost of radicalizing the society on the basis of

misinterpretation of Islam. Swat got its dose of radicalization with the start of Jihad against

USSR and in 1990s with the TNSM propagating and recruiting for the implementation of

Shariah in Malakand Division. The radicalization got impetus during the rule of Talibans in

Afghanistan and Jihad/insurgency in Kashmir. The major support came after the 9/11 to the

radicalized and militants outfits, which sent fighters from seminaries having wrong

interpretation of Islam. The TNSM along with got their best chance of radicalizing the society

of Swat after the operation against Lal Mosque. It can be easily said with greater degree of

confidence about the single most important factor for radicalization in both Swat and

Waziristan was the use of Religion of Islam for the political objectives by the state through

misinterpretation of it through seminaries. This was later on used by the militants to advance

their objectives to fill the power vacuum and misbalance of power created by the state. The

whole process of radicalization of societies in Waziristan and Swat can be summed up through

the verse of Hazrat Allama Iqbal as: Iqbal’s philosophy and message is obvious from one of

his famous Urdu verses – Deen-e-Mullah fi Sabeelillah Fasad, meaning ‘the religion of the

mullah is anarchy in the name of Allah’. Different surveys specially conducted by Pakistan

Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) have highlighted the fact that the religious misinterpretation

and extremist teachings through Madrassahs apart from few other factors has played a major

role in the radicalization of the societies in Waziristan and Swat. As Mrs Paracha has said in
 98

her briefing to the Pakistani PM on his visit to SDM’s facility – Sabaoon in Feb 2014, “Seen

in terms of fundamentalism or fanaticism, as well as any advocacy of replacement of

democracy with an authoritarian regime. It is relatively easier to instill “hate” and this was

done by the Terrorists / Militants by misquoting the Quran. In essence they knew little about

Islam beyond “misquoted, misinterpreted version of the concept of Jihad” and the rewards in

heaven for killing soldiers and innocent people not siding with Terrorists organization”.

Poverty. Abject poverty in the tribal areas especially Waziristan and Gujjar caste

played a key role in exacerbating the situation in these areas and making a suitable breeding

ground for radicalism to get roots and strengthen itself. The same factor was used first by the

State and later on by the extremist/militants to further their political objectives. The absolute

majority of the militants captured/surrendered in these areas were from very poor to poor

background. A couple of year back a unique research study led by Christian Fair, focusing on

the nexus of poverty and militancy through a survey sample of 141 militants’ families who

were killed either fighting in Kashmir or Afghanistan. The main focus of this 2004/05 study

revolved around the militants who died after the Afghanistan Jihad of 1980s. The study had

remarkable results corroborating the nexus between poverty and the radicalization, as the

majority of the slain fighters were from either very poor financial back ground joining the

movement for finances themselves or were sent by their families to ease the financial and

economic burden. As with the case with poor communities, the large families could afford

son/sons to alleviate them out of abject poverty and certainly doing that in the name of

religion. The poverty did play its role in fuelling and speeding up the process of radicalization

and joining militant outfits. The same was the case of the militants of Swat as was observed

by the author during visit to the detention centre in Mingora-Swat and also the data collected

by the author from Swat Deradicalization’s Centre (Sabaoon). 85% of the beneficiaries of

Sabaoon were hailing from poor background earning between Rs 5,000 to 8,000 per month
 99

by doing menial jobs and labour compounded by the fact that they had to support large

families. ‘Religion may be the most important motivating factor, but not the only reason…

Ignorance, Poverty, Illiteracy and Social Compulsions are all contributing to

radicalization’ Dr. John Horgan

Illiteracy and Unemployment. The deliberate negligence of the state to ensure

that the areas of Waziristan remain backward so that can be radicalized through madrassahs

and used in Jihad against USSR in Afghanistan saw the utter disregard to the formal education

leading to the worst standings of these areas with respect to education. Illiteracy has been found

to be widespread especially in the militants. Over 90% of the militants captured/surrendered

were illiterate. A similar finding of Christian Fair highlighted the miserable situation of literacy

to the extent that not even 4% of the militants had received formal education or full time

religious education. They were just given basic religious education (enough to radicalize them

for violent extremism and terrorism) and then they were given military/terrorist training to

become fodder of the war. Couple with illiteracy is the factor of unemployment and job

opportunities found common in the militants of both Waziristan and Swat. With no proper

industrial base in the region or other job opportunities in the area and due to illiteracy

unemployment has been widespread especially in the youth leading them to be easily

radicalized by the militants in the name of Islam and providing them with the job opportunities.

A lucrative pay package coupled with so called fighting in the way of Islam became one of the

basic motivating factors of radicalized youths joining militants’ outfits.

Marginalization and Bad Governance. The social scientists, economist

and leading policy making institutes have found in their study of the linkage between

population and state. It is believed that if the state has better attitude especially that of a caring

one induces a better, loyal attitude towards it by the society. FATA is still controlled and

governed till 2015 through draconian and repressive age old colonial laws of British Raj i.e

Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The relationship between the state and its society dwells
 100

upon the basis of the services that the state provides to its society, which includes basic services

required as by the individual human being from social security to education. The

marginalization and bad governance played havoc with the lives of the people of Swat and

fuelled the process of radicalization in the area almost in the same manner as was the case in

FATA. This led to the full fledge militancy in the entire area of Swat. Those who were less

fortunate in terms of social status and were marginalized were used by the terrorists to further

their goals and objectives by using violent means. The lack of administrative good governance

and managing the affairs lead to the vacuum which was filled up by the terrorists and tried

providing the essential services to populace.

Swat after losing its special status as an autonomous, self governing region in 1969

gave rise to bad governance specially the speedy and cheap justice. The same was exploited by

the militant organization of TTP (Swat) to their advantage to provide free of cost justice with

minimum of delays at their doorsteps. This did attracted Swat’s common people towards TTP

(Swat) seeking better judicial system and better governance. The same is applicable for

Waziristan, where the state of Pakistan continued to neglect the areas and ruled them with

colonial era draconian law of FCR. The marginalized and worst governed areas left a vacuum

after the state used the Mullahs of the areas for achieving their political objectives at the cost

of ruining the already established Maliki System. This vacuum of power was later filled up by

different militant organization which sprang up after 9/11 once the militants of these areas

were defeated by US/Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. The radicalization in Swat and

Waziristan got impetus from the unchecked activities of militants who initially recruited for

fight against ISAF forces present in Afghanistan and later made their own chapters of Tehreek

e Taliban Pakistan and other similar organizations in FATA. Different peace treaties between

the state and different militant organization gave shot in the arm to these organizations to recruit

and radicalized with impunity. Lal Mosque operation turned out to be of immense value to

these terrorists organization in radicalizing the populace of these two regions. The distinguish
 101

between terrorists as ‘Good and Bad Talibans’ exacerbated the situation in these areas to give

a free hand to the Good ones to radicalize the Youth in almost as an official patronage to their

activities. Bad or non existence of Governance in Swat and Waziristan gave the perfect

enabling environment to the militant organizations a free hand in the radicalization of the

societies mainly the illiterate, unemployed and disoriented Youth.

Militants of Swat and Waziristan – Identical Twins. The militants belonging to

the two different geographically separated regions possessed almost identical qualities and

characteristics especially with regards to radicalization, that they can easily be termed identical

twins. According to the author’s observation and those of officials who had served in both

Waziristan and Swat, the over arching similarities between the militants of Swat and Waziristan

are due to their same set of recruitment process. The use of religion to motivate the Youth

which are in the impressionable age was found common in both set of militants. Majority of

the militants in both areas had a poor / very poor back ground, making it easier for the militants

to recruit them. As the factors responsible for radicalization of militants in both the areas were,

same or identical those lead to the almost identical demographic, economic and other data.

There might be difference in economic opportunities present in both areas but a careful review

of the data of the detainees by the author revealed interesting revelation that majority of the

militants from Swat were of Gujjar origin (Tennets) with very poor economic and social

background. Some of the striking similarities (leading as contributing factors in their

radicalization, which in case of Waziristan can be targeted for deradicalization of militants held

by the LEAs) between militants of both Swat and Waziristan are mentioned below:-

Age Comparison of Swat and Waziristan Militants143

143
Data gathered by the author from LEAs regarding the militants captured in Swat, North and South Waziristan
till December 2015.
 102

45%

40%

35%

30%

25%
SWAT
20% WAZIRISTAN

15%

10%

5%

0%
< 15 Years < 18 Years < 24 Years > 24 years

Comparison of Birth Order between Swat and Waziristan Militants144

60%

50%

40%

30% SAWAT
WAZIRISTAN

20%

10%

0%
YOUNGEST CHIILD MIDDLE CHILD ELDEST CHILD

Socio Eco Profile between Swat and Waziristan Militants held by LEAs145

144
Ibid.
145
Ibid.
 103

70%

60%

50%

40%
SAWAT
30% WAZIRISTAN

20%

10%

0%
Poor Lower Middle Middle

Comparison of Motivational factors leading them to join militancy between Swat and

Waziristan Militants146

60%

50%

40%

30%

SAWAT
20%
WAZIRISTAN

10%

0%

146
Ibid.
 104

Comparison of Education profiles of Militants of Swat and Waziristan147

60%

50%

40%

30% SAWAT
WAZIRISTAN
20%

10%

0%
Illiterate Primary Middle School High School College
School

Comparison of Religious Education profiles of Militants Less than 18 Years of age of

Swat and Waziristan148

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%
SAWAT
40%
WAZIRISTAN
30%

20%

10%

0%
Read Quran w/o Read Quran with Read Hadith Did not Read
Translation Translation Quran/Hadith

147
Ibid.
148
Ibid.
 105

Comparison of Religious Education profiles of Militants above the age of 18 Years of age

of Swat and Waziristan149

70%

60%

50%

40%

SAWAT
30% WAZIRISTAN

20%

10%

0%
Read Quran w/o Read Quran with Read Hadith Did not Read
Translation Translation Quran/Hadith

Comparison of Illiteracy & Unemployment of Militants of Swat and Waziristan150

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50% SAWAT
40% WAZIRISTAN

30%

20%

10%

0%
Iliterate under 18 Illiterte over 18 Unemployed Unemployed
under 18 over18

149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.
 106

RECOMMENDATION

DERADICALIZATION MODEL FOR MILITANTS OF WAZIRISTAN

The Concept. The concept of deradicalization of detainees (Waziristan’s militant) is

same as of the Swat Deradicalization Model, which is as following:-

“Restoration of Self Respect, Removal of Psychological Burden Caused by Ideological

Exploitation and Understanding True Perspective of Life & Islam”

Mission

The mission statement of Waziristan Deradicalization Model (WDM) could be based on the

same line as that of Swat Deradicalization Model (SDM):-

“Provide an environment conducive for restoration of self respect of selected

individuals (adult detainees and juveniles) with a view to remove their psychological

burden caused by ideological exploitation and / or coercion so as to make them useful

Pakistani citizens, causing no threat to society.”

Core Objectives. The core objectives may be woven around following:-

 Create conducive, enabling environment for the beneficiaries to focus on

deradicalization process without mental and physical pressures.

 Deradicalize and remove psychological burden with a special focus on

misinterpretation of religion.

 Vocational training - helping them to earn a respectable living.

 Prepare individuals towards economic emancipation and social responsibility.

 107

Implementation Stages. The implementation of the deradicalization program will involve

four different stages starting from the selection of beneficiaries to post reintegration monitoring

stage. The four stages are enumerated as following:-

 Selection Stage. This stage involves identification of psychological

willing participants through the process of input from elders, concerned Army unit and

the psychologist / psychiatrist.

 Deradicalization Stage. This stage involves housing the participants in

respectable living environment and exposing them to correct religious ideology,

psychological treatment, families’ engagement, and structured interface with elders,

dev of national spirit, co-curricular activities and vocational training.

 Pre Reintegration - Assessment Stage. This is a concurrent process

running throughout the first two stages to evaluate the level of fitness and suitability for

re-integration.

 Post Reintegration - Monitoring Stage. This is meant to ensure that the re-

integration Beneficiaries remain in the mainstream and protected from the negative

influences of militant elements in the society.

Conduct Paradigm. In conduct of Deradicalization process, following four major

steps will be taken to achieve the core objectives:-

 Psychological Conditioning & Correction.

 Correct Reflection of Social & Religious Aspects.

 Skill Enhancement (Economic Empowerment).

 Family participation in the Deradicalization Program.

Modalities
 108

 Step – I (Selection of Beneficiaries). The selection of beneficiaries is to

be carried out with utmost care and must be deliberated in detail through well laid out

program. Special focus of attention to be paid on Juvenile detainees who are deemed

necessary to go through the deradicalization program. The selection of beneficiaries

may be carried as following:-

 Initial screening on the basis of age, gender, detention period, behaviour

and verification by Police / Political Agent to be carried out.

 Selection of individuals amongst the detainees will be carried out in

coordination with local Jirgas and concerned security elements.

 Pre-induction examination by psychologist shall be undertaken by

utilizing different psychometric screening techniques.

 Aspects of social intervention by families and community have to be

duly considered during selection.

 Detainees once selected for the program will be referred to as

“Beneficiaries”.

 Step-II (Psychological Conditioning & Correction)

 The first step will be psychiatric module which involves transition of

minds of the inmates so as to be receptive of social and religious

education.

 Psychiatric therapy of rigid minded individuals will be undertaken by a

dedicated and highly qualifies psychiatric team comprising civil and

military doctors along with expert Psychologist preferably who worked

with Swat Deradicalization Programs.

 109

 In order to assess an individual’s behavior with his group/section,

frequent interactions of the psychiatric team during off hours should also

be planned.

 Time should be devoted for lectures and discussions through dedicated

faculty of Army and local/ civil psychiatrists. Frequent, impromptu,

unorthodox psychological tests of the Beneficiaries be carried out to

monitor their progress and also the efficacy of various activities carried

out during the deradicalization program.

 Step - III (Social and Religious module). It is aimed at helping

Beneficiaries realize their social obligations thus becoming useful members of the

society and correcting the misunderstandings related to basic Islamic concepts.

Following are few of the suggested steps:-

 Purpose should be to bring a change in their attitude towards a modern

and civilized life which is within the bounds of the true religious

teachings.

 Regular lectures by the influential guest speakers are to be conducted in

the program preferably by learned local religious scholars of repute.

 Imparting of Quranic education to the Beneficiaries should also be given

due consideration preferably with translation focusing on the true

concepts of Islam relating to Jihad.

 One complete day be planned every week for a monitored group

discussion in the presence of complete psychiatric and training team,

which may focus topics and subjects ranging from religion to small

matters of life.
 110

 Beneficiaries should also be allowed after a specific time (to be

ascertained by the Psychologists on the performance and progress

towards the deradicalization) to socialize with their families once a week

thus making them aware of their civic responsibilities.

 Overall a very conducive living environment is to be provided in the

program, where all the beneficiaries are treated with dignity and respect,

which will make their transition back to a normal member of the society

easy.

 Step - IV (Vocational Training). It is, imparting of the Vocational

Training to all beneficiaries, which is aimed at facilitating their after-release

employment. This module encompasses various disciplines as shown on the screen.

For vocational modules, Waziristan Deradicalization Program should be affiliated with

Government Technical and Vocational Centre FATA (GTVC).

 Step –V (Family Deradicalization). It Involves Family

deradicalization, which will be another significant facet of the program. It will be

done on weekly basis through lectures and discussion by eminent religious scholars and

notables from the society on all visitors’ days. Services of ladies religious scholars

(preferable Pashto speaking) may be procured for female members of beneficiaries.

 Step – VI (Post Deradicalization Reintegration). It is one of the

most important stage of the complete program of any deradicalization effort. The entire

effort put in may go to waste if the reintegration process is not carried out in true letter

and spirit. The non-recidivism can only be ensured with the active participation of

Beneficiaries’ family and community. The community is also to be made partner and

stake holder in the reintegration of Beneficiaries back into the society/community,

which in turn will make the community safe and away from harm’s way. The two

processes involved in the post deradicalization reintegration are appended below:-

 111

 Rehabilitation/Reintegration. Reintegration efforts should not only

dilate on imparting tech skills through vocational training with no financial

assistance for rehabilitation. It is suggested that financial assistance may

continue till at least 2 years after the release of beneficiaries from the

deradicalization program, which will go a long way in stabilizing the

beneficiaries’ financial situation. The stipend should be enough to maintain

a household in the absence of income, thus cutting off the chances of

recidivism because of financial issues.

 There is no time-line for reintegration.

 Each beneficiary is assessed according to the GRAIR, intermittently.

 The variables impacting each beneficiary is different, therefore the

reintegration plan is tailored accordingly.

 What is important is, that a child doesn’t “go back”.

 The effort should be to try and inculcate a desire for change.

 Therefore, if it is not a school, then it is a vocational training college or

a job that the child goes back to.

 Monitoring. Decentralized monitoring of the released Beneficiaries should

be conducted by the concerned LEAs (also involving police, Village Defense

Committees, Peace Committees and sources) for a period of 1year by calling/ reporting

of Beneficiaries. The community has to be educated regarding the monitoring the

beneficiaries in manner that it does not make the Beneficiaries guilty conscious. It

should be done in a manner that it invokes self participation by the Beneficiaries.

Released on the advice of area notables to a specific ‘Guarantor’ with assurance from

his immediate family. Periodic feedback of released beneficiaries is received from the
 112

respective Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and concerned social circles. The data

is collected, collated and analysed for initiating any action or assistance required by the

beneficiaries. Monitoring is exercised for a period of 1 year by re-calling beneficiaries

at regular intervals as under:-

 Initial 6 Months

 1st Half : On weekly basis.

 2nd Half : On fortnightly basis.

 After 6 Months : On monthly basis.

 Registration of released beneficiaries with concerned local Police

stations.

 The Monitoring Cell’s Primary Goal

 The Social Workers from the NGOs handling Deradicalization

facilities and the Monitoring Cell constituting members from

LEAs as well will assess the family situation at home in the

initial community visits so as to have a general idea of the

dilemmas waiting for the Beneficiaries post reintegration.

 The Social Workers counsel the children prior to as well as after

Reintegration depending on what kind of Problems the children

and or their families/communities Report.

Distribution of Time/Effort of various aspects of Deradicalization Program

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Social & Religious

Aspects including
20% Education
Family De-
Radicalization
15% 50% Skill Enhancement
(Vocational Training)
Psychological
15% Conditioning

(Suggested % Distribution of Waziristan Deradicalization Model’s Time/Effort)

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WAZIRISTAN DERADICALIZATION MODEL

Adult Juvenile

Razmak
Bannu Miran Shah Mir Ali
Wana Facility (15 Years &
Facility Facility (16-18 years)
Less)

High Risk Low and Med Risk Low to High Risk

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FLOW CHART – DERDICALIZATION PROGRAM

Apprehended
Arrival at NGO’s
Volunteer Arr Monitoring Cell
Local Units Post

Jointly byNGO& LEAs

Surrendered Reintegration Local Units
By Local Units Monitoring
Report by Both

By LEAs
Initial
Categorize
Screening
Recommend Joint Finalization
Interview of Cases for
Reintegration Reintegration
Arrival Case Study Process
LEAs&NGO Ceremony
Re-Categorize /
Risk Stratification Join Society
Case Analysis
Interviews De-Rad By NGO’s
By NGO

Transfer to Module EXPERTS

By NGO
NGO Risk
Stratification
and Induction
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CIV-MIL SYNERGY IN
DERDICALIZTION PROGRAM
Induction (Selection process by
LEAs + NGOs
Psycho-social aspects

Deradicalization Process Academics

Vocational training
GRAIR (Guideline sfor Risk
Assessment, Intervention &
Reintegration)
Sports

Reintegration (LEAs + NGOs +

Community)

Guideline for Risk Assessment,

Intervention and Reintegration taps
on:

 Historical Risk Factors

 Familial Risk Factors

 Social Contextual Risk factors

 Individual Clinical risk factors

 Protective factors

 Extremist/ terrorist risk factors

 Willingness to understand /
verification Islam. i.e. replace
previous misrepresentations.
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GRAIR

 Guideline

 Facilitation of determining the root cause of individual beneficiary’s radicalization.

 In and out of violent extremism:-

 Risk towards violence, criminality & psychopathy.

 Intervention areas & duration of treatment.

 Aspects of reintegration: personal & environmental.

 Purpose

 Catering to the risk assessment needs of the Deradicalization Facilities & the

Reintegrated (MC) population

 Indigenous sampling of all the beneficiaries.

 Different from adolescents at Risk for Violence & prison population.

 Specific areas to be covered – SES, Religious understanding, association with

militants, etc.

 Designed for adolescent population (along with beneficiaries over 18 years of age

with slight modifications in the techniques) to be used affected by the militancy in

the region.

 Based on already established Risk Assessments + Factors identified within

beneficiaries of deradicalization facilities.

 Objectifies the information on each case.

 Not based on subjective information.

 Hunches or feelings are justified with facts.

 Easy to identify problem areas as well as specific problems

 E.g: history shows problem in abuse at home, and negative attitudes, anger

management, lack of empathy, etc, in Individual/Clinical Risk factors. These may

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be translated into lack of protective factors, such as minimal strong attachments or

social support, lack of authority figure, Father working abroad.

 ‘IN’ and ‘OUT’ of Violent Extremism

 Factors leading “IN” to Extremism

 Misinterpretation / Misuse of Religion.

 3 P’s (Power, Poverty & Politics).

 Absence of Father-figure.

 Dropping out of School.

 Large family size (8+ at avg).

 Middle born child.

 Lack of religious understanding.

 Fear or threat to own/family life.

 Lack of logical reasoning/ abstract thinking.

 The most powerful Factor that encouraged the young to join militancy was

accepting the quotations from the Quran, without questioning or reasoning

logically.

E.g: “Oh people of Waziristan, wage war against the army, police and

FC (security forces)…”

 Factors leading “OUT” to Extremism

 Disengagement (forced vs. self motivated).

 Deradicalization/ Corrective religious education.

 Goal direction (educational pursuits and or skill acquisition).

 Social and personal support.

 Employment opportunities.
 119

 Pro-social involvement in communities/immediate environment.

 Development of logical thinking.

 Psychological Factors likely to be Encounter during Deradicalization

 Aggression & hostility.

 Defensiveness/ Evasiveness.

 Denial.

 Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

 Depression & Anxiety.

 Sleep problems (Insomnia, parasomnia, nightmares).

 Homosexual tendencies.

 Low self esteem.

 Feelings of guilt.

 Conversion Disorder.

 Dissociative Episodes.

 Soft neuropathology leading to EEG abnormalities.

 Assessment Procedure

 Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM and Re-SPM).

 Bender Gestalt Test (BGT).

 WISC/WAIS (Wechsler Intelligence Scales).

 House-Tree-Person (HTP).

 Wechsler Non Verbal (WNV).

 Major activities to be carried out during Deradicalization Program

 Formal Education:-

 Class I to Matriculation.

 Intermediate (F.A/ F.Sc) to Bachelors (B.A./BSc).

 120

 Psychosocial Intervention:-

 Individual & group sessions.

 Behavior Modification Procedures.

 Corrective Religious Education.

 Vocational Training Skills.

 Extra-curricular:-

 Computers.

 Sports (cricket, volleyball, football, badminton, table tennis).

 Field trips.

 Debating, sports competitions, Annual Sports Gala .

 121

Conclusion

The areas of Waziristan and Swat though distant apart had almost identical factors and

basis for enabling environment conducive for Radicalization of those areas. The most basic

and building block of the militancy and radicalization of these areas was the use of Islam and

its wrong interpretation initially by the state for achieving its political objectives in Afghanistan

(Initially against USSR and then by supporting Taliban movement and its government in

Afghanistan since 1996). Secondly the militant organizations used the same for their

recruitment and power grab against the same state machinery and the state itself. The words of

Quran and that of the Mohammad (P.B.U.H) were twisted, moulded and misinterpreted to

radicalize the populace specially the Youth. The common factors of Poverty, Illiteracy,

Unemployment and Bad/Non-existent Governance in these areas created an environment

conducive for the radicalization and to the advantage of the militant organizations embarked

on so called shariah state and power grab.

Swat Deradicalization Model (SDM) through its various centres showed a great achievement

by undertaking gigantic task of deradicalizing militants and terrorists. Since the causes and

factors of radicalization amongst the society in general and militants in particular the same

between Waziristan and Swat, it can be said with a great amount of certainty that if the SDM

is applied to the Militants of Waziristan, it has the great Prospect of Rehabilitating them in the

same manner like that of the Swat. A few modifications in the SDM to further increase the

efficacy will go a long way in rehabilitating Militants in the different parts of FATA. As it is

in the Quran, The one who killed a Human Being is just like killing the entire Human Race,

while the one Who saves a Life (of a human being) is like saving the entire Mankind.

Rehabilitating militants through Deradicalization programmes is just one step in that direction

in saving precious lives of the ones, who were detracted/radicalized due to the reasons

including that of the state and its society. Deradicalization of the militants is possible and a
 122

fact, if applied through a well thought out programme, SDM is one such shining example of

success in deradicalizing and rehabilitating militants.

“The war of words” has not yet taken over to counter the ideology that the terrorists have

propagated. We need to take over all the secondary schools in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KP] and

provide the intervention for religious education, we need to work with mothers, encourage a

planned family, and children should not be “dispensable”. We should help chart the course of

these adolescents towards achievement. Our students have shown incredible success in their

academic achievement and are at the top of the institutions they are attending…why? They do

not have to be concerned about the expense of their education. Our promise to them? “You can

do whatever you like on merit and we will support you!” This is the function of the State.

However there are no jobs in Swat. So our graduates became disillusioned. We have now set

up a vocational skill centre elsewhere where there are jobs and our boys are training to become

scouts to look for jobs for their peers!

Swat at the least should become a tax haven or also be given trade benefits and concessions so

industrialists open factories and create jobs in Swat…. why not? It happened with Bangladesh.

I just feel strongly that if the “powers that be” really wanted to help Pakistan (and not just give

donations) then why are there no export benefits like tariff concession etc as have been given

to Bangladesh.

There is so much that civil society can do and are doing…we just need the structure within

which the expectations of human rights are not denied…education, health, jobs, security. Who

then would want to die? Children grow up without an authority figure and women are mostly

illiterate, although true they were empowered by Fazlullah [who led the Taliban in Swat] to

“ensure heaven for their families..” they were given a role...If we had concessions for Swat and

KP, believe me most businesses and industries would flourish there and opportunities would

open up for jobs.

 123

We pay for each and every cost for the students at Sabaoon and those reintegrated. The security

is provided by the army and for that I am not only grateful, I would not have done this without

this provision.

But there is a need for intervention programmes and community engagement at and through

the secondary schools in the most vulnerable areas of Swat. Any donations that come to

Sabaoon could help these boys build a better future for themselves. These would also enable

other children.

Finally, there is no ‘one’ template as a solution for every type of radicalization. The

counter radicalization program to rehabilitate the militant through deradicalization programs

must cater for the distinct characteristics of militancy, its root causes, its economic conditions

and its living condition in a particular society. For example, the Swat Deradicalization Model’s

programmes would be difficult to implement elsewhere in the country where the main root

cause of radicalization is not religious like in the case of Balochistan. The problems that a

program may face, ranges from resources to counter the narrative of the terrorists and militants.

But, a deradicalization program such as Swat Deradicalization Model may be used as a

guideline for dealing with militants and reintegrating them back into the society through

deradicalization by analyzing the causes of their radicalization and finding the suitable answers,

narrative and means to counter them.

 124

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