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FIREARMS
Republic Act No. 10591
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday,
the twenty-third day of July, two thousand
twelve.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10591]
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS
AND AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
ARTICLE I
TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND
DEFINITION OF TERMS
SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be
known as the “Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act”.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. – It is the
policy of the State to maintain peace and order
and protect the people against violence. The
State also recognizes the right of its qualified
citizens to self-defense through, when it is the
reasonable means to repel the unlawful
aggression under the circumstances, the use of
firearms. Towards this end, the State shall
provide for a comprehensive law regulating the
ownership, possession, carrying, manufacture,
dealing in and importation of firearms,
ammunition, or parts thereof, in order to
provide legal support to law enforcement
agencies in their campaign against crime, stop
the proliferation of illegal firearms or weapons
and the illegal manufacture of firearms or
weapons, ammunition and parts thereof.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this
Act:
(a) Accessories refer to parts of a firearm which
may enhance or increase the operational
efficiency or accuracy of a firearm but will not
constitute any of the major or minor internal
parts thereof such as, hut not limited to, laser
scope, telescopic sight and sound suppressor or
silencer.
(b) Ammunition refers to a complete unfixed
unit consisting of a bullet, gunpowder,
cartridge case and primer or loaded shell for
use in any firearm.
(c) Antique firearm refers to any: (1) firearm
which was manufactured at least seventy-five
(75) years prior to the current date but not
including replicas; (2) firearm which is
certified by the National Museum of the
Philippines to be curio or relic of museum
interest; and (3) any other firearm which
derives a substantial part of its monetary value
from the fact that it is novel, rare, bizarre or
because of its association with some historical
figure, period or event.
(d) Arms smuggling refers to the import,
export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or
transfer of firearms, their parts and components
and ammunition, from or across the territory of
one country to that of another country which
has not been authorized in accordance with
domestic law in either or both
country/countries.
(e) Authority to import refers to a document
issued by the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) authorizing the importation of
firearms, or their parts, ammunition and other
components.
(f) Authorized dealer refers to any person, legal
entity, corporation, partnership or business
entity duly licensed by the Firearms and
Explosive Office (FEO) of the PNP to engage
in the business of buying and selling
ammunition, firearms or parte thereof, at
wholesale or retail basis.
(g) Authorized importer refers to any person,
legal entity, corporation, partnership or
business duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP
to engage in the business of importing
ammunition and firearms, or parts thereof into
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines
for purposes of sale or distribution under the
provisions of this Act.
(h) Authorized manufacturer refers to any
person, legal entity, corporation, or partnership
duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage
in the business of manufacturing firearms, and
ammunition or parts thereof for purposes of
sale or distribution.
(i) Confiscated firearm refers to a firearm that
is taken into custody by the PNP, National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and all other
law enforcement agencies by reason of their
mandate and must be necessarily reported or
turned over to the PEO of the PNP.
(j) Demilitarized firearm refers to a firearm
deliberately made incapable of performing its
main purpose of firing a projectile.
(k) Duty detail order refers to a document
issued by the juridical entity or employer
wherein the details of the disposition of firearm
is spelled-out, thus indicating the name of the
employee, the firearm information, the specific
duration and location of posting or assignment
and the authorized bonded firearm custodian
for the juridical entity to whom such firearm is
turned over after the lapse of the order.
(l) Firearm refers to any handheld or portable
weapon, whether a small arm or light weapon,
that expels or is designed to expel a bullet,
shot, slug, missile or any projectile, which is
discharged by means of expansive force of
gases from burning gunpowder or other form of
combustion or any similar instrument or
implement. For purposes of this Act, the barrel,
frame or receiver is considered a firearm.
(m) Firearms Information Management System
(FIMS) refers to the compilation of all data and
information on firearms ownership and
disposition for record purposes.
(n) Forfeited firearm refers to a firearm that is
subject to forfeiture by reason of court order as
accessory penalty or for the disposition by the
FEO of the PNP of firearms considered as
abandoned, surrendered, confiscated or revoked
in compliance with existing rules and
regulations.
(o) Gun club refers to an organization duly
registered with and accredited in good standing
by the FEO of the PNP which is established for
the purpose of propagating responsible and safe
gun ownership, proper appreciation and use of
firearms by its members, for the purpose of
sports and shooting competition, self-defense
and collection purposes.
(p) Gunsmith refers to any person, legal entity,
corporation, partnership or business duly
licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in
the business of repairing firearms and other
weapons or constructing or assembling
firearms and weapons from finished or
manufactured parts thereof on a per order basis
and not in commercial quantities or of making
minor parts for the purpose of repairing or
assembling said firearms or weapons.
(q) Imitation firearm refers to a replica of a
firearm, or other device that is so substantially
similar in coloration and overall appearance to
an existing firearm as to lead a reasonable
person to believe that such imitation firearm is
a real firearm.
(r) Licensed citizen refers to any Filipino who
complies with the qualifications set forth in this
Act and duly issued with a license to possess or
to carry firearms outside of the residence in
accordance with this Act.
(s) Licensed, juridical entity refers to
corporations, organizations, businesses
including security agencies and local
government units (LGUs) which are licensed to
own and possess firearms in accordance with
this Act.
(t) Light weapons are: Class-A Light weapons
which refer to self-loading pistols, rifles and
carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and
light machine guns not exceeding caliber
7.62MM which have fully automatic mode; and
Class-B Light weapons which refer to weapons
designed for use by two (2) or more persons
serving as a crew, or rifles and machine guns
exceeding caliber 7.62MM such as heavy
machine guns, handheld underbarrel and
mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-
aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless
rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile
and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-
aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a
caliber of less than 100MM.
(u) Long certificate of registration refers to
licenses issued to government agencies or
offices or government-owned or -controlled
corporations for firearms to be used by their
officials and employees who are qualified to
possess firearms as provider in this Act,
excluding security guards.
(v) Loose firearm refers to an unregistered
firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm,
firearm which has been lost or stolen, illegally
manufactured firearms, registered firearms in
the possession of an individual other than the
licensee and those with revoked licenses in
accordance with the rules and regulations.
(w) Major part or components of a firearm
refers to the barrel, slide, frame, receiver,
cylinder or the bolt assembly. The term also
includes any part or kit designed and intended
for use in converting a semi-automatic burst to
a full automatic firearm.
(x) Minor parts of a firearm refers to the parts
of the firearm other than the major parts which
are necessary to effect and complete the action
of expelling a projectile by way of combustion,
except those classified as accessories.
(y) Permit to carry firearm outside of residence
refers to a written authority issued to a licensed
citizen by the Chief of the PNP which entitles
such person to carry his/her registered or
lawfully issued firearm outside of the residence
for the duration and purpose specified in the
authority.
(z) Permit to transport firearm refers to a
written authority issued to a licensed citizen or
entity by the Chief of the PNP or by a PNP
Regional Director which entitles such person or
entity to transport a particular firearm from and
to a specific location within the duration and
purpose in the authority.
(aa) Residence refers to the place or places of
abode of the licensed citizen as indicated in
his/her license.
(bb) Shooting range refers to a facility
established for the purpose of firearms training
and skills development, firearm testing, as well
as for sports and competition shooting either
for the exclusive use of its members or open to
the general public, duly registered with and
accredited in good standing by the FEO of the
PNP.
(cc) Short certificate of registration refers to a
certificate issued by the FEO of the PNP for a
government official or employee who was
issued by his/her employer department, agency
or government-owned or -controlled
corporation a firearm covered by the long
certificate of registration.
(dd) Small arms refer to firearms intended to be
or primarily designed for individual use or that
which is generally considered to mean a
weapon intended to be fired from the hand or
shoulder, which are not capable of fully
automatic bursts of discharge, such as:
(1) Handgun which is a firearm intended to be
fired from the hand, which includes:
(i) A pistol which is a hand-operated firearm
having a chamber integral with or permanently
aligned with the bore which may be self-
loading; and
(ii) Revolver which is a hand-operated firearm
with a revolving cylinder containing chambers
for individual cartridges.
(2) Rifle which is a shoulder firearm or
designed to be fired from the shoulder that can
discharge a bullet through a rifled barrel by
different actions of loading, which may be
classified as lever, bolt, or self-loading; and
(3) Shotgun which is a weapon designed, made
and intended to fire a number of ball shots or a
single projectile through a smooth bore by the
action or energy from burning gunpowder.
(ee) Sports shooting competition refers to a
defensive, precision or practical sport shooting
competition duly authorized by the FEO of the
PNP.
(ff) Tampered, obliterated or altered firearm
refers to any firearm whose serial number or
other identification or ballistics characteristics
have been intentionally tampered with,
obliterated or altered without authority or in
order to conceal its source, identity or
ownership.
(gg) Thermal weapon sight refers to a battery
operated, uncooled thermal imaging device
which amplifies available thermal signatures so
that the viewed scene becomes clear to the
operator which is used to locate and engage
targets during daylight and from low light to
total darkness and operates in adverse
conditions such as light rain, light snow, and
dry smoke or in conjunction with other optical
and red dot sights.
ARTICLE II
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS
SEC. 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance
of and Obtaining a License to Own and
Possess Firearms. – In order to qualify and
acquire a license to own and possess a firearm
or firearms and ammunition, the applicant must
be a Filipino citizen, at least twenty-one (21)
years old and has gainful work, occupation or
business or has filed an Income Tax Return
(ITR) for the preceding year as proof of
income, profession, business or occupation.
In addition, the applicant shall submit the
following certification issued by appropriate
authorities attesting the following:
(a) The applicant has not been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude:
(b) The applicant has passed the psychiatric test
administered by a PNP-accredited psychologist
or psychiatrist;
(c) The applicant has passed the drug test
conducted by an accredited and authorized drug
testing laboratory or clinic;
(d) The applicant has passed a gun safety
seminar which is administered by the PNP or a
registered and authorized gun club;
(e) The applicant has filed in writing the
application to possess a registered firearm
which shall state the personal circumstances of
the applicant;
(f) The applicant must present a police
clearance from the city or municipality police
office; and
(g) The applicant has not been convicted or is
currently an accused in a pending criminal case
before any court of law for a crime that is
punishable with a penalty of more than two (2)
years.
For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or
permanent dismissal of a criminal case before
the courts of law shall qualify the accused
thereof to qualify and acquire a license.
The applicant shall pay the reasonable licensing
fees as may be provided in the implementing
rules and regulations of this Act.
An applicant who intends to possess a firearm
owned by a juridical entity shall submit his/her
duty detail order to the FEO of the PNP.
SEC. 5. Ownership of Firearms and
Ammunition by a Juridical Entity. – A juridical
person maintaining its own security force may
be issued a regular license to own and possess
firearms and ammunition under the following
conditions:
(a) It must be Filipino-owned and duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC);
(b) It is current, operational and a continuing
concern;
(c) It has completed and submitted all its
reportorial requirements to the SEC; and
(d) It has paid all its income taxes for the year,
as duly certified by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
The application shall be made in the name of
the juridical person represented by its President
or any of its officers mentioned below as duly
authorized in a board resolution to that effect:
Provided, That the officer applying for the
juridical entity, shall possess all the
qualifications required of a citizen applying for
a license to possess firearms.
Other corporate officers eligible to represent
the juridical person are: the vice president,
treasurer, and board secretary.
Security agencies and LGUs shall be included
in this category of licensed holders but shall be
subject to additional requirements as may be
required by the Chief of the PNP.
SEC. 6. Ownership of Firearms by the
National Government. – All firearms owned by
the National Government shall be registered
with the FEO of the PNP in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Such registration
shall be exempt from all duties and taxes that
may otherwise be levied on other authorized
owners of firearms. For reason of national
security, firearms of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), Coast Guard and other law
enforcement agencies shall only be reported to
the FEO of the PNP.
SEC. 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence or Place of Business. – A permit to
carry firearms outside of residence shall be
issued by the Chief of the PNP or his/her duly
authorized representative to any qualified
person whose life is under actual threat or
his/her life is in imminent danger due to the
nature of his/her profession, occupation or
business.
It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove
that his/her life is under actual threat by
submitting a threat assessment certificate from
the PNP.
For purposes of this Act, the following
professionals are considered to be in imminent
danger due to the nature of their profession,
occupation or business:
(a) Members of the Philippine Bar;
(b) Certified Public Accountants;
(c) Accredited Media Practitioners;
(d) Cashiers, Bank Tellers;
(e) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams;
(f) Physicians and Nurses;
(g) Engineers; and
(h) Businessmen, who by the nature of their
business or undertaking, are exposed to high
risk of being targets of criminal elements.
ARTICLE III
REGISTRATION AND LICENSING
SEC. 8. Authority to Issue License. – The Chief
of the PNP, through the FEO of the PNP, shall
issue licenses to qualified individuals and to
cause the registration of firearms.
SEC. 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. –
Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act
and payment of required fees to be determined
by the Chief of the PNP, a qualified individual
may be issued the appropriate license under the
following categories;
Type 1 license – allows a citizen to own and
possess a maximum of two (2) registered
firearms;
Type 2 license – allows a citizen to own and
possess a maximum of five (5) registered
firearms;
Type 3 license – allows a citizen to own and
possess a maximum of ten (10) registered
firearms;
Type 4 license – allows a citizen to own and
possess a maximum of fifteen (15) registered
firearms; and
Type 5 license – allows a citizen, who is a
certified gun collector, to own and possess
more than fifteen (15) registered firearms.
For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container
secured by lock and key or other security
measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall
be required.
For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must
comply with the inspection and bond
requirements.
SEC. 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. –
Only small arms may be registered by licensed
citizens or licensed juridical entities for
ownership, possession and concealed carry. A
light weapon shall be lawfully acquired or
possessed exclusively by the AFP, the PNP and
other law enforcement agencies authorized by
the President in the performance of their duties:
Provided, That private individuals who already
have licenses to possess Class-A light weapons
upon the effectivity of this Act shall not be
deprived of the privilege to continue possessing
the same and renewing the licenses therefor, for
the sole reason that these firearms are Class
“A” light weapons, and shall be required to
comply with other applicable provisions of this
Act.
SEC. 11. Registration of Firearms. – The
licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity shall
register his/her/its firearms so purchased with
the FEO of the PNP in accordance with the
type of license such licensed citizen or licensed
juridical entity possesses. A certificate of
registration of the firearm shall be issued upon
payment of reasonable fees.
For purposes of this Act, registration refers to
the application, approval, record-keeping and
monitoring of firearms with the FEO of the
PNP in accordance with the type of license
issued to any person under Section 9 of this
Act.
SEC. 12. License to Possess Ammunition
Necessarily Included. – The licenses granted to
qualified citizens or juridical entities as
provided in Section 9 of this Act shall include
the license to possess ammunition with a
maximum of fifty (50) rounds for each
registered firearm: Provided; That the FEO of
the PNP may allow more ammunition to be
possessed by licensed sports shooters.
SEC. 13. Issuance of License to Manufacture
or Deal In Firearms and Ammunition. – Any
person desiring to manufacture or deal in
firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition
thereof, or instruments and implements used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition, shall
make an application to:
(a) The Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG) in the
case of an application for a license to
manufacture; and
(b) The Chief of the PNP in the case of a
license to deal in firearms and firearms parts,
ammunition and gun repair.
The applicant shall state the amount of
capitalization for manufacture or cost of the
purchase and sale of said articles intended to be
transacted by such applicant; and the types of
firms, ammunition or implements which the
applicant intends to manufacture or purchase
and sell under the license applied for; and such
additional information as may be especially
requested by the Secretary of the DILG or the
Chief of the PNP.
The Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the
PNP may approve or disapprove such
application based on the prescribed guidelines.
In the case of approval, the Secretary of the
DILG or the Chief of the PNP shall indicate the
amount of the bond to be executed by the
applicant before the issuance of the license and
the period of time by which said license shall
be effective, unless sooner revoked by their
authority.
Upon approval of the license to manufacture or
otherwise deal in firearms by the Secretary of
the DILG or the Chief of the PNP as the case
may be, the same shall be transmitted to the
FEO of the PNP which shall issue the license in
accordance with the approved terms and
conditions, upon the execution and delivery by
the applicant of the required bond conditioned
upon the faithful compliance on the part of the
licensee to the laws and regulations relative to
the business licensed.
SEC. 14. Scope of License to Manufacture
Firearms and Ammunition. – The scope of the
License to Manufacture firearms and
ammunition shall also include the following:
(a) The authority to manufacture and assemble
firearms, ammunition, spare parts and
accessories, ammunition components, and
reloading of ammunitions, within sites, areas,
and factories stated therein. The Secretary of
the DILG shall approve such license;
(b) The license to deal in or sell all the items
covered by the License to Manufacture, such as
parts, firearms or ammunition and components;
(c) The authority to subcontract the
manufacturing of parts and accessories
necessary for the firearms which the
manufacturer is licensed to manufacture:
Provided, That the subcontractor of major parts
or major components is also licensed to
manufacture firearms and ammunition; and
(d) The authority to import machinery,
equipment, and firearm parts and ammunition
components for the manufacture thereof.
Firearm parts and ammunition components to
be imported shall, however, be limited to those
authorized to be manufactured as reflected in
the approved License to Manufacture. The
Import Permit shall be under the administration
of the PNP.
A licensed manufacturer of ammunition is also
entitled to import various reference firearms
needed to test the ammunition manufactured
under the License to Manufacture. A licensed
manufacturer of firearms, on the other hand, is
entitled to import various firearms for
reference, test and evaluation for manufacture
of similar, types of firearms covered by the
License to Manufacture.
An export permit shall, however, be necessary
to export manufactured parts or finished
products of firearms and ammunition. The
Export Permit of firearms and ammunition
shall be under the administration of the PNP.
SEC. 15. Registration of Locally Manufactured
and Imported Firearms. – Local manufacturers
and importers of firearms and major parts
thereof shall register the same as follows:
(a) For locally manufactured firearms and
major parts thereof, the initial registration shall
be done at the manufacturing facility:
Provided, That firearms intended for export
shall no longer be subjected to ballistic
identification procedures; and
(b) For imported firearms and major parts
thereof, the registration shall be done upon
arrival at the FEO of the PNP storage facility.
SEC. 16. License and Scope of License to Deal.
– The License to Deal authorizes the purchase,
sale and general business in handling firearms
and ammunition, major and minor parts of
firearms, accessories, spare parts, components,
and reloading machines, which shall be issued
by the Chief of the PNP.
SEC. 17. License and Scope of License for
Gunsmiths. – The license for gunsmiths shall
allow the grantee to repair registered firearms.
The license shall include customization of
firearms from finished or manufactured parts
thereof on per order basis and not in
commercial quantities and making the minor
parts thereof, i.e. pins, triggers, trigger bows,
sights and the like only for the purpose of
repairing the registered firearm. The license for
gunsmiths shall be issued by the Chief of the
PNP.
SEC. 18. Firearms for Use in Sports and
Competitions. – A qualified individual shall
apply for a permit to transport his/her
registered firearm/s from his/her residence to
the firing range/s and competition sites as may
be warranted.
SEC. 19. Renewal of Licenses and
Registration. – All types of licenses to possess
a firearm shall be renewed every two (2) years.
Failure to renew the license on or before the
date of its expiration shall cause the revocation
of the license and of the registration of the
firearm/s under said licensee.
The registration of the firearm shall be renewed
every four (4) years. Failure to renew the
registration of the firearm on or before the date
of expiration shall cause the revocation of the
license of the firearm. The said firearm shall be
confiscated or forfeited in favor of the
government after due process.
The failure to renew a license or registration
within the periods stated above on two (2)
occasions shall cause the holder of the firearm
to be perpetually disqualified from applying for
any firearm license. The application for the
renewal of the license or registration may be
submitted to the FEO of the PNP, within six (6)
months before the date of the expiration of such
license or registration.
SEC. 20. Inspection and Inventory. – The Chief
of the PNP or his/her authorized representative
shall require the submission of reports, inspect
or examine the inventory and records of a
licensed manufacturer, dealer or importer of
firearms and ammunition during reasonable
hours.
ARTICLE IV
ACQUISITION, DEPOSIT OF FIREARMS,
ABANDONED,
DEMILITARIZED AND ANTIQUE
FIREARMS
SEC. 21. Acquisition or Purchase and Sale of
Firearms and Ammunition. – Firearms and
ammunition may only be acquired or purchased
from authorized dealers, importers or local
manufacturers and may be transferred or sold
only from a licensed citizen or licensed
juridical entity to another licensed citizen or
licensed juridical entity: Provided, That, during
election periods, the sale and registration of
firearms and ammunition and the issuance of
the corresponding licenses to citizens shall be
allowed on the condition that the transport or
delivery thereof shall strictly comply with the
issuances, resolutions, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission on Elections.
SEC. 22. Deposit of Firearms by Persons
Arriving From Abroad. – A person arriving in
the Philippines who is legally in possession of
any firearm or ammunition in his/her country
of origin and who has declared the existence of
the firearm upon embarkation and
disembarkation but whose firearm is not
registered in the Philippines in accordance with
this Act shall deposit the same upon written
receipt with the Collector of Customs for
delivery to the FEO of the PNP for
safekeeping, or for the issuance of a permit to
transport if the person is a competitor in a
sports shooting competition. If the importation
of the same is allowed and the party in question
desires to obtain a domestic firearm license, the
same should be undertaken in accordance with
the provisions of this Act. If no license is
desired or leave to import is not granted, the
firearm or ammunition in question shall remain
in the custody of the FEO of the PNP until
otherwise disposed of in-accordance with law.
SEC. 23. Return of Firearms to Owner upon
Departure from the Philippines. – Upon the
departure from the Philippines of any person
whose firearm or ammunition is in the custody
of the FEO of the PNP, the same shall, upon
timely request, be delivered to the person
through the Collector of Customs. In the case
of a participant in a local sports shooting
competition, the firearm must be presented to
the Collector of Customs before the same is
allowed to be loaded on board the carrier on
which the person is to board.
SEC. 24. Safekeeping of Firearms and
Ammunition. – Any licensee may deposit a
registered firearm to the FEO of the PNP, or
any Police Regional Office for safekeeping.
Reasonable fees for storage shall be imposed.
SEC. 25. Abandoned Firearms and
Ammunition. – Any firearm or ammunition
deposited in the custody of the FEO of the PNP
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be
deemed to have been abandoned by the owner
or his/her authorized representative if he/she
failed to reclaim the same within five (5) years
or failed to advise the FEO of the PNP of the
disposition to be made thereof. Thereafter, the
FEO of the PNP may dispose of the same after
compliance with established procedures.
SEC. 26. Death or Disability of Licensee. –
Upon the death or legal disability of the holder
of a firearm license, it shall be the duty of
his/her next of kin, nearest relative, legal
representative, or other person who shall
knowingly come into possession of such
firearm or ammunition, to deliver the same to
the FEO of the PNP or Police Regional Office,
and such firearm or ammunition shall be
retained by the police custodian pending the
issuance of a license and its registration in
accordance, with this Act. The failure to deliver
the firearm or ammunition within six (6)
months after the death or legal disability of the
licensee shall render the possessor liable for
illegal possession of the firearm.
SEC. 27. Antique Firearm. – Any person who
possesses an antique firearm shall register the
same and secure a collector’s license from the
FEO of the PNP. Proper storage of antique
firearm shall be strictly imposed.
Noncompliance of this provision shall be
considered as illegal possession of the firearm
as penalized in this Act.
ARTICLE V
PENAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession
of Firearms and Ammunition. – The unlawful
acquisition, possession of firearms and
ammunition shall be penalized as follows:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small
arm;
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if three (3)
or more small arms or Class-A light weapons
are unlawfully acquired or possessed by any
person;
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess
a Class-A light weapon;
(d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall,
unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-B light
weapon;
(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than
that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) in this
section shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully possess any firearm under any
or combination of the following conditions:
(1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a
loaded magazine;
(2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any gadget
used to guide the shooter to hit the target such
as thermal weapon sight (TWS) and the like;
(3) Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes,
firearm muffler or firearm silencer;
(4) Accompanied with an extra barrel; and
(5) Converted to be capable of firing full
automatic bursts.
(f) The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess
a major part of a small arm;
(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess
ammunition for a small arm or Class-A light
weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is
committed by the same person charged with the
unlawful acquisition or possession of a small
arm, the former violation shall be absorbed by
the latter;
(h) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part
of a Class-A light weapon;
(i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition
for a Class-A light weapon. If the violation of
this paragraph is committed by the same person
charged with the unlawful acquisition or
possession of a Class-A light weapon, the
former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
(j) The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess
a major part of a Class-B light weapon; and
(k) The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess
ammunition for a Class-B light weapon. If the
violation of this paragraph is committed by the
same person charged with the unlawful
acquisition or possession of a Class-B light
weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed
by the latter.
SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the
Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose
firearm, when inherent in the commission of a
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code
or other special laws, shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the
crime committed with the use of a loose
firearm is penalized by the law with a
maximum penalty which is lower than that
prescribed in the preceding section for illegal
possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu
of the penalty for the crime charged: Provided,
further, That if the crime committed with the
use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law
with a maximum penalty which is equal to that
imposed under the preceding section for illegal
possession of firearms, the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed
in addition to the penalty for the crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
other special laws of which he/she is found
guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of,
or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup
d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without
using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act
shall be considered as a distinct and separate
offense.
SEC. 30. Liability of Juridical Person. – The
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum to
prision mayor in its medium period shall be
imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
director or other responsible officer of/any
public or private firm, company, corporation or
entity who shall willfully or knowingly allow
any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by
any person or persons found guilty of violating
the provisions of the preceding section, or
willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use
unregistered firearm or firearms without any
legal authority to be carried outside of their
residence in the course of their employment.
SEC. 31. Absence of Permit to Carry Outside
of Residence. – The penalty of prision
correccional and a fine of Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
who is licensed to own a firearm but who shall
carry the registered firearm outside his/her
residence without any legal authority therefor.
SEC. 32. Unlawful Manufacture, Importation,
Sale or Disposition of Firearms or Ammunition
or Parts Thereof, Machinery, Tool or
Instrument Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Parts
Thereof. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully engage in the
manufacture, importation, sale or disposition of
a firearm or ammunition, or a major part of a
firearm or ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used by the
same person in the manufacture of a firearm,
ammunition, or a major part thereof.
The possession of any machinery, tool or
instrument used directly in the manufacture of
firearms, ammunition, or major parts thereof by
any person whose business, employment or
activity does not lawfully deal with the
possession of such article, shall be prima facie
evidence that such article is intended to be used
in the unlawful or illegal manufacture of
firearms, ammunition or parts thereof.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period to prision mayor in its medium period
shall be imposed upon any laborer, worker or
employee of a licensed firearms dealer who
shall unlawfully take, sell or otherwise dispose
of parts of firearms or ammunition which the
company manufactures and sells, and other
materials used by the company in the
manufacture or sale of firearms or ammunition.
The buyer or possessor of such stolen part or
material, who is aware that such part or
material was stolen, shall suffer the same
penalty as the laborer, worker or employee.
If the violation or offense is committed by a
corporation, partnership, association or other
juridical entity, the penalty provided for in this
section shall be imposed upon the directors,
officers, employees or other officials or persons
therein who knowingly and willingly
participated in the unlawful act.
SEC. 33. Arms Smuggling. – The penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall engage or participate in arms
smuggling as defined in this Act.
SEC. 34. Tampering, Obliteration or Alteration
of Firearms Identification. – The penalty of
prision correccional to prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall tamper, obliterate or alter
without authority the barrel, slide, frame,
receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including
the name of the maker, model, or serial number
of any firearm, or who shall replace without
authority the barrel, slide, frame, receiver,
cylinder, or bolt assembly, including its
individual or peculiar identifying
characteristics essential in forensic examination
of a firearm or light weapon.
The PNP shall place this information, including
its individual or peculiar identifying
characteristics into the database of integrated
firearms identification system of the PNP
Crime Laboratory for future use and
identification of a particular firearm.
SEC. 35. Use of an Imitation Firearm. – An
imitation firearm used in the commission of a
crime shall be considered a real firearm as
defined in this Act and the person who
committed the crime shall be punished in
accordance with this Act: Provided, That
injuries caused on the occasion of the conduct
of competitions, sports, games, or any
recreation activities involving imitation
firearms shall not be punishable under this Act.
SEC. 36. In Custodia Legis. – During the
pendency of any case filed in violation of this
Act, seized firearm, ammunition, or parts
thereof, machinery, tools or instruments shall
remain in the custody of the court. If the court
decides that it has no adequate means to safely
keep the same, the court shall issue an order to
turn over to the PNP Crime Laboratory such
firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof,
machinery, tools or instruments in its custody
during the pendency of the case and to produce
the same to the court when so ordered. No bond
shall be admitted for the release of the firearm,
ammunition or parts thereof, machinery, tool or
instrument. Any violation of this paragraph
shall be punishable by prision mayor in its
minimum period to prision mayor in its
medium period.
SEC. 37. Confiscation and Forfeiture. – The
imposition of penalty for any violation of this
Act shall carry with it the accessory penalty of
confiscation and forfeiture of the firearm,
ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tool
or instrument in favor of the government which
shall be disposed of in accordance with law.
SEC. 38. Liability for Planting Evidence. – The
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall willfully and maliciously insert; place,
and/or attach, directly or indirectly, through any
overt or covert act, any firearm, or ammunition,
or parts thereof in the person, house, effects, or
in the immediate vicinity of an innocent
individual for the purpose of implicating or
incriminating the person, or imputing the
commission of any violation of the provisions
of this Act to said individual. If the person
found guilty under this paragraph is a public
officer or employee, such person shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SEC. 39. Grounds for Revocation,
Cancellation or Suspension of License or
Permit. – The Chief of the PNP or his/her
authorized representative may revoke, cancel or
suspend a license or permit on the following
grounds:
(a) Commission of a crime or offense involving
the firearm, ammunition, of major parts
thereof;
(b) Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or any offense where the penalty
carries an imprisonment of more than six (6)
years;
(c) Loss of the firearm, ammunition, or any
parts thereof through negligence;
(d) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or
major parts thereof outside of residence or
workplace without, the proper permit to carry
the same;
(e) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or
major parts thereof in prohibited places;
(f) Dismissal for cause from the service in case
of government official and employee;
(g) Commission of any of the acts penalized
under Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002”;
(h) Submission of falsified documents or
misrepresentation in the application to obtain a
license or permit;
(i) Noncompliance of reportorial requirements;
and
(j) By virtue of a court order.
SEC. 40. Failure to Notify Lost or Stolen
Firearm or Light Weapon. – A fine of Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any licensed firearm holder who fails to
report to the FEO of the PNP that the subject
firearm has been lost or stolen within a period
of thirty (30) days from the date of discovery.
Likewise, a fine of Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
holding a valid firearm license who changes
residence or office address other than that
indicated in the license card and fails within a
period of thirty (30) days from said transfer to
notify the FEO of the PNP of such change of
address.
SEC. 41. Illegal Transfer/Registration of
Firearms. – It shall be unlawful to transfer
possession of any firearm to any person who
has not yet obtained or secured the necessary
license or permit thereof.
The penalty of prision correccional shall be
imposed upon any person who shall violate the
provision of the preceding paragraph. In
addition, he/she shall be disqualified to apply
for a license to possess other firearms and all
his/her existing firearms licenses whether for
purposes of commerce or possession, shall be
revoked. If government-issued firearms,
ammunition or major parts of firearms or light
weapons are unlawfully disposed, sold or
transferred by any law enforcement agent or
public officer to private individuals, the penalty
of reclusion temporal shall be imposed.
Any public officer or employee or any person
who shall facilitate the registration of a firearm
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or
submission of falsified documents shall suffer
the penalty of prision correccional.
ARTICLE VI
FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 42. Firearms Repository. – The FEO of
the PNP shall be the sole repository of all
firearms records to include imported and
locally manufactured firearms and ammunition.
Within one (1) year upon approval of this Act,
all military and law enforcement agencies,
government agencies, LGUs and government-
owned or -controlled corporations shall submit
an inventory of all their firearms and
ammunition to the PNP.
SEC. 43. Final Amnesty. – Persons in
possession of unregistered firearms and holders
of expired license or unregistered firearms shall
register and renew the same through the Final
General Amnesty within six (6) months from
the promulgation of the implementing rules and
regulations of this Act. During the interim
period of six (6) months, no person applying
for license shall be charged of any delinquent
payment accruing to the firearm subject for
registration. The PNP shall conduct an
intensive nationwide campaign to ensure that
the general public is properly informed of the
provisions of this Act.
SEC. 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations.
– Within one hundred twenty (120) days from
the effectivity of this Act, the Chief of the PNP,
after public hearings and consultation with
concerned sectors of society shall formulate the
necessary rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of this Act to be published in at
least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
SEC. 45. Repealing Clause. – This Act repeals
Sections 1, 2, 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, and Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8294 and all other laws,
executive orders, letters of instruction,
issuances, circulars, administrative orders, rules
or regulations that are inconsistent herewith.
SEC. 46. Separability Clause. – If any
provision of this Act or any part hereof is held
invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the
law or the provision not otherwise affected
shall remain valid and subsisting.
SEC. 47. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days from its publication in a
newspaper of nationwide circulation.
Approved,
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias
WARPAN, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that the person
arrested committed no other crime.
Furthermore, if the person is held liable for
murder or homicide, illegal possession of
firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but
not a separate offense. Hence, where an
accused was convicted of direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide for firing an
unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who
were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot
be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms. Neither can such
unlawful act be considered to have aggravated
the direct assault.
The Case
FELICIANO, J.:
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran City, convicting him of qualified
illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007 and
of murder in Criminal Case No. 4012 and
imposing upon him the penalty of death in
both cases.
On 18 December 1984, appellant was
charged with violation of Section 1,
paragraph (2), of Presidential Decree No.
1866, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of
December 1984, in the City of
Tagbilaran Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, while
acting under the influence of drugs
and without any license or permit
from the proper authorities, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have ill his possession,
custody and control an unlicensed
firearm, a SMITH & WESSON
Airweight caliber .38 revolver with
Serial Number 359323 with Five (5)
spent shells and Five (5) live
ammunitions and without any
justifiable cause and with intent to
kill, used the said firearm and
ammunitions to shoot one Francis
Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting
upon the latter the following gunshot
wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT
WOUNDS — Head & Chest
(through and through);
Head Entrance — 1.4 x 2.2
cm., Left Fronto-Temporal
Area; Port — 1.3 x 0.3 cm.;
Right Cheek. 3.5 cm. above
the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm.
— Right Infrascapular Area at
the level of the 7th Intercostal
Rib (Back); Exist — 0.3 cm.
dia; above the right nipple;
Y-shape laceration, check at
the right angle of the mouth,
Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8
which gunshot wounds or injuries
directly caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the
provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2
of the Presidential Decree No. 1866.
1
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus- BRION,
DEL
CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
ARTICLE 256
TO 257
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42819 April 15, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRISPIN GENOVES, defendant-appellant.
Leodegario Alba for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for
appellee.
HULL, J.:
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex
crime of homicide with abortion.
In the morning of the 28th of May, 1934,
appellant and deceased Soledad Rivera were
laborers in adjoining cane fields. Soledad
claimed that the yoke of the plow which
appellant was repairing belonged to her and
tried to take it by force. Appellant struck her
with his fist, causing her to fall to the ground.
She got up and returned to the fray, whereupon
she received another blow with the fist on the
left cheek which caused her again to fall to the
ground. Immediately after the incident
deceased proceeded to the municipal building,
a distance of about four kilometers, and
complained to the chief of police about the
maltreatment. At the time Soledad was heavy
with child, and as she complained to the chief
of police of pain in the abdomen, she was seen
by the president of the sanitary district.
According to testimony deceased was in good
health the day before.
From the time of the incident there was
hemorrhage and pain which were symptoms of
premature delivery. Deceased remained in this
condition until June 10, 1934. On that date the
condition culminated in the painful and
difficult premature delivery of one of the twin
babies that she way carrying, but the other baby
could be delivered. Both babies were dead.
The first assignment of error is the contention
of appellant that the death of the offended party
was not the direct result of the assault upon her
by the defendant. It is generally known that a
fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and
the evidence shows a complete sequel of events
from the assault to her death. The accused must
be held responsible for the natural
consequences of his act.
The other defense is that the accused did not
strike the deceased, but this fact is clearly
established by the prosecution. We find the
mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted and
provocation, as the offended party by force
induced the appellant to use force on his
part.1ªvvphïl.nët
The abortion in this case is unintentional
abortion denounced by article 257 of the
Revised Penal Code. On the whole case, the
period of confinement is fixed at twelve years
and one day to fourteen years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal. The
indemnity is fixed at P1,000.
The sentence, as thus modified, is affirmed,
with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-
appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In an information, dated 7 May 1976,
Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was
charged before the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the
complex crime of parricide with intentional
abortion, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of
December, 1974, in Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court the accused
Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault and
use personal violence on
MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA,
the lawfully wedded wife of the
accused, by then and there boxing
and stranging her, causing upon her
injuries which resulted in her
instantaneous death; and by the
same criminal act committed on the
person of the wife of the accused,
who was at the time 8 months on the
family way, the accused likewise did
then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously cause the death of
the child while still in its maternal
womb, thereby committing both
crimes of PARRICIDE and
INTENTIONAL ABORTION as
defined and punished under Art. 246
and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the
Revised Penal Code, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said
woman and child in the amount as
the Honorable Court shall assess.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted
by counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to
the offenses charged.
After trial the lower court rendered a
decision ** dated 9 August 1978, the
dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused
Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, of the
complex crime of Parricide with
Intentional Abortion, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Marciano Abuyo in the
sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the
costs. "For unselfish, valuable and
exemplary service rendered by
counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C.
Dating, Jr., a compensation of
P500.00 is hereby recommended for
him subject to the availability of
funds
SO ORDERED.
The accused having been sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death, this case is on
automatic review before this Court.
At the trial in the court a quo, the
prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr.,
Pedro Salufrania and Narciso Abuyo.
Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., who was then
Rural Health Officer of Talisay, Camarines
Norte, testified that, after passing the
Board Examination, he was employed as a
Resident Physician of La Union Provincial
Hospital, then as Junior Resident
Physician of Bethane Hospital in San
Fernando, La Union and that later, he
joined the government service, starting
from 1968 up to the time of the trial; that as
a Doctor of Medicine, he had performed
about ten (10) post mortem examinations;
that he was called upon by the Municipal
Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of
Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was
exhumed from its grave in the Municipal
Cemetery of Talisay at around 11:00
o'clock in the morning of 11 December
1974; that his post mortem examination
lasted from 12:30 o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of the same day. He reduced
his findings of injuries into writing. (Exhibit
"A"), which, together with their probable
cause, as testified to by him, are as
follows:
Injury Cause
1) "Blunt
Multiple object or
abrasion friction by
s with
contusio hard
n, left object"
leg, (tsn., Aug.
middle 20,
part, posterior
covering 1976, p. 7)
an area
of
about 2
& 1/2 by
5 inches.
2) Friction on
Abrasion a hard
s, 1/2 by object"
2
tal fossa
(back
left leg)
3) Hard
Multiple pinhead
pinhead sized
sized material
from the
side of
the right
eye
down to
mandibu
lar bone
(right
check)
4) Upper No cause
right given
eyelid
more
promine
nt than
the left
eyelid
("the
right
upper
eyelid a
little bit
bulging
than the
left
eye
"and"
sort of
"swollen
") (tsn.,
Aug. 20,
1976,
pp. 7-8)
5) Usually,
Tongue the main
protrudin cause of
g bet
ween protruding
the lips, tongue
about 1 during
inch
teeth
line. death is
(by)
strangulati
on.
(tsn., Aug.
20, 1976,
p. 8)
6)
Decease
d is
pregnant
with a
baby
boy
about 7-
8
months
old (tsn.,
Aug. 20,
1976, p.
8).
Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after
conducting the post mortem examination,
he issued a certification thereof (Exhibit
"A"); that he issued a death certificate
(Exhibit "B") for the deceased Marciano
Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5
December 1974, made on the basis of the
information relayed by a certain Leonila
Loma to his nurse before the burial, without
mentioning the cause of death; that the
cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was
indicated on said death certificate only
after the post mortem examination on 11
December 1974.
The other witness for the prosecution was
Pedro Salufrania, son of herein appellant
and of the deceased. The lower court's
decision states that, by reason of interest
and relationship, before Pedro Salufrania
was allowed to testify against his father-
accused Filomeno Salufrania, he was
carefully examined by the prosecuting
officer and the defense counsel under the
careful supervision of the court a quo, to
determine whether, at his age of 13 years
old, he was already capable of receiving
correct impressions of facts and of relating
them truly and, also, whether he was
compelled and/or threatened by anybody
to testify against his father-accused. 1
The lower court found Pedro Salufrania to
be determined and intelligent. He
convincingly declared that he was not
threatened by any of his uncles on his
mother's side to testify against his father,
because it was true that the latter killed his
mother. Then, formally testifying as the
prosecution's lone eyewitness, he stated
that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his
mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about
6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December
1974, in their small house at a far away
sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines
Norte; that during said quarrel, he saw his
father box his pregnant mother on the
stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his
father strangled her to death; that he saw
blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his
mother and that she died right on the spot
where she fell.
Pedro Salufrania further testified that after
killing his mother, the accused- appellant
went out of the house to get a hammock;
that his brother Alex and he were the only
ones who witnessed how the accused
killed their mother because his sister and
other brothers were already asleep when
the horrible incident happened; that his
brothers Celedonio, Danilo and sister Merly
woke up after the death of their mother and
kept watch at their mothers body while
their father was away; that their father
arrived early the next morning with the
hammock and after placing their dead
mother on the hammock, the accused
carried her on his shoulder and brought the
cadaver to the house of his sister
Conching, located at a populated section
of Tigbinan that from Tigbinan the corpse
was transferred to Gabon, Talisay,
Camarines Norte for burial.
Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania
stated that he is now living with his uncle
Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still
refused to live with his father-accused,
because the latter has threatened to kill
him and his other brothers and sister
should he reveal the true cause of his
mother's death.
The third witness for the prosecution was
Narciso Abuyo, a resident of Gabon,
Talisay, Camarines Norte. He testified that
the accused Filomeno Salufrania and his
sister, the deceased Marciana Abuyo, were
lawfully wedded husband and wife as
evidenced by a marriage contract (Exhibit
"C"). He declared that his sister was more
or less seven (7) months pregnant when
she died; that he first came to know about
his sister's death on 4 December 1974 thru
his nephews Pedro and Alex Salufrania
who first informed him that their mother
died of stomach ailment and headache;
that he went to Tigbinan to request for the
body of his sister so that it may be buried
in Talisay, Camarines Norte and, as
intended, Marciana Abuyo was buried in
the Talisay Cemetery on 6 December
1974.
Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the
burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3)
children of his deceased sister went to his
house and refused to go home with their
father Filomeno Salufrania; that when
asked for the reason why, his nephew Alex
Salufraña told him that the real cause of
death of their mother was not stomach
ailment and headache, rather, she was
boxed on the stomach and strangled to
death by their father; that immediately after
learning of the true cause of death of his
sister, he brought the matter to the
attention of the police authorities of Talisay,
Camarines Norte, who investigated Alex
and Pedro Salufirania and later, to that of
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Norte.
The defense had for witnesses Geronimo
Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling
Balce and the accused Filomeno
Salufrania.
Geronimo Villan testified that he was a
neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania. He
declared that Marciana Abuyo died at
around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4
December 1974 in her house at Sitio
Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Camarines
Norte; that he happened to pass by said
house because his attention was attracted
by the bright light in the fireplace and he
saw Filomeno Salufrania boiling "ikmo" and
garlic as medicine for his wife who was
about to deliver a child; that he helped the
accused by applying "ikmo" to the different
parts of the body of Marciana Abuyo and
by administering the native treatment
known as "bantil", that is, by pinching and
pulling the skin with two fingers of his
closed fist; that when the condition of
Marciana Abuyo worsened, he told
Filomeno Salufrania to go and get Juanita
Bragais who is known as a healer but the
latter arrived at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning of 4 December 1974 and that at
that time Marciana Abuyo was already
dead.
Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he
was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another
son of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00
o'clock in the morning of 4 December
1974. He further testified that when he
reached the house of the Salufranias,
Marciana Abuyo was already dead so he
just helped Filomeno Salufrania in
transferring the body of his wife to the
house of the latter's brother-in-law at
Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.
Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a
former resident of Kapagisahan Tigbinan,
Labo, Camarines Norte testified that she
arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania
at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4
December 1974 after being called by one
of the latter's sons; that she saw Marciana
still in a coma lying on the lap of her
husband who informed her that Marciana
was suffering from an old stomach ailment.
The accused Filomeno Salufrania admitted
that he was that lawful husband of the
deceased Marciana Abuyo; that at around
9:00 o'clock in the morning of 3 December
1974, Marciana arrived home from Talisay
where she had earlier stayed for about a
week; that she was hungry upon her
arrival, so he allegedly cooked their food
and after eating their lunch, he proceeded
to his work while his wife rested in their
house; that when he returned home at 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of that same day,
his wife complained to him of stomach pain
and he was told to prepare the beddings
because she was already sleepy; that at
about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 4
December 1974, he was awakened by his
wife who was still complaining of stomach
pain, and that she asked for a drink of hot
water; that while he was boiling water,
Geronimo Villan arrived and assisted him
in administering to his wife the native
treatments known as "hilot" or massaging
and "banti" that Geronimo Villan and
Francisco Repuya alternately applied
"bantil" to his wife but when her condition
worsened, he woke up his children, Pedro
and Alex to fetch Rico Villanueva who
might be able to ,save the life of their
mother; that his children left and returned
without Rico Villanueva but the latter
arrived a little later.
Accused-appellant then went on to say that
he sent for Juanito Bragais but the latter
was not able to cure his wife, since the
latter was already dead when he arrived;
that after the death of his wife, he ordered
his children to get the hammock of Kaloy
Belardo whose house was about two (2)
kilometers away from their house, and
upon the arrival of the hammock, he placed
the body of his wife thereon and brought it
to the house of his sister Consolacion
Salufrania in Tigbinan; that while the
corpse of Marciana Abuyo was at Tigbinan
he sent Chiding and his elder son to inform
the brothers and sisters of his wife at
Talisay about her death and that Leonila
Abuyo and Salvador Abuyo came; that he
informed the Barangay Captain of Tigbinan
of the cause of death of his wife; that upon
the suggestion of the brothers and sisters
of Marciana Abuyo, especially Salvador
Abuyo, the body of their sister was brought
home to Talisay and thereafter buried at
the Talisay Cemetery; that there was no
quarrel between him and his wife that
preceded the latter's death, and that during
the lifetime of the deceased, they loved
each other; that after her burial, his son
Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-
in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he
was not able to talk to his son until during
the trial; and that at the time of death of his
wife, aside from the members of his family,
Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and
Liling Angeles Balce were also present.
The case was considered submitted for
decision by the trial court on 18 July 1978.
As aforestated, the trial court found the
appellant guilty of the crimes charged and
sentenced him to the penalty of death.
The appellant assigns the following errors
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE
BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF AN
INCOMPETENT WITNESS, AND ON
INCONSISTENT AND INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION,
THEREBY VIOLATING THE RULE THAT
THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO AN
ACQUITTAL UNLESS HIS GUILT IS
SHOWN BEYOND ANY REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS
CREDIBLE AND SUFFICIENT, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
PARRICIDE WITH INTENTIONAL
ABORTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DISCREDITING THE EVIDENCE FOR
THE ACCUSED.
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed
to determine the competence of Pedro
Salufrania before he was allowed to testify.
Since Pedro was allegedly a child of tender
age, being only thirteen (13) years old
when he testified, and only eleven (11)
years old when the offense charged
occurred, he is presumed incompetent
under Rule 130 Sec. 19 (b) of the Revised
Rules of Court, which includes among
those who cannot be witnesses:
Children who appear to the court to
be of such tender age and inferior
capacity as to be incapable of
receiving correct impressions of the
facts respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly.
Therefore, according to appellant, for
failure of the trial court to determine
Pedro's competence, the presumption of
incompetency was not rebutted and
Pedro's testimony should not have been
admitted. Moreover, appellant stresses that
there is no basis for the trial court's finding
that Pedro is intelligent.
Appellant's contention is without merit. The
record shows that the trial court
determined Pedro Salufrania's competency
before he was allowed to testify under
oath. 2 The trial court's conclusion that
Pedro was intelligent and competent is fully
supported by Pedro's responsiveness to
the questions propounded to him when he
was already under oath:
A. Did you go here in court to
testify voluntarily?
Q. Yes, Your Honor.
A. Were you not forced by
your uncle to testify in his
case?
Q. No, I was not forced by my
uncle.
xxx xxx xxx
A. The accused is your father?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Do you love him?
Q. No, sir.
A. Your father is accused now
of crime which carries the
penalty of death, are you still
willing to testify against him?
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you say that you
don't love your father
A. Because he killed my
mother.
Q. And that is the reason why
you hate your father now?
A. Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 3, 7,17,
Nov. 12, 1976).
Pedro's strong sense of moral duty to tell
the truth, even though it should lead to his
father's conviction, shows that he fully
appreciated the meaning of an oath, which
likewise proves that he was no longer a
child of tender years at the time of his
testimony.
Appellant also alleges that, since Pedro
changed his answer from no to yes when
he was asked whether he was threatened
by his uncle to testify against his father,
shows that Pedro was lying and proves
that he did not appreciate the meaning of
an oath at all. 3
Again, this contention is without merit,
Pedro became confused when the trial
court ordered that the original question be
reformed. Pedro's confusion is apparent
from the fact that when asked the third
time, he affirmed his first answer,
Q. Isn't it that your uncle
threatened you with bodily
harm if you will not give
statement before the police?
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. But later you actually went
with your uncle to the police
because you were threatened
by him with bodily harm if you
will not follow him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is it true that your uncle
threatened you with bodily
harm if you will not give
statement to the police?
A. No, sir. (tsn., pp. 6, 7, Nov.
12, 1976)
Appellant next lists the following alleged
inconsistencies to discredit the testimony
of Pedro. First, Pedro testified on direct
examination that his mother died in the
evening of December 3. while on cross-
examination he said that she died in the
morning of December 4. It must be noted
that he affirmed twice during cross-
examination that his mother died on
December 3, just as he had testified during
direct examination. Significantly, he did not
mention December 4 as the date when she
died, as appellant would make it appear.
Pedro merely answered 'yes' to the
question "And isn't it that your mother died
in the early morning on that day
(December 4) and not on the evening of
December 3?" 4 Thus, Pedro's answer
could have resulted only from a
misapprehension of the a question, and for
no other reason.
Second, appellant alleges that Pedro
testified on direct examination that he saw
appellant leave the house to get a
hammock after strangling the victim and
then came back the following morning.
However, upon cross-examination, Pedro
testified that appellant left at noon or in the
afternoon of December 4. Moreover, Pedro
allegedly testified on re-direct that he saw
appellant sleep beside the dead body of
his mother. Again Pedro misapprehended
the question propounded to him. Ajudicious
reading of the transcript will bear this out:
Q. When did your father leave
to get the hammock?
A. In the afternoon.
Q. That may be when the body
was brought to Talisay. When
your father, rather, when you
said that your father left to get
a hammock so that your
mother may be brought to
Tigbinan what time was that?
A. About 12:00 o'clock noon.
(Tsn, p. 16, Nov. 12, 1976)
One may discern that the court itself
noticed that there was a missapprehension
when it commented "that maybe when the
body was brought to Talisay" after Pedro
answered "In the afternoon". When Pedro
answered "about 12:00 noon' he must
have been referring to the time when
appellant carried his dead wife to Tigbinan.
It must be noted that the question was so
worded that it could have misled Pedro to
think that what was being asked was the
time when appellant brought his dead wife
to Tigbinan. In fact, there is nothing
inconsistent with Pedro's testimony that he
saw his father leave in the evening of
December 3 and again saw him asleep
and thus not noticed appellant's coming
back after securing a hammock and
sleeping beside the deceased. Pedro was
therefore telling the truth when he said
that, upon waking up, he saw his father
sleeping beside his dead mother. By then,
appellant had already returned with the
hammock.
Third, Pedro allegedly testified on direct
examination that the corpse was carried to
Tigbinan in the morning of December 4,
while on cross-examination, he said it was
in the evening. 5 It must be pointed out that
Pedro merely answered "yes" to a question
purportedly mentioning the time when the
victim's body was transferred to Tigbinan.
The question is as follows: "The corpse of
your mother was brought to the Tigbinan
proper when the vigil was had in the
evening of December 4, is that right?" It is
to be noted that the question's thrust is
whether or not the victim's body was
brought to Tigbinan. The time it was
brought was merely incidental. Thus,
Pedro may not have paid attention to the
part of the question involving time.
Moreover, the phrase "in the evening" may
have referred either to the time of transport
of the body or to the vigil, which could have
definitely confused Pedro.
Fourth, Pedro allegedly testified on direct
examination that he, together with his
brothers and sister, kept vigil beside their
mother's dead body that night, while on
cross-examination, he testified that they
just kept lying down and pretended to
sleep. 6 There is nothing inconsistent here.
The children could have kept vigil while
lying down with their deceased mother.
Appellant further cites other alleged
improbabilities to discredit Pedro's
testimony. Appellant contends that it was
improbable for Pedro to have seen the
attack on his mother since he testified that
the room was dimly lighted, and that, while
the attach was going on, he closed his
eyes pretending to sleep. 7 This contention
is without merit. Even though the room was
dimly lighted, Pedro was only two (2)
meters away from his parents; thus, he
could easily see, as he saw, the attack on
his mother. 8 Also, although he pretended
to be asleep, it was unlikely that he kept
his eyes closed all the while, as he was
aware that a fight was going on. Rather, it
was to be expected that he had his eyes
open and, thus, he saw the heinous crime
unfold and ultimately consumated.
Appellant alleges that he does not believe
that it was fear of him that caused the
delay in Pedro's divulging the real cause of
his mother's death until 10 December
1974. According to appellant, such fear
could no longer have influenced Pedro
from December 6, the date he started to
live separately from him. This contention is
untenable. Even though Pedro started to
live separately from his father from
December 6, it cannot be said that the
influence of appellant's threat suddenly
ceased from that time. It must be noted
that Pedro was young and was still very
much under appellant's influence and
control. The thought and memory of his
father's viciousness were still too fresh
even after three days from his mother's
death. The fear that he too could be killed
by appellant in like manner must have
deterred him from divulging the truth
earlier.
Appellant also alleges that it was
improbable for Pedro to have just watched
the killing of his mother. This contention is
untenable. At that moment, when his
mother was being assaulted and strangled,
Pedro must have been so shocked as to
be rendered immobile and powerless to do
anything. This is a normal reaction in such
a situation. Besides, it is a fact of life that
different people react differently to the
same types of situations. 9 One cannot
overlook that there is no standard form of
behaviour when one is confronted by a
shocking occurrence. 10
Appellant next alleges that since the
prosecution has failed without satisfactory
explanation to present Pedro's brother Alex
who is alleged to be also an eyewitness to
the killing of the victim, it is presumed that
Alex's testimony would be adverse to the
prosecution if presented. This contention is
without merit. First, Alex, who is younger
than Pedro by 3 years, may not have been
competent to testify due to his tender age.
Second, even assuming that he was
competent to testify, his testimony could be
merely corroborative. Corroboration is not
necessary in this case because the details
of the crime have already been testified to
by Pedro with sufficient clarity. The failure
to present all the eyewitnesses to an act
does not necessarily give rise to an
unfavorable presumption, especially when
the testimony of the witness sought to be
presented is merely corroborative. 11
Witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered, and it is a well established rule
that the testimony of a single witness, even
if uncorroborated, but positive and
credible, is sufficient to support a
conviction. 12 In any event, it is not for the
appellant to say how many witnesses the
prosecution should have presented. 13
The inconsistencies magnified by appellant
in the testimony of Pedro Salufrania have
been satisfactorily explained. In fact, some
of them are not material since they neither
touch upon the manner of death of the
victim nor question the identity of the killer,
both of which were unwaveringly testified
upon by Pedro. Thus, with the alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities
explained away, Pedro's testimony remains
unperturbed. Even if there were
discrepancies, such discrepancies were
minor and may be considered as earmarks
of verisimilitude. 14
The trial court's assessment of Pedro's
testimony, as quoted hereunder, deserves
more than passing consideration:
... The testimony of eye-witness
Pedro Salufrania, 13-year old son of
the victim Marciana Abuyo and her
killer-spouse Filomeno Salufrania,
appears to be very clear, convincing
and truthful. It is vivid as to the
details of the horrible occurence that
took place at about 6:00 o'clock in
the evening of December 3, 1974 in
their small house at a far away sitio
of Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte,
resulting in the untimely and cruel
death of her (sic) mother. He and his
brother Alex were the only
eyewitnesses to the gory crime
committed by their father. The
credibility of this witness (Pedro
Salufrania) and his testimony was
invested when, despite rigid cross-
examination, the veracity of his
testimony in chief was not
impeached. He remained firm and on
the verge of crying, when he pointed
an accusing finger at his father
during the trial. He was unshaken
notwithstanding a long and detailed
cross-examination. And, there is
reason to bestow complete credence
to his testimony because he had the
opportunity to closely observe how
his father had deliberately and
cruelly ended the life of his mother.
Despite his tender age and apparent
childish innocence, this Court
believes that he can clearly perceive
and perceiving, make known his
perception, precluding the possibility
of coaching or tutoring by someone.
His declaration as to when, where
and how the horrible incident
complained of happened is the
believable version. 15
Appellant questions the competence of Dr.
Dyquiangco as an expert witness, since
this is the first time that the doctor
conducted an autopsy on a cadaver which
had been buried for about a week. It must
be noted, however, that although this was
the doctor's first autopsy under
circumstances present in this case, he had,
however, conducted similar post-mortem
examinations on ten (10) other occasions.
This would constitute sufficient experience.
Significantly, appellant did not object to the
doctor's expression of medical opinions
during the trial. Being an expert in his field,
the doctor is presumed to have taken all
pertinent factors into consideration with
regard to the autopsy, including embalming
and the state of the cadaver's
decomposition. Dr. Juan Dyquiangco Jr.,
was a disinterested witness in the case,
and a reputable public official in whose
favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties must be
applied.
Appellant further alleges that the findings
of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of
Pedro Salufrania do not tally. Suffice it to
say that the Court finds no inconsistencies
between the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco
and Pedro Salufrania's testimony. Both are
consistent on material points. Thus, the
Court sees no reason to disturb the
conclusions reached by the trial court
insofar as their credibility and the
appellant's guilt are concerned.
Appellant's third assignment of error
alleges that the trial court erred in
discrediting his evidence simply because
the testimonies of the defense witnesses
were consistent on material points.
Moreover, there is no showing, according
to the appellant, that said testimonies were
rehearsed so as to dovetail with each
other.
This contention is without merit. The Court
notes, first of all, that appellant did not
even bother to discuss his defense in order
to refute the massive evidence against
him. This is tantamount to an admission
that he could not adequately support his
version of Marciana Abuyo's death. The
trial court's reasons for rejecting the
defense version, as hereunder quoted, are
tenable and sound. Thus —
On the contrary, the testimonies of
defense witnesses Geronimo Villan,
Angeles Liling Balce and the
accused Filomeno Salufrania
suspiciously dove-tailed in every
detail as to when, where and how
.Marciana Abuyo died at 6:00 o'clock
in the morning of 4 December 1974,
in their house at sitio Kapagisahan
Tigbinan Labo, Carnarines Norte, of
stomach pain. On these points,
these witnesses and the accused
made statements which seemed to
be very fresh and clear in their
minds, despite the lapse of four long
years. Their exact and uniform
declarations on these points, their
phenomenal recollections, without
sufficient special or uncommon
reason to recall, rendered their
testimonies unconvincing. If at all,
their testimonies appeared to this
Court to be an eleventh hour
concoction. And, as defense
witnesses, after observing them and
their declarations on the witness
stand, they appeared to the Court to
be untruthful and unreliable. For,
despite the synchronization of time
when, the place where and how the
incidence happened, their
testimonies on other material points
revealed their tendency to
exaggerate and their propensity to
falsehood, thus-Aside from the
accused Filomeno Salufrania, there
are three other witnesses for the
defense Geronimo Villan Angeles
Liling Balce and Juanita Bragais.
There is nothing in the testimony of
Juanito Bragais because he did not
witness how and when Marciana
Abuyo died. Francisco Repuya, who
was also alleged by Filomeno
Salufrania to be present when
Marciana Abuyo died, did not testify.
Accused Filomeno Salufrania never
claimed that he summoned for
Angeles Liling Balce. According to
him Angeles Liling Balce was not
present during the moment of death
of Marciana Abuyo, for she was
fetched by him only after the death of
his wife. Logically, therefore, there is
no basis for the presentation of
Angeles Liling Balce that she was
present during the moment of death
of Marciana Abuyo. She was merely
play-acting. Geronimo Villan who
claimed he passed-by the house of
Filomeno Salufrania and saw the
latter boiling water with "ikmo" and
garlic, as medicine for his wife
Marciana Abuyo, who was about to
give birth was discredited by
accused himself who declared he
was merely boiling water for the hot
drink of his wife, who was suferring
from her old stomach ailment. In like
manner, witness Geronimo Villan
discredited the accused Filomeno
Salufrania, about the presence of
Francisco Repuya, who allegedly
alternated with Geronimo Villan in
applying the native treatments of
'hilot' and 'bantil' to Marciana Abuyo,
when throughout his testimony he
(Geronimo Villan) never mentioned
the presence of Francisco Repuya.
After closely observing defense
witnesses Geronimo Villan and
Angeles Liling Balce, this Court is
convinced that their testimonies and
accounts of the incident are
fabricated, untruthful and not worth
of credence. Certainly, they were not
present immediately before and
during the moment of death of
Marciana Abuyo. ...
Added to these, there is one
scandalous circumstance, which to
the mind of this Court, betrays the
guilty conscience of the accused. If
there was nothing revealing in the
face of the deceased Marciana
Abuyo, why was her face covered by
a piece of cloth by the accused. ...
Trial judges are in the best position to
ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in
the testimony of witnesses. This Court will
normally not disturb the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses, in view
of its advantage in observing first hand
their demeanor in giving their testimony. 16
Such rule applies in the present case.
Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he
indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence
to show that he had the intention to cause
an abortion. In this contention, appellant is
correct. He should not be held guilty of the
complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion but of the complex crime of
Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The
elements of Unintentional Abortion are as
follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such
pregnant woman without intending
an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally
exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the
foetus dies, either in the womb or
after having been expelled
therefrom. 17
The Solicitor General's brief makes it
appear that appellant intended to cause an
abortion because he boxed his pregnant
wife on the stomach which caused her to
fall and then strangled her. We find that
appellant's intent to cause an abortion has
not been sufficiently established. Mere
boxing on the stomach, taken together with
the immediate strangling of the victim in a
fight, is not sufficient proof to show an
intent to cause an abortion. In fact,
appellant must have merely intended to kill
the victim but not necessarily to cause an
abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore,
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that
accused Filomeno Salufrania committed
and should be held liable for the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. The abortion, in this case, was
caused by the same violence that caused
the death of Marciana Abuyo, such
violence being voluntarily exerted by the
herein accused upon his victim.
It has also been clearly established (a) that
Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8)
months pregnant when she was killed; (b)
that violence was voluntarily exerted upon
her by her husband accused; and (c) that,
as a result of said violence, Marciana
Abuyo died together with the foetus in her
womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code states that the
accused should be punished with the
penalty corresponding to the more serious
came of parricide, to be imposed in its
maximum period which is death. However,
by reason of the 1987 Constitution which
has abolished the death penalty, appellant
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded to the
heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is
increased to P30,000.00 in line with the
recent decisions of the Court. With costs
against the appellant,
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 262
TO 266
THIRD DIVISION
GLORIA PILAR S. G. R. No. 170723
AGUIRRE,
Present:
Petitioner,
YNARES-
- versus - SANTIAGO,
SECRETARY OF Chairperson,
THE
AUSTRIA-
DEPARTMENT
MARTINEZ,
OF JUSTICE,
MICHELINA S. CORONA,*
AGUIRRE- CHICO-
OLONDRIZ, NAZARIO, and
PEDRO B.
AGUIRRE, DR. REYES, JJ.
JUVIDO AGATEP
and DR. Promulgated:
MARISSA B.
March 3, 2008
PASCUAL,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------
------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre
(Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the 21
July 2005 Decision[2] and 5 December 2005
Resolution,[3] both of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled Gloria Pilar
S. Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department of
Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr.
Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual,
Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does.
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Secretary of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter
issued the twin resolutions dated 11 February
2004[4] and 12 November 2004,[5]
respectively, which in turn affirmed the 8
January 2003 Resolution[6] of the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City.
The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of
Quezon City recommended the dismissal of the
criminal complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 02-
12466, for violation of Articles 172
(Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of
Falsified Documents) and 262 (Mutilation),
both of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act, for insufficiency of evidence.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by
petitioner Gloria Aguirre against respondents
Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido
Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr. Marissa B. Pascual
(Dr. Pascual) and several John/Jane Does for
falsification, mutilation and child abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano Larry Aguirre[7] used to be a charge
of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child caring
agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and
licensed by the Department of Social Work and
Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978,
respondent Pedro Aguirre; the latters spouse,
Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes Aguirre); and
their four daughters, who included petitioner
Gloria Aguirre and respondent Olondriz, came
to know Larry, who was then just over a year
old. The Aguirres would have Larry spend a
few days at their home and then return him to
the orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry,
then two years and nine months of age,
formally became the ward of respondent Pedro
Aguirre and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by
virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal
Guardianship executed in their favor by Sister
Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the
Heart of Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the
Aguirre spouses guardianship of Larry was
legalized when the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed
them as joint co-guardians over the person and
property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses
and their children noticed that his
developmental milestones were remarkably
delayed. His cognitive and physical growth did
not appear normal in that at age 3 to 4 years,
Larry could only crawl on his tummy like a
frog x x x;[8] he did not utter his first word
until he was three years of age; did not speak in
sentences until his sixth year; and only learned
to stand up and walk after he turned five years
old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first
enrolled Larry at the Colegio de San Agustin,
Dasmarias Village, but the child experienced
significant learning difficulties there. In 1989,
at age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for
neurological and psychological evaluations.
The psychological evaluation[9] done on Larry
revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild
mental deficiency.[10] Consequent thereto, the
Aguirre spouses transferred Larry to St. John
Ma. Vianney, an educational institution for
special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a
urologist/surgeon, was approached concerning
the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of
age, vasectomized. Prior to performing the
procedure on the intended patient, respondent
Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by
a psychiatrist in order to confirm and validate
whether or not the former could validly give his
consent to the medical procedure on account of
his mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance,
Larry was brought to respondent Dr. Pascual, a
psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric
report dated 21 January 2002, respondent Dr.
Pascual made the following recommendation:
[T]he responsibility of decision making may be
given to his parent or guardian.[11]
the full text of which reads
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
GENERAL DATA
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male,
high school graduate of [Marie Vianney], was
referred for psychiatric evaluation to determine
competency to give consent for vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage
and prenatal history is not known to the
adoptive family except that abortion was
attempted. Developmental milestones were
noted to be delayed. He started to walk and
speak in single word at around age 5. He was
enrolled in Colegio de San Agustin at age 6
where he showed significant learning
difficulties that he had to repeat 1st and 4th
grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he
was 11 years old. Neurological findings and
EEG results were not normal and he was given
Tecretol and Encephabol by his neurologist.
Psychological evaluation revealed mild to
moderate mental retardation, special education
training was advised and thus, he was
transferred to St. John Marie Vianney. He
finished his elementary and secondary
education in the said school. He was later
enrolled in a vocational course at Don Bosco
which he was unable to continue. There has
been no reported behavioral problems in school
and he gets along relatively well with his
teachers and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive
family. He is the youngest in the family of four
sisters. Currently, his adoptive parents are
already old and have medical problem and thus,
they could no longer monitor and take care of
him like before. His adoptive mother has
Bipolar Mood Disorder and used to physically
maltreat him. A year ago, he had an episode of
dizziness, vomiting and headaches after he was
hit by his adoptive mother. Consult was done in
and several tests were done, results of which
were consistent with his developmental
problem. There was no evidence of acute
insults. The family subsequently decided that
he should stay with one of his sisters to avoid
similar incident and the possibility that he
would retaliate although he has never hurt
anybody. There has been no episode of violent
outburst or aggressive behavior. He would
often keep to himself when sad, angry or
frustrated.
He is currently employed in the company of his
sister and given assignment to do some
photocopying, usually in the mornings. He
enjoys playing billiards and basketball with his
nephews and, he spends most of his leisure
time watching TV and listening to music. He
could perform activities of daily living without
assistance except that he still needs supervision
in taking a bath. He cannot prepare his own
meal and never allowed to go out and run
errands alone. He does not have friends and it
is only his adoptive family whom he has
significant relationships. He claims that he
once had a girlfriend when he was in high
school who was more like a best friend to him.
He never had sexual relations. He has learned
to smoke and drink alcohol few years ago
through his cousins and the drivers. There is no
history of abuse of alcohol or any prohibited
substances.
MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He
was cooperative and he had intermittent eye
contact. Speech was spontaneous, soft, and
relevant. He responded to questions in single
words or simple sentences. He was anxious
specially at the start of the interview, with full
affect appropriate to mood and thought content.
There was no apparent thought or perceptual
disturbance. No suicidal/homicidal thoughts
elicited. He was oriented to time, place and
person. He has intact remote and recent
memory. He could do simple calculation. He
could write his name and read simple words.
His human figure was comparable to a 7-8 year
old. He demonstrated fair judgment and poor
insight. He had fair impulse control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Psychological tests done on (Dr. Lourdes
Ledesma) and on (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-
Villaosor) consistently revealed mild to
moderate mental deficiency.
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS
RESULTS
CT scan done showed nonspecific right deep
parietal subcortical malacia. No localized mass
lesion in the brain.
MRI done on showed bilateral parietal x x x
volume loss, encephalomalacia, gliosis and
ulegyria consistent with sequela of postnatal or
neonatal infarcts. Ex-vacuo dilatation of the
atria of lateral ventricles associated thinned
posterior half of the corpus callosum.
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
Axis I None
Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate
type
Axis III None
Axis IV None at present
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60
Larrys mental deficiency could be associated
with possible perinatal insults, which is
consistent with the neuroimaging findings.
Mental retardation associated with neurological
problems usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is
very much dependent on his family for his
needs, adaptive functioning, direction and in
making major life decisions. At his capacity, he
may never understand the nature, the
foreseeable risks and benefits, and
consequences of the procedure (vasectomy)
that his family wants for his protection. Thus,
the responsibility of decision making may be
given to his parent or guardian.
Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.
Psychiatrist[12]
Considering the above recommendation,
respondent Pedro Aguirres written consent was
deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the
conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31
January 2002, respondent Dr. Agatep
performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre,
respondent Pedro Aguirres eldest child,
instituted a criminal complaint for the violation
of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles
172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre,
Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Does before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit,[13] docketed as I.S.
No. 02-12466, contained the following
allegations:
2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic)
medical practitioners specializing in urology
and psychiatry respectively; while respondent
Pedro B. Aguirre is my father; Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the victim
Laureano Larry Aguirre xxx is my common
law brother. JOHN and JANE DOES were the
persons who, acting upon the apparent
instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre-
Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre, actually
scouted, prospected, facilitated, solicited and/or
procured the medical services of respondents
Dra. Pascual and Dr. Agatep vis--vis the
intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of
my common law brother Larry Aguirre subject
hereof.
xxxx
4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the
Heart of Mary Villa of the Good Shepherd
Sisters was furnished a copy of respondent Dra.
Pascuals Psychiatry Report dated by the
DSWD, in which my common law brother
Larry was falsely and maliciously declared
incompetent and incapable of purportedly
giving his own consent to the MUTILATION
VIA BILATERAL VASECTOMY intended to
be performed on him by all the respondents.
xxxx
6. Based on the foregoing charade and false
pretenses invariably committed by all of the
respondents in conspiracy with each other, on
31 January 2002, my common law brother
Larry Aguirre, although of legal age but
conspiratorially caused to be declared by
respondents to be mentally deficient and
incompetent to give consent to his
BILATERAL VASECTOMY, was then
intentionally, unlawfully, maliciously,
feloniously and/or criminally placed thereafter
under surgery for MUTILATION VIA
BILATERAL VASECTOMY x x x, EVEN
WITHOUT ANY AUTHORIZATION ORDER
from the GUARDIANSHIP COURT, nor
personal consent of Larry Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included
therein an allegation that
v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination,
professional interview of nor verification and
consultation with my mother, Lourdes Sabino-
Aguirre, respondent Dra. Pascual baselessly,
fraudulently and with obvious intent to defame
and malign her reputation and honor, and
worse, that of our Sabido family, falsely
concluded and diagnosed, via her falsified
Psychiatry Report, that my mother Lourdes
Sabido-Aguirre purportedly suffers from
BIPOLAR MOOD DISORDER x x x.
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirres
accusations against them, respondents Pedro
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits.
In her defense,[14] respondent Olondriz denied
that she prospected, scouted, facilitated,
solicited and/or procured any false statement,
mutilated or abused her common-law brother,
Larry Aguirre. Further, she countered that:
3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry
went through a vasectomy procedure, there is
nothing in the Complaint which explains how
the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the
vasectomy, I can state with complete
confidence that I did not participate in any way
in the alleged mutilation.
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services
of the physician who performed the vasectomy,
Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was my father,
Pedro Aguirre, Larrys guardian, who obtained
his services. I merely acted upon his
instructions and accompanied my brother to the
physician, respondents Dra. Marissa B. Pascual
x x x.
xxxx
10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what
manner the Complainant is authorized or has
any standing to declare that Larrys consent was
not obtained. Complainant is not the guardian
or relative of Larry. While she argues that
Larrys consent should have been obtained the
Complaint does not dispute the psychiatrists
findings about Larrys inability to give consent.
xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state
what alleged participation was falsified or the
portion of the psychiatric report that allegedly
states that someone participated when in fact
that person did not so participate.
xxxx
15. Again, I had no participation in the
preparation of the report of Dr. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he
(Larry) is mentally deficient or incompetent to
give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a
vasectomy operation was explained to him
(Larry) by both respondent doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my
father on the belief that my father continues to
be the legal guardian of Larry. I know of no
one else who asserts to be his legal guardian x
x x.[15]
Alleging the same statement of facts and
defenses, respondent Pedro Aguirre argues
against his complicity in the crime of
mutilation as charged and asserts that:
5. In any case, as I did not perform the
vasectomy, I can state with complete
confidence that I did not participate in any way
in the alleged mutilation.[16]
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy
performed on Larry does not in any way
amount to mutilation, as the latters
reproductive organ is still completely intact.
[17] In any case, respondent Pedro Aguirre
explains that the procedure performed is
reversible through another procedure called
Vasovasostomy, to wit:
8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible
through a procedure called Vasovasostomy. I
can also state with confidence that the
procedure enables men who have undergone a
vasectomy to sire a child. Hence, no permanent
damage was caused by the procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the
charge of falsification in the complaint, to wit:
14. x x x I did not make it appear that any
person participated in any act or proceeding
when that person did not in fact participate x x
x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the
preparation of the report of Dra. Pascual. She
arrived at her report independently, using her
own professional judgment x x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petitas
Complaint is how Larry is argued to be legally
a child under the definition of one law but
nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be
capacitated to give his consent as fully as an
adult.[18]
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that
co-guardianship over Larry had been granted to
himself and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre, way
back on 19 June 1986 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre contends that being
one of the legal guardians, consequently,
parental authority over Larry is vested in him.
But assuming for the sake of argument that
Larry does have the capacity to make the
decision concerning his vasectomy, respondent
Pedro Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria
Aguirre has no legal personality to institute the
subject criminal complaint, for only Larry
would have the right to do so.
Just as the two preceding respondents did,
respondent Dr. Agatep also disputed the
allegations of facts stated in the Complaint.
Adopting the allegations of his co-respondents
insofar as they were material to the charges
against him, he vehemently denied failing to
inform Larry of the intended procedure. In his
counter-statement of facts he averred that:
(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative
interview x x x wherein I painstakingly
explained what vasectomy is and the
consequences thereof; but finding signs of
mental deficiency, x x x I advised his relatives
and his nurse who accompanied him to have
Larry examined by a psychiatrist who could
properly determine whether or not Larry x x x
can really give his consent, thus I required
them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and
clearance prior to the contemplated procedure.
(c) On , I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric
report prepared by Dr. Marissa Pascual x x x.
In her said report, Dr. Pascual found Larry to
suffer from mental retardation, mild to
moderate type and further stated that at his
capacity, he may never understand the nature,
the foreseeable risks and benefits and
consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) x x
x, thus the responsibility of decision making
may be given to his parent or guardian x x x.
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an
affidavit executed by Pedro Aguirre stating that
he was the legal guardian of Larry x x x Pedro
Aguirre gave his consent to vasectomize Larry
x x x.
(e) Only then, specifically , vasectomy was
performed with utmost care and diligence.[19]
In defense against the charge of falsification
and mutilation, respondent Dr. Agatep argued
that subject complaint should be dismissed for
the following reasons:
1. The complainant has no legal personality to
file this case. As mentioned above, she is only a
common law sister of Larry who has a legal
guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of
the herein respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint
clearly centers on the condition of
complainants mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her
reputation, and miserably fails to implicate the
degree of participation of herein respondent. x
xx
xxxx
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this
felony does not apply to me since it clearly
gives reference to co-respondent, Dr. Marissa
Pascuals Psychiatry Report, dated , in relation
with her field of profession, an expert opinion.
I do not have any participation in the
preparation of said report, x x x neither did I
utilized (sic) the same in any proceedings to the
damage to another. x x x I also deny using a
falsified document x x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in
anyway equate to castration and what is
touched in vasectomy is not considered an
organ in the context of law and medicine, it is
quite remote from the penis x x x.
(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit
is very vague in specifying the applicability of
said law. It merely avers that Laureano Larry
Aguirre is a child, and alleges his father, Pedro
Aguirre, has parental authority over him x x x.
[20]
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the
criminal charges of falsification and mutilation
imputed to her. She stands by the contents of
the assailed Psychiatric Report, justifying it
thus:
x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirres mental
status was based on my own personal
observations, his responses during my
interview of him, the results of the two (2)
psychological tests conducted by clinical
psychologists, the results of laboratory tests,
including a CT Scan and MRI, and his personal
and family history which I obtained from his
sister, Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning
Mrs. Lourdes Aguirre is not a statement of my
opinion of Mrs. Aguirres mental status, x x x.
Rather, it is part of the patients personal and
family history as conveyed to me by Mrs.
Aguirre-Olondriz.
6. x x x An expression of my opinion,
especially of an expert opinion, cannot give rise
to a charge for falsification. A contrary opinion
by another expert only means that the experts
differ, and does not necessarily reflect on the
truth or falsity of either opinion x x x.
7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs.
Aguirre, because I never did x x x.
8. I had no participation in the surgery
performed on Larry Aguirre except to render an
opinion on his capacity to give informed
consent to the vasectomy x x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the
complaint, I submit that complainants are not
the proper persons to subscribe to the same as
they are not the offended party, peace officer or
other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated x x x.[21]
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the
circumstances attendant to the case did not
amount to the crime of falsification. He held
that
[T]he claim of the complainant that the
Psychiatric Report was falsified, because
consent was not given by Larry Aguirre to the
vasectomy and/or he was not consulted on said
operation does not constitute falsification. It
would have been different if it was stated in the
report that consent was obtained from Larry
Aguirre or that it was written therein that he
was consulted on the vasectomy, because that
would mean that it was made to appear in the
report that Larry Aguirre participated in the act
or proceeding by giving his consent or was
consulted on the matter when in truth and in
fact, he did not participate. Or if not, the entry
would have been an untruthful statement. But
that is not the case. Precisely (sic) the report
was made to determine whether Larry Aguirre
could give his consent to his intended
vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter of
Larrys consent having obtained or not may nor
be an issue after all, because complainants (sic)
herself alleged that Larrys mental condition is
that of a child, who can not give consent. Based
on the foregoing consideration, no falsification
can be established under the circumstances.[22]
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of
respondent Dr. Pascual that Lourdes Aguirre
had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be
considered falsification since
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre
was in fact personally interviewed by
respondent Dr. Pascual and that the latter
concluded that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar
Mood Disorder. The report merely quoted other
sources of information with respect to the
condition of Lourdes Aguirre, in the same
manner that the fact that Lourdes Aguirre was
physically abusing Larry Aguirre was also not
of Dra. Pascual personal knowledge. But the
fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is
not of her own personal knowledge in her
report does not mean that she committed
falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report,
but for as long as she has not alleged therein
that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre,
which allegation would not then be true, she
cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it
goes without saying that if the author of the
report is not guilty, then with more reason the
other respondents are not liable.[23]
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the
Assistant City Prosecutor also held that the
facts alleged did not amount to the crime of
mutilation as defined and penalized under
Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e.,
[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way
deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ,
which is still very much part of his physical
self. He ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability
(sic) to procreate, the operation is reversible
and therefore, cannot be the permanent damage
contemplated under Article 262 of the Revised
Penal Code.[24]
The Assistant City Prosecutor,[25] in a
Resolution[26] dated 8 January 2003, found no
probable cause to hold respondents Pedro
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
liable for the complaint of falsification and
mutilation, more specifically, the violation of
Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
Accordingly, the Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of petitioner Gloria
Aguirres complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. The dispositive portion of the
resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the
above-entitled case be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.[27]
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre
appealed the foregoing resolution to the
Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for
Review.[28]
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, for the
Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In
resolving said appeal, the Chief State
Prosecutor held that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000,
the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio,
dismiss outright the petition if there is no
showing of any reversible error in the
questioned resolution or finds the same to be
patently without merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its
attachments and found no error that would
justify a reversal of the assailed resolution
which is in accord with the law and evidenced
(sic) on the matter.[29]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirres Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied with
finality by the DOJ in another Resolution dated
12 November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre
went to the Court of Appeals by means of a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision dismissing petitioner
Gloria Aguirres recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed
Resolutions dated February 11, 2004 and
November 12, 2004 of the Secretary of Justice
in I.S. No. 02-12466 are hereby AFFIRMED.[30]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirres motion for
reconsideration proved futile as it was denied
by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 5
December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, as amended, premised on
the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS, GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE
ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED,
BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE
INTERNET WHICH RUNS AMUCK WITH
OUR SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT
BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS
PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE BY A
FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE
NOT AMOUNTING TO MUTILATION, X X
X; AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT
REFUSED TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR
MUTILATION AND FALSIFICATION
DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE
THEREFOR X X X.[31]
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more
proper issue for this Courts consideration is,
given the facts of the case, whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ
did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when the latter affirmed the public prosecutors
finding of lack of probable cause for
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the
criminal complaints of falsification and
mutilation in relation to Republic Act No.
7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals explained
that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the
permanency of sterilization as a result of a
vasectomy operation, and the chances of
restoring fertility with a reversal surgery x x x.
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral
vasectomy performed on Larry does not
constitute mutilation even if intentionally and
purposely done to prevent him from siring a
child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from
castration: in the latter act the reproductive
capacity is permanently removed or damaged.
[32]
It then concluded that:
The matter of legal liability, other than
criminal, which private respondents may have
incurred for the alleged absence of a valid
consent to the vasectomy performed on Larry,
is certainly beyond the province of this
certiorari petition. Out task is confined to the
issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice
and the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City committed grave abuse of
discretion in their determining the existence or
absence of probable cause for filing criminal
cases for falsification and mutilation under
Articles 172 (2) and 262 of the Revised Penal
Code.[33]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends
that the Court of Appeals and the DOJ failed to
appreciate several important facts: 1) that
bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioners
brother, Larry Aguirre, was admitted[34]; 2)
that the procedure caused the perpetual
destruction of Larrys reproductive organs of
generation or conception;[35] 3) that the
bilateral vasectomy was intentional and
deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his
reproductive organ and his capacity to
procreate; and 4) that respondents, in
conspiracy with one another, made not only
one but two (2) untruthful statements, and not
mere inaccuracies when they made it appear in
the psychiatry report[36] that a) Larrys consent
was obtained or at the very least that the latter
was informed of the intended vasectomy; and
b) that Lourdes Aguirre was likewise
interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically,
however, petitioner Gloria Aguirre does not in
any way state that she, instead of respondent
Pedro Aguirre, has guardianship over the
person of Larry. She only insists that
respondents should have obtained Larrys
consent prior to the conduct of the bilateral
vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), for public respondent DOJ, argues that
the conduct of preliminary investigation to
determine the existence of probable cause for
the purpose of filing (an) information is the
function of the public prosecutor.[37] More
importantly, the element[s] of castration or
mutilation of an organ necessary for generation
is completely absent as he was not deprived of
any organ necessary for reproduction, much
less the destruction of such organ.[38]
Likewise, in support of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, respondents Pedro Aguirre
and Olondriz assert that, fundamentally,
petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no standing to file
the complaint, as she has not shown any injury
to her person or asserted any relationship with
Larry other than being his common law sister;
further, that she cannot prosecute the present
case, as she has not been authorized by law to
file said complaint, not being the offended
party, a peace officer or a public officer charged
with the enforcement of the law. Accordingly,
respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz posit
that they, together with the other respondents
Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual, may not be charged
with, prosecuted for and ultimately convicted
of: 1) mutilation x x x since the bilateral
vasectomy conducted on Larry does not
involve castration or amputation of an organ
necessary for reproduction as the twin elements
of the crime of mutilation x x x are absent[39];
and 2) falsification x x x since the acts
allegedly constituting falsification involve
matters of medical opinion and not matters of
fact,[40] and that petitioner Gloria Aguirre
failed to prove damage to herself or to any
other person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein,
stresses that vasectomy is not mutilation. He
elucidates that vasectomy is merely the
excision of the vas deferens, the duct in testis
which transport semen[41]; that it is the penis
and the testis that make up the male
reproductive organ and not the vas deferens;
and additionally argues that for the crime of
mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262 of
the Revised Penal Code necessitates that there
be intentional total or partial deprivation of
some essential organ for reproduction. Tubes,
seminal ducts, vas deferens or prostatic urethra
not being organs, respondent Dr. Agatep
concludes, therefore, that vasectomy does not
correspond to mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private
document, respondent Dr. Agatep asseverates
that he never took part in disclosing any
information, data or facts as contained in the
contentious Psychiatric Report.
For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that
the assailed Psychiatry Report was the result of
her independent exercise of professional
judgment. Rightly or wrongly, (she) diagnosed
Larry Aguirre to be incapable of giving
consent, based on interviews made by the
psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and persons who
interacted with him.[42] And supposing that
said report is flawed, it is, at most, an erroneous
medical diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[43]
The term does not mean actual and positive
cause nor does it import absolute certainty.[44]
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief;[45] that is, the belief that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. A finding of probable cause merely
binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.[46]
The executive department of the government is
accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its
principal obligation being the faithful execution
of the laws of the land. A necessary component
of the power to execute the laws is the right to
prosecute their violators,[47] the responsibility
of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the
determination of whether or not probable cause
exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an
accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ.
And by the nature of his office, a public
prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the
averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ
have a wide range of discretion, the discretion
of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by (public)
prosecutors.[48] And this Court has
consistently adhered to the policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in
the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for
the filing of an information against the
supposed offender.[49]
But this is not to discount the possibility of the
commission of abuses on the part of the
prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the
investigating prosecutor may erroneously
exercise the discretion lodged in him by law.
This, however, does not render his act
amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[50]
Prescinding from the above, the courts duty in
an appropriate case, therefore, is confined to a
determination of whether the assailed executive
determination of probable cause was done
without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting
from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of
law to grant the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the
finding of whether or not there exists probable
cause to file an information, the one seeking
the writ must be able to establish that the
investigating prosecutor exercised his power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be
patent and gross as would amount to an evasion
or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion is not enough.[51]
Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had
jurisdiction over the case but has transcended
the same or acted without authority.[52]
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the
present petition, the reasons of the Assistant
City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal
complaints for falsification and mutilation, as
affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of
whether or not he committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause
for falsification and mutilation exists - the
Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the
factual and legal milieu of the case. He found
that there was no sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case for the crimes
complained of as defined and punished under
Articles 172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime
of falsification of a private document, the
Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that the
circumstances attendant to the case did not
amount to the crime complained of, that is, the
lack of consent by Larry Aguirre before he was
vasectomized; or the fact that the latter was not
consulted. The lack of the two preceding
attendant facts do not in any way amount to
falsification, absent the contention that it was
made to appear in the assailed report that said
consent was obtained. That would have been an
untruthful statement. Neither does the fact that
the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes
Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the
same token amount to falsification because said
report does not put forward that such finding
arose after an examination of the concerned
patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he
reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered
Larry unable to procreate, it was not the
permanent damage contemplated under the
pertinent provision of the penal code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor was
not shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
are charged with violating Articles 172 and 262
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610. Article 172, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code, defines the crime
of falsification of a private document, viz
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals
and use of falsified documents. The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third
party, or with the intent to cause such damage,
shall in any private document commit any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents
with falsification of a private document for
conspiring with one another in keeping Larry in
the dark about the foregoing (vasectomy) as the
same was concealed from him by the
respondents x x x,[53] as well as for falsely
concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to
be suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code which defines the acts
constitutive of falsification, that is
Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated
in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in
such copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative
to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.
vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report,
shows that the acts complained of do not in any
manner, by whatever stretch of the imagination,
fall under any of the eight (8) enumerated acts
constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented
by petitioner Gloria Aguirre, it is necessary that
we discuss the elements of the crime of
falsification of private document under the
Revised Penal Code, a crime which all the
respondents have been accused of perpetrating.
The elements of said crime under paragraph 2
of Article 172 of our penal code are as follows:
1) that the offender committed any acts of
falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated
in Article 171; 2) that the falsification was
committed in any private document; and 3) that
the falsification caused damage to a third party
or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage. Under Article
171, paragraph 2, a person may commit
falsification of a private document by causing it
to appear in a document that a person or
persons participated in an act or proceeding,
when such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the act or proceeding. On the
other hand, falsification under par. 3 of the
same article is perpetrated by a person or
persons who, participating in an act or
proceeding, made statements in that act or
proceeding and the offender, in making a
document, attributed to such person or persons
statements other than those in fact made by
such person or persons. And the crime defined
under paragraph 4 thereof is committed when
1) the offender makes in a document statements
in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and 4) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was
made with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the
crime to the case at bar, in order that
respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in
conspiracy with her, to have committed the
crime of falsification under par. 3 and 4 of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
essential that that there be prima facie evidence
to show that she had caused it to appear that
Larry gave his consent to be vasectomized or at
the very least, that the proposed medical
procedure was explained to Larry. But in the
assailed report, no such thing was done. Lest it
be forgotten, the reason for having Larry
psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to
ascertain whether or not he can validly consent
with impunity to the proposed vasectomy, and
not to obtain his consent to it or to oblige
respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what
the import of the medical procedure was.
Further, that Larrys consent to be vasectomized
was not obtained by the psychiatrist was of no
moment, because nowhere is it stated in said
report that such assent was obtained. At any
rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre contradicts her
very own allegations when she persists in the
contention that Larry has the mental age of a
child; hence, he was legally incapable of
validly consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect
diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre, with regard to
paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, we quote with approval the succinct
statements of the Assistant City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding,
which is not of her own personal knowledge in
her report does not mean that she committed
falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report,
but for as long as she has not alleged therein
that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre,
which allegation would not then be true, she
cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it
goes without saying that if the author of the
report is not guilty, then with more reason the
other respondents are not liable.[54]
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the
Revised Penal Code defines the crime as
Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall
intentionally mutilate another by depriving
him, either totally or partially, of some essential
organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above
provision shows that the elements[55] of
mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262
of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be
a castration, that is, mutilation of organs
necessary for generation; and 2) that the
mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately,
that is, to deprive the offended party of some
essential organ for reproduction. According to
the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not
amount to the crime of mutilation as defined
and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy
operation did not in any way deprived (sic)
Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still
very much part of his physical self. Petitioner
Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this
Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy
constitutes the crime of mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation
would be contrary to the intentions of the
framers of our penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in
United States v. Esparcia,[56] in which this
Court had the occasion to shed light on the
implication of the term mutilation. Therein we
said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is
whether or not the crime committed is that
defined and penalized by article 414 of the
Penal Code. The English translation of this
article reads: "Any person who shall
intentionally castrate another shall suffer a
penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua." The Spanish text, which
should govern, uses the word "castrare,"
inadequately translated into English as
"castrate." The word "capar," which is
synonymous of "castrar," is defined in the
Royal Academic Dictionary as the destruction
of the organs of generation or conception.
Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish
any person who shall intentionally deprived
another of any organ necessary for
reproduction. An applicable construction is that
of Viada in the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their
order of gravity, is the mutilation known by the
name of 'castration' which consists of the
amputation of whatever organ is necessary for
generation. The law could not fail to punish
with the utmost severity such a crime, which,
although not destroying life, deprives a person
of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind
that according to this article in order for
'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that the
'castration' be made purposely. The law does
not look only to the result but also to the
intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason
of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of
the organs of generation, the act, although
voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it
would not come under the provisions of this
article, but under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada,
Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect,
4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a
man, totally or partially, of some essential
organ of reproduction? We answer in the
negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of
vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas
deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are
transported from the testicle to the urethra
where they combine with the seminal fluid to
form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends
merely tied.[57] That part, which is cut, that is,
the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is
part of the duct system of the male reproductive
organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a
highly organized unit of structure, having a
defined function in a multicellular organism
and consisting of a range of tissues.[58] Be that
as it may, even assuming arguendo that the
tubular passage can be considered an organ, the
cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or
deny a man of any essential organ of
reproduction for the simple reason that it does
not entail the taking away of a part or portion
of the male reproductive system. The cut ends,
after they have been tied, are then dropped
back into the incision.[59]
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man
his power of reproduction, such procedure does
not deprive him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction. Notably,
the ordinary usage of the term mutilation is the
deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the
body),[60] with the operative expression being
deprivation. In the same manner, the word
castration is defined as the removal of the
testies or ovaries.[61] Such being the case in
this present petition, the bilateral vasectomy
done on Larry could not have amounted to the
crime of mutilation as defined and punished
under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code. And no criminal culpability could
be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the
urologist who performed the procedure, much
less the other respondents. Thus, we find
sufficient evidence to explain why the Assistant
City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they
did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the writ of certiorari is unavailing; hence,
should not be issued.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the
Courts general policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has
been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot order
the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case.[62] The
courts try and absolve or convict the accused
but, as a rule, have no part in the initial
decision to prosecute him.[63] The possible
exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion
into the precincts of the executive. But that is
not the case herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision and 5
December 2005 Resolution, both of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner
Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80399-404. November 13, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH
and RUDY GAID, accused-appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Accused-appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and
Rudy Gaid were each charged with two counts
of forcible abduction with rape,[1] one count of
robbery with frustrated homicide[2] and one
count of robbery.[3]
I. In Criminal Case No. 3809 - Forcible
Abduction with Rape
That on or about March 31, 1983 in the
evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with violence and intimidation, and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, conspiring,
confederating together with one Rudy Gaid
alias Boy Gaid, who is presently at large, and
mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abduct the herein complainant, Marilou
Nobleza by then and there taking and carrying
her away with her sister, Maritess Nobleza, and
loading said complainant on board a stolen
pick-up, against her will and consent and with
lewd designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra,
Carmen Hill, this city, to Malasag, this city, and
while at Malasag, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge (by accused Permonette Joy
Fortich) of the herein complainant, against her
will and consent, to her great damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
II. In Criminal Case No. 3877 - Forcible
Abduction with Rape
That on or about March 31, 1983, in the
evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with violence and intimidation and with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abduct the
complainant Maritess Nobleza, by then and
there taking and carrying her away with her
sister, Marilou Nobleza, and loading in a stolen
pick-up with her sister, against her will and
consent and and (sic) with lewd designs, and
brought her from Alta Tierra, Carmen Hill, this
City, to Malasag, this city, and while at
Malasag, this city (sic) did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means
of violence and intimidation have carnal
knowledge (by accused Permonette Joy
Fortich) of the complainant, against her will
and consent, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
III. In Criminal Case No. 3878 - Forcible
Abduction with Rape
That on or about March 31, 1983, in the
evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named (accused),
with violence and intimidation, and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, and a motor
vehicle, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abduct the complainant Maritess Nobleza, by
then and there taking and carrying her away
with her sister, Marilou Nobleza, and loading in
a stolen pick-up with her sister, against her will
and consent and with lewd designs, and
brought her from Alta Tierra, Carmen Hill, this
city, to Malasag, this city, and while at
Malasag, this city (sic), did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means
of violence and intimidation have carnal
knowledge (by accused Rudy Gaid alias Boy)
of the said complainant, against her will and
consent, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
IV. In Criminal Case No. 3896 - Forcible
Abduction with Rape
That on or about March 11, 1983 (sic), in the
evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with violence and intimidation and with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, and motor vehicle,
conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping with (sic) one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously abduct the complainant Marilou
Nobleza, by then and there taking and carrying
her away with her sister, Maritess Nobleza, and
loading in a stolen pick-up with her sister,
against her will and consent and with lewd
designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra,
Carmen Hill, this city to Malasag, this city
(sic), and while at Malasag, this city, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
by means by violence and intimidation have
carnal knowledge (by accused Rudy Gaid alias
Boy) of the complainant, against her will and
consent, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
V. In Criminal Case No. 3977 - Robbery with
Frustrated Homicide
That on or about March 31, 1983, at Carmen
Hill, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with firearms,
with violence and intimidation upon persons,
with intent of gain and against the will of the
owner thereof, conspiring, confederating
together with one Rudy Gaid alias Boy Gaid,
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
rob and carry away a polo shirt, pants while
being worn by Luis S. Tumang and a cash
worth P160.00, a wrist watch (Elgin) worth
P500.00, valued all in all in the total amount of
P660.00, to the damage and prejudice of the
said owner in the aforesaid sum; that on the
occasion of the robbery and to enable them to
facilitate the taking and robbing (sic) the
offended party, and to carry out with ease the
commission of the offense, accused Permonette
Joy Fortich with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked and mauled the said Luis S. Tumang,
struck and hit him with a firearm, thereby
inflicting the following injuries, to wit: fracture
depressed type left perietat (sic) bone;
contussion (sic) hematoma left temporal area;
abrasion behind left ear; multiple linear
abrasion both thigh and leg, which ordinarily
would cause the death of the said offended
party, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Homicide,
as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of some cause
independent of his will, that is, by the timely
and able medical attendance rendered to the
offended party which prevented his death.
Contrary to Article 294 in relation to Article
249 and Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
VI. In Criminal Case No. 4162 - Robbery
That on or about March 31, 1983, more or less
10:30 in the evening at Carmen Hill, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent of gain by means of
violence and intimidation on the person take,
steal and carry away polo shirt and pants while
being worn by one Rolly (I)mperio and a
wallect (sic) contained (sic) P85.00 in cash,
who was at the same time attacked and beaten
up by the said accused, inflicting upon him
physical injuries, to wit: Laceration of parietal
area, 2 cm. in length, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded
not guilty to all the charges.
On November 25, 1983, the six criminal cases,
upon agreement of the prosecution and the
defense, were consolidated and tried jointly.
The evidence for the prosecution elicited the
following facts:
On March 31, 1983, at about 8:00 oclock in the
evening, after attending mass at St. Augustine
Church, Cagayan de Oro City, sisters Marilou
and Maritess Nobleza, together with their
friends Rolly Imperio and Luis Tumang,
proceeded to Alta Tierra Hotel in Carmen Hill
using an Isuzu pick-up owned by the latters
mother. After a while the group decided to go
home. Suddenly, two men armed with
handguns who were later identified as
appellants emerged from the rear end of the
vehicle and fired a single shot which hit the left
side of the pick-up. They introduced
themselves as members of the New Peoples
Army (NPA) and ordered the sisters to get
inside the vehicle while Imperio and Tumang
were instructed to strip.
Gaid thumped Imperio on the head with a .38
caliber revolver causing him to fall down,
while Tumang was hit several times by Fortich
in various parts of the body and momentarily
lost consciousness. Tumang was divested of his
wallet containing one hundred sixty pesos
(P160.00) in cash, five U.S. dollars (P70.00),
six Saudi Arabian Riyals (P30.42), one 12K
gold wristwatch worth P500.00, pants valued at
P140.00, and shoes worth P125.00. All of these
items were not recovered.[4] Imperio, on the
other hand, was stripped of his pants valued at
P135.00, a wallet worth P45.00 containing
P85.00 in cash, a pair of shoes, and one t-shirt.
[5]
ANTI HAZING
LAW
REPUBLIC ACT No. 8049
AN ACT REGULATING HAZING AND
OTHER FORMS OF INITIATION RITES
IN FRATERNITIES, SORORITIES, AND
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an
initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club
or the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Military
Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the
Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army
Training. The physical, mental and
psychological testing and training procedure
and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of
prospective regular members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police as approved ny the Secretary of
National Defense and the National Police
Commission duly recommended by the Chief
of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Director General of the Philippine National
Police shall not be considered as hazing for the
purposes of this Act.
Section 2. No hazing or initiation rites in any
form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or
organization shall be allowed without prior
written notice to the school authorities or head
of organization seven (7) days before the
conduct of such initiation. The written notice
shall indicate the period of the initiation
activities which shall not exceed three (3) days,
shall include the names of those to be subjected
to such activities, and shall further contain an
undertaking that no physical violence be
employed by anybody during such initiation
rites.
Section 3. The head of the school or
organization or their representatives must
assign at least two (2) representatives of the
school or organization, as the case may be, to
be present during the initiation. It is the duty of
such representative to see to it that no physical
harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a
recruit, neophyte or applicant.
Section 4. If the person subjected to hazing or
other forms of initiation rites suffers any
physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the
officers and members of the fraternity, sorority
or organization who actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals. The person or persons who
participated in the hazing shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or
mutilation results there from.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years) if in consequence of the
hazing the victim shall become insane,
imbecile, impotent or blind.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period (14 years, 8 months and one
day to 17 years and 4 months) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim shall
have lost the use of speech or the power to
hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a
hand, a foot, an arm or a leg or shall have
lost the use of any such member shall have
become incapacitated for the activity or
work in which he was habitually engaged.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period (12 years and one day to
14 years and 8 months) if in consequence of
the hazing the victim shall become
deformed or shall have lost any other part of
his body, or shall have lost the use thereof,
or shall have been ill or incapacitated for
the performance on the activity or work in
which he was habitually engaged for a
period of more than ninety (90) days.
5. The penalty of prison mayor in its
maximum period (10 years and one day to
12 years) if in consequence of the hazing
the victim shall have been ill or
incapacitated for the performance on the
activity or work in which he was habitually
engaged for a period of more than thirty
(30) days.
6. The penalty of prison mayor in its
medium period (8 years and one day to 10
years) if in consequence of the hazing the
victim shall have been ill or incapacitated
for the performance on the activity or work
in which he was habitually engaged for a
period of ten (10) days or more, or that the
injury sustained shall require medical
assistance for the same period.
7. The penalty of prison mayor in its
minimum period (6 years and one day to 8
years) if in consequence of the hazing the
victim shall have been ill or incapacitated
for the performance on the activity or work
in which he was habitually engaged from
one (1) to nine (9) days, or that the injury
sustained shall require medical assistance
for the same period.
8. The penalty of prison correccional in its
maximum period (4 years, 2 months and
one day to 6 years) if in consequence of the
hazing the victim sustained physical injuries
which do not prevent him from engaging in
his habitual activity or work nor require
medical attendance.
The responsible officials of the school or of the
police, military or citizen's army training
organization, may impose the appropriate
administrative sanctions on the person or the
persons charged under this provision even
before their conviction. The maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed in any of the
following instances:
(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by
force, violence, threat, intimidation or
deceit on the person of the recruit who
refuses to join;
(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant
initially consents to join but upon learning
that hazing will be committed on his person,
is prevented from quitting;
(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant
having undergone hazing is prevented from
reporting the unlawful act to his parents or
guardians, to the proper school authorities,
or to the police authorities, through force,
violence, threat or intimidation;
(d) when the hazing is committed outside of
the school or institution; or
(e) when the victim is below twelve (12)
years of age at the time of the hazing.
The owner of the place where hazing is
conducted shall be liable as an accomplice,
when he has actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted therein but failed to take any action
to prevent the same from occurring. If the
hazing is held in the home of one of the officers
or members of the fraternity, group, or
organization, the parents shall be held liable as
principals when they have actual knowledge of
the hazing conducted therein but failed to take
any action to prevent the same from occurring.
The school authorities including faculty
members who consent to the hazing or who
have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to
take any action to prevent the same from
occurring shall be punished as accomplices for
the acts of hazing committed by the
perpetrators.
The officers, former officers, or alumni of the
organization, group, fraternity or sorority who
actually planned the hazing although not
present when the acts constituting the hazing
were committed shall be liable as principals. A
fraternity or sorority's adviser who is present
when the acts constituting the hazing were
committed and failed to take action to prevent
the same from occurring shall be liable as
principal.
The presence of any person during the hazing is
prima facie evidence of participation therein as
principal unless he prevented the commission
of the acts punishable herein.
Any person charged under this provision shall
not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance
that there was no intention to commit so grave
a wrong.
This section shall apply to the president,
manager, director or other responsible officer
of a corporation engaged in hazing as a
requirement for employment in the manner
provided herein.
Section 5. If any provision or part of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other
parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid
and effective.
Section 6. All laws, orders, rules or regulations
which are inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Act are hereby amended or
repealed accordingly.
Section 7. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
calendar days after its publication in at least
two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ARTEMIO G.R. No.
VILLAREAL, 151258
Petitioner, G.R. No.
154954
- versus -
G.R. No.
PEOPLE OF THE
155101
PHILIPPINES,
G.R. Nos.
Respondent.
178057 &
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 178080
-----------x
Present:
PEOPLE OF THE
CARPIO, J.,
PHILIPPINES,
Chairperson,
Petitioner,
BRION,
- versus -
PEREZ,
THE HONORABLE
SERENO, and
COURT OF
APPEALS, REYES, JJ.
ANTONIO Promulgated:
MARIANO
February 1, 2012
ALMEDA,
DALMACIO LIM,
JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE
MONTECILLO,
VINCENT
TECSON,
ANTONIO
GENERAL,
SANTIAGO
RANADA III,
NELSON
VICTORINO,
JAIME MARIA
FLORES II,
ZOSIMO
MENDOZA,
MICHAEL
MUSNGI,
VICENTE
VERDADERO,
ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ,
AMANTE
PURISIMA II,
EULOGIO
SABBAN,
PERCIVAL
BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS,
JONAS KARL B.
PEREZ, RENATO
BANTUG, JR.,
ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO,
and RONAN DE
GUZMAN,
Respondents.
x--------------
-----------x
FIDELITO DIZON,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x--------------
-----------x
GERARDA H.
VILLA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MANUEL
LORENZO
ESCALONA II,
MARCUS JOEL
CAPELLAN
RAMOS,
CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and
ANSELMO
ADRIANO,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------
------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo
Lenny Villa the victim in this case on 10
February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to
put an end to hazing.[1] Due in large part to the
brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda
Villa, groups were organized, condemning his
senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a
special law, which became effective in 1995,
that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of
the law was to discourage members from
making hazing a requirement for joining their
sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.
[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract
the exculpatory implications of consent and
initial innocent act in the conduct of initiation
rites by making the mere act of hazing
punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
FACTS
ISSUES
SO ORDERED.