Crim Rev Atty Diwa Part 1 21-30

CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 21-30
Jeross Romano Aguilar
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56358 October 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUIS B. TORING DIOSDADO BERDON and CARMELO B. BERDIN, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Fil C. Veloso counsel de oficio for Luis B. Toring.
Joel P. Alino for Berdon and Berdin.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The appellants herein seek the reversal of the October 28, 1980 decision of the Circuit Criminal Court in Cebu City in Criminal Case No.
CCC-XIV-2170, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Luis B. Toring guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER by direct participation as principal; Diosdado Berdon
as accomplice thereto; and Carmelo Berdin as accessory after the fact.
Appreciating in favor of the accused Luis B. Toring the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender, the said circumstance having been offset by the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime, the accused Luis Toring should be, as he is, hereby
sentenced to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties
of law.
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances on the part of the
accused Diosdado Berdon, the said accused should as he is hereby sentenced to
the indeterminate penalty of from SIX (6) YEARS of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to TWELVE (12) and ONE (1) DAY of ReclusionTemporal, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties of the law.
Appreciating in favor of the accused Carmelo Berdin, the privileged mitigating

circumstance of minority, the said accused being only 17 years of age, the accused
Carmelo Berdin should be, as he is, sentenced to the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law.
The defendants shall jointly and solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Samuel Augusto for actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P15,000.00
and for moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The instrument of the crime, the knife, Exhibit "B", is confiscated in favor of the
government.
Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED. 1
According to the prosecution, the antecedent facts are as follows:
In the evening of May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City for
the last canvassing of votes for the candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. As
one of the candidates was the daughter of Samuel Augusto, he and the members of his family
attended the affair.
Also present were members of the kwaknit gang, a group which was noted for their bird-like way of
dancing and their propensity for drunkenness and provoking trouble. Its president, called the "alas"
king, was Luis Toring. The group was then outside the dancing area which was ringed by benches.
At around 10:45 p.m., Samuel's daughter was proclaimed the winner in the contest. Beer and
softdrinks having been served the parents of the candidates by the officers of the Naga Chapel
Association which took charge of the affair, Samuel was tipsy when, after his daughter's
proclamation, he stepped out of the dancing area to answer the call of nature.
At that moment, barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Luis Toring, Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado
Berdon proceed to a dark area while whispering to each other. Diosdado Berdon handed a knife to
Luis Toring, 2 who then approached Samuel from behind, held Samuel's left hand with his left hand,
and with his right hand, stabbed with the knife the right side of Samuel's abdomen. 3 Upon seeing
Felix running towards them, Luis Toring pulled out the knife and, together with Carmelo Berdin and
Diosdado Berdon, ran towards the dark. Felix tried to chase the three but he was not able to catch
them. He returned to where Samuel had slumped and helped others in taking Samuel to the
hospital.
According to Maria Catalina Sorono, who was six (6) meters away from Samuel and Luis when the
assault occurred, Diosdado Berdon and Carmelo Berdin were poised to deliver fist blows on Samuel
just before Luis Toring stabbed him. Diosdado gave the knife to Luis Toring. 4
As soon as she saw the stabbing of Samuel, Maria Catalina shouted for help. The three assailants
ran towards the direction of the fields. Jacinto Lobas and Mario Andog responded to her shouts and
brought Samuel to the Opon Emergency Hospital where he died on arrival. According to the
necropsy report, 5 Samuel, who was thirty years old, died due to massive hemorrhage secondary to
the stab wound on the abdomen. Said wound is described in the report as follows:
Stab wound, with herniation of omental issues; elliptical, 3.5 cms. long, running
vertically downward, edges clean-cut, superior extremity rounded, inferior extremity
sharp, located at the abdominal region, right anterior aspect, 7.5 cms. to the right of
anterior median line and 107.0 cms. above right heel, directed backward, upward
and medially, involving skin and the underlying soft tissues, penetrating right
peritoneal cavity, incising inferior vena cava, attaining an approximate depth of 15.0
cms.
The death weapon, a kitchen knife made of stainless steel and with a red-colored handle, was
recovered from the house of Luis Toring. According to Patrolman Pantaleon P. Amodia, the police
found out during the investigation that Luis Toring had left the weapon with "Camilo" Berdin. When
the police confronted Berdin, the latter led them to the house of Toring which Berdin entered. When
he emerged from the house, Berdin handed the weapon to the police. 6
An information for murder was filed against Toring. Subsequently, however, the information was
amended to include Diosdado Berdon and Carmelo Berdin as defendants. The three were charged
therein with conspiracy in killing Samuel Augusto in a treacherous manner. Berdon, it was alleged,
"conveniently supplied the death weapon" which Toring used in stabbing Samuel while Berdin
allegedly concealed the weapon to prevent its discovery by the police. 7 The crime was purportedly
committed with the attendance of the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and nighttime.
All three accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. At the trial, Luis Toring, alias "Lowe,"
testified that he was not the president of the kwaknit gang. He went to the benefit dance in the
company of Venir Ybañez, Joel Escobia, Ely Amion, Abel Pongase, Abe Berdon, Genio Berdin and
Alex Augusta. Toring and his group were standing outside the dancing area when, at around eleven
o'clock in the evening, Samuel, a known tough guy ("maldito"), approached them and held Venir
Ybanez by his collar. Then Samuel thrust the butt of his shotgun on the chin of Joel
Escobia, 8 proceeded to another group who were also gangmates of Toring, and again, with the
barrel of his shotgun, hit Eli Amion's chest several times. 9
Reacting to what he saw, Toring got his kitchen knife which was tucked in his waist, approached
Samuel from the latter's right side and stabbed him once as he did not intend to kill Samuel. Toring
then ran towards the dark portion of the area and went home. There, he left the knife and proceeded
to the hut by the fishpond of one Roman. 10
Toring was sleeping in the hut with his older brother, Arsenio, when, at around 4:00 o'clock in the
morning of May 26, 1980, Edgar Augusto, the younger brother of Samuel, shot them. Arsenio was
hit on the left leg and he stayed two months in the hospital for the treatment of his wound. 11
At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 26, 1980, Toring surrendered to two Philippine Constabulary
soldiers.12 They brought him to the police of Lapu-lapu City on May 28, 1980.13 When the police
asked him about the knife he used in stabbing Samuel, Toring told them to go to Carmelo Berdin
because he was the only person who knew where Toring hid it. 14 Asserting that he was the one who
returned the knife to his own house, Toring testified that Carmelo Berdin used to see him hide his
weapons upstairs because Berdin was a frequent visitor of his. 15
For his part, Carmelo, a 5 feet tall, asthmatic 17-year-old whom the court described as "lilliputian,"
admitted that he witnessed the stabbing incident but he ran away with his group immediately after
because he was afraid he might be shot by Samuel. He was with Toring when the latter hid the still
bloodied knife under a trunk in Toring's house. He was familiar with the hiding place of the knife
because Toring showed it to him and there were times when he would get the knife there upon
Toring's request. Carmelo corroborated Toring's testimony that on that fateful night, Toring carried
the knife tucked at the back of his waistline. 16
In court, Toring testified that he never saw Diosdado at the dance. 17 However, in his sworn
statement dated May 28, 1980 and marked as Exhibit D, Toring stated that he took the knife from
Diosdado to stab Samuel. Confronted with said statement, Diosdado said that when he asked Toring
why he implicated him, Toring allegedly replied that he "included" Diosdado because of the case the
barangay brigade had filed against Toring. 18
According to Diosdado, he did not attend the May 25 dance because of the trouble which erupted
during the dance the night before. He did not have anything to do with the stabbing of Samuel. He
admitted, however, that a week after the incident, his family went to barrio Andaliw Ronda, Cebu, for
their yearly visit to his father-in-law. He stayed there for fifteen days and would have stayed longer
had not his mother informed him of the subpoena addressed to him. 19
On October 28, 1980, a day after the last day of hearing, the lower court 20 rendered a decision
discrediting Toring's claim that the killing of Samuel was justified because it was done in defense of
a stranger pursuant to Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court found that Toring
was the "aggressor acting in retaliation or revenge by reason of a running feud or long-standing
grudge" between the kwaknit gang and the group of Samuel, who, being the son of the barangay
captain, was a "power to be reckoned with." It mentioned the fact that a year before the incident in
question, Toring was shot by Edgar Augusto (Samuel's brother) and hence, in his desire to avenge
himself, Toring, "needed but a little excuse to do away with the object of his hatred. 21
The lower court could not believe that Samuel brought along his shotgun to the dance because he
was "not reputed to be a public official or functionary entitled to possess a firearm." Otherwise, the
police and the barangay tanod would have arrested him. The court surmised that if Samuel really
carried a shotgun, he certainly must have had a permit or license to possess the same.
It noted that while Toring testified that Samuel was aiming his shotgun at the chest of Ely Amyon
(Amion), prosecution witness Joel Escobia claimed that he was at the receiving end of Samuel's
thrusts with the butt of his shotgun. To the court, such discrepancy is fatal to the defense because in
appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, the court must know "with
definiteness the identity of the stranger defended by the accused." 22
The lower court, however, ruled out the existence of conspiracy among the three accused on the
ground that there was no proof on what they were whispering about when Felix saw them.
Accordingly, it held that the accused have individual or separate liabilities for the killing of Samuel:
Toring, as a principal, Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice by his act of giving Toring the knife, and
Carmelo Berdin as an accessory for concealing the weapon. It considered treachery as the
qualifying circumstance to the killing, found no proof as to allegation of evident premeditation but
appreciated nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. It meted the accused the penalties
mentioned above.
All three accused appealed.

Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel was justified because he
acted in defense of his first cousin, Joel Escobia. Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides
that no criminal liability is incurred by anyone "who acts in defense of ... his relatives ... by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed
in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation
was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein." The first and
second requisites referred to are enumerated in paragraph (b) in the same article on selfdefense as:
(a) unlawful aggression, and (b) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Joel Escobia, whose chin was hit with the butt of Samuel's shotgun, is the first cousin of Toring their
fathers being brothers, 23 although no explanation appears on record why they have different
surnames. At any rate, this allegation on relationship was not rebutted by the prosecution.
The appreciation of the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, however, hinges in this case
on the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Corollarily, the claim of Toring that
Samuel was, at the time of the assault, carrying a shotgun to intimidate Toring's group must be
proven.
Understandably, no prosecution witness attested that they saw Samuel with a firearm. The
prosecution even recalled to the witness stand Samuel's widow who asserted that her husband did
not own any firearm. 24 Going along with the prosecution's evidence, the lower court arrived at the
rather gratuitous conjecture that Samuel could not have had a shotgun with him because no one
without a permit would carry a firearm without risking arrest by the police or the barangay tanod. At
the same time, however, the lower court described Samuel as the son of the barangay captain who
"had the run of the place and had his compelling presence felt by all and " sundry." 25
While matters dealing with the credibility of witnesses and appreciation of evidence are primarily the
lower court's province, this Court has the power to determine whether in the performance of its
functions, the lower court overlooked certain matters which may have a substantial effect in the
resolution of a case. 26 Defense witness Joel Escobia was, besides Toring, the only witness whose
sworn statement was taken by the police on May 26, 1980, the day after the fatal assault on Samuel.
In his sworn statement, 27 Escobia attested that as he was about to dance with a girl, Samuel
stopped him, pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to Escobia
and asked him, "Do you like this, Dong?" to which Escobia replied, "No, Noy I do not like that."
Samuel then placed the bullet in the shotgun and was thus pointing it at Escobia when Toring came
from behind Samuel and stabbed the latter. Even on cross-examination at the trial, Escobia did not
depart from his statement. In fact he added that Samuel pointed the shotgun at his chin and told him
to eat the bullet. 28
There is no reason to doubt Joel Escobia's assertion of Samuel's unlawful aggression inasmuch as
his sworn statement 29 and testimony in court had not been successfully discredited by the
prosecution which also failed to prove that Joel had reason to prevaricate to favor Toring.
The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on
the part of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a
relative. Toring himself admitted in court 30 as well as in his sworn statement 31 that in 1979, he was
shot with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that
in attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to
avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge,
resentment or evil motive 32 because of a "running feud" between the Augusto and the Toring
brothers. As the defense itself claims, after the incident subject of the instant case occurred, Toring's
brother, Arsenio, was shot on the leg by Edgar Augusto. Indeed, vendetta appears to have driven
both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other. Hence, under the circumstances, to justify
Toring's act of assaulting Samuel Augusto would give free rein to lawlessness.
The lower court correctly considered the killing as murder in view of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The suddenness of the assault rendered Samuel helpless even to use his
shotgun. We also agree with the lower court that conspiracy and evident premeditation were not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, nighttime cannot be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. There is no proof that it was purposely sought to insure the commission of the crime
or prevent its discovery. 33 However, Toring should be credited with the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense of relative and the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code being reclusion
temporal maximum to death, the imposable penalty is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
medium in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstances of incomplete defense of relative
and voluntary surrender (Art. 64 [5]). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty
to be meted on Toring is prision correctional maximum as minimum to prision mayor maximum as
maximum penalty.
On the culpability of Diosdado Berdon, the Court holds that his defense of alibi cannot be sustained
in the absence of proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when
it was committed. 34 His house was only a kilometer away from the place where he supplied the knife
to Toring. 35 That distance does not preclude the possibility that Diosdado aided Toring in the
perpetration of the crime as it could be negotiated in just a few minutes by merely
walking. 36 Moreover, his alibi was uncorroborated as it was founded only on his own testimony and
what appears as a self-exonerating affidavit. 37
But what pins culpability on Diosdado were the testimonies of at least two prosecution witnesses
who positively identified him as the one who gave Toring the knife. Motive, therefore, has become
immaterial in the face of such positive identification 38 and hence, even if it were true that he was not
a member of the kwaknit gang, his participation in the killing has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Added to this is the fact that Toring himself in his sworn statement before the police pointed to
him as the source of the knife. 39 Verily, Toting could not have implicated him because of the
incomprehensible reason that a case had been filed against Toring before the barangay brigade.
Pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as an accomplice by his previous act of supplying
Toring the death weapon, Diosdado Berdon should be meted the penalty of prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporalmedium which is the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion
temporal maximum to death, the penalty prescribed for murder by Article 248 (Article 6 [3]). There
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be in its medium period
or reclusion temporal minimum (Article 64 [1]). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty should be taken from prision mayor minimum while the maximum penalty should
be within the period of reclusion temporal minimum.
With regards to Carmelo Berdin, his culpability as an accessory to the murder has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that he knew where Toring hid the knife does not imply that he
concealed it to prevent its discovery (Article 19 [2]). There simply is no proof to that effect. On the
contrary, Luis Toring in his sworn statement and testimony during the trial testified that after stabbing
the victim, he ran away and went to his house to hide the murder weapon. Being a close friend of
Toring and a frequent visitor to the latter's house, it is not impossible for Carmelo Berdin to know
where Toring hid his knives. Significantly, Carmelo readily acceded to the request of police officers
to lead them to the place where Toring kept the knife. He willingly retrieved it and surrendered it to
the police, a behavior we find inconsistent with guilt.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed insofar as it convicts Luis Toring as
principal in the murder of Samuel Augusto and Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice thereto.
The lower court's decision is modified as follows:
(a) Luis Toring shall be imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum as maximum;
(b) Diosdado Berdon shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayorminimum as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as
maximum;
(c) Carmelo Berdin is acquitted as an accessory to the murder of Samuel Augusto, and
(d) Luis Toring and Diosdado Berdon shall jointly and severally pay the heirs of Samuel Augusto an
indemnity of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). Costs against appellants Toring and Berdon.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 60159 November 6, 1989 - FAUSTO ANDAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 60159. November 6, 1989.]
P/CPL. FAUSTO ANDAL, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Eugenio E. Mendoza and Wenceslao G. Laureta for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF SANDIGANBAYAN ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT

RESPECT AND ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED IN THE SUPREME COURT. — In a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 7 of P.D. 1610 creating the
Sandiganbayan, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are entitled to great respect and only
questions of law may be raised in the Supreme Court.
2. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL COURT WILL NOT BE DISTURBED WHEN RESOLUTION
OF A FACTUAL ISSUE HINGES ON CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; EXCEPTION. — Well settled is the
rule that when the resolution of a factual issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses, the findings
of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which, if considered, mights affect the result of the case. Herein petitioner
failed to demonstrate that his case falls under the exception which would justify this Court to
overturn the findings of fact of the trial court.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; PRIMORDIAL REQUISITE

THEREOF IS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION; CASE AT BAR. — The primordial requisite of self-defense is
unlawful aggression, and for unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life
or personal safety. In the instant case, there was no imminent and real danger to the life or limb of
the petitioner when he shot the deceased, since the latter had already been disarmed.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
The petitioner, Fausto Andal, a member of the Batangas Integrated National Police, has appealed
to this Court the decision ** of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2521 which found him
guilty of the crime of Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of one (1) year of prision
correccional; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P20,000.00, as
moral damages; and to pay the costs.
In his petition for review, the petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan erred in rejecting his plea
of self-defense, on the ground that the initial unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased
after the petitioner had disarmed him.
We find no merit in the petition for it raises only factual issues. The record of this case shows that
the herein petitioner, Fausto Andal, then a corporal in the Batangas Integrated National Police,
whose duty shift was from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon to 12:00 o’clock midnight, was on patrol
aboard a tricycle driven by Police Pfc. Casiano Quinio in the evening of 25 September 1980. At
about 7:00 o’clock that night, he went to the pier located at Sta. Clara, Batangas City, to check on
one of his men, Pfc. Maximo Macaraig, who was stationed there, because the said Macaraig had
failed to report to police headquarters for briefing.
c han robles law lib rary : re d
Upon reaching the police checkpoint at the pier, and upon seeing Macaraig, petitioner asked
Macaraig why he did not pass by police headquarters for briefing before proceeding to his post.
Macaraig replied that he did not have to report to police headquarters since he already had his
orders. Sensing trouble, Quinio drove away his tricycle. Macaraig, however, followed them and told
the petitioner: "You report, supsup, ka." Petitioner kept his cool and did not say anything. But,
Quinio went to Macaraig to pacify him. Thereafter, petitioner and Quinio went back to the poblacion
of Batangas City. chanrobles law lib rary : re d
At about 11:00 o’clock that night, petitioner and Quinio parked their vehicle in front of the
Philbanking Building at P. Burgos Street, Batangas City. Quinio alighted from the tricycle and
joined Pat. Andres Perez and Pat. Pedro Banaag who were seated on a bench. The petitioner also
alighted from the tricycle and stood at the sidewalk near the bench. After a few minutes, Macaraig
arrived and went straight to the petitioner. He was furious this time and demanded why the
petitioner had embarrassed him in front of so many people. The petitioner denied the charge and
called Quinio to clear up matters with Macaraig. Quinio told Macaraig that the petitioner did not
utter defamatory words against him and asked him to forget the incident. ("Pasensiyahan na kayo,
hindi kayo magkakaiba.") Macaraig did not say anything. But, he returned to the petitioner and
challenged him. Quinio again tried to pacify Macaraig and brought him across the street. Still,
Macaraig refused to be pacified and went to the petitioner with a drawn gun in his hand.
Pointing the gun menacingly at the petitioner, Macaraig said: "Bumunot ka, bumunot ka."
Petitioner, however, refused to fight, saying: "I cannot fight you because we are both policemen."
Macaraig, nevertheless, fired his gun pointblank at the petitioner, hitting the latter in the middle
aspect, lower right knee. Petitioner then lunged at Macaraig and they grappled for possession of
the gun. Petitioner was able to wrest the gun from Macaraig. Thereafter, two (2) successive shots
were fired and Macaraig fell to the ground. He was brought to the hospital but he was dead on
arrival.
The factual issue hinges on what transpired after the petitioner had wrested the gun from the
deceased until the two (2) shots were fired, which caused the death of Macaraig. The findings of
respondent court on this factual issue are to this effect: jgc:chan robles. com.ph
"The pivotal question is: Was there an appreciable time lapse between the first aggression, i.e.
when deceased shot accused on his knee and the time accused resorted to force by way of firing
the two shots at the deceased? The facts unfolded indicate that there was This is what happened
after accused had grabbed the gun: (1) He asked deceased, "Why did you fire at me?" (2) He even
turned his head towards his son and instructed him just to stay in the jeep. (3) His son, Domingo
Andal, challenged deceased to a fight "sportsman like." (4) Deceased moved backward — 2 meters
away from accused. (5) Pfc. Quinio even thought the trouble was over as he started to get his
tricycle." 1
The petitioner contends that after he had taken possession of the gun from Macaraig, the latter
tried to grab the gun back and, in the scuffle, the gun went off twice, hitting the deceased. But,
this claim was not given credence by the respondent court which said: jgc:chan robles. com.ph
"The theory of the defense that the two shots were fired while accused and deceased were
grappling for the possession of the gun, is fictitious. When Pat. Perez heard the two shots,
deceased was `more or less’ two meters from the accused (p. 38, TSN sess. i.d.). This jibes with
the testimony of Pat. Quinio that after accused had wrested the gun from deceased, the latter
`somewhat backout’ (p. 76, TSN sess., i.d.) More important, immediately after the two
shots, Accused was holding the gun with his right hand and as demonstrated in Court said `right
hand stretched downward’ (p. 77, TSN sess., i.d.). This demonstration is given credence by
corroborative physical evidence. According to Dr. Luis Aclan who examined the body of deceased,
the trajectory of the bullet was downward (see Exh. `B-1’), with the right armpit (No. 3) as the
point of entrance and the back of the body the point of exit (No. 5). The other slug had its point of
entrance at No. 2 in Exhibit `B-1.’" 2
In its resolution, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision, the respondent
court also said:
jgc:chanro bles. com.ph
"It can not be correctly held, to quote the words of accused in his motion, that `it was precisely
when the two protagonists were grappling for the possession of the gun that the two shots were
suddenly fired resulting to the fatal wounding of the deceased’. This would be contrary to the
testimony of Pat. Perez, a witness whose credibility the defense does not impugn. According to Pat.
Perez, deceased was ‘more or less’ two meters from the accused when he heard two gun shots.
Immediately after they were fired, this witness looked at the direction where they came from. He
saw accused holding e gun with his right hand stretched downward. Under such scenario — with a
distance of two meters apart and the hand of accused holding the gun stretched downward — it is
clear that deceased and accused were not grappling for the possession of the gun at the time the
two shots were fired." 3
In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 7 of P.D. 1610 creating the
Sandiganbayan, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are entitled to great respect and only
questions of law may be raised in the Supreme Court. 4
Moreover, well settled is the rule that when the resolution of a factual issue hinges on the
credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed, unless it has
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, mights affect the
result of the case. Herein petitioner failed to demonstrate that his case falls under the exception
which would justify this Court to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court, as heretofore cited
and summarized thus —
"Stated briefly, the initial illegal aggression staged by deceased had ceased after he was disarmed
by accused. By then, Accused a taller and bigger man than deceased had the upperhand. He was in
possession of the gun of deceased while the latter was unarmed. In fact, it was probably because
of this circumstance that deceased moved backward. Aside from accused, his son who dared to
fight deceased was there, not to say Pat. Perez and Quinio, all under his supervision. Patently,
there was no further threat to the life and limb of accused.
"Absent the element of unlawful aggression, there is no self-defense complete (Art. II, par. 1) or
incomplete (Art. 13, par. 1, RPC)." 5
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that the petitioner failed to prove the defense he had raised.
The primordial requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression. And for unlawful aggression to be
present, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. In the instant case, there was no
imminent and real danger to the life or limb of the petitioner when he shot the deceased, since the
latter had already been disarmed. As former Chief Justice Aquino states in his book on Criminal
Law: chanrobles v irt ual lawl ibra ry
"In order to justify self-defense, it is essential that the attack upon defendant be simultaneous with
the killing, or preceded the latter without an appreciable interval of time. (Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56),
x x x
"The harm caused by one person to another who offended or caused him injury, sometime after he
suffered such offense or such injury, does not constitute an act of self-defense, but an act of
revenge. (Banzuela, 31 Phil. 564). 6
In imposing on the appellant the penalty of just one (1) year of prision correccional, the
respondent Court held (which we here affirm): jgc:cha nrob les.com. ph
"In People v. Oanis and Galanta (74 Phil. 257), the court set forth two requisites in order that
fulfillment of duty and exercise of a right 7 may be considered as justifying circumstance, namely:
(a) that the offender acting [sic] in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right;
and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or in the lawful exercise of such right or office. If one is
absent, Accused is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of right or office." 8
x x x
"It is evident that accused was acting in the performance of his duty as supervisor of deceased and
policemen when the events that led to the shooting occurred. His attempt to discipline his men was
resented by deceased who was one of them. Such attitude did not diminish with the passage of
hours; instead, deceased’s rage heightened to violence. He not merely uttered verbal insults to his
superior but actually drew his gun and shot him. Fortunately, the latter overpowered deceased.
Unfortunately, Accused did not stop at that point. He used unnecessary violence against the
defenseless person of the deceased. Thus, he exceeded the limits of his authority." 9
"Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code vests discretion to [sic] the court in lowering the penalty
either by one or two degrees whenever incomplete justifying circumstance exists in a given case
like the case at bar. The laudable patience of accused in not retaliating despite repeated insults by
a subordinate, his length of service in the government (since 1957), and most important, his
obsession to inculcate discipline in his men, to OUR mind, entitle accused to a two-degree
reduction of the penalty prescribed by law. Our attitude is a signal to the men in uniform that while
WE condemn felonious violence WE support efforts to maintain discipline in the service." 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Sandiganbayan is
AFFIRMED. With costs. chanrobles v irt ual lawl ibra ry
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., concur in the result.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125059. March 17, 2000]
FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated

February 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No. 15993, which affirmed the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-91-25910 to 15, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts in this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from

Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit in the latter's project at
Bacoor, Cavite.
Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC,

forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering
48 monthly installments.
After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit
and incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint.
Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he
was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with
the project plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sycip and 12 out of 14 unit buyers then filed
a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defects,
but FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its
townhouse project. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the
alleged defects.
Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for

encashment Sycip's postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent "stop
payment orders" to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other
postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to
close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges every time he made
a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of
petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated
checks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22
involving said dishonored checks.
On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with the RTC
of Quezon City six Informations docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25910
to Q-91-25915, charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910

reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in Quezon City,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make, draw and issue in favor of Francel Realty
Corporation a check 813514 drawn against Citibank, a duly
established domestic banking institution in the amount of
P9,304.00 Philippine Currency dated/postdated October 30, 1990
in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue
that she/he did not have any funds in the drawee bank of (sic) the
payment of such check; that upon presentation of said check to
said bank for payment, the same was dishonored for the reason
that the drawer thereof, accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. did not
have any funds therein, and despite notice of dishonor thereof,
accused failed and refused and still fails and refused (sic) to
redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Francel Realty Corporation in the amount aforementioned
and in such other amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." [1]
Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25911 to Q-91-25915, with Informations similarly

worded as in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910, except for the dates, and check
numbers were consolidated and jointly tried.
[2]
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to each of the charges. Trial
then proceeded.
The prosecution's case, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the
appellate court, is as follows:
"The prosecution evidence established that on or about August

24, 1989, at the office of the private complainant Francel Realty
Corporation (a private domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business) at 822 Quezon Avenue, QC, accused Francisco
Sycip, Jr. drew, issued, and delivered to private complainant
Francel Realty Corporation (FRC hereinafter) six checks (among
a number of other checks), each for P9,304.00 and drawn pay to
the order of FRC and against Francisco's account no. 845515 with
Citibank, to wit: Check No. 813514 dated October 30, 1990 (Exh.
C), Check No. 813515 dated November 30, 1990 (Exh. D), Check
No. 813518 dated February 28,1991 (Exh. E), Check No. 813516
dated December 30, 1990 (Exh. F), Check No. 813517 dated
January 30, 1991 (Exh. G) and Check No. 813519 dated March
30, 1991 (Exh. H), as and in partial payment of the unpaid
balance of the purchase price of the house and lot subject of the
written contract executed and entered into by and between FRC
as seller and Francisco as buyer on said date of August 24, 1989
(Exh. B, also Exh. 1). The total stipulated purchase price for the
house and lot was P451,700.00, of which Francisco paid FRC in
the sum of P135,000.00 as down payment, with Francisco
agreeing and committing himself to pay the balance of

P316,000.00 in 48 equal monthly installments of P9,304.00 (which
sum already includes interest on successive monthly balance)
effective September 30, 1989 and on the 30th day of each month
thereafter until the stipulated purchase price is paid in full. The
said six Citibank checks, Exhs. C thru H, as earlier indicated were
drawn, issued, and delivered by Francisco in favor of FRC as and
in partial payment of the said 48 equal monthly installments under
their said contract (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). Sometime in September
1989, the Building Official's certificate of occupancy for the subject
house -a residential townhouse -was issued (Exh. N) and
Francisco took possession and started in the use and occupancy
of the subject house and lot.
"When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were presented to

the Citibank for payment on their respective due dates, they were
all returned to FRC dishonored and unpaid for the reason:
account closed as indicated in the drawee bank's stamped
notations on the face and back of each check; in fact, as indicated
in the corresponding record of Francisco's account no. 815515
with Citibank, said account already had a zero balance as early as
September 14, 1990 (Exh. 1-5). Notwithstanding the fact that
FRC, first thru its executive vice president and project manager
and thereafter thru its counsel, had notified Francisco, orally and
in writing, of the checks' dishonor and demanded from him the
payment of the amount thereof, still Francisco did not payor make
good any of the checks (Exhs. I thru K)..."[3]
The case for the defense, as summarized also by the trial court and adopted
by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
"The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after taking

possession and starting in the use and occupancy of the subject
townhouse unit, Francisco became aware of its various
construction defects; that he called the attention of FRC, thru its
project manager, requesting that appropriate measures be
forthwith instituted, but despite his several requests, FRC did not
acknowledge, much less attend to them; that Francisco thus
mailed to FRC a verified letter dated June 6, 1990 (Exh. 2) in sum
giving notice that effective June 1990, he will cease and desist
'from paying my monthly amortization of NINE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED FOUR (P9,304.00) PESOS towards the
settlement of my obligation concerning my purchase of Unit No.
14 of FRC Townhomes referred to above, unless and until your
Office satisfactorily complete(s) the construction, renovation
and/or repair of my townhouses (sic) unit referred to above and
that should FRC 'persist in ignoring my aforesaid requests, I shall,
after five (5) days from your receipt of this Verified Notice,
forthwith petition the [HLURB] for Declaratory Relief and
Consignation to grant me provisional relief from my obligation to
pay my monthly amortization to your good Office and allow me to
deposit said amortizations with [HLURB] pending your completion

of FRC Townhomes Unit in question'; that Francisco thru counsel
wrote FRC, its president, and its counsel notices/letters in sum to
the effect that Francisco and all other complainants in the
[HLURB] case against FRC shall cease and desist from paying
their monthly amortizations unless and until FRC satisfactorily
completes the construction of their units in accordance with the
plans and specifications thereof as approved by the [HLURB] and
as warranted by the FRC in their contracts and that the dishonor
of the subject checks was a natural consequence of such
suspension of payments, and also advising FRC not to encash or
deposit all other postdated checks issued by Francisco and the
other complainants and still in FRC's possession (Exhs. 3 thru 5);
that Francisco and the other complainants filed the [HLURB] case
against FRC and later on a decision was handed down therein
and the same is pending appeal with the Board (Exhs. 6, 7, & 12
thru 17, also Exh. 8); that as of the time of presentation of the
subject checks for payment by the drawee bank, Francisco had at
least P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank (Exhs. 10 & 11)
and, that Francisco closed his account no. 845515 with Citibank
conformably with the bank's customer service officer's advice to
close his said account instead of making a stop-payment order for
each of his more than 30 post-dated checks still in FRC's
possession at the time, so as to avoid the P600.00-penalty
imposed by the bank for every check subject of a stop-payment
order." [4]
On March 11, 1994, the trial court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1
of B.P. Blg. 22 in each of the six cases, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-91-25910, Q-91-

25911, Q-91-25912, Q-91-25913, Q-91-25914 and Q-91-25915,
the Court finds accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Sec. 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced in and for each case
to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days and pay the costs.
Further, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the offended party,
Francel Realty Corporation, as and for actual damages, the total
sum of fifty-five thousand eight hundred twenty four pesos
(P55,824.00) with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of
commencement of these actions, that is, November 8, 1991, until
full payment thereof.
"SO ORDERED." [5]
Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. His appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 15993. But on February 29, 1996, the
appellate court ruled:
"On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so

hold that appellant has no basis to rely on the provision of PD 957
to justify the non-payment of his obligation, the closure of his

checking account and the notices sent by him to private
complainant that he will stop paying his monthly amortizations." [6]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 18, 1996, but it was
denied per Resolution dated April 22, 1996.
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE ANY JUSTIFIABLE
CAUSE TO STOP OR OTHERWISE PREVENT THE PAYMENT
OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS BY THE DRAWEE BANK.
II
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT MUST BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED
HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE TOWNHOUSE UNIT AND THE TOWNHOUSE PROJECT.
III

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS WITH THE
DRAWEE BANK TO COVER THE SUBJECT CHECKS UPON
PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT THEREOF.
IV

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND AWARDING DAMAGES IN
FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT." [7]
The principal issue before us is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the conviction of petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner argues that the court a quo erred when it affirmed his conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, considering that he had cause to stop payment of the
checks issued to respondent. Petitioner insists that under P.D. No. 957, the
buyer of a townhouse unit has the right to suspend his amortization payments,
should the subdivision or condominium developer fail to develop or complete
the project in accordance with duly-approved plans and specifications. Given
the findings of the HLURB that certain aspects of private complainant's
townhouse project were incomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his right
to suspend payments should not render him liable under B.P. Blg. 22.
The Solicitor General argues that since what petitioner was charged with were
violations of B.P. Blg. 22, the intent and circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a worthless check are immaterial. The gravamen of the offense
[8]
charged is the act itself of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Mere issuing of a bad check
is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. In his view,
P.D. No. 957 does not provide petitioner a sufficient defense against the
charges against him.
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an offense
[9]
is committed when the following elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment. [10]
In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists, the
other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the
issuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough
funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P.
No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima
facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. But [11]
such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to

sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. As pointed out by
[12]
the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds

"is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of
funds." But such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary.
[13]
In this case, we find that the other party has presented evidence to contradict
said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every
element of the offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable
presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply
means that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly
funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The [14]
checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to
Sell in August 1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time
said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in
the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for
encashment. On the contrary, there is testimony by petitioner that at the time
[15]
of presentation of the checks, he had P150,000.00 cash or credit with

Citibank.
As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of petitioner's Account
No. 845515 with Citibank was not for insufficiency of funds. It was made upon
the advice of the drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each
time petitioner issued a "stop payment" order to prevent encashment of
postdated checks in private respondent's possession. Said evidence
[16]
contradicts the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

But it establishes petitioner's state of mind at the time said checks were
issued on August 24, 1989. Petitioner definitely had no knowledge that his
funds or credit would be insufficient when the checks would be presented for
encashment. He could not have foreseen that he would be advised by his own
bank in the future, to close his account to avoid paying the hefty banks
charges that came with each "stop payment" order issued to prevent private
respondent from encashing the 30 or so checks in its possession. What the
prosecution has established is the closure of petitioner's checking account.
But this does not suffice to prove the second element of the offense under
B.P. Blg. 22, which explicitly requires "evidence of knowledge of insufficient
funds" by the accused at the time the check or checks are presented for
encashment.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in

this case, would be to misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction
under the law. It must be stressed that every element of the offense must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal
statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable act must come
clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute.
[17]
While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking
system, it is difficult to see how conviction of the accused in this case will
[18]
protect the sanctity of the financial system. Moreover, protection must also be
afforded the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No. 957. A statute
[19]
must be construed in relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate

ends and purposes intended by the legislature. Courts will not strictly follow
[20]
the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of legislature
and when ends are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. More [21]
so, when it will mean the contravention of another valid statute. Both laws
have to be reconciled and given due effect.
Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to

suspend payments until such time as the owner or developer had fulfilled its
obligations to the buyer. This exercise of a statutory right to suspend
[22]
installment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against the purported

violations of B.P. Blg. 22 that petitioner is charged with.
Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction

of petitioner's and other units of the subject condominium bought on
installment from FRC, we are of the view that petitioner had a valid cause to
order his bank to stop payment. To say the least, the third element of
"subsequent dishonor of the check... without valid cause" appears to us not

established by the prosecution. As already stated, the prosecution tried to
establish the crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22. Here that
presumption is unavailing, in the presence of a valid cause to stop payment,
thereby negating the third element of the crime.
Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not
subject to the Revised Penal Code, but the Code is supplementary to such a
law. We find nothing in the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would prevent the
[23]
Revised Penal Code from supplementing it. Following Article 11 (5) of the
[24]
Revised Penal Code, petitioner's exercise of a right of the buyer under Article
23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges against him.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T.

Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the charges against him under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105002. July 17, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIARANGAN

DANSAL accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Appellant claims that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible

force. Because he admits in effect the commission of a punishable act, he must
prove the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.
Statement of the Case
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 1990 Decision of the [1]
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 2 in Criminal Case No. 3141
[2]
convicting Appellant Diarangan Dansal of the crime of murder.

A complaint against appellant was filed on March 28, 1990 by INP Station
[3]
Commander Cabsaran C. Azis of Matungao, Lanao del Norte. After preliminary

investigation, Provincial Prosecutor IV Felix Fajardo charged appellant with
murder on September 7, 1990 in an Information which reads: [4]
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1990, at Matungao, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with 4 John
Does, who are still at large and whose case is still pending in the lower court, with
treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, and with
intent to kill, did then & there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one Abubacar Pagalamatan with a Garand rifle thereby inflicting upon the latter
multiple gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
Upon arraignment, appellant with the assistance of counsel de

oficio pleaded not guilty. In due course, the trial court rendered its assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: [5]
WHEREFORE, finding accused DIARANGAN DANSAL guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of Murder, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and he is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Abubakar Alamat, also known as Abubakar Pagalamatan the amount of P30,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
Accused is entitled in full for the period of his detention.
Hence, this appeal.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution sought to establish that on March 2, 1990 in Pasayanon,

Matungao, Lanao del Norte, appellant, armed with a Garand rifle like his four
(4) other companions, fired the fatal shots which caused the death of Abubakar
Alamat, also known as Abubakar Pangalamatan.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Cosain Dowa, Dr.
Marilyn Rico, Amina Oticol, Panda Antalo and Timal Mosa. Their testimonies
may be synthesized as follows:
Panda Antalo testified that at three oclock in the afternoon of March 2, 1990
in Matungao, Lanao del Norte, he and Timal Mosa were walking through a
barrio road on their way to see Mayor Asis. They saw Abubakar Alamat, the
[6]
victim, conversing with five (5) persons, one of whom was appellant. However,
Antalo did not recognize appellants companions. When he and Mosa were five
(5) meters away from the group, he heard gunshots. He turned his head and
noticed that smoke was coming out of appellants rifle and empty shells were
falling therefrom. The Garand rifles of appellant and his companions were
pointed at the victim who was lying on the ground face upwards. Seven (7)
shots were fired. At that time Antalo was immobile as he was frightened. Thus,
he was unable to run and take cover. After appellant and his companions ran
towards the coffee plantation, Antalo approached the victim and discovered that
the latter had sustained seven (7) wounds. [7]
Timal Mosa corroborated Antalos account. He testified that at 3:00 p.m. of

March 2, 1990, he and Antalo were on their way to Mayor Asis house in
Pasaupnon, Matungao. He saw the victim, the appellant and four (4) other
persons talking to one another. Then he heard a gunshot from behind. When
he turned to look, he noticed that smoke was coming out of appellants gun and
that empty shells were dropping from it as appellant continued to fire at the
victim. Appellants rifle was pointed at the victim who had fallen on the
ground. He heard seven (7) gunshots. Appellants companions also carried
Garand rifles, but Mosa concluded that these were not fired because he did not
notice any smoke from their barrels. He was not frightened. Neither did he take
cover, as he knew both the victim and the appellant. After firing at the victim,
appellant together with his four companions fled towards Mayor Asis coffee
plantation. He and Antalo approached the victim, whom they found already
dead. Thereafter, they reported the shooting to the victims wife.[8]
Cosain Dowa, a Rural Sanitarium Inspector of the Health Office of

Matungao, Lanao del Norte, testified that on March 5, 1990 he prepared the
victims Certificate of Death (Exh. A). Although his main duty was to inspect food
establishments, construct barangay toilets, and assist in watershed
constructions in the municipality, he also helped the health officer in the
preparation of death certificates. When the body of the victim was brought in,
[9]
he observed gunshot wounds on his right foot, right thigh and right breast. The
right knee was distorted. There was a bullet hole at the victims back which he
believed was the entry point leading to the gaping wound on the breast. [10]
Dr. Marilyn Rico testified that she was the Rural Health Officer of Matungao,
Lanao del Norte. She signed Abubakar Alamats Certificate of Death (Exh. A-
2) which was prepared by Dowa.
[11]
Amina Oticol, the widow of the victim, testified that, around 3:00 p.m. of
March 2, 1990, she was at their house in Panta-on, Matungao, Lanao del
Norte. Antalo and Mosa came and informed her that appellant killed her
husband. She had her husbands corpse brought to their house. Her husband
was buried in Panta-on, Matungao, Lanao del Norte. She incurred expenses for
the burial in the amount of P15,000.00, but she asked for P100,000.00 as
compensation therefor. [12]
Version of the Defense
Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He testified that on March
1, 1990, he went to Tagolo-an, Lanao del Norte to visit his elder sister Saramina
Dansal. At his sisters house, Mimbalawang Dorado, together with his sons
Macod, Talente and Talentes son Usop, all surnamed Dorado, seized appellant
and brought him to their house at Tongkol, Tagolo-an, Lanao del Norte for
reasons undisclosed to him. [13]
The next day, March 2, 1990 at 7:00 a.m., they all left Tagolo-an for
Matungao and arrived there at 11:00 a.m. He was given a Garand rifle that was
not serviceable. They proceeded to the victims house at Panta-on, Matungao,
Lanao del Norte. They asked the victim to come out and then they fired their
guns at him as soon as he appeared. Appellant said that the Dorados killed the
victim to avenge the killing of one of Mimbalawags sons named Ali by a certain
Salonga, the victims paternal cousin.
After shooting the victim, the Dorados allegedly aimed their guns at
appellant and told him to run away.As he was also related to the victim, the
latters mother being his paternal aunt, appellant wanted to shoot the
Dorados. Finding that his rifle was not operational, he fled with the
Dorados. Thereafter, they rode a truck to Karomatan. They left their guns at the
house of Mimbalawags sister in Bangko, near Matungao. He went home and
[14]
afterwards told the mayor of Tagolo-an that the Dorados killed his cousin. He
was subsequently summoned and detained by the mayor of Panta-on. [15]
Ruling of the Trial Court
As stated earlier, the court a quo convicted appellant of murder. It gave

credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It disbelieved
appellant in view of the absence of any improper motive on the witnesses part
to testify wrongly against him.
The trial court noted that appellant and the four (4) Dorados were all armed
with Garand rifles; that they immediately fired their guns at the victim as he
came out of his house; and that the victim was not in a position to defend
himself. From these facts, it concluded that the offenders consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed
by them to ensure the accomplishment of their purpose with impunity. Thus,
treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation were
appreciated in the conviction of the appellant.
Hence, this appeal.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant through the Public Attorneys Office ascribes the following errors
to the trial court:
I
The lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellants presence in the crime
scene was under a compulsion of an irresistable (sic) force.
II
The lower court erred in considering the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
abuse of superior strength.[16]
In a nutshell, appellant invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion

under an irresistible force under paragraph 5, Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code. Further, he argues that, if at all, he should be convicted only of homicide
because the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of superior strength.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Preliminary Issue: Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
Without specifically raising it as an error, appellant nonetheless laced his

brief with attacks on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Hence, we
shall dispose of this matter.
Well-settled is the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. Such findings are
[17]
conclusive upon the Supreme Court in the absence of any showing that the trial
court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance
of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. We [18]
have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and the arguments of
appellant, and we have found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court.
The two prosecution eyewitnesses positively and clearly identified appellant
as the assailant who alone fired his rifle at the victim. Their testimonies
corroborated each other. Antalo testified thus: [19]
PROSECUTOR BADELLES:
q Now, in the afternoon of March 2, 1990, around 3:00 oclock more or less, did (sic)
you remember where were you?
a I can remember, sir.
q Where were you?
a I was on my way to see Mayor Asis that day, sir.
q While on your way to Mayor Asis, were you walking, riding or what?
a I am walking with Timal, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q While on your way to the house of Mayor Asis in that afternoon of March 2, 1990,
with Timal, did you notice anything along the road?
a Yes, there was.
PROSECUTOR BADELLES:
q What was that you noticed?
a While we are on our way to the Mayors house, we saw Abubacar Alamat that he had
5 companions and I recognized one of them. (Witness pointing to the accused
Abubacar Pagalamatan [sic])
q Now what were they doing when you saw them?
a They were having conversation, sir.
q Now, you said you saw them, now how far were you [from] the groups?
a About 5 meters far, sir.
q Were they in front of you or at the back of you when you saw them first?
a At my back, sir.
q And then after that was there any unusual [event] that happened?
a There was, sir.
q What was that unusual thing that happened?
a I heard a shound (sic) of gun burst sir.
q What did you do when you heard that gun burst?
a I glanced at them and I noticed that the gun of Diarangan Dansal the tip of his gun
has smoke and I also noticed empty shells falling down.
q Now how far were you when you saw Diarangan Dansal with the tip of his gun having
smoke and the empty shells falling down from his gun?
a About 5 meters, sir.
q Now, how many burst all in all that you heard?
a Seven burst, sir.
q Now you said that you saw empty shells falling down from the gun of Diarangan
Dansal, how many empty shells that you saw that fell down from the gund (sic) of
Diarangan Dansal?
a I have not seen the others sir.
q By the way what was gun of Diarangan Dansal hold that time? (sic)
a Garand, sir.
q When you saw Dirangan (sic) Dansal holding a Garand and when you saw that tip of
his gun smoking, to was direct (sic) that his gun pointing?
a Pointing to Abubacar Pagalamatan, sir.
q Now how about Abubacar Pagalamatan at the time when you saw him holding a gun
which was pointed to Abubacar Pagalamatan with smoke coming out from the tip
of the gun and the empty shells falling down, what was the relative position of
Abubacar Pangalamatan to Diarangan Dansal?
a Abubacar Pangalamat was lying down, his face upward, sir.
q Now, after you heard those 7 burst of a gun, what did you do next?
a I was immovilized (sic) sir.
q How about Diarangan Dansal and his companions, what did he do after the 7 burst
you heard?
a They were running toward the coffee trees, sir.
Mosa corroborated Antalos account in this wise: [20]
PROS. BADELLES:
Q On or about March 2, 1990 at 3:00 in the afternoon, can you remember where were
you?
xxx xxx xxx

A We were then going to the house of Asis at Pasayano, Matungao.
Q You used the word ()we() who was your companion at that time?
A Panda Andalo.
Q While on your way to the house of Asis at Pasayano Matungao, along the way did
you see any person?
xxx xxx xxx

A I saw Diarangan Dansal and Abubakar Pangalamatan.

Q They have compnaion (sic) if any at that time?
A Yes, sir, I did not recognize him.
Q How many of them?
A Four (4).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now waht (sic) was the position of these persons in relation to your position at the
time you saw them?
A I was ten (10) meters from them and they are talking to each other.
Q Were they in front of you or back of you?
A They are at my back.
Q Now, when you were about ten (10) meters from them, this ten (10) meter at your
back were there anything happened unusual (sic)?
xxx xxx xxx

A I heard gun shot and then I looked back.
Q Towards what direction after hearing the shot?
A I looked back at them.
Q Who was ()them() that you are referring to?
A Abubakar Pangalamatan and Diarangan Dansal.
Q And when you look back at them what did you see?
A I saw firearm of iarangan (sic) Dansal and the firearm was smoking and the empty
shells were coming out from the rifle.
Q Towards what direction was the fireamr (sic) of Diarangan Dansal pointed to when
see him at that time?
A The firearm was pointed to at Abubakar Pangalamatan.
Q When you look back at them and saw Diarangan Dansal pointed his firearm to
Abubakar Pangalamatan what was then the position of Abubakar Pangalamatan?
A when the firearm exploded, Abubakar Pangalamatan fell down.
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way how many shots that you hear (sic)?
A Seven shots.
Q The first shots that you hear was immediately, was prior to the looking back where
Abubakar Pangalamatan and Diarangan Dansal were located (sic)?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about the second shots, when did you hear it?
A As I look back.
Q Did you see who fire (sic) the shot?
A Diarangan Dansal.
Q How did you know that it was Diarangan Dansal who firedthe (sic) second shot?
A Because there was a smoke coming from his gun and the empty shells coming from
his rifle.
Q In the second shot, was shotting (sic) by Diarangan Dansal to what direction was the
firearm of Diarangan Dansal point to? (sic)
A It was he who was still pointing his gun to Pangalamatan.
Q How about the third shot, when did you hear it?
A Well, I suspect that it was still at the gun of Diarangan Dansal and I heard that the
same gunshot coming from the guaran (sic) of Diarangan Dansal.
Q How did you know that the same shot was coming from the same barrel of
Diarangan Dansal?
A Because smoke was coming out from the barrel of his gun.
Q And the 4th the 5th, the 6th and the seven (7) shots you hear it when?
A Still from the firearm of Diarangan Dansal.
Q How do you know that it was coming from the firearm of Diarangan Dansal?
A Because the smoke was still coming out from his gun and the empty shell coming
from his gun.
Q How about the companion of Diarangan Dansal was they arm (sic) at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What firearm?
A Garand.
Q All the while when you hear the gunshots and all these six (6) successive gun shots
and saw Diarangan Dansal shot what did the companion of Diarangan Dansal do?
A They were around Diarangan Daniel holding their gun.
Q Did you notice if they fired their gun?
A No, sir.
Q How did you know that they did not shot their firearm?
A Because there was no smoke coming from their firearm.
Q After the 7th shot, do you know what the group of Drainage Daniel (sic) did?
A They Fled (sic).
Q Towards what direction?
A Towards the coffee plantation.
Both testimonies are straightforward, clear and consistent and they point
categorically to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Furthermore, appellant has not alleged, much less proven, ill motive on the
part of said witnesses to accuse appellant of such a grave offense. In his brief,
appellant admits that he cannot discern any reason for Antalo and Mosa to
testify falsely against him. In this light, we cannot fault the court a quo for
[21]
holding that: [22]
The court is constrained to believe that the testimonies of witnesses Panda Antalo and
Timal Mosa are credible for failure by the defense to show that said witnesses were
prejudiced against the accused or that said witnesses had an existing improper motive
in imputing to the accused the crime for which he is charged. When there is no
evidence showing that the witnesses are prejudiced against the accused, the witnesses
would not have imputed to the accused the commission of such a grave offense as that
of murder if it was not true that he was really guilty thereof (People vs. Ali, 29 SCRA
756). The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal

witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that such
improper motive did not exist, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and
credit (People vs. Saroah, 5 SCRA 385; People vs. Valera, 5 SCRA 910).
The defense assails the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses Antalo and

Mosa because their conduct during the commission of the crime was allegedly
contrary to common experience. Appellant finds it unlikely for said
eyewitnesses to keep on standing despite the burst of gunfire as if x x x
watching a movie in the making and to remain unmoved by the violent shooting
incident. Ordinarily, a man in a similar situation would either take cover or run
for safety. Because the eyewitnesses did not so conduct themselves, appellant
concludes that their testimonies were preposterous and untrue.
We disagree. Antalo said that he was so scared of what was happening that
he could not move, while Mosa admitted that he was afraid but he did not take
cover, as he knew both the appellant and the victim.Their reactions, although
the exact opposite of each other, are valid and probable. Taking cover or
running away is not the only natural reaction possible under the
circumstances. There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a
strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which
witnesses to a crime must react. [23]
First Issue: Exempting Circumstance Insufficiently Proved
Appellant claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12,

paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, because he allegedly acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force. He allegedly joined the armed Dorados
against his will because of fear for his own safety. He claims in his brief that the
Dorados were guarding him so closely that escape was risky and protection by
lawfully constituted authorities was, at the moment, out of reach. [24]
We cannot sustain such defense. A person who invokes the exempting

circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force must prove his defense by
clear and convincing evidence. He must show that the irresistible force
[25]
reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also
against his will. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the
[26]
accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape.

The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending; and it must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of
future injury is not enough. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear
[27] [28]
of future injury, is insufficient.

[29]
In this case, appellant failed to show such compulsion. In his testimony, he

did not mention that the Dorados physically or morally threatened to kill or hurt
him. He did not even make any attempt to resist. He simply took for granted that
they would kill or hurt him if he did not follow them. No evidence was presented
to establish how, if at all, he was compelled to join the Dorados in killing the
victim. In other words, appellant failed to prove that the Dorados made a real
and imminent threat on his life or limb sufficient to overcome his free will.
Indeed, the Court finds no acceptable basis for appellants assertion that he
was compelled and intimidated by the Dorados. Even without him, the Dorados
could have easily carried out the crime, if such was their intention. If we believe
appellants story, there was no need for the Dorados to mortally threaten
appellant to join them. Besides, forcing appellant, a relative of the victim, to join
them complicated rather than facilitated their criminal endeavor. With the
appellant present among them, they would have had to guard themselves from
possible resistance and double cross in case he did not consent to their
plan.Furthermore, it would have been highly illogical for the Dorados to force
appellant to take part in their crime, only to give him an unserviceable rifle. [30]
Moreover, his story does not inspire belief for reasons other than the
obvious one that it is uncorroborated. According to appellant, he was taken
against his will from his sisters house in Tagolo-an the day before the
commission of the crime. It is strange why his sister was not presented as
witness to corroborate his account. Even the mayor of Tagolo-an, to whom he
reported that he had been forced to participate in a killing, could have testified
in his favor. But said official, who could have injected credence to his defense,
was not presented to corroborate his testimony. The non-presentation of these
witnesses tends to show that they would not have corroborated appellants
allegations had they testified.
Second Issue: Qualifying Circumstances
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of treachery,

evident premeditation and superior strength.
The evidence of the prosecution, however, adequately established only
treachery. Treachery is appreciated when a frontal attack is directed at an
unarmed victim who is totally unaware of and unprepared for said
assault. There is treachery where the attack on an unarmed victim, who has
[31]
not given the slightest provocation, is sudden, unexpected and without

warning. According to Prosecution Witness Mosa, the victim, the appellant
[32]
and his companions were talking to one another prior to the shooting. It would
have been impossible to hide Garand rifles from someone who was so
close. Thus, it is safe to assume that the victim knew that appellant and his
companions were carrying them. If the victim suspected that they would use
those rifles to commit the crime, then he would have avoided them. But instead,
the victim stayed and spoke with them. The victim, therefore, had no idea that
he was going to be shot by appellant who, after all, was his relative. Even if he
eventually did come to know that appellant intended to shoot him, he -- being
alone and unarmed -- could not have defended himself against all five of them.
Abuse of superior strength, on the other hand, was not established, as there
was no testimony to the effect that appellant and his companions took
advantage of their collective strength in order to kill the victim. Witness Mosa
[33]
even said that only appellant fired at the victim. Mere superiority in number after
all is not necessarily indicative of this aggravating circumstance.
The prosecution also failed to establish evident premeditation. For this
qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, there must be a lapse of sufficient
time to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection that would allow the
conscience of the actor to attempt to overcome the resolution of his will. But [34]
the prosecution was unable to establish this time element as its evidence dealt
merely with the circumstances of the actual shooting itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification as regards the civil indemnity which is
hereby INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in line with current
jurisprudence. [35]
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 89684 September 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO SAZON, alias "INSIK," accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Benjamin P. Sorongon for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
For the death of Wilfredo Longno, alias, "Inday," on September 17, 1983 at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City, herein accused-
appellant Gerardo Sazon, alias "Insik," and Cornelio Altejos, alias "Toto," were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, 1 in an amended information dated October 18, 1983.2 However, only herein accused was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty, since
Cornelio Altejos was not apprehended and has since remained at large.
After trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He
was further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P16,628.40 representing hospital
bills, expenses for the coffin, tomb, wake and attorney's fees, and P30,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of the victim.
The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the criminal action below are herein under set forth
as synthesized by the court a quo from the testimonies of the witnesses, 3 and as clarified and
amplified by us from the transcripts of the notes of the hearings.
On September 15, 1983, in the barangay aforementioned, a certain Ernesto Romualdez was
accosted by appellant near the barangay hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that appellant and
his companions were engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez which
caused the latter to fall. Wilfredo Longo, who was then present at the scene, approached and helped
the fallen Romualdez and pushed appellant away. This apparently angered appellant who, in his
native dialect said "Andam ka lang Inday kay patyon ta guid," ("Watch out Inday for I will kill you") to
which Longno retorted, "Just do it."
Two days later, or on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 o'clock P.M., appellant and his cousin,
Cornelio Altejos, were drinking softdrinks at the shire of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed by.
Thereupon, appellant and Altejos left their softdrinks half-assumed and followed Longno.
Longno eventually reached the bench near the public faucet where the group of Massulini Dullete,
Samuel Canoso and Nathaniel Ramos were sitting. He joined the group in their conversation by
saying, "Upon ako dira." ("I'll go with what you say."). Shortly thereafter, appellant and Altejos arrived
and appellant accosted and pointed a gun at Longno, saying, "Maano ka?" ("What are you going to
do?"). Longno then faced appellant and said, "Brod, tiruha lang." ("Brod, just shoot.")
Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun, hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete,
Canoso and Ramos then scampered for safety as appellant and the wounded Longno grappled for
the gun. It was while the two were thus struggling that Altejos stabbed Longno in the chest, after
which both appellant and Altejos ran away.
Longno then came out of the footwalk shouting, "Tay tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno ako ni Toto."
("Father, I was shot by Insik and stabbed by Toto."). He was able to run about thirty (30) meters
before he fell. His father, Julio Longno, ran to his son who was then lying sprawled on the ground.
Rushed to the St. Paul's Hospital, Wilfredo Longno died. Later, it was established that the cause of
death was hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound.
Appellant's version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot Longno but pleads self-
defense. He claims that on September 17, 1983, he left the house of his father-in-law at about 8:00
o'clock P.M. with his cousin, Altejos. The latter had asked for help to have a .22 caliber revolver
repaired and appellant was taking the revolver to a policeman friend of his. On their way, appellant
saw Longno from a distance. Upon his approach, Longno allegedly said, "Insik, I heard that you are
not afraid of me. Maybe you want to be taught a lesson." 4
Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in his waist and was about to draw the
same. He, therefore, parried the gun but it fired hitting one of appellant's left fingers which was later
amputated. It was then that appellant pulled out his gun and shot Longno in the forearm. Appellant
and Longno afterwards grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to separate appellant and
Longno but he was brushed aside by the latter. In the course of their struggle, Altejos then shouted
to appellant, "I stabbed Inday, run," and so he and Altejos ran away. 5
Appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant for having acted in
complete self-defense.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder and
in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua when the prosecution has not
established by competent evidence the existence of conspiracy and the presence of
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. 6
Appellant's version does not inspire credence. Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused
invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution. For, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be
disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. 7
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the
presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself.8
In the present case, the burden of evidence having been shifted, we hold that the defense failed to
establish the primary element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and, therefore, the
plea of self-defense must fail. The narrations of the sequence of events by the accused, and by the
lone alleged eyewitness for the defense, Jose Randera, are unconvincing primarily on account of
their inherent inconsistency and conflict with each other.
Appellant on cross-examination testified as follows:
Q How far were you from Inday Longno when he allegedly fired a
shot at you?
A One (1) meter.

Q At one (1) meter distance did (sic) you not able to recognize what
kind of a gun was that allegedly used by Inday Longno?
A No, sir, at first I only saw the handle of the gun and I did not see the
body of the gun.
Q But you can recognize between a pistol and a revolver?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that allegedly used by Inday Longno, was that a pistol or
a revolver?
A Because immediately after he said those words 'Maybe you want to

learn a lesson he immediately drew his gun and I was able to parry.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you fired at Inday Longno hitting him on his left arm near the
elbow, was he still holding that gun he used in shooting you hitting
you at the left palm?
A No, sir, because of too much force the gun fell.
Q Did you not pick up the gun?
A No, sir.9
On the other hand, defense eyewitness Jose Randera stated in his testimony:
ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness)
Q While Wilfredo Longno alias Inday was pointing a gun at Gerardo

Sazon alias Insik, what was Gerardo Sazon doing?
WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:
A When Inday said something, Insik Sazon brushed aside the gun
and the gun fired.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said, that Wilfredo Longno alias Inday pointed a gun at

Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, with what hand was he holding that gun
when he was pointing that gun to Gerardo Sazon?
A His right hand.
ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)
Q You said that Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun which was
being pointed to him, what hand did Gerardo Sazon used (sic) in
brushing that gun?
A His left hand.
Q When Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun pointed to him, what
else if any did he do?
A Insik also drew a gun and shot Inday,
COURT: (To the witness)
Q What hand?
A Right hand. He drew a gun with his right hand and shot Inday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that there was a brushing, who was brushing aside and
who was brushed aside?
Q Inday parried Cornelio Artejos (sic).
COURT: (To the witness)
Q And, what happened next?
Cornelio Artejos (sic) pulled out a knife and stabbed Inday.
Q This happened when Inday was already hit by Sazon?
A Yes, sir.
Q When Cornelio Artejos (sic) stabbed Wilfredo Longno alias Inday,

what was Gerardo Sazon and Wilfredo Longno doing if they were
doing anything.?
A They were graffling of (sic) the weapon.
Q You are referring to whose weapon they were graffling (sic) at that
time?
A Inday's weapon.10
The testimonies aforequoted reveal an inconsistency on the matter of the gun for which appellant
and the victim supposedly grappled. While appellant claimed that the victim's weapon fell to the
ground, witness Randera stated that appellant and the victim still grappled for the latter's gun. The
latter statement is itself difficult to imagine since appellant at that precise moment was also allegedly
holding with his right hand the gun which he used in shooting Longno.
It is necessary to stress that such inconsistency cannot be considered a minor detail since the
homogeneity of the answers to the inquiry could very well have established the existence of not only
a single gun. Had this prevarication not been exposed, said testimonies could have bolstered the
defense theory that the victim himself carried a gun which he used to assault the appellant and thus
establish the element of unlawful aggression contrived by the defense.
Furthermore, the credibility of witness Randera is shattered by this finding of the trial court which is
sustained by the evidence:
The testimony of security guard Jose Randera deserves scant consideration not only
because he admitted that he was one of those threatened by the deceased Wilfredo
Longno but also because he wilfully falsified the truth when he testified that the
deceased was shot and hit by the accused on the body and that he saw blood come
out just below the right breast of the deceased. The physical evidence in this case
showed that there was no wound on the right breast of the deceased nor on any part
of his body. The gunshot wound sustained by the deceased was only on his left
forearm. Considering that he testified that there were no other persons there during
the incident except the accused, the deceased and Cornelio Altejos when the
overwhelming weight of evidence is that there were a lot of other people during the
incident (this) showed that this witness had small regard for the truth. 11
Coming back to appellant's representations in court, his vacillation as to what he allegedly did after
Altejos stabbed the victim is another instance which renders his version highly suspect. While stating
on direct examination that he ran to the main road, 12 he claimed on cross-examination that he only
walked a short distance and then went to the hospital upon seeing that his hand was
wounded. 13 The latter statement is itself inconsistent with his earlier declaration during the same
proceeding that he was brought by a policeman to the hospital. 14 This irresolution on the part of the
appellant was obviously to avoid any imputation of guilt against him arising from his flight. 15
At any rate, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is further negated by the physical evidence
in the case. Again, we quote the trial court with approval:
The testimony of the accused Gerardo Sazon that the deceased was armed with a
gun and fired at him is not borne out by the physical evidence in this case. The
paraffin test conducted on the cadaver of the deceased showed that the hands of the
deceased were negative for gunpowder residues indicating that he did not fire a gun
during the incident. The other parts of his body like his forearm and his abdomen
bore strong traces of gunpowder residues because of the burst of the gun of the
accused. The court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that there was only one
gun during the incident and that the gun belonged to and/or was used by the
accused Gerardo Sazon. That a part of one of his fingers was blown off at very close
range, according to Dr. Ely Canja strongly indicated that the accused accidentally hit
his finger when he and the deceased grappled for the possession of the gun. 16
In contrast, appellant was found positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates). While
the presence or absence of nitrates cannot indeed be considered conclusive proof that one has or
has not fired a gun, the following testimony on direct examination by prosecution witness Zenaida
Sinfuego a forensic chemist whose expertise on the matter was sufficiently established, yields this
verification:
Atty. E. Original:
Q Now, have you conducted also a paraffin examination on the

person of Wilfredo Longno?
COURT:
Q On the cadaver?
Atty. E. Original:
Q On the cadaver?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Have you brought with you the result of that examination?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now I have here a carbon original of Chemistry Report No. C-200-

83, result of the paraffin test on the cadaver of Wilfredo Longno,
please compare this carbon original to the original copy in your
possession whether it is the same?
A The same.
xxx xxx xxx

Q This report says specimen submitted, one pair of paraffin casts

taken from the left and right hands of the cadaver of one Wilfredo
Longno, one piece of paraffin cast taken from left forearm of same
subject and one piece paraffin last taken from the left side of the
abdomen. Purpose of laboratory examination: to determine the
presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) on the above-mentioned
specimens. Findings, cast from hands-negative for the presence of
gunpowder residues (nitrates). Cast from forearm-positive for the
presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the 1 1/2 in, 2 1/2 in, 3
in, and 4 in radius. Cast from the left side of the abdomen-positive for
the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the center and in the
1 and 2 in radius. In the layman's language Mrs. Sinfuego, will you
please explain to the Honorable Court these findings 1, 2 and 3?
A Casts from the hands, negative for the presence of gunpowder

residues that means that, no blue specks were found in the hands of
the cadaver.
COURT:
Q Before we go on, what is the implication when the finding is

negative?
A Probably, the subject never fired a gun.
Q Within what time-span?
A The gunpowder will stay only within three days.
Q When was this examination conducted?
A Last September 18,1983.
Q Now before we go on, on that Chemistry Report which has been

marked as Exhibit 'D' regarding the paraffin test conducted on the
right hand of the accused Gerardo Sazon, your finding there states,
positive for gunpowder residues, what is the implication?
A The implication states positive, that Sazon have (sic) fired a gun.
Q Within what time-span?
A Within three days.
Q Within three days?
A Within three days.
Q From the examination?
A Three days from the subject firing of a gun.
Q And when was the examination conducted?
A Last September 19,1983, Your Honor.
Q September?
A Nineteen.
Q So he could have fired a gun on September 17,1983?

A I think that depends, Your Honor on the requesting party.
Q I am asking you if it was possible that he fired a gun which left the
powder burns, was it possible that he fired a gun on September 17?
A Yes, Your Honor. 17
On cross-examination, Sinfuego further testified as follows:
Q Is it possible for a person who has not fired a firearm and could be
(sic) positive for nitrates?
A Yes, Sir.
Q In what instance?
A For example, if he is near to the person firing a gun it is possible

that it was carried by the wind.
Q So that is the only case wherein you find nitrates on the person
who has not fired a gun?
A Also from the fertilizer.
Q You mean, a person handling fertilizers could also be positive for

nitrates?
A Yes, Sir but we have to consider also the time of reaction, from
contaminance (sic) for the nitrates will take effect between two to
three minutes.
COURT:
Q Can you determine on your examination whether the nitrates found

was (sic) the nitrates left by gunpowder residues or by fertilizer can
you distinguish that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this (sic) nitrates found on the hands of the accused, could you
determine where did it (sic) come from?
A Gunpowder residues. 18
Parenthetically, it is true that the bad moral character of the offended party may be proven in
evidence to establish in any reasonable degree the probability of the offense charged, 19 e.g., the
quarrelsome nature of the victim may tend to establish that he started the unlawful aggression.
Nonetheless, such evidence, seeking to establish as it does only a probability, cannot prevail over
facts sufficiently proven by the prosecution during the trial belying such aggression. These
observations find application in the instant case where the defense presented and now argue on
character evidence consisting of criminal charges involving minor offenses which had been filed
against the deceased, but not one of which resulted in conviction and were in fact dismissed except
for one case which was sent to the archives. 20
Obviously, whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Being so
and in the absence of any showing that the Court a quo failed to appreciate facts or circumstances
of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and
heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No
compelling reason, therefore, lies for this Court to disturb the trial court's finding that appellant did
not act in self-defense. 21
The Court, however, holds that appellant, albeit guilty, can only be convicted of homicide and not
murder. The trial court correctly held that the killing was not accompanied by treachery. It, however,
ruled that there was evident premeditation on the part of appellant. We find the records sorely
wanting in evidence to support the latter conclusion.
The fact that appellant told the deceased that he would kill him and that two days later, after the
deceased passed by the store where appellant and Altejos were drinking softdrinks the latter
followed the former and inflicted the fatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a conclusion of
premeditated killing.
To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. 22
In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in that
incident of September 15, 1983, warning the victim that the former would kill him, does not convince
us that, under the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already decided to kill the
victim. A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that
and, worse, publicly announced. It was more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado
on the part of appellant.
Again, the circumstance that appellant and Altejos were by chance at the store when the victim
passed by cannot be taken as manifestly indicating that appellant had clung to his determination to
kill the victim. No evidence was presented to show that appellant purposely waited there for the
deceased. Nor was there any showing that the deceased frequently passed by the same route as to
warrant and explain appellant's waiting for the former at that place. Indeed, that the meeting may
have been purely accidental is not a remote possibility. We are more inclined to believe that it was
the belligerent and defiant demeanor of the victim when confronted by appellant near the public
faucet that precipitated assault.
Under such considerations and there being no other evidence to prove that the death of the victim
was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to
qualify the killing to murder. 23The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be proved in
an evident and incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting
the offense.24 Thus, for the same reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
cannot be appreciated in this case. Superior strength may aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is
clearly shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of it.25 In the absence of any
evidence to show that the accused purposely sought to use their superior strength to their advantage
in the present case, a finding to that effect by the trial court cannot be sustained.
Finally, the fact that appellant did not inflict the mortal wound upon the deceased is of no moment,
since the existence of conspiracy was satisfactorily shown by the evidence. The coordinated acts of
appellant and Altejos of immediately following the victim and jointly confronting him thereafter reveal
a concordance and unity of thought which resulted in the encounter. The circumstances that after
the accused shot the victim in the forearm and, while he and the victim were grappling for appellant's
gun, Altejos stabbed the victim to death, indicate closeness and coordination of their action geared
towards a common purpose, that is, to kill the victim. 26 Proof of a previous agreement to commit the
crime is not absolutely essential to establish a conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown
to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective, 27 as such circumstance is invariably
indicative of a conspiratorial agreement.
It bears mention, at this point, that while we have ruled out evident premeditation in the case, this
does not negate the existence of a conspiracy. True, conspiracy generally involves evident
premeditation, but this circumstance requires for its raison d' etre a sufficient time in a juridical sense
for the accused to meditate and reflect on the consequences of his intended action. Such time
element is not an indispensable requirement for a conspiracy to exist. 28 Consequently, we find that
there was a conspiracy between appellant and Altejos although, for lack of conclusive showing, we
cannot consider evident premeditation against appellant.
The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not
required to sustain a conviction. 29 The act of one in killing the victim becomes the act of all the
accused. Insofar as Cornelio Altejos is concerned, however, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over him and he can neither be convicted nor exculpated herein. References in this judgment to him
are, therefore, obiter and with no binding effect on him. 30
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon is
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
The award by the lower court of the items of civil liability to be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs
of the deceased is hereby MODIFIED by disallowing the grant of attorney's fees for lack of basis,
and increasing the death indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy adopted by the
Court en banc on August 30,1990.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., is on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39630 November 13, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEONCIO ROXAS, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Fuentecilla for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, convicting the
defendant-appellant of the crime of homicide upon the following information:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1933, at about 9 o'clock in the evening, in the
municipality of Puerto Galera, Province of Mindoro, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, armed with an automatic pocket-knife, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound Felicisimo Garcia
with said weapon inflicting upon the latter two wounds in different parts of the body, to wit:
one incised wound 18 1/2 centimeters long on the lower portion of the right chest, cutting the
6th and 7th ribs and exposing the 5th rib and lung, and another incised wound, superficial, 1
1/3 centimeters long to the left of the vertebral column; and a result thereof, the aforesaid
Felicisimo Garcia died instantaneously.
He was sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and required to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000. The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
1. El Juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en el caso de autos la existencia de la circunstancia

eximente de legitima defensa a favor del acusado, y al condenarle a este a doce años y un
dia de reclusion temporal con las accesorias de la ley, al pago de las costas del juico y a
indemnizar a los herederos del occiso en la suma de P1,000 en vez de absolverle
libremente.
2. Que en todo el Juzgado a quo erro al no imponer al acusado en la causa de autos la pena
de prision mayor, en lugar de la reclusion temporal impuesta.
We have carefully considered the excellent brief for the appellant filed by Antonio Fuentecilla who
was appointed as attorney de oficio on this appeal, in which a careful and thorough analysis of the
evidence was made in support of the first assignment of error. But we have come to the conclusion
that the findings of fact made by the court below are amply supported by the evidence. Even though
the deceased was the aggressor, the defendant himself admits that the aggressor was not armed.
There being no rational necessity shown for the means which the accused used to repel the attack
of his aggressor, article 11 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be invoked here to exempt the
defendant from the responsibility.
Counsel for the appellant maintains that the accused was a minor below eighteen when the offense
was committed and asked that this be considered as an additional mitigating circumstance under the
provisions of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. Article 13, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code is as follows:
That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of the
minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80.
Exhibit A, offered by the prosecution, states that the age of the accused at the time of the
commission of the offense was seventeen years and eight months. We accept this as the best
evidence in the record as to the true age of the accused. It is necessary, therefore, to reform the
judgment of the court below and to enter one in conformity with article 80 of the Revised Penal
Code. We accept and affirm the findings of fact of the court below as to the guilt of the defendant.
We further find the presence of the following extenuating circumstances and direct that they be
applied when final sentenced may be pronounced, namely: First, the age of the accused being under
eighteen (article 13, paragraph 2); second, provocation on the part of the deceased (article 13,
paragraph 4); third, obfuscation (article 13, paragraph 6); fourth, voluntary surrender (article 13,
paragraph 7). That part of the judgment which sentences the defendant to twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 is hereby
revoked and it is ordered that the defendant-appellant be placed in the Philippine Training School for
Boys at Welfareville in the custody of the care of the Commissioner of Public Welfare until the said
defendant shall have attained his majority, subject however, to the provisions and conditions of said
article 80 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is ordered that the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Mindoro for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. Costs de oficio. lawphil.net
Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-162 April 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DIOSCORO ALCONGA and ADOLFO BRACAMONTE, defendants. DIOSCORO
ALCONGA, appellant.
Jose Avanceña for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Barcelona for appellee.
HILADO, J.:
On the night of May 27, 1943, in the house of one Mauricio Jepes in the Municipality of San Dionisio,
Province of Iloilo several persons were playing prohibited games (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). The deceased
Silverio Barion was the banker in the game of black jack, and Maria de Raposo, a witness for the
prosecution, was one of those playing the game (t.s.n., p. 95). Upon invitation of the said Maria de
Raposo, the accused Dioscoro Alconga joined her as a partner, each of them contributing the sum of
P5 to a common fund (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). Maria de Raposo played the game while the said accused
posted himself behind the deceased, acting as a spotter of the cards of the latter and communicating
by signs to his partner (t.s.n., pp. 95-96, 126). The deceased appears to have suffered losses in the
game because of the team work between Maria de Raposo and the accused Alconga (t.s.n., pp. 96,
126). Upon discovering what the said accused had been doing, the deceased became indignant and
expressed his anger at the former (t.s.n., pp. 96, 126). An exchange of words followed, and the two
would have come to blows but for the intervention of the maintainer of the games (t.s.n., p. 96). In a
fit of anger, the deceased left the house but not before telling the accused Alconga, "tomorrow
morning I will give you a breakfast" (t.s.n., p. 96), which expression would seem to signify an intent
to inflict bodily harm when uttered under such circumstances.
The deceased and the accused Alconga did not meet thereafter until the morning of May 29, 1943,
when the latter was in the guardhouse located in the barrio of Santol, performing his duties as "home
guard" (t.s.n., pp. 98-100). While the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse, the
deceased came along and, addressing the former, said, "Coroy, this is your breakfast," followed
forthwith by a swing of his "pingahan" (t.s.n., p. 100). The accused avoided the blow by falling to the
ground under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse (t.s.n., pp. 100-101). A
second blow was given but failed to hit the accused, hitting the bench instead (t.s.n., p. 101). The
accused manage to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen (t.s.n., p. 101). While the
deceased was in the act of delivering the third blow, the accused, while still in a crawling position
(t.s.n., p. 119), fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and to fall to the ground (t.s.n.,
p. 101). Rising to his feet, the deceased drew forth his dagger and directed a blow at the accused
who, however, was able to parry the same with his bolo (t.s.n., pp. 101-102). A hand-to-hand fight
ensued (t.s.n., p. 102). Having sustained several wounds, the deceased ran away but was followed
by the accused (t.s.n., p. 6). After running a distance of about 200 meters (t.s.n., pp. 21, 108), the
deceased was overtaken, and another fight took place, during which the mortal bolo blow — the one
which slashed the cranium — was delivered, causing the deceased to fall to the ground, face
downward, besides many other blows deliver right and left (t.s.n., pp. 6, 28). At this instant, the other
accused, Adolfo Bracamonte, arrived and, being the leader of the "home guards" of San Dionisio,
placed under his custody the accused Alconga with a view to turning him over to the proper
authorities (t.s.n., pp. 102-105).
On their way to San Dionisio, the two accused were stopped by Juan Collado, a guerrilla soldier
(t.s.n., pp. 80, 104). Adolfo Bracamonte turned over Alconga to Collado who in turn took him to the
headquarters (t.s.n., pp. 81, 104). In the afternoon of the same day, Collado delivered Alconga to
Gregorio Barredo, a municipal policeman of San Dionisio, together with the weapons used in the
fight: a revolver, a bolo, and a dagger (t.s.n., pp. 81, 104).
The injuries sustained by the deceased were described by police sergeant Gil G. Estaniel as follows:
P. ¿Y que hicieron ustedes cuando ustedes vieron a Silverio Barion? — R. Examine sus
heridas.
P. ¿Donde ha encontrado usted las heridas, en que parte del cuerpo? — R. En la cabeza,
en sus brazos, en sus manos, en la mandibula inferior, en la parte frente de su cuello, en su
pecho derecho, y tambien en el pecho izquierdo, y su dedo meñique habia volado, se habia
cortado, y otras perqueñas heridas mas.
P. ¿En la cabeza, vio usted heridas? — R. Si, señor.
P. ¿Cuantas heridas? — R. Una herida en la region parietal derecha y una contusion en la

corona de la cabeza.
P. ¿Vio usted el craneo? — R. En la craneo llevaba una herida, en quel el craneo se ha roto.
P. ¿En el pecho, herida ha encontrado usted? — R. Debajo de la tetilla derecha, una herida
causada por una bala.
P. ¿Y otras heridas en el pecho, puede usted decir que clase de heridas? — R. Heridas
causadas por bolo.
P. ¿Como de grande acquellas heridas en el pecho? — R. No recuerdo la dimension de las

heridas en el pecho.
P. ¿Pero en la cabeza? — R. La cabeza se rajo por aquella herida causada por el bolo.
(T.s.n., p. 25.)
It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the deceased. The
initial stage commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant without sufficient provocation on
the part of the latter. Resisting the aggression, appellant managed to have the upper hand in the
fight, inflicting several wounds upon the deceased, on account of which the latter fled in retreat.
From that moment there was no longer any danger to the life of appellant who, being virtually
unscathed, could have chosen to remain where he was. Resolving all doubts in his flavor, and
considering that in the first stage the deceased was the unlawful aggressor and defendant had not
given sufficient provocation, and considering further that when the deceased was about to deliver
the third blow, appellant was still in a crawling position and, on that account, could not have
effectively wielded his bolo and therefore had to use his "paltik" revolver — his only remaining
weapon — ; we hold that said appellant was then acting in self-defense.
But when he pursued the deceased, he was no longer acting in self-defense, there being then no
more aggression to defend against, the same having ceased from the moment the deceased took to
his heels. During the second stage of the fight appellant inflicted many additional wounds upon the
deceased. That the deceased was not fatally wounded in the first encounter is amply shown by the
fact that he was still able to run a distance of some 200 meters before being overtaken by appellant.
Under such circumstances, appellant's plea of self-defense in the second stage of the fight cannot
be sustained. There can be no defense where there is no aggression.
Although the defendant was not the aggressor, he is not exempt from criminal liability for the
reason that it is shown that he struck several blows, among them the fatal one, after the
necessity for defending himself had ceased, his assailant being then in retreat. Therefore
one of the essential ingredients of self-defense specified in No. 4, article 8 of the Penal Code
is wanting (now article 11, case No. 1, Revised Penal Code). (United States vs. Dimitillo, 7
Phil., 475, 476; words in parenthesis supplied.)
. . . Even if it be conceded for the moment that the defendants were assaulted by the four
(offended parties), the right to kill in self-defense ceased when the aggression ceased; and
when Toledo and his brothers turned and ran, without having inflicted so much as a scratch
upon a single one of the defendants, the right of the defendants to inflict injury upon them
ceased absolutely. They had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. A fleeing man is not
dangerous to the one from whom he flees. When danger ceases, the right to injure ceases.
When the aggressor turns and flees, the one assaulted must stay his hand. (United
States vs. Vitug, 17 Phil., 1, 19; emphasis supplied.)
Upon the foregoing facts, we hold that appellant's guilt of the crime of homicide has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial court appreciated in his favor of two
mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and provocation on the part of the deceased. The first
was properly appreciated; the second was not, since it is very clear that from the moment he fled
after the first stage of the fight to the moment he died, the deceased did not give any provocation for
appellant to pursue much less further to attack him.
The only provocation given by him was imbibed in, and inseparable from, the aggression with which
he started the first stage of the fight. The evidence, as weighed and appreciated by the learned trial
judge, who had heard, seen and observed the witnesses testify, clearly shows that said stage ended
with the flight of the deceased after receiving a bullet wound in his right breast, which caused him to
stagger and fall to the ground, and several bolo wounds inflicted by appellant during their hand-to-
hand fight after both had gotten up. The learned trial judge said:
The evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense in support of their respective
theories of the case vary materially on certain points. Some of these facts have to be
admitted and some have to be rejected with the end in view of arriving at the truth. To the
mind of the Court, what really happened in the case at bar, as can de disclosed by the
records, which lead to the killing of the deceased on that fatal morning of May 29, 1945
(should be 1943), is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

In the morning of May 29, 1943, while Dioscoro Alconga was alone in the guardhouse
performing his duties as guard or "ronda" in Barrio Santol, the deceased Silverio Barion
passed by with a "pingahan". That was the first time the deceased and the accused Alconga
had met since that eventful night of May 27th in the gambling house of Gepes. Upon seeing
the accused Alconga, who was then seated in the guardhouse, the deceased cried: "Coroy,
this is now the breakfast!" These words of warning were immediately followed by two
formidable swings of the "pingahan" directed at the accused Alconga which failed to hit him.
Alconga was able to avoid the blows by falling to the ground and crawling on his abdomen
until he was outside the guardhouse. The deceased followed him and while in the act of
delivering the third blow, Dioscoro Alconga fired at him with his revolver thereby stopping the
blow in mid-air. The deceased fell to the ground momentarily and upon rising to his feet, he
drew forth a dagger. The accused Alconga resorted to his bolo and both persons being
armed, a hand-to-hand fight followed. The deceased having sustained several wounds from
the hands of Alconga, ran away with the latter close to his heels.
The foregoing statement of the pertinent facts by the learned trial judge is in substantial agreement
with those found by us and narrated in the first paragraphs of this decision. Upon those facts the
question arises whether when the deceased started to run and flee, or thereafter until he died, there
was any provocation given by him from appellant to pursue and further to attack him. It will be
recalled, to be given with, that the first stage of the fight was provoked when the deceased said to
appellant "Cory, this is now the breakfast," or "This is your breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing
or two of his "pingahan." These words without the immediately following attack with the "pingahan"
would not have been uttered, we can safely assume, since such an utterance alone would have
been entirely meaningless. It was the attack, therefore, that effectively constituted the provocation,
the utterance being, at best, merely a preclude to the attack. At any rate, the quoted words by
themselves, without the deceased's act immediately following them, would certainly not have been
considered a sufficient provocation to mitigate appellant's liability in killing or injuring the deceased.
For provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately
preceding the act. (Revised Penal Code, article 13, No. 4.)
Under the doctrine in United States vs. Vitug, supra, when the deceased ran and fled without having
inflicted so much as a scratch upon appellant, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded
with one revolver shot and several bolo slashes, as aforesaid, the right of appellant to inflict injury
upon him, ceased absolutely — appellant "had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure" said
deceased — for the reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees." If
the law, as interpreted and applied by this Court in the Vitug case, enjoins the victorious contender
from pursuing his opponent on the score of self-defense, it is because this Court considered that the
requisites of self-defense had ceased to exist, principal and indispensable among these being the
unlawful aggression of the opponent (Rev. Penal Code, article 11, No. 1; 1 Viada, 5th ed., 173).
Can we find under the evidence of record that after the cessation of said aggression the provocation
thus involved therein still persisted, and to a degree sufficient to extenuate appellant's criminal
responsibility for his acts during the second stage of the fight? Appellant did not testify nor offer other
evidence to show that when he pursued the deceased he was still acting under the impulse of the
effects of what provocation, be it anger, obfuscation or the like. The Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the act.
It is therefore apparent that the Code requires for provocation to be such a mitigating circumstance
that it not only immediately precede the act but that it also be sufficient. In the Spanish Penal Code,
the adjective modifying said noun is "adecuada" and the Supreme Court of Spain in its judgment of
June 27, 2883, interpreted the equivalent provision of the Penal Code of that country, which was the
source of our own existing Revised Penal Code, that "adecuada" means proportionate to the
damage caused by the act. Viada (Vol. 11, 5th ed., p. 51) gives the ruling of that Supreme Court as
follows:
El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que la provocacion o amenaza que de parte del ofendido
ha de preceder para la disminucion de la responsabilidad criminal debe ser proporcionada al
daño que se cause, lo cual no concurre a favor del reo si resulta que la unica cuestion que
hubo fue si en un monton de yeso habia mas omenos cantidad, y como perdiera la apuesta
y bromeando dijera el que la gano que beberia vino de balde, esa pequeña cuestion de
amor propio no justificaba en modo alguno la ira que le impelio a herir y matar a su contrario.
(S. de 27 de junio de 1883, Gaceta de 27 de septiembre.)
Justice Albert, in his commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 edition, page 94, says: "The
provocation or threat must be sufficient, which means that it should be proportionate to the act
committed and adequate to stir one to its commission" (emphasis supplied).
Sufficient provocation, being a matter of defense, should, like any other, be affirmatively proven by
the accused. This the instant appellant has utterly failed to do. Any way, it would seem self-evident
that appellant could never have succeeded in showing that whatever remained of the effects of the
deceased's aggression, by way of provocation after the latter was already in fight, was proportionate
to his killing his already defeated adversary.
That provocation gave rise to a fight between the two men, and may be said, not without reason, to
have spent itself after appellant had shot the deceased in his right breast and caused the latter to fall
to the ground; or — making a concession in appellant's favor — after the latter had inflicted several
bolo wounds upon the deceased, without the deceased so much as having scratched his body, in
their hand-to-hand fight when both were on their feet again. But if we are to grant appellant a further
concession, under the view most favorable to him, that aggression must be deemed to have ceased
upon the flight of the deceased — upon the end of the first stage of the fight. In so affirming, we had
to strain the concept in no small degree. But to further strain it so as to find that said aggression or
provocation persisted even when the deceased was already in flight, clearly accepting defeat and no
less clearly running for his life rather than evincing an intention of returning to the fight, is more than
we can sanction. It should always be remembered that "illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or
at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind.
Agresion ilegitima. — Agresion vale tanto como acometimiento. Para que exista el derecho
de defensa es preciso que se nos acometa, que se nos ataque, o cuando menos, que se
nos amenace de atacarnos de un modo inmediato e inminente; v. gr., desenvainando el
puñal para herirnos con el o apuntando la pistola para dispararla contra nosotros. (Viada,
5. a edicion, 173.)
After the flight of the deceased there was clearly neither an assault nor a threatened assault of the
remotest kind. It has been suggested that when pursuing his fleeing opponent, appellant might have
thought or believed that said opponent was going to his house to fetch some other weapon. But
whether we consider this as a part or continuation of the self-defense alleged by appellant, or as a
separate circumstance, the burden of proof to establish such a defense was, of course, upon
appellant, and he has not so much as attempted to introduce evidence for this purpose. If he really
thought so, or believed so, he should have positively proven it, as any other defense. We can not
now gratuitously assume it in his behalf.
It is true that in the case of United States vs. Rivera (41 Phil., 472, 474), this Court held that one
defending himself or his property from a felony violently or by surprise threatened by another is not
obliged to retreat but may pursue his adversary until he has secured himself from danger. But that is
not this case. Here from the very start appellant was the holder of the stronger and more deadly
weapons — a revolver and a bolo, as against a piece of bamboo called "pingahan" and a dagger in
the possession of the deceased. In actual performance appellant, from the very beginning,
demonstrated his superior fighting ability; and he confirmed it when after the deceased was first
felled down by the revolver shot in right breast, and after both combatants had gotten up and
engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, the deceased using his dagger and appellant his bolo, the former
received several bolo wounds while the latter got through completely unscathed. And when the
deceased thereupon turned and fled, the circumstances were such that it would be unduly stretching
the imagination to consider that appellant was still in danger from his defeated and fleeing opponent.
Appellant preserved his revolver and his bolo, and if he could theretofore so easily overpower the
deceased, when the latter had not yet received any injury, it would need, indeed, an unusually strong
positive showing — which is completely absent from the record — to persuade us that he had not
yet "secured himself from danger" after shooting his weakly armed adversary in the right breast and
giving him several bolo slashes in different other parts of his body. To so hold would, we believe, be
unjustifiably extending the doctrine of the Rivera case to an extreme not therein contemplated.
Under article 249, in relation with article 64, No. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, the crime committed
by appellant is punishable by reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which would be from 12
years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. However, in imposing the penalty, we take into
consideration the provisions of section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103), as
amended by Act No. 4225. Accordingly, we find appellant guilty of the aforesaid crime of homicide
and sentence him to an indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years
and 8 months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000,
and to pay the costs.
As thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26240 October 31, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BENJAMIN GONDAYAO, alias "BEN", ET AL., defendants,
BENJAMIN GONDAYAO, alias "BEN", and ANOY GONDAYAO, defendants-appellants.
Bonifacio T. Doria and Bernardo M. Morada for defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro
and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for plaintiff-appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by defendants Benjamin Gondayao and Anoy Gondayao, from a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, convicting them of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, and
sentencing them to life imprisonment and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Orlando Piol, in the sum of P6,000.00, and to pay two-fifths of the costs.
After grappling with Benjamin Gondayao, near the market place, in the Barrio of Paitan, Municipality
of Sual, Province of Pangasinan, on November 14, 1965, between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m., Orlando
Piol appeared to have — in addition to several lacerations on the head — two (2) stab wounds on
the back, 4 to 4-1/2 inches deep, in consequence of which he died that same afternoon, due to a
massive internal hemorrhage. Immediately after the occurrence, Benjamin assumed full
responsibility for said injuries, which he claimed to have inflicted in self-defense. On November 17,
1965, Macario Aquino, Chief of Police of Sual, filed, with the Municipal Court thereof, a complaint
charging Benjamin Gondayao with homicide. Twelve (12) days later, Aquino filed an amended
complaint charging murder, allegedly committed, not only by Benjamin Gondayao, but, also, by his
brother, Anoy Gondayao, and Eduardo Bersamina, Eto Agbayani and Jovencio Yanday. Soon
thereafter, the corresponding information for murder was filed, with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, against said five defendants. After due trial, under a plea of not guilty, said court
rendered the appealed decision convicting Benjamin Gondayao and Anoy Gondayao as charged
and sentencing them as stated at the beginning of this decision, as well as acquitting their three (3)
co-defendants, for insufficiency of the evidence, with three-fifths (3/5) of the cost de officio. Hence,
this appeal by the Gondayaos.
The main eyewitnesses for the prosecution were Macario Pascua and Police Chief Macario Aquino.
The first testified that, while he was reading a newspaper, in front of the house of the Vice-Mayor, in
Barrio Paitan, Sual, Pangasinan, on November 14, 1965, between 10:00 and 11:30 a.m., he saw
Benjamin Gondayao and his co-defendants, a few meters away, drinking gin in front of the store of
Segundo Sevillena, which was alongside the house and store of the Vice-Mayor; that, after
consuming a bottle of gin, Benjamin Gondayao, repeatedly cursed the "Nacionalistas" for not offering
a drink despite their victory in the polls; that, as Orlando Piol who was nearby, replied by cursing the
losers in the elections, an exchange of unfriendly utterances followed; that, eventually, the group
headed by Benjamin picked up stones and threw them at Piol, who was hit several times on the
head; that, as the same began to bleed, Piol drew out a dagger and approached Benjamin, who,
forthwith, embraced him; that, grappling with each other, they both fell down, with Piol on top of
Benjamin; that, at this juncture, Anoy Gondayao picked up a stone and hit Piol with it on the head,
and then wrestled the dagger from him; that, upon a signal given by Benjamin, who had meanwhile
managed to get away from under Piol, Anoy stabbed Piol on the back and, then, leaving the dagger
imbedded therein, retreated; that thereupon Benjamin pulled out the dagger and sank it again on the
back of Piol who was still facing downward, in a stooping position; and that Eduardo Bersamina, Eto
Agbayani and Jovencio Yanday were then about 5 meters away.
Macario Aquino did not witness the beginning of the incident. He was about 25 meters from the
place of the occurrence, when he noticed a commotion. Rushing to the scene thereof, he saw
Benjamin and Piol, about 3 meters away from him, rush at each other and grapple with one another,
until they fell together from a bamboo bed, locally known as "papag", on which they were standing;
that, inasmuch as the same and a wooden fence between him and the combatants prevented him
from going to them directly and seeing what was going on after said fall, he walked about 10 meters,
in order to go around the fence and approach the fighting men; that, bidding them to stop, he seized
the hand of Benjamin which held a dagger, with which he was poised to stab Piol then lying down on
his stomach, under Benjamin; that Aquino thereupon wrested from him the dagger, which was
stained with blood; and that Benjamin then said it was he who had wounded Piol.
Upon the other hand, Benjamin Gondayao testified that his remark, about the failure to give a blow-
out on the part of the winner in the elections, was addressed to his nephew, Rudy Natividad; that,
when Piol resented said remark, Benjamin replied that the same was not aimed at him, and that,
perhaps, he (Piol) is a "nacionalista"; that after another exchange of unfriendly remarks, Piol drew
out his dagger and said "I am going to kill you"; that Benjamin then tried to run away and went up the
"papag", with the intention of jumping over the wooden fence beside it; that he was unable to do so
because Piol followed him on top of the "papag"; that he, therefore, faced Piol, who thrust his dagger
at him (Benjamin), but he parried the thrust with the left arm, which was then wounded slightly; that,
by pressing the hand with which Piol held the dagger, Benjamin succeeded in disarming him; that,
as Piol grappled with and embraced him, they fell to the ground, with Piol under him; that Piol landed
over the dagger — then held by Benjamin — which pierced his (Piol's) back; that, as they kept on
wrestling with each other, Piol managed to roll over and place himself on top of Benjamin; that Piol
then picked up a stone and with it struck Benjamin on the face, thereby causing thereon a lacerated
wound; that Piol tried to hit him a second time with the stone, but Benjamin warded off the blow; that
he was then able to get another stone, with which he, in turn, hit Piol on the head several times; that
Piol, however, squeezed the neck of Benjamin, who let loose the stone and, pulling Piol down with
his (Benjamin's) right hand, stabbed him (Piol) with his (Benjamin's) left hand, by thrusting the
dagger into his back; and that the Chief of Police then came and separated them.
Benjamin's co-defendants set up their respective alibis, but We are not concerned with the three (3)
defendants who were acquitted by the lower court. As regards appellant Anoy Gondayao, We note
that the Chief of Police did not even see him at the scene of the occurrence, although said officer
admitted that he had not paid any attention to the persons who were near the combatants. Again, it
is difficult to see how Anoy Gondayao could have stabbed Piol without being noticed by said peace
officer. In this connection, it is well to remember that, according to Macario Pascua — the only
witness who testified to the alleged participation of Anoy Gondayao in the commission of the crime
charged — this appellant stabbed Piol after the latter and Benjamin had fallen from the "papag" in
the course of their fight. The Chief of Police was only three (3) meters away, looking at them, even
before they had thus fallen. Hence, he would have, in all probability, seen Anoy, had he done what
Pascua imputed to him (Anoy). There was, of course, the possibility that Anoy's intervention may
have taken place as the Chief of Police went around the fence that separated him from the
combatants and his attention was momentarily diverted from them. In a way, however, this
circumstance is offset by the fact that, as soon as the Chief of Police approached the combatants
and bade them to stop, Benjamin owned his responsibility for the injuries of Piol. This statement was
made before Benjamin had time to reflect, and thus forms part of the res gestae, as well as carries
much weight. All things being considered, We find that the prosecution has not established, beyond
reasonable doubt, the guilt of Anoy Gondayao, who should, accordingly, be acquitted, for
insufficiency of the evidence.
With respect to appellant Benjamin Gondayao, his Honor, the trial Judge, found his testimony
unworthy of credence and the record before Us fully justifies such finding. Indeed, Benjamin testified
that, as he grappled with Piol on top of a "papag", they fell together therefrom, with him on top of Piol
who landed on his back, over the dagger held by Benjamin, who had wrested it from Piol, and that
this was how Piol sustained the first stab wound on the back. This cannot possibly be true, for the
Chief of Police testified that Piol was holding the dagger when he and Benjamin fell down from the
"papag". Besides, had Piol's back been pressed against the dagger, which was allegedly held by
Benjamin, the resulting wound would have taken a markedly slanting direction instead of being
almost at right angle with, or perpendicular to, the body, as it turned out to be. Then, too, Piol was on
top of Benjamin, when they fell from the "papag", according to Macario Pascua.
Again, Benjamin's version is that, after this accidental injury on the back of Piol, the latter succeeded
in rolling over and being on top of him (Benjamin); that Piol then struck him on the face with a stone;
that, after fending off another attempt of Piol to similarly hit him again, he (Benjamin) picked up
another stone and, in turn, struck him with it on the head; that, as Benjamin squeezed him by the
neck, he let the stone loose and, pulling Piol down with his (Benjamin's) right hand, he (Benjamin)
stabbed Piol on the back — on which, according to Benjamin, Piol was lying — by thrusting the
dagger with his left hand; and that, at this juncture, the Chief of Police came and took the weapon
from him.
This story is manifestly artificious and unworthy of credence. It should be noted that, according to
Benjamin, he held the dagger, even before they fell from the "papag"; that the dagger was still in his
hand when Piol allegedly struck his face with a stone; and that he (Benjamin), in turn, took another
piece of stone, and hit Piol with it. This would have been impossible, however, unless Benjamin
first released the dagger, which he then held; but, We cannot believe that he, or anybody for that
matter, would have done so under the circumstances.
Again, when Piol allegedly squeezed the neck of Benjamin, the latter threw the stone away and
picked up the dagger once more. He would thus have Us believe that, in order to get the stone with
which he claimed to have hit Piol on the head, he put the dagger in a convenient place from which,
at the opportune moment, he got it back to inflict the second stab wound. The context of Benjamin's
story does not convey the idea that he had such a control of the situation as to be able to choose the
place where he would put the dagger and the time he would retrieve it.
But, this is not all. Instead of stabbing Piol on the stomach, for, by this time, he was again lying down
on his back — according to the defense — with Benjamin on top of him, he (Benjamin) thrust the
dagger, with his left hand, into the back of Piol, causing therein another stab wound almost at right
angle with his body, like the first. Just why, being in the precarious condition he depicted himself,
Benjamin chose to stab Piol in such an awkward, inconvenient and unbelievable manner, the
defense has not even tried to explain. Regardless of the foregoing, an injury inflicted in this fashion
on Piol's back, which was allegedly pressed against the ground, would have necessarily been much
more slanting than the first, instead of being almost perpendicular to the body. The fact of the matter
— and this has been established by the testimony of the Chief of Police, whose impartiality and
veracity are not contested — is that Piol was then lying down, not on his back, but on his stomach
with Benjamin on top of him. This explains why and how he (Benjamin) managed to stab Piol on the
back. It, likewise, shows that Piol could not have struck Benjamin on the face with a stone, much
less squeezed his neck. .
It is clear, from the foregoing, that Benjamin stabbed Piol twice from behind, after disarming
him.1 Considering, moreover, that Benjamin had provoked the incident, by hurling uncomplimentary
remarks at his political opponents, one of whom was Piol;2 that such remarks led to an altercation
with Piol, in consequence of which, stones were thrown at him, hitting him on the head; that when,
owing to the impact of said stone, which could have rendered him groggy, and the lacerated injuries
thus sustained by him, Piol prepared himself to fight by drawing out his dagger,
Benjamin accepted the challenge resulting from this act, by "rushing" to his encounter and grappling
with him; and that, accordingly, Benjamin cannot be given the benefit of either complete or
incomplete self-defense.3 Although Piol was stabbed from behind, Benjamin did not act with
treachery, for this was merely an incident of their struggle, which had begun with both contenders
facing each other, each prepared for the fight that ensued.4
The crime committed by Benjamin Gondayao is, therefore, that of homicide, and no modifying
circumstance having attended its perpetration, the penalty therefor (reclusion temporal) should be
imposed in its medium period. Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should, accordingly,
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the
corresponding accessory penalties. Moreover, the indemnity due from him to the heirs of Orlando
Piol should be increased from P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, pursuant to People v. Pantoja5 and
subsequent cases,6 apart from the fact that Anoy Gondayao should be acquitted, for insufficiency of
the evidence against him, with the proportional part of the costs de officio.
With the foregoing modifications, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in
all other respects, with one-fifth (1/5) of the costs against appellant Benjamin Gondayao. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28129 October 31, 1969
ELIAS VALCORZA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Nemesio G. Beltran for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo
and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for respondent.
DIZON, J.:
Elias Valcorza was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon where, after
trial, he was found guilty thereof, with the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong as the one committed and voluntary surrender, and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of not less than two years, four months and one day of prision correccional,
nor more than eight years and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of Roberto Pimentel
in the amount of 6,000, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. He appealed to the Court of Appeals where, on August 16, 1967, judgment was rendered
modifying the decision of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment is modified as to the prison term and appellant Elias Valcorza
is declared guilty of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
passion and obfuscation and, accordingly, he is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty
of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessories of the
law; to pay the heirs of the deceased, Roberto Pimentel, in the sum of six thousand pesos
(P6,000.00), together with the costs.
In all other respects, the appealed judgment is affirmed.
From the above decision the present appeal by certiorari was taken, it being petitioner's claim that
the Court of Appeals committed the following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ALTHOUGH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY AS
PEACE OFFICER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN SHOOTING THE DECEASED BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO DANGER TO HIS LIFE OR LIMB, A RULING WHICH IS BEYOND THE
CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 11, PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
CONTRARY TO THE RULING LAID BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN
PEOPLE VERSUS DELIMA, 46 PHIL. 738;
II
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN

LIKING PETITIONER TO A TRIGGER-HAPPY POLICEMAN AND IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECEASED HAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A DANGEROUS PERSON, A RULING WHICH IS

CONTRARY TO ITS FINDING OF FACTS;
III
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN NOT

ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BASED ON THE FACTS IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 11,
PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The facts found by the Court of Appeals — which must be deemed conclusive for the purpose of this
appeal — are as follows:
The deceased, Roberto Pimentel, was confined an June 4, 1960 in the municipal jail of
Maramag, Bukidnon, as a detention prisoner to answer a charge of stealing a chicken. At
about 1:00 p.m. when appellant was the police guard on duty, Roberto Pimentel escaped.
The following day a police patrol team composed of Police Sgt. Federico Daiton and
Patrolmen Melquiades Cañas, Pablo Lubido and the appellant himself went to a place called
Poultry Area in barrio Cuya, Maramag, Bukidnon, where the accused had been reported to
be hiding, for the purpose of bringing him back to jail. Their efforts to locate and apprehend
Roberto Pimentel having been fruitless, they decided to pass the night in the house of one
Gavino Tirayosa intending to return to town the following morning.
At about five o'clock in the morning of the next day, June 6, 1960, Sgt. Daiton went down
from the house of Gavino Tirayosa to answer a call of nature. He went to a nearby bridge
and squatted thereon to defecate. While he was in that position, he saw a person
approaching slowly and he ordered him to halt. The latter instead of doing so, jumped down
into the creek spanned by the bridge. He yelled for his companions, saying that the person
who jumped into the creek could be their quarry. Patrolmen Cañas, Lubido and the appellant
rushed out of the house of Gavino Tirayosa, Cañas and appellant going to the place at the
creek where the person had jumped down.
Sgt. Daiton stationed himself near the bridge and Patrolman Lubido went to the other side of
the creek. Appellant and Cañas followed the course of the creek and after covering a
distance of 100 meters they came across footprints which they examined separately. While
they were doing so, Roberto Pimentel emerged suddenly from the bushes and lunged at the
appellant, hitting him with a stone at the right cheek and causing him to fall to the ground.
When appellant Valcorza was on the ground, Roberto Pimentel again struck him with a stone
on the right arm. Fearing that Pimentel might grab his service revolver, appellant Valcorza
summoned Patrolman Cañas who dashed towards the place but Pimentel ran away.
Appellant Valcorza regained his composure and immediately chased the deceased, firing a
shot into the air and ordering him to stop. As the deceased did not heed his order, appellant
fired four times into the air, at the same time pursuing the prisoner for a distance of about
100 meters. At that point, fearing that the patrol team might fail in apprehending the
deceased, appellant Valcorza fired a fifth shot at Pimentel as the latter was in an act of again
jumping down into another part of the creek and when the distance between the two was
only three meters. Patrolman Ca_¤_as could not be of much help in the chase because his
revolver got entangled with some vines and he dropped it. After recovering his revolver he
joined Valcorza but Pimentel had already jumped down into the water of the creek.
The members of the patrol team went down into the water to locate Pimentel and they saw
him floating, with a wound on his back. As Pimentel was still alive, he was placed in the
police jeep and taken to the poblacion of Maramag for treatment, but he died a few minutes
after arrival in the municipal building.
The physician who examined the cadaver of the victim gave the opinion that the missile from
the gun fired against the victim entered at the right side of the back but the slug was lodged
inside the body. The gray discoloration at the edge or rim of the wound of entry showed the
presence of powder burns which, in the opinion of the physician, indicates that the gun was
fired at close range.
Elias Valcorza surrendered himself and his firearm to the Chief of Police upon arrival in the
municipal building of Maramag.
Appellant seeks to justify his firing the shot against the deceased by stating that he tried to
hit him only at the leg, after he had disregarded his several warning shots and orders to stop
running away. He claims that he did so at the spur of the moment probably because he
feared that his patrol team might not succeed in apprehending the deceased and bringing
him back to jail. Furthermore, he also claims that he only fired at the deceased when the
latter was in the act of jumping down into the creek which had water of 8 feet deep, and if the
deceased succeeded in crossing the creek the patrol team might not be able to apprehend
him. In brief the appellant conveys idea that he had to fire at the deceased in order that he
may not continue escaping.
The above version of the appellant was given in open court when he testified on October 4,
1962 (t.s.n. — pp. 9, 76). However, he claims that he aimed only at the leg of the deceased
is not consistent with what he said in his sworn statement, Exhibit A. 'Question and Answer
No. 7' (p. 1, Criminal Case Record), given to the Constabulary soldiers on the afternoon of
the day of the incident, or at 3:15 p.m. of June 6, 1960. In narrating how the deceased was
shot, appellant Valcorza stated in part as follows:
"But said Roberto Pimentel tried his very best to make another escape then he ran
away cause I was fell down on the ground during the time I wrestled him, Roberto
Pimentel. Then I still follow him and fire my revolver four (4) times up in the sky to
stop him but still he continue running, so what I did I fired him one direct hit shot on
his back then he tried dive escape into the water, and because he could not do
anything cause he was already suffering from a gunshot wound we pick him up and
bring him to our headquarters in the Office of the Chief of Police of Maramag,
Bukidnon, for the necessary treatment of the gunshot wound on his right side back ...
."
What the appellant said on June 6, 1960 in his statement, Exhibit A, which he subscribed
and sworn to before the Justice of the Peace of Maramag, Bukidnon, on June 7, 1960, is an
unadulterated narration of what happened on the day of the incident more than two years
before he took the witness stand. This first narration is more reliable because it was made
when there was yet no time for reflection so as to make his story fit into the facts of the
incident. After the lapse of two years during which he could deliberate and analyze the
occurrence and prepare his defense, his testimony in court no longer jibed with what he said
shortly after the event. This inconsistency affects his credibility and wrecks his theory that he
had no intention to kill the deceased but only meant to disable him from further escaping. It
also seriously impairs his defense as it shows that there was no reasonable necessity for
appellant to shoot the deceased at the time he was running away with no weapon in his
hands which he could use for aggression against the appellant in case he desired to turn
back and face the latter. (pp. 3-7, Annex "A", Petitioner's brief.)
There is no question, therefore, that: on June 4, 1960, the deceased Roberto Pimentel was a
detention prisoner confined in the municipal jail of Maramag, Bukidnon, from which he escaped at
about one o'clock p.m. that day when petitioner was on guard duty; the following day four members
of the police force of the municipality, petitioner included, went after him to a place called Poultry
Area in barrio Cuya, their first efforts to locate him there being unsuccessful; early the following
morning, while Sgt. Daiton, who led the patrol, was squatting on a bridge to answer a call of nature,
he saw a man approaching slowly and he ordered him to stop; the latter, who happened to be the
escaped detainee, instead of doing so, jumped into the creek spanned by the bridge, whereupon
Sgt. Daiton summoned his three companions who all rushed out of the house where they had spent
the night, and went after the escaping prisoner; petitioner and policeman Ca_¤_as, while following
the course of the creek and examining certain footprints they had found, saw their quarry suddenly
emerging from nearby bushes; the latter lunged at petitioner hitting him with a stone on the right
cheek, as a consequence of which he fell down, and while in that position on the ground he was
struck again with a stone by the escaping detainee; thereafter the latter ran away pursued by
petitioner and his companion; in the course of the pursuit the former fired a warning shot into the air,
and as the escaping detainee paid no heed to this, petitioner fired into the air four times more and
kept on pursuing him; as the latter was apparently widening the distance between them, and fearing
that he might finally be able to elude arrest, petitioner fired directly at him while he was in the act of
jumping again into another part of the creek, the shot having hit him on the back; as a result of the
wound thus inflicted upon him, Pimentel died a few minutes after arrival at the municipal building to
which he was taken.
While We have not lost sight of the fact that the deceased Pimentel was charged with a relatively
minor offense, namely, stealing a chicken; and while We do not in any way wish to encourage law
enforcing officers to be trigger-happy nor to employ force and violence upon persons under their
custody, We cannot, in the consideration of this case, disregard the following facts: the said
deceased, in violation of the law, had escaped from detention; when ordered to stop by Sgt. Daiton
— whom he must have recognized as a peace officer in his pursuit — he ran away and then threw
himself into a creek to elude his pursuer; after sometime he suddenly emerged from bushes near
which petitioner and a fellow policeman were and assaulted the former twice with a stone and then
ran away again pursued by petitioner and his companion; that petitioner does not appear to be a
trigger-happy policeman as shown by the fact that he had fired five cautionary shots into the air and
decided to aim directly at the escaping detainee only when he had already reasons to fear that the
latter would be able to elude him and his companions. These facts and circumstances constrain Us
to hold that the act thus performed by petitioner — and which unfortunately resulted in the death of
the escaping detainee — was committed in the performance of his official duty and was more or less
necessary to prevent the escaping prisoner from successfully eluding the officers of the law. To hold
him guilty of homicide may have the effect of demoralizing police officers discharging official
functions identical or similar to those in the performance of which petitioner was engaged at the time
he fired at the deceased Pimentel, with the result that thereafter We would have half-hearted and
dispirited efforts on their part to comply with such official duty. This of course, would be to the great
detriment of public interest.
CONSEQUENTLY, in the spirit of our decision in People vs. Delima, 46 Phil. 738, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and, as a consequence, petitioner is acquitted, with costs de
officio.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee,
JJ., concur.
Sanchez and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. L-23514 February 17, 1970 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. AVELINO MANANSALA, JR.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23514. February 17, 1970.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AVELINO MANANSALA, JR., ET

AL., Defendants, AVELINO MANANSALA, JR. and JOSE MANANSALA, Defendants-
Appellants.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and
Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Quintin C. Paredes and Paredes & Associates, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; CIRCUMSTANCES BELIE SELF-DEFENSE; CASE AT BAR. — When

Avelino surrendered to the policemen he declined to give any statement, which in the natural
course of things he would have done if he had acted merely to defend himself. A protestation of
innocence or justification is the logical and spontaneous reaction of a man who finds himself in
such an inculpatory predicament as that in which the policemen came upon the appellants, with
Avelino still clutching the death weapon and its victim dying before him.
2. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION; PROVED. — But while it is clear that
Avelino did not act in legitimate self-defense, the trial court correctly held that there was sufficient
provocation on the part of the victim. The evidence given by the witnesses for the defense as to
how and why the fight started, and as to the fact that the deceased hit Avelino with his fist, is not
controverted by the witnesses for the prosecution, who did not see the incident from the very
beginning. And one fist blow at least is confirmed by the doctor who treated Avelino for a contusion
around one eye.
3. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; FACTS CONSTITUTIVE OF TREACHERY. — The fact that when Avelino
stabbed the victim the latter was practically helpless and unable to put up any defense, being in
the tight embrace of Jose Manansala, was correctly appreciated by the trial court as treachery, and
qualifies the offense as murder.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay in its Criminal Case No.
3285 convicting Avelino Manansala, Jr. and Jose Manansala of murder and sentencing the first to
an indeterminate penalty of from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal, and the second to reclusion perpetua; both of them to indemnify jointly
and severally the heirs of Rodrigo Aringo in the sum of P6,000.00; and each to pay 1/3 of the
costs.
The prosecution, relying mainly on the testimony of two eyewitnesses — Celestino Atun and
Percival Amador — and of the policemen who went to the scene of the crime upon noticing the
commotion it produced, sought to establish the following: Between 1:00 and 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of March 27, 1962, some persons had a quarrel inside the New Bicol Carinderia, an
eatery located near the Legaspi Port Market, Legaspi City. After a short while the protagonists
came out through the backdoor of the carinderia. Jose Manansala had Rodrigo in a tight embrace
from behind, with his arms under the latter’s armpits. While Rodrigo was in that position of
apparent helplessness, Avelino stabbed him with a balisong, or Batangas knife. The stabbing
continued while Rodrigo was led, or dragged, by Jose to a bamboo bed (papag) nearby, and even
after Rodrigo had been forced down on it in a prone position. When the policemen who responded
to the commotion arrived they found Avelino still holding the fatal weapon, and Rodrigo’s limp
body, bathed in his own blood, stretched on the papag. A taxicab was commandeered to take the
wounded man to a hospital, but he expired even before the vehicle could start. The autopsy Inter
conducted by Dr. Antolin Lotivio, a resident physician of the Albay Provincial Hospital, revealed that
the victim died from massive hemorrhage and shock as a result of the multiple wounds (thirteen in
all) sustained by him in the chest, abdomen, back and the extremities.
The accused did not take the witness stand. However, they presented two witnesses, Domingo
Daria and Salvador Petilos, who said that they saw the whole incident. The substance of their
testimony is as follows: Early in the afternoon of March 27, 1962 Avelino, a small-time peddler of
textiles in the Legaspi Port Market, was eating his lunch inside one of the eateries dotting the
market site, when Rodrigo Aringo alias Diego, a baggage boy in the same market, approached him
and demanded his fee for having carried Avelino’s baggage. Avelino said he was willing to pay for
the services rendered at noon, but not for those rendered earlier in the morning. He then took
some money from his pocket and proferred it to Rodrigo. Obviously peeved at having been thus
publicly rebuffed, Rodrigo brusquely brushed Avelino’s hand aside and instantly gave him a fist
blow in the face. Avelino fell from his seat; he tried to get up, but was given another blow, and
then a third. As he reeled from the force of the last blow a batangas knife he was carrying fell from
his trousers pocket. Avelino picked up the knife, and Rodrigo, seeing that he was armed, rushed to
the carinderia’s kitchen and returned almost immediately with a 10-inch knife in his hand. With it
he swung at his antagonist, but the latter evaded the blow.
Meanwhile, appellant Jose Manansala, an uncle of Avelino, noticed the commotion from outside the
carinderia, where he was loading baggage on a parked truck some six meters away. He shouted at
Rodrigo to stop. Rodrigo paid no heed and instead delivered another thrust at Avelino, who again
evaded it. At the third attempt, Jose embraced Rodrigo from behind, and it was at that moment
that Avelino stabbed Rodrigo and inflicted the numerous wounds which proved fatal. Jose took the
kitchen knife from Rodrigo and threw it away, and then released his limp body on the papag
nearby. When the policemen arrived Avelino was still clutching the knife he had used. Both
appellants were apprehended.
In its decision rendered on August 14, 1964 the trial court sustained the prosecution’s version of
the incident and found both accused guilty of murder. However, the court credited Avelino with the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the victim, and imposed
upon him a lesser penalty than that imposed on his uncle.
Appellants’ plea is self-defense. This is predicated on the theory that the deceased was himself
armed with a knife with which he tried to stab Avelino, as declared by the two witnesses for the
defense. Several circumstances, however, belie this claim. First, Avelino sustained no knife wound
at all. Second, although several policemen arrived at the scene of the incident almost immediately
after it happened, not one of them saw the knife allegedly used by Rodrigo. Nor was it shown to
them, or at least brought to their attention, by either of the appellants. Indeed, when Avelino
surrendered to the policemen he declined to give any statement, which in the natural course of
things he would have done if he had acted merely to defend himself. A protestation of innocence or
justification is the logical and spontaneous reaction of a man who finds himself in such an
inculpatory predicament as that in which the policemen came upon the appellants, with Avelino still
clutching the death weapon and his victim dying before him.
But while it is clear that Avelino did not act in legitimate self-defense, the trial court correctly held
that there was sufficient provocation on the part of the victim. The evidence given by the witnesses
for the defense as to how and why the fight started, and as to the fact that the deceased hit
Avelino with his fist, is not controverted by the witnesses for the prosecution, who did not see the
incident from the very beginning. And one fist blow at least is confirmed by the doctor who treated
Avelino for a contusion around one eye.
On the other hand, the fact that when Avelino stabbed the victim the latter was practically helpless
and unable to put up any defense, being in the tight embrace of Jose Manansala, was correctly
appreciated by the trial court as treachery, and qualifies the offense as murder.
Jose Manansala was found guilty as co-principal on the ground that there was concert of action
between him and his nephew. The evidence does not justify this finding beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no showing that the killing was agreed upon between them beforehand. No motive for it
has been shown other than the provocation given by the deceased; and such motive was true only
insofar as Avelino was concerned. The circumstances indicate that if Jose embraced Rodrigo and
rendered him helpless, it was to stop him from further hitting Avelino with his fists. However, Jose
is not entirely free from liability, for it has been established that even after the first knife thrust
had been delivered he did not try to stop Avelino, either by word or overt act. Instead Jose
continued to hold Rodrigo, even forced him down on the bamboo bed with Avelino still pressing the
attack. Withal it cannot be said that Jose’s cooperation was such that without it the offense would
not have been accomplished. But although not indispensable, it was a contributing factor. If Jose’s
initial intent was free from guilt, it became tainted after he saw the first knife thrust delivered. The
thirteen wounds must have taken an appreciable interval of time to inflict, and Jose’s cooperation
facilitated their infliction. He must therefore be held liable as an accomplice.
The slaying of the deceased having been qualified by treachery, Avelino Manansala is liable for
murder, the penalty of which is reclusion temporal maximum to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code). Appreciating in favor of Avelino the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation by the
deceased without any generic aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty imposable
upon him is the minimum period of the penalty for murder (see par. 3, Art. 63, Revised Penal
Code), which is reclusion temporal maximum (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Since
the resulting penalty is neither death nor life imprisonment, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103 as amended). Avelino Manansala is therefore entitled to an
indeterminate sentence, the upper range of which is reclusion temporal maximum and the lower
range — which is one degree lower than the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
murder — is anywhere within prision mayor maximum (10 years and 1 day) to reclusion temporal
medium (17 years and 4 months). The penalty meted out by the trial court on Avelino Manansala,
Jr. — "from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal" — is within the range allowed by law and is therefore correctly imposed.
As regards appellant Jose Manansala, the penalty prescribed by law, he being an accomplice, is one
degree lower than that prescribed for the principal, or prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium (10) years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and considering that under paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code,"
(W)hen there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, (the court) shall impose the
penalty prescribed by law in its medium period," the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, modified as follows: cha nrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary
Appellant Jose Manansala, as accomplice to the offense of murder, is sentenced to an

indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 12 years and
1 day of reclusion temporal; the amount of the indemnity is raised from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00
to be paid the heirs of the deceased by Avelino Manansala, Jr. as principal; in case of the
insolvency of the principal, Jose Manansala, as accomplice, is subsidiarily liable for the indemnity
due from said principal; and in all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs
in this instance.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo
and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Crim Rev Atty Diwa Part 1 21-30

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CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 21-30

Jeross Romano Aguilar

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-56358 October 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Fil C. Veloso counsel de oficio for Luis B. Toring.

Joel P. Alino for Berdon and Berdin.

Appreciating in favor of the accused Luis B. Toring the mitigating circumstance of

Appreciating in favor of the accused Carmelo Berdin, the privileged mitigating

According to the prosecution, the antecedent facts are as follows:

All three accused appealed.

The lower court's decision is modified as follows:

Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 60159 November 6, 1989 - FAUSTO ANDAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.:

[G.R. No. 60159. November 6, 1989.]

P/CPL. FAUSTO ANDAL, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE

Eugenio E. Mendoza and Wenceslao G. Laureta for Petitioner.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF SANDIGANBAYAN ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT

3. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; PRIMORDIAL REQUISITE

Narvasa, J., concur in the result.

[G.R. No. 125059. March 17, 2000]

FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated

On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from

Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC,

Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for

The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910

"That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in Quezon City,

"CONTRARY TO LAW." [1]

Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25911 to Q-91-25915, with Informations similarly

"The prosecution evidence established that on or about August

agreeing and committing himself to pay the balance of

"When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were presented to

"The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after taking

deposit said amortizations with [HLURB] pending your completion

"WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-91-25910, Q-91-

"SO ORDERED." [5]

"On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so

to justify the non-payment of his obligation, the closure of his

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:

"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

"THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

is committed when the following elements are present:

such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to

the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds

of presentation of the checks, he had P150,000.00 cash or credit with

contradicts the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in

must be construed in relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate

Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to

installment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against the purported

Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction

"subsequent dishonor of the check... without valid cause" appears to us not

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 105002. July 17, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIARANGAN

Appellant claims that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible

Statement of the Case