(1) Salas V Jarencio (1972)
Ratio:
Legal Doctrine: Regardless of the source or
classification of land in the possession of a
municipality, excepting those acquired with its own
funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of
its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes
Facts:
 February 24, 1919—the 4th Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a
land registration court, rendered judgment in
Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111,
declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee
simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the
City of Mani1a, containing an area of 9,689.8
square meters, more or less.
 August 21, 1920 –Title No. 4329 issued on in
favor of the City of Manila after the land in
question was registered in the City's favor.
The Torrens Title expressly states that the
City of Manila was the owner in 'fee simple'
of the said land
 September 20, 1960—the Municipal Board,
presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio
Villegas, requested "His Excellency the
President of the Philippines to consider the
feasibility of declaring the city property
bounded by Florida, San Andres and
Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate
of Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an
area of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial
property of the City of Manila for the
purpose of reselling these lots to the actual
occupants thereof
 The said resolution of the Municipal Board of
the City of Manila was officially transmitted
to the President of the Philippines the
following day, to which a copy was furnished
to the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Congress of the Philippines.
 June 20, 1964—RA 4118 was passed by the
Senate and approved by the President
pursuant to the request. Such bill was
enacted for social justice purposes, that they
be sold to their currently landless occupants.
 But due to reasons which do not appear in
the record, the City of Manila made a
complete turn-about, for on December 20,
1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as
the City Mayor of Manila and the City of
Manila as a duly organized public
corporation, brought an action for injunction
and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction
to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein
appellants, particularly the Governor of the
Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of
Manila, from further implementing Republic
Act No. 4118, and praying for the declaration
of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.
Issues and Decisions:
1. Is the property involved private or
patrimonial property of the City of Manila?
NO, it is the property of the State.
2. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not
repugnant to the Constitution? YES, it is
valid.
1. Is the property involved private or
patrimonial property of the City of
Manila? NO, it is the property of the
State.
The rule is that when it comes to property of the
municipality which it did not acquire in its private or
corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature
can transfer its administration and disposition to an
agency of the National Government to be disposed of
according to its discretion.
The possession of a municipality, excepting those
acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held in trust for the State
for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for
governmental or proprietary purposes.
The City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral
Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any
shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said
land as its private or patrimonial property. The
presumption is that such land came from the State
upon the creation of the municipality.
That it has in its name a registered title is not
questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held
in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was
part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by
the sovereign upon its creation
Therefore, the land in question pertains to the State
and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the
benefit of the people therein for whom the State can
legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.
(2)Laurel v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92013)
Ojeda v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 92047)
ROPPONGI PROPERTY
FACTS: The subject property in this case is one of
the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The
said property was acquired from the Japanese
government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It
consists of the land and building for the Chancery of
the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the
site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building
needed major repairs. President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of
Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe,
Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations'
capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease
or disposition.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations
valued at $550M would be payable in twenty (20)
years in accordance with annual schedules of
procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and
Japanese governments. The procurements are to be
divided into government sector and those for private
parties in projects, the latter shall be made available
only to Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned
entities in national development projects.
Although there was a proposal to lease the property
with the provision to have buildings built at the
expense of the lessee, the same was not acted
favorably upon by the government. Instead, President
Aquino issued EO No. 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations’ capital
goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
dispositions. Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by
various sectors, the Executive branch of the
government pushed for the sale of reparation
properties, starting with the Roppongi lot. The
property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum
floor price of $225M. The first was a failure, while the
second has been postponed and later restrained by
the SC.
Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that
the subject property is not governed by our Civil
Code, but rather by the laws of Japan where the
property is located. They relied upon the rule of
lexsitus which is used in determining the applicable
law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution
of the title to a property.
ISSUES:
Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be
alienated by the Philippine Government?
NO. There can be no doubt that the property is
of public dominion and the respondents have
failed to show that it has become patrimonial.
The property is correctly classified under Art 420 of
the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and
intended for some public service. The fact that it has
not been used for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such
conversion happens only if property is withdrawn
from public use, through an abandonment of the
intention to use the Roppongi property for public
service and to make it patrimonial property.
Abandonment must be a certain and positive act
based on correct legal premises.
The EO does not declare that the properties lost their
public character, merely intending the properties to
be made available to foreigners and not to Filipinos
alone, in case of sale, lease or other disposition.
Furthermore, it is based on the wrong premise that
the Japan properties can be sold to end-users, when
in fact it cannot.
Neither does the CARP Law re-classify the properties
into patrimonial properties, merely stating that
sources of funds for its implementation be sourced
from proceeds of the disposition of the Government in
foreign countries, but not that the Roppongi property
be withdrawn from being classified as a property of
public dominion.
CONFLICT OF LAW
Furthermore, the respondents’ argument that the
Japanese law and not our Civil Code shall apply is
incorrect. There is no conflict of law in this
situation. A conflict of law arises only when:
There is a dispute over the title or ownership of
an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance,
the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined.
A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply. Both elements doesnot exist in the case. The
issues are not concerned with the validity of
ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the government officials to validly dispose
of property belonging to the state and the validity of
the procedures adopted to effect the sale, which
should be governed by Philippine law The rule of lex
situs does not apply.
Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents,
have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property?
NO. A law or a formal declaration to withdraw the
Roppongi property from public domain to make it
alienable and a need for legislative authority to
allow the sale of the property is needed. None has
been enacted for this purpose.
(3) Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709
Facts: Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., a holder of a lumber
concession, has operated sawmill in aland which it
does not own. The company erected a building
therein which housed the machinery used by it. In the
lease contract between the sawmill company and the
owner of the land,it has been agreed that after the
lease period or in case the company should leave or
abandon the land leased before the said period,
ownership of all the improvements and buildings
except machineries and accessories, made by the
company shall pass to the owner of the land without
any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said
improvements and buildings. In another action, A writ
of execution was issued against the company and the
properties in question were levied upon. The
company assailed the said writ contending that the
machineries and accessories were personal in nature,
hence, not subject to writ of execution. The trial
judge ruled in favour of the company.
Issue: Whether or not the subject properties are
personal in nature.
Held: The subject properties are personal in
nature.Article 334, paragraph 5, of the [Old] Civil
Code provides that real property consists of (5)
Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of any building or
land for use in connection with any industry or trade
being carried on therein and which are expressly
adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of
industry. Machinery which is movable in nature only
becomes immovable when placed in a land by the
owner of the property or land but not when so placed
by a tenant or any person having only a temporary
right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner. In the case at bar, the machinery is intended
not by the owner of the land but by the saw mill
company for use in connection with its trade. In this
sense, the machinery is not a real property.
(4) Chavez v PEA and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation
G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002
Facts: Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a wholly
government-owned and –controlled corporation which
is the primary implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged
lands of the public domain. By virtue of a Special
Patent issued by President Corazon Aquino, the
Register of Deeds of the Paranaque, in April 1988,
issued certificates of title, in the name of PEA,
covering three reclaimed islands known as the
Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paranaque City. The
Freedom Islands have a total land area of 157.841
hectares.
In April 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation,
to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also
required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares
of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-Manila Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation
Project. The JVA was later amended giving AMARI an
option to reclaim an additional 350 hectares of
submerged area. Part of the consideration for
AMARI’s work is the conveyance of 70% of the total
net usable reclaimed area – equivalent to 367.5
hectares, title of which will be in AMARI’s name.
Issue: Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation,
can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5
hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas
in Manila Bay
Held: No. AMARI as a private corporation cannot
acquire the reclaimed Freedom Islands, though
alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease,
as provided under Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution. The still submerged areas (i.e., the more
or less additional 250 and 350 hectares of submerged
areas) in Manila Bay are inalienable lands of the
public domain; as such, they are beyond the
commerce of man, as provided under Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
The reclaimed Freedom Islands: The assignment to
PEA of the ownership and administration of the
reclaimed areas in Manila Bay, coupled with President
Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering
the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. They also constitute a declaration that the
Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public
service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition or concession to qualified parties.
The submerged areas: The mere reclamation of
foreshore and submerged areas by PEA does not
convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed
lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if
the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-
public use.
PEA’s authority to sell: In order for PEA to sell its
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of
the public domain, there must be legislative authority
empowering PEA to sell these lands, in view of the
requirement under CA No.141. Without such
legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease
its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA’s Charter grants it
such express legislative authority to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority
granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain would be subject to the
constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence,
such legislative authority could only benefit private
individuals.
Registration of alienable lands of the public domain:
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No.
1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public
ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of
ownership previously conferred by any of the
recognized modes of acquiring
ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a
better right than what the registrant had prior to the
registration. The registration of lands of the public
domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot
convert public lands into private lands. Jurisprudence
holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance
of the certificate of title the alienable land of the
public domain automatically becomes private land
cannot apply to government units and entities like
PEA.
Lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529
are not exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands
of the public domain may also be registered pursuant
to existing laws.Several laws authorize lands of the
public domain to be registered under the Torrens
System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without
losing their character as public lands. For instance,
- Under the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987, private property purchased by
the National Government for expansion
of an airport may be titled in the name
of the government agency tasked to
administer the airport. Private property
donated to a municipality for use as a
town plaza or public school site may
likewise be titled in the name of the
municipality. All these properties
become properties of the public domain,
and if already registered under Act No.
496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered
land. There is no requirement or
provision in any existing law for the de-
registration of land from the Torrens
System.
- Private lands taken by the Government
for public use under its power of
eminent domain become unquestionably
part of the public domain. Nevertheless,
Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes
the Register of Deeds to issue in the
name of the National Government new
 certificates of title covering such
expropriated lands.
(1) SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and
VENIDA M. VALDEZ, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006
FACTS: This case originated from a complaint for
unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and
Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel
and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these
material facts:
2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a
piece of residential lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk
19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta.
Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from
Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992
by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is
hereto attached marked as Annex "A" and the xerox
copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name
marked as Annex "B";
3. That defendants, without any color of title
whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by building their
house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein
plaintiffs rightful possession thereof;
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the
herein defendants to peacefully surrender the
premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to
vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the
Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of
the former to surrender the lot peacefully;
In their answer, private respondents contended that
the complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior
physical possession of the property or that they were
the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private
respondents claimed ownership over the land on the
ground that they had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years,
as attested by an ocular inspection report from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
MTC RULING: The Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners,
ordering private respondents to vacate the property
and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the
same plus attorney’s fees.
RTC RULING
Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision
dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of
the MTC.
CA RULING: Undeterred, the private respondents filed
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 10
March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for
unlawful detainer because they failed to show that
they had given the private respondents the right to
occupy the premises or that they had tolerated
private respondents’ possession of the same, which is
a requirement in unlawful detainer cases.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF
THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR
UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
The petition is not meritorious. Under existing law
and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions
available to recover possession of real property:
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and
(c) accion reivindicatoria.6
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of
action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and
unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one
is deprived of physical possession of real property by
means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied.8 The two are
distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry,
the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
beginning, and that the issue is which party has
prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer,
possession of the defendant is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of
the right to possess.9
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are
summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial
court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must
be brought within one year from the date of actual
entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from
the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the right to
physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the
right of possession which should be brought in the
proper regional trial court when dispossession has
lasted for more than one year.12 It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. 13 In other
words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint
more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not
one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, butan
accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also
brought in the proper regional trial court in an
ordinary civil proceeding.14
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is
essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be
recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy.16 As
explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by
tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be
made.
If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was
with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the
latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue
before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70,
within one year from the date of the demand to
vacate.
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the
word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present right
from the start of possession sought to be recovered,
to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold
otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And
for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is
an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress –
in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one
year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before
suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy;
and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right
to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible
entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well
be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe.
No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring
suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to
prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw
him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the
postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that
the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of
the summary nature of the action.18 (Underlining
supplied)
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land
which determines the cause of action, whether it is
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is
legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal,
the case is unlawful detainer.
The evidence revealed that the possession of
defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely
tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that
defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then
built a house thereon without the permission and
consent of petitioners and before them, their mother.
xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was
effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the
owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession
by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained
in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court
ofAppeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to
be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one
of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
(2) CARIDAD O. DE GALLEGO v LAND
AUTHORITY
G.R. No. L-26848, August 17, 1981
FACTS: The petitioner herein, a registered owner of a
parcel of land situated in the province of Rizal, seeks
the cancellation of certain conditions involving the
conveyance of said land in question which was said to
have been acquired by the Government for residential
purposes with the principal objective of distributing
the same to the landless and thereby allow more
people to have their own homes. Petitioner insists
that the primary intention of the restriction against
transfers or conveyances of the property except to
the landless and except by hereditary succession in
order to insure that more people shall own residential
homes, has been lost by the transformation of the
property from residential to commercial since the
landless who may want to establish their residential
homes can no longer afford to pay the commercial
price of this commercial property and thus said
restriction should be eliminated to allow the
aforementioned property to contribute to the
economic development of the country.
Petitioner, wife of former Ambassador
Manuel Gallego, was not a landless individual, nor
was she landless at the time when the said property
was acquired by her, the fact being that the
restriction refers only to voluntary conveyances and
did not comprehend sales by public auction, as in the
particular case, where the petitioner came to own the
property as the highest bidder in a foreclosure sale by
reason of a mortgage thereon.
ISSUE: Whether said conditions have lost any sound
basis in that while the subject parcel of land was
originally a residential lot, the classification of the
property had been changed to that of commercial.
HELD: NO. The conditions are found or provided in
Section 17 and 18 of Land Registration Order No. R-3
under the subject "Rules and Regulations Governing
the Acquisition and Disposition of Landed Estate,"
approved November 15, 1951 by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Said conditions,
having been imposed pursuant to an Administrative
Order which has the force and effect of the law, are
therefore binding upon any person who acquires title
to the same, it appearing that said Conditions are
annotated as encumbrances on the back of the
Certificate of Title of the land. Moreover, said
Conditions are not contrary to law, morals, customs,
or public policy. In fact, these Conditions had been
imposed in order to implement more effectively the
main purpose of the constitutional provision which is
to break up landed estates into reasonably small
portions and to discourage the concentration of
excessive landed wealth in an entity or a few
individuals, (Republic vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461)
Incidentally, the New Constitution of 1973 provided a
modification of the original provision in the 1935
Constitution, thus: "The National Assembly may
authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into
small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.
Therefore, it was only proper for the Court to hold the
subject Conditions to remain as they were.