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The Russo-German War

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 contents

Features
6 Barbarossa: The Russo-German War
Nazi Germany and the USSR are locked in the greatest
land war of all time.
by Joseph Miranda
Number 1
Aug/Sep 2008 25 A Drop Zone Too Far: Operation Market Garden
The Allies launch a daring airborne assault behind German lines
Publisher: Christopher Cummins to try to win the war in September 44.
Editors: Ty Bomba & Joseph Miranda
by John Burtt
Associate Editor: Kelly Bell
Copy Editors: Jason Burnett, Jon Cecil, Paul
Koenig and Dav Vandenbroucke. 44 Amerika Bombers: Luftwaffe Plans to
Design • Graphics • Layout: Callie Cummins Bomb the United States
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping The Luftwaffe’s intercontinental bombers and the origins of the
Advertising: Rates and specifications available on
Cold War’s space race.
request. Write P.O. Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390. by Perry Moore
SUBSCRIPTION RATES are: Six issues per year—the United
States is $109.97. Non-U.S. addresses are shipped via Airmail:
Canada add $20 per year. Overseas add $30 per year. Inter- 50 BIAK: The War in the Pacific’s Unknown Blunder
national rates are subject to change as postal rates change. The Imperial Japanese Army proves it can still fight a battle even
Six issues per year-Newsstand (magazine only)-United States
is $19.97/1 year. Non-U.S. addresses are shipped via Airmail:
as the Allies break through their inner defense perimeter.
Canada add $10 per year. Overseas add $13 per year. by John Burtt
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NON U.S. SUBSCRIBERS PLEASE NOTE: Air mail to foreign On the Home Front: New Orleans & LaGarde Hospital in World War II
addres­ses may take six to ten weeks for delivery. Inquiries Adrian N McGrath
should be sent to World at War after that time, to P.O. Box
21598, Bakersfield CA 93390.
Behind the Lines: The US State Department in World War II
Mike Haran
World at War (©2008) reserves all rights on the contents of Movers & Shakers: Geoffry Pyke
this publication. Nothing may be reproduced from it in whole
Michael O’Brien
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R1 Barbarossa: The Russo-German War
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4 #1

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 Dear Reader
Thank you for taking a look at the premier issue of World at War magazine. We hope you’ll enjoy the articles
and become a subscriber.
If you’re already a subscriber or regular customer of Strategy & Tactics, you’ll recognize the similarities in
format. Our articles are analytical rather than the narrative, going beyond general descriptions and focusing on
the “how” and “why” of battles and campaigns. World at War carries the approach into a more focused look at
the greatest conflict in history, World War II. Like its long-running sister magazine, Strategy & Tactics, every
issue will include three to four articles, lavishly illustrated with many detailed, full-color maps, plus a game on
the same subject as the feature article. World at War will be published bi-monthly (six times a year) in months
alternating with Strategy & Tactics.
Each issue includes a feature article from the following strategic regions: the Western and Mediterranean
Theaters, the East Front, the Pacific Theater, and a category for other battles and campaigns (actual battles
and campaigns not fitting a specific theater such as the Battle of the Atlantic, the Spanish Civil War, or what-if
battles such as Sealion or Moscow 1941). Each issue also includes a board game with the same topic as the lead
article. Games also rotate through these four categories.
World at War #1 features a game, Barbarossa: East Front 1941-1945, by editor and renowned game de-
signer Ty Bomba. Articles include Barbarossa, an overview of the strategic decisions on the East Front, A Drop
Zone Too Far, an analysis of Operation Market-Garden, Amerika Bomber, and Biak: Unknown Blunder in the
Pacific. Several FYI-style pieces are included: On the Seas with Japan’s Escort Convoys, On the Home Front
with New Orleans and Lagrade Hospital, and War by Other Means, the US State Department in WWII.
Ty Bomba and Joseph Miranda are working together on World at War, combining their editorial and game
design talents.

First 12 Issues
East Front 1: Barbarossa 5: Finnish Front, 1941-42 9: Dest. Army Grp. Center
Pacific 2: Solomons Campaign 6: Great East Asia War 10: Coral Sea Solitaire
Western & 3: The Bulge 7: Greek Tragedy 11: Salerno
Mediterranean
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World at War 5

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 BARBAROSSA:
The Russo-German War
By Joseph Miranda

6 #1

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 Plans
Adolf Hitler had ordered planning begun for the
invasion of the Soviet Union as early as July 1940.
The operation was code named “Barbarossa,” after
the great medieval German emperor. Hitler originally
wanted the offensive to begin in late 1940, but OKW,
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the high command of
the armed forces, advised against that based on the dif-
ficulty of campaigning in the Russian autumn weath-
er.
Gen. Erich Marcks of OKH (Oberkommando des
Heeres, the high command of the army) formulated the
original invasion plan. He divided German forces into
two army groups, North and South. Army Group North
would operate north of the Pripet Marshes, its objec-
tive Moscow. Army Group South would be responsible
for seizing the Ukraine. The final objective line was
Archangel-Gorki-Rostov. Barbarossa’s primary goal
was the destruction of the Red Army. That would pre-
vent the Soviets from becoming a threat to German-
occupied Europe and, more generally, it would destroy
communism as an organized political force.
Barbarossa was to be accomplished within the
space of a single campaign. Hitler wanted a quick vic-
tory so he could again turn his attention against the
British Empire. In retrospect, his expectations about
the ease of conquest of the Soviet Union seem fantas-
tic, given the size of the country and that of the Red
Army. But Hitler believed the Soviet Union was a hol-
low shell and a concerted attack would cause it to col-
lapse. The Nazi ideological view of communism was
of a parasitic force, incapable of decisive action.
There were also other, more practical, reasons for
Hitler’s dim appraisal of the Soviets. Stalin’s purge of
the Soviet officer corps in the 1930s had decimated
Red Army leadership. The poor performance of the
Soviet armed forces in the 1939-40 Winter War against
Finland seemed to confirm that view. There was also
the experience of the victorious German campaigns
in Poland, the West and the Balkans. The blitzkrieg
seemed unstoppable, and there was no overarching
reason for the Germans to expect themselves to be
stopped in Russia.
But there was yet another reason for Hitler’s over
confidence. German intelligence grossly underrated
Soviet military strength, estimating there were 50 to
75 Red Army divisions on the western frontier, with
another 150 or so elsewhere. The Germans believed
the Soviets had far fewer tanks than they actually
possessed. They also failed to properly appraise geo-
graphic conditions within Russia. For example, Ger-
man maps showed roads where only trails existed.
Even more critically, the Germans failed to take fully
into account the size of the Russian theater of opera-
tions. That was due to their experience of having cam-
paigned in the relatively smaller countries of western,
central and southern Europe. The scope of the Rus-
WaW-1-Issue.indd 7
sian steppes, forest, and swamps, stretching into the
heartland of Eurasia, was beyond commanders whose
experience had been in operations in which one could
drive across an entire country in the course of a day, at
least during peacetime.
In any event, Marcks plan underwent further revi-
sion in the year following Hitler’s ordering of Bar-
barossa. In its final form, Barbarossa included three
army groups. Army Group North, commanded by Gen,
Leeb, consisted of two armies and one panzer group. It
was to advance toward Leningrad. Army Group Cen-
ter (Gen. Bock) had two armies (later reinforced by a
third) and two panzer groups. It was to advance along
the Warsaw-Smolensk-Moscow axis, destroying the
Soviet armies in front of it. Army Group South (Field
Marshal von Rundstedt) had three German armies,
one panzer group and one Romanian army. Its objec-
tive was to seize the Ukraine. To the north, the Finn-
ish army, bolstered by some German divisions, was to
advance on a general line east of the border.
Significantly, the final revised plan did not make
Moscow a major objective. Hitler saw the Soviet capi-
tal as purely a geographic site, not a locale worthy of
a major offensive operation. That Moscow decision
would become a major source of controversy in the
campaign and a magnet for German forces in the east
in late 1941.
Soviet Strategy
Stalin and the Red Army high command were also
preparing. They realized the alliance between the So-
viet Union and the Third Reich was uneasy at best,
regardless of the diplomatic formalities of the Nazi-
Soviet Pact of 1939. The Soviets developed a strategy
that, while less than perfect, would prove effective in
stopping the Germans in 1941. That Soviet strategy
was simple. The forces on the frontier would fight
battles of attrition with the invaders while reserves
were assembled in the rear. As the Germans advanced
deeper into the Soviet Union, they would overextend
themselves. When the Soviets had mobilized sufficient
strength, they would launch a counteroffensive and
smash the over-extended enemy. In the event, that’s
what the Soviets attempted, and it worked.
The Red Army high command had correctly evalu-
ated the situation. The Germans couldn’t be stopped
on the frontier. The Western Allies had tried an up-
front defense in Belgium and France in 1940, and the
Yugoslavs did the same early in 1941. The result in
each case was total German victory. Once the Germans
had made a breakthrough, the panzers would race deep
into the enemy rear, cutting off the Allied forces on the
frontiers.
One of the advantages the Soviets had lay in that
country’s immense spaces. They could afford to sac-
continues on page 10
World at War 7
5/14/08 1:15:40 PM
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 World at War 9

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 The Course of the Campaign: 1941—
Barbarossa
On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union.
The titanic confrontation that all Europe had expected for years
had come into being. Nazism and communism were locked in
a death struggle that would decide the outcome of the Second
World War in Europe.
The initial stages of the Nazi invasion seemed to be phe-
nomenally successful. The Germans advanced in great pincer
movements, with the panzer groups leading the way. Those
panzer groups were mechanized army-sized formations consist-
ing of panzer and motorized infantry divisions plus support ele-
ments. In early July, Army Group Center closed a huge pocket
at Minsk, bagging some 290,000 prisoners and 2,500 tanks.
At Smolensk the Germans took another 100,000 prisoners and
2,000 tanks.
While Army Group Center was making those advances, the
situation on the flanks was less optimistic. In the north, Soviet
resistance slowed the Germans. In the south, the Soviets main-
tained a large salient in the front, with Kiev at its center. In
a series of stormy conferences with his generals during July
and August, Hitler decided to divert Army Group Center’s pan-
zer groups. The 3rd Panzer Group would support Army Group
North’s advance to Leningrad, while the 2nd would turn south
and close a pocket around the Kiev salient in conjunction with
Army Group South.
Thus bolstered, Army Groups North and South resumed the
offensive. Army Group North reached the outskirts of Leningrad
before being stopped by Soviet resistance. Army Group South
conducted an incredible encirclement at Kiev, taking some
665,000 Red Army soldiers as prisoners by the end of Septem-
ber. The German advance across the Ukraine then continued,
reaching the Don River by mid-October. With the situation on
the flanks restored, Hitler reassigned the two panzer groups
back to Army Group Center and also finally ordered an assault
on Moscow. At the battle of Vyazma (30 September to 7 Octo-
ber) the Germans took another 650,000 prisoners. Continued
fierce Russian resistance, aided by increasingly dismal weather
and the overextended German supply lines, finally brought the
offensive to a halt just in front of the Soviet capital.
Gates of Moscow
On 6 December the Red Army, under the command of Mar-
shal Georgi Zhukov, launched a massive counterattack that
threw back the Germans. Hitler ordered his troops to stand fast
and hold in the freezing weather. In the fierce fighting that fol-
lowed, the Germans managed to stabilize their lines still well
inside in the Soviet Union. In fact, it was only in the south,
where Rostov was retaken by the Soviets, that an important
population center was given up by the Germans. By March
1942, both sides were exhausted and the campaign had ground
to a halt in the spring mud.
The Wehrmacht took 900,000 casualties in the Russian cam-
paign from June 1941 to April 1942; it received only 450,000
replacements in return. One indicator of the extent of losses is
the Germans replaced only 10 percent of the motor vehicles lost
in Barbarossa for the opening of the 1942 campaign. That was
disastrous for an army that relied on its mechanized forces to
spearhead offensives. Thus began the process of attrition that
led to the destruction of the German army in the east. Hitler was
never again able to conduct a general offensive across the entire
eastern front.
10 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 10
rifice their border regions because there was plenty of
territory, population and industry farther east. Stalin’s
absorption of eastern Poland, the Baltic states, and the
frontier regions of Finland in 1939-40 paid off.
Soviet strategy was also assisted by the failure of
German strategic intelligence. The Germans believed
the forces on the frontier represented the Soviets’ main
strength. They estimated something like 200 divisions,
total, were in the Soviet order of battle. In fact, the So-
viets had some 360 divisions. That misperception con-
tinued well into the campaign. The Germans lacked a
good order of battle for the Red Army strategic reserve
as well as a realistic estimate of the USSR’s industrial
capability. For years prior to the war the Soviets had
stockpiled arms and equipment. They were therefore
able to make good their equipment losses in the field
in 1941—though trained manpower was harder to
come by.
It should also be noted, though, the Soviet high
command overestimated the capabilities of their
troops. They thought they could defend against a three
to one superiority of attacking force, but that calcula-
tion didn’t take into account superior German tactical
skill. In the event, the panzers penetrated the front de-
spite the Wehrmacht’s numerical inferiority to Soviet
tanks.
Still, the Soviets can be said to have made the best
use of what they had. For example, in the first year and
a half of the war the Red Army lacked the command
and control capability to coordinate large-scale offen-
sives. The Soviets therefore concentrated on making
local counterattacks. While those actions weren’t deci-
sive, they cumulatively worked to slow the Germans,
as the invaders often had to fight to retake local ter-
rain, and they were also slowly worn down in terms of
strength and initiative.
Meanwhile, the Soviets massed troops in their stra-
tegic rear areas. They were held in reserve for training,
digging entrenchments, and to conduct battles farther
to the east in the event Moscow fell. Soviet war mak-
ing capacity also skyrocketed. From the fourth quarter
of 1941 to the first quarter of 1942, Soviet military
production increased 40 to 110 percent, depending on
the category of equipment. On the other side, German
industry still hadn’t been fully mobilized onto a war
footing. During the autumn of 1941, in fact, the Ger-
mans planned to convert some of their war industry to
civilian production, as they believed the campaign was
coming to a victorious conclusion.
The Soviets also anticipated the Nazis would alien-
ate the populace, and that would lead to partisan war-
fare. Accordingly, the Soviets made some preparations
for resistance behind enemy lines. Most of the partisan
bands that rose in 1941 were actually composed of So-
viet soldiers who took to the woods and marshes rather
than surrender when their units were overrun.
5/14/08 1:15:54 PM
 German troops take aim on the Russian front.
From Blitzkrieg to Attrition
As the 1941 campaign wore on toward winter,
Soviet strategy forced the Germans into a series of
battles of attrition. Generally the Germans used their
mechanized divisions to conduct breakthroughs and
encircle enemy units. The infantry would then close
and destroy trapped enemy forces, but surrounded
Red Army troops would often fight on. That process
worked to slow the German advance, as their infantry
was marching about 50 miles behind the lead panzers.
Once the infantry had closed the distance, they would
reduce the pockets by assault. The casualty count still
usually favored the Germans. Encircled Soviet units
were cut off from their lines of communication and
were frequently disorganized. Mass Russian surren-
ders were often the result, but German losses gradu-
ally increased. Even more subtle was the effect those
battles had on German logistics. Clearing the pockets
forced the Germans to consume much artillery ammu-
nition, placing another burden on the already straining
supply system.
German soldiers themselves were starting to go
ragged. Exhaustion and disease began to take their
toll. The wounded and sick couldn’t be left behind to
the mercies of the partisans. German columns started
to resemble medieval armies marching grimly forward
to whatever destiny lay in the east. Their officers and
troops became uneasy about the great distances that
had to be covered and the seemingly endless Soviet
armies resisting in front of them.
That uneasiness also started to be felt in Germany
itself. Classified intelligence reports from the Nazi
Party Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) indi-
cated home front morale was starting to decline as it
was becoming apparent the war in Russia was not go-
ing to end soon. New domestic propaganda measures
were recommended to keep the civilians motivated and
WaW-1-Issue.indd 11
head off a repeat of the German home front collapse of
late 1918. And all this came full circle, as in 1941-42
because Hitler did not commit the Reich’s economy to
“total war” status for fear it would undermine civilian
morale.
At the end of Operation Barbarossa the Germans
had gained control of much of the European portion
of the Soviet Union, especially the economic and in-
dustrial regions of the Ukraine, but the Wehrmacht
was vastly overextended. Most important, the Soviet
peoples had been made more willing to fight for their
country, largely as the result of the failure of German
political strategy. Stalin exploited those patriotic sen-
timents, rallying the Soviet peoples to defend their
homeland against the invaders with a call to basic
“bourgeoisie” patriotism.
Turning Points
The Stalingrad battle, fought from late 1942 and
into the winter following, proved decisive not simply
because of the massive losses to Axis armed forces. It
also represented a change in German strategy. Until
Stalingrad, the Germans had won by winning cam-
paigns, not individual battles. Once they had gained
operational ascendancy, enemy armed forces fell into
their grasp. After Stalingrad they were trying to win
battles in order to use them to gain the telling blow
for their campaigns. Given superior Soviet manpower,
however, the Germans were bound to lose with that
approach regardless of what happened in the working
out of the details. Fighting World War I type battles
made no sense in World War II.
By the time of the Kursk Offensive (July 1943),
the Soviets had figured out a counter to the blitzkrieg.
Defensively, the Soviets developed an organizational
advantage with their numerous independent anti-tank
brigades. These units allowed the Soviets to concen-
continues on page 16
World at War 11
5/14/08 1:15:55 PM

SD Pollsters
The public’s mood was important to Hitler, and he went to great
lengths to check on it. The normal democratic methods of gauging
public opinion, such as polls and letters to newspaper editors, were
not available owing to the nature of Nazi society. Instead, the SD
(Sicherheitsdienst or Security Service) had the mission of gathering
information on domestic opinion and providing regular reports.
There was much to be disturbed about. The SD reported the pop-
ulace gave more credence to letters from friends and relatives at the
front than they did to official propaganda. As casualties piled up, so
did doubts about the war. Despite the official Nazi line, the German
people were realizing they were in a protracted war of attrition, a
conflict for which they hadn’t been prepared psychologically.
One thing obvious to everyone from the start had been the differ-
ence between the public response to the opening of the war in 1939
as compared to that of 1914. At the outbreak of the First World War,
mass patriotic demonstrations had broken out throughout Germany
in support of the mobilization. In contrast, the prevalent attitude
across Germany in September 1939 had clearly been one of anxiety
and apathy. There were none of the spontaneous parades of cheering
citizens and flower bedecked soldiers that those old enough remem-
bered from the summer of 1914. The reason for that difference was
everyone, young and old, also knew of the bloodbath that had fol-
lowed the soldiers marching to the front in 1914-18. Even the most
hardened German militarist understood another such war would end
everything Hitler had accomplished since coming to power in 1933.
Hitler therefore had good reasons to limit industrial mobilization
for war. Normalcy, or at least the illusion of normalcy, had to be
maintained as long and as much as possible. The last thing the Na-
zis wanted was a repeat of the great labor strikes that had swept the
country in 1917-18. They therefore allowed industry to continue to
produce consumer goods while keeping nightclubs open in order to
maintain morale. Hitler also hoped a happy work force would turn
out more armaments in the long run.
The leadership’s perceived need to placate home front opinion
had largely dictated the way Germany fought the war in 1939-41:
Poland—Scandinavia—Low Countries—France—Balkans. The
blitzkrieg victories of those years were not only militarily important
but politically essential. They showed the Nazis could win the new
war without the protracted bloodbath of the First World War. Hitler
was providing the German people evidence he could hand them great
victories at low cost. That was why the Crete operation proved such
a shock to Hitler: the heavy casualties suffered by the German para-
troopers in the capture of that island were instantly reminiscent of the
bloodbaths suffered in the First World War.
That was also why the invasion of the Soviet Union was such a
huge gamble. Germany had to win quickly because the Reich wasn’t
set up for a long war. The deficiency was not just the lack of a fully
mobilized war economy. It was centered on the more fundamental
psychological issue: the war was being transformed from a series of
limited campaigns into a continent-wide struggle.
12 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 12
The Course of the Campaign: 1942—
Stalingrad
On 5 April 1942, Hitler issued Fuehrer Directive Num-
ber 41, codenamed Case Blau (Operation Blue), ordering a
new offensive in southern Russia. Case Blau’s objective was
to seize the vital industrial and petroleum producing regions
stretching from the Don basin to the Caucasus Mountains.
Hitler and his generals were beginning to realize the war was
not going to be won in a series of lightning campaigns. The
objective was to attack the Soviets on the economic and in-
dustrial fronts, thereby undermining their ability to wage a
longer war.
Hitler had learned a lesson from the 1941 campaign: not
to disperse strength across the front. Instead, the 1942 of-
fensive would take place only in Army Group South’s sector.
Army Group South was divided into two new commands,
Army Group A on the southern wing, from Rostov south, and
Army Group B to its immediate north along the Don.
Hitler wanted the 1942 campaign executed in a series
of consecutive thrusts. The first one would be the northern-
most, starting from Kursk and advancing across the Don
toward Voronezh. That force would then turn south to roll
back the flank of the Russian armies toward Stalingrad. The
second thrust would be launched from Kharkov straight east.
The third would be based from the lower Don and head to-
ward Stalingrad. The first thrust would split the front, and
the subsequent ones would consolidate the initial gains. That
would allow the Germans to concentrate all their air support
and logistics for each operation. The ultimate objective was
the oil of the Caucasus.
Stalingrad was at first only a secondary objective. Even
from the start of planning, however, the Germans recognized
the city was an important industrial center, contained Red
Army training facilities, and also controlled river traffic on
the lower Volga. Stalingrad also had political significance
in that it had been connected with military victories of its
namesake during the Russian Civil War. Finally, it was also
the center of an area inhabited by Volksdeutsch, Germans
who had been settled in Russia for centuries.
Operation Blue kicked off on 28 June 1942. The Ger-
mans’ Kharkov-based thrust succeeded in clearing the Don
and advanced toward Stalingrad. To the south, Army Group
A took Rostov on 24 July, opening the way for an advance to
the Caucasus. Ominously, the Germans found their panzers
were closing on thin air; in the opening stage of the cam-
paign they took only 70,000 prisoners.
The Soviets had learned lessons, too. Instead of standing
and fighting—and being trapped in pockets—they fell back.
And so in 1942 the Wehrmacht couldn’t attain a military vic-
tory; the Soviet armies remained intact to fight again. The
Germans pursued, but found themselves overextended.
With the Soviet armies falling back, Hitler changed plans.
He ordered Army Group B to take Stalingrad while Army
Group A drove toward the Caucuses. While that might seem
a flexible response to the changing situation, it was actually
a flawed strategy. The change divided German resources be-
tween two diverging axes of advance. Gen. Hoth’s 4th Pan-
zer Army was shifted from Army Group B to Army Group A.
That slowed Army Group B’s advance toward Stalingrad just
at the moment the city was only weakly defended.
5/14/08 1:15:55 PM
 By late August, Army Group B had reached the outskirts
of Stalingrad, and there a furious fight developed. In order
to support it, Hitler took 4th Panzer Army away from Army
Group A and sent it back to B. That seesaw motion across the
front did little to further German objectives and in the end
proved wasteful. While some German patrols reached the
Caspian, temporarily cutting off the Caucasus from the rest
of Russia, the overall offensive came to a halt. Army Group
A lacked the strength to reach its final objectives.
Stalingrad developed into a massive battle of attrition.
Both sides fed troops into the battle, and ferocious fights
followed throughout the rubble. The Germans inched their
way forward, eventually capturing some 90 percent of the
city. Still, the Red Army grimly held on to the rest, draw-
ing the Germans in ever farther. In order to sustain the bat-
tle, the Germans had to pull more of their divisions from
Army Group B’s flanks, turning Stalingrad into a magnet for
their forces. As the city turned into a cauldron of blood and
rubble, Hitler placed the Rumanian, Italian and Hungarian
armies on the flanks of 6th Army. The situation was thereby
set for the Soviet counterattack that would turn the course of
the war in the east.

Operation Uranus
On 19 November 1942, the Soviets struck back at Stal-
ingrad, with Marshal Zhukov in command. He launched two
powerful thrusts, one north of the city and the other to the
south. They overran the Axis-allied armies on the flanks and
then kept going. The Soviet spearheads converged to the
west of Stalingrad, trapping Paulus and 6th Army and forcing
the rest of Army Group B to fall back or face annihilation.
Zhukov’s move stunned the Germans. For the first time
in the war, an Allied army proved capable of launching a
mechanized double envelopment to trap a major German
force. Gen. Weichs, Army Group B’s commander, urged 6th
Army to immediately reverse its front and fight its way out,
but Hitler ordered Gen. Paulus to hold Stalingrad at all cost.
Hermann Goering promised that the Luftwaffe would keep
the Stalingrad pocket supplied and hurriedly organized an
airlift.
The Germans lacked the strength to break through to
Stalingrad. Field Marshal Manstein, in command of the re-
lief force, could only scrape together a few mobile divisions.
The lead elements of that force came to within 35 miles of
the city before being halted. In the air, the Luftwaffe failed
to deliver anywhere near sufficient supplies to maintain 6th
Army. Against Zhukov’s mechanized might, Manstein could
at best fight a delaying action. Paulus surrendered on 2 Feb-
ruary 1943. With the fall of Stalingrad, Zhukov increased the
pressure westward. The Soviets took Kharkov and seemed
about to sweep through the entire Ukraine.
By that time, however, the Soviets had in turn overex-
tended themselves. Manstein then assembled a mobile force
and launched a counterattack against the Soviet southern
flank. Faced with that threat to his line of communication,
the Red Army fell back. The Germans retook Kharkov on
14 March 1943, shortly after which the spring thaw put an
end to further mobile operations. As in the year before, the German soldier and
front settled down; both sides again rebuilt, and the Germans
Russian civilians.
planned a new offensive for the upcoming summer.
World at War 13

WaW-1-Issue.indd 13 5/14/08 1:15:56 PM

 The Course of the Campaign: 1943—Citadel
The focal point for the German 1943 offensive in the east
was the Kursk salient, Operation Zitadelle (Citadel). Unlike
1941 and 1942, the Germans’ objective in 1943 was not to
knock the Soviet Union out of the war. Instead, they wanted
to achieve an operational victory, the destruction of the sa-
lient itself. By keeping the offensive limited, the Germans
would ensure they wouldn’t overextend themselves as they
had the previous two years.
By destroying the Kursk salient, the Germans would at-
tain several goals. First, they would straighten their lines.
The salient gave the Soviets a position from which they
could launch a thrust deep into the German rear both north
and south, possibly splitting the front in two. A shorter front
would require fewer troops to hold. Second, the Germans
wanted to draw in and destroy the Soviet armored reserves,
making it impossible for them to launch an offensive later
in the year. The Germans believed their new heavy tanks
and assault guns would give them the edge, and they would
also concentrate the Luftwaffe to ensure air superiority over
the attack sector. The geometry of the salient itself also ap-
peared to give then an advantage; its exposed position made
it vulnerable to a double envelopment launched against its
northern and southern flanks.
Finally, Hitler also hoped to gain a major victory he
could then exploit for political and psychological purposes.
A victory at Kursk would restore the myth of the invincible
German armed forces. It would make up for the psychologi-
cal blows received at Stalingrad and Tunisia and reassure
Hitler’s shaky allies.
House to house: Red Army troops advance
14 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 14
Much seemed to be in the Germans’ favor as the date for
the offensive approached. The objectives were all well with-
in range of their supply system. There would be no messy
autumn or winter weather to slow things. The Wehrmacht
wouldn’t be plunging deep beyond the existing front to new
locales where they could be cut off. More, the Kursk offen-
sive was to be fought to gain a purely military victory. The
Germans weren’t seeking any economic objectives, mean-
ing they would not be sidetracked into chasing after far off
industrial areas.
The Germans launched the Kursk offensive on 4 July
1943. The northern pincer was under Gen. Model’s 9th Army.
The southern pincer was under Gen. Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army,
backed up by Army Detachment Kempf. Both wings made
slow progress, fighting against a tenacious Soviet defense.
The 4th Panzer Army seemingly broke through in the south,
but was then fought to exhaustion.
On 13 July, Hitler ordered the offensive halted and the
units to withdraw. The reason, probably, ws that the panzers
were not making the planned gains. Manstein and others op-
posed the decision, claiming that if only they could be al-
lowed time to push a little farther they could complete the
destruction of the Soviet armor reserve. Manstein was, no
doubt, being over-optimistic, since the Germans had taken
heavy losses in the course of Zitadelle and the Red Army
still had considerable reserves behind the salient.
Soviet historians claim, with considerable justification,
the real reason for the withdrawal was the Soviet defense
and counterattack had stopped Zitadelle. Whatever the rea-
son, the Germans had lost more men and equipment than
they had bargained for. The Germans saw the Kursk offen-
sive as a reasonable choice. Unfortunately for Hitler, the
Wehrmacht couldn’t win the war with reasonable measures.
Kursk therefore represented a reversal of the German strat-
egy of the indirect approach. At Kursk the Germans made a
head on assault. The end result was attrition of the panzers,
stalemate and a massive Soviet counteroffensive.
The Soviet 1943 summer offensive followed Kursk. It
then continued into the autumn and winter, giving the So-
viets the initiative in the east. They would never again sur-
render it. The Soviets had learned much by that stage in the
war, demonstrating they could conduct large-scale mobile
operations. The Germans had come to be fighting an enemy
who was coming close to their own operational capabilities.
through Stalingrad.
5/14/08 1:15:58 PM
 Turning Tides
Even as the Germans were fighting their way into the
enemy defenses at Kursk, the Soviets launched their own
summer offensive, starting with an attack on the Orel sa-
lient, north of Kursk, on 11 July. The Germans pulled their
9th Army out of the Kursk offensive in order to assist the
2nd Panzer Army’s defense of the newly active sector. To
the south, Soviet pressure caused Manstein, in command
of Army Group South, to request permission to fall back to
the Dneper. Hitler refused. He had just recently allowed a
withdrawal from the Orel salient, but the Ukraine was much
more valuable to the Reich’s war economy and couldn’t be
abandoned.
The Soviets kept up the pressure throughout August.
Finally, Hitler allowed Army Group South to withdraw
to the Dneper. The Red Army followed close behind, and
hard fighting continued as both sides attempted to maintain
bridgeheads on opposite banks of the river. The Soviets
wanted bridgeheads to gain access farther west; the Germans
wanted them as bases for future counterattacks to the east.
Army Group Center also fell back, reestablishing a front at
the Panther Line, a hastily constructed fortified position west
of Smolensk.
As autumn turned into winter, the Soviets kept attacking,
and by the time the ground froze in December, the Soviets
again increased the pressure. As 1944 opened, they finally
broke through on the Leningrad front, forcing back Army
Group North.
The Germans hoped the spring thaw would bring relief,
but the Soviets kept on rolling. Their tanks and trucks were
better suited to the ground conditions than were the German.
The 1st Panzer Army was cut off in the Ukraine, but man-
aged to fight its way back to friendly lines. By April 1944
the Soviets had cleared the Ukraine and the front finally
settled down. Hitler relieved Manstein, blaming him for the
reverses in southern Russia. Manstein in turn blamed Hit-
ler for a lack of reinforcements. And with the German high
command bickering, the Red Army would launch its greatest
offensive.

World at War 15

WaW-1-Issue.indd 15 5/14/08 1:16:00 PM

 The Course of the Campaign: 1944-45—
Bagration to Berlin

On 22 June 1944 the Soviets launched one of the greatest of-

fensives of the war, Operation Bagration. Their target was Army
Group Center’s position, a large bulge running east and north of
the Pripet Marshes. Bagration was a surprise to the German high
command. Soviet deception operations had convinced them the
main Soviet thrust would be in the south, against Hitler’s allies
in the Balkans, and the Rumanian and Hungarian oilfields. Con-
sequently, German reserves were deployed elsewhere when the
Soviets struck.
The Soviets demonstrated the leadership and skill necessary to
fight a mobile campaign in depth. They concentrated overwhelm-
ing force—artillery, armor and air—at the main points of their at-
tack, breaking through with much carnage. The offensive didn’t
stop after the initial breakthrough. Soviet forces kept going until
they had cleared the Germans from Belorussia. They enveloped
German forces at three strongpoints: Vitebsk, Bobruysk and near
Minsk. Hitler’s orders to stand fast hobbled the German forces
there. Soviet mechanized forces bypassed centers of resistance,
and succeeding waves of infantry eventually overwhelmed the
strongpoints.
By 11 July, Army Group Center had lost 28 divisions. That was
more units than had been destroyed at Stalingrad, and the Soviet
offensive was still rolling westward. Wehrmacht reinforcements
were frantically rushed to the front, but the Germans found they
couldn’t maneuver due to fuel shortages. The Soviets made ex-
tensive use of their airpower and partisans to attack deep into the
German rear.
The Soviets pressed on throughout the remainder of July, and
by the end of the month Soviet spearheads had reached the Baltic
coast near Riga. Meanwhile the Soviets launched another offen-
sive, this time on the Leningrad front. With its lines of communi-
cation already threatened by Bagration to the south, Army Group
North could only fall back.

trate defensive strength at threatened sectors. The real

advantage of the Soviets, though, wasn’t so much from
a superiority in numbers, but in the types of units needed
to fight particular types of battles. The numerous Soviet
artillery divisions allowed them to concentrate their of-
fensive firepower when the time came to go over to the
attack.
At Kursk the Germans underestimated their enemy.
They believed the Soviets wouldn’t be ready to launch a
major offensive until the winter. In actuality, the Soviets
were ready for the offensive at about the same time as the
Germans. Kursk was a battle of attrition, but attritional
warfare was the antithesis of mobile panzer operations.
Kursk signaled the Soviets were capable of fighting the
Germans head to head. Much of that was due to the expe-
rience they had gained in the previous two years of war.
The Kursk operation also played into Soviet command
control capabilities. Once the Germans had committed
themselves to attacking the flanks of the salient, it was
obvious where the panzers would head. Accordingly, the
Soviet high command could respond to German moves in
War traction: Soviet factory producing T-34 tanks.
a timely way. As the Germans advanced, reinforcements
16 #1

WaW-1-Issue.indd 16 5/14/08 1:16:02 PM

 The Soviets also went over to the offensive in the Ukraine,
driving into south Poland. Axis strongpoints along the Black
Sea coast were cut off and destroyed. The drive continued into
the Balkans in August and September. Rumania and Bulgaria
defected from the Axis and joined the Allies.
By the opening of autumn, the Soviet leviathan began to
slow down. Casualties, German counterattacks, and overex-
tended Red Army lines of communication had all taken their
toll. A Soviet drive into Hungary was repulsed. At that time,
Adm. Horthy, the Hungarian chief of state, declared his readi-
ness for an armistice. Such a move would have left a glaring
hole in the German line, and would probably have meant the
German divisions still fighting in the Balkans would be cut off.
Hitler sent in Otto Skorzeny to troubleshoot. In a Budapest pal-
ace coup, Skorzeny placed Horthy under house arrest, and then
set up a new government loyal to the Axis. That salvaged the
Balkan front, at least for a couple more months.
The Soviets decided to clean up the Baltic in October. Gud-
erian, by that time OKH chief of staff, wanted to pull back
Army Group North before it was completely cut off. Hitler re-
fused until it was too late. Army Group North then ended up
clinging to the Courland peninsula in Latvia until the end of
the war. Back in the Balkans, the Soviets reached the Danube
in late November and, by the end of the year, had also encircled
Budapest. On 13 February 1945 the Hungarian capital fell, fol-
lowed by Vienna on 15 April.
The Soviets began their final drive on Berlin, reaching the
Reich’s capital on 22 April 1945. By that time, the war was
effectively over. The Western Allied armies had breached the
Rhine. Still, Soviet manpower shortages were telling, with Sta-
lin scraping the bottom of the Soviet manpower pool. Quite possibly, the Red Army’s Berlin offensive was the last major of-
fensive they could have conducted during the war. But conduct it they did, and on 2 May, after fierce fighting, Berlin fell. Two
days earlier Hitler had committed suicide in his bunker.

could be fed into threatened sectors.
When it came time for the Soviets to go over to the
offensive, the Red Army was prepared. It had orga-
nized independent tank armies (essentially reinforced
armored corps), which were used as strategic-level
units, to be concentrated for major offensives. At the
same time, the Wehrmacht ended up employing its
mobile units simply to try to hold the line.
German organization in mid-war degraded their
own mobility. At the start of Barbarossa, the panzer
groups had been composed of panzer and motorized
divisions. Starting in late 1941, they were reorganized
as full-blown panzer armies. While that upgrading of
status gave them additional resources, it also created a
shortfall. As armies, they were responsible for holding
entire sectors of the front; previously, the higher pan-
zer formations were considered independent maneu-
ver formations. The panzer armies acquired numerous
foot-mobile infantry divisions that couldn’t keep up
with the mechanized units. As the German Army be-
came strung out over the steppes, then, its ability to
concentrate combat power diminished.
Regardless of overall numbers, the Soviets could at-
tain local superiority. It wasn’t so much that the Weh-
rmacht lacked the divisions to counter the Red Army,
it was that the Red Army could concentrate its mobile
forces at critical points in the line, and back them up with
massed artillery formations. Soviet operational break-
throughs forced the Germans to pull back their units or
be destroyed in envelopments, thus unhinging the entire
front. It was a vicious cycle from which the Wehrmacht
could never escape.
As 1944 opened, the Germans found themselves on
the defensive in the East, and that defense was failing.
They lacked operational reserves to reinforce threatened
sectors of the front. The reinforcements available usu-
ally consisted of only a few units rushed in from other
fronts, or battlegroups reconstituted locally from recent-
ly destroyed divisions. And the units on the front were
stretched thin. During the Soviet summer offensive of
1944 (Operation Bagration), Army Group Center had 45
divisions to hold a front of over 610 miles. Divisional
frontages were therefore stretched up to 15 miles, more
than three times the doctrinal standard for defensive op-
World at War 17

WaW-1-Issue.indd 17 5/14/08 1:16:04 PM

 erations. In addition, Army Group Center had virtually
no central reserves. Most of the army group’s panzer and
motorized divisions were deployed along, or close to,
the front.
Given the nature of mobile warfare, the Germans
couldn’t win by defeating the Soviets up front; however,
they also lacked the reserves to fight a battle in their own
rear area. Once the Soviets broke through, the entire Ger-
man line therefore became unhinged. The Germans were
in no position to defend against the type of mechanized
warfare they had pioneered a few years earlier.
Endgame
Operation Barbarossa was supposed to have been the
harbinger of the new German order in Europe. Instead,
it unleashed the forces that in the end brought down the
Third Reich. The central lesson to be learned is that Hit-
ler’s ambitions were totally out of line with the military
and industrial capacities behind running a modern war.
The quick victories of 1939-40 created the illusion the
Wehrmacht could accomplish anything. But where the
blitzkrieg broke down was in the long run. Military vic-
tories had to be translated into the capitulation of the en-
emy but the nature of the war in the east precluded that.
Added to that was the fact German doctrine failed to
adapt to the changing nature of the war. Once the formu-
las of 1939-40 proved ineffective, the Germans could at
best improvise. But the Wehrmacht’s ad hoc solutions
could not compete with the well developed Red Army
operational art of 1943-45. The Germans effectively lost
the war in 1941; it just took four more years of fierce
fighting to bring home that fact to Berlin.
at
Power projection: German multi-tube rocket launcher.
18 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 18
Push To the East
The Nazis had grandiose plans for Europe. Hitler’s ob-
jective in the Soviet Union was nothing as petty as shift-
ing the continental balance of power, or merely destroying
Bolshevism. The Fuehrer wanted to turn the Eurasian land
mass, from the Polish frontier to the Urals, into a giant Ger-
man colony. The peoples of those lands were to be either dis-
placed, exterminated or subjugated to provide serf-like labor
for German colonists. With the Russian mineral resources,
grainfields and steppes at its disposal, the Third Reich could
establish the economic and geopolitical foundations for a
new millennia of German domination of Europe.
Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler also got into the act. His
plan was to settle the east with Germanic warrior-peasants.
They would establish strongpoint-settlements to guard and
develop the Nazi conquests. His SS was also to do much
of the dirty work in clamping down on the local populace,
though Germanic peoples already in place could stay on as a
subsidiary elite.
After Barbarossa was launched on 22 June 1941, the Na-
zis began implementing those policies. Conquered territo-
ries were incorporated into two great Reichscommissariats,
Ostland and Ukraine. They were placed under Nazi Party
bigwigs for economic exploitation, backed up by Himmler’s
political police apparatus and the usual atrocities.
In the event, the Reich’s plans for the east proved a dis-
mal failure. For one thing, there was little interest among
most Germans in moving into the newly conquered territo-
ries, since it meant giving up the relative comfort of home
for the dangers and uncertainties of colonial life in a war
zone. For another, Nazi extermination campaigns against
Soviet commissars, Jews and intelligentsia destroyed the
very cadres who ran the economy of the conquered lands.
And the Nazi Party hacks were not up to the job. The situa-
tion got so bad even some higher ranking Nazis objected to
the mismanagement.
Adding to the economic confusion was Stalin’s trans-
planting of much of the factory equipment located in regions
the Germans would overrun to safety in the Urals and Sibe-
ria. Small wonder that, even with the most ruthless exploi-
tation, the Nazi occupation of the western USSR provided
only a fraction of its prewar production to the Reich.
The irony was Hitler’s new frontier went the other way.
The Nazis had to import foreign laborers into Germany itself
in order to expand industrial output. That, in turn, required
the expansion of the security apparatus to keep the home-
front under control. And the endless battles in the east quick-
ly ate up any surplus German war production. Barbarossa,
far from turning the east into a German colony, proved to be
the undoing of Hitler’s vision for a new Europe.
5/14/08 1:16:05 PM
 German officers confer somewhere on the endless steppe.

World at War 19

WaW-1-Issue.indd 19 5/14/08 1:16:10 PM

 Blitz Across the Russian Steppes!
Barbarossa:
The Russo-German War, 1941-45
Barbarossa is a two-player, low-to-intermediate com-
plexity, strategic-level simulation of the entire Russo-Ger-
man War designed by Ty Bomba. The game was originally
designed and published by James F. Dunnigan back in 1969.
This new edition is an extensive redesign.
The German player begins on the offensive, attempting
to win the game by seizing key areas on the map. The Soviet
player is at first primarily on the defensive, but the situation
requires he halt his opponent’s push to the east and then, in
turn, launch a series of counter-offensives that will eventu-
ally move the Red Army to Berlin and the heart of Europe.
The game may end sooner than the historic termination time
if the German player is able to do significantly better than
his historic counterparts. Likewise, if the Soviet player is
able to carry out his strategic comeback more efficiently
than did his historic counterparts, the game may again ter-
minate earlier than it did historically.
Each hexagon on the map represents 55 miles (90 kilo-
meters) from side to opposite side. The large-hex map cov-
ers from Berlin and Yugoslavia in the west to Leningrad in
To purchase the game that covers the campaigns
analyzed in this issue’s cover story, send your name
and address along with: All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
$24 US Customers
CA residents add $1.09 sales tax. Send to:
$27 Canadian Customers
$29 Overseas Customers
20 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 20
the north, Maikop in the southeast, and Gorki in the north-
east. Expeditions may be launched into the Caucasus.
The primary units of maneuver for the German side are
corps, while for the Soviets they’re armies. The orders of
battle have been extensively researched to ensure they’re
the most accurate ever presented for a game of this scale.
The counter-mix includes all 25 of the German Korpsgrup-
pen, which were unheralded formations crucial to that side’s
overall war effort during 1944-45. Beyond that, there are
also counters for: Army Detachments Hollidt, Fretter-Pico
and Lanz/Kempf; Provisional Panzer Corps Raus, the Kerch
Straits Command, and Group Mieth. On the Soviet side
there’s a full corps-and-army OB, along with all the Guards
and Guards Tank armies, as well as “Mechanized Group Pop-
ov,” the single most elite Red Army formation ever to take
the field during the war. There are 280 half-inch, NATO-style
counters.
Each full game turn represents one or two months, de-
pending on the time of year. Two experienced gamers can
count on finishing the entire game in no more than 10 hours.
Decision Games
ATTN: World at War Game Offer
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
5/14/08 1:16:12 PM
 On the Seas
Japan’s Escort Convoys
By early 1944 the US Navy’s
submarine campaign against Japanese
merchant shipping was taking a fear-
some toll. In response, the Japanese
Navy created eight escort convoys
in April. They were designated 1st
Escort Convoy, 2nd Escort Convoy,
etc., and were temporary collections
of ships assigned to protect convoys.
They were commanded by admirals
who’d been passed over for promo-
tion, retired, and then brought back on
active duty. They mostly came from
staff jobs.
The vessels they commanded
were mainly corvette class “escorts”
(Kaibokan), from 740 tons making
16.5 knots to 970 tons and 30.5 knots.
Minesweepers, minelayers, sub-chas-
ers and the occasional destroyer were
also included. They also assigned
four escort carriers, converted from
merchant ships, for critical convoys,
but those vessels proved ineffective at
killing submarines. In fact, each one
fell prey to the very submarines they
were supposed to be hunting.
On 3 May 1944, Rear Adm. Mat-
suji Ijuin and his 1st Escort Convoy
steamed out of Moji, Kyushu, bound
for Singapore with Convoy HI-61.
His command included the escort car-
rier Taiyo, and reached Singapore on
the 19th . Ijuin then headed north with
Convoy HI-62. His time in command
of that group of ships was to be short.
The USS Raton torpedoed his flag-
ship, the 870 ton, 19.75 knot, Type
A escort Iki, killing the admiral. Yet
Ijuin hadn’t been a slouch. He was a
real fighting sailor who had earlier
commanded two cruisers and a battle-
ship. While commanding Destroyer
Squadron 3, he fought three gun and
torpedo actions and survived the sink-
ing of what was then his flagship, the
light cruiser Sendai.
Some of the other escort convoy
admirals were also experienced, but
their navy’s anti-submarine doctrine
and tactics proved inadequate to
the task. Escort crews were poorly
trained, and escort vessels were often
slower than the submarines they
were to chase. Air cover was spotty,
WaW-1-Issue.indd 21
communications rudimentary, and
Japanese radar and sonar technologi-
cally outdated.
The learning curve for escort
convoy commanders was therefore
steep. Rear Adm. Tei Monzen reached
flag rank in May, took command of
3rd Escort Convoy on 1 June, and
led a convoy toward Saipan. Nine
days later, he was killed aboard the
destroyer Matsukaze when she was
torpedoed.
Rear Adm. Ichimatsu Takahashi
commanded 2nd Escort Convoy, where
he was fated to fly his admiral’s
flag for less than a month. He’d just
delivered a convoy to Chichi-jima, in
the Bonin Islands, and had departed
for home when, on 4 August, he
lost seven merchant ships within his
convoy, his brand new flagship the
destroyer escort Matsu, and his own
life.
Rear Adm. Mitsuhara Matsuyama
had commanded a cruiser division
early in the war at Guadalcanal,
where he contributed to the stun-
ning Japanese victory off Savo Island
in August 1942. Later he survived
the sinking of his flagship, the light
cruiser Tenryu. He later failed promo-
tion to vice admiral and was retired
but was then soon remobilized. In
April the navy gave him 7th Escort
Convoy, and he soon led an 18 ship,
12 escort, convoy into Saipan without
loss, a laudable tactical success.
Back in Japan, Matsuyama orga-
nized Convoy HI-65, which included
the light cruiser Kashii (modified as
an anti-submarine vessel), and the
escort carrier Shinyo. Other craft
included sister ships Chiburi and
Awaji, both 940 ton, 19.5 knot, Type
B escorts. His newest escort was
the 745 ton, 16.5 knot, Type C No.
19, commissioned less than a month
earlier. He also had the slow, 11 knot,
130 ton, Subchaser 60 and the 450
ton, 19 knot, minelayer Tsubame. He
departed Moji on 29 May with the
Singapore bound, 10 ship, HI-65. The
voyage was quiet except for the loss
of the Awaji to a submarine attack.
He safely returned to Japan with
the fast northbound Convoy HI-66.
For that trip he deployed five escorts,
including the escort carrier Kaiyo, to
shepherd just four merchantmen. He
headed south again in August with
the 13 ship HI-73. His seven escorts
included the escort carrier Unyo.
Rear Adm. Tsutomu Sato was
another officer the navy retired and
recalled after failing promotion. He
had commanded a squadron of sub-
marines and had been serving afloat
at the start of the war. Since then he’d
served ashore. Sato received com-
mand of 8th Escort Convoy in April,
and he served the longest stint of any
commander of an escort convoy: just
under nine months.
His greatest effort occurred in
July, with southbound Convoy HI-69,
14 merchantmen and three escort
carriers. Two of the carriers sailed
as aircraft ferries while only one, the
Shinyo, served in an anti-submarine
role. Sato had five other escorts, the
light cruiser Kashii, Type A escort
Sado, Type B Chiburi, and Type C
No. 7 and No. 17. The navy was never
keen on assigning destroyers to con-
voys, and here is a perfect example
of an important convoy operating
without a single destroyer. As a result,
five escorts covered 14 merchant
ships and three aircraft carriers. US
submarines attacked the convoy and
damaged one merchantman and escort
No. 17, which was an amazingly light
toll for a trip to Singapore.
Rear Adm. Sadamichi Kajioka
and his 6th Escort Convoy experienced
three bad trips. He was yet another
officer who’d missed promotion. The
navy retired him in October 1943, but
brought him back in January 1944 to
World at War 21
5/14/08 1:16:12 PM

put him in command of the 6 . He
th
lost four troopships in April and May
while escorting a convoy carrying
two infantry divisions toward New
Guinea. The loss of life on Yoshida
Maru was staggering: an entire in-
fantry regiment drowned. Aden Maru
took another 700 to their deaths when
she went down.
Kajioka next led Convoy HI-71
out of Japan on 8 August. He had 11
merchantmen, an escort carrier in an
anti-submarine role, two destroyers,
Type A escort Hirato (flagship), Type
Bs Kurahashi, Mikura and Shonan,
and Type C No. 11. The escort
force grew at Formosa by one more
destroyer, three Type As and one
Type B. There was then more than
one escort for each freighter. Even
so, three submarines caught HI-71
off Luzon, sank four of the biggest
merchantmen and damaged or drove
ashore several more. Even worse, the
submarines sank the escort carrier
Taiyo.
Events got even uglier for Kajioka
and 6th Escort Convoy. He assembled
a new convoy at Singapore, HI-72: 10
freighters, one old destroyer, his own
Hirato (still his flagship), and four
smaller escorts. As he approached the
dreaded Luzon Strait, US submarines
sank the Hirato, killing Kajioka. They
also sank the convoy’s only destroyer
and four of the freighters. Torpedoes
damaged another two ships. Just four
of the 10 merchantmen reached port
undamaged.
On 11 September, Rear Adm.
Setsuzo Yoshitomi, with 5th Escort
Convoy, led Convoy HI-74 north
out of Singapore. He’d earlier failed
selection to vice admiral. The Navy
retired him, then brought him back.
He covered northbound HI-74’s four
oil-laden tankers and one transport
with the escort carrier Unyo, the light
cruiser Kashii, Type B escort Chiburi,
and Type C escorts Nos. 13, 19, 21,
and 27. US submarines damaged one
tanker, sank a second, and then also
sank the Unyo.
On southbound HI-79 in late
October, Yoshitomi’s eight empty
tankers and six escorts made the trip
without loss. His return with Convoy
22 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 22
HI-80 illustrates an interesting point.
New 1,262 ton, 27.75 knot, Matsu-
class destroyer escorts were starting
to come off the ways. They would’ve
been valuable additions to convoy
escort duty, but destroyer losses had
been so heavy the navy almost always
tasked the new Matsus to operate with
what remained of the fleet. The Mat-
sus also escorted high-speed warships
making logistics runs. Convoys such
as HI-79 steamed along with just the
small Kaibokan.
In late October, Adm. Matsuyama
and his 7th Escort Convoy successfully
transported the 11,000-man 1st Infan-
try Division from Shanghai to Manila.
He, his escorts, and the division then
steamed south toward Leyte. Their
luck held: typhoon weather concealed
his four big transports. Only one was
lost to air attack, and that was after
unloading.
Success, though, only meant Mat-
suyama and 7th Escort Convoy had to
do it all over again a week later. That
time three transports carried the 26th
Infantry Division. Because Mat-
suyama had only four small escorts,
the navy added six destroyers as a
screen. Even so, this time there was a
bigger price to pay. US Army aircraft
sank two of the three transports and
severely damaged Matsuyama’s flag-
ship, the Three-month-old Type B,
940 ton Okinawa.
Taken altogether then, Japan’s
escort convoys proved a patchwork.
The navy high command appreci-
ated too late the need for specialized
anti-submarine training on a large
scale. They’d built their navy to fight
the “one decisive battle” called for
by their official doctrine. Convoy
doctrine, tactics and equipment were
not of significance. By 1944 then,
when the Japanese tried to address
the problem, there was little they
could do with the resources they had
remaining. The Japanese nation had
enough men and an industrial base
capable of fighting a short war against
a power like the United States. Escort
convoys, like banzai charges and ka-
mikaze aircraft, were stopgap efforts
that could only delay the inevitable.
~John W. Whitman
On the Home Front
New Orleans &
LaGarde Hospital in
World War II
Sixty years ago, along the shore of
Lake Pontchartrain in New Orleans,
the area was filled with US military
bases, wartime industries, POW
camps for captured Germans, facili-
ties for the famous Higgins landing
boats, a factory that built PBY flying
boats, a military airport, a Navy hos-
pital, and a distinguished Army hos-
pital, LaGarde General. That facility
was responsible for saving the lives
of many US soldiers during the war
years. Today, however, the hospital
and all those other military installa-
tions are gone. Long before the flood
waters of Katrina wiped out most of
the area, those facilities from World
War II had already been eliminated by
developers and real estate agents in
the 1950s.
During World War II, New Or-
leans became a beehive of activity for
war industry, military installations,
and vital shipping, mainly because
of the importance of the port on
the Mississippi River. In the center
of town was the famous Higgins
plant, which built landing craft and
PT-boats. Across town, on the north
side, was the shoreline along Lake
Pontchartrain. On its west end there
was a Coast Guard station, east was
LaGarde Army Hospital, with a Navy
hospital across the street. Across
Bayou St. Jean was another Coast
Guard station, the US Maritime Com-
mission, a Naval Reserve Aviation
Base, and an aircraft carrier training
center. Continuing eastward, there
was a Navy assembly plant and a fac-
tory for Consolidated Vultee Aircraft
Company, which made PBY flying
boats. Those amphibious aircraft were
tested on the lakefront before being
sent out to duty.
Next to the PBY plant was a camp
that housed captured German soldiers.
An Army bombing squadron was next
to that, in a base called Camp Leroy
Johnson. Then there was a National
Guard seaplane hangar, and finally a
small airport called Shushan, which
the military leased all during the war.
5/14/08 1:16:13 PM
 The entire militarized area stretched
about 10 miles.
LaGarde Hospital was on the
extreme west end of all those bases.
Much of what we know about that
hospital today is sketchy, but insight
can be found by reviewing some
of the headlines in the issues of its
weekly newsletter, The LaGarde
Sentinel. Those articles show what
interested the editors back then and
what recovering soldiers wanted to
read. For example, one headline read:
“Rail Travel Totals Over A Million
Trips.” It told of a report from the
War Department discussing the
movement of some 510,000 wounded
and sick military men during 1942-
45. Another was: “1,060,727 Total
US Casualties,” which reported on
the total damage done to Army and
In the distance is LaGarde Hostpital, 1941.
Navy personnel. In “Vets in Business
to Get First Call When Surplus War
than a century old, and such geo- wire services about the A-bomb.
Goods Go On Sale,” a page one story,
graphic differences still mattered a Other parts of the newsletter had
explained that for the first 18 days
lot.) Another sports article discussed a items unique to the wartime situation,
after a surplus item went on sale only
physical reconditioning instructor and such as a one-liner that admonished:
servicemen had the right to it. Such
his participation in an archery contest. “Keep phone conversations short.”
reserved items included Jeeps, which
could only be bought if the service- One lead story was about baseball. No doubt there was high demand by
man was in farming or ran a business. It reveled in the LaGarde team’s patients to call family and friends.
recent 3-1 victory over the team from Another section, called “Patient
Other items dealt with life at the
the Naval Air Station. It also reported Patter,” described a “coming out par-
hospital and the other nearby bases.
on the next big game against their ty” held by nurses for three patients
For example, there was a story about
arch rivals: the Naval Hospital across who were finally being removed from
awards given to civilian and military
the street. traction. The party was celebrated
personnel for ideas they’d put in the
hospital’s suggestion box. One soldier Lower on the sports page there with a cake. Each newly upright
received a 15-day furlough and a was detailed a softball game for patient, in a wheelchair, cut himself
letter of commendation for his sug- female personnel, the LaGarde WACs a big slice, it was reported, complete
gestion, while a civilian won a $5.00 versus the Keesler Airfield Lady with ice cream and chocolate syrup.
award (equivalent to roughly $125.00 Commandos. The LaGarde team, also A local pianist and vocalist provided
in today’s dollars). called the Lady Lions, had won 2-0, it musical entertainment. The article
was reported. There were also articles summarized: “The patients want
In the newsletter’s “Chaplain’s
about swimming and sports trivia to express their appreciation to the
Corner” column was the schedule
quizzes. nurses for the swell party.”
for all religious services held. Such
serviceswere held frequently for One of the more out of character One of the most moving depart-
Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths. stories in the Sentinel was intended ments in the newsletter was titled:
to explain to the patients and staff the “Was He In Your Outfit?” It presented
Fully a quarter of the newsletter
mysterious new technological weapon a long list of soldiers’ names, ranks
was devoted to sports reporting. For
the US had recently used against and units. It was an attempt to help
example, there was an article about
Japan: the atomic bomb. The headline locate those men. The text read:
the tennis team, the LaGarde Lion
read: “The Atomic Bomb: Latest “To help you locate any buddies
Netmen, who’d lost their recent
Discovery In the Deadly History of you might have in the hospital, the
match because most of their good
Armaments.” The story even had a Sentinel will carry a weekly list of
players had gotten furloughs and
graphic, reproduced from the New men admitted to LaGarde.” It advised
quickly left camp. The newsletter
York Times, showing one atom bomb patients who wanted to request to be
notes most of those furloughed men
and comparing it to the power of included on the list again to do so in
went to “Yankeeland,” meaning they
20,000 tons of TNT. The same issue writing.
went North. (The Civil War was less
also carried stories taken from various ~ Adrian N. McGrath
World at War 23

WaW-1-Issue.indd 23 5/21/08 4:00:44 PM

 Behind the Lines
The US State Depart-
ment in World War II
 
During World War II the US State
Department, through channeling of
telephone, telegraph and radio com-
munications, as well as the outright
control of ship bunker fuel and stores,
fought an economic war in order to
deny Germany material with which
to fight. Diplomatic measures were
also undertaken in order to stop goods
flowing from neutral countries to the
Germans.
Prior to US entry into the war,
the Federal government had only a
poor idea of the trading carried on
by neutral countries. The prevailing
philosophy at the pre-war foreign
office was typified by its head, Col.
Stimson, who stated: “Gentlemen do
not read other gentlemen’s mail.”
Knowing what a country had for
sale, and its trading patterns, was
complex information not easily come
by; however, Cordell Hull, head of
the State Department, put together a
new system of classification. What
constituted “war material” was
defined, and “freezing orders” could
be obtained that worked to stop trade
in particular commodities by tying
up all assets of countries trading in
the forbidden merchandise. Sweden,
Switzerland, Spain and Portugal were
the main culprits regarding trade with
Germany.
There were also practicali-
ties—not just legalities—involved.
For example, the US overlooked
Sweden’s selling industrial diamonds
to Germany (which used that material
to build proximity fuses). That was
because Sweden was an escape route
for Allied airmen shot down over
Germany. The time needed to train
a pilot was critical, a thing money
couldn’t speed up. At the same time,
by international law, the Swedes were
required to detain Allied airmen who
came into her territory for the dura-
tion of the war but, in fact, they often
let them slip out aboard aircraft from
other neutral countries.
24 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 24
  Things came to a head, though,
in 1943 when the USAAF bombed
the Schweinfurt ball bearing factory.
The Swedish firm SKD replaced the
lost German production, even while
building a new factory in order to
be able to fill British orders. Amid
growing US public outrage, Sweden
agreed to refuse all further credit to
Germany, reduce exports and also
stop Axis arms shipments across her
territory. Erik Boreman, the Swed-
ish foreign office under-secretary,
officially complained the US State
Department didn’t understand his
country’s precarious position. In the
event, it wasn’t until April 1944 the
German transit route through Sweden
to Finland was fully closed.
  Switzerland proved more intrac-
table than Sweden. When the Allies
asked that nation to reduce its trade
with Germany, the Swiss government
seemingly agreed, but examination
of their business records showed that
trade with Germany was continu-
ing to expand, by 50 to 100 percent,
depending on the category.
In response to that finding, Swiss
Foreign Minister Charles Bruggmann
complained his country didn’t want to
be attacked by the Germans, which,
he said, it would be if it refused to
trade. He made that statement shortly
after the Normandy landings. A State
Department European affairs official
then remarked that, at that late stage
of the war he couldn’t see where Ger-
many would find the forces needed to
invade Switzerland. It wasn’t until 1
October 1944, then, that the Swiss put
a ban on all arms and military goods
sales to Germany. They didn’t fully
suspend trade until April 1945. In the
words of State Department official
Dean Acheson, the Swiss only “sur-
rendered one month ahead of Gen.
Jodl.”
  On the Iberian peninsula,
Hitler had made an agreement with
Generalissimo Franco at a meeting
in October 1940 regarding a joint
invasion of British-held Gibraltar.
The Spanish dictator wriggled out of
that agreement, as he was more afraid
of the Allies than he was of his ally.
Roosevelt had a hard time getting
Britain to agree on a joint embargo on
Spain, because Churchill was of the
opinion they could, through diplo-
macy, bring Franco actively into the
Allied camp. The US and Britain in
fact, came to completely agree on the
correct policy for Spain, but with Ger-
man attention eventually concentrated
north of the Mediterranean it became
a moot point.
  Portugal at the time was the main
supplier of wolfram to the world. That
iron ore was used in the manufacture
of plate armor. Doctor Salazar, the
Portuguese prime minister, suggested
giving all the belligerents, on both
sides, equal shares in the running
of the mines. The US then applied
pressure by withholding oil. When
the Portuguese complained, the State
Department would release a tanker or
two from US ports, hoping the small
amount sent would ensure none was
going on to Germany.
The overall approach of the US
State Department to neutrals and
their trade during the war was prob-
ably best summarized as “stick and
carrot.” Necessary items from the
US would be traded if war supplies
to Germany were interrupted. Those
refusing to comply were threatened
with trade sanctions and legal action
to be taken up after the end of hostili-
ties.
~Mike Haran
continued on page 41
5/21/08 4:02:43 PM
 A Drop Zone Too Far:
Operation MARKET GARDEN
By John D. Burtt
Allied units are in plain text; German units are in italics.
O
n the afternoon of 17 September 1944,
a fleet of 1,545 transport aircraft and
478 gliders swarmed above the occu-
pied Netherlands and dropped 20,000
Allied airborne troops behind German
lines. Their goal was to hold bridges over major ca-
nals and rivers and allow a British armored corps to
pass through to breach the Rhine River. Success would
open the way to the German industrial heartland of the
Ruhr and, according to Allied planners, end the war in
1944. But weather, poor plans, misread intelligence,
and especially an underestimation of the enemy, com-
bined to make Operation MARKET GARDEN a cost-
ly failure.
WaW-1-Issue.indd 25
Situation
On 1 September 1944, the mood in Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) was euphoric. Since the
D-Day landings on 6 June, Allied success had exceeded their
wildest expectations. Pre-invasion timetables had expected 12
allied divisions to reach the Seine River on D+90 (4 Septem-
ber). But by that date, 16 divisions had penetrated 150 miles
beyond the Seine, where planners hadn’t expected them to be
for almost a year after the invasion. During the breakout from
Normandy and the pursuit across France, the German armies
in the west had lost over 23,000 dead, 67,000 wounded, and
almost 200,000 missing or taken prisoner.
There were two caveats to the ecstatic atmosphere. The first
was logistics. Allied supply was still coming in through Nor-
mandy, far to the rear. The French railroad system, wrecked
during the pre-D-Day aerial campaign, was still being rebuilt.
Whole divisions were being deprived of trucks after landing,
so their integral transport could push towards the movement
of supplies. Both Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodge’s First Army and
Lt. Gen. George Patton’s Third Army weregetting only about
half of what they needed to continue operations. The Common-
wealth Armies, Lt. Gen. H. D. G. Crerar’s Canadian First and
Lt. Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey’s British Second, were in similar
World at War 25
5/14/08 1:16:15 PM
 straits. The situation was made worse by the fact the armies
were diverging: Patton’s Third was moving almost due east
toward Metz and Nancy, Hodges and Dempsey northeast to-
ward Aachen and Brussels, respectively, and Crerar is north
toward the channel ports.
The second caveat was Allied leadership. Prior to 1
September, the Allied ground commander was British Gen.
Bernard Montgomery, with Gen. Omar Bradley as his subor-
dinate. On 1 September, however, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower
took over as overall Allied ground commander, assigning
Montgomery to command of the 21st Army Group (Canadian
First and British Second) with Bradley, as his equal, now
commanding the two US armies in 12th Army Group. Mont-
gomery, despite being promoted to field marshal (essentially
outranking his superior Eisenhower), felt miffed to be losing
overall command of the campaign.
Both Brussels and Antwerp were captured intact on 4
September by Montgomery’s divisions, and the new field
marshal took that occasion to send Eisenhower his famous
“Full blooded thrust” letter, stating all logistic resources
should be given to a single major drive (under his command)
through the Ruhr, then onto Berlin, to bring the war in Eu-
rope to a victorious conclusion.
While Eisenhower agreed the Ruhr was a priority tar-
get, he also felt a single thrust, as envisioned by Montgom-
ery, would give the Germans a clear flank to attack as 21st
Army Group outpaced US forces to the south. He felt more
comfortable with a broader approach north and south of the
Ardennes Forest, aiming to target both the Ruhr and Saar
industrial regions. Indeed, the controversy over those two
strategies is still argued to this day.
Rigged for action: Paratrooper preparing for a drop.
26 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 26
While the Allied generals discussed the merits of vari-
ous strategies, Eisenhower had to deal with his own supe-
rior, Joint Chief of Staff commander Gen. George Marshall.
Marshall, as well as Army Air Force commander Gen. Hap
Arnold, had an issue with the Allied strategic reserve, the
First Allied Airborne Army. Created in mid August and com-
manded by former Ninth Air Force Commander Lt. Gen.
Lewis Brereton, the army consisted of the US 82nd, 101st
and (later) 17th Airborne Divisions and the British 1st and 6th
Airborne Divisions. Some 18 different plans had been gener-
ated for a mass airborne landing in France, but the ground
campaign moved too swiftly to actually implement any of
them. The airborne was a source of several highly trained
divisions, and keeping them in reserve meant they were be-
ing wasted. Marshall and Arnold pushed Eisenhower hard to
use that reserve.
Montgomery and Eisenhower met in person on 10 Sep-
tember to hash out their differences in strategies. In the
process of the discussion, Montgomery proposed a major
airborne operation, to be called MARKET GARDEN. The
operation would drop several airborne divisions into Hol-
land to capture bridges over the major waterways there and
allow the British Second Army to drive to and beyond the
Rhine River. Again, that would open the way to Germany’s
industrial heart, the Ruhr, then on to Berlin.
Eisenhower was torn. The priority for him was to deal
with the logistics situation and then put all his armies into
full motion forward. For that he needed Antwerp’s excellent
harbor, as well as every channel port he could open. While
the Allies had taken Antwerp, the Germans controlled the
sixty mile Scheldt Estuary that controlled sea access to the
city. The idea of MARKET GARDEN was attractive, how-
ever, since it took advantage of the apparent disorganization
of the German forces and could, if successful, outflank the
German defenses in the north. Ultimately, Eisenhower gave
control of First Airborne Army to Montgomery, after getting
assurance Antwerp would be opened.
The Plan
The overall goal of MARKET GARDEN was to use the
airborne to seize a 95-mile-long corridor that would allow
British armor to traverse the roads and bridges from the
Meuse-Escaut Canal to beyond Arnhem, reaching the Zuider
Zee. Success would attain multiple objectives: German Fif-
teenth Army and all other Wehrmacht forces in western Hol-
land would be cut off; the German defense of the West Wall
would be outflanked; and Allied forces would be positioned
for a drive to the Ruhr.
In order to achieve those goals, eight major waterways
had to be crossed:
• three major rivers—Maas, Waal, and the lower Rhine
(Nieder Rijn);
• two minor rivers—Dommel and Aa;
• three major canals—Wilhelmina, Willems, and Maas-
Waal.
Allied intelligence was dismissive of Wehrmacht forces
in the operational zone. They estimated only 20 German di-
visions remained in the west and that reserves in the Nether-
lands were limited to low category troops backed by only 50
to 100 tanks. Those forces were not expected to be capable
of major resistance.
5/14/08 1:16:15 PM
 World at War 27

WaW-1-Issue.indd 27 5/14/08 1:16:17 PM

 The primary combat organizations involved in the MAR-
KET (airborne) portion of the operation had the following
objectives.
• 101st Airborne Division (Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor),
consisting of the 501st, 502nd and 506th Parachute Regi-
ments, the 327th Glider Regiment secure a 15 mile stretch
of highway between Eindhoven and Veghel, capture the
Dommel crossing at Eindhoven, the Wilhelmina bridge
at Zon, the Dommel crossing at St Oedenrode, and the
Willems and Aa bridges at Veghel.
• 82nd Airborne Division (Brig. Gen. James Gavin), con-
sisting of the 504th, 505th, and 508th Parachute Regiments,
the 325th Glider Regiment and supporting engineers and
artillery: capture the Maas crossing at Grave, the Waal
bridge at Nijmegen and the Maas-Waal Canal crossings
in between. Also, defend the high ground to the east,
called the Groesbeek Ridge, against counterattacks out
of Germany.
• 1st British Airborne Division (Maj. Gen. Robert “Roy”
Urquhart), consisting of the 1st and 4th Parachute Bri-
gades, the 1st Airlanding Brigade, the 1st Polish Parachute
Brigade and supporting engineers and artillery: capture
the Arnhem bridges and the high ground north of Arn-
hem to control counterattacks.
The GARDEN (ground) portion of the operation was as-
signed to Lt. Gen. Sir Brian Horrocks’s XXX Corps,
consisting of the Guards Armored Division, the 43rd
(Wessex) Infantry Division, and the 50th (Northumber-
land) Division, which was reassigned to VIII Corps
shortly after MARKET GARDEN launched. Their goal
was to drive straight through to and across the Rhine in
60 hours.
Too Many Objectives
From the start, MARKET GARDEN had two sig-
nificant problems: the plan itself and the opposition it ex-
pected.
The operational plan was thrown together in a three day
period, with minimal time for such niceties as photo recon-
The objective: the bridge at Arnhem .
28 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 28
naissance, intelligence, or feedback from the units involved.
And the first serious deficiency resided in the airborne plan
itself. Though First Airborne Army commander Brereton de-
manded a “thunderclap surprise” air assault on the bridges,
he failed to give his airborne commanders the resources
needed to do that.
Maj. Gen. Paul Williams, commander of the US Army
Air Force (USAAF) IX Troop Carrier Command, demanded
a single airborne drop per day, which on the first day would
limit the troops dropped to about half total strength. He also
wanted to allow aircraft maintenance and pilot rest between
transport missions. Brereton concurred, despite knowing one
drop a day meant it would take four days to put four full divi-
sions on the ground. That forced his airborne commanders to
choose among the units of their divisions dropped initially,
and which ones would land in the follow-on drops.
Given the restrictions, Taylor chose to maximize his
infantry on the first drop, since his objectives were spread
over the 15 miles of his drop area. He reasoned artillery
dropped on day one would not be able to support everyone.
He planned to have his glider infantry come on the second
drop, followed by his artillery.
Gavin had a worse problem. His objectives included
both bridge capture and immediate flank defense. He put
his priority on the flank defense. His concern lay with the
24 square mile forest called the Reichswald that bordered
his drop zone. He thought if the enemy gained the top of
Groesbeek Ridge, just west of the Reichswald, they could
dominate the surrounding area, making Allied possession of
the bridges a moot point. Gavin was also apparently led to
believe there was a substantial enemy armor presence in the
Reichswald, making defense of the ridge all the more press-
ing. (Where that particular piece of intelligence came from,
no one knows.)
Adding to Gavin’s dilemma was the decision by the com-
mander of 1st British Airborne Corps and deputy commander
of the First Airborne Army, Lt. Gen. Frederick Browning, to
accompany the 82nd. Browning would bring his headquar-
ters staff to provide on -site command for the operation, thus
creating more necessity for Gavin to seal off the Reichswald.
With those concerns and requirements, Gavin chose to drop
his three parachute regiments, plus some of his artillery, on
the first day, followed by the rest of his artillery and finally
his glider infantry. Though he targeted the Graves bridge
over the Maas River for immediate capture with drops on
both sides, he declined to plan any major move on the Ni-
jmegen bridge over the Waal until his flank was secure.
Urquhart’s 1st Airborne was the recipient of the worst of
all the transport problems. Williams declined to plan drops
near Urquhart’s primary objective, the Nieder Rijn bridge
at Arnhem, citing extensive flak defenses and bad terrain.
Again Brereton did not overrule the decision—and neither
did anyone else. Thus, Urquhart’s troops were going to be
landed outside Oosterbeek, a full six miles from their objec-
tive. He would land with two only brigades, one of which
had to be tasked to protect the landing zone, while the other
marched to its objective. Follow-on drops would bring in the
third brigade of his division, the Polish brigade. So though
the 1st Airborne had the fewest operational objectives, it was
the farthest away from them and with the fewest infantry.
The ground force, Horrock’s XXX Corps, was given spe-
cific instructions from Montgomery: their assault had to be
“rapid, violent, without regard to what is happening on the
5/14/08 1:16:18 PM
 flanks.” Operational plans called for Second Army’s other
two corps to advance on either flank to allow Horrocks’
troops to simply smash straight through to the airborne
troops. The chief problem they had was the terrain and fact
they were going to use a single road. The US official history
described the route as follows:
Because of these waterways, the texture of the
soil, and innumerable ditches and dikes, a vehicular
column would be road-bound almost all the way from
Eindhoven to Arnhem. Though the cities of Eind-
hoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem were communications
centers, all with more than 100,000 population, only
one main highway passes through them…almost ev-
ery road is lined on either side with trees. The result
is… severe restriction of observation (pg 131).
The Enemy Gets a Say
The second major problem MARKET GARDEN faced
was the nature of the enemy. Far from collapsing the disaster
that occurred in France, the Germans were regrouping and
WaW-1-Issue.indd 29
preparing to fight. The loss of Antwerp got Hitler’s atten-
tion away from concurrent disasters on the Eastern Front,
and he moved quickly to shore up his crumbling Western
Front. Col. Gen. Kurt Student was given command of the
First Fallschirmjaeger (Airborne) Army with orders to de-
fend the Albert Canal leading into Holland. (There is irony
here, MARKET GARDEN would pit both Allied and Ger-
man “First Airborne Armies” against each other.)
At first nothing more than a paper army, Student’s forces
consisted on the veteran 6th Fallschirmjaeger Regiment un-
der Lt. Col. von der Heydte, plus five other new parachute
regiments. To that converging force, the 176th and 719th Divi-
sions were added, plus kampfgruppe (battlegroup) under the
commander of the mauled 85th Division, Lt. Gen. Kurt Chill,
who had gathered remnants of his and two other divisions
and posted them on the Albert line. Though still weak, by 7
September they were digging in, and by the 12th they were
actually counterattacking against Allied thrusts over the Ca-
nal.
Student was aided immeasurably by a major Allied mis-
World at War 29
5/14/08 1:16:19 PM
 take, Montgomery had halted his drive following Antwerp’s
capture while, among other things, he argued with Eisenhower.
The pause allowed the Germans to dig in deeper around the
Scheldt Estuary and to evacuate some 65,000 troops and 225
guns of the Fifteenth Army out of the trap that could have closed
around them. Those troops would make themselves felt during
MARKET GARDEN.
Meanwhile, Army Group B commander, Feldmarschall
Walther Model ordered the II SS Panzer Corps, consisting of
remnants of the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions and com-
manded by SS Gen. Wilhelm Bittrich, to move to the Arnhem
area for regrouping and rehabilitation. The savage battles in
France had left both of those divisions shells of their former
strength: 3-4,000 men surviving out of 18,000 and only a few
armored fighting vehicles (AFV) still operational. Model also
moved his headquarters to Oosterbeek to be nearer the front.
While the Germans had no forewarning about MARKET GAR-
DEN, that move would prove a surprise to the Allies when the
operation began. And Model himself was the right commander
on the spot. Sometimes known as the “Fuehrer’s Fireman,” he
had a reputation for salvaging otherwise impossible situations.
Allied intelligence prior to the onset of MARKET GAR-
DEN decrypted messages about the evacuation of Fifteenth
Army, the move of Model’s headquarters, and the 9th SS Panzer
Division’s relocation. Intelligence from the Dutch underground
confirmed the panzers’ arrival. The Allied commanders, how-
ever, disregarded the news as they were under the opinion the
divisions could either defend Holland or rest and refit, but not
both. In one extraordinary incident, Browning literally relieved
an intelligence officer of his duties after the officer showed him
photos of tanks in the area. Even Montgomery waved off warn-
ings given to him personally by Eisenhower’s chief of staff.
Worse, no one told the 1st Airborne Division about the panzers.
On the eve of MARKET GARDEN, then the Germans
had halted their retreat, had good commanders in the area, and
deployed battered but still potent forces—especially if facing
lightly armed airborne troops.
The defenders: German assault gun ready for action.
30 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 30
D-Day—Sunday, 17 September 1944
A total of 983 US and 435 British aircraft began prepa-
ratory bombings of enemy flak positions, airfields and bar-
racks complexes in Holland, both the night before and most
of Sunday morning. So far, so good: the heavy attack did
not alert the Germans a major operation was about to break
over their heads. The size of the intruding bomber force was
typical of the period, and the Germans were used to massive
Allied air raids.
Following the bombardment, some 1,500 transports and
nearly 500 gliders flew over in two waves. Heavily escorted
by fighters, the aerial armada met little resistance and, at ap-
proximately 2:00 p.m. Sunday afternoon, the skies over Hol-
land filled with parachutes. From there the story unfolded in
four parts.
101st Airborne
Taylor’s men landed in two areas. The 502nd and 506th
Regiments all dropped into a triangle between the Dutch vil-
lages of Best, Zon and St. Oedenrode, while the 501st dropped
in two parts on either side of Veghel. The 502nd would guard
the drop zone and go after the bridge at St Oedenrode, while
the 506th went after the bridge at Zon and prepared to march
south toward the town of Eindhoven. The 501st’s objectives
were the bridge over the Aa River and the Williems Canal
bridge. A little over 6,700 troops landed with less than two
percent casualties.
Within three hours of landing, the 501st secured the
bridges and the village of Eerde, then set up roadblocks. St.
Oedenrode and its bridges also fell easily, however, German
troops, reacting quickly, overran the northern drop zone,
capturing 46 paratroopers.
Farther south, the 506th Regiment ran into some prob-
lems as it cleared Zon. At the Wilhelmina Canal, a Ger-
man 88mm gun held back the paratroops and allowed the
Germans to blow up the bridge, virtually in the face of the
attacking Americans. The 506th crossed the Canal and took
positions south for the night, deciding to wait until the next
day to move on Eindhoven, their last objective.
The hardest fight Taylor’s men encountered was at the
village of Best, a secondary objective. Taylor had added it to
his list to provide an alternate crossing point if needed. The
single company assigned to take it, H/3/502, ran into a stout
German defense that was quickly reinforced by troops of the
59th Infantry Division.
82nd Airborne
Gen. Gavin’s division also dropped in two areas: the
505th and 508th east of the Mook-Groesbeek-Wyler roadway,
almost atop the Groesbeek Ridge. His third regiment, the
504th, dropped on both sides of the Graves Bridge. A total
of almost 7,300 paratroopers landed successfully, again with
only a two percent casualty rate.
The Graves bridge, attacked on both sides at once, fell
easily. The 504th’s other objectives were four bridges over
Maas-Waal Canal. They were able to capture one bridge at
Molenhoek, with help from the 505th Regiment attacking
from the other side. Two other bridges at Maiden and Hatert
were destroyed by their defenders. The fourth bridge at Ho-
inghutie was not attacked until the next day, when it too was
destroyed before the paratroops could capture it. A roadway
bridge next to the main bridge was damaged from the demo-
lition weakening it too much for use by XXX Corps.
5/14/08 1:16:21 PM
 World at War 31

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 While the 504th was busy trying to take bridges, the rest
of the 82nd was consolidating its area, sweeping the enemy
out of the villages of Mook, Beek and Groesbeek and prob-
ing toward the Reichswald. Among other things, they deter-
mined the intelligence they had on enemy armor there was
false.
At 6:00 p.m., the commander of the 508th Regiment, Col.
Lindquist, felt secure enough to send a battalion toward Ni-
jmegen. It was a major urban area that would give any de-
fenders an advantage. His 1st Battalion invested the southern
suburb of De Ploeg, and sent a single platoon to scout the
approach to the bridge. Two companies followed that night,
but arrived at the bridge at the same time as German rein-
forcements.
The bridges had initially been defended by a scratch
group, called Kampfgruppe Henke, after the commander of
the Fallschirmjaeger training school there. His forces in-
cluded five companies of trainees supported by 88mm and
20mm flak guns. As the two US paratroop companies con-
verged toward the bridge, reinforcements from 10th SS Pan-
zer Division arrived to bolster the defenders, with more on
the way. The American paratroopers were stopped cold. The
focus on the Groesbeek Ridge left the 82nd a bridge short of
its goals.
1st Airborne
As noted above, Urquhart’s British paratroops landed
six miles east of their objective. Their landing went well,
putting 5,700 troops on the ground with minimal casualties.
Among the missing, however, were most of the jeeps of the
division’s reconnaissance group, charged with driving to
Arnhem Bridge and taking it in a Coup de main. So Urquhart
had to do it on foot.
32 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 32
Leaving the 1st Air Landing Brigade to defend the land-
ing zone, he sent his other three battalions toward Arnhem
in three separate columns within two hours of landing. Lt.
Col. John Frost’s 2nd Battalion, traveling closest to the river,
made it into the city seven hours later with two of his three
companies. The third had detoured to take a railway bridge
enroute, only to see it blown up as they arrived. Frost’s men
took control of buildings covering the northern end of the
bridge. They tried twice to take the southern end, but both
attacks were repulsed.
While Frost worked his way into Arnhem toward the
bridge, the other two battalions were running into steadily
increasing opposition. They had the poor luck of running
into an SS training battalion on maneuvers in the woods just
to the east of the landing zone. Guessing the paratroops’ pri-
mary goal, SS Capt.Sepp Krafft had his troops cover the road
and fall back slowly, taking a toll on the advancing para-
troopers and delaying them. Near midnight, another German
kampfgruppe, under SS Lt. Col. Ludwig Spindler, arrived to
bolster the defenses. His group consisted of two companies
of armored artillery troops from 9th SS Panzer Division, plus
100 engineers.
Meanwhile, the landing zones had come under pres-
sure from another enemy force. Division Tettau, named for
Gen. Hans von Tettau (commander of German training in
the Netherlands), was a polyglot group of units rather than a
real division. Its primary fighting units were three battalions
from the SS NCO training school, bolstered by the Dutch
SS Surveillance Battalion and a naval detachment. Their ini-
tial foray toward the landing zones was repulsed with heavy
losses by 7th Battalion, Kings Own Scottish Borders, of the
1st Air Landing Brigade.
5/14/08 1:16:22 PM
 By the end of MARKET GARDEN’S first day, Urquhart’s
troops had managed to get about 500 men into Arnhem to
hold one end of the bridge, while the rest of his division
struggled against increasing enemy resistance.

XXX Corps
Horrocks’s armor hit the road an hour after the paratroops
dropped, following an intense preliminary bombardment.
Led by the Irish Guards armor group (2nd Armor Battalion
and 3rd Infantry Battalion, Irish Guards Regiment), Horrocks
didn’t expect much resistance. Intelligence estimated six
battalions of infantry and 20 anti-tank vehicles in front of
his corps. In fact, Kampfgruppe Walther, which barred the
way initially, deployed 10 battalions backed with 12 tank
destroyers. The Germans had set tank ambushes along the
road, facilitated by the terrain and treeline. The preliminary
bombardment took its toll on the defenders, but it was a hard
fight for Horrocks’s men to make it to Valkenswaard by the
end of the first day.
The Germans
One of the key reasons for the failure of the MARKET
GARDEN operation was the speed of the German reaction,
aided significantly by a major error on the part of the Allies.
The major error rested with a single unidentified Ameri-
can officer, killed in a glider crash. The officer carried with
him nearly complete plans for the whole MARKET portion
of the operation, which within hours were found and deliv-
ered to the desk of Student. Thereafter the Germans knew
what the Allies were trying to do, and so could plan accord-
ingly.
The air drop caught Model and his staff at lunch in Arn-
hem, and they quickly vacated the area to avoid falling into
enemy hands. Bittrich received initial reports about the para-
troop attack a half hour after the air drop had started. Within
10 minutes he had started issuing orders. The 9th SS Panzer
was to initially provide reconnaissance, then concentrate on
defending Arnhem and destroying the British paratroops.
The 10th SS was to head to Nijmegen to defend the bridges
there. Model joined Bittrich at 3:00 p.m., and while the SS
units prepared to move, orders for more units went out. Stu-
dent was put in charge of defeating the 101st Airborne. A full
panzer brigade was diverted from a planned move to Aachen
and given to him as reinforcement. Along with the 10th SS,
Model sent orders to the 406th Landeschuetzen Division, near
the Reichswald, to engage the 82nd Airborne, to be reinforced
by the II Fallschirmjaeger Corps.
D+l: Monday, 18 September 1944
101st Airborne
During the night the Germans threw several weak attacks
against the 501st troops defending Veghel, but they were eas-
ily handled.
At best, the secondary objective was fast becoming the
battle for the paratroops. Taylor reinforced his company with
2/502 and 3/502 battalions to seal off the Germans and take
the bridge. More troops from the German 59th Division ar-
rived and the battle raged through the day. The bridge itself,
however, was blown up at 11:00 a.m..
After halting for the night south of the blown bridge at
Zon, Taylor’s 506th Regiment continued to advance on Eind-
hoven and the bridges there. Though delayed by 88mm flak
guns and resistance from the single rear- echelon battalion
C-47 planes load for Holland.
defending it, the town and bridges were taken by mid-morn-
ing. At 12:30 p.m., armored cars arrived from XXX Corps,
but it was almost 7:00 p.m. when the Guards tanks arrived.
At mid-afternoon, Taylor’s first reinforcements arrived
in gliders, two battalions of the 327th Glider Infantry Regi-
ment, and other units. Almost 2,600 troops were success-
fully inserted, but they still had no artillery support.
82nd Airborne
In Nijmegen, Gavin reinforced l/508th with a single com-
pany of the 3/508, but as before, the assault was stopped
short of the bridge by the SS troops. The attack by G Compa-
ny, 3/508 marked the third assault by 82nd troops against the
bridge, one by a patrol, one by two companies of paratroops,
and one by a single company. Gavin planned a farther as-
sault that day with a battalion from the 504th, but Browning
chose to turn down the plan, wanting Gavin to put his efforts
into holding the high ground. Browning justified his odd
decision, given the importance of the bridge, because he’d
heard nothing from XXX Corps at that time.
Gavin’s need to defend the high ground was in fact be-
coming critical. In the east, the Germans had put together
an ad hoc division out of alarm units, non-commissioned
officer school candidate, Luftwaffe, and “stomach” and “ear”
battalions (manned by troops with assorted medical prob-
lems.) Most of these troops had no infantry training, but four
separate battalion-sized kampfgruppen (Stargaard, Fuer-
stenberg, Greschick and Goebel), totaling about 3,400 men,
moved against the widely spaced paratroops. Gavin was in
need of more infantry, and the paratroops were inititally
driven back.
Fortunately, the second day’s parachute drop for the 82nd
arrived literally on top of the German attackers. The attack
shattered, the Germans who retreating to their start lines. The
airborne reinforcements included three battalions of artillery
and the division engineers—but no additional infantry.
1st Airborne
Early on the 18th, six battalions of Germans under the
nominal command of Gen. Tettau attacked from the west
and made slow progress against the defense put up by1st
Air Landing Brigade. In the middle of the afternoon, 1st Air-
borne’s reinforcements arrived with of three battalions of the
4th Parachute Brigade. The new drop caught Tettau’s attack
from behind, and many of his ill-trained troops recoiled. The

World at War 33

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 4th’s commander, Brig. Hicks, sent his troops east to bolster
the attack toward Arnhem. There, Urquhart’s first two para-
troop battalions, having been stopped on their individual
routes toward Arnhem, both shifted south toward the river
road route Frost’s battalion had successfully negotiated the
day before. However, the kampfgruppe under Spindler was
being reinforced, and the Germans stopped the paratroops
with heavy casualties a mile short of their goal.
Making matters worse, 1st Airborne’s radios were not
working, and so no word of their problems could be trans-
mitted. The final mistake overtook Urquhart himself. Having
gone forward with 1st Parachute Brigade’s commander, Brig.
G. Lathbury, to scout, the two commanders found them-
selves trapped in a house by German armor.
In Arnhem itself, Frost’s troops were coming under in-
creasingly strong attack. The 10th SS Panzer Reconnaissance
Battalion, troops from Panzer Regiment 21, and four compa-
nies and tanks from Panzergrenadier Training and Replace-
ment Battalions were squeezing the paratroops from the east
and north.
In addition, that morning 9th SS Panzer reconnaissance
battalion, under SS Capt. Victor Graebner, attacked from the
south. Ironically that battalion had passed over the bridge on
its way to Nijegen before Frost’s troops closed it. Graebner
initially caught the paratroops by surprise, but the British
quickly recovered and smashed the assault, destroying al-
most half the German vehicles and killing Graebner him-
self.
XXX Corps
Horrocks’ armor made slow progress up the single road,
blocked at noon near the village of Aalst by Fallschirmjae-
ger troops manning 75mm anti-tank guns. The position was
bypassed but not without losses. The first tanks rolled into
Eindhoven around 7:00 p.m. Moving on to Zon, the engi-
neers began putting a Bailey bridge together so the armor
could cross the Wilhelmina canal.
The Germans
Frost’s defense of the northern end of Arnhem Bridge
posed a problem for Model and Bittrich. With bridge access
closed, they had lost their easy route south toward Nijmegen,
which both agreed was the place to stop the Allied advance.
To bypass the bridge, the SS engineers began a ferrying
operation at Pannerden, some seven miles southeast of Arn-
hem. Using anything that floated, including rafts that had to
be poled across to ferry tanks, the SS was able to slowly feed
reinforcements into the battle at Nijmegen.
D+2, Tuesday, September 19, 1944
101st Airborne
At 6:45 a.m., engineers finished building a Bailey bridge
at Zon, and XXX Corps moved north, over 30 hours behind
schedule.
The 101st’s battle at Best raged for a third day, despite
the loss of the bridge there the day before. Reinforced by
a squadron of British tanks from the 13th/18th Hussars and
the 2/327 Battalion, the Americans finally overwhelmed the
Germans, capturing some 1,400 and killing over 300 oth-
ers.
Additional reinforcements arrived, but with difficulty.
Bad weather kept almost half the division’s gliders from
landing, but the last battalion of the 327th Infantry and, fi-
34 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 34
nally, some of the division’s artillery, landed. Only smaller
75mm guns were received, though; the gliders carrying the
larger 105mm guns were turned back.
Late that afternoon the Germans attacked the open cor-
ridor from both sides. Panzer Brigade 107, consisting of in-
fantry and a Panther battalion, emerged from the woods to
the east and attacked the bridge at Zon, destroying a truck
on the bridge itself and shelling the divisional headquarters.
Fortunately for Taylor and his Americans, the terrain was too
poor for the 107th’s commander, Maj. Freiherr von Maltzahn,
to attack with his entire unit. After losing two of his Panthers
to 57mm anti­tank fire and a bazooka, Maltzahn retired.
On the other side of the corridor, three companies of the
59th Division made a tentative attack on St. Oedenrode, but
the 501st troopers held them off.
82nd Airborne
At 10:00 a.m., XXX Corps reached the Graves Bridge,
making contact with the 82nd troops there.
Overall, Gavin’s sector was quiet for the day. He, Brown-
ing and Horrocks met in the afternoon to discuss what to do
about the enemy held bridge in Nijmegen. Gavin suggested
putting troops across the Waal in boats to attack the bridge
from both ends. The plan was accepted, pending the arrival
of British assault boats from somewhere back in the line of
traffic. The arrival of the 82nd’s glider infantry, sorely need-
ed, was postponed due to the weather.
In the meantime, Gavin ordered the 2/505 out of division
reserve to attack toward the bridge’s southern end, now de-
fended by some 500 SS engineers and soldiers from 10th SS
Panzer Division. Supporting the defenders were four Jag-
dpanzer tank destroyers and flak guns across the Waal River.
Bolstering the paratroops, attack, Horrocks added a battal-
ion of infantry from the Grenadier Guards as well as three
squadrons of tanks. The allied troops made slow progress in
bitter house to house fighting; by evening they were close
to the bridges, but told to mop up and wait. Browning and
Gavin wanted a coordinated effort with the river crossing.
1st Airborne
At 3:30 a.m., 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions launched a
major assault east toward the Arnhem Bridge down the river
road. They pushed to within half a mile of their destination,
but, as the sun came up, the paratroops found themselves
in a horrific crossfire from 20mm and 37mm guns on either
flank, as well as troops in front of them. The result was a
slaughter, stopping the attack. A later attack by the 2nd South
Staffords and the 11th Parachute Battalion fared no better,
and a mix-up in communications let the Germans catch the
11th Battalion unaware as they prepared to withdraw, result-
ing in heavy casualties.
Urquhart escaped from his hiding place and rejoined his
division. With his four assault battalions down to a com-
bined 400 men, he ordered all his troops to pull back into an
enclave west of Oosterbeek, essentially admitting he could
not get to Frost.
Gliders carrying troops of the 1st Polish Independent
Parachute Brigade arrived and were heavily damaged, as the
Germans had closed on the landing zone. The gliders were
also hit by the Luftwaffe, operating nearly unopposed due to
the weather hampering Allied fighters. The remnants of this
unit as well as those of the Air Landing Brigade, were all
pulled back toward Urquhart’s position.
5/14/08 1:16:23 PM
 In Arnhem itself, Frost’s troops were assaulted by artil-
lery and tanks, squeezing them into a smaller and smaller
pocket. During the day they lost eight of the 18 buildings
they had stubbornly defended.

D+3, Wednesday, 20 September 1944

101st Airborne
The morning started early for Taylor’s troops, as Pan-
zer Brigade 107 again came out of the woods and attacked
toward the bridge at Zon. A reduced company of the 327th
Glider Infantry managed to hold them off until tanks of the
13th/18th Hussars arrived after their battle at Best. The British
destroyed four of the attacking Panther tanks, and by mid-
morning Maltzahn had retreated again.
Taylor had decided the best way to keep the corridor
open was to aggressively probe outward, trying to disrupt
any enemy plans. One such probe by the 1/501st out of Veg-
hel trapped a march battalion of Fallshchirmjaeger between
the villages of Heeswijk and Dinther north of the Willems
Canal, killing and wounding some 80 soldiers and captured
over 400.
On a lower note, weather hampered supply deliveries
and the 101st only recovered about 30 percent of what was
dropped to them; the rest of the supply canisters scattered
behind enemy lines.
82nd Airborne
Gavin’s widespread troops came under attack from
the Reichswald that morning while he awaited develop-
ments in Nijmegen.
The 406th Division headquarters had been heavily rein-
forced by the remnants of the II Fallschirmjäger Corps—the
3rd and 5th Fallschirmjaeger Divisions, both reduced to regi-
mental size. The Germans formed three separate kampfgrup-
pen to attack and converge on Nijmegen that morning:
• KG Becker consisted of about 800 troops of the 5th, 8th
and 9th Regiments of the 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division.
They weren’t the vaunted paratroops of Crete; they were
mostly service and supply troops. Becker’s goals were
the villages of Wyler and Beek.
• KG Greschick had 400-500 conscripted infantry, backed
by two groups of 20mm guns. They were to take Groes-
beek, then link up with Becker.
• KG Hermann consisted of the regimental sized 5th
Fallschirmjaeger Division troops, with a single 88mm
gun for support. They were to drive northwest through
Mook toward the vital bridge at Heaman.
Because he was so low on infantry and concentrating on
the battle at Nijmegen, Gavin’s eastward screen consisted of
a couple platoons garrisoning villages. The German attacks
made good progress against them, taking Wyler and Mook
and gaining a foothold on Groesbeek. But timely interven-
tion by Coldstream Guards armor and additional troops
stopped the German drive, though fighting continued.
In Nijmegen, the infantry-armor assault on the southern
portion of the bridge resumed. To the northwest along the
Waal, though, tanks of the Irish Guards and all the artillery
they could muster were preparing to support an attempt to
put boats across the Waal. That attempt was delayed until
1500 because the trucks with the assault boats had trouble
getting through the traffic jam on the highway.
On the ground: British paratroopers in Arnhem.
But the flimsy 19-foot canvas boats finally arrived, and
the 3/504 Battalion, commanded by Maj. Julian Cook, start-
ed across. Fighting the fast current and heavy enemy fire,
only half the 26 boats made it, but the troopers who landed
found little to hold them back. With the Germans focused on
holding the bridge, only a few were in a position to resist the
Americans. The 11 surviving boats made another five cross-
ings, bringing the rest of Cook’s men and the l/504 Battal-
ion.
Close to 1900, with the railroad bridge flanked and the
infantry closing on the road bridge, British tanks started
across prematurely, confused by the single American flag on
the north shore. Fortunately German demolitions failed and
the last bridge before Arnhem was in Allied hands.
1st Airborne
Across the Rhine, Urquhart’s troops, except for the rem-
nants of Frost’s battalion, “circled the wagons” just west of
Oosterbeek in an area about two miles square. All of those
battalions were shot up and had little supply. Nearly all the
supplies dropped for them had fallen into German hands;
however, the British did manage contact with the outside
world, so Browning and his superiors now knew their plight.
In Arnhem, Frost’s perimeter continued to dwindle. Worse,
his troops were forced away from the bridge, opening it to
German traffic south.
The Germans
The loss of the Nijmegen Bridge forced Model and Bit-
trich to improvise. Some of the forces battling Frost were
pulled back to prepare to move south as soon as the Arnhem
bridge opened. Counterattack orders were sent to the weak
units crossing at Pannerden. Farther south, additional troops
were preparing to contest the 101st’s control of the corridor.

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 D+4, Thursday, 21 September 1944
101st Airborne
Taylor pushed his troops outward, hoping to disrupt Ger-
man plans against the thin corridor he held, as the Dutch
were reporting rumors of a big counterattack due soon. The
502nd Regiment around St. Oedenrode attacked out 2,000
yards from the village, working through scattered resistance
and the occasional strong point. The 501st Regiment moved
northwest from Veghel and at midnight occupied the village
of Schijndel. On either flank of the 101st’s corridor,
the British VIII and XII Corps were making slow progress in
support of MARKET GARDEN.
82nd Airborne/XXX Corps/lst Airborne
Gavin’s troops retook the village of Beek, then followed
up by sending the 504th and 508th pushing east to clear the
remnants of the previous day’s German attacks.
After spending almost 24 hours mopping up in Nijmegen
and expanding the northern shore bridgehead, XXX Corps
finally launched the Irish Guards up the road in the early af-
ternoon. Just three miles north, near Ressen, the British tank-
ers ran into an SS infantry battalion and 11 tanks, backed by
two full batteries of 88mm guns. The area around the road
was poor tank country. The British official history described
the region like this:
“...it is flat low-lying land, drained by innumerable
ditches and waterways which separate its fields in
place of hedges. The main road to Arnhem, in par-
ticular ran between deep, wide ditches within which
advancing tanks were firmly enclosed; there was no
escape on either hand.”
The Guards were stopped. It was apparent to Horrocks
an armor-heavy force would not be able to finish the drive to
Arnhem. His main infantry force, the 43rd Wessex Division,
was enroute through the tangled traffic jam, and they finally
arrived that night.
Not all was going the Germans’ way, though, as that af-
ternoon, north of where the Irish tankers were trying to break
through, the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade finally arrived, in
part. Bad weather meant only 53 of the 110 aircraft made
it through to the drop area; so only about two battalions of
Polish paratroopers were dropped south of the Rhine near
the village of Driel.
The Germans, again, reacted quickly to the potential
threat of the new drop isolating the SS units defending the
road south of them. As the Poles took Driel, the Germans
formed a north-south defense line to block any enemy move-
ment toward the Arnhem road.
Across the river, the Oosterbeek perimeter was shrinking
from pressure all around. The troops had lost control of the
only ferry that might have brought the Polish troops across
the river to them. On a positive note, however, Urquhart
was able to make contact with, and begin employing, XXX
Corps artillery to aid his defense.
In Arnhem, however, the remnants of Frost’s gallant bat-
talion were overwhelmed, killed or captured. The battle for
that bridge was over.
The Germans
Model spent the day reorganizing his troops to the south
with plans for a concentric assault on the corridor held by
101st Airborne. He split command of that operation between
36 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 36
General der Infantrie Hans Reinhard’s LXXXIII Corps,
which would assault from the west, and General der Infan-
trie Hans von Obstfelder’s LXXXVI Corps from the east.
Reinhard’s primary assault force was Kampfgruppe Hu-
ber, three infantry battalions backed by four Jagdpanther
assault guns. Their mission would be to drive through the
villages of Schijndel and Eerde toward Veghel. They were
supposed to be supported by Fallschirmjaeger Regiment 6
and other paratroop units, but those were too far away to be
able to complete a road march and attack with Huber on the
22nd.
Obstfelder’s force was the reconstituted Kampfgruppe
Walther, still built around Panzer Brigade 107, but also in-
cluding artillery and infantry support from the 180th Divi-
sion. The units were short on ammunition and experience,
but they were tasked with taking Veghel and destroying the
bridge from the east.
D+5, Friday, 22 September 1944
101st Airborne
Taylor’s plan for aggressive action called for two bat-
talions of the 501st to drive south of Schijndel and meet with
two battalions of the 502nd driving north from St. Oedenrode.
In addition, two battalions from the 506th were moving north
from Zon toward the village of Uden. It was undefended at
the moment, but rumors from the Dutch had significant Ger-
man forces in the area. The 2/501 remained in the defense of
Veghel, while the 3/502 battalion defended St. Oedenrode.
Taylor’s reserve, the 327th Glider Regiment, remained in the
drop zones near Zon.
Kampfgruppe Huber initiated an attack on Schijndel ear-
ly in the morning, but Taylor’s nighttime move disrupted the
attack and, with the aid of British tanks, repelled Huber’s as-
sault. The Germans slipped south and continued to advance
on Veghel, coming within firing range of the Veghel bridge
by mid-afternoon. However Huber’s men were caught from
behind by the 501st moving south from Schijndel and in the
ensuing battle, basically disintegrated, leaving 170 wounded
and 250 men captured. The western attack in the corridor
was, for the moment halted.
To the east, Kampfgruppe Walther started its attacks at
9:00 a.m., taking the village of Erp but being stymied short
of Veghel by Taylor’s paratroops. One section of Panzer
Brigade 107, however, emerged onto the corridor between
Uden and Veghel, cutting communications north, then mov-
ing south toward the bridge. By mid-afternoon, losses to the
kampfgruppe, which included nearly all of its commanding
officers, drove the Germans back from Veghel, but the road
remained closed.
The battle caused Horrocks’ at Nijmegen, to order his
32nd Guards Brigade south to help Taylor’s hard-pressed
men.
82nd Airborne/XXX Corps/lst Airborne
The 43rd Division attacked that morning, sending the
129th Brigade straight up the road toward Ressen, while the
214th attacked farther to the west, taking the small village of
Oosterhaut before joining the Polish contingent near Driel.
Across the river, the Germans launched heavy attacks
against Urquhart’s perimeter; Kampfgruppe Tettau attack-
ing from the west, Kampfgruppe Bruhns, assorted compa-
nies from the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, from the north, and
5/14/08 1:16:24 PM
 Airborne logistics: Allied aircraft drop supplies.
Spindler’s 9th SS Panzer kampfgruppe from the east. The
fighting was the worst kind of vicious hand-to-hand, house
to house close-in action that consumed time and troops,
especially some of the poorer trained among the Germans.
By evening Model estimated the remaining perimeter to be
about one square mile.
D+6—D+9, Saturday-Tuesday,
23-26 September 1944
101st Airborne
Taylor’s men got the road opened again on Saturday, af-
ter Kampfgruppe Walther was withdrawn due to losses in
their battle with the paratroops as well as new pressure from
VIII Corps in their rear. The division’s final reinforcements
were able to arrive. However, Fallschirmjäger Regiment 6
reopened the attack from the west, pushing hard in the area
around Eerde, which saw heavy losses to British tanks as
well as the Fallschirmjaegers. Von der Heydt’s attack stalled
quickly.
Another German unit, Kampfgruppe Jungwirth, four
weak battalions thrown together from a variety of sources
and under command of Maj. Hans Jungwirth, a First Para-
chute Army officer, supported by some tank destroyers, side-
stepped the battle at Eerde and struck the corridor near the
village of Koevering, south of Veghel. They shot up some 50
Allied vehicles as they battled troops from the 502nd Regi-
ment for control of the village. As before they were unable
to take it, but the road was again closed. The road wouldn’t
be opened again until Tuesday, 26 September.
WaW-1-Issue.indd 37
82nd Airborne/XXX Corps/lst Airborne
The 82nd’s last infantry reinforcement, the 325th Glider
Infantry Regiment, arrived along with the rest of the Pol-
ish Brigade. Small groups of Poles and some 43rd Division
troops were able to cross the Rhine River to Urquhart’s men,
but the numbers were not enough to offset the pressure the
Germans were continuing to apply. On Sunday, 25 Septem-
ber, the decision was made to pull out the 1st Airborne. That
night, the pitifully small remnant of the division crossed the
Rhine to safety. With their withdrawal, Operation MARKET
GARDEN came to a close.
The Cost
Overall, MARKET GARDEN seized bridgeheads over
five of six major waterways and drove a salient 65 miles
deep into German-held territory. Montgomery declared the
operation a 90 percent success. General Brereton, First Air-
borne Army commander went even farther, stating in his
diaries the airborne portion of the operation MARKET was
a “brilliant success”, claiming the airborne troops did what
they were supposed to do. He made that assessment despite
the fact that two major bridges remained uncrossable by Al-
lied armor had they arrived when scheduled.
In the final analysis, however, the operation failed to
get troops across the Rhine to flank the West Wall defenses,
thus negating the overall goal. The casualties incurred were
heavy, especially for 1st Airborne, which lost over 70 percent
of its effective strength in killed, wounded and captured. The
101st lost some 2,100, and the 82nd over 1,400. The two elite
paratroop divisions would lose another 3,500 troops fighting
in the salient until they were withdrawn in November. Com-
bined with the 3,700 men lost from British Second Army,
World at War 37
5/14/08 1:16:25 PM
 Paratroops land out side of the town.
MARKET GARDEN cost the Allied over 11,000 casualties.
German official sources list their own casualties during the
fighting as 3,300, but more recent studies indicated their
losses were closer to 6,000.
Analysis
As with any failed operation, a litany of reasons has
been put forth from various sources. The United States Of-
ficial History listed the weather, faulty intelligence, delays
in ground force advance, and the presence of Student and
Model on the German side as the reasons for the failure,
though the overall reason is identified as “over-ambition.”
The British official history cites bad weather, bad fortune
and errors in planning as the primary reasons. It also cites
the lack of speed from the ground force and the speed of the
German reaction as keys.
Montgomery himself cites the weather, the dropping of
the airborne too far away from their objectives, and faulty
intelligence assessing the II SS Panzer Corps as ineffective.
More importantly, he also cites the lack of Allied supreme
headquarters support as thenumber one reason. His memoirs
state emphatically that MARKET GARDEN, “if properly
backed from inception, would have worked.”
In general, the official histories have it right. MARKET
GARDEN failed because a lot of things went wrong. The
weather was an obvious problem, as it delayed crucial re-
inforcements and also inhibited the ability of the Allied air
forces to interdict the battlefield, allowing the Germans to
reinforce easily. Intelligence was also a problem, especially
the threat of massed armor from the Reichswald, and the
dismissal of SS panzer remnants as a concern. Stupidity also
played its part, as in taking full operational plans into battle
where they could be captured by the enemy.
Montgomery’s own assessment that SHAEF Eisenhower
didn’t take the operation seriously enough is simply a final
shot in the “Broad verses Narrow Thrust strategy” argument
38 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 38
the two commanders had in the Autumn of 1944. Mont-
gomery’s reasoning is that if Eisenhower had completely
stopped Patton when Montgomery told him to, enough sup-
plies would have been available to keep Second Army’s XII
and VIII Corps armed and active on the shoulders of XXX
Corps’ thrust to Arnhem, dissipating the German response
and allowing MARKET GARDEN to succeed.
While that argument may have some merit, it doesn’t ad-
dress the two key problems with the operation—the abysmal
planning, and the speed of the German reaction.
The failure in the planning of the MARKET (airborne)
portion of the attack stems from its maximizing a weakness
of airborne troops while minimizing one of their key ad-
vantages. Airborne troops are inherently slow once on the
ground owing to their minimal motor transport. The usual
airborne advantage is surprise: placing troops where the en-
emy doesn’t expect them. Dropping airborne troops away
from their objectives, like the 1st Airborne west of Ooster-
beek, is a misuse of airborne troops.
The drops themselves also violated standard bridge-tak-
ing tactics, well developed after the Normandy drops. Gen.
Gavin, in his memoir On to Berlin, said, “bridges must be
attacked at both ends simultaneously.” With two exceptions
(the bridges at Veghel and Graves), that tactic was ignored in
MARKET GARDEN. Of the nine bridge attacks from a sin-
gle side, only two (St. Oedenrode and Einhoven) succeeded;
the other seven—Zon, Best, Nijmegen (initially), Hatert,
Maiden, Hoinghutie, and Arnhem—failed. The bridge at
Molenhoek was captured after the 504th attacked it from one
side, but only because troops from the 505th finally arrived to
help from the other side.
The reasons for that failure are difficult to ascertain. Gen.
Urquhart’s acceptance of the 1st Airborne’s drop zones can
be excused, as he had little airborne experience prior to tak-
ing command of the Red Devils. Gen’s Browning, Brereton,
continues on page 40
5/14/08 1:16:27 PM
 Market Garden’s Ultimate Defeat:
A New Interpretation

Ever since its sad ending, Market Garden has been one of
the most thoroughly studied and deeply analyzed operations
of all of World War II, both academically and in popular cul-
ture. In fact, since the ULTRA revelations of the early 1970s
and the hit movie later in that same decade, there seems to
have been nothing more to understand about the campaign.
That changed more recently, though, when an important new
interpretation as to what ultimately caused the defeat of the
Allied plan was offered. The revelation came in the publica-
tion of historian Walter S. Dunn’s book, Heroes or Traitors:
The German Replacement Army, the July Plot, and Adolf
Hitler (Praeger, 2003).
In brief, the German Replacement Army was the admin-
istrative mechanism through which both new recruits and Plane formation on the way to Market Garden.
recuperating wounded veterans were brought, respectively,
from civilian life and military hospitals into the ranks of ac-
In aid of the plot, Fromm then clandestinely began hold-
tive-duty military units. Throughout the war, depending on
ing manpower within the Replacement Army. He had Hit-
the tempo of fighting and the call-up and formation cycle for
ler’s trust, and had set up his army so its weekly and monthly
recruits and new units, manpower within the Replacement
manpower reports came directly and exclusively to his own
Army usually varied between 100,000 and 300,000. Until
desk. The Replacement Army’s new role, of course, was go-
mid-1943, however, the Replacement Army was really an
ing to be to allow the plotters to rapidly seize control across
“army” only in name. Its manpower was spread over Ger-
Germany as soon as Hitler was killed. By the time the bomb
many in company and battalion-sized packets.
went off, then, there were more than 600,000 men (approxi-
That changed, though, at the end of July 1943, when the mately 50 divisional equivalents) awaiting Fromm’s orders.
Replacement Army’s chief, Gen. Erich Fromm, issued an or-
Of course, those men’s absence from the front had been
der to his subordinates throughout that organization calling
keenly felt during the summer fighting in 1944. The inter-
on them to set up combat-capable regiments. It seems that
pretation taken then—by the replacement and reinforcement
after the aerial destruction of Hamburg earlier that year, Hit-
starved German commanders at the front and the Allied
ler had become fearful that trouble might be brewing across
intelligence analysts—had been that the Reich was simply
Germany, either in the form of a rebellion of the millions
running out of manpower. Thus, when the Allies launched
of foreign slave-laborers who worked across the country, or
Operation Cobra in the west, and the Soviets attacked from
even a 1918-style uprising among the increasingly dispirited
the east in Operation Bagration, the German front in both
citizenry. Fromm’s order, on the surface at least, was issued
cases was nothing more than a thin shell. Huge and rapid
to provide the Fuehrer assurance sufficient and well-orga-
Allied breakthroughs followed.
nized military force would be on hand to deal with any such
emergency. When Hitler survived the Bomb Plot, and Fromm’s par-
ticipation was soon revealed and he was arrested, the Fueh-
The Replacement Army’s up-organizing, however, took
rer assumed direct command of the Replacement Army. That
on an entirely different, and much more significant, meaning
was how Hitler suddenly found himself in command of what
when Fromm secretly joined the anti-Hitler conspiracy that
amounted to two army groups’ worth of reinforcements in
ultimately went into the history books as the “July Bomb
August 1944. It was those ‘new’ units that stabilized the
Plot.” Until his coming on board, the great operative weak-
German situation on both fronts when they were belatedly
ness of that plot stemmed from the fact it was one put to-
rushed forward.
gether almost exclusively by staff officers. None of them
commanded any actual military units they could order into Looked at broadly, then, it wasn’t the Germans’ rapid
action once the bomb went off and Hitler was (presumably) reaction that surprised the Allied command during Market
dead. That changed when Fromm came into the cabal, bring- Garden. Ever since Moltke the Elder had set in place the
ing with him his home-based army. concept of “mission-oriented orders” in the mid-19th cen-
tury, the Germans had been well known as past masters of
military improvisation. The surprise came from the fact they
had so much on hand with which to react—and that was due
to the peculiar circumstances surrounding the failure of the
July Bomb Plot and Fromm’s role in it.
~Ty Bomba

World at War 39

WaW-1-Issue.indd 39 5/14/08 1:16:28 PM

 Gavin, Taylor, and Ridgway had no such excuse. Gavin, in
his memoirs, noted that he “couldn’t believe his ears” when
Urquhart described his battle plan to drop so far away from
his objective. Yet Gavin did much the same thing—excused
perhaps by Browning’s direct requirements for him—by
dropping away from his primary objectives, which were the
bridges.
Aiding and abetting the poor planning was the decision
by Gen. Williams of the IX Troop Carrier Command—
backed by Gen. Brereton—to limit the drops to one a day.
That decision left the airborne commanders sunable to take
advantage of any surprise they created with the initial drop
while also cutting down their options for that drop.
The other impact on planning was William’s insistence
not to drop near Arnhem bridge, due to flak and terrain con-
siderations. That decision itself was odd, since in an ear-
lier rendition of the MARKET GARDEN plan, Operation
COMET, that’s exactly where the troops were to land. Wil-
liams and Brereton, as support leaders, needed to take their
orders from the combat leaders, not the other way around.
As for the GARDEN plans, little needs to be said. They
were planning on putting 20,000 vehicles down a single road
in 60 hours. Montgomery’s orders to ignore the flanks was
simply not possible on such a restricted path. By the time
XXX Corps got to Nijmegen, they were dissipating strength
to aid fights on both sides of the corridor.
In hindsight, more drops were needed on D-Day ,and the
drops needed to be placed to get paratroops closer to their
key objectives. And a realistic timetable for XXX Corps was
needed to complete their movement
Why didn’t all of these things get addressed? The only
apparent reason is a failure of the Allied High Command to
estimate German capabilities and intentions at that time in
the war. As noted, the breakout from the Normandy beach-
head had been spectacular, with the German army on the
run. Allied intelligence officers were telling their bosses the
Sources
Brereton, Lewis, The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the Pacific,
Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941—8 May 1945 (New York:
William Morrow and Company, 1946).
D’Este, Carlo, Eisenhower, A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2002).
Eisenhower, David, Eisenhower: At War, 1943-1945 (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1986).
Ellis, L. F., Victory in the West, Volume II: The Defeat of Germany, (Lon-
don: HMSO, 1968).
Gavin, James M., On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander,
1943-1945 (New York, Viking Press, 1978).
Hamilton, Nigel, Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Mont-
gomery (New York: Random House, 1981).
Hinsley, F. H., British Intelligence in the Second World War: It’s In-
fluence on Strategy and Operations, Volume III, part II (London,
HMSO, 1988).
Irving, David, The War between the Generals, (New York: Congdon &
Lattes, Inc, 1981).
Kershaw, Robert J., ‘It Never Snows in September’: The German view
of MARKET-GARDEN and the Battle of Arnhem, September, 1944,
(New York: lan Allan Publishing, 1990).
Lewin, Ronald, ULTRA Goes to War: the First Account of World War II’s
Greatest Secret based on Official Documents (New York, McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1978).
MacDonald, Charles B., The United States Army in World War II, The
European Theater of Operations: The Siegfried Line Campaign
(Washington, DC: Office of Chief of Military History, 1963).
40 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 40
end of the war was in sight, that the enemy has infact already
been beaten. That evaluation was made despite the grow-
ing resistance from the German all alonog, the front in Sep-
tember. ULTRA intelligence reported Model’s headquarters
move to the Arnhem area, Student’s command of the First
Fallschirmjaeger Army, and the assignment of SS Panzer
remnants to the area. But the Allied commanders, especially
Montgomery, ignored the signs, fixing their eyes instead on
the chimera of an early end to the war.
The second key problem with MARKET GARDEN lay
with the nature of the enemy. As noted above, Allied intel-
ligence and virtually all the Allied commanders basically
discounted serious enemy opposition. Thus the speed and
ferocity of the German reaction, especially against the 1st
Airborne–the organization with the fewest initial troops—
was unexpected. Even more marked was the ability of the
Germans to put together ad hoc groups of disparate troops
and turn them into effective combat formations. Consider
two examples.
The initial response to the 1st Airborne’s landings from
west of their drop zones came from Division Tettau. Its
commander, Hans von Tettau was a combat veteran, having
commanded the 24th Infantry Division on the Eastern Front.
When MARKET GARDEN broke over his head he had no
real staff nor resources in his position as Training Com-
mander in the Netherlands. Despite that handicap, he put
together seven ad hoc battalions that included SS training
units, Luftwaffe infantry, naval companies, and artillerymen
from Regiment 184 acting as infantry, and sent them into ac-
tion. The difference in troop quality showed in the results of
the actions. Troops from the SS NCO training school—vir-
tually all veterans—performed well. The naval troops, with
minimal infantry training, took heavy losses against the Brit-
ish paratroops. But the paratroop’s critical drop zones were
under heavy attack within hours of the drop.
On the other side of 1st Airborne, barring the way for most
of Urquhart’s troops, was Kampfgruppe Spindler. Initially,
Spindler had 120 men of Panzer Artillery Regiment 9 of the
9th SS Panzer Division, acting as infantry, along with less
than 100 SS engineers. That small force was joined around
midnight by the remainder of four companies of SS Training
and Replacement Battalion 16 initially opposed the advance
of the 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions toward Arnhem.
The Germans weren’t perfect. In their haste some re-
sponsibilities got blurred. One of them was Arnhem itself. In
an effort to get troops into contact with the known dropsites,
especially Oosterbeek and south of Nijmegen, Model ne-
glected to give any of his commander’s direct responsibility
for Arnhem. As a result, Frost was able to sneak in and take
positions around the bridge. Despite that error, thought, the
German response was swift and hard—the very essence of
what the Allies hoped their own attack would be.
In retrospect, MARKET GARDEN was a good idea with
sound goals. But the same intelligence that made the opera-
tion seem worth the risk also undermined it by ignoring a
still potent enemy and allowing flawed plans to be gener-
ated. The plan for MARKET GARDEN proved inadequate.
Given more time to think about it, airborne commanders
Taylor, Gavin, Ridgeway and even Browning might have
acknowledged those flaws.
at
5/14/08 1:16:28 PM
 Movers & Shakers
Geoffry Pyke
Geoffrey Pyke is not a well
known name in military history, but
he makes for a lengthy footnote, and
probably deserves more renown than
has been his lot since his suicide in
1948. Pyke, an Englishman, was an
idea-man, a brilliant eccentric who
was almost a caricature of the ‘odd-
ball scientist’ character used so often
in Hollywood. With Pyke, however,
that stance wasn’t affected. He wore
the same suit all the time because it
made dressing easier, and he wore
spats over his shoes so he could dis-
pense with socks. His eccentricities,
though, aren’t of concern to the mili-
tary historian. His three contributions
to the world in general and, and to the
military in particular, are: Pykrete,
Weasels and Black Devils.
Pykrete was the least successful of
his three brainchildren, and in some
ways it was also the most intrigu-
ing. Pyke, who was on Lord Louis
Mountbatten’s staff during World War
II, conceived the idea you could build
a less expensive but yet more durable
aircraft carrier out of ice, if you just
did it right. It says a lot for both Pyke
and Mountbatten the idea wasn’t dis-
missed out of hand, but was instead
taken seriously, developed, tested, and
came close to being carried out.
The key to the ice aircraft carrier,
which was code named “Project Hab-
bukak,” lay in creating a special kind
of ice. Pyke didn’t actually develop
that ice, but the scientists who did
were following his suggestions.
After some experimentation, they
determined that, if a small amount of
wood pulp was added to water, ice
made from it was incredibly hard and
melted much more slowly than regu-
lar ice. The resulting material was
named “Pykrete” in Pyke’s honor,
and Mountbatten took to carrying
samples of it around to let skeptical
bureaucrats and officers try to smash
it with a hammer. Those demonstra-
tions never failed to impress, though
Mountbatten undoubtedly went too
far when he shot a block of it with a
WaW-1-Issue.indd 41
pistol and lightly wounded another
senior officer in the neck with the
ricochet.
Amazingly, it wasn’t that incident
that spelled the end of Habbukak.
Rather, it was the successful inva-
sion of the continent and the defeat
of the U-boats. The super ice aircraft
carriers envisioned within the project,
each to have been four or five times
as large as a regular one, were to
have been stationed in the middle
of the Atlantic, there to provide air
protection against submarines. They
could also have been moved closer to
Europe for use as alternative basing
facilities for the Allied air forces.
They were to be constructed entirely
out of Pykrete, with internal cooling
systems to keep them from melting.
When D-Day proved a success, it was
decided the cost was no longer worth
the effort, and the plan was scrapped.
That was a shame in the technical
sense, because there was no practical
reason it wouldn’t have worked, as
successful tests done at Patricia Lake
in Jasper, Alberta, showed.
Pyke’s Weasels were tied to his
Black Devils, and must be explained
together, though they eventually took
different paths. Pyke was nothing if
not an observant man, and he was
impressed by the trouble Finnish
ski-troops were able to cause the Red
Army during their conflict in 1939.
It seemed to him specially trained
and equipped troops could cause
Hitler equal amounts of trouble in
winter conditions, especially after
the Germans invaded Norway. Nazi
interest in Norwegian nuclear heavy
water experiments also worried him,
and he saw his idea for new soldiers
as the ideal force to sabotage the
facilities where those experiments
were conducted. He pitched the idea
to Mountbatten, basing it on a special
piece of snow equipment of his own
invention. That device eventually
became known as the “Weasel.”
Pyke originally conceived the
Weasel as a lightweight powered
sledge using special, wide caterpil-
lar tracks to go easily over snow.
The driver was supposed to ski
along behind the Weasel and direct
it with controls strung out the back
of the machine. His original idea
was the driver could simply let go
if he accidentally drove the sledge
into a crevice or over a precipice. He
eventually scrapped that part of the
idea, and he evolved the Weasel into
a small two-to-four-man transport
with an enclosed cab and remarkable
winter mobility.
The men to use the vehicle were
being assembled and trained at the
same time as the Weasel was being
designed and tested. US Army Col.
Robert Frederick was put in charge
of that regiment, a choice steeped in
irony. His job prior to receiving that
command had been to review ques-
tionable ideas from well intentioned
but ill-informed outsiders and write
reports explaining why they were bad
ideas that wouldn’t work. Frederick
was initially given Pyke’s ideas for
the Weasel and special winter soldiers
for just that reason, and he wrote a
persuasive report critical of the whole
concept.
Mountbatten, however, would
not take “no” for an answer on this
project. It had been his idea to have
the Americans take it over, but he had
no intention of letting conservative
elements in the US Army kill it. Fred-
erick was then given the command on
the logical, if perverse, notion he was
the person in the Army who knew
the most about the idea. That caused
considerable embarrassment for
Frederick as he put together his unit.
On several occasions his own report
was quoted back to him by people
who felt he shouldn’t get what he was
asking for.
Both the Canadian and US Armies
contributed soldiers to what came to
be called 1st Special Services Force,
and their attitudes toward the project
Attention readers: We’re always looking
for authors for FYI for Strategy & Tactics
and Observation Post for World at War.
If you’d like to try your hand at writing
short (under 2,000 words), pithy articles
for this column, on virtually any aspect of
WWII military history, contact Ty Bom-
ba, FYI editor, at: WhiteRook@att.net.
World at War 41
5/14/08 1:16:29 PM
 were reflected in the bizarre composi-
tion of the regiment. The Canadians,
honored by Mountbatten’s personal
request for them to participate, sent
only the best volunteers, the cream
of their army. The US Army took
manning the unit as an opportunity to
send its most questionable discipline
problems as “volunteers” (many
signed up to get out of stockades).
Somehow, though, that mix worked
well, and the unit turned out to be one
of the most effective, man for man, of
the entire war.
Both of those products of Pyke’s
fertile mind turned out to be useful,
and they’re still with us today in dif-
ferent forms, but they never actually
deployed together. “Project Plough,”
the deployment of the 1st Special
Service Force to Norway, was eventu-
ally cancelled. The unit was instead
used to help clear the Japanese from
the Aleutian Islands; then it was sent
to Italy, where it took its nickname,
“The Black Devils,” from a diary
found on the body of a dead German
near the Anzio beachhead. The 1st
Special Service Force thus became
the nucleus and inspiration for the
many elite special forces units in the
US armed forces, such as the Navy
SEALS and Army Green Berets.
The 1SSF also never used
Weasels, but they were eventually
manufactured by the Studebaker Mo-
tor Corporation and designated as the
M28. Those vehicles were used by the
10th Mountain Division in training in
Colorado, and then in combat in Italy
late in the war. They also turned out
to be Arctic exploration vehicles of
the first order. The Weasel’s descen-
dents are still in use in Antarctica,
Siberia, and Alaska today, and can
be seen on many ski slopes around
the world hauling equipment and
performing vital search and rescue
missions over terrain that few other
vehicles can conquer.
~ Michael O'Brien
42 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 42
Weapons
The 5 Inch / 38 Caliber
Dual-Purpose Gun
Naval warship designers of the
1930s faced a difficult challenge.
Where the battleships and cruisers of
World War I had to face only other
ships of their class and fast moving
torpedo carrying ships, they now had
to face aircraft that carried bombs and
torpedoes. Though few naval leaders
saw bombers as much of a threat, tor-
pedo planes could potentially cripple
a warship, and the major warships’
secondary armament typically em-
ployed against destroyers and torpedo
boats was inadequate against torpedo
planes, while anti-aircraft guns lacked
the firepower to deter surface torpedo
attack. Further, whatever they felt
about bombers, they realized they had
to make some provision for defending
against attacks from them.
Unfortunately, the naval treaties
of the 20s and 30s put severe weight
limitations on warship displacement,
forcing ship designers to compromise
between secondary and anti-aircraft
armament. The US Navy chose a
different path: design a long-range
medium caliber gun that could be
used against both surface ships and
aircraft. The result was the 5 inch /
38 caliber dual-purpose gun (surface
and air gunnery). Introduced into
service in 1934, it proved to be the
best medium caliber naval gun of the
20th century and can still be found in
service today.
The ubiquitous 5”/38 participated
in every US naval engagement from
Pearl Harbor to Desert Storm. It was
the 5”/38 that first engaged Japanese
aircraft attacking US naval formations
in World War II. It provided the bulk
of the naval gunfire support to Army
and Marine Corps troops fighting
in coastal areas. More 5”/38 rounds
were manufactured and fired than that
of any other medium-to-large naval
gun of the 20th century. Ironically,
its designers had thought it would
be used against surface targets over
90 percent of the time and aircraft
less than 10 percent. Naval gunfire
support was something they saw as a
mission that might arise occasionally,
but not as a primary mission. Yet, in
Sicily, it was 5”/38 naval gunfire that
broke the Herman Goering Division’s
assault on the landing beach.
During World War II, anti-aircraft
fire was the guns’ primary mission in
the Pacific, particularly after 1942,
followed by naval gunfire support
(NGFS). Every battalion that went
ashore in the Pacific and Korea had
a 5”/38-equipped destroyer in direct
support. The guns’ primary advantage
over other naval weapons in that mis-
sion was the ability to engage reverse
slope targets. That was accomplished
by using high angle fire (above 45
degrees) and a reduced propellant
charge, effectively converting them
into a type of howitzer.
Unfortunately, reduced charge
engagements also meant reduced
range (12,000 yards versus 18,000).
Despite that loss in effective range,
though, the guns continued to provide
that vital capability in Korea and on
some of the Pacific Islands during
World War II. It’s also a testament to
US naval and air supremacy that, with
the exception of three incidents in
Vietnam, NGFS became the only mis-
sion in which the guns participated
after World War II.
In US naval service, the 5”/38
carried the designation “Mark 12”
and was used in various models and
gun mountings on every class of fleet
warship that entered service between
1935 and 1945. Only escort ships,
patrol craft and smaller combatants
didn’t carry the 5”/38. Originally
mounted in single-gun Mark 24 gun
mounts, they were first retrofitted on
Somers and Porter-class destroyers
beginning in 1934, replacing their
5”/51 caliber single-purpose guns.
They also replaced the 5”/25 caliber
anti-aircraft and 5”/51 secondary bat-
tery guns on the cruiser Wichita. They
also became the main gun armament
of the Dunlap, Fanning, and Fletcher-
class destroyers that provided the
backbone of America’s destroyer fleet
in World War II. The twin-gun Mark
25 mount entered service in 1937,
when it was developed for the sec-
5/14/08 1:16:29 PM
 ondary batteries of America’s cruisers
and battleships.
As World War II progressed, and
the importance of anti-aircraft fire
grew, so did the need to increase de-
stroyer firepower. So a lighter version
of the Mark 25 mount was introduced
on the Sumner and Gearing-class
destroyers that began to enter service
in 1944.
At first glance, the 5”/38 doesn’t
appear impressive: neither its 54 lb.
projectile nor its 18,200 yard maxi-
mum range are outstanding. They
were sufficient, though, for surface
gunnery against unarmored warships,
which was the typical mission for
destroyer weapons and the second-
ary armament of major warships.
At the same time, the guns’ traverse
and elevation rates were faster than
that of any other major anti-aircraft
weapon of World War II, and that
enabled them to be used against all
but the most modern jet attack aircraft
and later anti-ship cruise missiles of
the Cold War era. Their hydraulic-as-
sisted loading system enabled a well
trained gun crew to sustain a rate
of fire of 10 to 12 rounds a minute
per gun. In some of the most heated
actions of World War II, some crews
fired 20 rounds a minute per gun for a
few minutes. That rate of fire gave US
destroyers unprecedented fire power:
a Gearing-class destroyer delivered
more explosives per minute than a
British C or D-class light cruiser,
even if the cruiser’s four-inch anti-
aircraft battery is included.
The 5”/38 also used a variety of
ammunition. Armor-piercing (AP)
ammunition constituted nearly 20
percent of the ammunition produced
before World War II, but by 1943,
anti-aircraft common (called “Able
Able Common”) made up over 80
percent of its ammo production,
followed by High Explosive (10
percent), white phosphorus (five
percent), and Illumination rounds
(five percent). Ships also continued
to carry a limited number of AP
rounds for bunker busting. There
was some postwar experimentation
with new fusing, including infrared
and radar-variable time fuses, in an
WaW-1-Issue.indd 43
effort to make the gun more effective
against various types of emerging
targets. During Vietnam the Navy
tested rocket-assisted projectiles to
increase the gun’s range, but it came
at a further cost in explosive power
and accuracy.
By 1960 it was apparent the guns’
fire control system was becoming
obsolescent. Modern jet aircraft ap-
proached at speeds at or above their
fire control system’s limits. That led
to further modifications to acceler-
ate the guns’ traverse and tracking
speeds. Though those changes bought
some time, by the early 1970s Soviet
cruise missiles entering service oper-
ated at supersonic speeds, forcing still
more modifications at a time when the
guns’ platforms were reaching the end
of their operational lives.
By 1973 it was apparent the 5”/38
was entering its final days. New
missile technologies, the improving
reliability of the automatic loading
systems of the longer-ranged and
more powerful 5”/54 gun that had
entered service in the 50s, and the
growing obsolescence of the 5”/38
platforms all mitigated against its
continued service. By 1980 only a
handful of frigates, reserve destroyers
and Coast Guard cutters still carried
them. Then came the re-introduction
of the battleship into naval service.
The re-commissioning of the
Iowa-class battleships gave the 5”/38
new life, extending its US naval
service almost to century’s end. As
the battleships’ secondary armament,
the gun provided NGFS to Marines in
Lebanon in 1983 and in Desert Storm.
Each battleship carried 7,000 rounds of
5”/38 ammunition and only 900 rounds
of 16-inch shells. More important, so
much 5” ammunition had been manufac-
tured in World War II’s final two years
the US still had nearly 1 million rounds
in storage in 1990. With 5” ammunition
so plentiful, both on board the ships and
in storage, the 5”/38 became the weapon
of choice for battleship fire missions
unless the target was out of their range or
exceptionally well hardened.
The 5”/38 was the world’s first “dual-
purpose” naval gun and arguably was
also the 20th century’s best medium-sized
naval cannon. It was high-tech when
it entered service and proved robust,
reliable and easy to maintain and use.
Though it’s no longer the most common
naval weapon on the globe, it remains in
service to this day among the navies and
coast guards of many nations, 70 years
after it was introduced.
~ Carl Otis Schuster
Next Issue
The game in our next issue will be
Solomons Campaign, an in-depth and
intense examination of the land, air and
naval facets of the 1942-43 Guadalcanal
campaign, designed by Joseph Miranda.
Articles in that issue will include:
“Strasbourg ’45”; “The Battle of Gdynia,
1939”’; “Operation Bodenplatt”; “Saga
of the USS Ohio”; “The Japanese ‘Knee’
Mortar”; “The Thai-French War of 1941”;
“Germany’s 50mm & 55mm Anti-Aircraft
Artillery”; and “Finland’s Winter War
Foreign Legion.”
World at War 43
5/14/08 1:16:30 PM
 Amerika Bombers:
Luftwaffe Plans to Bomb
the United States
By Perry Moore
The Luftwaffe He-177 heavy bomber and crew.
In World War I, the fledgling German air force ex-
perimented with the use of bombers to attack the Brit-
ish Isles. While the Royal Navy guarded the sealanes
against the German High Seas Fleet, the skies were open
to intruders. The idea was a series of bombing attacks
against British cities would cause a homefront morale
collapse and thereby break the trench deadlock on the
Western Front. Initial German strategic bombing efforts
used Zeppelins, but they proved less than effective. In
1917 the Germans began using their Gotha and “Giant”
bombers to attack Britain. Initially the effects were elec-
trifying. Small numbers of biplane bombers making day-
light attacks caused considerable panic in London and
other cities, but British air defense efforts were quickly
ramped up, frustrating the German intruders.
The entry of the United States into the Great War in
1917 caused far-thinking German airmen to consider the
possibility of using the aeroplane as a means to attack
the otherwise unreachable American mainland. That
would require the use of large biplanes to reach the east-
ern seaboard. Aircraft technology was unable at the time
to produce a bomber that could cross the Atlantic, de-
liver its bombs, and return to Europe.
44 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 44
Enter Hitler
With the end of the World War on 11 November
1918, those plans were largely forgotten. Germany
was disarmed by the Versailles Treaty, but Gen. Hans
von Seeckt, commander of the German armed forces
in the 1920s, the Reichswehr, encouraged new ways
of thinking about warfare. In 1929, Maj. Wilberg, an
army weapons officer, created a report on require-
ments for the building of a strategic bomber. That re-
port remained secret until 1933, surfacing with the rise
of Adolf Hitler. He supported the building of a new
German air force, the Luftwaffe, and the Luftwaffe’s
first chief of staff, Gen. Walther Wever, was a strategic
bombing enthusiast.
The proposed intercontinental bomber was to be a
four engine aircraft with a crew of eight. It was to be
armed with two 20mm cannon and five machineguns.
Its operational altitude was to be 19,700 feet with a top
speed of 186 miles per hour. Its range would be 1,242
miles. It was not a particularly impressive aircraft by
World War II standards, but for the early 1930s, if it
could have been built, the bomber would have been
ahead of its time.
5/14/08 1:16:30 PM
 Luftwaffe Organization
The Luftflotte was responsible for aerial operations on a
major sector of the front. The Fliegerkorps contained several
geschwader, plus sometimes independent gruppen/satafflen of
fighters and recon aircraft. Geschwader generally were func-
tionally organized with aircraft capable of the same mission,
such as medium bombers. Gruppen usually had all aircraft of
the same type. Fliegerdivisionen and Fliegerfuehreren were
special commands operating where there were not sufficient
aircraft to warrant a full Fliegerkorps.

World at War 45

WaW-1-Issue.indd 45 5/14/08 1:16:33 PM

 Other long-range aircraft were in various planning
stages. But with the death of Wever in a May 1936
flying accident, the Reich Air Ministry became more
interested in aircraft that could conduct operations
within the confines of the continent of Europe or could
support the newly forming panzer divisions. Conse-
quently the Germans emphasized short-range fighters
such as the Me-109 and medium bombers such as the
He-111.
Still, the Germans went forward with some ex-
perimental long-range aircraft. The Do-19 first flew in
1936. The Ju-89 flew in 1937. They were originally
built as transports but could be converted into bombers.
In 1936 the Reich Air Ministry requested a long-range
bomber capable of flying 3,100 miles with a 1,100 lb.
bombload. The east coast of the United States is 4,000
miles from Europe; so, unless the Germans could seize
forward airbases on the Atlantic islands, or Greenland,
America was still out of range.
Nonetheless, the competition to build long-range
aircraft was fierce. Focke-Wulf produced its FW-200,
a four-engine aircraft, and in August 1938 one flew
non-stop from Berlin to New York. America could
now be reached by air. Later during World War II, the
FW-200 would see extensive use as a maritime attack
aircraft.
In 1939 the He-177 Greif (Griffin) had its first
test flight. The He-177 was intended to be a strategic
bomber, but was plagued with development problems.
While it had four engines, it had only two propellers—
each propeller was turned by two engines coupled
together. That was done to reduce drag and increase
airspeed, but proved to be an inefficient design. The
Greif’s engines also had a habit of catching fire, which
made it less than popular with its crews.
Luftwaffe officers plan an attack.
46 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 46
While the He-177 is frequently disparaged (Hitler
once referred to it as the “worst junk ever”), its techni-
cal shortfalls reflected a real problem within the Ger-
man aircraft industry—the lack of engines capable of
providing sufficient speed for large bombers. The He-
177 had been rushed into production in the hope such
engines would be developed later. That necessitated ad
hoc solutions, such as the coupling of two engines to
each propeller, to actually get the aircraft to fly.
Meanwhile, in 1937, Hitler met with aircraft de-
signer Willy Messerschmitt. To the Fuehrer’s surprise,
Messerschmitt presented him with a long-range bomb-
er program. He had already worked up specifications
for the Me-261, an aircraft that could fly 4,160 miles at
16,400 feet with a 2,205 lb. bombload. Two prototypes
were actually built. Messerschmitt also had plans for
the Me-264, a long-range four-engine aircraft.
Amerika Bomber
The Reich Air Ministry was interested in long-
range aircraft designs, though mainly for reconnais-
sance. The Kriegsmarine (German navy) also support-
ed long-range designs for patrolling the North Sea and
Mediterranean and attacking Allied convoys. The Air
Ministry established the Amerika Bomber program to
design and build aircraft that could attack the United
States. While the military value of attacking American
targets might have been minimal, the potential political
value was immense. The appearance of German bomb-
ers over North America would show the United States
it was vulnerable to attack. Even a small effort would
probably lead to public demand for pulling back inter-
ceptors to defend the homeland, thereby undermining
the US war effort in Europe. Bombing major Ameri-
can cities, such as New York and Washington, would
also provide a morale boost for the Reich’s populace,
showing the Luftwaffe could retaliate for any attacks
against Germany.
The drawback for the Luftwaffe’s long-range bomb-
ers was they lacked the fuel capacity to fly across the
Atlantic, attack targets with an appreciable bombload,
then fly home. Several solutions were proposed, among
them seizing forward airbases in the Atlantic, such as
the Azores. That would have been difficult, though,
owing to Allied naval superiority. Aerial refueling was
also considered by the Air Ministry. Another alterna-
tive was building large seaplanes with up to eight en-
gines. They could “land” at sea and be refueled from
submarines or tankers.
War
World War II began in Europe on 1 September
1939 with the German invasion of Poland. The Weh-
rmacht overran Western Europe in the following year.
During the summer of 1940, the Reich tried to defeat
Britain in an air campaign that became known as the
Battle of Britain. But the Royal Air Force defeated the
Luftwaffe, pointing up Germany’s deficit in strategic
5/14/08 1:16:35 PM
 The Azores: Advanced Base against the Americas?
The Azores are Portuguese territory. While the Portuguese government was
officially neutral, it saw the danger of German domination of Europe, espe-
cially with Hitler’s friend, Generalissimo Franco, next door in Spain. Realizing
the importance of the islands as one of the few mid-Atlantic Ocean bases, the
Portuguese began gradually building up their defenses. In 1943 the British, us-
ing a 14th century treaty, negotiated the use of the islands as an airbase. They
constructed airfields and brought in aircraft squadrons to hunt for U-Boats and
otherwise defend the islands.
Any German attempt to seize the Azores would have been difficult, given
their distance from the European mainland and Allied naval superiority. One
possibility would have been for German airborne troops and special operations
units to seize the islands in a surprise attack, possibly ferried by seaplanes refu-
eling via submarines along the way. Holding the islands would have been more
difficult, given that the troops would have been out of range of most resupply
efforts, and the Germans would no doubt have been subjected to intense Allied counterattacks via air and sea.
Prior to the British expanding the base in 1943, the Azores had an airfield capacity for three or four squadrons (about 48 air-
craft). The island of Tecerira had 5,800 Portuguese defenders in one infantry and one artillery regiment. Its airfield contained
14 Gladiators, obsolescent biplanes. The larger island of San Miguel, further eastward, had 16,000 troops in three infantry
regiments, 13 Gladiators and 12 Grumman G-44s.
If a German base could have been established on the Azores, FW-200s and He-177s could have reached parts of the US
East Coast. Distances were 2,246 miles to Boston, 2,461 miles to New York, and 2,670 miles to Norfolk.

bombing capability. Nonetheless, Britain was under
siege from U-Boats, and with Hitler dominating the
continent, the United States became actively involved
in supporting the Allied cause. The US Navy patrolled
the Atlantic; American bases were established in Ice-
land, and Washington provided material support to the
Allies via Lend-Lease. It was becoming apparent the
United States would eventually become an active bel-
ligerent.
Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goring considered vari-
ous plans for attacking the east coast of the US in the
event of open hostilities. Again, his purpose was pri-
marily political, to show the American people they
were vulnerable to attack. By mid-1940 the Luftwaffe
had detailed plans for long-range bombers. They had
to be able to fly non-stop 7,450 miles with 4,400 lbs.
of bombs. The intent was to use airbases on the Atlan-
tic coast of occupied France to launch aircraft against
New York; however, the only operational long-range
bombers the Germans had were the FW-200 (2,170
mile combat range) and He-177 (4,036 mile range, not
operational until late 1942). Hitler liked New York as
a target because, aside from it being one of the Ameri-
can cities closest to Europe, it was also in his mind a
symbol of American power and wealth. More practi-
cally, there was considerable industry in the New York
area, and 20 manufacturing sites had been identified as
targets.
The Luftwaffe’s problem was not a lack of aircraft
designs, or even airframes. They were both plentiful
and valid. What was lacking were engines. In April
1941, the Air Ministry demanded that 50 Me-264s be
built and tested, with 10 aircraft to have top priority
so the air offensive against America could begin the
moment the United States entered the war. They were
to be capable of flying 7,450 miles with a bombload of
up to 22,050 lbs.
In a conference on 22 May 1941, Hitler was in-
formed that if Germany seized the Azores in the mid-
dle of the Atlantic, the islands could provide a base
from which the He-177s and FW-200s could bomb
America. The invasion never happened and the Brit-
ish negotiated a further agreement with the Portuguese
government in 1943 that turned the Azores into an Al-
lied military stronghold.
Still, the Air Ministry was not deterred. The He-
177, by refueling in mid-air, could be given a range of
5,900 miles. But the He-177’s engines malfunctioned
an average every five hours; so long-range flying was
rendered problematic at best. Beyond the engine is-
sue, aerial refueling was a largely untested technology
at the time. It would have meant coordinating aircraft
over the often stormy Atlantic with the primitive ra-
dio navigation aids of the day. Another alternative
was the use of drop tanks. The FW 200 with extra fuel
tanks had a range of 2,795 miles carrying 4,630 lbs. of
bombs.
Regardless of the technical solution—aerial refuel-
ing, drop tanks, a longer-range bomber—the question
becomes, what would any actual bombing campaign
accomplish? In a best case scenario, 12 to 30 bomb-
ers might reach the US east coast. They would lack
fighter escort, and US pursuit squadrons available at
the time flew P-39s, P-40s, P-47s and P-36s. Five US
interceptor squadrons were based at Mitchell Air Base
in New York, three squadrons at Norfolk, Virginia,
World at War 47

WaW-1-Issue.indd 47 5/14/08 1:16:35 PM

 Aircraft Specifications
Aircraft Max Speed Service Range Payload Armament Engines Crew
(mph) ceiling (miles) (bombload in (caliber of guns) (number &
(feet) pounds) horsepower)
Do-19 195 18,386 993 3,528 2 x 7.92mm, 2 x 20mm 4 x 715hp 9
FW-200 223 19,700 2,210 2,203 4 x 13mm, 1 x 20mm 4 x 1,200hp 5
He-177 305 26,266 3,415 2,205 + 2 x 3 x 7.92mm, 3 x 13mm, 2 2 (paired) x 5
missiles x 20mm 2,950hp
Ju-390 313 19,700 6,023 6,615 + 3 x 3 x 13mm, 4 x 20mm 6 x 1,700hp 10
missiles
Me-264 348 26,266 6,210 6,615 4 x 13mm, 2 x 20mm 4 x 1,730hp 6
(ferry)
US B-29 357 31,881 3,247 19,845 12 x 12.7mm, 1 x 20mm 4 x 2,200hp 11
Note: Aircraft specifications may differ owing to model being evaluated.

and seven squadrons at Savannah, Georgia. The first
wave of bombers would have the element of surprise,
but once alerted, subsequent attacks would become in-
creasingly risky. Air defenses, including radar, fighters
and antiaircraft guns, would be quickly built up.
Then, too, navigation shortfalls and weather condi-
tions might make it difficult for the bombers to find
their targets. However, the shock value of a Nazi at-
tack on the United States itself would be consider-
able, though that might also backfire by producing
even more American public opinion for prosecution
of the war until total victory, as had been the result of
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December
1941.
Enter the Me-264
The Luftwaffe did not have much faith in the He-
177, due to all its technical shortfalls. The FW-200,
while a good aircraft, lacked the bombload capacity
and range. So the Air Ministry finally decided to build
the Me-264. The Me-264 had its origins in Messer-
schmitt‘s P-1061, a reconnaissance aircraft. In 1940,
as part of its long-range bomber program, the Air Min-
istry ordered six Me-264s (the re-designated P-1061),
later reducing that to three aircraft. The first prototype
Me-264 flew on 23 December 1942. The aircraft was
difficult to handle owing to its high wing loading (the
ratio of aircraft mass to wing area, the lower the wing
loading, the more lift). Still, the design showed prom-
ise. It was to be only lightly armored in order to give
it more range. But, alas for the Reich, the Me-264 was
not to be.
In October 1943, the Air Ministry halted the Me-
264 program in order to transfer resources into jet
fighter production, needed to stem the growing Allied
strategic bombing menace. In July 1943 all three Me-
264 prototypes were destroyed or damaged in an Al-
lied air raid, and the program was officially cancelled
in September of that year.
One other aircraft is of interest in the Amerika
Bomber program. That was the Ju-390, a six-engined
long-range bomber and recon aircraft. Only two pro-
totypes were built, but its range of 6,023 miles would
have allowed it to fly from Europe to the US east
coast. There are claims one of the Ju-390 prototypes
actually did make such a flight in January 1944, com-
ing to within 12 miles of New York, sighting the city’s
lights before turning back. If true, that was the closest
the Nazis ever came to bombing America.
at

Iron Hammer
In 1943 the Luftwaffe was preparing for a last-ditch
strategic bombing campaign against the Soviet Union to
salvage the disintegrating military situation on the Eastern
Front. That was Operation Eisenhammer (Iron Hammer),
which was to employ He-177s to carry out attacks against
Soviet power generation and industrial facilities east of
Moscow. The bombers were to have launched guided
bombs/missiles that had already proven their worth in the
Mediterranean. But Iron Hammer was called off owing to
the Red Army’s capture of the forward airfields from which
the bombers were to have been based.
—Joseph Miranda
From the pilot’s seat: the Me-264 intercontinental bomber’s cockpit
48 #1

WaW-1-Issue.indd 48 5/14/08 1:16:36 PM

 To the Stars
Hitler would eventually turn to his rocket and missile program for long range retaliatory bomb-
ing, producing the V-1 and V-2 missiles. Those “vengeance” weapons were used against Britain and
not the United States, as they lacked the range to cross the Atlantic. The Nazis did begin develop-
ment of the A9/A10 intercontinental missile in 1940 at Peenemunde. It had a planned range of 6,210
miles, a speed of 32.11 miles per second, and a trajectory that peaked at an altitude of 34 miles,
effectively entering the fringes of outer space.
The A9/A10 was ahead of its time, using a two stage construction with a discardable booster
(A10) for initial thrust, and a warhead (A9) that would glide to the target. Tests showed the missile
would have been inaccurate at long-range, making it useless for military purposes. So the A9 stage
was redesigned with a cockpit for a pilot and delta wings (becoming, in effect, the first planned
manned spacecraft). The idea was, as the A9 approached the target, the pilot would fly the missile
onto the final glide path guided by radio beacons from surfaced submarines. Then, at the last mo-
ment, he would eject before the missile impacted.
The A9/A10 had an uneven development, being cancelled at one point in order for the Peen-
emunde scientists to concentrate on existing missile designs. But in late 1944 it was re-authorized
as Projekt Amerika. Its first flight was planned for 1946, but the end of the war brought the program
to a close. Interestingly, both the United States and the Soviet Union drew many ideas from the A9/
A10 in their own post-war missile designs. Hitler’s plans for bombing America eventually paid off
in both the Cold War nuclear balance of terror and the race to the moon.
—Joseph Miranda

Precursor to space: V-2 missile.

A Fast & Easy Playing Series of Card Games

Releasing in June
Lightning: Poland
This game depicts the German campaign
against Poland in September, 1939. Historically,
it was a stunning victory but the blitzkrieg strat-
egy was untested and Poland expected to hold
on long enough for other countries to intervene.
In the game, the Germans strive to force the Pol-
ish surrender quickly by capturing Polish cities
including the Polish capital, Warsaw. The Polish
fight to defend their cities and stop the German
advance. Cards depict the combat forces, objec-
tives, and events of the campaign.
All games include 110 full color playing cards and one sheet of rules.
Currently Available Games in the Series
War on Terror. You have been charged with hunting down
terrorist-aiding regions around the world and toppling their
corrupt governments. To accomplish that, you’ve been
given command of the latest weapons and best personnel
America has to offer.
D-Day. You command the Allied and Axis armies as each
struggles to control the five key beaches along the Norman-
dy coastline. You make vital command decisions that send
troops into battle, assault enemy positions, and make heroic
sacrifices so others can advance to victory!
Midway. From 4 to 6 June 1942, a massive battle raged
around the tiny Pacific island of Midway that changed the
course of World War II. You command the US and Japanese
fleets and their squadrons of fighter planes, torpedo bomb-
ers and dive bombers in this epic battle!
North Africa. Covering the great battles of Erwin Rommel
from 1941 to 1943, as he fought his way back and forth
across the deserts of North Africa. The game features: the
Afrika Korps, Tobruk, the Desert Rats, Malta, anti-tank
guns, resupply from Europe, minefields and more.

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24 hour fax line (661) 587-5031. Mail to : Decision Games, PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390-1598
World at War 49

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 BIAK: The War in the
Pacific’s Unknown Blunder
by John D. Burtt

Japanese units and operations are in italics.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s New Guinea campaign has been hailed by some historians as a
brilliant operation. Sidestepping large Japanese forces and striking where they were weak, the Allied Southwest Pacific (SW-
PAC) forces moved swiftly up the 1,000-mile-long New Guinea coastline on a direct path to the Philippines.
One step in the campaign, however, became controversial almost immediately. The invasion of Biak in May 1944 ran into
severe problems and ultimately failed to meet MacArthur’s promises for the campaign. Two regiments of the US 41st Infantry
Division assaulted Biak, an island off Western New Guinea, on 27 May 1944. The objective was to capture its three airfields
and use them to support the Central Pacific attack on the Marianas Islands, scheduled for 15 June. Despite the eventual rein-
forcement by two more regiments, the first airfield wasn’t captured until 22 June and the island itself wasn’t declared secure
until August.
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 The invasion came close to becoming a disaster that
might have set back the whole American timetable for the
Pacific War. Historians have since claimed the reason for the
setback was the American strategy of having two separate
drives toward Japan: the Central Pacific drive under Adm.
Chester Nimitz and the Southwest Pacific drive under Ma-
cArthur. Dividing forces gave the Japanese the opportunity
to try to defeat each drive in detail.
But given the resources available to the Americans, it ap-
pears that, though the dual drive strategy caused a risky split
in naval forces, the real problems on Biak were poor leader-
ship, tactical errors, and an unexpected Japanese defense.
Drive Across the Pacific
In early 1944 the Allies were accelerating their drives
against the Japanese. In the SWPAC, MacArthur and Adm.
“Bull” Halsey cooperated in Operation CARTWHEEL. That
resulted in the isolation and devastation of the Japanese base
at Rabaul, New Britain. Once it had been neutralized, the
Americans bypassed Rabaul in order to avoid the casual-
ties, as well as the delay, of a costly assault against it. The
great Japanese base at Truk had also been smashed in two
days of carrier aircraft attacks in February 1944. In the Cen-
tral Pacific, Nimitz showed the lessons of Tarawa had been
learned when his forces quickly took the Marshalls in Janu-
ary 1944.
So far so good, and the quick win in the Marshalls brought
the two-drive strategy into the spotlight. Though MacArthur
continued to argue that “forces in two weak thrusts...can-
not attain our major strategic objectives,” the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) disagreed. In particular, they wanted to take the
Marianas in the Central Pacific in order to stage their newest
strategic bomber, the B-29, directly against Japan.
MacArthur, concerned his slower pace up the New Guin-
ea coast might make the JCS cancel his cherished return to
the Philippines, proposed to cancel his next planned assault
on Hansa Bay, New Guinea, and instead leapfrog nearly 500
miles to land at Hollandia. That operation would bypass
Hansa Bay, where some 40,000 Japanese were digging in
and were expected to provide stiff resistance. Instead, the
landing at Hollandia would target rear-area support troops
who were busy trying to establish air bases. Hollandia would
be an easier target, and any airbases captured would further
support the SWPAC drive. The JCS agreed with MacArthur
and, on 12 March 1944, issued a directive that specified the
attack on Hollandia as well as Nimitz’s assault on the Mari-
anas. In addition, Nimitz was ordered to provide fast carrier
support for the Hollandia operation.
On 22 April, SWPAC forces landed at Hollandia in two
separate thrusts and quickly scattered the 11,000 Japanese
support troops. Four days later the three main airfields in the
region were under Allied control. Nimitz supported the op-
eration with three carrier groups and some 700 naval aircraft
of Task Force 58 under Rear Adm. Marc Mitscher. Shortly
after the successful landings, Mitscher took TF 58 back to
the Central Pacific to prepare for the Marianas.
Having seized the initiative, MacArthur planned more
leaps forward, first to the Wadke-Sarmi area, 140 miles west,
then to Biak Island. Biak was a late substitute-landing site,
selected because its airbases could easily be converted to
Allied use. Quick conversion was necessary, as MacArthur
had promised to provide air support for Nimitz’s Marianas
campaign. The next stop looked easy.
WaW-1-Issue.indd 51
The decision to invade Biak was made official on 10
May, just 17 days ahead of the day the troops were to land
on the island.
Meanwhile in Tokyo
Whereas the Allied fortunes of war were improving,
those of the Japanese were deteriorating. The Solomons had
been lost, and Rabaul and Truk neutralized. Japanese avia-
tors, lacking training and fuel, were unable to challenge US
air superiority.
Given a bad situation, the Imperial General Headquar-
ters (IGHQ) fell back on a basic Japanese obsession: to fight
a decisive battle that would annihilate the American naval
strike forces and then force the Allies to the negotiating ta-
ble. On 3 May IGHQ issued orders for that decisive battle.
On paper, the new A-Go operation was composed of over
1600 aircraft and an impressive looking battlefleet with nine
carriers, five battleships and 13 cruisers. The battle site was
planned to be near the Marianas where IGHQ expected the
next US attack.
Inherent in the plans was the necessity to conserve
strength everywhere until time for the decisive action. So
hard choices were made. The army section of IGHQ decided
on 9 May to redraw the Pacific defense perimeter and ex-
clude Biak Island. The Naval General Staff also chose to
write off the island, citing difficulties in resupply and rein-
forcement through enemy controlled waters.
But those decisions changed when the US invaded Biak
before the Japanese could launch A-Go. The Navy staff re-
alized US aircraft based on the island could threaten A-Go
from the southern flank. The navy, followed by the army,
decided to fight for Biak.
On to Biak—Operation
HORLICKS
Given the information available, MacArthur and Gen.
Walter Krueger (commander of the US Sixth Army) expect-
ed little trouble meeting their scheduled 27 May invasion
date for Biak. Air support was under Gen. G. C. Kenneys
and would be provided from Wadke Island, captured and
converted on 17 May 1944, among other bases. Vice Adm.
T. C. Kinkaid, commander of Naval Forces SWPAC, would
provide naval support.
Intelligence was sketchy, and the estimate of enemy
troops on the island was only 5,000 troops. Col. Charles Wil-
loughby, MacArthur’s intelligence chief, was not concerned
about the Japanese ground force. The lack of serious opposi-
tion at Hollandia and Wadke had given the SWPAC leader-
ship the impression Japanese capabilities had deteriorated.
MacArthur’s team expected a strong aerial reaction to the
continues on page 54
Biak
Biak is a 50-mile long island in the mouth of Geelvink Bay, some 500
miles west of Hollandia and 180 miles from Wadke. The Japanese had
two airstrips in service on the southern coast of the island, with another
near completion. The island was a mass of coral terraces and ridges
hidden by lush tropical growth. In particular, the southern coastline
was edged by a coral ridge some 200 feet in height. A reef surrounded
most of the island, limiting landing sites to areas away from the primary
objectives, the airfields. That didn’t seem to matter because the force
collected for the task was thought to be enough.
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 invasion, but no naval opposition. Thus SWPAC planners
thought Seventh Fleet would be sufficient, especially given
US air superiority.
As noted, tactical intelligence for the operation was
sketchy at every level. There were no maps, only aerial pho-
tographs that showed strong positions near Mokmer Airfield.
Despite the lack of hard information, SWPAC expected a
simple, quick invasion and easy capture of the objectives.
The best beaches were in front of Bosnek, capital of the
island, and Mokmer Village, near one of the targeted air-
fields. As photo-reconnaissance had shown considerable
Japanese combat strength near Mokmer, Maj. Gen. Horace
H. Fuller, commander of 41st Infantry Division, decided to
land his battalions near Bosnek, nine miles from the airfields.
The 186th Infantry Regiment would lead off with the mission
of establishing a beachhead 600 yards deep and extending a
mile in each direction from the landing site. The 162nd Infan-
try would then land and push west to the airfields.
At 6:30 a.m. on 27 May, Kinkaid’s cruisers and destroy-
ers began their bombardment, 45 minutes before the first
American troops landed. Problems arose immediately, but
not for the Americans. Despite the long preparation time, the
actual landing caught Col. Kuzume Naoyuki, the island’s
commander, by surprise. Guns were not emplaced and,
worse, supplies had not been moved inland. In fact, the inva-
sion caught Lt. Gen. Numata Takazo, chief of staff of Second
Area Army, on the island in the middle of an inspection. De-
spite some claims that he led an inspired Japanese defense,
Numata actually refused command and did little except stay
with Adm. Senda until escaping the island in early June.
On the beaches, US landing teams were unprepared for
the strong westerly current that pushed the 186th Battalion
nearly two miles from the intended landing sites. The drift
went unnoticed because of the dust from the bombardment.
Despite the westerly landing of the 186th, Fuller decided to
have his regiments maintain their pre-planned assignments.
So the 186th moved back east while the 162nd landed at
Bosnek and moved west. That decision generated massive
confusion and delayed the post-landing movement toward
the airfields. In retrospect, Fuller should have had the regi-
ments exchange missions and thereby maintain the initiative
that complete surprise had presented him. Still, order was
restored from the confusion by noon.
Coming ashore: US infantry land on a Pacific island.
54 #1
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Some 15,000 Americans, 12 tanks, 28 howitzers, 500
vehicles and 2,400 tons of supplies were landed on the first
day. That excellent performance was then almost undone by
Rear Adm. W. M. Fechteler, commander of the Naval Attack
Force. He allowed four loaded LSTs to start unloading at
Biak side-by-side despite the risk of Japanese air attack. Af-
ter dark that first air attack took place, involving four bomb-
ers with fighter escort. All four bombers were shot down,
with one crashing into a sub-chaser. The bombs they dropped
failed to explode. The Americans were lucky; had the LSTs
been hit, the beachhead supply situation would have become
perilous.
The 162nd finished the day by moving west, with 3rd Bat-
talion in the lead. The first real resistance was encountered
at what became known as the Parai Defile, where a 200-
foot cliff came within 100 feet of the beach. In a preview
of things to come, a few Japanese held up the battalion for
three hours before American tanks finally arrived to punch
through. One US company tried to climb the cliffs to take up
a flank position for the westward march but the steep terrain
stopped them.
By the end of the day, 3rd Battalion had gone through
Mokmer Village, while its brother battalions were at Parai
and Ibdi. It was an impressive start to the operation, and it
seemed to indicate intelligence estimates of weak Japanese
strength were correct.
Fighting Inland
The next day, 3/162 (3rd Battalion, 162nd Regiment) con-
tinued its advance toward Mokmer while 2/162 was ordered
to scale the steep cliffs to the plateau and protect the right
flank. By 9:30 a.m. the troops had reached a road junction
1,500 yards west of the village, only 200 yards short of the
airfield. There the Japanese suddenly came to life. Machine-
gun fire and mortars hit the 3/162 from front and flank. There
was little room for maneuver on the coast road, and there
was no help from 2/162, which had stalled on the cliffs due
to terrible terrain and increasing enemy resistance.
A Japanese counterattack by 2/222 got through to the
coast road, and two companies of the US 3/162 were cut off
for a short period. Artillery and naval support was sparse be-
cause all but one radio failed. The battalion was withdrawn
back to Mokmer Village, fighting through the Japanese road-
block.
Though the 186th was inactive, the withdrawal of 3/162
and the failure of 2/162 to reach the terrace prompted Fuller
to request additional troops. Krueger agreed and ordered two
battalions of the 163rd Infantry (also of the 41st Division) to
speed up their redeployment to the island.
Early on 29 May, Kuzume attacked with elements of the
2/222 and 3/222 supported by 10 tanks. The 3/162 repulsed
three separate attacks while the light Japanese tanks proved
no match for two medium Shermans of the 603rd Tank Com-
pany. The first tank battle of the Pacific war was thus a rout,
with all 10 Japanese tanks lost at a cost of a stuck gun on one
Sherman. Some 500 Japanese infantry were also killed in
the attacks, but another group of Japanese again cut the road
behind the lead elements.
The 162nd was in a difficult position. Enemy fire enfi-
laded their positions from the heights on their right flank.
The positions, hidden in coral caves and covered by heavy
growth, had excellent fields of fire and better observation of
the coast; the 162nd could hardly make out where the enemy
5/14/08 1:17:00 PM
 was. Fuller decided to pull the regiment farther back. Five and fighting conditions. The 186th made little progress, and
companies were withdrawn by amphibious landing craft, the 162nd was stopped cold at the Parai Defile.
while 1/162 and the remainder of the force broke through Krueger, needing an airfield to meet MacArthur’s goals,
the Japanese barrier and retreated along the road. A new de- ordered a company of the 163rd to invade and survey Owi
fensive position was taken up near Mandon, where the 186th and Woendi islands just off Biak’s coast. Company A/1/163
had erroneously landed two days before. Behind them the performed the duty, found the islands undefended, seized the
Japanese filed into the caves and positions near Parai. objectives and the engineers started work.
The next two days found the Hurricane task force reor-
ganizing and trying to determine the extent of the opposi- The High Command Responds
tion. Patrolling determined that, rather than one coral ridge While Hurricane Force struggled against the terrain, heat
flanking the coastal road, there were a series of seven, hon- and Kuzume’s troops, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)
eycombed with crevices and caves and covered with heavy high command was debating a response to the invasion.
rain forest growth. That terrain was now being actively de- Vice Adm. Ugaki Matome, commanding Ozawa’s Battleship
fended by Japanese. Division 1, argued successfully that enemy planes stationed
Krueger ordered Fuller to regain the initiative, push for- on Biak would cut off Western New Guinea airstrips, inter-
ward “vigorously” and complete his mission. Fuller’s plans
were more elaborate this second time. With the newly ar-
rived 163rd Regiment protecting the beachhead, the 186th
would push inland then turn west along the interior plateau.
The 162nd would again push up the coast, this time with its
flanks defended.
The new attack jumped off on 1 June but made little
headway. Early on the morning of 2 June, the Japanese
struck again with a heavy counterattack by 1/222. The attack
was repulsed, with 100 casualties including the battalion’s
commanding officer, but it further delayed the Americans.
More damaging was the lack of water, and that lack
began to be felt in the intense heat. There was no water in
Biak’s interior, so it had to be hand-carried to the troops over
poor trails. That limited the water available to the troops to
one canteen per man, clearly insufficient given the weather
Once ashore: infantry slogs through jungle island terrain.
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 The Americans dict Palau’s airfields, and threaten fleet movements west of
Gen. Walter Krueger, commander of US Sixth Army, allotted two Mindanao. The new Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Toyoda,
regiments of the 41st Infantry Division for the task of capturing Biak. agreed and issued Dispatch Operations Order #102, order-
It was called Hurricane Force and consisted of the 162nd and 186th ing a counter-invasion of Biak, code named KON.
Infantry Regiments, reinforced by a company of medium tanks (603rd When the IJN decided to contest Biak, the Japanese
Tank Company), three field artillery battalions, a battalion of 155mm transferred 90 aircraft, mostly fighters, to the area, the first
artillery from Sixth Army, and two antiaircraft battalions. Three avia- of some 166 aircraft that would be sent. But that proved an
tion engineer battalions would land on D+2 (two days after the initial ineffective move. Many of the pilots became ill with ma-
invasion) to begin rehabilitating the captured airfields. In all, Krueger laria; the rest were basically untrained and often inept. For
had some 15,000 combat and 5,000 aviation service troops set aside example, on 2 June, 54 Japanese aircraft attacked the US an-
for Operation HORLICKS. Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller, commanding chorage off Biak, unopposed by Allied air, which had been
general of the 41st Division, would lead Hurricane Force. grounded by weather. Twelve of the intruders were shot
Airpower for the Biak campaign was in the hands of Gen. G.C. down by anti-aircraft fire, with only a near miss on an LST
Kenney’s Fifth Air and Thirteenth Air Forces (of the US Army Air to show for their effort. An attack the next day by 41 aircraft
Force). At the time of the invasion the total Allied air strength in the (again with no Allied interception due to weather) lost 11
region stood at 800 fighter, 780 bomber, 173 reconnaissance and 373 aircraft for slight damage to a destroyer. The Japanese air
transport aircraft. About half were available at any one time, the rest effort over Biak was completely ineffective.
being down for maintenance and At sea, Operation KON called for Rear Adm. Sakonju
repair. Aircraft were staging out of Naomasa’s Cruiser Division 16 (heavy cruiser Aoba and light
Hollandia and the Admiralties with cruiser Kinu) to lead the counter-invasion with the battleship
two fighter groups (approximately Fuso, heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro, and 12 destroy-
75 aircraft each) operating out of ers in support. The ships were to transfer the 2,500 troops
the newly won airfield of Wadke, of the 2nd Amphibious Brigade from Davao and Zamboanga
opened only days after its 17 May to Biak during the night of 4 June. The force assembled at
invasion. Davao on 1 June and sailed south. The amphibious brigade
The naval strength allotted was an army unit trained for sea borne counterattacks against
for Operation HORLICKS was the Allied intrusions into the Japanese defensive sphere.
weakest of the three services. Vice Allied ULTRA intelligence tracked the orders for KON,
Adm. T. C. Kinkaid, commander providing Kinkaid with crucial information as to when and
of Naval Forces SWPAC, had two where the landing would be attempted. He sent his ships, un-
Australian heavy cruisers, four light der the tactical command of Rear Adm. V.A.C. Crutchley, to
cruisers and some fourteen destroy- intervene. Crutchley’s orders were to destroy forces inferior
ers to provide fire support and naval to his in strength but retire before superior forces. He had the
cover for the Biak operation. heavy cruiser Australia, light cruisers Boise, Nashville and
Phoenix, and 14 destroyers. Kinkaid’s orders were based on
Sgt. Alvin Josephy a realistic view of his naval strength.
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The new intelligence generated an immediate reaction
on the island. Offensive operations were interrupted as ar-
tillery batteries were dug in and re-sited to face out to sea.
Supplies stockpiled in the Bosnek area had to be dispersed
in the event of Japanese bombardment. Effectively, the inva-
sion was halted.
On 3 June, Allied recon aircraft sighted the KON force
700 miles short of its goal. Surprise had been lost. Then Jap-
anese reconnaissance erroneously reported US carriers off
Biak, as their inexperienced airmen apparently had mistaken
LSTs for carriers. The Japanese high command, having little
in the way of effective air support, chose not to continue the
counterattack. The 2nd Amphibious Brigade was unloaded at
Sorong, and Fuso and her escort sailed back to Tawi Tawi.
The Americans had dodged a major bullet.
Back on Biak
The near miss at sea failed to dent US overconfidence,
which led to tactical sloppiness. On the night of 4-5 June,
the airfield at Wadke had over 100 aircraft lined up wing-
tip to wingtip, a situation Kenney remembers as “inviting
trouble.” Two Japanese bombers raided the island, destroy-
ing 30 to 60 aircraft (depending on who was counting) and
putting Wadke Airfield out of commission for several days.
That seriously affected American air cover for Biak.
Along with the Japanese efforts, other outside influences
were building up to delay the island’s capture. At Hollandia,
MacArthur announced Biak was being “mopped up,” essen-
tially declaring a victory where none existed. The Australian
press picked up on the line and had a field day, seriously
embarrassing MacArthur. That, in addition to the possibility
his promise to Nimitz for air support against the Marianas
would go unfulfilled, made MacArthur push Krueger for re-
sults. Krueger responded with pressure on Fuller, sending
his staff to investigate the situation. On 6 June the pressure
led Fuller to make a bad tactical error.
WaW-1-Issue.indd 57
Japanese 75 millimeter AA gun.
The Japanese
The Japanese position on Biak was far stronger than the
Americans expected. The main defense force came from the
222nd Infantry Regiment/36th Infantry Division, commanded
by Col. Kuzume Naoyuki, which had been on the island for
five months. In addition, there were three airfield construction
units, a field antiaircraft battery, and some 1,500 naval troops
under Rear Adm. Senda Sadatoshi. The defense also included
some 30 Type-95 light tanks with 37mm cannon and machine-
guns. There were close to 11,000 Japanese on Biak, half of
them trained combat troops, double what SWPAC expected.
Kuzume broke with traditional Japanese doctrine to defend
his island. Japanese tactics in May 1944 demanded the anni-
hilation of the enemy at the waterline instead of a defense in
depth. That doctrine did not officially change until after Saipan
had fallen in July 1944. Rather than put his troops up front,
where they could be suppressed by US firepower, Kuzume
positioned his main defenses so he could deny the use of the
airfields with artillery interdiction fire for the longest possible
time. Tht approach was totally unexpected by US planners.
Japanese airpower supporting Biak was poor, because
aircraft were being conserved for the A-Go operation in the
Marianas. Responsibility for air defense in the region rested
with the 23rd Air Flotilla, based in Sorong on the western tip of
the Vogelkop Peninsula, some 325 air miles from Biak. On 27
May it had just nine fighters and four bombers ready for opera-
tions; however, there were 21 airfields within range of Biak re-
inforcements were to be shifted that way. On paper some 1,600
aircraft were available for A-Go and potentially for Biak, in
the First Air Fleet under Vice Admiral Kakuta Kakuji, but only
about 20% were actually available. The rest were lost to poor
maintenance and enemy action.
The Japanese had two major naval anchorages at Davao and
Tawi Tawi, which were within 60 hours sailing time from Biak.
With the IJN concentrating the fleet for A-Go, the Japanese had
temporary naval superiority. The First Task Force, under Vice
Adm. Ozawa Jisaburo, was organized into two sections. The
2nd Fleet included two battleship divisions with the 69,000-ton
super-battleships Yamato and Musashi, three cruiser divisions
with 10 heavy cruisers and a screen of four destroyer divisions.
Third Fleet, the carrier strike force, included three carrier divi-
sions (six heavy and three light carriers) and some 450 aircraft.
By 16 May, Ozawa’s task force was at Tawi Tawi.
World at War 57
5/14/08 1:17:04 PM
 Seapower: superbattleship Yamato.
Fuller ordered the 186th, reinforced with the 2/162, to
break through directly to Mokmer airfield. The regiment at
the time was pushing slowly, but surely, through the Japa-
nese positions on the coastal plateau. Col. O. P. Newman,
commander of the 186th, protested the orders on the grounds
that such a move would bypass too many Japanese positions.
But Fuller restated the order and the 186th complied.
As Newman’s four battalions moved out towards Mok-
mer Airfield, the rest of the 162nd was preparing to bypass
the Parai Defile. The 3/162 was loaded onto amphibious ve-
hicles and landed directly at Mokmer Village. By the end of
7 June, Mokmer Airfield was finally in US hands.
But the tactical error was making itself felt. Japanese fire
from the bypassed positions kept engineers from working on
the airfield and, more importantly, was keeping LCMs and
LSTs from landing supplies on the isolated beachheads of
the 162nd and the 186th. It was only later that night landing
craft were finally able to make it to the beach with ammuni-
tion and other critical supplies.
On 8 June the two beachheads were finally linked, but
engineers were still unable to work on the airfields. Japanese
machinegun, mortar and artillery fire kept things interdicted.
Fuller’s regiments began to attack outward to mop up the
positions they had bypassed.
Surrounding Waters
At the same time, the Japanese were again attempting
to reinforce the island. A second KON operation was made
with a much smaller force of six destroyers, carrying only
about 800 troops and supplies. Cruisers Aoba and Kinu were
supposed to provide support for the effort but ultimately held
back, probably due to Allied air activity. Despite limited air
support from devastated airfields on Wadke, US long-range
B-24s from Lake Sentani attacked the destroyers at noon
on 9 June and sank the Harusame. The convoy continued
toward Korim Bay, on the north side of Biak. There they
sighted (and were sighted by) Crutchley’s force of cruisers
and destroyers (less the Nashville, which had been damaged
in an air raid the day before) at 10:00 p.m.
Mistaking the Australia for a battleship, the Japanese
retreated with 12 US destroyers in full pursuit. The chase
ended four hours later with a single hit on destroyer Shi-
ratsuyu. Crutchley called off the pursuit as his ships were
moving out of range of air cover. Only a few Japanese troops
from cast-off barges made it to Biak.
Ashore, the Americans were making little headway. The
only significant milestone was the reopening of the Parai
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WaW-1-Issue.indd 58
Defile on 12 June, allowing traffic directly from the primary
US base in Bosnek. Travel remained difficult, though, as
Japanese gunners could still fire upon the coastal corridor.
The Japanese Navy decided to make a major push for
Biak, despite the earlier failures. First Fleet Commander
Ozawa committed a massive force for the third effort.
Cornerstone of that effort were the battleships Yamato and
Musashi, accompanied by heavy cruisers Aoba, Myoko, and
Haguro and seven destroyers. Their mission was to land 800
troops at all costs, and to destroy American positions, sup-
plies and ships. This fleet was off the coast of Halmahera on
11 June, finalizing their preparations.
This third KON operation has sparked considerable his-
torical discussion. Ozawa’s fleet was markedly superior in
every way to Kinkaid’s available ships, and Kinkaid would
have likely avoided a surface battle. Clearly, had the two
Japanese 18-inch gun battleships reached Biak, severe dam-
age would have been inflicted on US positions. And unlike
the previous KON efforts, there is no indication the US knew
the battleships were coming. Just as clear, however, is the
fact the ground troops the fleet carried were insufficient to
do more than delay the inevitable US victory on Biak.
The Japanese fleet would have also still have been op-
erating without adequate air cover. As stated previously, the
Japanese air effort in the area was poor and Ozawa had not
sent a carrier with the battleships to provide support. The
fleet would have been under attack, as soon as it had been
spotted, by every aircraft Kenney had. Given that US recon-
naissance was reaching out some 700 miles, the Japanese
zone of vulnerability was substantial. There is no way of de-
termining whether Ozawa’s ships could have continued in
the face of an American air blitz, although his “at all costs”
order seems clear.
In the event, nothign came of the third Kon operation.
On 12 June the US Third Fleet under Adm. Spruance began
its pre-invasion attacks on the Marianas. This signaled the
start of the Japanese A-Go operation, and Ozawa recalled his
battleships to take part. Ironically, the invasion of the Mari-
anas saved MacArthur’s Biak operation, when the general
had expected Biak’s bases to support Nimitz at Saipan.
Command Crisis
The inability to fulfill the promise of air support for the
Saipan operation continued the concern in MacArthur’s
headquarters over credibility. MacArthur had put enormous
pressure on Krueger, telling him at one point Biak was “se-
riously interfering with the execution of strategic plans.”
5/14/08 1:17:05 PM
 Krueger responded by sending staff officers to Biak to in-
vestigate the situation. They began to report that attacks
were not being coordinated well or carried out aggressively.
They also reported Fuller was not spending time at the front
pushing his people. That indictment was odd, considering
neither MacArthur nor Krueger visited Biak to do any push-
ing themselves.
Krueger decided to make a change, and ordered Lt. Gen.
Robert Eichelburger, I Corps commander at Hollandia, to go
to Biak and take over as Hurricane Force commander. Fuller
was to continue only as commander of the 41st Infantry Divi-
sion. He refused the obvious demotion in responsibility and
asked to be relieved instead. On 15 June, Eichelburger ar-
rived on Biak with express orders from Krueger to launch an
immediate attack to clear the airfields. In addition, the 34th
Infantry Regiment, 24th Division was sent as a reinforcement
to the island.
Despite Krueger’s orders for an immediate attack,
Eichelburger spent three days acclimatizing himself to the
situation and resting his troops. He had three regiments es-
tablished in an arc around Mokmer Airfield. His plan was for
a coordinated effort by all three.

Complex Combat
On the other side of the jungle, the Japanese situation
was deteriorating rapidly. Kuzume’s troops had enough am-
munition, but little food or water. The loss of the coastal
wells meant the only source of water for them was located
some 14 miles inland.
Communications among the defenders was limited. Ku-
zume had his headquarters in a cave complex called the West
Caves, some 1,200 yards from Mokmer Airfield. Adm. Sen-
da was headquartered in a complex called the East Caves,
located east of Mokmer. Finally, there was a major center of
resistance in a cave/bunker complex called the Ibdi Pocket.
There was little communication among those complexes
and no coordination. What limited reinforcements that actu-
ally made it to the island, some 1,200 troops from the 219th
and 221st Regiments of the 35th Division, were immediately
thrown into defensive positions.
Still, each Japanese complex was strong and well de-
fended. The West Caves were actually an interlocking series
of three large sumps (that is, holes in the ground), connected
by tunnels and caverns. It could hold over 1,000 troops. The
area was also ringed by pillboxes and bunkers. The East
Caves were located in the face of a 240-foot high cliff. There
were two large caverns with pillboxes and defenses above
and below the entrances. The caves held mortars, 20mm
guns and heavy machineguns. More significantly, the East
Caves could observe everything from Parai to Mokmer Air-
field and thereby fire on approaching Americans. Finally, the
Ibdi Pocket was a 400 by 600 yard position with some 21
natural caves and over 75 pillboxes within the position. Each
position would have to be reduced by the Americans if they
wanted to secure the island.
Eichelburger’s plan was straightforward and similar to
the one Fuller had been developing. The 186th would punch
through and envelop the Japanese right flank, while the 163rd
and 162nd operated against the rear and left, respectively. The
primary objective was the high ground north of the airfield.
Once the Japanese positions were suppressed, the work on
the airfield could be re-started. The newly arrived 34th Infan-
try was to move west against Sorido and Borokoe airfields.
In the air: USAAF B-24 bomber.
The major difference between Eichelburger’s plan and
Fuller’s was the new Hurricane force commander put more
emphasis on reconnaissance, preparation and coordination
than had Fuller. What Eichelburger could also do that Fuller
could not was ignore Krueger until he was ready to move.
Krueger kept up a blistering barrage of demands for action.
Eichelburger responded that he needed time to correct his
“complete ignorance of the situation” and to rest the troops
for a well-coordinated effort.
On 19 June the coordinated attack jumped off. With
1/162 engaging the West Caves directly and 3/163 taking
the high ground directly behind the caves,, the 186th, with
2nd Battalion leading, pushed north and west against limited
opposition, and by the end of the day had taken the ridge
behind the caves and completed its isolation.
The next day the 34th infantry jumped off to the west and,
against moderate resistance, overran Sorido and Borokoe
Airfields as well as Sorido village. While aviation engineers
began work on Mokmer, 1/162 attacked the West Caves with
tank support. The troops made it to the edge of the sumps
and began a three-day trial by fire to find a way to reduce the
position. Massed artillery, pointblank tank fire, air bombard-
ment, and poured gasoline were used against the position.
The Japanese refused to surrender. The 41st Infantry was
beginning to invent the “blowtorch and corkscrew” tactics
that would dominate island combat throughout the rest of the
war, the combination of flame weapons and demolitions to
dig out cave defenders. Still, the day ended with little prog-
ress and the battalion pulled back for the night.

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Jungle artillery: US mortar crew fires their weapon.
The attack on 21 June focused on Cave 1, where all the
positions surrounding the entrance were finally silenced.
Direct tank fire was nearly futile, as the stalagmites and
stalactites stopped incoming rounds, but the tankers could
suppress the enemy long enough for the infantry and engi-
neers to work in close. Drums of gasoline were rolled into
the sump and ignited. Again the 1/162 pulled back for the
night.
The Japanese, isolated and pinned in the caves, knew it
was just a matter of time. Kuzume burned his regimental
colors and ordered his troops to break out to the north and
continue the fight from there. Their massed attack struck the
186th in their northern blocking positions. Over 100 Japanese
soldiers were killed. Few made it through, although small
groups, including Kuzume, infiltrated through the lines.
On 22 June, 1/162 finally succeeded in silencing the
West Caves, now depleted of most of its defenders, by low-
ering 1,000 pounds of TNT into the caves and exploding it.
Several days later, troops entered the caves and found the re-
mains of some 125 Japanese along with tons of equipment.
On the same day, P-40s from Fifth Air Force began oper-
ating off of Mokmer Airfield. The reason for the Biak inva-
sion was finally a reality.
Endgame
The reduction of the West Caves and the opening of Mok-
mer Airfield marked the effective end of the Biak campaign,
though the battle would continue for two more months. The
East Caves were finally reduced on 4 July, after bombers
struck it using skip bombing. The Ibdi Pocket was surround-
ed and reduced position by position and finally inundated
with firepower. From 10-20 July, some 6,000 rounds of artil-
lery were pumped into the pocket, followed by a B-24 strike
on 22 July with 1,000 lb. bombs. Troops finished the sweep
on 28 July. The 3/163 was amphibiously transported to Ko-
rim Bay on the north shore to sweep that area. On 20 August,
Krueger declared the campaign over.
The final casualty figures had 400 US dead and 2,000
wounded; there were also some 7,200 non-battle casualties
due to sickness. It is estimated over 8,000 Japanese were
killed.
What If?
Based on a review of the forces available to both sides,
only their naval resources appeared to be adequate for the
task, had they pushed their naval advantage. Without deter-
60 #1
WaW-1-Issue.indd 60
mined naval opposition, American division of forces meant
little. And it was air superiority that provided the edge that
allowed the US to risk splitting its naval resources. Thus,
from a resources point of view, the American dual drive
strategy did not contribute to the problems on Biak.
That strategy did help, in fact, in that it kept the Japa-
nese guessing about where the next major blow would fall.
In their attempt to force the decisive battle, they assumed the
Marianas would be the next battle site and did not have the
flexibility to change plans and commit the proper resourc-
es in a determined manner to adapt to a changed situation.
Their half-hearted effort to reinforce the air and ground units
at Biak did little except take away from their A-Go effort.
The dual drive strategy also had an effect on the Biak
campaign in its effect on MacArthur’s leadership style. In
his effort to speed up his SWPAC campaign (and save his
Philippines plans), he exerted maximum pressure on his
commanders to finish each operation in minimum time
and move on. The result was no real attempt was made to
complete one task before jumping to another. This process
worked well at times. MacArthur invaded the Admiralties
in February with troops outnumbered 4:1, and he won when
the Japanese could not coordinate their attacks. He invaded
Wadke in May and had its airstrips in full operation a week
after the landing. But that approach failed on Biak.
On Biak, planning was minimal and overly optimistic.
Regimental commanders did not even know when the air-
fields were supposed to be captured. Intelligence was often
minimal or faulty. Dense growth and broken terrain, com-
bined with extreme heat and lack of water, slowed the at-
tackers significantly. In addition, US troops ran into a deter-
mined Japanese defense from a commander who knew what
his priority was—deny the airfields—and how to accomplish
it for the maximum time. Finally, there was operational slop-
piness from all US services based on overconfidence.
In short, bad planning, bad terrain, determined resis-
tance, and poor US leadership caused the delays on Biak,
not the dual drive strategy. That strategy would in fact be
vindicated in the year following with Allied forces breaching
the Japanese inner defense perimeter on a broad front.
at
Sources
Books
Barbey, Daniel E., MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious
Force Operations, 1943-1945, Annapolis: USNI, 1969.
Chwialkowski, Paul, In Caesar’s Shadow: The Life of General Robert
Eichelberger, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.
Craven W. F. and Cate, J. L., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume
IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, Washington: Office of Air
Force History, 1983.
Drea, Edward J., MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against
Japan, 1942-1945, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992.
Hayashi, Saburo, Kogun: the Japanese Army in the Pacific War, Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1978.
James, D. Clayton, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, 1941-1945, Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975.
Kenney, George C., General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the
Pacific War, Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1949.
Krueger, Walter, From Down Under to Nippon: The story of the Sixth Army
in World War II, Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1953.
Long, Gavin, MacArthur as Military Commander, New York: D. Van Nos-
trand Company, 1969.
5/14/08 1:17:07 PM
 World at War 61

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 Decision Games…
Games
publisher of military history magazines & games

China: The Middle Kingdom

China: The Middle Kingdom covers the full scope of
Chinese history, from its beginnings as a collection of warring
feudal states, to the current cold war between China and
Taiwan. In this epic game based on the classic Avalon Hill
Britannia system, four players each control several factions
simultaneously, with each faction having their own objectives
and situations, such as conquering certain provinces. The
winner is the player who scores the most points by the end of
the game. This breathtaking game unfolds on an illustrated map
of China with 432 counters, covering 50 separate countries and
peoples, including all of the major dynasties of Chinese history,
the arrival of the European powers, both World Wars and the
Japanese invasion, right up to the end of the civil war between
the Communists and the Nationalists. The game occurs over
24 turns, starting from 403 BC, during the “Warring States”
period as China begins to rise from its feudal age. The game
has two shorter campaign scenarios covering the first half and
second half of the full campaign game.
Battles between armies can be dramatically affected by
the presence of mountains, emperors, heroes, new inventions,
and even the Great Wall. Rebellions, barbarian invasions, and
uprisings may spring up from anywhere, and signal the end of
one dynasty and the birth of a new dynasty. Diplomacy is as
important as military strength. Each player continually must
defend against multiple enemies on multiple fronts.

62 #1

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 Available this Summer
Flying Circus:
Aerial Combat in WWI
Flying Circus: Aerial Combat in WWI depicts the fun
and flavor of World War I aerial dogfighting. You fly the
colorful and agile aircraft of WWI as you make history
in the world’s first use of aircraft in a military role.
This is the basic game. You have everything you need
to play single aircraft duels to multi-aircraft dogfights.
Each aircraft has its own unique charateristics reflected
in its ratings and special abilities. The basic game rules
cover all the maneuvers that made WWI aerial combat:
barrel rolls, stall turns, Immelmanns, vertical rolls and
Chandelles. Outmaneuver your opponent to line up your
guns and watch his planes go down in flames!
Gamers who have played the Down in Flames game
series will find many similarities in game play, however,
previous experience is not necessary. The basic game
rules can be read in less than 20 minutes and you can
play your first game immediately.
110 full color
playing cards &
rules sheet
Flying Circus Deluxe:
Bombers & Campaigns
This is the deluxe game. You will need the basic game
card deck to play this expanded version. Then you will
have everything you need to play single aircraft duels
and team play with multiple flights in swirling dogfights.
This deluxe game adds rules for altitude, pilot abili-
ties—including a deck of 25 pilot cards for historical
campaigns—bombers, rear gunners, scouts and other
optional rules. This deluxe game also includes cards and
rules for playing multi-mission games of famous WWI
campaigns such as Cambrai and Meuse-Argonne, along
with a “Campaign Analysis” article detailing the develop-
ment of the aircraft, their tactics and strategy.
Contents:
110 Deluxe deck cards
(bombers, scouts, plus more
fighters & action cards)
Deluxe Game rules booklet
6 Campaign Cards
Pilot Log
36 Pilot & altitude cards
Dice marker

Shipping Charges
1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
$10 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail
20 2 Canada
26 4 Europe, South America
28 6 Asia, Australia

QTY Title Price Total

China The Middle Kingdom $60
Highway to the Reich $160
Flying Circus-Basic $25
Flying Circus-Deluxe $40
Shipping

Name
Address
City/State/Zip
Country
V/MC # Exp.
PO Box 21598 Signature
Bakersfield CA 93390
661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com Phone #
World at War 63

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 jump into history!

Highway to the Reich

Highway to the Reich is a tactical simulation of the largest airborne operation in history. Over 35,000 men
belonging to 1st Allied Airborne Army dropped from the skies of Holland. Their objective: capture and hold a high-
way. The result: a salient into German territory that lacked only the last objective, and was thus a tragic defeat.
The 2,000-plus counters detail Gen. Brereton’s airborne corps of three divisions, the units of 30th Corps, and
Model’s scattered and disheveled forces at company level for infantry; battery level for artillery, anti-tank and
anti-air, and troop-level for tanks and armored cars.
The four maps cover from the front along the Meuse-Escaut Canal to the area, nearly 200 hexes away, sur-
rounding Arnhem Highway Bridge. Each map is positioned to cover the operational area of one airborne division
in order to allow one-division scenarios.
All the activities of each formation are completed before those of another are begun. Attacks start with a
preliminary barrage, followed by fire attack by maneuver companies, and then close action with tanks and as-
sault troops. All activities involve comparisons of involved units’ capabilities. Optional rules focus on hidden
movement and multi-player variations, as well as giving the Allied player the opportunity to execute his own
operational plan. The revisions have made this classic game easier and faster to play than ever before.

Contents:
Four 22” x 34” maps
2,520 die-cut counters
Rule & scenario books
6 Organization Charts
Player Aid Cards
Campaign Analysis
Six-sided Dice

PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com Order form on page 63.
64 #1

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