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After Margarita died, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir.
First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left
However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the
registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, dismissal. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The
instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in
materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo:
into a residential or industrial subdivision
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is
Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more
to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case
injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory
parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor yet to be held and the judgment rendered.
Priscilla filed MTD on the grounds of (1) Prescription; and (2) No And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines
cause of action whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is
appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in
RTC denied MTD Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may
MR: granted MTD be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
Opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional Rules to be appealable; but the remedy from an interlocutory one is
sale for not being a party thereto; not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.
Javellana’s MR denied The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal
Javella: notice of appeal (decision of RTC denying MR)-> CA is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 allowed to be resorted to.
orders dismissing his complaint
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a
Petition for certiorari: denied by CA motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively
an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly
CA (IN NOTICE OF APPEAL) Remanded the records to the RTC for clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a
further proceedings in accordance with law. motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order
Decision of CA: There is a cause of action
II. YES. Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
As to contention that it was filed out of time: Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time.
CA gave due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because She points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on
Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21,
not even seek an extension of time to file his appellants brief; that 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion
current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of
present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from
that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an
given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000,
reasons. his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days
beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.
ISSUES:
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
I. WON the RTC order was appealable Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken
II. WON appeal was filed on time within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
III. WON there is forum shopping appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 We are aware that in Young v. Sy, in which the petitioner filed a
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional notice of appeal to elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial her case due to non-suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi- CA assailing the same orders four months later, the Court ruled that
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing the successive filings of the notice of appeal and the petition for
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to certiorari to attain the same objective of nullifying the trial courts
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that warranted the
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for dismissal of both cases. The Court said:
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution. Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a
petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping.
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had
already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to actions elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way of
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of litis pendentia
affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of are present between the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth
procedure. According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[28] Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the same
facts and refer to the same subject matterthe RTC Orders which
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders.
justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one
of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions forum may amount to res judicata in the other.
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial
procedure. policy. The petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two or
more appeals, and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags
ISSUE: WON the appeal was filed on time But human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should
stand in the way of performing a legal duty.
RULING: NO. The appeal was not filed on time
According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked
last day for filing and perfecting the appeal, in this case, was January for an extension of time, within which to file and perfect his appeal,
8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero should have filed his in the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he must bear the
(1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of court,
the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946. which have been considered indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial
Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules business, is an imperative necessity.
of court, will cause the judgment to become final, and the
certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the It may not be amiss to state in this connection that no irreparable
jurisdiction which has been lost. damage has been caused to the petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, as
Margarita Villarica, the vendor to the two, of the land in question,
The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond has shown readiness to repair the damage done.
should be perfected and filed may, however, be extended by order
of the court, upon application made, prior to the expiration of the No showing having been made that there had been merely
original period. excusable negligece, on the part of the attorney for petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that there had been gave abuse of sound
Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and judicial discretion, on the part of the respondent judge, the petition
effect of law; and rules of court prescribing the time within which for certiorari filed in this case, is, therefore, hereby dismissed,
certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are without costs. So ordered.
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory >Petitioner Bustos, the accused in a criminal case, assisted by
and imperative, so that failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation.
Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the >In that investigation, his counsel moved that the complainant
dismissal of the appeal. (Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39Phil., 922.) In the present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by
brief, within the time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the law.
appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, the court >The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11
may dismiss the appeal. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.) of rule 108.
>Objection was sustained.
Counsel for the petitioner Alvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure >In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to
to perfect and file his appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife, renounce his right to present evidence
which ended in her death on January 10, 1946, and by which he was > justice of the peace forwarded the case to CFI.
greatly affected.
>The petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of
It is not, therefore, difficult to understand the state of mind of the the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol,
attorney, and his intense devotion and ardent affection towards his the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine
dying wife. the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the
Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a difficult arrest of the accused.
situation. In his motion for reconsideration and new trial, dated >The motion was denied
December 27, 1945, he did not point out specifically the findings or > It is contended that Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
conclusions in the judgment, are not supported by the evidence or infringes Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. It is said that
which are contrary to law, making express reference to the the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs
pertinent evidence or legal provisions, as expressly required by Rule substantive rights
37, section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of that
kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely to ISSUE: WON Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court impairs
delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not substantive rights
interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection of the
appeal. Hence, the period for perfecting herein petitioner's appeal RULING: NO.
commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of the We are of the opinion that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its
judgment rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or
and, therefore, his notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the
January 8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
appeal bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946. Substantive rightsis a term which includes those rights which one
enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
It is futile to speak of hospitals, doctors and nurses to minister alone relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
to the needs of the sick and the dying, who are dearest to us, for our defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations
pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a
personal knowledge or based on authentic records. pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of
the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept that
based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to facilitate the
and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for
unsigned pleading. deserving reasons, be subordinated by the need for an apt
dispensation of substantial justice in the normal course. They ought
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other compliance, consistent with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn 1, Section 6.14 Not being inflexible, the rule on verification allows
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: for such liberality.15
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any Considering that the dismissal of the other complaints by the LA was
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi- without prejudice, the other complainants should have taken the
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other necessary steps to rectify their procedural mistake after the decision
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending of the LA was rendered. They should have corrected this procedural
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; flaw by immediately filing another complaint with the correct
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action verification this time. Surprisingly, they did not even attempt to
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within correct this technical blunder. Worse, they committed the same
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint procedural error when they filed their appeal16 with the NLRC.
or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be Under the circumstances, the Court agrees with the CA that the
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory dismissal of the other complaints were brought about by the own
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without negligence and passive attitude of the complainants themselves. In
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after Formoso, the Court further wrote:
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding Rules when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but they
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his refused to do so. Despite the opportunity given to them to make all
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the of them sign the verification and certification of non-forum
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall shopping, they still failed to comply. Thus, the CA was constrained to
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative deny their motion and affirm the earlier resolution.
sanctions. x x x. [Emphases supplied]
The Court can only do so much for them.
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure
an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and Most probably, as the list submitted is not complete with the
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of information as to when each started and when each was dismissed
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. Verification there must be some truth in the claim of respondent that those
is deemed substantially complied with when, as in this case, one complainants who failed to affix their signatures in the verification
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in were either not employees of respondent at all or they simply
the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters refused to prosecute their complaints. In its position paper,18
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and respondent alleged that, aside from the four (4) complainants who
correct. withdrew their complaints, only 17 out of the more or less 104
complainants appeared on its records as its former project
The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as employees or at least known by it to have worked in one of its
unsigned and dismissible. construction projects. From the sworn statements executed by Felix
Yortas, Marvin Batta,
The lone signature of Martos would have been sufficient if he was
authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. Unfortunately, Lito Bantillo, Gavino Felix Nicolas, and Romeo Pangacian Martos,
petitioners failed to adduce proof that he was so authorized. The they already withdrew their complaints against respondent. Their
complaints of the other parties in the case of Nellie Vda. De Formoso status and cause of action not being clear and proven, it is just not
v. v. PNB13 suffered a similar fate. Thus: right that these complaints be considered as similarly situated as
Martos and entitled to the same benefits.
Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only
Malcaba signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in the subject petition. There was no proof that Malcaba
>Regional Adjudicator’s ruling: it was lawfully redeemed While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this
>DARAB reversed: not lawfully redeemed unfortunate result, she is bound by such. (sorry u tanga counsel mo)
>MR denied for being filed out of time
> petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA ESTIPONA v. HON. LOBRIGO
GR NO. 226679 AUGUST 15 2017
> CA resolved to require Consolacion’s counsel to submit within five >Petitioner Estipona is accused for violation of Section 11, Article II
(5) days from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education of R.A. No. 9165
(MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended > Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping. Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and,
Apparently, Consolacion’s counsel failed to indicate in the petition instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II
his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number as of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus
required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacion’s and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of
verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to rehabilitation
indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart
from her community tax certificate. >He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 which states that
“Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of
> Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision
the CA dismissed the petition on plea-bargaining” violates the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court and
Contention of Consolacion:
CA’s summary dismissal of her petition on technical grounds is ISSUE: WON Sec 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached
unwarranted. Consolacion invoked substantial justice against the upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
CA’s strict application of the rule requiring her counsel to note his procedure.
MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and the rule
rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non- RULING: YES. It is unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-
forum-shopping defective in the absence of the details of any one of making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
her current identification document issued by an official agency VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
bearing her photograph and signature.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper is now SC’s exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments.
RULING: YES
The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA in The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
dismissing Consolacion’s petition before it on the ground of the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning
petitioner’s unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
requirements attendant to the filing of a petition for review under was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
remained obstinate despite the opportunity afforded to them by the importontly, the Constitution took away the power of Congress to
CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this took repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
place, however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
Consolacion’s petition and without reasonable cause proffered to practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with
justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed Congress, more so with the Executive.
inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the
circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish
requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and
rules appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's
CA saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules. authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure
Neither does this Court see any. is exclusive and one of the safeguards of our institutional
independence
Thus, in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down a new standard of No substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners' life,
relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable amparo petitioners to liberty and security has been shown to exist in this case. For, even if
meet the required amount of proof showing the State's direct or the existence of the OB List or, indeed, the inclusion of petitioners'
indirect involvement in the purported violations and found it a fair names therein, can be properly inferred from the totality of the
and proper rule in amparo cases “to consider all the pieces of evidence presented, still, no link has been sufficiently established to
evidence adduced in their totality” and “to consider any evidence relate the subject OB List either to the threatening visits received by
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is petitioners from unknown men or to the violent deaths of the three
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.” (3) mentioned personalities and other known activists, which could
strongly suggest that, by some identifiable pattern of military
Put simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is involvement, the inclusion of one's name in an Order of Battle would
inadmissible under the rules for as long as it satisfies “the most basic eventually result to enforced disappearance and murder of those
test of reason – i.e., relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand persons tagged therein as militants.
and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.”
UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN) vs NATIONAL
This measure of flexibility in the admissibility of evidence, however, ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA)
does not do away with the requirement of substantial evidence in G.R. No. 187107 January 31, 2012
showing the State's involvement in the enforced disappearance, >IRR to implement RA 9136 were issued on February 27, 2002.
extrajudicial killing or threats thereof. It merely permits, in the Under Sec. 3(b)(ii), Rule 33 of the Rules and Regulations, all the NEA
absence of hard-to-produce direct evidence, a closer look at the employees and officers are considered terminated otherwise known
relevance and significance of every available evidence, including as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law)
those that are, strictly speaking, hearsay where the circumstances of > Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated
the case so require, and allows the consideration of the evidence from their employment with the implementation of the assailed
adduced in terms of their consistency with the totality of the resolutions.
evidence. >Petitioners raise the following issues:
The statement of Representative Ocampo that the respondents are
the real source of the OB List is unquestionably hearsay evidence 1. The NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees;
because, except for the fact that he himself received the OB List 2. Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the NEA Board the power
from an unnamed source merely described as “a conscientious to terminate all NEA employees; and
soldier,” he had no persona knowledge concerning its preparation. 3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.
But even if the Court were to apply the appropriate measure of
flexibility in the instant cases by admitting the hearsay testimony of >On the other hand, respondents argue in their Comment that:
Representative Ocampo, a consideration of this piece of evidence to 1. The Court has no jurisdiction over the petition
the totality of those adduced, namely, the Press Releases issued by Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the principle
the 10th ID admitting the existence of a military-prepared Order of of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should
Battle, the affidavits of petitioners attesting to the threatening visits have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with
and tailing of their vehicles by menacing strangers, as well as the this Court directly.
violent deaths of alleged militant personalities, leads to the 2 Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed
conclusion that the threat to petitioners' security has not be resolutions of the NEA Board have long been implemented; and
adequately proven. 3. The assailed NEA Board resolutions were issued in good faith
ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL and FATIMA A. AFDAL v. ROMEO CARLOS Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service
G.R. No. 173379 December 1, 2010 first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in
> Romeo Carlos (respondent) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer person will substituted service be availed of. In Samartino v. Raon,
and damages against petitioners before MTC we said:
> According to the records, there were three attempts to serve the
summons and complaint on petitioners. We have long held that the impossibility of personal service
> However, petitioners failed to file an answer. justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the
> respondent filed an ex-parte motion and compliance with position proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed.
paper submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings on The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
record. (Judgment by default) summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
> MTC ruled in favor of respondent. otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
>petitioners filed the petition for relief before the RTC. Petitioners In this case, the indorsements failed to state that prompt and
pointed out that they never received respondent’s demand letter personal service on petitioners was rendered impossible. It failed
nor were they informed of, much less participated in, the to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It was
proceedings before the Lupon. Moreover, petitioners said they were also not shown that efforts were made to find petitioners personally
not served a copy of the summons and the complaint. and that said efforts failed. These requirements are indispensable
Issue: WON CFI has jurisdiction It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
RULING: YES. GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that
was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as
was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too
of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct.
this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in
done heretofore in the case with its active participation. Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right
for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then
quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et
origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs.
rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor
pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307,
of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
65 Phil. 170).
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter- quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the
bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief — cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as
well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its
filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore. part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings
had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. revolting.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable ATTY. RESTITUTO G. CUDIAMAT v. BATANGAS SAVINGS AND LOAN
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due BANK, INC
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or G.R. No. 182403 March 9, 2010
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a >Petitioner Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has the registered co-owners of a parcel of land.
abandoned it or declined to assert it. > entrusted the custody of the title to who was residing in Balayan
> Perfecto, without the knowledge and consent of Restituto,
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds obtained a loan from respondent Batangas Savings and Loan Bank,
of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the Inc. (the bank). To secure the payment of the loan, Perfecto
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, mortgaged the property for the purpose of which he presented a
is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by Restituto,
The ruling was echoed in Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin. > RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of the private respondents
> CA affirmed
In the present case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general
jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of title > In the Memorandum filed by the petitioner corporation, it avers
filed by petitioners. The Nasugbu RTC, as a liquidation court, that the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court erred in holding
assumed jurisdiction over the claims against the bank only on May that private respondents’ claim of the existence of the purported
25, 2000, when PDIC’s petition for assistance in the liquidation was loans was supported by a preponderance of evidence, despite the
raffled thereat and given due course. fact that the pieces of documentary evidence presented by the
private respondents were tainted with irregularities. Thus, the RTC
While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter and the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches, the amounting to excess of their jurisdiction in giving credence to these
present case is an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file and pieces of documentary evidence presented by the private
relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had respondents.
already been given the opportunity to present their respective > Petitioner corporation further argues that the conclusion made by
evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which had, in the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court that it benefited
In the case at bar, the findings of the RTC of Quezon City as well as While it is true that this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit
the appellate court are properly supported by evidence on record. which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, may
Both courts found that the alleged loans extended to the petitioner treat a Petition for Certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
corporation by private respondent Sacris were reflected in the more so if the same was filed within the reglementary period for
petitioner corporation’s financial statements, particularly in the filing a Petition for Review, however, in the present case, this Court
years 1992-1993, were contrary to the claim of petitioner finds no compelling reason to justify a liberal application of the
corporation. The said financial statements of the petitioner rules, as this Court did in the case of Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v.
corporation were not the sole bases used by the RTC of Quezon City Court of Appeals. In the said case, this Court treated the Petition for
and by the appellate court in its findings of liability against the Certiorari filed by the petitioner therein as having been filed under
petitioner corporation. The RTC of Quezon City also took into Rule 45, because said Petition was filed within the 15-day
consideration the pieces of documentary evidence15 which likewise reglementary period for filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
became the grounds for its findings that indeed, private respondent Petitioner’s counsel therein received the Court of Appeals
Sacris had extended a loan to petitioner corporation, and that the Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on 26 October
same was given to private respondent Abillar, and received by the 1993 and filed the Petition for Certiorari on 8 November 1993, which
petitioner corporation. Those pieces of documentary evidence very was within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a Petition for
well supported the claim of private respondent Sacris that the Review on Certiorari. It cannot therefore be claimed that the
petitioner corporation received money from him through its former Petition was used as a substitute for appeal after that remedy had
President, private respondent Abillar. Thus, petitioner corporation been lost through the fault of the petitioner. Conversely, such was
cannot claim that it never consented to the act of private not the situation in the present case.
respondent Abillar of entering into a loan/investment transaction
with private respondent Sacris, for there are documents that would In the instant case, petitioner corporation received on 23 February
prove that the money was received by the petitioner corporation, 2006 the Resolution of the appellate court dated 14 February 2006
and the latter acknowledged receipt of said money. The same pieces denying its Motion for Reconsideration. Upon receipt of the said
of evidence likewise confirm the findings of the RTC of Quezon City Resolution, the petitioner corporation had 15-days or until 10 March
that the petitioner corporation benefited from the said transaction; 2006 within which to file an appeal by way of Petition for Review
therefore, it should be held liable for the same amount of its unpaid under Rule 45. Instead of doing so, they inexplicably allowed the
obligation to private respondent Sacris. As the findings of the RTC of 15-day period to lapse, and then on 6 April 2006 or on the 42nd day
Quezon City and the appellate court are supported by evidence, this from receipt of the Resolution denying their Motion for
Court finds no reason to deviate from the heretofore cited rule. Reconsideration, they filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of both the RTC of
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and Quezon City and the appellate court. Hence, this case cannot be
evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of treated as an appeal under Rule 45, primarily because it was filed
certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In way beyond the 15-day reglementary period within which to file the
certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to Petition for Review. Petitioner corporation will not be allowed to use
examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the the remedy of certiorari as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy
probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the of appeal.26
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving
publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, title to or possession of real property is now determined by its
where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass assessed value. The assessed value of real property is its fair
upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous
to possess the property. to taxable value.
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals we explained:
ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of
issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, possession regardless of the value of the property involved?
being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial
conclusive on the issue of ownership.36 of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA — that all
cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property — no
over the subject property, we will only do so to determine if they or longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a distinction must be made
the respondents should have the right of possession. between those properties the assessed value of which is below
P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a
real property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the
hear the case. real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over required because the nature of the action and the court with original
actions involving title to or possession of real property is plenary. and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed,
jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and the claims asserted therein.
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., the Court cited Prof. Arturo M.
of the subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses thereat Tolentino’s definition and characterizes "tolerance" in the following
without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less any manner:
building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its
true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor. Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are
"those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the
subject premises, plaintiff referred the matter to his lawyer who property; they are generally those particular services or benefits
immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the defendants to which one’s property can give to another without material injury or
vacate the premises. prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts of little disturbances which a
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations,
continues to fail and refuse to vacate the premises without valid or permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land,
legal justification. tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And,
Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a long time,
> MeTC held that the respondents had no right to possess the land no right will be acquired by prescription." Further expounding on the
and that their occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance concept, Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the possessor to
> RTC affirmed the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of
> CA reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions. It ruled that the knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be
respondents’ possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered
lessor’s tolerance. It emphasized that ejectment cases are summary as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are
proceedings where the only issue to be resolved is who has a realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence
better right to the physical possession of a property. The or non-existence of the permission. [citations omitted; italics
petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is based on an accion supplied]
publiciana: he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract
of lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the land The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or
permission must have been present at the beginning of possession;
Issue: WON an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy. if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.
RULING: NO. Unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy for the
present case It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the statements in a complaint for unlawful detainer as a basis for
action and the jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban, the claim that the defendant’s
specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the possession was merely tolerated was contradicted by the
absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer complainant’s allegation that the entry to the subject property was
is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then ruled that the
does not have jurisdiction over the case.26 unlawful detainer action should fail.
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint (SEE FACTS The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed
FOR ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT) run counter to the suspicious when a complaint is silent regarding the factual
requirements for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, circumstances surrounding the alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty
the possession of the defendant was originally legal and his Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: "(1)
possession was permitted by the owner through an express or defendant immediately occupied the subject property after its sale
implied contract. to her, an action merely tolerated by the plaintiff; and (2) the
respondent’s allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by
In this case, paragraph makes it clear that the respondents’ mere tolerance." The Court expressed its qualms over these
occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual averments of fact as they did not contain anything substantiating
or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or permitted the occupation of
possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the the property by the defendant:
defendant to vacate the property and the defendant’s subsequent
refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes the These allegations contradict, rather than support, plaintiff’s theory
defendant’s occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these
letters were written by the petitioner’s counsel. Under these arguments advance the view that defendant’s occupation of the
allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should not be property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the
based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiff’s
unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date. supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from
the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the
respondents occupied the premises by mere tolerance of the owner.
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed
regarding the grant of permission, but proof as well. It noted that as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, this Court should
the plaintiffs alleged the existence of tolerance, but ordered the still resolve the case, as requiring him to properly refile the case
dismissal of the unlawful detainer case because the evidence was serves no other ends than to comply with technicalities.45
"totally wanting as to when and under what circumstances xxx the
alleged tolerance came about." It stated that: The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the
MeTC in an ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or
Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never accion reivindicatoria. These cases are not interchangeable and their
at all in physical possession of the premises from the time he started differences constitute far more than mere technicalities.
occupying it and continuously up to the present. For sure, the
petitioners merely derived their alleged prior physical possession In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for
only on the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), arguing forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion publiciana and
that the issuance of said title presupposes their having been in summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also
possession of the property at one time or another.35 applicable to an unlawful detainer case which bears the same
relevant characteristics:
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply
anchor their claims on the validity of the owner’s title. Possession de On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be
facto must also be proved. treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the negative. Forcible entry
is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real
ruled that a complaint which fails to positively aver any overt act on property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful
the plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any dispossession of the real property. Second, forcible entry is
showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of
detainer. As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is
alleging tolerance must definitely establish its existence from the the better right to possession over the real property. Third, an action
start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a
itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the
beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time of RTC.
forcible entry:
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought
"tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession only
tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought or possession de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer
to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful and forcible entry cases are not processes to determine actual title
detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of ownership is
espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore
entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. inconclusive.47 Because they only resolve issues of possession de
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the facto, ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion
inferior court — provided for in the rules. If one year from the publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion reivindicatoria
forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions.48 The purpose
ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be
his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy
action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of
years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession during
can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of
physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance
in the inferior court — upon plea of tolerance to prevent of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally
prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land. deprived of possession might take the law in his hands and seize the
Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the property by force and violence.49 An ejectment case cannot be a
postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining rights
are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is of possession or ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva, the Court
PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO v. POGOY With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at
G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983 the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those
instances where said law applies. For this reason, Circular No. 22
>The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE,
building bearing the deceased’s name. Said building has been leased CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo. COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS,
> Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a resident of MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by
Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said
the overdue rentals, and thereafter to vacate the premises. Circular reads:
>As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted an ejectment
case against the former "Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of
Local Government and Community Development that all the
>petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among others, the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their
want of jurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the parties Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
are residents of the same city, as alleged in the complaint, petitioner known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of
contended that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby
case for failure of respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise known as proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Lupons."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of
December 14, 1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of
"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with
That from the acceptance from (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance as
paid the docket fee to show that the case was docketed in the civil would place the suit outside the operation of said law. Instead, he
division of this court could be considered as meeting the insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in
requirement or precondition for were it not so, the Clerk of Court the performance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which to
would not have accepted the filing of the case especially that there Our mind has been sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the
is a standing circular from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action from the
without even mentioning the Letter of Instruction of the President Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint.
of the Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with certain
exceptions must not be filed without passing the barangay court." Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under
Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay
In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals."
admitted not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a
process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6 social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases
of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action in court where involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a
the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations, as juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole,
applying to the case at bar. testate or intestate, estate, etc.
Issue: WON case should be dismissed for not complying with PD In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal
1508 party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo.
While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the
RULING: NO administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the
The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is
Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915
entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this period is counted from is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is
demand to vacate the premises. 2 a juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator may file the complaint
directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay
Lupon for arbitration.
PETITIONERS, as defendants, moved for the dismissal of the MeTC: in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for non-
Complaint. Before firing an Opposition, the SPOUSES applied for a compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other
Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Thereafter, the SPOUSES presented grounds. The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of
their Opposition claiming that, under Section 6(3) of P.D. No. 1508, the same barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has
the parties may go directly to the Courts if the action is coupled with been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level.
a provisional remedy such as preliminary attachment.
Issue: WON non-compliance with the barangay conciliation
ISSUE: WON case should be dimissed for not complying with PD proceedings is a jurisdictional defect that warrants the dismissal of
1508 the complaint.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that she should In the case of Leonor v. Sycip,21 the Supreme Court (SC) had the
have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable occasion to explain this provision of law. It ruled that Article 2041
settlement as provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay does not require an action for rescission, and the aggrieved party, by
Law, instead of filing a collection case. The petitioner points out that the breach of compromise agreement, may just consider it already
the cause of action did not arise from the Kasunduang Pag-aayos but rescinded, to wit:
on the respondent’s breach of the original loan agreement
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of
ISSUE: WON CA should have decided the case on the merits rather the same Code, which speaks of "a cause of annulment or rescission
than remand the case for the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag- of the compromise" and provides that "the compromise may be
aayos annulled or rescinded" for the cause therein specified, thus
suggesting an action for annulment or rescission, said Article 2041
RULING: YES confers upon the party concerned, not a "cause" for rescission, or
This Court agrees with the petitioner. the right to "demand" the rescission of a compromise, but the
authority, not only to "regard it as rescinded", but, also, to "insist
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay upon his original demand". The language of this Article 2041,
conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039, denotes that
is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, no action for rescission is required in said Article 2041, and that the
is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if
morals, good customs, public order and public policy.16 This is in he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original
accord with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz: demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement,
without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicial declaration of rescission, for he may "regard" the
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a compromise agreement already "rescinded".22 (emphasis supplied)
judicial compromise.
As so well stated in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,23 a
Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the party's non-compliance with the amicable settlement paved the way
parties, an amicable settlement has the force and effect of res for the application of Article 2041 under which the other party may
judicata even if not judicially approved.17 It transcends being a mere either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in
contract binding only upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or consider it as
judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the rescinded and insist upon his original demand. To quote:
Rules.18 Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code,19
such amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by
In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms
and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance
may be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the
respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms thereof,
thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed.
Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041
of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for collection of sum of
money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to rule that
enforcement by execution of said agreement is the appropriate
remedy under the circumstances.
The petitioner avers that the CA erred in remanding the case to the
trial court for the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos as it
prolonged the process, "thereby putting off the case in an indefinite
pendency."25 Thus, the petitioner insists that she should be allowed
to ventilate her rights before this Court and not to repeat the same
proceedings just to comply with the enforcement of the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos, in order to finally enforce her right to payment.26