Preventing Religious Radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina The Role of The BiH Islamic Community

Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs
ISSN: 1360-2004 (Print) 1469-9591 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjmm20
Preventing Religious Radicalization in Bosnia

and Herzegovina: The Role of the BiH Islamic
Community
Hamza Preljević
To cite this article: Hamza Preljević (2017): Preventing Religious Radicalization in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: The Role of the BiH Islamic Community, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, DOI:
10.1080/13602004.2017.1405503
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1405503
Published online: 27 Nov 2017.
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Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1405503
Preventing Religious Radicalization in Bosnia and

Herzegovina: The Role of the BiH Islamic Community
HAMZA PRELJEVIĆ
Abstract
The goal of the paper is to identify the Islamic Community’s methods of preventing
religious radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The roots of radicalism
and extremism are explained by examining “Islamic revival” and studied within the
Bosnian context. Although BiH appears in many international reports as a potential
“cradle of terrorism”, the situation on the ground is quite different and there are
Downloaded by [109.175.38.166] at 05:07 27 November 2017
many instances of combined efforts by the government and religious institutions in

preventing religious radicalization in BiH. The analysis focuses on the Islamic com-
munity’s efforts to contend the spread of illegal mosques that sometimes promote
radical Islam in BiH. Although there are radical individuals with different and
sometimes radical understanding of Islam, the majority of Bosnian Muslims
oppose any form of religious radicalization. The Islamic Community plays the
most important role in preventing the spread of radical Islam in BiH, and this
paper analyzes its efforts to homogenize Bosnian Muslims and prevent radicaliza-
tion.
Introduction
Radicalism and extremism are increasingly discussed by domestic officials, international
agents and academic researchers. The importance of the two phenomena intensified with
the Al-Qaeda and ISIL/Daesh terrorist attacks1 and an increasing number of Muslims
around the world who joined various militant groups in the Middle East. Media also
pay attention to those who fought and returned from Syria and Iraq to their homelands.
They warn the public about the threat of ISIS and claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) is one of the most vulnerable countries in Europe. Although the Islamic Commu-
nity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBiH), invests significant efforts in preventing religious
radicalization, their role and significance has often been neglected, opening doors to
foreign criticism about BiH as a potential “cradle of terrorism”.
However, the terms of “radicalism” and “extremism” are often used vaguely, confusing
the public and in some cases causing certain security issues or “religious intolerance”. For
example, in case of BiH, “radicalization”2 and “religious obligation”3 are often under-
stood as synonymous. Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, the President of Croatia, in an inter-
view from 29 November 2016 for Defense News said:
Hamza Preljević is a Senior Assistant in International Relations at the International University of Sara-
jevo, where he is a Ph.D. candidate. His areas of interest are the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, issues
of Bosnian Muslims, Western Balkan studies, EU integration and security studies—with an active research
focus on various aspects of transatlantic relations and NATO’s relations with the Western Balkans. His
refereed articles have appeared in several recognized publications, including Insight Turkey, Croatian Inter-
national Relations Review and the European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology. He teaches political
system of Bosnia and Herzegovina and assists on courses on Politics in Europe and Geopolitics.
© 2017 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs

2 Hamza Preljević
[T]he kind of Islam that we’ve known in Bosnia Herzegovina is changing, it’s
becoming more radicalized, especially in rural areas, changing the way of life,
even the appearance of people, in terms of clothing and behavior and a lot
more rigid interpretation of the values of Islam. And that is why it’s so crucially
important to keep the stability of the community of Islam in Bosnia and Herze-
govina and in Croatia as well.4
In addition, Sebastian Kurz, the Austrian Foreign Minister, in an interview for Handels-
blatt on 21 August 2017 said: “In Sarajevo and Priština, for example, women are paid to
wear the full veil in public”, adding: “We cannot look on and do nothing.”5
Both statements imply the process of radicalization in BiH as a result of foreign influ-
ence. However, it seems that both statements equalize “radicalization” and “religious
obligations”. Addressing this issue, the Office of Public Relations of ICBiH denied
Kurz’s allegations:
The Islamic Community in BiH has no information that Muslim women in BiH
are paid to dress as described by Kurtz and believes that everyone has the right,
including Muslim women, to dress in the way they want. We believe that Mr.
Kurz has good intentions while insisting on the EU institutions to pay more
attention to the Western Balkans and we understand his concern about the
current situation, but he did not find the right way to properly illustrate it
(author’s translation).6
Moreover, the Bosnian State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) stated: “ …
SIPA does not have any information in relation to such a phenomenon in BiH”
(author’s translation).7 These two statements indicate the conflicting attitudes toward
the radicalization in BiH and, although statements such as Kurz’s and Grabar-Kitarović’s
might not be true, they certainly harm the image of BiH.
This study analyzes the ICBiH’s efforts to contend radical ideologies and movements
in BiH by closing illegal jamaats or incorporating their members into its community
under the guidance of its imams in order to prevent potential radicalization.8 BiH has
been criticized for the “rise of radicalism” on its territory, while religious obligations of
Muslims have often been misunderstood and referred to as radical. Although there are
marginal cases of individuals with radical and/or extremist ideologies, this paper argues
that these individuals do not represent the average Bosniak. On the contrary, just like
in any other nation, these individuals are isolated cases of deviant behavior that need
to be “rehabilitated” and included in the society.
Radicalization, De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization

The terms “radicalization”, “de-radicalization” and “counter-radicalization” are widely
used and often misused in the context of Islam as practiced by Bosnians. There is little
consensus regarding the meaning of the terms “radicalization” and “extremism”.9
Many governments face difficulties when defining these two concepts, which often lead
to certain issues and confusion. In this paper, radicalization is not treated as a
synonym for extremism and terrorism. Alex Schmidt, an analyst at the International
Center for Counter-Terrorism at the Hague, writes:
While both [radicalism and extremism] stand at some distance from main-
stream political thinking, the first [radicalism] tends to be open-minded,
Preventing Religious Radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina 3
while the second [extremism] manifests a closed mind and a distinct willingness
to use violence against civilians.10
The radicalization process is a form of “ideological injection” which makes an individ-
ual to adopt radical views on certain issues. Radicalization is also described as a process of
developing extreme ideology—through the rejection of status quo, potentially achieved
through acts of violence—terrorism. Therefore, dealing with radicalism before turning
into extremism is important for preventing violence. The ICBiH has started dealing
with the radicalization process in order to avoid serious consequences in the future.
Additionally, the terms “de-radicalization” and “counter-radicalization” are also
“poorly defined and mean different things to different people”11, which influences the
process of radicalization prevention in various ways.
In this paper, “de-radicalization” is defined as a process that changes people’s beliefs
that are based on the justification of extreme and radical ideologies and by adopting a
moderate and nonviolent approach.12 Therefore, the term “de-radicalization” does not
mean a complete change of one’s beliefs, but rather their moderation. “Disengagement
from violence could be seen as an important part and parcel of the process of de-radica-
lization.”13 The prefix de in “de-radicalization” implies that this process can only be
applied after the radicalization occurs. In other words, to disengage from radicalism,
an individual first has to become radical.
De-radicalization initiatives are particularly important for preventing violence, and the
involvement of religious communities in such initiatives attracts a lot of attention by the
public. If conducted successfully, the de-radicalization process may be effective and
prevent “behavioral radicalism”. There is no ideal recipe for de-radicalization and the
initiator (ICBiH) of the process must define the strategy on their own. On the other
hand, the counter-radicalization process refers to preventative policy by not allowing
radical movements to grow in a society. Author Farhan Zahid writes:
If utilized carefully, counter-radicalization is much more useful than de-radica-
lization, but in fact, few countries have attempted to do so as it requires even
broader network and resources to ascertain the target audiences and then to
approach them with substantial means to disavow the individuals.14
In addition, the counter-radicalization seeks to prevent the radicalization of new indi-
viduals. The counter-radicalization strategies are also a means of eradicating terrorism or
violent radicalism.15 The counter-radicalization practitioners need to identify commu-
nities or individuals who promote extremism or radical violence and prevent other indi-
viduals from joining them by including effective counter-narratives and similar strategies.
Both de-radicalization and counter-radicalization focus on individuals and/or groups
inspired and motivated by violent ideologies. It is the policy-makers (the ICBiH) who
decide whether to target “cognitive” or “behavioral radicalism” or to approach them
together.
Methodology
This research focuses on the analysis of the ICBiH efforts to prevent radicalization
around the country. As the ICBiH is the major religious institution of the Bosnian
Muslims, this research analyzes the methods ICBiH uses to deal with potentially
radical movements. In addition, the research is aimed to determine whether radical
movements may have stronghold in BiH. In order to address these issues, primary
4 Hamza Preljević
and secondary sources are analyzed qualitatively. Secondary sources include both
local and international analysis, articles and news. Primary data are collected
through empirical research and in-country data collection, for example, interviews
with prominent figures from the ICBiH. Semi-structured interview is also used
because it offers a balance between flexibility and close-ended interview. Hitchcock
and Hughes describe it as:
[Semi-structured interview] allows depth to be achieved by providing the
opportunity on the part of the interviewer to probe and expand the interviewee’s
responses … . Some kind of balance between the interviewer and the intervie-
wee can develop which can provide room for negotiation, discussion, and
expansion of the interviewee’s responses.16
Interview as a research method is generally useful because of its potential to offer
detailed information about the research subject. As the topic of radicalism is poorly
analyzed in BiH, the interview can provide an extensive insight into the radicalization
process in BiH. The interviews will help the author to explore the issue of radicaliza-
tion and understand the role of the ICBiH in preventing the radicalization in BiH. The
data collected during this research include perspective on the issues of radicalization
by some of the leading ICBiH officials. The interviews were conducted during Fall of
2017.
The ICBiH
The ICBiH was established in 1882, during the Austrian-Hungarian rule. It represents an
authentic religious community of Muslims living in BiH, including the Bosniaks living
outside their homeland and other Muslims who accept this community as their own.17
Independent from the state, self-financed, led by an elected leader and having an
elected assembly,18 the ICBiH is considered to be one of the best organized Islamic
administrative units in the world. The ICBiH is financed by waqfs (inalienable charitable
endowments), membership fees, zakah (religious obligation), sadaqat al-fitr (a form of
charity given during the month of Ramadan), gifts, and revenue from its agencies and
funds.
As an autonomous organization, the ICBiH manages its property and administers its
own activities (rituals, Islamic education, management of Islamic endowments, publish-
ing, charity, etc.) independently from the state. Its existence and activities are based on
the religious rituals and it dates back to the Ottoman rule in Bosnia; as such it is an inse-
parable part of the Ummah (global community of Muslims). The ICBiH, as well as its
activities, is based on the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah, the Islamic traditions of Bosniaks
and current social demands. In the interpretation and performance of Islamic religious
rituals, the Hanafi madhhab19 is deemed applicable.
The aim of the ICBiH is to create an environment in which all of its members live in
harmony with Islamic norms. The ICBiH protects the authenticity of Islamic norms,
as well as their interpretation and application. The ICBiH is supposed to advocate for
the religious rights of Muslims and provide its members with the resources necessary
for performing their Islamic obligations. Many of the ICBiH’s activities (e.g. zakah)
improve financial standing of the poor Muslims. According to its Constitution, the
ICBiH cooperates and establishes and maintains contact with the Islamic communities,
institutions and organizations worldwide. The area of cooperation include promotion of
peace, justice and well-being of all people.20
Bosnian War 1992–1995 and Destruction of Islamic Cultural Heritage

The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) during the early
1990s was a difficult transition from Communism to Democracy for BiH. After Tito’s
death in 1980, there was a period of economic decline and rise of Serbian nationalism
under the rule of Slobodan Milošević. A similar movement in Croatia was led by
Franjo Tuđman during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The activities by both leaders
were undermining Bosnian national sovereignty.
During the disintegration process, the Yugoslav authorities submitted a request to the
European Community (EC) for assistance in resolving the constitutional and political
deadlock. The EC adopted the Declaration for establishing Arbitration Commission
and agreed to help Yugoslavia. The Commission had five permanent members appointed
by the EC’s Constitutional Court in the autumn of 1991. Robert Badinter was the pre-
sident of the Commission. On 17 December 1991, the Commission adopted Guidelines
for the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which con-
firmed the general criteria for the recognition of new states. 23 December 1991 was a
deadline for submitting applications for recognition of the new states. BiH, Croatia,
Macedonia and Slovenia submitted their applications, while Serbia and Montenegro
claimed that they had been recognized by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.21
On 15 October 1991, the Assembly of BiH adopted a Memorandum on Independence.
Out of 240 members, 71 members from the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) abstained
from voting. On 11 January 1992, the Badinter Commission concluded the following:
(i) the constitution of BiH defines the country as “democratic state”, guaranteeing
equality of all peoples;
(ii) BiH as a democratic country promotes the rule of law and human rights;
(iii) the authorities in BiH had provided assurance that there are no pretensions of
any kind over the neighborhoods territories and
(iv) BiH has guaranteed to uphold the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act, as well as
other international agreements guaranteeing human rights, civil and political
rights and freedom.22
A referendum for independence from Yugoslavia was held on 29 February and 1

March 1992. The citizens of BiH were given the opportunity to decide on the future
course of their republic. The turnout was 63.4% and 99.7% of citizens voted in favor
of independence. On 4 March 1992, the Assembly of BiH confirmed the referendum
results and amended the Constitution, defining BiH as a sovereign and independent
state of equal citizens (Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, Croats and Others). After the referen-
dum, on 27 March 1992, 77 Serb deputies (71 SDP delegates and 6 from other
parties) left the Assembly of BiH and held their own session on which they adopted
the Constitution of the “Serb nation in BiH” and proclaimed the “Serb entity in BiH”.
The entity was later de facto recognized by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA).23 On
6 April 1992, Bosnian Serbs launched first attacks on Bosnian Muslims and Croats.24
On the same day, the EC recognized BiH and on 22 May 1992, BiH became a UN
member state.
During the war, BiH was seriously devastated and many people died. In 1995, the
GDP per capita was about 19.8% of the pre-war economy.25 The production and
export were virtually non-existent and most of the Bosnian infrastructure was destroyed.
Many buildings, crucial for normal state functioning, were destroyed or damaged, as well
as roads, bridges, tunnels, water supply and sewage systems, power grids, telecommuni-
6 Hamza Preljević
cations and so on. More than 100,000 people were killed and majority of casualties were
Bosnian Muslims.26 The Bosnian war is often characterized notoriously as a systematic
rape and sexual violence mostly against Muslim women.27 In addition, the UNSC Resol-
ution 820, issued on 17 April 1993, stated that the rape in BiH was “massive, organized
and systematic” (para. 6).28 This resolution pointed out the “practice of ethnic cleansing”
in the Bosnian war. The rape crimes were committed “in order to humiliate, or destroy,
the identity of the victim”.29 A significant body of the world literature on the rape-crime
written after 1991indicates that the Bosnian Muslims were the biggest victims of the rape-
crime committed by the Bosnian Serbs (see, for instance, Nizich30 and Stephens31).
Besides civil casualties, Bosnian cultural heritage was also destroyed systematically by
the Bosnian Serbs and in some cases Bosnian Croats. According to Preljević,32 “the
massive destruction of cultural and religious heritage—particularly the Ottoman and
Islamic inheritance—during the 1992–1995 Bosnian War was widespread in the
country [BiH]”. The scale of destruction was immense and it includes mosques,
masjids (mosques without minarets), tombs (turbe), tekiyes (Dervish monastery),

mektebs (Islamic weekend school), sahat kula (clock tower) and waqf (endowment) build-
ings.33 For instance, out of 1444 pre-war mosques, 614 were destroyed and 307 were
damaged. Many of the destroyed or damaged mosques were listed as Bosnian cultural
heritage or protected by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ-
ization.34 In addition, out of 557 masjids, 218 were destroyed and 41 were damaged. Out
of 1425 waqf buildings, 405 were destroyed and 149 damaged. Also, 69 mektebs and 37
tombs were destroyed35 and many ICBiH imams, staff and students were killed.36 There-
fore, “the destruction of Bosnian cultural heritage is not linked to the destruction of
someone else’s cultural heritage [Bosnian Muslims], but rather to the destruction of cul-
tural heritage belonging to humankind”.37 What happened to BiH and Bosnian Muslims
in the 1990s is similar to what is happening to Syria today.
Islamic Revival in BiH

The First Period—1970–1990
Although the Islamic revival started in Yugoslavia in the early 1970s, the deliberate
destruction of Muslim cultural, religious and historical heritage in the 1990s affected
the course of the revival.38 The re-awakening of Bosnian Muslims and “Bosnian
Islam” can be divided into three periods. The first period lasted from 1970 to 1992
and it was marked with the re-awakening of Bosnian Muslims. During this period,
the ICBiH was a part of the Islamic Community of SFRY.39 Apart from the liberaliza-
tion of SFRY40 which provided Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Albanians with more
rights, several factors contributed to the “Islamic revival”.41 Among them was the
economic growth in Yugoslavia. This factor, rather than foreign aid, accelerated the
(re)construction of mosques, masjids and other religious buildings across SFRY.42
This helped Bosnian Muslims to preserve their tradition, the Hanafi teaching, and
the moderate approach to Islam. The imams and the ICBiH43 were the main agents
in distributing the message of moderation to the people. During the 1970s, Bosnian
Muslims were allowed to study at Arab universities, while in 1977 the Faculty of
Islamic Theology was founded in Sarajevo.44 In the 1970s, there were more than
3000 mosques and masjids in SFRY.45 In 1992, the ICBiH had 1444 mosques, 557
masjids, 954 mektebs and 15 tekiyes,46 and by the end of the war, most of them were
damaged or destroyed.
The Second Period—1992–2012

The second period lasted from 1992 to 2012. Unlike the previous period, the imams and
the ICBiH were not the only interpreters of Islam. The war in BiH opened the door to
new interpreters.47 The international community, including the European neighbors,
failed to help Bosnian Muslims during the war. The UN also imposed arms embargo
on the former Yugoslav republics which led to massive atrocities and war crimes over
Muslims, as they did not have almost any weapons. Desperate for help, Bosnian govern-
ment and the ICBiH’s relied on the only option available—the Islamic world. The goal of
Bosnian Muslims was to secure humanitarian aid, as well as financial and diplomatic
support.48 The arrival of humanitarian workers from the Muslim world and their engage-
ment in the public life brought new dynamics to the Bosnian interpretation of Islam. New
Schools of jurisprudence (Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali) were introduced to BiH for the
first time.
The humanitarian help from the Arab world also included Arabic religious influence
and arrival of missionaries, which was not too different from the Western humanitarian
methods in BiH since 1993. Free Islamic publications were not always in line with the
Hanafi madhhab, but back then BiH did not have other options but to accept any
support. Along with the humanitarian workers,49 the mujahedeen fighters50 also came
to BiH and changed the course of the Bosnian “Islamic revival”:
The mujahedeen helped Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) fight against their “oppres-
sors”.51 They were motivated by what they perceived as a Christian assault on
their “Islamic brothers”, which was exactly the same rhetoric spread by both
Bosnian Croats and Serbs. In addition, they were also “provoked” by the
failure of the West to put an end to the abuse of human rights in BiH.52
Mujahedeen brought Salafi53 and non-traditional teachings to BiH and started spreading
it among Bosnian Muslims. Writer Muhamed Jusić states:
Due to half a century isolation to which Bosnian Muslims were subjected, they
have not been able as a community in the early years of the war and postwar to
develop some kind of “immunity” on an ideological interpretation of Islam, nor
to form a clear attitude towards pluralism within the Islamic thought.54
In order to reduce the influence of different religious interpretation, in 1993 Reisu-l-
ulema Mustafa Cerić issued a fatwa on mandatory compliance with Hanafi madhhab in
all religious rituals in the ICBiH.55
Immediately after the war, the reconstruction of damaged and destroyed mosques
started. During this period, the majority of mosques were built by the local people and
some of the mosques were financed by foreign governments. Today, although under a
direct control of the ICBiH, there are still Malaysian, Indonesian, Kuwaiti, Qatari,
Saudi, Jordanian and other mosques in Sarajevo. International relations scholars consider
foreign aid as a means by which countries pursue their foreign policy goals56 and promote
their ideologies. There is also the King Fahd Cultural Center in Sarajevo and Mostar
affiliated with the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Sarajevo.57 Moreover, Saudi Arabia
started offering scholarships to Bosnian Muslims to study theology in Makkah and
Medina.58 The exact number of Bosnian students who study in Saudi Arabia is
unknown.59 Bosnian Muslims have also been studying in other Arab countries, such as
Syria (before the war), Egypt, Iraq, Yemen and so on. Also, various websites that
promote Salafi Islam have been designed.60
8 Hamza Preljević
The Post-War Period

The post-war period of BiH witnessed the rise of Iranian influence and Shi’ism.61 This
led to the establishment of the non-religious Persian-Bosnian College by the Iranians
in 1999 in Lješevo, a village near Sarajevo, while the Institute Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra
Foundation and Iranian Cultural Center Sarajevo62 are publishing Islamic literature on
Shi’a teachings on a regular basis. The Shi’a organization Kewser gathers Bosnian
Muslim women and has its magazine, runs radio and TV stations, all entitled Zehra.
There is also another Iranian TV station—Sahar. According to Esad Duraković,63
although Shi’as are a relatively small group in BiH, they are very influential and they
promote their version of Islam through culture and education.64 Besides the non-reli-
gious college, there are several foreign secular schools and a university supported by
Fethullah Gülen.65 His organization is known by the name The Hizmet Foundation.66
The network of “four preschools, five elementary schools, five high schools and a univer-
sity67 is active in Sarajevo, Mostar, Bihać, Zenica and Tuzla”, and it was managed by the
Foundation Bosna Sema.68 Soon after the failed coup d’état in Turkey in June 2016, the
ownership of the above-mentioned schools was transferred to the Global Education.69
However, this does not mean that the promotion of the Gülenist ideology in BiH
stopped. The owner has changed but the staff and structure of the Gülenist schools
remained the same. The teachings of Fethullah Gülen are available in Bosnian language70
and his organization owns an e-news portal Novo Vrijeme (New Times).71 While various
aspects of the previously mentioned organizations attract most of the attention in BiH,
there are other sects and movements that operate in BiH, such as Ahmediyya Muslim
Jamaat, Nurji, Sulejmanji, Bahá’í and different Sufi tariqa.
The Islamic revival after the 1990s has manifested itself through active engagement of
the ICBiH to re(open) and (re)construct many endowments, schools, mosques72 and
other buildings. Before the establishment of communist Yugoslavia in 1945, there
were many madrasas in BiH. However, after Tito came to power, all of them were
closed except the Gazi Husrev-bey madrasa in Sarajevo. The collapse of communism
and the independence of BiH provided the ICBiH with the opportunity to act indepen-
dently from the state. The ICBiH soon (re)established five more madrasas73 and imams
were allowed to teach children in mektebs on weekends.
In 2007, the ICBiH adopted the House Rules and Article 5 states “the Hanafi
madhhab is applied in the interpretation and practice of Islamic duties in mosques,
masjids, and other religious objects of the ICBiH” (author’s translation).74 The goal
of the rules is to reduce the influence of other interpretations of Islam, as well as to
preserve the traditional Bosnian Islam in the mosques. The school curriculum in
Bosnian madrasas is in line with these rules and it is also very similar to the one
offered by the general education high schools (best high schools in BiH). The curricu-
lum includes several religious courses as well. The graduates can enroll in any univer-
sity and study natural or social sciences. There is also FIN in Sarajevo and two Islamic
Pedagogical Academies in Zenica (1993) and Bihać (1995) established by the ICBiH.
All of the above-mentioned institutions are based on the Hanafi madhhab and they
promote moderate Islam. In order to preserve the culture and history of Bosniaks,
the ICBiH established Institute for the Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks (Institut za
islamsku tradiciju Bošnjaka)75 in 2008.76 On 7 July 2012, the ICBiH Sabor adopted
a decision on founding the Al-Wasatiyya Center for Dialogue (Centar za dijalog
Vesatijja). The mission of this Center is to promote peace-building among people,
moderate path of Islam, prevent and eradicate extremism.77 The ICBiH publishes
Islamic books, newspapers and magazines and distributes them throughout BiH.78 It
has its radio station Bir (One), as well as several websites that promote wesatijja (mod-
eration).79 All of the ICBiH activities during the second period of the “Islamic revival”
were important for contending teachings of Islam that are not in line with the Bosnian
tradition.
The Third Period

The third and current period of Islamic revival in BiH started in 2012. The ICBiH has
been re-opening and re-constructing schools, mosques and other buildings. Although
significantly marginalized, foundations and organizations with Iranian, Shi’ite80, as
well as Fethullah Gülen81 teachings still exist in BiH, while other sects and movements
such as Ahmediyya Muslim Jamaat, Nurji, Sulejmanji, Bahá’í and Sufi tariqa are
present, too. However, during this period new policies of the ICBiH were introduced.
Husein Kavazović was appointed new Reisu-l-ulema of the ICBiH. He started reforming
the ICBiH and strengthening relations between the ICBiH and its Mešihats (muftiluks or
units) in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and the Diaspora.82 The two main research insti-
tutions, Institute for the Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks and Al-Wasatiyya Center for Dia-
logue, became more active, preserving the tradition of Bosniaks, moderate Islam and
opposing various forms of radicalism. The ICBiH continued promoting inter-religious
dialogue as a means of peace-building in BiH83 and it condemned terrorism around
the world.84 Bosnian Muslims continued studying at Arab universities across the
Middle East, Malaysia and Turkey.
As the trend of radicalization among some Muslim communities emerged around the
world,85 the Balkan Muslims were affected, too. The adoption of radical and/or extreme
ideologies in BiH has been promoted in the “para-jamaats” or “parallel jamaats/
mosques”. The ICBiH put significant effort to contend this process. Although the
birth of radicalization can be traced back to the second period of the Islamic revival,
only during the third period “radicalism” became more serious. The “ideological injec-
tion” of the ISIS/Daesh-inspired groups contributed to such transformation in BiH.
The generalization was a result of the fact that only members of the Salafi communities
in BiH joined the ISIS/Daesh groups, and only some of them adopted extreme and
violent ideologies.86 The London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicaliza-
tion and Political Violence estimated that 330 individuals from BiH joined ISIS.87
Although this is a significant number, it is not relevant to support claims that Bosnian
Islam and Muslims (Bosniaks) are radical,88 especially taking into account that the
ICBiH together with the Bosnian government developed various strategies against radi-
calization in BiH.
Protection of Traditional Islam and the Struggle Against Para-Jamaats

Terrorism is a global and constantly changing phenomenon. It is difficult to find a state
that has not been affected by some forms of radicalism or extremism. BiH, as well as most
of the other European states, face challenges of extremism and radicalism but, unlike
other countries, BiH has often been accused for being a terrorist haven. As Czech Presi-
dent Miloš Zeman said:
After defeat in Iraq and Syria, Islamists can move to Afghanistan, where they
have a great chance to succeed. But there is also a danger that these fugitive mili-
10 Hamza Preljević
tants will create a kind of a terrorist base here, in Europe. And Bosnia can
become such a base, firstly because of its national structure, and also judging
by the black Daesh flags raised in a number of Bosnian cities and villages.89
The reason for this, as Miloš Zeman stated, is the national structure of BiH, referring to
the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) who account for 51.11% of the population in BiH.90
The Bosniak member of the tripartite presidency of BiH Bakir Izetbegović criticized
Zeman and rejected his claim that BiH could become an ISIS military base in Europe
because of its national component(s). Izetbegović, the member of the tripartite Presi-
dency of BiH, criticized Czech President Milos Zeman’s statement, saying:
The Czech president spreads dangerous untruth about BiH without any reason,
and especially about the Bosniaks … The goal of such statements is to poison
the European community with false ideas about BiH, especially about its citi-
zens of the Islamic faith.91
However, Zeman’s allegations are not unusual. Christopher Deliso argues that
“Bosnia, the Muslim country America had so fervently supported during the previous
decade, had also served as a finishing school for terrorists intent on killing Americans.”92
BiH is a multi-ethnic country, and it is definitely not a Muslim country. It seems that
Deliso overlooked this fact which led him to significant overstatement regarding the
alleged terrorism in BiH and especially regarding the ambitious title of his book The
Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West. In addition,
Zeman’s insistence that BiH is a terrorist “cradle” is unfounded. The Bosnian Muslims
are one of the three peoples and as illustrated in the previous sections, the overwhelming
majority of them, as well as the ICBiH, strongly oppose violent ideologies and radicalism.
However, local, regional and international media are constantly trying to present the
problem of Wahhabism and/or Salafism as a security threat to BiH and Europe. This pre-
sents BiH as a politically instable country and the “spread of Islamic extremism, such as
Wahhabism, is the most serious ideological challenge of our [current] times”.93 The
media have replaced the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism from the early 1990s
with “Wahhabism” and “Salafism”. In 1992, the Washington Post wrote:
The Serbs of Bosnia say they are fighting a war against their Muslim neighbors
here because, among other reasons, Bosnia’s Muslims want to set up a radical
Islamic state […] the Serb-run press and broadcast media here [in BiH]—and in
neighboring Serbia—routinely refer to Bosnian Muslims as fundamentalists
who, if given their way, would turn this war-torn former Yugoslav republic
into an Iranian-style theocracy. All women, including Serb Orthodox Chris-
tians, would be forced to wear chadors, the head-to-toe black dress of Islamic
fundamentalism.94
At the moment, Wahhabi and/or Salafi movements do not have many followers in BiH.
These movements can be divided into three groups: (i) those loyal to the ICBiH, (ii) those
with parallel religious structure and (iii) the extremists. The vast majority of Wahhabi/
Salafi followers in BiH are peaceful and the only difference between them and other
Muslims in Bosnia is the way they pray and dress.
The first group opposes Salafis/Wahhabis who want to split from the ICBiH. The two
remaining groups see the ICBiH as ignorant and violator of Islamic norms and values.
However, there is a big difference between the second and third group. The second
group has been “injected” by a “cognitive” radicalism, while the third group by “behav-
ioral” radicalism. The “cognitive” radicalism might be defined as opposition of Wahhabi/

Salafi communities to the values, norms and institutions of the ICBiH, which results in
para-jamaats. Also, the “cognitive” radicalism is a form of “ideological injection” by
which individuals and/or groups adopt radical or extreme ideas. It is rather difficult to
identify factors that cause a switch from “cognitive” to “behavioral” radicalism or extre-
mism, which is the reason why preventative measures need to be developed. On the other
hand, the Wahhabi/Salafi who are also extremists consider jihad (religiously sanctioned
warfare) as individual ( fard ‘ayn) rather than the state obligation of Muslims ( fard
kifaya).95 Such Wahhabi/Salafi movements emphasize the use of violence as divine
imperative. The most extreme among them are the takfiri jihadists96 who threaten even
those Muslims who do not share their religious views. In a way, they are very similar to
Al-Qaeda, al-Nusra Front and ISIS. They reject legal Islamic scholarship and the
ICBiH, as well as anything different from their interpretations of the Quran, the
Sunnah and Hadith.
The Salafi/Wahhabi teachings were mainly “imported” during the Bosnian war 1992–
1995. The ICBiH reacted decisively during the early period of war, implementing a pre-
ventative policy against the spread of Salafi/Wahhabi teachings. In 1993, Reisu-l-ulema
Mustafa Cerić issued a fatwa on mandatory compliance with Hanafi madhhab in all reli-
gious rituals in the ICBiH.97 This was a binding decision for all employees (imams,
muftis, etc.) of the ICBiH. This illustrates the Bosnian Muslims’ desire—even in war cir-
cumstances—to protect the society from radical interpretation of Islam. Such a decision
guaranteed that the teachings in the ICBiH mosques and schools will be in accordance
with the Hanafi madhhab (moderate Islam). This fatwa was also a guarantee that the
new ICBiH staff would be educated in the traditional way and it was a clear sign from
the ICBiH to the Muslim (Islamic) majority countries that—despite the assistance
during the war—they cannot impose their ideologies on the ICBiH or Bosnian
Muslims. The fatwa was difficult to implement during the war as it did not include a
ban on book publishing. Although publishing was not seen as a threat, it provided
Salafi/Wahhabi missionaries with the opportunity to promote their teachings among
Bosnian Muslims. According to Muhamed Jusić,98 a ban on publishing of non-Hanafi
books was not possible because BiH is a free society and the ICBiH was not allowed to
interfere with the state jurisdiction. Jusić adds that the ICBiH placed a ban on publishing
of non-Hanafi books in its institutions, but not outside of them.99
In November 1997, the ICBiH added the article VIII to the Constitution of the ICBiH,
in which the Item 2 prescribes: “The Hanafi madhhab shall be applied in interpretation
and practice of the Islamic worship duties in the ICBiH (author’s translation).”100
This amendment was made during the early stage of restoration of Islamic sites destroyed
and/or damaged by war. Many funds were provided by the Muslim majority countries
and, in order to reduce their influence, this amendment served as a preventative policy
of the ICBiH. This was the period of the (re)construction of mosques when many
donors from the Muslim majority countries offered financial assistance. In addition, in
2007, the ICBiH adopted the House Rules in Mosques.101 These rules were adopted
in response to the Salafi/Wahhabi followers’ practice of organizing activities in
mosques in BiH without consent from the Imams.
Nevertheless, the ICBiH has often been criticized for “tolerating” the Salafi/Wahhabi
communities, while in reality they were tolerated by the state institutions that failed to
prevent them from establishing illegal jamaats. The reason for the ICBiH’s decision to
suggest that para-jamaats be included in the ICBiH in 2015 and not before, is provided
by Enes Ljevaković:
In the previous period, especially after the war, the ICBiH had other priorities.
We had to restore the ruined mosques and there were more than 600 of them …
Then, we had to help refugees and displaced people. This was a huge project
and our priority. After … terrorist attacks around the world, as well as the terror-
ist attacks in our country, the groups or individuals who were in touch with these
jamaats [para-jamaats] came to the focus … Basically, the para-jamaats became
our focus because they felt that they were potential hotspots of some kind of
extremism. We want to prevent this and eliminate the consequences that we
already see and feel (author’s translation).102
Also, after the 2015 terrorist attack on two soldiers of the AFBiH103, the Reisu-l-Ulema
Husein Kavazović and the ICBiH decided to use a legal framework and open-door policy
to pressure the para-jamaats to integrate in the official institutions of the ICBiH.104 The
ICBiH identified the communities and individuals who promoted the radical and
extreme ideologies that might lead to violence and, by closing them, they prevented
other individuals to be “injected” with a radical and extreme ideology. It is important

to emphasize that the ICBiH identified groups that formed para-jamaats and that it
was up to the state enforcement institutions to decide what to do with them.
The Para-Jamaats
In 2016, the ICBiH reported 64 para-jamaats in BiH.105 According to Ismail Smaj-
lović106, the imams reported the illegal activities and gathering in private premises that
were not registered—approved by the ICBiH or the state institutions.107 Mustafa
Spahić108 argues that these para-jamaats emerged in places where the ICBiH was weak
and where the activities of ICBiH were insignificant. According Spahić, the Wahhabi/
Salafi movements are built on denial of legal institutions and social structure. He
added that people who established these para-jamaats were not a part of the ICBiH
and that they do not understand the social circumstances of Bosnian Islam.109 The
leaders of para-jamaats do not understand the consequences of their activities on the
Bosnian Muslim community. They created their “perfectly conceived” jamaat in their
mind and because of that they are ready to oppose the ICBiH.
Al Jazeera reported on 29 October 2016 that 22 para-jamaats refused to integrate in the
ICBiH. Dragan Mektić, Minister of Defense of BiH, said that “para-jamaats like this one
(referring to Kula para-jamaat in Tuzla), which did not integrate in the structure of
ICBiH, will become a security issue and the state institutions of BiH will deal with
them”.110 On 13 January 2016, the Office of Public Relations of ICBiH demanded
from the relevant state institutions to close the illegal jamaats.111 Although significant
efforts to close the illegal jamaats were made by the state, the Law on “Freedom of reli-
gion and legal status of churches and religious organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina”
was not implemented fully.112 In addition, Ismail Smajlović argues that the state insti-
tution did not react in a timely manner and that the para-jamaats might “wake-up”
again.113
The counter-radicalization policy was not only about closing illegal jamaats or incor-
porating them in the ICBiH. Ismail Smajlović does not consider this process as a fight
against individuals and/or groups that were outside the ICBiH but rather a fight for
them. The ICBiH will take the responsibility to speak to them about Islam and risks of
ideological interpretation of Islam, as well as of radicalization.114 All of the jamaats
that accepted to become a part of the ICBiH also accepted the status, rules and regu-
lations of the ICBiH. This includes the appointment of Hanafi imams in their jamaats,
payment of membership fee and the ICBiH’s mektebs for their kids.
However, the ICBiH imams are not trained to deal with radicalism, extremism and ter-
rorism because the traditional Islam in BiH never had such challenges. Mustafa Spahić
thinks that this proves that imams’ duties need to be based on lifelong learning process
and that they should adjust to the current challenges.115 Mensur Pašalić116 also says
that discussions and seminars on religious radicalization and violent extremism are
important for imams. As a result, IlmiyyahAssociation of the ICBiH (Udruženja ilmijje
IZ BiH) organized eight massive seminars for the imams on “Imams duties, religious radi-
calization and violent extremism” (Imamski poziv, vjerski radikalizam i nasilni ekstremi-
zam). This project was supported by the imams, as well as the Bosnian diaspora. Ilmija has
received invitation to organize similar seminars abroad for the Bosnian Muslim dia-
spora.117 The seminars indicate that the ICBiH is developing communications strategy
and counter-narratives against radicalism and violent extremism. The counter-narrative
practices are supposed to be used around BiH in order to reinforce the traditional Islamic
values of BiH.
In addition to the above-mentioned issues, many states face challenges related with the
return and social re-integration of their citizens who fought in the Middle East. As of early
December 2016, more than 100 people returned from Iraq and Syria to BiH118 and 22 of
them were sentenced.119 The re-integration process is not merely about “a change in
individual mindset, but also a shift in social relationships and personal circumstances”.120
Mensur Pašalić believes that rehabilitation and de-radicalization of these people could
work because they were ideologically tricked and added that they could have normal
lives once the sentences are served.121 Similar programs are organized in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Yemen.122 According to Mustafa Bisić, the
Deputy Minister of Ministry of Justice of BiH, BiH is ready to be engaged in the de-radi-
calization and rehabilitation project.123 Ismail Smajlović argues that the ICBiH has
capacity to engage in rehabilitation programs, but that the state must make a request
for this.124
On the other hand, the ISIS fighters from BiH are not representative of the ICBiH,
Bosnian Muslims or BiH. Islam in BiH is institutional and the work of the ICBiH is regu-
lated by the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious
Organizations in BiH, in which Article IV, Item II prescribes:
Churches and religious communities shall not, when teaching religion or in other
actions, disseminate hatred and prejudices against any other Churches and reli-
gious communities or its members, or against the citizens of no religious affilia-
tion, or prevent their freedom to manifest in public their religion or belief.125
Also, the Bosnian war has changed the course of Islamic revival in BiH. Besides the
Salafi/Wahhabi, there are also various organizations connected with Fethullah Gülen,
Shi’as, Ahmediyya Muslim Jamaat, Nurji, Sulejmanji and Bahá’í. Most of them are
peaceful, although in 2016 the Turkish government declared the Gülenist movement ter-
rorist. The evidence proved the involvement of Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ)
in the failed military coup in Turkey. The movement was very sophisticated and it started
with peaceful activities that turned into violence. In other words, the cognitive radicalism
among the Gülenist followers turned into behavioral radicalism which led to death of 265
people in Turkey.126 After the failed military coup, Reisu-l-Ulema Husein Kavazović
stated: “Like in all parts of the world, FETÖ exists in BiH … ” adding that “against
this organization legal means will be used”.127 The Bosniak member of the tripartite Pre-
sidency of BiH said that FETÖ is “Octopus with arms reaching out to 150 states around
the world, including Bosnia”, adding that “FETÖ is definitely a treacherous terror
group.”128
A set of preventative measures is needed; the political elites in BiH cannot rely on
reports about the current activities of the Gülenist followers in BiH. The Gülenist fol-
lowers were cognitively radical and acted peacefully in Turkey and then they became be-
haviorally radical. The security agencies in BiH should work to prevent the emergence of
behavioral radicalism among them. This should not include the exclusion of the Gülenist
followers from the society but rather a process of de-radicalization that would enable
them to rehabilitate and understand the nature of FETÖ. It could prevent the FETÖ fol-
lowers in BiH to use violent means to reach their political goals in the future.
Conclusion
Radicalism and extremism lead to denial of democracy and human rights which usually
results in terrorism. The ICBiH condemns individuals and groups who committed ter-
rorist acts in the name of Islam and perceives such acts as illegal use of force.129 Although
the ICBiH demonstrated commitment to the elimination of radical and extremist ideol-
ogies in BiH, Muslims in BiH are often criticized for being or becoming radical, while
BiH is described as a “terrorist haven”130. Such accusations harm BiH and the
Western Balkans and they do not contribute to the fight against radicalization. Also,
the assessments of this study showed that, despite their efforts, the Wahhabi/Salafi move-
ments’ do not have many supporters in BiH. The ICBiH and majority of Bosnian
Muslims are of Hanafi madhhab, and follow a traditional and moderate Islam in BiH.
The key findings of this analysis are:
(i) ICBiH has been contributing to the prevention of radical ideologies and move-
ments in BiH.
(ii) ICBiH efforts are important for preserving the Bosnian non-violent tradition,
Hanafi teaching and the moderate Islamic approach.
(iii) ICBiH uses legal means to combat the rise of radical movements.
(iv) ICBiH bases its work on the draft of the “Platform for Dialogue”.
(v) ICBiH needs to deal with both the “cognitive” and “behavioral” radicalism.
The conclusions of this study are:
(i) The Salafi movements were targeted because their teachings and activities do
not recognize the legal system of BiH or represent a national security threat.
(ii) Not all Salafis represent a threat and not all of them violate the legal system.
(iii) State institutions should have more effective enforcement strategy for the
implementation of the Law on “Freedom of religion and legal status of churches
and religious organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.
(iv) Individuals with radical and/or extreme ideologies cannot be perceived as an
average Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak).
(v) The Islamic religious obligations and behavioral radicalism cannot be used
interchangeably.
The ICBiH’s efforts to prevent and suppress radical movements in BiH show that
Islam as practiced in Bosnia by its citizens is not the same as radicalism or terrorism.
More Muslims live in almost any developed EU member state than in BiH and if the
threat of terrorism is assessed based on the number of Muslims in a country, then France,
Germany, Austria, Great Britain certainly pose greater threat for the security of Europe
than BiH. Therefore, the call made by Bosniak leaders that the criticism coming from
some EU officials regarding alleged radicalization and terrorism in BiH should stop, is
indeed sound, as it is not based on facts and it unfairly damages the international
image and reputation of BiH and Bosnian Muslims.
NOTES
1. Valery Perry, Initiatives to Prevent/Counter Violent Extremism in South East Europe – A Survey of
Regional Issues, Initiatives and Opportunities, Sarajevo: Regional Cooperation Council, 2016.
2. Radicalization is a process by which individuals or groups adopt extreme beliefs. These views emerge
out of misguidance (ideological interpretation of a religion), misunderstanding (insufficient knowl-
edge, or Islamic illiteracy), anger, a “sense of injustice” and so on. Such beliefs are often violent,
but not always. In this sense, the “dangerous ideology of Islam” does not have to do anything with
Islam, but rather with political orientations of individuals or groups which are victims of such
ideologies.
3. Religious obligations are duties to which Muslims are bound to according to the Holy Scripts (e.g.
halal food, praying rituals, scarf or hijab that Muslim women wear, Muslim male circumcision, etc.).
These duties do not present a threat to national and regional security, and they are followed by a free
will of Muslims.
4. Jen Judson, “Interview: President of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic”, Defensive News, 29 Novem-
ber 2016, www.defensenews.com/global/2016/11/29/interview-president-of-croatia-kolinda-grabar-
kitarovic/ (accessed 21 February 2017).
5. Andre Ballin and Ozan Demircan, “EU, Russia and Turkey Struggle for Balkan Influence”, Handels-
blatt Global, 21 August 2017, https://global.handelsblatt.com/politics/eu-russia-and-turkey-struggle-
for-balkan-influence-815423 (accessed 21 August 2017).
6. Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Saopćenje Ureda za odnose s javnošću Rijaseta”
[Press Release of the Public Relations Office of Riyasat], 22 August 2017, http://islamskazajednica.
ba/vijesti/aktuelno/25444-saopcenje-ureda-za-odnose-s-javnoscu-rijaseta (accessed 22 August 2017).
7. Klix, “SIPA: Nemamo saznanja da se državljankama BiH plaća za nošenje marame” [SIPA: We Have
No Information that Someone Is Paying BiH Citizens to Wear Headscarves], 25 August 2017,
https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/sipa-nemamo-saznanja-da-se-drzavljankama-bih-placa-za-nosenje-
marame/170825028 (accessed 26 August 2017).
8. Parallel mosques and jamaats refer to the Muslim communities which act independently from the
ICBiH. As such, they are considered to be illegal religious communities.
9. Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories”,
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter, 2011, pp. 7–36.
10. Alex P. Schmid, Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion
and Literature Review, The Hague: International Center for Counter-Terrorism, March 2013,
https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-Executive-Summary-March-2013.pdf
(accessed 5 July 2017).
11. International Crisis Group, “De-radicalisation and Indonesian Prisons”, Asia Report, No. 142, 19
November 2007, p. i.
12. International Peace Institute, “A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterror-
ism”, June 2010, Meeting Note, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/a_new_
approach_epub.pdf (accessed 16 August 2017).
13. Farhan Zahid, “Analyzing the Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Models”, Centre
Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement [French Research Center], Foreign Analysis No. 43,
2016, p. 3.
14. Ibid.
15. Adrienne Ou, “Hearts and Minds: A Comparison of Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Britain
and the United”, Cornell International Affairs Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2016, pp. 1–31.
16. Graham Hitchcock and David Hughes, Research and the Teacher: A Qualitative Introduction to School-
based Research, London: Routledge, 1989, p. 83.
17. The Islamic Community—Sentinel and Principles, Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
2012, http://english.islamskazajednica.ba/the-islamic-community/modules-menu/the-islamic-
community-sentinel-and-principles (accessed 29 December 2016).
18. The organizational structure of the ICBiH is composed of eight muftiluks (a district-level organiz-
ational unit of the Islamic Community, which typically includes more than 15 majlises): Bihać,
Banja Luka, Tuzla, Travnik, Zenica, Goražde, Sarajevo and Mostar. In addition to the eight men-
tioned muftiluks, the ninth muftiluk is the military one. The military muftiluk is dealing with religious
life of Muslims serving the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH). Muftiluks are further
divided into Majlises (a local organizational unit of the Islamic Community, which typically includes
at least seven jamaats that form a whole) which are composed of small units called jamaats (represents
the basic and smallest organizational unit, typically organized on a level of settlement). The upper
body of the ICBiH incorporates the Riyasat (main executive body of the ICBiH), the Raisu-l-
Ulama (the President of the Riyasat and the Grand Mufti (supreme authority) in the ICBiH), the
Assembly of the ICBiH and the Constitutional Court of the ICBiH. See: Structural organization of
the Islamic Community, Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012, http://english.
islamskazajednica.ba/the-islamic-community/modules-menu/the-structural-organisation-of-the-
islamic-community (accessed 29 December 2016).
19. Hanafi madhhab is one of the four religious Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence.
20. Ustav Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini [The Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia
and Herzegovina], http://www.izb.se/files/Ustav_IZ-e_precisceni_tekst_2014.pdf (accessed 3 August
2017).
21. Mustafa Imamović, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Evolution of Its Political and Legal Institutions, Sarajevo:
Magistrat, 2006.
22. Ibid.
23. DPA brought the conflict in BiH to an end. The agreement was signed on 21 November 1995 by the
representatives of BiH, Serbia and Croatia; and was witnessed by the Contact Group countries.
24. The UNSCE Resolution 47/121 (Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina), issued on 18 December
1992, clearly depicts the involvement of Serbia and Montenegro in the Bosnian war. For instance,
the Resolutions says that the UNSC is “strongly condemning Serbia and Montenegro and their sur-
rogates in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for their continued non-compliance with all rel-
evant United Nations resolutions” (para. 7), and adding that the UNSC:
strongly condemns Serbia, Montenegro and Serbian forces in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina for violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their non-compliance with existing resol-
utions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the London Peace
Accords of August 1992. (para. 15)
Also this Resolution:
demands that Serbia and Montenegro and Serbian forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina immediately cease their aggressive acts and hostility and comply fully and uncondi-
tionally with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolutions 752
(1992) of 15 May 1992, 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, 770 (1992) and 771 (1992) of 13
August 1992, 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992,
General Assembly resolution 46/242 and the London Peace Accords of August 1992.
(para. 16, from http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r121.htm (accessed 17 July
2017))
25. Mersiha Hukić, “Rebuilding Bosnia-Herzegovina: Achievements and Difficulties”, 9 February 2000,
Center for Balanced Development, http://www.i-p-o.org/rebuilding-bosnia.htm (accessed 7 June
2017).
26. Michael B. Bishku, “Bosnia and the Middle East: Current Political, Economic and Cultural Ties”,
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2016, p. 202.
27. Inger Skjelsbæk, “Victim and Survivor: Narrated Social Identities of Women Who Experienced Rape
During the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Feminism & Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2006, pp. 373–403.
28. UNSC Resolution 820 (1993), 17 April 1993, www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930417a.htm (accessed 10
June 2017).
29. Skjelsbæk, “Victim and Survivor”, op. cit., p. 375.
30. Ivana Nizich, “Violations of the Rules of War by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina”, Hastings Women’s Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1994, pp. 25–52.
31. Beth Stephens, “Women and the Atrocities of War”, Human Rights, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1993, pp. 12–15.
32. Hamza Preljević, “Review of Bosnia and the Destruction of Cultural Heritage, Edited By Helen Walasek,
with Contributions by Richard Carlton, Amra Hadžimuhamedović, Valery Perry, and Tina Wik,
London, Routledge, 2015”, European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 3,
2017, pp. 373–375.
33. Muharem Omerdić, Prilozi u izučavanju genocidima nad Bošnjacima [Samples for the Study of the
Genocide on Bosniaks], Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999.
34. For instance, some of the oldest mosques in BiH that were destroyed or damaged during the 1992–
1995 Bosnian war were: Gazi Husrev-bey Mosque (1532), Emperor’s Mosque (1565), Ali Pasha
Mosque (1561), Sheikh Magribija Mosque (1766) in Sarajevo, Aladža Mosque (1551) and Emper-
or’s Mosque (1483) in Foča, Sultania Esma Mosque (1745) in Jajce, Karađoz Bey Mosque (1570) in
Mostar, Ferhat Pasha Mosque (1579) and Arnaudija Mosque (1595) in Banja Luka, Emin Turhan
Bey Mosque (1448/9) in Ustokolina, and Sultan Abdul Aziz Mosque (1862) in Brčko.
35. Ibid.
36. Six Chief imams, 61 imams, 1 muallim (teacher), 5 retired imams, 4 professors, 15 pupils of Gazi
Husrev-bey Madrasa (Islamic high school), 1 student at the Faculty of Islamic Studies (FIN) and 5
officers from the institutions of ICBiH were killed. See more: Muharem Omerdić, “Sudbina
imama u proteklom ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini” [Fate of Imams in the LAST WAR], Novi
Muallim, Vol. 30, No. 14, 2007, pp. 19–21.
37. Preljević, “Review of Bosnia and the Destruction of Cultural Heritage,” op. cit., pp. 373–375.
38. The Islamic revival is considered to be one of the most important social movements of the twentieth
century. See more: Jean-Paul Carvalho, “A Theory of the Islamic Revival. Department of Econ-
omics”, March 2009, Discussion Paper, No. 424, University of Oxford. This phenomenon
(Islamic revival) affected “every single Muslim country from North Africa to South-east Asia”.
See more: Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, in The Dese-
cularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, ed. Peter L. Berger, Washington, DC:
Erdmann, 1999, p. 7. Also, the Muslims in Europe, especially in the Balkans, stared to re-awake.
39. ICSFRY:
was divided into four territorial units administered through regional assemblies—in Sarajevo
for Bosnia-Herzegovina; in Priština (Kosovo) for Serbia; in Skopje for Macedonia; and in
Titograd for Montenegro, with a meshihat (an executive authority) in Zagreb for Croatia-Slo-
venia and three muftis in Mostar, Tuzla, and Belgrade.
See more: Vjekoslav Perić, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 12.
40. The pre-liberalization period of SFRY, from 1945 to early 1960, consider the Bosnian Muslim (along
with other Muslims in SFRY) to be “backwarded and Asiatic”. For instance, in 1946 the Shari’a
(Islamic religious) law was abolished. In 1950, veil and mektebs were banned. In 1952, the Sufi
orders were closed down. Books related to Islamic science were banned to be published until
1964, and the cultural and educational societies were closed down across the country. See more:
Bishku, “Bosnia and the Middle East”, op. cit., p. 205.
41. The Islamic revival of the Balkan (SFRY) Muslims was manifested in five different areas: “(i)
(re)construction of mosques; (ii) education; (iii) publications; (iv) use of Islamic social symbols;
(v) political cultural and organizations; and (vi) emergence of the Muslim solidarity institutions.”
See more: Fikret Karčić, “Islamic Revival in the Balkans 1970–1992”, Islamic Studies, Vol. 36,
No. 2/3, Summer/Autumn, 1997, p. 570.
42. Ibid., p. 568.
43. The ICBiH acted through its institutional capacity. For instances, the ICBiH offered active informal
educations in Mektebs, and formal education in Madrasas and FIN. Besides that, the ICBiH started to
offer scholarship for studies abroad, mainly Egypt was the case.
44. Ibid., p. 205.
45. Perić, Balkan Idols, op. cit., p. 12.
46. Karčić, “Islamic Revival in the Balkans 1970–1992”, op. cit., p. 570.
47. Some of which are: agents of humanitarians, mujahedeens (Islamic missionaries) and Salafi (faculty,
high) educated Bosnian Muslims.
48. Harun Karčić, “Islamic Revival in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–2010”, Center for Advance Studies,
2010, http://cns.ba/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/islamic_revival_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_
1992-1995.pdf (accessed 21 June 2017).
49. These people were civilians, and did not engage in battlefields as soldiers.
50. Between 2000 and 5000 Muslim foreign fighters—mujahedeens—fought in BiH during the war. See
more: International Crisis Group, “Bosnia’s Dangerous Tango: Islam and Nationalism”, 26 Febru-
ary 2013, Policy Briefing, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/bosnias-dangerous-tango-islam-
and-nationalism.pdf (accessed 11 July 2017). In addition, “the number of mujahideen who stayed
in the country [BiH] is unknown, but estimates vary from 700 to more than 1000”. See more: Ste-
pahnie Zosak, “Revoking Citizenship in the Name of Counterterrorism: The Citizenship Review
Commission Violates Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Northwestern Journal of Inter-
national Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring, 2010, p. 218.
51. The first Arab volunteers joined the Seventh Muslim Mountain Brigade of the Third Corps Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. “However, on August 13, 1993, Supreme Commander Rasim Delic
ordered the establishment of the El-Mujahedin unit comprised strictly of mujahideen in the Third
Corps.” See more: Zosak, “Revoking Citizenship in the Name of Counterterrorism”, op. cit.,
p. 218. This unit was “considered to be base of Salafi teachings, their official ideology was closer
to opponents of official Saudi Ulama then those followers of Takfir”. See more: Muhamed Jusić,
“Islamist Movements in the Twentieth Century and Their Presence in BiH”, in Islamic Scene in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, eds. Wölkner, S., and Pašalić, M., Sarajevo: Udruženje Ilmije Islamske
Zajednice u BiH & Fondacija Konrad Adenauer [Sarajevo: Ilmiyyah Association of the ICBH &
Foundation Konrad Adenauer], 2011, p. 133.The unit was disbanded on 12 December 1995 at
the end of the war.
52. Stepahnie Zosak, “Revoking Citizenship in the Name of Counterterrorism: The Citizenship Review
Commission Violates Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Northwestern Journal of Inter-
national Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring 2010, p. 218.
53. Salafism comes from the Arabic salaf (predecessors or ancestors). The movement is created on the
teachings and actions of Muhammad Ibn Wahhab (1703–1787). Despite the fact that the followers of
this movements are known in BiH as Wahhabis (named after the founder), they do not accept that
name. See more: Muhamed Jusić, “Islamist Movements in the Twentieth Century and Their Pres-
ence in BiH”, op. cit., pp. 126–136.
54. Ibid., p. 128.
55. Islamic Community of BiH, “Fetva o obavezi pridržavanja henefijskog mezheba” [Fatwa on Manda-
tory Following of the Hanafi Madhhab], 13 December 1993, published online 5 January 2017,
www.islamskazajednica.ba/component/content/article?id=193:iz-kurana&catid=69:zanimljivosti
(accessed 9 September 2017).
56. Clair Apodaca, “Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2017,
doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.332.
57. Beside Sarajevo and Mostar, Arabic language courses are organized (under the sponsorship of Cul-
tural Center) in Goražde, Srebrenik, Tuzla, Bugojno, Kiseljak, Visoko, Živinice, Travnik and Bihać.
See more: Al Jazeera Balkans, “Arapski na Balkanu najpoželjniji jezik za učenje” [The Arabic
Language Is the Most Preferable Language in the Balkans], 8 April 2017, http://balkans.aljazeera.
net/vijesti/arapski-na-balkanu-najpozeljniji-jezik-za-ucenje (accessed 12 September 2017).
58. Bishku, “Bosnia and the Middle East”, op. cit., p. 211.
59. Harun Karčić, “Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina: International Actors and
Activities”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2010, pp. 519–534.
60. For instance, Islam Bosna (http://www.islambosna.ba/), Nur Islam (http://www.nur-islam.com/), Put
Vjernika (https://putvjernika.com/) and so forth.
61. The exact number of Shias is unknown, but the fact is that the number is rising.
62. Mulla Sadra Foundation and Iranian Cultural Center Sarajevo offer also Persian language courses.
63. Esad Duraković is a philologist, orientalist, translator, literary critic. He is a full member of the
Academy of Science and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and full professor at the Faculty of Phil-
osophy in Sarajevo.
64. Patria bh. novinska agencija, “Esad Duraković: Država BiH je u smrtnoj opasnosti, ali..” [Esad Dur-
aković: BiH is in grave danger, but …], 22 June 2017, http://www.nap.ba/new/vijest.php?id=36578
(accessed 3 August 2017).
65. Fethullah Gülen is Turkish origin preacher, writer and most recently political figure. He lives in
Pennsylvania, United States. He has millions of followers worldwide. The Turkish government
requested extradition of Gülen because of alleged involvement in the failed attempt of the military
coup in Turkey.
66. The author does not refer to these schools as “Turkish schools” since the movement of Fethullah
Gülen is considered to be a “terrorist organization” in Turkey.
67. International Burch University.
68. Anadolu Agency, “Fethullah Gulen’s Broad Western Balkans Network”, 28 July 2016, para. 11,
http://aa.com.tr/en/education/fetullah-gulens-broad-western-balkans-network/617524 (accessed 25
July 2017).
69. Diplomas from these schools (and university) are not recognized in Turkey.
70. Books of Fethullah Gülen and his followers have been actively translated to Bosnian language and
published by Hikmet—a Publication House with Gülenist inclinations.
71. Novo Vrijeme operates since 2012 as a portal and weekly newspaper, and since 29 April 2017, it
works only as a portal. See more: http://novovrijeme.ba/.
72. By 2014, 452 mosques were reconstructed and 367 new mosques were built. See more: Klix, “U BiH
od rata obnovljene 452 i izgrađeno 367 novih džamija”, 7 May 2017, https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/
u-bih-od-rata-obnovljene-452-i-izgradjeno-367-novih-dzamija/140507043 (accessed 16 July 2017).
73. The five schools are: “Osman ef. Redžović” Madrasa in Visoko, established in 1992; the Džemalu-
dinef. Čaušević Madrasa in Cazin, established in 1993; the Behram-bey Madrasa in Tuzla, estab-
lished in 1626 and re-established in 1993; the Elči Ibrahim Paša Madrasa in Travnik, established
in 1706 and re-established in 1993; and the Karađoz Bey Madrasa in Mostar, established in 1557
and re-established in 1995.
74. Islamic Community in BiH, “Odluka o o džamijskom—kućnom redu” [The Decision on House
Rules in Mosques], 16 October 2007, http://islamskazajednica.ba/images/stories/URADITI/kucni
%20red.pdf (accessed 7 August 2017).
75. Previous name of the institution was the Institut za proučavanje tradicije Bošnjaka (Institute for
Research on Bosniak Tradition).
76. See more: Islamic Community in BiH—Sabor, “Decision on the Establishment of Institute for
Research on Bosniak Tradition” (No. SIZ-78/8).
77. Al-Wasatiyya Center for Dialogue, “O Centru za dijalog—Vesatijja” [About the Center for Dialogue
—Al-Wasatiyya], http://cdv.ba/o-centru-za-dijalog-vesatijja/ (accessed 8 September 2017).
78. El-Kalem is the official publishing house of the ICBiH. The House was founded in 1973. The pub-
lications include topics as: Hadith, Fiqh, Ahlaq, Arabic language, collections of Fatwa, children books
and collection of Duas. See more: http://www.elkalem.ba/index.php?route=common/home.
79. For instance, Rijaset (http://www.islamskazajednica.ba), (ii) El-Kalem (www.elkalem.ba), (iii) Pre-
porod newspaper (www.preporod.com), (iv) Gazi Husrev Beg Library (www.ghbibl.com.ba), Hajj
and Umrah (v) (http://www.hadziumra.ba), (vi) FIN (www.fin.ba) and (vii) all of madrasas set up
their own webpages.
80. Author finds interesting that the Shi’a foundations in BiH, which are sponsored by Iran, have not
been frequently criticized for their activities. This opens space for further discussion. Although the
Iranian relations with the Western countries are not the best, having them next to the EU borders
seems to be “acceptable”.
81. In addition, the newly founded Turkish Maarif Foundation started to operate in BiH. According to
Haldun Koc, Turksih ambassador to BiH, this foundation acts globally with the support of the Min-
istry of Education of the Republic of Turkey. See more: Faktor, “Turski ambasador Koc: FETO u
BiH na izdisaju, otvaraju se škole Maarif fondacije” [Turkish Ambassador Koc: FETO Is Close to Its
End, the Maarif Schools Will Be Open], 23 February 2017, https://faktor.ba/vijest/turski-ambasador-
koc-feto-u-bih-na-izdisaju-otvaraju-se-skole-maarif-fondacije-237291 (accessed 17 July 2017). The
President of Maarif Foundation, Birol Akgün, said that this foundation “was not founded simply
to fight Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) schools and organizations abroad … ” See more: Daily
Sahab, “Maarif Foundation Head: We Aim to Offer an Education that Reflects Turkish Vision,
Promote Turkish Language”, 12 February 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2017/02/13/
maarif-foundation-head-we-aim-to-offer-an-education-that-reflects-turkish-vision-promote-turkish-
language (accessed 27 August 2017). The importance of this foundation lies in the efforts to offer an
alternative channel of education—by opening schools, which eventually should reduce the Gülenist
influence.
82. Senada Tahirovic, “Intervju Muallima—Reisu-l-ulema IZ u BiH Husein ef. Kavazović: Islamska
zajednica ima ustavnu obavezu da čuva islamsku tradiciju Bošnjaka” [Muallim Interview—Reisu-l-
ulema Husein Kavazović: Islamic Community Has Constitutional Obligation to Preserve the Islamic
Tradition of Bosniaks], 31 August 2014, http://igbd.org/?p=7566 (accessed 21 July 2017).
83. Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Draft of the Platform of the ICBiH on Dialogue”,
2015, http://vijecemuftija.islamskazajednica.ba/index.php/2015-12-08-13-41-32/fetve-i-rezolucije/
156-nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih-za-dijalog (accessed 20 June 2017).
84. Ibid.
85. Author refers to this group as “minority”, and as such, they cannot represent the “majority” of
Muslims.
86. In the past two months, I [Srđan Puhalo] have met over 130 Salafis in Jablanica, Sarajevo, Zenica,
Maglaj, Bočinj, Tuzla, Gračanica, Sanski Most, Ključ, Ošve and Maoča … And I have to disappoint
you—I have not met any terrorist. I have not met either people who support suicide attacks in Paris,
Brussels, nor what ISIS is doing in Iraq and Syria; or someone who is scarcely waiting to commit
suicide attack. Maybe they were very skilled hypocrites, they (the Salafis) might hidden the suppor-
ters of the above mentioned from me; but I did not met them (referring to extremists). See more:
Srđan Puhalo, “Kako sam preživio 130 selefija” [How I Survived Surrounded with 130 Salafis], Sele-
fije u Bosni i Hercegovini: ko su oni, kako ih drugi vide i kako se izvještava o njima [Salafis in Bosnia and
Herzegovina], Banja Luka: Pro educa, 2016.
87. Kristin Archick et al., “European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses, and Issues for
the United States”, 27 April 2015, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44003.
pdf (accessed 18 June 2017).
88. The last census from 2013 showed that 1,790,454 (and 1,769,592 Bosniaks) people with Islamic reli-
gion live in BiH. Using simple calculations, the result showed that these 300 individuals make up
only 0,01675 of the total Muslim, not Bosniak, population in BiH. See more: Agency for Statistics
of BiH, “Cenzus of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 2013,
http://www.popis2013.ba/popis2013/doc/Popis2013prvoIzdanje.pdf (accessed 10 September 2017).
89. Sputnik News, “Czech President: Militants Could Flee to Bosnia After Defeat of Daesh”, 27 August
2017, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201708271056840039-czech-bosnia-militants-defeat/
90. Agency for Statistics of BiH, “Cenzus of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina”, 2013, http://www.popis2013.ba/popis2013/doc/Popis2013prvoIzdanje.pdf (accessed 10
September 2017).
91. Sputnik News, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Slam Czech Leader’s Claims on Terrorist Base”, 29 August
2017, https://sputniknews.com/politics/201708291056871815-bosnia-herzegovina-slams-zeman/
92. Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West,
London: Praeger Security International, 2007, p. 12.
93. Freedom House—Center for Religious Freedom, “Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Invade
American Mosques”, 2005, p. 16, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/
Saudi%20Publications%20on%20Hate%20Ideology%20Invade%20American%20Mosques.pdf
94. Peter Maass, “Bosnian Serbs Say They’re Fighting Against Islamic Fundamentalism”, Washington
Post, 11 August 1992, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/08/11/bosnian-serbs-
say-theyre-fighting-against-islamic-fundamentalism/5713626c-66ef-4b39-ae2f-f67c2b01abf7/?utm_
term=.0c9723c11a5c (accessed 13 September 2017).
95. Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, “Islamism, Salafism, and jihadism: A Primer”, Brookings Institute, 15
July 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-
primer/, (accessed 13 September 2017).
96. Takfir refers to the practice of excommunication, or when one Muslim declares the other one to be
non-believer (kafir).
97. Islamic Community of BiH, “Fetva o obavezi pridržavanja henefijskog mezheba”, op. cit.
98. Muhamed Jusić is an Islamic scholar, columnist and an analyst on Middle Eastern and Balkan
studies. He also is adviser for media to Husein Kavazović, Reisu-l-Ulema in BiH.
99. Personal interview with Muhamed Jusić, conducted on 8 September 2017.
100. Ustav Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, op. cit.
101. Islamic Community in BiH, “Odluka o o džamijskom—kućnom redu” [The Decision on House
Rules in Mosques], op. cit.
102. Radio Slobodna Evropa, “Sarajevski muftija: Formiranje ‘paradžemata’ cijepa Islamsku zajednicu”
[Sarajevo Mufti: The Formation of “Para-jamaats” Splits the Islamic Community], 29 January
2016, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sarajevski-muftija-paradzematima-nema-mjesta-u-bih/
27518705.html (accessed 14 September 2017).
103. Vječernji List, “Tužiteljstvo BiH: Ubojstvo vojnika je djelo terorizma” [Prosecutor’s Office of BiH:
The Death of Soldiers Is a Crime of Terrorism], 19 November 2015, https://www.vecernji.hr/
vijesti/bih-istraga-o-ubojstvu-vojnika-u-sarajevu-traje-nagada-se-o-motivima-1038549 (accessed 14
September 2017).
104. Muhamed Jusić, “The Complex Ecology of Islamic Narratives and Movements in Bosnia and
Herzegovina”, in Between Salvation and Terror: Radicalization and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon
in the Western Balkans, ed. Vlado Azinović, Sarajevo: Atlantic Initiative, 2017, p. 54.
105. Vječernji list, “Paradžemati raspostranjeni širom BiH: Ima ih 64, uglavnom su po brdima” [Para-
jamaats Are Widespread Through BiH: There Are 64 of Them, Mostly in Rural Area], 20 January
2016, https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/paradzemati-raspostranjeni-sirom-bih-ima-ih-64-uglavnom-
su-po-brdima-1053427 (accessed 14 September 2017).
106. Ismail Imamović is the Director of the Administration for Legal and Administrative Affairs.
107. Personal interview with Ismail Imamović, conducted on 12 September 2017.
108. Mustafa Spahić is retired professor of Sociology and History of Islam in Gazi Husrev-Bey Madrasa.
He is author of many books, articles, and book chapters. In 1983, the Communist regime arrested
him and he was imprisoned for five years.

109. Personal interview with Mustafa Spahić, conducted on 12 September 2017.
110. Al Jazeera, “U BiH 22 paradžemata ne žele biti dio Islamske zajednice” [In BiH 22 Para-jamaats Do
Not Want to be a Part of the Islamic Community], 29 October 2016, 2017, http://balkans.aljazeera.
net/vijesti/u-bih-22-paradzemata-ne-zele-biti-dio-islamske-zajednice (accessed 14 September 2017).
111. Islamska zajednica, “Saopćenje za javnost Ureda za odnose s javnošću Rijaseta” [Press Release of the
Public Relations Office of Riyasat], 13 January 2015, www.islamskazajednica.ba/component/
content/article?itemid=457&id=23389:reisu:l-ulema-primio-privrednike-iz-tesnja-saopcenje-za-
javnost-ureda-za-odnose-s-javnoscu-rijaseta (accessed 14 September 2017).
112. “Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organizations in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina”, Law 28 gennaio 2004, No. 5, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
113. Personal interview with Ismail Imamović, op. cit.
114. Ibid.
115. Personal interview with Mustafa Spahić, op. cit.
116. Mensur Pašalić is president of Ilmiyyah Association of the ICBH (Udruženja ilmijje IZ BiH) since
2011. Also, he is the Head of the Department for Bosnian Diaspora, Cooperation with Non-
Muslim Countries and International Organizations in the Directorate of the Riyaset for Foreign
Affairs.
117. Personal interview with Mensur Pašalić, conducted on 12 September 2017.
118. Georgia Holmer and Adrian Shtuni, “Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Impera-
tive”, United States Institute of Peace, 2017, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/
sr402-returning-foreign-fighters-and-the-reintegration-imperative.pdf (accessed 15 September
2017).
119. Aida Hadžimusić, “Državljani BiH (ne)odlaze na strana ratišta” [Citizens of BiH (Don’t) Go to
Foreign Battles]” N1, 15 May 2017, http://ba.n1info.com/a154101/Vijesti/Vijesti/Drzavljani-BiH-
ne-odlaze-na-strana-ratista.html (accessed 15 September 2017).
120. Georgia Holmer and Adrian Shtuni, “Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Impera-
tive”, United States Institute of Peace, 2017, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/sr402-
returning-foreign-fighters-and-the-reintegration-imperative.pdf (accessed 15 September 2017).
121. Personal interview with Mensur Pašalić, op. cit.
122. Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash, and Laura O. Khor, “Detainee Release and Global Public
Safety: Terrorist Disengagement and Deradicalization Programs—The Way Ahead”, Homeland
Security Policy Institute—The George Washington University, HSPI Issue Brief 22, 6 June 2014.
123. Klix, “BiH deradikalizacijom želi prevaspitati teroriste i radikaliste, stručnjaci vjeruju u promjene”
[BiH with the De-radicalization Program Wants to Rehabilitate the Terrorists and Radicals,
Experts Believe in Progress], 15 October 2017, https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/bih-
deradikalizacijom-zeli-prevaspitati-teroriste-i-radikaliste-strucnjaci-vjeruju-u-promjene/171005056
(accessed on 18 October 2017).
124. Personal interview with Ismail Imamović, op. cit.
125. “Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organizations in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina”, op. cit.
126. Independent, “Prime Minister Says 265 People Killed in Attempted Military Coup, Including At
Least 100 Plotters”, 16 July 2017, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-coup-dead-
erdogan-military-chief-ankara-istanbul-death-toll-plotters-how-many-killed-wounded-a7140376.html,
127. Agency Anadolu, “Kavazović: Kao u svim dijelovima svijeta, FETO postoji i u BiH”, 9 August 2016,
http://aa.com.tr/ba/balkan/kavazovi%C4%87-kao-u-svim-dijelovima-svijeta-feto-postoji-i-u-bih/
625682 (accessed 1 September 2017).
128. Daily Sabah, “FETÖ Is a Terror Group with 150-State Outreach, Bosnia’s Izetbegovic Says”, 14 July
2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/07/14/feto-is-a-terror-group-with-150-state-
outreach-bosnias-izetbegovic-says (accessed 1 September 2017).
129. Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Draft of the Platform of the ICBiH on Dialogue”,
op. cit.
130. Balkan Insight, “Bosnian Authorities Have Responded to Terrorism Threats Says Expert”, 6
February 2017, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-authorities-have-responded-to-
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Preventing Religious Radicalization in Bosnia and

many instances of combined efforts by the government and religious institutions in

© 2017 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs

Radicalization, De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization

Bosnian War 1992–1995 and Destruction of Islamic Cultural Heritage

A referendum for independence from Yugoslavia was held on 29 February and 1

masjids (mosques without minarets), tombs (turbe), tekiyes (Dervish monastery),

Islamic Revival in BiH

The Second Period—1992–2012

The Post-War Period

The Third Period

Protection of Traditional Islam and the Struggle Against Para-Jamaats

ioral” radicalism. The “cognitive” radicalism might be defined as opposition of Wahhabi/

other individuals to be “injected” with a radical and extreme ideology. It is important

Also this Resolution:

him and he was imprisoned for five years.

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