North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ reports, 1969

FACTS:
• On December 1, 1964, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands concluded an
agreement for the partial delimitation of the boundary near the coast.

• On June 9, 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark concluded a similar agreement.

• The Three States failed to reach an agreement on the boundaries beyond the limits of the partial
delimitations, since, Denmark and Netherlands wanted this prolongation to take place based on the
equidistance principle and that they claimed that the Geneva Convention supported this method,
whereas Germany who had not ratified the Geneva Convention was of the view that, together, these
two boundaries would produce an inequitable result for her due to its concave coastline, such a line
would result in her losing out on her share of the continental shelf based on proportionality to the
length of its North Sea coastline.

• On February 2, 1967, the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark and Federal Republic of
Germany and the Netherlands signed two special agreements for the submission of the disputes
between them concerning the delimitation of their continental shelf boundaries in the North Sea to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).

• The Special Agreements further stated that the respective Governments "should delimit he continental
shelf in the North Sea between their countries by agreement in pursuance of the decision requested
from the ICJ.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Germany is under a legal obligation to accept the equidistance-special circumstances
principle, contained in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, either as a
customary international law rule or on the basis of the Geneva Convention.

HELD:

First, on the basis of the Geneva Convention:

NO, the Court held that Germany had not acted in any manner so as to incur obligations contained in Article
6 of the Geneva Convention. The equidistance–special circumstances rule was not binding on Germany by
way of treaty law.
Article 6 (2) of the Geneva Convention states that:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of twoadjacent States, the boundary
of the continental shelf shall be determinedby agreement between them. In the absence of
agreement, and unless anotherboundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary
shall bedetermined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearestpoints of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea ofeach State is measured.
It is clearly stated that unless the parties had already agreed on a method for delimitation or unless special
circumstances exist, the equidistance method would apply. Germany had signed, but not ratified, the Geneva
Convention, hence, the use of the equidistance method of delimitation was not obligatory as between the
parties.

Second, as a customary international law rule:

The Court held that the principle of equidistance, as contained in Article 6 did not form a part of existing or
emerging customary international law at the time of drafting the Convention.
The Court supported this finding based on:
1. the hesitation expressed by the drafters of the Convention, the International Law Commission, on the
inclusion of Article 6 into the Convention and
2. the fact that reservations to Article 6 was permissible under the Convention.

Further, for a customary rule to emerge the Court held that it needed:
1. very widespread and representative participation in the Convention, including States whose interests
were specially affected (in this case, they were coastal States); and
2. virtually uniform practice undertaken in a manner that demonstrates;
3. a general recognition of the rule of law or legal obligation.

Consequently, the first criteria was not met. The number of ratifications and accessions to the Convention
were not adequately representative or widespread.
Hence, the Court concluded that the equidistance principle was not binding on Germany by way of treaty or
customary international law.