Banawa vs. Mirano, No.
L-24750, 97 SCRA 517, May 16, 1980 on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each
Case Digest for Statutory Construction
FACTS: Defendants-appellants spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza took care of
Maria Mirano, Juliana’s niece, since Maria is 9 years old and treated her the same way as they
treated the co-appellant Gliceria Abrenica, their legally adopted child. On May 5, 1921, the
spouses bought a parcel of land situated at Brgy. Iba, Taal, Batangas from Placido Punzalan and
registered the said parcel of land in the name of Maria, because the said spouses wanted
something for Maria after their death.
On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died. At the time of her death she left only
as her nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs-appellees, namely Primitiva, who is a surviving sister,
and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are children of the deceased’s
brother.
The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards to the possession of the Iba
property as legal heirs of Maria. The court ruled in favor of the Miranos. The Banawas appealed
to the Court of Appeals stating that they are entitled to the land in question by virtue of Section 5,
Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:
In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be
his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his
parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who
shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates.
The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the case at the Court of Appeals and were
substituted by their legally adopted child Gliceria Abrenica and her husband Casiano Amponin.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Appellants filed at the Supreme
Court a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding its ruling
that Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court does not apply in the instant case because Maria
Mirano was not legally adopted.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court applicable to the instant case?
HELD: NO. It is very clear in the rule involved that specifically provides for the case of the
judicially adopted child and does not include extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must
be taken to mean exactly what it says.
Teotico vs. Del Val
G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965 – Anna
Facts:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila with no
ascendants or descendants. She left properties worth P600,000.00 and a will written in Spanish
which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her
signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the
presence of three witnesses who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and
other. Said will was acknowledged before a Notary Public by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the full use of her mental
faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of
the will and from any influence of fear or threat and that she freely and spontaneously executed
said will.
She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her niece named Josefina Mortera; and the
usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building to the said spouses. However, the naked ownership
of the building was left in equal parts to the legitimate children of said spouses. She also instituted
Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed of in the will.
Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First
Instance of Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose
Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix.
Issues:
(1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?;
(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?;
(3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the
legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
Held:
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because nowhere in the will was any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because
she is not a co-owner thereof.
Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she would not acquire any interest in any portion of the
estate left by the testatrix. She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the
deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that she claims to be an acknowledged
natural child of Jose and also an adopted daughter of Francisca. But the law does not give her
any right to succeed to the estate of Maria because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by
law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil
Code provides: “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; … .”
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir
in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

On the secon issue, the claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the
evidence of record. The will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the
evidence.
Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her husband Rene had the opportunity to exert
pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the
execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually
isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the
instrumental witnesses had testified in court. The exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower
and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the
will of another rather than her own
On the third issue, the question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions. In Castañeda
v. Alemany, the Court had stated, thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed
with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the
only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. The judgment in
such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to
pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a
certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring
invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been
made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is
that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not
allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the
disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for
the same reason.
N THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed
to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and
under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed
to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
MORALES vs OLANDRIZ READ FULL TEXT
Seangio v Reyes 508 SCRA 177 (2006)G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006DY
YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO,Petitioners,
vs.HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional TrialCourt, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,ALBERTO D. SEANGIO,
ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY
D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS andJAMES D. SEANGIO,
Respondents.COMPLETE DIGEST
There was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was
denominated as “Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana.” The private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document
purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of
the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to
intestacy. Private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule
only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the
same, and ordering the dismissa lof the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear
that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent. Petitioners filed
their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally,the authority of the probate
court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2) private respondents
question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent;and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply because
Segundo’s will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs. The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings,
hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by petitioners.
Issue: Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
Held: Petition granted. The questioned will is a holographic will. Testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument,conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article783) can
be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act
of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property
of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be construed
more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this
regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ngMana, was intended by the
testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the
form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,the disinheritance cannot be given effect
MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982
Topic: Allowance of Wills; Concept of Probate – NCC 838
DOCTRINE:
GENERAL RULE: the probate of the will is limited to an examination of the extrinsic
validity of the will only.
EXCEPTION: [Please take note of Nuguid v Nuguid and Balanay v Martinez cases as
exceptions]
The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon during probate for practical
considerations as when on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
FACTS:
Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will. The will states that all
her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang and her family whose family the
testatrix has lived with continuously for 30 years. The will further stated that she is
troubled with her nephews and that She did not consider Nonoy as her adopted son
for letting her do acts against her will. Maninag filed a petition for the probate of the
holographic will while the adopted son instituted intestate proceedings. The cases
were consolidated and the testate proceeding was dismissed by the trial court
following the court’s reasoning that the adopted son was preterited and intestacy
should ensue. Maninag filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the court’s findings
should be limited to the extrinsic validity of the will and not the intrinsic validity.
ISSUE/S: WON a court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of a will during probate.
HELD/RATIO: As a general rule, NO. Judgment reversed. Testate proceeding
remanded to trial court for determination whether the adopted son was preterited
or validly disinherited.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The case of
Nuguid vs. Nuguid and Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez provide the exception rather
than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the will in those cases were passed upon
even before probate because “practical considerations” so demanded.
Doctrine of Nuguid vs. Nuguid:
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should
meet that issue.
Doctrine of Balanay vs. Martinez:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
In this case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of
the will, the adopted son had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter,
whether there was a valid disinheritance. By virtue of the dismissal of the testate
case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly
considered. From the face of the will, the issue of the will on
preterition/disinheritance is a conclusion that is not indubitable.
Austria v. Reyes Digest
Austria v. Reyes
Facts:
1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll
have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children.
2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the
petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was
allowed.
3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the
nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.

4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held
that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.
Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid
RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary
institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that
the falsity will set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the
heirs will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be
stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover,
testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.
VDA. DE KILAYKO v TENGCO 207 SCRA 600; March 27, 1992
FACTS: Maria Lizares y Alunan died and left her "testamento" in the possession and custody of
her niece, Eustaquia Lizares, who later filed a petition for the settlement of her estate. The
probate court declared the will probated and appointed Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of
Maria Lizares. - Eustaquia filed a project of partition, which was granted by the probate court.
Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in
the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the estate;
adjudicated to them the properties respectively assigned to them, and ordered the Register of
Deeds to effect the corresponding transfer of properties. - Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to
reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been
omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. The Court granted the motion and adjudicated to
Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota
allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any
other person in her last will and testament. The heirs executed an agreement of partition and
subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over the inherited land. - Eustaquia Lizares
died single without any descendant. - Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint
administrators of her intestate estate. - On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained
in pars. 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple
substitution, CelsaL. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion to reopen once again the testate estate
proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed among others that a substitute administrator be
appointed. - The intestate heirs of Eustaquia opposed the motion, alleging that the court had no
more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure
had long become final and that the testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and
void. The Court denied the motion to reopen the testate proceedings. - Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko,
et al. filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the
joining administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares. - The joint administrators filed the
present petition. Petitioners contend, among others, that the claim of petitioners over the
properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria
Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners
claim that said provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil Code, they
constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.
ISSUES 1. WON the independent action for reconveyance should prosper. 2. WON petitioners
are the conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares
HELD 1. NO Ratio
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal,
for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set
aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
Reasoning Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and
every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate
succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not
in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate
shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called
upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties.- The facts
show that the petitioners recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in
fact reaped the fruits thereof.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the
guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed
to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him.
Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the
inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner’s knowledge, the partition
barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and
jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. - Moreover,
when petitioners. moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares, the
judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was already final and
executory, then reglementary period of thirty days having elapsed from the time of its issuance,
with no timely appeal having been filed by them.- The only instance where a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by proper
motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which if
successful, would be for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and
executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposedof.
2. NO Ratio
When a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should die a second heir also
designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then
be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art.859 of the Civil Code but it shall be
effective only if the first heir dies before the testator.
Reasoning Although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and11
of her will, the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to be valid, had not
been satisfied. The allegation of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria
Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of
the Civil Code is baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to
preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs be
considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.- In this case, the instituted heir,
Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for,
upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia.
Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by
operation of the law of intestacy.

PALACIO VS RAMIREZ SEPARATE

Crisologo vs Singson

Facts:

Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death death—whether this
happens before or after that of Donya Leona's death—Consolacion's share shall belong to the
brothers of the Donya Leona.

Issue:

Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.

Held:

No, it is not fideicommissary substitution.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of
heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the o f ideicommissa kind, nor does it contain a
clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights
over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the
testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death—whether this happens
before or after that of the testatrix—her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.—It is of the essence of a

fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve
and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon
the happening of a particular event.

The last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the
substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place
upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.