SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK OF THE Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.

960 which
PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, was
charged with serious Illegal detention and Rape of herein
petitioner Karen Salvacion. Upon his arrest, it was
recovered from him among others, bank books and a
dollar account with China Bank Corp. On the day of the
hearing of his petition for bail, he was able to escape from
jail. Pending his arrest the criminal cases were archived.
Meanwhile, in the Civil Case against Bartelli, the Judge
granted the prayer of attachment and a notice of
garnishment was served on China Bank. China Bank
invoked R.A. No. 1405 and later on, Section 113 Central
Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits
of Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever. This prompted petitioner’s counsel to inquire
herein respondent whether the said circular has any
exception or has been repealed/amended. Respondent
cited that the provision is absolute in application.
Meanwhile, the court has rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners. Petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar
deposit with China Bank but the bank invoked the CB
Circular. Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this
Court.
Issue:
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice
would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. “Ninguno non deue enriquecerse
tortizeramente con dano de otro.” Simply stated, when the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamental solutions that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB
Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to
be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances.

Whether or not the secrecy of foreign currency deposits

should be made applicable to a foreign transient?

Ruling:

NO.
This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.

It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in

1983 or at a time when the country’s economy was in a
shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably, this was the reason why said statute was
enacted. But the realities of the present times show that
the country has recovered economically; and even if not,
the questioned law still denies those entitled to due
process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive.
The intention of the questioned law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality such as the
case before us.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined,

thus:

It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the

Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency
Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of
PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these
deposits that are induced by the two laws and given
protection and incentives by them. Obviously, the foreign
currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the
kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035
and given incentives and protection by said laws because
such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only
for a short time.

Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a

transient. He deposited his dollars with respondent China
Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his
temporary stay in the Philippines.
For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus
submits that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli
is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of
its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned
ALONZO vs IAC
DOCTRINE: Statutory Construction: Legislative
Intent: The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute
determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit
is within the letter but although it is not within the letter
thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within
the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing
which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much
within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which
is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
FACTS:
1. 5 Brothers and Sisters inherited qual pro indiviso
shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of
their deceased parents.
2. One of them, through an absolute deed of sale,
transferred to petitioners, his undivided share of
the land. A year later, his sister sold her share in
a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”.
3. Petitioners occupied the two fifths of the land
representing the portions sold to them and
thereafter enclosed it with a fence.
4. The son of the petitioners, Eduaro Alonzo and his
wife, then built a semi-concrete house with the
consent of the petitioners.
5. One of the heirs to the land sought to redeem the
portions that were sold but was subsequently
denied due to him being an American citizen.
6. Another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking
the same right of redemption claimed by her
brother.
7. The trial court also dismiss this complaint, now on
the ground that the right had lapsed, not having
been exercised within thirty days from notice of
the sales. Although there was no written notice, it
was held that actual knowledge of the sales by
the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
8. IAC, in reversing the trial court, the respondent
court declared that the notice required by the said
article was written notice and that actual notice
would not suffice as a substitute.
ISSUES:
1. WoN actual knowledge satisfied the requirement
of Article 1088 of the Civil Code.
PROVISIONS:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights
to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do
so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes.
a. While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the
law in such a way as to reflect the will of the
legislature. While we may not read into the
law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it
the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we
defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the
spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law
maker's will.
b. Was there a valid notice? Granting that the
law requires the notice to be written, would
such notice be necessary in this case?
Assuming there was a valid notice although it
was not in writing. would there be any
question that the 30-day period for
redemption had expired long before the
complaint was filed in 1977? In the face of the
established facts, we cannot accept the
private respondents' pretense that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother
and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring
written proof of such notice, we would be
closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor
of their palpably false claim of ignorance,
thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to
make sure that the redemptioners are duly
notified. We are satisfied that in this case the
other brothers and sisters were actually
informed, although not in writing, of the sales
made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.
c. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably
informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt
either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales
in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs
exercising their right of redemption. These
are the justifications for this exception.
DISPOSITION
1. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The
decision of the respondent court is REVERSED
and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
BERCES VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two
administrative cases against respondent incumbent
Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the
latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the
President questioning the decision and at the same time
prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec.
67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of
the President thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay
of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary
injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the
President as having been issued with grave abuses of
discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991)
impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No.
18 (1987).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6
of Administrative Order No. 18.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.
RATIO:
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an
“appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final
or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said
provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to
stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is
nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are
deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed
order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section
6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more
direct language expressive of such intention.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found
between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an
express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the
new and old laws.
Sec. 68 Ra 7160 (LGC) provides that an appeal from an
adverse decision against a local elective official to the
President “SHALL not prevent a decision from becoming
final and executor”
“Shall” is not mandatory because there is room to
construe said provision as giving discretion to the
reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed
decision
MECANO vs.COA
FACTS:
Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized
and on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is
claiming from the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim
requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground
that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the
RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness
incurred in performance of duty. — When a person in the
service of the national government of a province, city,
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the
performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual
physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department
may direct that absence during any period of disability
thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more
than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion
also authorize the payment of the medical attendance,
necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees
of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated
shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there
be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with
the performance of some act in the line of duty, the
Department head may in his discretion authorize the
payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the
Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioner’s illness to be
service-connected, the Committee on Physical
Examination of the Department of Justice favorably
recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned
petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having considered
the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with
a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of
Justice Drilon stating that “the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate
in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including
the particular Section 699 of the latter”.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then
Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration;
Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA
Chairman however, denied petitioner’s claim on the
ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason
that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted
in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented,
however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees’
Compensation Commission, considering that the illness
of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by
Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director Lim
with the advice that petitioner “elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court if he so desires”.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the RAC
HELD:
1. Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject
matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to
the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal
of the earlier one.
2. 2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will
operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new
Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire
subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters
treated in the old Code which are not found in the new
Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave
law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims
for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still
others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of
Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only
those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure,
understandably because of the many changes that
transpired in the government structure since the
enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.

The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the
hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner’s claim for provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject
benefits claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be
no such conflict because the provision on sickness
NO benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not
The question of whether a particular law has been been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a
law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that
expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The
and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for
declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on
that a particular and specific law, identified by its number the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are conflicting statutes.
implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question,
the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the
legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code
partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of
the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book
VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders,

rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent
with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature
of this repealing clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it
fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a
general repealing provision. It is a clause which
predicates the intended repeal under the condition that
substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior
acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an
implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
Paras v. Comelec
Facts:
Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of
Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994
barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition
signing was scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at
least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition,
well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The
Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November
1995, but which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due
to the petitioner’s opposition. To prevent the holding of the
recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special
Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court
issuing a restraining order. After conducting a summary
hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order,
dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his
counsel to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the
third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January
1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent
prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no
recall can take place within one year preceding a regular
local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections
slated on the first Monday of May 1996. He cited
Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support
the argument, the Court in which case considered the SK
election as a regular local election.
Issue:
Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be
construed as a regular local election in a recall proceeding
Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit,
rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and
intent. The too literal interpretation of the law leads to
absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-
literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That
intention is usually found not in “the letter that killeth but
in the spirit that vivifieth”. In the present case, Paragraph
(b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election. The
Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a
regular election, as this would render inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code. It would be
more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of
the Code to construe regular local election as one
referring to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and
be filled by the electorate.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition
for having become moot and academic, as the next
regular elections involving the barangay office concerned
were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary
Restraining Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining
the recall election, was made permanent.
CIR vs ESSO Standard Eastern
FACTS:
Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax by
P221,033.00. It was granted a tax credit by the
Commissioner accordingly on 1964. However, ESSOs
payment of its income tax for 1960 was found to be short
by P367,994.00. The Commissioner (of Internal
Revenue) wrote to ESSO demanding payment of the
deficiency tax, together with interest thereon for the period
from 1961 to 1964. ESSO paid under protest the amount
alleged to be due, including the interest as reckoned by
the Commissioner. It protested the computation of
interest, contending it was more than that properly due. It
claimed that it should not have been required to pay
interest on the total amount of the deficiency tax,
P367,994.00, but only on the amount of P146,961.00—
representing the difference between said deficiency,
P367,994.00, and ESSOs earlier overpayment of
P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a tax credit).
ESSO thus asked for a refund. The Internal Revenue
Commissioner denied the claim for refund. ESSO
appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals which ordered
payment to ESSO of its refund-claim representing
overpaid interest.
The Commissioner argued the tax credit of P221,033.00
was approved only on year 1964, it could not be availed
of in reduction of ESSOs earlier tax deficiency for the year
1960; as of that year, 1960, there was as yet no tax credit
to speak of, which would reduce the deficiency tax liability
for 1960. In support of his position, the Commissioner
invokes the provisions of Section 51 of the Tax Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the interest on delinquency should be
applied on the full tax deficiency of P367,994.00 despite
the existence of overpayment in the amount of
P221,033.00.
HELD:
NO. Petition was denied. Decision of CTA was affirmed.
RATIO:
The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has
stressed, as early as 1960, the Government already had
in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 representing excess
payment. Having been paid and received by mistake, as
petitioner Commissioner subsequently acknowledged,
that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the
Government had the obligation to return it to ESSO That
acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some
four (4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts
from its actuality. The obligation to return money
mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is
made, and not from the time that the payee admits the
obligation to reimburse.The obligation to return money
mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is
made, and not from the time that the payee admits the
obligation to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to
reimburse an amount paid to him results from the mistake,
not from the payee’s confession of the mistake or
recognition of the obligation to reimburse.
A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust
or lead to absurd results. Statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd
conclusion.
URSUA VS CA
FACTS:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and
dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to get a copy of the
complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman.
His lawyer asked him that because the law firm’s
messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to
the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez.
He revealed to him that he feels uncomfortable asking for
a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in
the said case. Perez then told him than he can go there
as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal his
true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the
logbook there as “Oscar Perez”. When he was handed a
copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as “Oscar
Perez”. However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to
learn that he was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then
recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua.
Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison
for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known
as “An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cesario Ursua’s conviction is proper.
HELD:
No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled
that a strict application of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in
this case only leads to absurdity – something which could
not have been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some
instances, a person is not allowed to use a name or an
alias other than his registered name or that which he was
baptized. Under the law, what makes the use of alias
illegal is the fact that it is being used habitually and
publicly in business transactions without prior
authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua
merely used the name “Oscar Perez” once, it was not
used in a business transaction, the use of the name was
with the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he
used a different name, in this instance, he was not even
required to disclose his identity at the Office of the
Ombudsman. When he was requesting a copy of the
complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the
complaint is a public record open to the public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No.
142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name
other than his name. A strict application of the law is not
warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez,
no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed
punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is
to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was
produced by Ursua’s act, said law need not be applied.
Reyes vs. Bagatsing
FACTS:
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the
Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26,
1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the
Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States
Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an
open space of public property, a short program would be
held. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that
in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech
and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by
it “to ensure a peaceful march and rally.” Petitioner filed
suit for mandamus unaware that permit was denied,
because it was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for
refusal of permit was due to police intelligence reports
which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing
such permit at this time and at the place applied for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of permit for the conduct
peaceable assembly to the gates of U.S. Embassy may
be validly enforced.
HELD:
NO. Mandatory injunction prayed was granted.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the
cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly,
arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is
quite explicit: “No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances.”. There can be no
legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of
Luneta as the place where the peace rally would
start. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use
of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two
block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.

There is merit to the observation that except as to the

novel aspects of a litigation, the judgment must be
confined within the limits of previous decisions. The law
declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide,
So it has been here. While the General rule is that a
permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold
their assembly at a public place of their choice, another
place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be
shown that there is a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil if no such change were made.
By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold
an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be filed well ahead in
time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place.