G.R. No.

L-45425 April 29, 1939

7. Tomasa Mercado
.08
................................................................................................
JOSE GATCHALIAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. 8. Julio Gatchalian
.13
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee. ...................................................................................................

9. Emiliana Santiago
Guillermo B. Reyes for appellants. .13
................................................................................................
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
10. Maria C. Legaspi
.16
IMPERIAL, J.: ...............................................................................................

11. Francisco Cabral

The plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant Collector of Internal .13
...............................................................................................
Revenue the sum of P1,863.44, with legal interest thereon, which they paid under
protest by way of income tax. They appealed from the decision rendered in the case 12. Gonzalo Javier
on October 23, 1936 by the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, which .14
....................................................................................................
dismissed the action with the costs against them.
13. Maria Santiago
.17
The case was submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of facts: ...................................................................................................

14. Buenaventura Guzman

Come now the parties to the above-mentioned case, through their respective
undersigned attorneys, and hereby agree to respectfully submit to this
Honorable Court the case upon the following statement of facts:
1. That plaintiff are all residents of the municipality of Pulilan, Bulacan, and
that defendant is the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippines;
2. That prior to December 15, 1934 plaintiffs, in order to enable them to
purchase one sweepstakes ticket valued at two pesos (P2), subscribed and
paid therefor the amounts as follows:
1. Jose Gatchalian
P0.18
....................................................................................................
.13
......................................................................................
15. Mariano Santos
.14
.................................................................................................
Total
........................................................................................................ 2.00
3. That immediately thereafter but prior to December 15, 1934, plaintiffs
purchased, in the ordinary course of business, from one of the duly
authorized agents of the National Charity Sweepstakes Office one ticket
bearing No. 178637 for the sum of two pesos (P2) and that the said ticket
was registered in the name of Jose Gatchalian and Company;

2. Gregoria Cristobal 4. That as a result of the drawing of the sweepstakes on December 15, 1934,
.18 the above-mentioned ticket bearing No. 178637 won one of the third prizes in
...............................................................................................
the amount of P50,000 and that the corresponding check covering the above-
3. Saturnina Silva mentioned prize of P50,000 was drawn by the National Charity Sweepstakes
.08 Office in favor of Jose Gatchalian & Company against the Philippine National
....................................................................................................
Bank, which check was cashed during the latter part of December, 1934 by
4. Guillermo Tapia Jose Gatchalian & Company;
.13
...................................................................................................
5. That on December 29, 1934, Jose Gatchalian was required by income tax
5. Jesus Legaspi
.15 examiner Alfredo David to file the corresponding income tax return covering
......................................................................................................
the prize won by Jose Gatchalian & Company and that on December 29,
6. Jose Silva 1934, the said return was signed by Jose Gatchalian, a copy of which return
.07 is enclosed as Exhibit A and made a part hereof;
.............................................................................................................
6. That on January 8, 1935, the defendant made an assessment against Jose
Gatchalian & Company requesting the payment of the sum of P1,499.94 to
the deputy provincial treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan, giving to said Jose
Gatchalian & Company until January 20, 1935 within which to pay the said
amount of P1,499.94, a copy of which letter marked Exhibit B is enclosed and
made a part hereof;
7. That on January 20, 1935, the plaintiffs, through their attorney, sent to
defendant a reply, a copy of which marked Exhibit C is attached and made a
part hereof, requesting exemption from payment of the income tax to which
reply there were enclosed fifteen (15) separate individual income tax returns
filed separately by each one of the plaintiffs, copies of which returns are
attached and marked Exhibit D-1 to D-15, respectively, in order of their
names listed in the caption of this case and made parts hereof; a statement
of sale signed by Jose Gatchalian showing the amount put up by each of the
plaintiffs to cover up the attached and marked as Exhibit E and made a part
hereof; and a copy of the affidavit signed by Jose Gatchalian dated
December 29, 1934 is attached and marked Exhibit F and made part thereof;
8. That the defendant in his letter dated January 28, 1935, a copy of which
marked Exhibit G is enclosed, denied plaintiffs' request of January 20, 1935,
for exemption from the payment of tax and reiterated his demand for the
payment of the sum of P1,499.94 as income tax and gave plaintiffs until
February 10, 1935 within which to pay the said tax;
9. That in view of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the amount of tax
demanded by the defendant, notwithstanding subsequent demand made by
defendant upon the plaintiffs through their attorney on March 23, 1935, a
copy of which marked Exhibit H is enclosed, defendant on May 13, 1935
issued a warrant of distraint and levy against the property of the plaintiffs, a
copy of which warrant marked Exhibit I is enclosed and made a part hereof;
10. That to avoid embarrassment arising from the embargo of the property of
the plaintiffs, the said plaintiffs on June 15, 1935, through Gregoria Cristobal,
Maria C. Legaspi and Jesus Legaspi, paid under protest the sum of P601.51
as part of the tax and penalties to the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan,
as evidenced by official receipt No. 7454879 which is attached and marked
Exhibit J and made a part hereof, and requested defendant that plaintiffs be
allowed to pay under protest the balance of the tax and penalties by monthly
installments;
11. That plaintiff's request to pay the balance of the tax and penalties was
granted by defendant subject to the condition that plaintiffs file the usual bond
secured by two solvent persons to guarantee prompt payment of each
installments as it becomes due;
12. That on July 16, 1935, plaintiff filed a bond, a copy of which marked
Exhibit K is enclosed and made a part hereof, to guarantee the payment of
the balance of the alleged tax liability by monthly installments at the rate of
P118.70 a month, the first payment under protest to be effected on or before
July 31, 1935;
13. That on July 16, 1935 the said plaintiffs formally protested against the
payment of the sum of P602.51, a copy of which protest is attached and
marked Exhibit L, but that defendant in his letter dated August 1, 1935
overruled the protest and denied the request for refund of the plaintiffs;
14. That, in view of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the monthly installments
in accordance with the terms and conditions of bond filed by them, the
defendant in his letter dated July 23, 1935, copy of which is attached and
marked Exhibit M, ordered the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan to
execute within five days the warrant of distraint and levy issued against the
plaintiffs on May 13, 1935;
15. That in order to avoid annoyance and embarrassment arising from the
levy of their property, the plaintiffs on August 28, 1936, through Jose
Gatchalian, Guillermo Tapia, Maria Santiago and Emiliano Santiago, paid
under protest to the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan the sum of
P1,260.93 representing the unpaid balance of the income tax and penalties
demanded by defendant as evidenced by income tax receipt No. 35811
which is attached and marked Exhibit N and made a part hereof; and that on
September 3, 1936, the plaintiffs formally protested to the defendant against
the payment of said amount and requested the refund thereof, copy of which
is attached and marked Exhibit O and made part hereof; but that on
September 4, 1936, the defendant overruled the protest and denied the
refund thereof; copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit P and made a
part hereof; and
16. That plaintiffs demanded upon defendant the refund of the total sum of
one thousand eight hundred and sixty three pesos and forty-four centavos
(P1,863.44) paid under protest by them but that defendant refused and still
refuses to refund the said amount notwithstanding the plaintiffs' demands.
17. The parties hereto reserve the right to present other and additional
evidence if necessary.
Exhibit E referred to in the stipulation is of the following tenor:
To whom it may concern:
I, Jose Gatchalian, a resident of Pulilan, Bulacan, married, of age, hereby
certify, that on the 11th day of August, 1934, I sold parts of my shares on
ticket No. 178637 to the persons and for the amount indicated below and the
part of may share remaining is also shown to wit:
Purchaser Amount Address
 1. Mariano Santos ........................................... P0.14 Pulilan, Bulacan. 1. Jose Gatchalian P4,42 3,94
D-1 P0.18 P 480
.......................................... 5 5
2. Buenaventura Guzman ............................... .13 - Do -
2. Gregoria Cristobal 2,57
3. Maria Santiago ............................................ .17 - Do - D-2 .18 4,575 2,000
...................................... 5
4. Gonzalo Javier .............................................. .14 - Do - 3. Saturnina Silva 1,51
D-3 .08 1,875 360
............................................. 5
5. Francisco Cabral .......................................... .13 - Do -
4. Guillermo Tapia 2,96
6. Maria C. Legaspi .......................................... .16 - Do - D-4 .13 3,325 360
.......................................... 5
7. Emiliana Santiago ......................................... .13 - Do - 5. Jesus Legaspi by Maria 3,10
D-5 .15 3,825 720
Cristobal ......... 5
8. Julio Gatchalian ............................................ .13 - Do -
6. Jose Silva
9. Jose Silva ...................................................... .07 - Do - 1,51
.............................................. D-6 .08 1,875 360
5
......
10. Tomasa Mercado ....................................... .08 - Do -
7. Tomasa Mercado 1,51
11. Jesus Legaspi ............................................. .15 - Do - D-7 .07 1,875 360
....................................... 5
12. Guillermo Tapia ........................................... .13 - Do -
8. Julio Gatchalian by 2,91
D-8 .13 3,150 240
13. Saturnina Silva ............................................ .08 - Do - Beatriz Guzman ....... 0

14. Gregoria Cristobal ....................................... .18 - Do - 9. Emiliana Santiago 2,96

D-9 .13 3,325 360
...................................... 5
15. Jose Gatchalian ............................................ .18 - Do -
10. Maria C. Legaspi 3,14
D-10 .16 4,100 960
...................................... 0
2.00 Total cost of said
11. Francisco Cabral 2,96
D-11 .13 3,325 360
...................................... 5
ticket; and that, therefore, the persons named above are entitled to the parts
of whatever prize that might be won by said ticket. 12. Gonzalo Javier 2,96
D-12 .14 3,325 360
.......................................... 5
Pulilan, Bulacan, P.I. 13. Maria Santiago 3,99
D-13 .17 4,350 360
.......................................... 0
(Sgd.) JOSE GATCHALIAN
14. Buenaventura Guzman 2,96
D-14 .13 3,325 360
........................... 5
And a summary of Exhibits D-1 to D-15 is inserted in the bill of exceptions as follows:
15. Mariano Santos 2,96
D-15 .14 3,325 360
RECAPITULATIONS OF 15 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR ........................................ 5
1934 ALL DATED JANUARY 19, 1935 SUBMITTED TO THE COLLECTOR
OF INTERNAL REVENUE. <="" td=""
style="fon
t-size:
Exhibi Purchas 50,00 14px;
Price Net 2.00
Name t e Expenses 0 text-
Won prize decoratio
No. Price
n: none;
 There is no doubt that if the plaintiffs merely formed a community of property the latter
color:
is exempt from the payment of income tax under the law. But according to the
rgb(0, 0,
stipulation facts the plaintiffs organized a partnership of a civil nature because each of
128);
font- them put up money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing
family: equally the prize which they may win, as they did in fact in the amount of P50,000
(article 1665, Civil Code). The partnership was not only formed, but upon the
arial,
organization thereof and the winning of the prize, Jose Gatchalian personally
verdana;"
> appeared in the office of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-
partner, as such collection the prize, the office issued the check for P50,000 in favor of
Jose Gatchalian and company, and the said partner, in the same capacity, collected
The legal questions raised in plaintiffs-appellants' five assigned errors may properly be the said check. All these circumstances repel the idea that the plaintiffs organized and
reduced to the two following: (1) Whether the plaintiffs formed a partnership, or merely formed a community of property only.
a community of property without a personality of its own; in the first case it is admitted
that the partnership thus formed is liable for the payment of income tax, whereas if Having organized and constituted a partnership of a civil nature, the said entity is the
there was merely a community of property, they are exempt from such payment; and one bound to pay the income tax which the defendant collected under the aforesaid
(2) whether they should pay the tax collectively or whether the latter should be section 10 (a) of Act No. 2833, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761. There is no
prorated among them and paid individually. merit in plaintiff's contention that the tax should be prorated among them and paid
individually, resulting in their exemption from the tax.
The Collector of Internal Revenue collected the tax under section 10 of Act No. 2833,
as last amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761, reading as follows: In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance to the plaintiffs appellants. So ordered.
SEC. 10. (a) There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually
upon the total net income received in the preceding calendar year from all Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
sources by every corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account
(cuenta en participacion), association or insurance company, organized in the
Philippine Islands, no matter how created or organized, but not including duly
registered general copartnership (compañias colectivas), a tax of three per
centum upon such income; and a like tax shall be levied, assessed, collected,
and paid annually upon the total net income received in the preceding
calendar year from all sources within the Philippine Islands by every
corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en
participacion), association, or insurance company organized, authorized, or
existing under the laws of any foreign country, including interest on bonds,
notes, or other interest-bearing obligations of residents, corporate or
otherwise: Provided, however, That nothing in this section shall be construed
as permitting the taxation of the income derived from dividends or net profits
on which the normal tax has been paid.

The gain derived or loss sustained from the sale or other disposition by a
corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en
participacion), association, or insurance company, or property, real, personal,
or mixed, shall be ascertained in accordance with subsections (c) and (d) of
section two of Act Numbered Two thousand eight hundred and thirty-three, as
amended by Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-six.

The foregoing tax rate shall apply to the net income received by every taxable
corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en
participacion), association, or insurance company in the calendar year
nineteen hundred and twenty and in each year thereafter.
G.R. No. L-27933 December 24, 1968
DIVERSIFIED CREDIT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE ROSADO and LUZ JAYME ROSADO, defendants-appellants.
Montalvo and Bernabe for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro D. Delfin for defendants-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L.:
This appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental (Civ. Case No. 7516 of that Court) was certified to us by the Court of
Appeals (Second Division) because the same involves no questions of fact.
The case had its origin in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, when the Diversified
Credit Corporation filed an action to compel the spouses Felipe Rosado and Luz
Jayme Rosado to vacate and restore possession of a parcel of land in the City of
Bacolod (Lot 62-B of Subdivision plan LRC-Psd-33823) that forms part of Lot No. 62 of
the Bacolod Cadastre, and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27083 in the
name of plaintiff. After answer, claiming that the lot was defendants' conjugal property,
the Municipal Court ordered defendants to surrender and vacate the land in litigation;
to pay P100.00 a month from the filing of the complaint up to the actual vacating of the
premises; to pay P500.00 attorneys' fees and costs. Upon appeal to the Court of First
Instance, the case was submitted on the following stipulation of facts (Rec. on App.,
pp. 59-60):
1. That Lot No. 62-B of Bacolod Cadastre belong to the thirteen co-owners,
including the wife of the defendant herein, who owns 1/13th part pro-indiviso;
2. That on May 11, 1964, Luz Jayme Rosado, wife of the defendant Felipe
Rosado, signed a Deed of Sale together with the co-owners of the property to
the plaintiff as shown by Exh. "A" for the plaintiff;
3. That on the lot in question the defendant Felipe Rosado had built a house
sometime in 1957 without the whole property having been previously
partitioned among the thirteen (13) co-owners;
4. That the title of the property has already been transferred to the plaintiff
upon registration of the Deed of Sale in June, 1964, with the Office of the
Register of Deeds;
5. That demand was made by the plaintiff upon the defendant Felipe Rosado
and his wife Luz Jayme Rosado on October 19, 1964, but until now the
defendant Felipe Rosado has refused to vacate the premises or to remove
his house thereon as shown by Exh. "B" for the plaintiff, on the grounds as he
alleged in his answer that he had built on the lot in question a conjugal house
worth P8,000.00 which necessarily makes the lot on which it stands subject
to Article 158 of the Civil Code and on the point of view of equity that the wife
of the defendant Felipe Rosado received an aliquot share of P2,400.00 only
from the share and if the house were demolished the defendant would suffer
damage in the amount of P8,000.00;
6. That the portion of the lot on which the house stands, would earn a
monthly rental of P50.00;
7. That Felipe Rosado, husband of Luz Jayme, did not give his conformity to
the Deed of Sale, Exh. "A".
8. That on October 31, 1964, the defendant Felipe Rosado requested the
plaintiff in the letter, Exh. "C" for the plaintiff, for a period of six (6) months
within which to vacate the premises.
9. That the letter was not answered by the plaintiff and they did not accept the
offer, and on November 25, 1964, they filed a complaint before the Municipal
Court which proves that plaintiff neglected the offer;
The Court of First Instance in its decision rejected the claim of ownership advanced by
Rosado, based upon the construction of a house on the disputed lot by the conjugal
partnership of the Rosado spouses, which allegedly converted the land into conjugal
property under Article 158, paragraph 2 of the present Civil Code of the Philippines;
further held that defendants were in estoppel to claim title in view of the letter Exhibit C
requesting for six (6) months within which to vacate the premises, and affirmed the
decision of the Inferior Court. Defendant Felipe Rosado resorted to the Court of
Appeals, and his appeal (CA-G.R. No. 37398-R) is the one now before us. He assigns
four alleged errors:
(a) The lower court erred in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void, since
upon the construction of the conjugal dwelling thereon, the conjugal
partnership of the defendant-appellant Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme
became the owner of the share of Luz Jayme in Lot No. 62-B, Bacolod
Cadastre;
(b) The trial court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to vacate Lot No.
62-B and in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void because as the legal
usufructuary of the share of Luz Jayme Rosado in Lot 62-B, Bacolod
Cadastre, the conjugal partnership, managed and administered by the
defendant-appellant Felipe Rosado can not be deprived of its usufructuary
rights by any contract between Luz Jayme and the plaintiff-appellee;
(c) The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant-appellant should be
reimbursed the value of the conjugal house constructed on Lot 62-B; and
(d) The lower court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to pay attorneys'
fees in the amount of five hundred (P500.00) pesos.
It can be seen that the key question is whether by the construction of a house on the he knew that the land occupied by the house did not belong exclusively to his wife, but
lot owned in common by the Jaymes, and sold by them to the appellant corporation, to the other owners as well, and there is no proof on record that the house occupied
the land in question or a 1/13th part of it became conjugal property. only 1/13 of the total area. The construction was not done in good faith.

Appellant, husband of vendor Luz Jayme, claims the affirmative invoking the second WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. Costs against
paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing that: appellant Felipe Rosado.

ART. 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and
separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership Capistrano, JJ., concur.
or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the
conjugal partnership.

Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage

on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but
the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.

Rosado further contends that as the building of the house at the expense of the
conjugal partnership converted the 1/13 undivided share on his wife in Lot 62-B into
property of the community, the deed of sale of May 11, 1964 in favor of the appellee
corporation was void in so far as said 1/13 share is concerned, because his wife, Luz
Jayme, had ceased to own such share from and after the building of the house; and
Rosado, as manager of the conjugal partnership, had not participated in the sale, nor
subsequently ratified the same.

We find appellant's thesis legally untenable. For it is a basic principle in the law of co-
ownership, both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889, that no
individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in
common until the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an
ideal, or abstract, quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by
all the co-owners. The principle is emphasized by the rulings of this Court. In Lopez vs.
Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567, it was held that while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, he has no right to sell a divided part of the real estate
owned in common. "If he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has the
right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two
parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds." The doctrine was
reiterated in Mercado vs. Liwanag, L-14429, June 20, 1962, holding that a co-owner
may not convey a physical portion of the land owned in common. And in Santos vs.
Buenconsejo, L-20136, June 23, 1965, it was ruled that a co-owner may not even
adjudicate to himself any determinate portion of land owned in common.

Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, it
cannot be validly claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on land
belonging to her, and Article 158 of the Civil Code can not apply. Certainly, on her 1/13
ideal or abstract undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily, the claim of
conversion of the wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in character as a result of
the construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis.

It is the logical consequence of the foregoing ruling that the lower court did not err in
holding that the appellant was bound to vacate the land without reimbursement, since
[G.R. No. 98328. October 9, 1997]
JUAN C. CARVAJAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLID HOMES,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is there denial of due process if an applicant for land registration is unable to
testify? May a land registration court, after it is convinced that the property subject of
an application for registration under the torrens system is already covered by an
existing certificate, dismiss such application and thus ignore petitioners insistence on
submitting further evidence of his alleged title? What constitutes sufficient evidence to
show identity of the land applied for with the land already titled in favor of private
respondent?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in this petition for review assailing the
November 29, 1990 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 18318,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this petition be, as it is hereby
DISMISSED.[3]
This petition also impugns the April 25, 1991 Court of Appeals Resolution [4] which
denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts found by public respondent are as follows: [5]
Petitioner is the applicant in a land registration case filed with Branch 71, Regional
Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Antipolo, Rizal. Sought to be
brought by petitioner under the operation of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is
a 96,470 square meter lot denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C and 6846-
D. Copies of the application were ordered by respondent Court to be furnished (to) the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) which on
March 18, 1987 submitted a report recommending that applicant be order[ed] to
amend his petition by including the names and complete postal addresses of the
adjoining owners and correcting the discrepancy regarding the boundary lot number
along line 2-3 of Lot 6846-D on plan Csd-04-005516-D. On order of respondent Court
[trial court], the petition was accordingly amended.
After the NLTDRA was notified that the case is [sic] initially set for hearing on
December 7, 1987, the Acting Chief, Docket Division of the NLRDRA [sic] submitted
another report recommending that petitioner be ordered to refer to the Bureau of
Lands for corrections of the discrepancy existing in the directional bearing and area of
Lot 6846-D, Csd-04-005516-D. The technical descriptions as corrected by the Bureau
of Lands was [sic] submitted and the application was initially set for hearing on April
26, 1988. The Notice of Initial Hearing stating that the application was set forbe [sic]
heard on April 26, 1988 was thereafter issued by the NLTDRA.
On June 1, 1988, an order of general default was issued by respondent
Court. Exempted from the order was one Annie Jimenez who filed an opposition to the
application. On June 22, 1988, private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. filed its
opposition stating that a land registered in its name under the Torrens System and
covered by then TCT No. N-7873 is almost identical to the property subject of the
application by petitioner. The opposition was not admitted considering that no motion
to set aside the order of general default was filed by private respondent.
On June 28, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to lift the order of general default
and to admit its opposition on the ground that its right would be adversely affected by
the application. Acting on the motion and in order to avoid duplicity, the NLTDRA was
directed to make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC
Psd-245998 and embraced in TCT No. N-7873 and to submit its plotting to the Court
for its guidance. In the same order dated July 1, 1988, respondent Court in the interest
of justice set aside the order of general default in so far as private respondent was
concerned and admitted private respondents opposition.
On January 10, 1989, petitioner filed a motion praying that the opposition of private
respondent be dismissed for the reason that the order issued by respondent court
directing the NLRTDA [sic] to make a plotting of the land in question on the basis of
the title submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch Manila released the
private respondent from the duty and obligation of presenting evidence to prove that
the land applied for is private and that there is apparent lack of interest on the part of
private respondent to pursue its claim on account of its non-appearance despite the
lapse of more than six months or to introduce evidence that will show that the land in
question is covered by the alleged torrens certificate of title.
During the hearings conducted on September 13, 1988, September 27, 1988, October
4, 1988, October 11, 1988, October 18, 1988, November 22, 1988, December 6, 1988,
petitioner presented his evidence on the question as to whether or not he had a
registrable right over the land in question.
Pursuant to the court order dated July 1, 1988 directing the NLTDRA to make the
plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and
embraced in TCT No. N-7873, the Land Registration Authority submitted a report
dated December 22, 1986 [should be 1988] recommending that, after due hearing, the
application for registration of petitioner be dismissed. The application was thus
dismissed by respondent court in an order dated January 2, 1989. Considering,
however, that the recommendation is [sic] for dismissal after due hearing, respondent
judge issued an order dated January 10, 1989 setting for hearing on January 24, 1989
the Report submitted by the Land Registration Authority. The hearing proceeded on
February 8, 1989 with Engr. Silverio G. Perez, Chief, Department on Registration,
Land Registration Authority being presented in connection with his Report
recommending the dismissal of the application after due hearing. On February 28,
1989, the petitioner's application for registration was dismissed.
On March 13, 1989, petitioner filed his motion to reconsider the February 28, 1989
dismissal of the application for registration to which private respondent filed an
opposition dated March 20, 1989. The motion for reconsideration was denied in an
order dated March 4, 1989.
On May 2, 1989 petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider the dismissal of his
petition. On May 8, 1989, respondent judge issued an order requiring the parties as
well as the engineers from the Land Registration Commission and the DENR to
appear before respondent Court on June 5, 1989. The engineer from the Land
Registration Commission was likewise directed to inform the court whether the
property applied for by petitioner is indeed inside the titled property of private
respondent.
After the Land Registration Authority submitted a report showing that there was indeed
an overlapping of the four (4) parcels of land applied for by petitioner and the
properties of Solid Homes under TCT 7873 and considering that the properties applied
for are [sic] within the titled property and could not be the subject of an application for
registration, the second motion to reconsider the dismissal of the application for
registration was denied in an order dated July 5, 1989.
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the application
for registration, and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
recourse to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues:[6]
1. Whether or not an actual ground verification survey is required to establish the
identity of the two parcels of land or whether TCT No. 7873 under Plan FP-1540 of
Solid Homes Inc., situated in Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal is identical or similar
to Lots 6846-A to 6846-D inclusive Cad. 585, Lungsod Silangan, Cadastre, situated in
Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal applied for under LRC Case No. 414 (-A), LRC Record No.
N-60084;
2. Whether or not the petitioner was given (the) chance and the opportunity to be
heard or allowed to fully introduce his evidence in the (proceeding) for Land
Registration and (to) rest (his) case;
3. Whether the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals is reversible.
Petitioner alleges that the table survey made by the Land Registration
Authority and the geodetic engineer of the Land Management Bureau cannot serve
as basis for identifying his land. On the other hand, petitioner was able to establish
the identity of the land he applied for by actual ground survey which was approved
by the Director of Lands and reprocessed by the Land Registration Authority. He
claims that if said land is covered by private respondents title, the Director of Lands
and/or Regional Director will no(t) approve the survey. Petitioner also argues that the
land in question is situated in Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal while that of private
respondent is in Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal. Survey Plan FP-1540, which served as
basis of private respondents certificate of title, cannot be found; hence, according to
petitioner, the table survey was anomalous. Petitioner adds that the matter entirely
wanting in this case (is) the identity or similarity of the realties. [7] Petitioner concludes
that the trial court should have ordered actual ocular inspection and ground
verification survey of the properties involved.
Petitioner further maintains that he was denied due process when he, as an
applicant in a land registration case, was not able to take the witness
stand. According to petitioner, even his counsel hardly participated in the proceeding
except to propound clarificatory questions during the examination of Engineer
Silverio Perez of the Land Registration Authority.[8]
Public respondent justified its dismissal of the appeal in this wise: [9]
Land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration proceeding cannot
again be subject of adjudication or settlement in a subsequent conducted proceeding
(Land Titles and Deeds by Noblejas, 1968 Revised Edition, page 96). The Report
submitted by the Land Registration Authority (Annex B) and the Survey Division of the
DENR (Annex RR) both indicate an overlapping of the lot applied for by petitioner and
the lot covered by TCT N-7873 owned by private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. Even if
petitioner were allowed to continue with the presentation of his evidence, the end
result would still be the dismissal of his application for registration. Respondent Judge
was therefore justified in cutting short the proceeding as the time to be spent in
hearing petitioners application could be used disposing the other cases pending with
respondent court.
Anent the allegation that private respondent Solid Homes did not actively participate in
the trials conducted to hear his evidence, suffice it to state that it is counsels
prerogative to determine how he intends to pursue his case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Identity of the Property Applied For
 We are not persuaded that the land petitioner applied for was not identical to
private respondents land which was already covered by a torrens certificate of
title. The two reports prepared by the Land Registration Authority and the DENR
Survey Division clearly showed that there was an overlapping between the two
properties. Because the futility of petitioners application was apparent, the trial court
deemed it unnecessary to hear further evidence. We agree.
At the outset, we stress that there was nothing irregular in the order given by the
trial court to the Land Registration Authority and the Survey Division of the DENR to
submit reports on the location of the land covered by petitioners application and
private respondents certificate of title. The authority of the land registration court to
require the filing of additional papers to aid it in its determination of the propriety of the
application was based on Section 21 of PD 1529:[10]
SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. -- The court
may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this
Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any additional papers. It
may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary.
From the above provision, it is also clear that ocular inspection of the property
applied for was only discretionary, not mandatory. Likewise, the land registration court
was not obliged to order the survey of the contested lot, especially when another
government agency had already submitted a report finding that the contested lot was
identical with that described in private respondents certificate of title and
recommending the dismissal of the application for registration.
Further, the order of the land registration court for the LRA and DENR to submit
reports was in accordance with the purposes of the Land Registration Law: [11]
The purposes of the land registration law, in general, are: to ascertain once and for all
the absolute title over a given landed property; to make, so far as it is possible, a
certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such
title; to quiet title to the land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality to a
title; and to decree that land title to be final, irrevocable and, undisputable.
(citing Benen vs. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531.)
It is true that a court of first instance acting as a land registration court has limited and
special jurisdiction. It can not be denied, however, that when the law confers
jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to
exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. (citing Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70 Phil.
388, 391.) The purpose of the applicant is to prove that he has an absolute or simple
title over the property sought to be registered, otherwise his application will be
denied. An absolute oppositor claims a dominical right totally adverse to that of the
applicant. If successful, registration will be decreed in favor of the oppositor. As to
whether or not private respondents have absolute or fee simple title over the property
sought to be registered necessarily requires a resolution of the question as to whether
or not the oppositors had a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicants. x x
x registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of
Based on the reports submitted, the land registration court correctly dismissed
the application for original land registration. An application for registration of an already
titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. It behooves a land
registration court to determine the veracity of any and all adverse claims, bearing in
mind Section 46 of Act No. 496 which provides that (n)o title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. The trial courts order to the LRA and DENR was a mere cautionary
measure in cognizance of the well-settled rule that a torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked. In other words, the title may be challenged only in a proceeding for that
purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already registered in the name
of another person. After one year from its registration, the title is incontrovertible and is
no longer open to review. The remedy of the landowner, whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, is to institute an ordinary action
for reconveyance or -- if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value -- for damages.[12] In view of the nature of a torrens title, a land
registration court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate
alters a valid and existing certificate of title.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the approval by the assistant chief of the
Bureau of Lands Survey Division of the survey conducted on the land applied for by
petitioner did not prove that the said land was not covered by any title. It merely
showed that such land has been surveyed and its boundaries have been determined.
Also noteworthy is the finding of public respondent that "the same order
(issued by the land registration court) [which set] aside the order (of) general default
insofar as private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. was concerned, directed the
NLTDRA to make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC
Psd-245998 and [that which was] embraced in TCT No. N-7873.[13] The intention of
the land registration court was to avoid duplicity, [14] that is, to rule out the possibility
that the land he sought to register was already covered by a certificate of title. In this
case, the land he applied for was found to be within the land described in private
respondents transfer certificate of title.
Petitioner also alleges that the land he applied for was located in Barangay
Mambogan, while the registered land of private respondent was in Barangay
Mayamot. In his reply filed with public respondent, however, he himself admitted that
Barangay Mambogan is a part of Barangay Mayamot [which is] a bigger barrio in
Antipolo, Rizal, and Mayamot covers a big parcel of land running from Antipolo up to
Marikina.[15] In view of petitioners declaration, it was not impossible for the land
owned by private respondent to be located in Barangay Mayamot and in Barangay
Mambogan. At any rate, whether the two lands are located in Mambogan or
Mayamot or both is a factual question, and its resolution by the trial and the appellate
courts is binding on this Court. Petitioner failed to provide a reason, let alone an
adequate one, to justify the reversal of such finding of the lower courts.
Petitioner also argues that the plotting made by NLTDRA was anomalous
because Survey Plan FP-1540, on which private respondents title was based, could
not be located. This argument lacks merit. The law does not require resorting to a
survey plan to prove the true boundaries of a land covered by a valid certificate of title;
the title itself is the conclusive proof of the realtys metes and bounds. Section 47 of the
Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, provides that (t)he original certificates in the
the register of deeds of the province or city where the land is situated, and the seal of
the court, and also the owners duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in all
the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained
therein except so far as otherwise provided in this Act. It has been held that a
certificate of title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land
registration proceedings.[16]Thus, this Court in Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals[17] ruled:
x x x. Petitioner contends that private respondents have not identified the property
sought to be recovered as required by Art. 434 of the Civil Code. He alleges that Sitio
Aduas, where the land in question is located, is at the boundary of Barangay May-Iba,
Teresa, Rizal, and Barangay Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner
maintains, the parcel of land he is occupying is located in Barangay May-Iba. He
claims that the technical description in the title does not sufficiently identify the
property of private respondent and that a geodetic survey to determine which of his
improvements should be demolished should first have been conducted by the private
respondent. x x x.
But private respondents title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the property is located in
Barangay Lagundi. Likewise, the certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer at Morong, Rizal stated that petitioner was occupying a landholding at
Barangay Lagundi.
For our purposes, a survey is not necessary. A certificate of title is conclusive
evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but also its location. The subject of
these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly, petitioners
required to demolish only whatever is constructed within its boundaries. (Underscoring
supplied.)
The old case of Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby[18] explains the nature of a
torrens certificate of title, as follows:
x x x. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better
title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it
registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of
title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very
few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise
all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered,
modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
All in all, the land registration court did not err in relying on the certificate of title
instead of the survey plan; likewise, the appellate court did not commit any reversible
error in affirming the trial courts decision.
Second Issue: Denial of Due Process
Petitioner claims that he was denied due process because he was unable to take
the witness stand. We disagree. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process. [19] In this
case, petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present
three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when
the trial court ordered the submission of the parties memoranda which signified the
termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case,
he forfeited his right to take the witness stand.
Likewise, we are not persuaded by his allegation that his own counsel hardly
participated in the proceedings. The records show that said counsel did cross-examine
Engineer Silverio Perez by propounding clarificatory questions to the latter. In any
event, the client is generally bound by the acts of his counsel. Petitioner has not
shown at all that his previous counsel had acted in such grossly negligent manner as
to deprive him of effective representation, or of due process. [20]
In support of his contention, petitioner cites Tirona vs. Naawa[21] which held:
We hold the view, however that respondent Judge erred when he ordered the
dismissal of the registration case over the objection of the oppositors; and when he
refused to reconsider the order of dismissal and reinstate the case he had neglected to
perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, and had
thereby deprived the oppositors of a right to which they are entitled.
Such ruling finds no application to the present case, because neither Respondent
Mariano Raymundo (the applicant in the land registration case) nor Petitioner
Constantino Tirona (the oppositor in the cited case) was a holder of any certificate of
title over the land intended for registration. Such being the case, the land registration
court was ordered to act in accordance with Section 37 of Act No. 496 [22] either by
dismissing the application if none of the litigants succeeded in showing a proper title,
or by entering a decree awarding the land applied for to the person entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912
RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and
VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and
MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants.
Gaspar de Bartolome, in his own behalf.
B. Gimenez Zoboli, for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby
the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint,
and the plaintiff from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs.
Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first
of whom, absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second
sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in
his written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant,
Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz
and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882,
respectively; that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a
nuncupative will in Vigan whereby she made her four children, named Manuel,
Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs
of all her property; that, of the persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother
and Francisca a few years after her death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and
therefore the only existing heirs of the said testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and
the defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from some personal property and jewelry
already divided among the heirs, the testatrix possessed, at the time of the execution
of her will, and left at her death the real properties which, with their respective cash
values, are as follows:
1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built,
P6,000.00
situated on Escolta Street, Vigan, and valued at
2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at
1,500.00
No. 88 Washington Street, Vigan; valued at
3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at 100.00
4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian,
60.00
Vigan; valued at
5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at 86.00
6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at 150.00
Total 7,896.00
That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial
authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the
administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and
products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that,
notwithstanding the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon Matilde
Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicente and to deliver to
the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected
therefrom, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of the
properties mentioned, had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said
properties by means of unkept promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on
account of the extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or their
value in cash, as the case might be, had suffered losses and damages in the sum of
P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintiffs therefore asked that judgment be rendered by
sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome, and Matilde Ortiz Felin de
Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of the total value in cash,
according to appraisal, of the undivided property specified, which one-half amounted
approximately to P3,948, or if deemed proper, to recognize the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz to
be vested with the full and absolute right of ownership to the said undivided one-half of
the properties in question, as universal testamentary heir thereof together with the
defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the plaintiffs in the sum of P8,000, for losses and
damages, and to pay the costs.
Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4,
6, 7, and 8 thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sister's brother
Manuel, their mother, who was still living, was his heir by force of law, and the
defendants had never refused to give to the plaintiff Vicente Ortiz her share of the said
properties; and stated that he admitted the facts alleged in paragraph 2, provided it be
understood, however, that the surname of the defendant's mother was Felin, and not
Feliu, and that Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted
paragraph 3 of the complaint, with the difference that the said surname should be
Felin, and likewise paragraph 5, except the part thereof relating to the personal
property and the jewelry, since the latter had not yet been divided; that the said jewelry
was in the possession of the plaintiffs and consisted of: one Lozada gold chronometer
watch with a chain in the form of a bridle curb and a watch charm consisting of the
engraving of a postage stamp on a stone mounted in gold and bearing the initials M.
O., a pair of cuff buttons made of gold coins, four small gold buttons, two finger rings,
another with the initials M. O., and a gold bracelet; and that the defendants were
willing to deliver to the plaintiffs, in conformity with their petitions, one-half of the total
value in cash, according to appraisement, of the undivided real properties specified in
paragraph 5, which half amounted to P3,948.
In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to
divide the said property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of
the same; that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on
Calle Escolta the sum of 288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived from
other sources, which were delivered to the plaintiffs with other larger amounts, in 1891,
and from the property on Calle Washington, called La Quinta, 990.95 pesos, which
proceeds, added together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or omission;
that, between the years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle Washington, La
Quinta, 376.33, which made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in 1897,
the work of reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle Escolta, which been
destroyed by an earthquake, which work was not finished until 1903 and required an
expenditure on the part of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of 5,091.52 pesos; that all the
collections made up to August 1, 1905, including the rent from the stores, amounted to
only P3,654.15, and the expenses, to P6,252.32, there being, consequently, a balance
of P2,598.17, which divided between the sisters, the plaintiff and the defendant, would
make the latter's share P1,299.08; that, as shown by the papers kept by the plaintiffs,
in the year 1891 the defendant Bartolome presented to the plaintiffs a statement in
settlements of accounts, and delivered to the person duly authorized by the latter for
the purpose, the sum of P2,606.29, which the said settlement showed was owing his
principals, from various sources; that, the defendant Bartolome having been the
administrator of the undivided property claimed by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing
the former legal remuneration of the percentage allowed by law for administration; and
that the defendants were willing to pay the sum of P3,948, one-half of the total value of
the said properties, deducting therefrom the amount found to be owing them by the
plaintiffs, and asked that judgment be rendered in their favor to enable them to recover
from the latter that amount, together with the costs and expenses of the suit.
The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations
contained in each of the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs
were obliged to pay to the administrator of the said property the remuneration allowed
him by law; that, as the revenues collected by the defendants amounted to no more
than P3,654.15 and the expenditures incurred by them, to P6,252.32, it followed that
the plaintiffs owed the defendants P1,299.08, that is one-half of the difference between
the amount collected from and that extended on the properties, and asked that
judgment be therefore rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum from
the plaintiffs, Ricardo Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from
December 7, 1904, the date when the accounts were rendered, together with the sums
to which the defendant Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the undivided
properties in question.
By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested permission
to amend the complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or respective
appraisal," fifth line of paragraph 5, the phrase "in cash in accordance with the
assessed value," and likewise further to amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof, by
substituting the following word in lieu of the petition for the remedy sought: "By reason
of all the foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased to render the judgment by sentencing
the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore
and deliver to the plaintiffs an exact one-half of the total vale of the undivided
properties described in the complaint, such value to be ascertained by the expert
appraisal of two competent persons, one of whom shall be appointed by the plaintiffs
and the other by the defendants, and, in case of disagreement between these two
appointees such value shall be determined by a third expert appraiser appointed by
the court, or, in a proper case, by the price offered at public auction; or, in lieu thereof,
it is requested that the court recognize the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, to be vested with a
full and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the said properties; furthermore, it is
prayed that the plaintiffs be awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for losses and damages,
and the costs." Notwithstanding the opposition of the defendants, the said amendment
was admitted by the court and counsel for the defendants were allowed to a period of
three days within which to present a new answer. An exception was taken to this
ruling.
The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties
concerned in the division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the
partition of some of them and their award to one or the other of the parties. Due
consideration was taken of the averments and statements of both parties who agreed
between themselves, before the court, that any of them might at any time acquire, at
the valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the properties in question,
there being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order
of December 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the valuation
determined by the said expert appraiser, the building known as La Quinta, the lot on
which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised within the
inclosed land, and the seeds lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia;
and that the defendants were likewise entitled to acquire the house on Calle Escolta,
the lot on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of
Candon.
After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8,
1906, set forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in
question for the purpose of their partition, it was not to be understood that he desired
from the exception duly entered to the ruling made in the matter of the amendment to
the complaint; that the properties retained by the defendants were valued at P9,310,
and those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half of which amounts each party
had to deliver to the other, as they were pro indiviso properties; that, therefore, the
defendants had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the amount
which the plaintiffs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price of
the properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the amount of the
counterclaim for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro indiviso
property should be deducted from the sum which the defendants had to pay the
plaintiffs, the former, for the purpose of bringing the matter of the partition to a close,
would deliver to the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of purchase
and sale, the sum of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the properties
alloted to the defendants; such delivery, however, was not to be understood as a
renouncement of the said counterclaim, but only as a means for the final termination of
the pro indiviso status of the property.
The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment
holding that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence
enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or
suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned, and absolved
the defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, with no
special finding as to costs. An exception was taken to this judgment by counsel for the
defendants who moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did
not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion
was denied, exception whereto was taken by said counsel, who filed the proper bill of
exceptions, and the same was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, with a
transcript of the evidence.
Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her
will by their mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings
were had, in accordance with the agreement made, for the division between them of
the said hereditary property of common ownership, which division was recognized and
approved in the findings of the trial court, as shown by the judgment appealed from.
The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and
which have been submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity
claimed for losses and damages, which the plaintiffs allege amount to P8,000, in
addition to the rents which should have been derived from the house on Calle Escolta,
Vigan; (2) the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the sum of P1,299.08,
demanded by way of counterclaim, together with legal interest thereon from December
7, 1904; (3) the payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of a
percentage claimed to be due him as the administrator of the property of common
ownership; (4) the division of certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta
Ortiz; and (5) the petition that the amendment be held to have been improperly
admitted, which was made by the plaintiffs in their written motion of August 21, 1905,
against the opposition of the defendants, through which admission the latter were
obliged to pay the former P910.50.lawphil.net
Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims made
by both parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the
defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to
the plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of
the fact that the defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta
house, which was pro indiviso property of joint ownership.
By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was
acquiesced in by the plaintiffs who made no appeal therefrom, the first issue has been
decided which was raised by the plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses and
damages, wherein are comprised the rents which should have been obtained from the
upper story of the said house during the time it was occupied by the defendants,
Matilde Ortiz and her husband, Gaspar de Bartolome.
Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said
finding whereby the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet, as such
absolution is based on the compensation established in the judgment of the trial court,
between the amounts which each party is entitled to claim from the other, it is
imperative to determine whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house
on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without paying to
her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived with her
husband abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced,
had it been rented to a stranger.
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them
in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the
interests of the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing them
according to their rights.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a
dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so
doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community
property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story
according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented
and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the
respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners
exercises, together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz,
plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and
were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta
with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time
between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange
that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents
and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter,
especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a
turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the
defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the properties of
joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not
obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been
derived from the upper of the story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less,
because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage
of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The
defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said
house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she
prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining
to her as coowner of the property.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which
entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the
fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's
husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower
floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the
peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires
that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said
quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount
of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in accordance with the evidence shown in the
record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the
husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use
gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived
with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the
rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been occupied
by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower
floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the
plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents which
should have been obtained during four years from the quarters occupied as an office
by the justice of the peace of Vigan.
With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the
payment of the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the
present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said
house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins and uninhabitable, and that, for its
reconstruction or repair, the defendants had to expend the sum of P6,252.32. This
expenditure, notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the plaintiffs,
was duly proved by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence,
unsuccessfully rebutted, was also introduced which proved that the rents produced by
all the rural and urban properties of common ownership amounted, up to August 1,
1905, to the sum of P3,654.15 which, being applied toward the cost of the repair work
on the said house, leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount actually advanced by
the defendants, for the rents collected by them were not sufficient for the termination of
all the work undertaken on the said building, necessary for its complete repair and to
replace it in a habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the plaintiff Vicenta
Ortiz, who was willing to sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the house in
question, when it was in a ruinous state, should pay the defendants one-half of the
amount expanded in the said repair work, since the building after reconstruction was
worth P9,000, according to expert appraisal. Consequently, the counterclaim made by
the defendants for the payment to them of the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper demand,
though from this sum a reduction must be made of P384, the amount of one-half of the
rents which should have been collected for the use of the quarters occupied by the
justice of the peace, the payment of which is incumbent upon the husband of the
defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the balance remaining, P915.08, is the amount
which the plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the defendants.
The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of
the counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained,
inasmuch as, until this suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the
plaintiffs would or would not be obliged to pay the sum whatever in reimbursement of
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the repair work on the said house on Calle
Escolta, whether or not the defendants, in turn, were entitled to collect any such
amount, and, finally, what the net sum would be which the plaintiff's might have to pay
as reimbursement for one-half of the expenditure made by the defendants. Until final
disposal of the case, no such net sum can be determined, nor until then can the debtor
be deemed to be in arrears. In order that there be an obligation to pay legal interest in
connection with a matter at issue between the parties, it must be declared in a judicial
decision from what date the interest will be due on the principal concerned in the suit.
This rule has been established by the decisions of the supreme court of Spain, in
reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of the Civil Code, reference on April 24,
1867, November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901.
With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the
defendant Matilde for his administration of the property of common ownership,
inasmuch as no stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and
his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any
remuneration whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an officious manager, he
administered the said pro indiviso property, one-half of which belonged to his wife who
held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any
compensation as such voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a
reimbursement for such actual and necessary expenditures as he may have made on
the undivided properties and an indemnity for the damages he may have suffered
while acting in that capacity, since at all events it was his duty to care for and preserve
the said property, half of which belonged to his wife; and in exchange for the trouble
occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half of the said property, he
with his wife resided in the upper story of the house aforementioned, without payment
of one-half of the rents said quarters might have produced had they been leased to
another person.
With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and
appellants only in their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower
court does not show that the allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is not true, to the
effect that the deceased mother of the litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during
her lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will made by the said deceased would
have been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been mentioned, at least it
would have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession of the
plaintiff Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother
of the said sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts,
without success; therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason
for holding that the said gift was not made.
As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the
assessed value of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as
determined by the judicial expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling of
the trial judge admitting the amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with the
law and principles of justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of a pro
indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation by
competent expert appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint
owners, but is beneficial to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the
assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less than the actual real value of
the property, and this being appraiser to determine, in conjunction with the one
selected by the plaintiffs, the value of the properties of joint ownership. These two
experts took part in the latter proceedings of the suit until finally, and during the course
of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an amicable division of the pro
indiviso hereditary property, in accordance with the price fixed by the judicial expert
appraiser appointed as a third party, in view of the disagreement between and
nonconformity of the appraisers chosen by the litigants. Therefore it is improper now to
claim a right to the collection of the said sum, the difference between the assessed
value and that fixed by the judicial expert appraiser, for the reason that the increase in
price, as determined by this latter appraisal, redounded to the benefit of both parties.
In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have
been duly refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment
appealed from, in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim presented
by the defendants, we should and hereby do sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of
the sum of P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed by the defendants as a balance of
the one-half of the amount which the defendants advanced for the reconstruction or
repair of the Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum claimed
by the latter the amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the
defendant Matilde, should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of
the quarters on the lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the
peace court of Vigan; and we further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to
pay one-half of the rents which could have been obtained from the upper story of the
said house; (2) that the plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay the legal interest from
December 7, 1904, on the sum expanded in the reconstruction of the aforementioned
house, but only the interest fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the
date of the judgment to be rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the
husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the
administration of the pro indiviso property belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is
he entitled to collect from the plaintiffs the sum of P910.50, the difference between the
assessed valuation and the price set by the expert appraisal solicited by the plaintiffs
in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5) that no participation shall be made of
jewelry aforementioned now in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said
judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its findings agree
with those of this decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No special finding
is made regarding the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-32047 November 1, 1930
MANUEL MELENCIO, MARIANO MELENCIO, PURA MELENCIO, and CARIDAD
MELENCIO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
DY TIAO LAY, defendant-appellee.
Jose V. Valladolid, Jose P. Melencio and Camus and Delgado for appellants.
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
On August 1,1927, the plaintiffs, Manuel, Mariano, Pura and Caridad Melencio,
brought the present action against the defendant-appellee, Dy Tiao Lay for the
recovery of the possession of a parcel of land situated in the town of Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, and containing an area of 4,628.25 square meters. The plaintiffs further
demand a monthly rental of P300 for the use and occupation of the parcel from May,
1926, until the date of the surrender to them of the possession thereof; and that if it is
found that the said appellee was occupying the said parcel of land by virtue of a
contract of lease, such contract should be declared null and void for lack of consent,
concurrence, and ratification by the owners thereof.
In his answer, the defendant pleaded the general issue, and as special defenses, he
alleged in substance that he was occupying the said tract of land by virtue of a
contract of lease executed on July 24,1905, in favor of his predecessor in interest, by
Ruperta Garcia, Pedro Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta Melencio under the
terms specified therein, and which contract is still in force; that Liberata Macapagal,
the mother of the plaintiffs, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of
Ramon Melencio, one of the original coowners of the parcel of land in question,
actually recognized and ratified the existence and validity of the contract aforesaid by
virtue of the execution of a public document by her on or about November 27,1920,
and by collecting from the assignees of the original lessee the monthly rent for the
premises until April 30, 1926; and that said defendant deposits with the clerk of court
the sum of P20.20 every month as rent thereof and that as a counterclaim, he seeks
the recovery of P272 for goods and money delivered by him to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs filed a reply to the answer alleging, among other things, that Ruperta
Garcia was not one of the coowners of the land in question; that the person who
signed the alleged contract of lease never represented themselves as being the sole
and exclusive owners of the land subject to the lease as alleged by the defendant in
his answer; that the said contract of lease of July 24,1905, is null and void for being
executed without the intervention and consent of two coowners, Ramon Melencio and
Jose P. Melencio, and without the marital consent of the husbands of Juliana and
Ruperta Melencio; that the lessee has repeatedly violated the terms and conditions of
the said contract; and that Liberata Macapagal, in her capacity as administratrix of the
property of her deceased husband, could not lawfully and legally execute a contract of
lease with the conditions and terms similar to that of the one under consideration, and
that from this it follows that she could not ratify the said lease as claimed by the
defendant.
On January 21,1928, Liberata Macapagal Viuda de Melencio, duly appointed and
qualified as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Ramon Melencio,
filed a petition praying to be allowed to join the plaintiffs as party to the present case,
which petition was granted in open court on January 31,1928. Her amended complaint
of intervention of February 14,1928, contains allegations similar to those alleged in the
complaint of the original plaintiffs, and she further alleges that the defendant-appellee
has occupied the land in question ever since November, 1920, under and by virtue of
a verbal contract of lease for a term from month to month. To this complaint of
intervention, the defendant-appellee filed an answer reproducing the allegations
contained in his answer reproducing the allegations contained in his answer to the
complaint of the original plaintiffs and setting up prescription as a further special
defense.
It appears from the evidence that the land in question was originally owned by one
Julian Melencio. He died prior to the year 1905 leaving his widow, Ruperta Garcia, and
his five children, Juliana, Ramon, Ruperta, Pedro R., and Emilio Melencio. Emilio
Melencio also died before 1905, his son Jose P. Melencio, then a minor, succeeding to
his interest in the said parcel of land by representation. A question has been raised as
to whether the land was community property of the marriage of Julian Melencio and
Ruperta Garcia, but the evidence is practically undisputed that Ruperta Garcia in
reality held nothing but a widow's usufruct in the land.
On July 24,1905, Ruperta Garcia, Pedro R. Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta
Melencio executed a contract of lease of the land in favor of one Yap Kui Chin, but
neither Jose P. Melencio nor Ramon Melencio were mentioned in the lease. The term
of the lease was for twenty years, extendible for a like period at the option of the
lessee. The purpose of the lessee was to establish a rice mill on the land, with the
necessary buildings for warehouses and for quarters for the employees, and it was
further stipulated that at the termination of the original period of the lease, or the
extension therof, the lessors might purchase all the buildings and improvements on the
land at a price to be fixed by experts appointed by the parties, but that if the lessors
should fail to take advantage of that privilege, the lease would continue for another
and further period of twenty years. The document was duly acknowledged but was
never recorded with the register of deeds. The original rent agreed upon was P25 per
month, but by reason of the construction of a street through the land, the monthly rent
was reduced of P20.20.
Shortly after the execution of the lease, the lessee took possession of the parcel in
question and erected the mill as well as the necessary buildings, and it appears that in
matters pertaining to the lease, he dealt with Pedro R. Melencio, who from 1905 until
his death in 1920, acted as manager of the property held in common by the heirs of
Julian Melencio and Ruperta Garcia. The original lessee, Yap Kui Chin, died in 1912,
and the lease, as well as the other property, was transferred to Uy Eng Jui who again
transferred it to Uy Eng Jui & Co., an unregistered partnership. Finally the lease came
into the hands of Dy Tiao Lay, the herein defendant-appellee.
Ramon Melencio died in 1914, and his widow, Liberata Macapagal, was appointed
administratrix of his estate. In 1913 the land which includes the parcel in question was
registered under the Torrens system. The lease was not mentioned in the certificate of
title, but it was stated that one house and three warehouses on the land were the
property of Yap Kui Chin.
In 1920 the heirs of Julian Melencio made an extrajudicial partition of parts of the
inheritance, and among other things, the land here in question fell to the share of the
children of Ramon Melencio, who are the original plaintiffs in the present case. Their
mother, Liberata Macapagal, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband,
Ramon, collected the rent for the lease at the rate of P20.20 per month until the month
of May,1926, when she demanded of the lessee that the rent should be increased to
P300 per month, and she was then informed by the defendant that a written lease
existed and that according to the terms thereof, the defendant was entitled to an
extension of the lease at the original rental. The plaintiffs insisted that they never had
any knowledge of the existence of such a contract of lease and maintained that in
such case the lease was executed without their consent and was void. It may be noted
that upon careful search, a copy of the contract of lease was found among the papers
of the deceased Pedro R, Melencio. Thereafter the present action was brought to set
aside the lease and to recover possession of the land. Upon trial, the court below
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant declaring the lease valid and ordering the
plaintiffs to pay the P272 demanded by the defendant in his counterclaim. From this
judgment the plaintiffs appealed.
The contention of the appellants is that the aforesaid contract of lease (Exhibit C) is
null and void for the following reasons:
1. That Exhibit C calls for an alteration of the property in question and
therefore ought to have been signed by all the coowners as by law required in
the premises.
2. That the validity and fulfillment of the said agreement of lease were made
to depend upon the will of the lessee exclusively.
3. That the said contract of lease being for a term of over six years, the same
is null and void pursuant to the provision of article 1548 of the Civil Code.
4. That the duration of the same is unreasonably long, thus being against
public policy.
5. That the defendant-appellee and his predecessors in interest repeatedly
violated the provisions of the agreement.
The first proposition is based on article 397 of the Civil Code which provides that "none
of the owners shall, without the consent of the others, make any alterations in the
common property even though such alterations might be advantageous to all." We do
not think that the alterations are of sufficient importance to nullify the lease, especially
so since none of the coowners objected to such alterations until over twenty years
after the execution of the contract of lease. The decision of this court in the case of
Enriquez vs. A. S. Watson and Co. (22 Phil., 623), contains a full discussion of the
effect of alterations of leased community property, and no further discussion upon the
point need here be considered.
The second proposition is likewise of little merit. Under the circumstances, the
provision in the contract that the lessee, at any time before he erected any building on
the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256
of the Civil Code.
The third and fourth proposition are, in our opinion, determinative of the controversy.
The court below based its decision principally on the case of Enriquez vs. A.S. Watson
& Co. (22 Phil., 623), and on the resolution of the Direccion General de
los Registros dated April 26,1907. (Jurisprudencia Civil, vol.107, p. 222.) An
examination of the Enriquez case will show that it differs materially from the present. In
that case all of the coowners of a lot and building executed a contract of lease of the
property for the term of eighteen years in favor of A. S. Watson & Co.; one of the
owners was minor, but he was represented by his legally appointed guardian, and the
action of the latter in signing the lease on behalf of the minor was formally approved by
the Court of First Instance. In the present case only a small majority of the coowners
executed the lease here in question, and according to the terms of the contract the
lease might be given a duration of sixty years; that is widely different from a lease
granted by all of the coowners for a term of only eighteen years.
The resolution of April 26,1907, is more in point. It relates to the inscription or
registration of a contract of lease of some pasture grounds. The majority of the
coowners of the property executed the lease for the term of twelve years but when the
lessees presented the lease for inscription in the registry of property, the registrar
denied the inscription on the ground that the term of the lease exceeded six years and
that therefore the majority of the coowners lacked authority to grant the lease.
The Direccion General de los Registros held that the contract of lease for a period
exceeding six years, constitutes a real right subject to registry and that the lease in
question was valid.
The conclusions reached by the Direccion General led to considerable criticism and
have been overruled by a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated June 1,1909.
In that decision the court made the following statement of the case (translation):
The joint owners of 511 out of 1,000 parts of the realty denominated El
Mortero, leased out the whole property for twelve years to Doña Josefa de la
Rosa; whereupon the Count and Countess Trespalacios together with other
coowners brought this suit to annul the lease and, in view of the fact that the
land was indivisible, prayed for its sale by public auction and the distribution
of the price so obtained; they alleged that they neither took part nor
consented to the lease; that the decision of the majority of part owners
referred to in article 398 of the Code, implies a common deliberation on the
step to be taken , for to do without it, would, even more than to do without the
minority, be nothing less than plunder; and that, even if this deliberation were
not absolutely necessary, the power of the majority would still be confined to
decisions touching the management and enjoyment of the common property,
and would not include acts of ownership, such as a lease for twelve years,
 which according to the Mortgage Law gives rise to a real right, which must be
recorded, and which can be performed only by the owners of the property
leased.
The part owners who had executed the contract prayed in reconvention that it
held valid for all the owners in common, and if this could not be, then for all
those who had signed it, and for the rest, for the period of six years; and
the Audiencia of Caceres having rendered judgment holding the contract null
and void, and ordering the sale of the realty and the distribution of the price,
the defendants appealed alleging under the third and fourth assignments of
error, that the judgment was a violation of article 398 of the Civil Code, which
is absolute and sets no limit of time for the efficacy of the decisions arrived at
by the majority of the part owners for the enjoyment of the common property,
citing the decisions of June 30th, 1897, of July 8th,1902, and of October 30th,
1907; under the fifth assignments of error the appellants contended that in
including joint owners among those referred to in said article, which sets
certain limits to the power of leasing, in the course of the management of
another's property, the court applied article 1548 unduly; and by the seventh
assignments of error, they maintained the judgment appealed from also
violated article 1727, providing that the principal is not bound where his agent
has acted beyond his authority; whence it may be inferred that if in order to
hold the contract null and void, the majority of the part owners are looked
upon as managers or agents exercising limited powers, it must at least be
conceded that in so far as the act in question lies within the scope of their
powers, it is valid; the contract cannot be annulled in toto.
The Supreme Court held that the appeal from the decision of the Audiencia of
Caceres was not well taken and expressed the following consideranda:
Considering that, although as a rule the contract of lease constitutes an act of
management, as this court has several times held, cases may yet arise,
either owing to the nature of the subject matter, or to the period of duration,
which may render it imperative to record the contract in the registry of
property, in pursuance of the Mortgage Law, where the contract of lease may
give rise to a real right in favor of the lessee, and it would then constitute
such a sundering of the ownership as transcends mere management; in such
cases it must of necessity be recognized that the part owners representing
the greater portion of the property held in common have no power to lease
said property for a longer period than six years without the consent of all the
coowners, whose propriety rights, expressly recognized by the law, would by
contracts of long duration be restricted or annulled; and as under article 1548
of the Civil Code such contracts cannot be entered into by the husband with
respect to his wife's property, by the parent or guardian with respect to that of
the child or ward, and by the manager in default of special power, since the
contract of lease only produces personal obligations, and cannot without the
consent of all persons interested or express authority from the owner, be
extended to include stipulations which may alter its character, changing it into
a contract of partial alienation of the property leased;
Considering that, applying this doctrine to the case before us, one of the
grounds upon which the judgment appealed from, denying the validity of the
lease made by the majority of the part owners of the pasture land El
Mortero is based, must be upheld; to wit, that the period of duration is twelve
years and the consent of all the coowners has not been obtained; hence, the
third, fourth. and fifth assignments of error are without merit; firstly, because
article 398 of the Civil Code, alleged to have been violated, refers to acts
decided upon by the majority of the part owners, touching the management
and enjoyment of the common property, and does not contradict what we
have stated in the foregoing paragraph; secondly because although the
cases cited were such as arose upon leases for more than six years, yet this
point was not raised on appeal, and could not therefore be passed upon; and
thirdly, because it cannot be denied that there is an analogy between a
manager without special authority, who is forbidden by article 1548 of the
Code to give a lease for a period of over six years, and the joint owners
constituting a legal majority, who may decide to lease out the indivisible
property, with respect to the shares of the other coowners; and having come
to the conclusion that the contract is null and void, there is no need to discuss
the first two assignments of error which refer to another of the bases adopted,
however erroneously, by the trial court;
Considering that the sixth assignment of error is without merit, inasmuch as
the joint ownership of property is not a sort of agency and cannot be
governed by the provisions relating to the latter contract; whence, article 1727
of the Code alleged to have been violated, can no more be applied, than, the
question of the validity or nullity of the lease being raise, upon the contract as
celebrated, it would be allowable to modify a posteriorisome one or other of
the main conditions stipulated, like that regarding the duration of the lease,
for this would amount to a novation; still less allowable would it be to
authorize diverse periods for the different persons unequally interested in the
fulfillment.
Taking into consideration articles 398,1548, and 1713 of the Civil Code and following
the aforesaid decision of June 1,1909, we hold that the contract of lease here in
question is null and void.
It has been suggested that by reason of prescription and by acceptance of benefits
under the lease, the plaintiffs are estopped to question the authority for making the
lease.To this we may answer that the burden of proof of prescription devolved upon
the defendant and that as far as we can find, there is no proof that Ramon Melencio
and his successors ever had knowledge of the existence of the lease in question prior
to 1926. We cannot by mere suspicion conclude that they were informed of the
existence of the document and its terms; it must be remembered that under a strict
interpretation of the terms of the lease, the lessees could remain indefinitely in their
tenancy unless the lessors could purchase the mill and the buildings on the land. In
such circumstances, better evidence than that presented by the defendant in regard to
the plaintiff's knowledge of the lease must be required.
The fact that Ramon during his lifetime received his share of the products of land
owned in common with his coheirs is not sufficient proof of knowledge of the existence
of the contract of lease when it is considered that the land in question was only a small
portion of a large tract which Pedro R. Melencio was administering in connection with
other community property.
The appealed judgment as to the validity of the lease is therefore reversed, and it is
ordered that the possession of the land in controversy be delivered to the intervenor
Liberata Macapagal in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Ramon Melencio. It is further ordered that the defendant pay to said administratrix a
monthly rent of P50 for the occupation of the land from May 1st, 1926, until the land is
delivered to the administratrix. The sum of P272 demanded by the defendant in his
counterclaim may be deducted from the total amount of the rent due and unpaid. The
building erected on the land by the defendant and his predecessors in interest may be
removed by him, or otherwise disposed of, within six months from the promulgation of
this decision. Without costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., , Malcolm, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Jonhson, J., I reserve my vote.
Separate Opinions
STREET and VILLAMOR, JJ., dissenting:
Although the name of Ramon Melencio, father of the plaintiffs in this action, was not in
fact signed to the lease in question, and the lease did not even so much as mentioned
him as one of the coowners, the undersigned are nevertheless of the opinion that
Ramon Melencio, and his children after him, are estopped from questioning said lease,
for the reason that, from 1905 to the time of his death in 1914, Ramon Melencio
enjoyed the benefits of the lease, as did his widow and children after him until
May,1926, when the widow repudiated the lease, as a preliminary to the bringing of
this action by the plaintiffs. By their acceptance of the benefits of the lease over so
long a period, the persons now questioning the lease and their father, their
predecessor in interest, are estopped to question the authority for making the lease.
This estopped cures the want of the special power contemplated in article 1548 of the
Civil Code.
In addition to the estopped arising from the acceptance of benefits under the lease, an
estoppel further arises from the fact that Ramon Melecio, during the years following
the execution of the lease, stood by and saw the lessees place upon the property
improvements of a value of more than P100,000, for which reason, also, equity will not
permit the lease to be disturbed to the prejudice of the lessee.
To exhibit the foregoing proposition fully, it is necessary to understand the facts
relative to the controversy. These are substantially as follows:
The land covered by the original lease, having an area of some 6,000 square meters,
is located in the town of Cabanatuan and was formerly the property of one Julian
Melencio, married to Ruperta Garcia. After the death of Julian Melencio, his widow,
Ruperta Garcia, united in 1905, with three of their children, namely, Pedro R., Juliana,
and Ruperta, in executing, in favor of Yap Kui Chin, as lessee, the lease which is the
subject of this controversy. The consideration mentioned in the lease was the sum P25
per month. On August 2,1907, at the request of Pedro R. Melencio, another document
was drawn changing the superficial configuration of the leased land but preserving its
original extension of 6,000 square meters. This change was made for the purpose of
giving Pedro R. Melencio space upon which to construct a house on the part
segragated from the original mass. In 1915 a new street, passing through the leased
property, was opened in Cabanatuan; and Pedro R. Melencio, acting for the lessors,
reduced the monthly rent from P25 to P20, to correspond with the reduction in the area
of the leased land resulting from the occupation of part of it by the street.lawphil.net
At the time the lease was made there was living one Ramon Melencio, son of Julian
Melencio and Ruperta Garcia and brother of the heirs who signed the lease. Also
before this time there had been another brother named Emilio Melencio. But Emilio
was dead and his only surviving son, Jose P. Melencio, was a small boy then under
the tutelage of his uncle Pedro R. Melencio. The lease referred to is not and never has
been questioned by any of the persons, or descendants of the persons, who signed
the instrument. Neither has it been questioned by Jose P. Melecio, son of Emilio. Nor
was the lease questioned in life by Ramon Melencio, who died in 1914; and the only
persons raising a question as to its validity are four of the five children of Ramon, the
same being the plaintiffs in this case.
By series of changes, not, necessary to be here recounted, the rights of the original
lessee became vested in the defendant, Dy Tiao Lay. At the time of the institution of
the present action the defendant, Dy Tia lay, had a rice mill, consisting of valuable
buildings and improvements, constructed on the land, and valued, it is alleged, at
P160,000; but during the time of the pendency of this action a fire occurred which
seems to have destroyed the mill and improvements with the exception of
a camarin valued at some P15,000.
In November, 1920, the children of Julian Melencio and Ruperta Garcia executed a
partial extra-judicial partition of the properties belonging to their father's estate; and the
land covered by this lease was assigned to Liberata Macapagal, widow of Ramon
Melencio, in right of her deceased husband Ramon and as representative of the
children. It will be noted that the land encumbered by the lease was thus assigned
precisely to the family of the deceased brother, Ramon Melencio, who at the same
time was the sole living brother whose name was not signed to the lease.
At the time the lease was executed, Pedro R. Melencio was in fact the manager of the
common ancestral estate belonging to himself and his brothers and sisters; and he
continued as such until 1920. After the partition, or partial partition, of the fraternal
estate in 1920, Liberata Macapagal Viuda de Ramon Melencio succeeded to the office
of manager, or guardian, of the estate of her children, at least with respect to the
parcel now in question.
It will be noted as an important fact that every dollar due as rent from the leased land
was paid by the lessee, from the time when rent first became due, and these
payments were made first to Pedro R. Melencio as manager of the common estate
pertaining to himself and his brothers and sisters, until 1920, when the rents began to
be paid to Liberata Macapagal in the right to herself and children. In April, 1926,
Liberata ceased to collect the rent, and in May, thereafter, she refused to accept
payment of the monthly instalment of rent then due. For this reason the defendant has
been making a consignation of the corresponding rent for the benefit of the lessors in
the office of the provincial treasurer. No question is made that during the life of Ramon
Melencio he received his share of the monthly rental from the property in question; nor
is there any question that thereafter his widow and children received their share of the
same until the property was assigned in partition to Liberata Macapagal and her
children, after which they received all of the rent, until Liberata refused longer to
accept it.
The undersigned concur in the proposition that the lease signed in 1905 was not per
se binding on Ramon Melencio, first, because he was not a party to that lease; and,
secondly, because the making of a lease for twenty years, extendible under certain
circumstances for a second and third period of equal duration, was an act of rigorous
alienation and not a mere act of management and enjoyment such as is contemplated
in article 398 of the Civil Code. (Sentencia, June 1,1909; Ruiz, Cod. Civ., vol. 4. p.
502) Neither do we pause to argue that the contract might have been considered valid
under the doctrine of this court stated in Eleizegui vs. Manila Lawn Tennis Club (2
Phil., 309). At any rate the lease did not purport to bind Ramon, and he was not even
mentioned therein as one of the coowners.
But it is to be noted that none of the parties signatory to the lease have at any time
sought to abrogate the contract; and some of the children of Ramon Melencio only are
before the court as actors in this case seeking to set the contract aside. Under these
circumstances the undersigned are of the opinion that Ramon Melencio was at the
time of his death bound by the lease, from his having participated for years in the
benefits derived from the contract, and that his children, who derive their rights from
him, are likewise bound.
It is well established that an estate in land may be virtually transferred from one man to
another without a writing, by the failure of the owner to give notice of his title to the
purchaser under circumstances where the omission to do so would operate as a fraud
(Kirk vs. Hamilton, 102 U. S., 68,77; 26 Law. ed., 79). This doctrine is so universally
accepted that a bare reference to general treatises on the subject of estopped is
necessary (10 R.C. L., p.694; 21 C. J., pp.1154, 1160, 1206, 1207, 1209); and the
estoppel is as effective with respect to a lease as it is with respect to a deed of
absolute conveyance (21 C.J., 1213).
In the case before us Ramon Melencio lived in the town where the land covered by
this lease was located, and every time he went abroad he must have seen the
valuable improvements which the original lessee, or his successors in interest, were
erecting and had erected upon part of the common ancestral estate. But from the date
the lease was executed until his death Ramon Melencio did nothing except to receive
such portion of the rent as pertained to him. Under these circumstances, even if his
brother Pedro R. Melencio had conveyed the property away by deed of absolute
alienation, Ramon would have been legally bound. It is but natural that so long as he
lived after the lease was made, no complaint was ever registered by him against its
validity.
And if Ramon Melencio was estoppel, of course his children are estopped, for their
rights are of a purely derivative character. In the case before us a period of more than
twenty-one years elapsed between the time the lease was made and the date when it
was first called in question by the widow.
But Manuel Melencio, the oldest of the heirs who are suing in this case, says that he
did not know the terms of the lease until a short while before this action was instituted,
when he called upon the widow of his uncle Pedro and found a copy of the lease after
searching among his uncle's papers. It is not surprising that this plaintiff, who was
hardly more than a baby when the lease was made, should not have known about the
terms of the contract. But it was all the time safely kept among the papers of his uncle
Pedro, who, as already stated, was manager of the common estate of the brothers and
sisters. Ramon Melencio is now dead and of course cannot speak as to whether he
knew the terms of the agreement. But he should be presumed to have known its
terms, because he was enjoying benefits from month to month under it, and he had
the means of knowledge immediately at hand, namely by recourse to a trusted brother
in whose custody the contract was preserved. In addition to this, we note that when
partition was effected about the year 1920 the fact that the property in question was
subject to a lease in favor of the defendant was noted in the document by which the
property was assigned to Liberata Macapagal and her children. The suggestion that
the terms of the lease were unknown to the plaintiffs is of little weight and of no legal
merit. We note that the lease was never registered, but this fact makes no difference in
a lawsuit between the parties to the lease, or their successors in interest.
We are of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.
G.R. No. L-3404 April 2, 1951
ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., defendants-appellees.
Alcuaz & Eiguren for appellant.
Araneta & Araneta for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother
Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by
Certificate of Title No. 60911 in Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an
undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common
property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share of Nieves was
offered for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. The offer was
later made to their mother but the old lady also declined to buy, saying that if the
property later increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken advantage
of her daughter. Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a
domestic corporation, and a new Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued in lieu of the
old title No. 60911 covering the same property. The three co-owners agreed to have
the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to
be later divided among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6)
entitled "Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated June 30, 1941.
Before, during and after the execution of this contract (Exh. 6), Atty. J. Antonio Araneta
was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason
and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a member of the Board of
Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as follows: The three
co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling it and constructing roads and curbs
on the same and then subdivide it into small lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance
the whole development and subdivision; it was prepare a schedule of prices and
conditions of sale, subject to the subject to the approval of the two other co-owners; it
was invested with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to be
subdivided, and execute the corresponding contracts and deeds of sale; it was also to
pay the real estate taxes due on the property or of any portion thereof that remained
unsold, the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all advertising expenses,
salaries of personnel, commissions, office and legal expenses, including expenses in
instituting all actions to eject all tenants or occupants on the property; and it undertook
the duty to furnish each of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio Tuason, copies of
the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and rents and collections made thereon.
In return for all this undertaking and obligation assumed by Araneta Inc., particularly
the financial burden, it was to receive 50 per cent of the gross selling price of the lots,
and any rents that may be collected from the property, while in the process of sale, the
remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal portions among the three co-owners so
that each will receive 16.33 per cent of the gross receipts.
Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for
purposes of reference we are reproducing them below:
(9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it
may be necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the
said property in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase
prices due thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots may be
rented while there are no purchasers thereof;
(11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby
given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-
owners of said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into
which this property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the
PARTY OF THE SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk,
delegate any of its powers under this contract to any of its officers,
employees or to third persons;
(15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell,
alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without
first giving preference to the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the
same under the same terms and conditions as those offered by any other
prospective purchaser. Should none of the co-owners of the property subject-
matter of this contract exercise the said preference to acquire or purchase the
same, then such sale to a third party shall be made subject to all the
conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract; provided, the PARTIES
OF THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be bound by this
contract as long as the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, namely, the
GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the members of the Araneta
family, who are stockholders of the said corporation at the time of the signing
of this contract and/or their lawful heirs;
On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her
attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta. Then in a letter dated October 19,
1946, Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged breach of the terms of the
"Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and abuse of powers granted to it in the
document, she had decided to rescind said contract and she asked that the property
held in common be partitioned. Later, on November 20, 1946, Angela filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Manila asking the court to order the partition of the
property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents collected
during the time that the same including rents collected during the time that Araneta
Inc., administered said property.
The suit was administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio
Tuason Jr., one of the co-owners evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose,
for he evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as
a co-defendant. After hearing and after considering the extensive evidence introduce,
oral and documentary, the trial court presided over by Judge Emilio Peña in a long and
considered decision dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The
plaintiff appealed from that decision, and because the property is valued at more than
P50,000, the appeal came directly to this Court.
Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh.
6) declared null and void or rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; that
she was given to understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and
legal adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of subdivision of a
parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and the
heirs of D. Tuason, Exhibit "L", but it turned out that the two contracts widely differed
from each other, the terms of contract Exh. "L" being relatively much more favorable to
the owners therein the less favorable to Araneta Inc.; that Atty. Antonio Araneta was
more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because he was one of
the officials of Araneta Inc., and finally, that the defendant company has violated the
terms of the contract (Exh. 6) by not previously showing her the plans of the
subdivision, the schedule of prices and conditions of the sale, in not introducing the
necessary improvements into the land and in not delivering to her her share of the
proceeds of the rents and sales.
We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the contract (Exh. 6) and we
agree with the trial court that in the main the terms of both contracts are similar and
practically the same. Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the copies of both
contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a broker, and both had
every opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the advisability of or
disadvantage in entering into the contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty. Antonio Araneta
was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a member of the Board of Directors of the
Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was not the party with which
Angela contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust. According to the
evidence Araneta, the pertinent papers, and sent to her checks covering her receive
the same; and that as a matter of fact, at the time of the trial, Araneta Inc., had spent
about P117,000 in improvement and had received as proceeds on the sale of the lots
the respectable sum of P1,265,538.48. We quote with approval that portion of the
decision appealed from on these points:
The evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J. Antonio
Araneta in connection with the execution of exhibit 6 by the parties, are above
board. He committed nothing that is violative of the fiduciary relationship
existing between him and the plaintiff. The act of J. Antonio Araneta in giving
the plaintiff a copy of exhibit 6 before the same was executed, constitutes a
full disclosure of the facts, for said copy contains all that appears now in
exhibit 6.
Plaintiff charges the defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. with infringing the
terms of the contract in that the defendant corporation has failed (1) to make
the necessary improvements on the property as required by paragraphs 1
and 3 of the contract; (2) to submit to the plaintiff from time to time schedule
of prices and conditions under which the subdivided lots are to be sold; and
to furnish the plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plans, a copy of the monthly
gross collections from the sale of the property.
The Court finds from the evidence that he defendant Gregorio Araneta,
Incorporated has substantially complied with obligation imposed by the
contract exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1, and that for improvements alone, it has
disbursed the amount of P117,167.09. It has likewise paid taxes,
commissions and other expenses incidental to its obligations as denied in the
agreement.
With respect to the charged that Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has failed to
submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plains, list of prices and the
conditions governing the sale of subdivided lots, and monthly statement of
collections form the sale of the lots, the Court is of the opinion that it has no
basis. The evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted to the
plaintiff periodically all the data relative to prices and conditions of the sale of
the subdivided lots, together with the amount corresponding to her. But
without any justifiable reason, she refused to accept them. With the indifferent
attitude adopted by the plaintiff, it was thought useless for Gregorio Araneta,
Incorporated to continue sending her statement of accounts, checks and
other things. She had shown on various occasions that she did not want to
have any further dealings with the said corporation. So, if the defendant
corporation proceeded with the sale of the subdivided lots without the
approval of the plaintiff, it was because it was under the correct impression
that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision of the majority co-owners is
binding upon all the three.
The Court feels that recission of the contract exhibit 6 is not minor violations
of the terms of the agreement, the general rule is that "recission will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for such
breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the
parties in making the agreement" (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine
Co., 47 Phil. 821).
As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the Japanese occupation
from 1942 and up to 1946, the Araneta Inc. although willing to fill the land, was unable
to obtain the equipment and gasoline necessary for filling the low places within the
parcel. As to sales, the evidence shows that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped selling the
lots during the Japanese occupantion, knowing that the purchase price would be paid
in Japanese military notes; and Atty. Araneta claims that for this, plaintiff should be
thankfull because otherwise she would have received these notes as her share of the
receipts, which currency later became valueles.
But the main contention of the appellant is that the contract (Exh. 6) should be
declared null and void because its terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which
we have reproduced, violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code, which for the
purposes of reference we quote below:
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community.
Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length
of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new
agreement.
We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not
applicable. The contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a
co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its
purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by
selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-
owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all
the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-
owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient
means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end
when the object of its creation shall have been attained.

This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps based on the other
agreement or contract (Exh. "L") referred to by appellant where the parties thereto in
express terms entered into partnership, although this object is not expressed in so
many words in Exh. 6. We repeat that we see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil Code
in the parties entering into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very reason that Art. 400 is not
applicable.

Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid
ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was
done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel
held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold
at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had
already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the partnership is in the
process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art.
400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may
agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be
no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years
left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points raised in the
appeal and which counsel for appellant has extensively and ably discussed, citing
numerous authorities. As we have already said, we have viewed the case from a
practical standpoint, brushing aside technicalities and disregarding any minor
violations of the contract, and in deciding the case as we do, we are fully convinced
that the trial court and this Tribunal are carrying out in a practical and expeditious way
the intentions and the agreement of the parties contained in the contract (Exh. 6),
namely, to dissolve the community and co-ownership, in a manner most profitable to
the said parties.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no
pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.
G.R. No. 101522 May 28, 1993
LEONARDO MARIANO, AVELINA TIGUE, LAZARO MARIANO, MERCEDES SAN
PEDRO, DIONISIA M. AQUINO, and JOSE N.T. AQUINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division), GRACE GOSIENGFIAO,
assisted by her husband GERMAN GALCOS; ESTER GOSIENGFIAO, assisted by
her husband AMADOR BITONA; FRANCISCO GOSIENGFIAO, JR., NORMA
GOSIENGFIAO, and PINKY ROSE GUENO, respondents.
The Baristers Law Office for petitioners.
Simeon T. Agustin for private respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Before Us is a petition foe review of the decision, dated May 13, 1991 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 13122, entitled Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. v. Leonardo
Mariano v. Amparo Gosiengfiao 1 raising as issue the distinction between Article
10882 and Article 16203 of the Civil Code.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
It appears on record that the decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao is the
registered owner of a residential lot located at Ugac Sur,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, particularly described as follows, to wit:
"The eastern portion of Lot 1351, Tuguegarao
Cadastre, and after its segregation now
designated as Lot 1351-A, Plan PSD-67391, with
an area of 1,1346 square meters."
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2416 recorded in
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.
The lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural
Bank of Tuguegarao (designated as Mortgagee bank, for brevity) on
several occasions before the last, being on March 9, 1956 and 29,
1958.
On August 15, 1958, Francisco Gosiengfiao died intestate survived
by his heirs, namely: Third-Party Defendants: wife Antonia and
Children Amparo, Carlos, Severino and herein plaintiffs-appellants
Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina (represented by
daughter Pinky Rose), and Jacinto.
The loan being unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed by the
mortgagee bank and in the foreclosure sale held on December 27,
1963, the same was awarded to the mortgagee bank as the highest
bidder.
On February 7, 1964, third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-
Ibarra redeemed the property by paying the amount of P1,347.89
and the balance of P423.35 was paid on December 28, 1964 to the
mortgagee bank.
On September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao on her behalf and that
of her minor children Emma, Lina, Norma together with Carlos and
Severino executed a "Deed of Assignment of the Right of
Redemption" in favor of Amparo G. Ibarra appearing in the notarial
register of Pedro (Laggui) as Doc. No. 257, Page No. 6, Book No. 8,
Series of 1965.
On August 15, 1966, Amparo Gosiengfiao sold the entire property to
defendant Leonardo Mariano who subsequently established
residence on the lot subject of this controversy. It appears in the
Deed of Sale dated August 15, 1966 that Amparo, Antonia, Carlos
and Severino were signatories thereto.
Sometime in 1982, plaintiff-appellant Grace Gosiengfiao learned of
the sale of said property by the third-party defendants. She went to
the Barangay Captain and asked for a confrontation with defendants
Leonardo and Avelina Mariano to present her claim to said property.
On November 27, 1982, no settlement having been reached by the
parties, the Barangay captain issued a certificate to file action.
On December 8, 1982, defendant Leonardo Mariano sold the same
property to his children Lazaro F. Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale notarized by Hilarion L. Aquino as
Doc. No. 143, Page No. 19, Book No. V, Series of 1982.
On December 21, 1982, plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. filed a
complaint for "recovery of possession and legal redemption with
damages" against defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano.
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that as co-heirs and co-owners of
the lot in question, they have the right to recover their respective
shares in the same, and property as they did not sell the same, and
the right of redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners
sold to the defendants.
 Defendants in their answer alleged that the plaintiffs has (sic) no
cause of action against them as the money used to redeem lot in
question was solely from the personal funds of third-party defendant
Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, who consequently became the sole
owner of the said property and thus validly sold the entire property to
the defendants, and the fact that defendants had already sold the
said property to the children, Lazaro Mariano and Dionicia M.
Aquino. Defendants further contend that even granting that the
plaintiffs are co-owners with the third-party defendants, their right of
redemption had already been barred by the Statute of Limitations
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, if not by laches.4
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch I, rendered a
decision dated September 16, 1986, dismissing the complaint and stating that
respondents have no right of ownership or possession over the lot in question. The
trial court further said that when the subject property foreclosed and sold at public
auction, the rights of the heirs were reduced to a mere right of redemption. And when
Amparo G. Ibarra redeemed the lot from the Rural Bank on her own behalf and with
her own money she became the sole owner of the property. Respondents' having
failed to redeem the property from the bank or from Amparo G. Ibarra, lost whatever
rights the might have on the property.5
The Court of Appeals in its questioned decision reversed and set aside the ruling of
the trial court and declared herein respondents as co-owners of the property in the
question. The Court of Appeals said:
The whole controversy in the case at bar revolves on the question of
"whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with
her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property
and terminates the existing state of co-ownership."
Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the
decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period
given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the
whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership
over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In
other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-ownership.
Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it is undisputed and supported by records, that
third-party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra redeemed the propety in
dispute within the one year redemption period. Her redemption of
the property, even granting that the money used was from her own
personal funds did not make her the exclusive owner of the
mortgaged property owned in common but inured to the benefit of all
co-owners. It would have been otherwise if third-party defendant
Amparo G. Ibarra purchased the said property from the mortgagee
bank (highest, bidder in the foreclosure sale) after the redemption
period had already expired and after the mortgagee bank had
consolidated it title in which case there would no longer be any co-
ownership to speak of .6
The decision of the Court of Appeals is supported by a long line of case law which
states that a redemption by a co-owner within the period prescribed by law inures to
the benefit of all the other co-owners.7
The main argument of petitioners in the case at bar is that the Court of Appeals
incorrectly applied Article 1620 of the Civil Code, instead of Article 1088 of the same
code which governs legal redemption by co-heirs since the lot in question, which forms
part of the intestate estate of the late Francisco Gosiengfiao, was never the subject of
partition or distribution among the heirs, thus, private respondents and third-party
defendants had not ceased to be co-heirs.
On that premise, petitioners further contend that the right of legal redemption was not
timely exercised by the private respondents, since Article 1088 prescribes that the
same must be done within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.
According to Tolentino, the fine distinction between Article 1088 and Article 1620 is
that when the sale consists of an interest in some particular property or properties of
the inheritance, the right redemption that arises in favor of the other co-heirs is that
recognized in Article 1620. On the other hand, if the sale is the hereditary right itself,
fully or in part, in the abstract sense, without specifying any particular object, the right
recognized in Article 1088 exists.8
Petitioners allege that upon the facts and circumstances of the present case,
respondents failed to exercise their right of legal redemption during the period
provided by law, citing as authority the case of Conejero, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et
al.9 wherein the Court adopted the principle that the giving of a copy of a deed is
equivalent to the notice as required by law in legal redemption.
We do not dispute the principle laid down in the Conejero case. However, the facts in
the said case are not four square with the facts of the present case.
In Conejero, redemptioner Enrique Conejero was shown and given a copy of the deed
of sale of the subject property. The Court in that case stated that the furnishing of a
copy of the deed was equivalent to the giving of a written notice required by law. 11
The records of the present petition, however, show no written notice of the sale being
given whatsoever to private respondents. Although, petitioners allege that sometime
on October 31, 1982 private respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao was given a copy of the
questioned deed of sale and shown a copy of the document at the Office of the
Barangay Captain sometime November 18, 1982, this was not supported by the
evidence presented. On the contrary, respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao, in her
testimony, declared as follows:
Q. When you went back to the residence of Atty.
Pedro Laggui were you able to see him?
 A. Yes, I did.
Q. When you saw him, what did you tell?
A. I asked him about the Deed of Sale which Mrs.
Aquino had told me and he also showed me a
Deed of Sale. I went over the Deed of Sale and I
asked Atty. Laggui about this and he mentioned
here about the names of the legal heirs. I asked
why my name is not included and I was never
informed in writing because I would like to claim
and he told me to better consult my own attorney.
Q. And did you go?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What kind of copy or document is that?
A. It is a deed of sale signed by my mother, sister
Amparo and my brothers.
Q. If shown to you the copy of the Deed of Sale
will you be able to identify it?
A. Yes, sir.11
Thereafter, Grace Gosiengfiao explicitly stated that she was never given a copy of the
said Deed of Sale.
Q. Where did Don Mariano, Dr. Mariano and you
see each other?
A. In the house of Brgy. Captain Antonio Bassig.
Q. What transpired in the house of the Brgy.
Captain when you saw each other there?
A. Brgy. Captain Bassig informed my intention of
claiming the lot and I also informed him about the
Deed of Sale that was not signed by me since it is
mine it is already sold and I was informed in
writing about it. I am a legal heir and I have also
the right to claim.
Q. And what was the reply of Don Mariano and Dr.
Mariano to the information given to them by Brgy.
Captain Bassig regarding your claim?
A. He insisted that the lot is already his because
of the Deed of Sale. I asked for the exact copy so
that I could show to him that I did not sign and he
said he does not have a copy. 12
The above testimony was never refuted by Dr. Mariano who was present before Brgy.
Captain Bassig.
The requirement of a written notice has long been settled as early as in the case
of Castillo v. Samonte,13 where this Court quoted the ruling in Hernaez v. Hernaez, 32
Phil., 214, thus:
Both the letter and spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any
attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by
including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by
registration. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal
notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the
effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or
reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the said
notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or
information was sufficient. 14
Moreover, petitioners themselves adopted in their argument respondents' allegation In
their complaint that sometime on October, 1982 they sought the redemption of the
property from spouses Leonardo Mariano and Avelina Tigue, by tendering the
repurchase money of P12,000.00, which the spouses rejected. 15 Consequently, private
respondents exercised their right of redemption at the first opportunity they have by
tendering the repurchase price to petitioners. The complaint they filed, before the
Barangay Captain and then to the Regional Trial Court was necessary to assert their
rights. As we learned in the case of Castillo, supra:
It would seem clear from the above that the reimbursement to the
purchaser within the period of one month from the notice in writing is
a requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the right of legal
redemption; the bringing of an action in court is the remedy to
enforce that right in case the purchaser refuses the redemption. The
first must be done within the month-period; the second within the
prescriptive period provided in the Statute of Limitation. 16
The ruling in Castillo v. Samonte; supra, was reiterated in the case of Garcia
v. Calaliman, where We also discussed the reason for the requirement of the written
notice. We said:
Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related
provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had
 stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the
sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner,
notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as
exacted by the code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its
terms and its validity, and to quiet and doubt that the alienation is
not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the
method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not
prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive
method written notification of redemption (Conejero et al. v. Court of
Appeals et al., 16 SCRA 775 [1966]; Etcuban v. Court of Appeals,
148 SCRA 507 [1987]; Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 75069, April
15, 1988).17 (Emphasis ours)

We likewise do not find merit in petitioners' position that private respondents could not
have validly effected redemption due to their failure to consign in court the full
redemption price after tender thereof was rejected by the petitioners. Consignation is
not necessary, because the tender of payment was not made to discharge an
obligation, but to enforce or exercise a right. It has been previously held that
consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase as a mere tender of
payment is enough on time as a basis for an action to compel the vendee a retroto
resell the property; no subsequent consignation was necessary to entitle private
respondents to such
reconveyance. 18

Premises considered, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the
absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not
even begun to run.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

133 Phil. 55
REYES J. B. L., J.:
Direct appeal from an order of the Court of first instance of La Union, in its Civil Case
No. 1990, granting a motion to dismiss the complain for legal redemption by a co-
owner (retracto legal de comuneros) on account of failure to state a cause of action.
The basic facts and issues are stated in the decision appealed from, follows:
"Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co-owner of
lot No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an area of 640 square
meters as evidenced by a deed of sale, Annex "A", which was executed on October
28, 1961 by Crispina Perez de Aquitania, one of the co-owners, in her favor.
On the other hand, the defendant, who on December 30, 1959 acquired the other 2/3
portion of Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquitaniaand her children, claimed that the
plaintiff bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is definitely identified and,
segregate hence there existed no co-ownership at the time and after said plaintiff
bought the aforesaid portion, upon which right of legal redemption can be exercised or
taken advantage of.
From the complaint, it would appear that Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey
of Rosario, covered by original certificate of title No. RO-2720 (N.A.), was originally
owned by the late spouses Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were survived
by her child namely, Crispin Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez
is also now dead. On October 28, 1951, Crispina P. Vda. deAquitania sold her right
and participation in Lot No. 802 consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square
meters to Leonora Estoque (Annex of the complaint). On October 29, 1951, Lorenzo
Perez, Crispina Perez and Emilia P. Posadas, widow of her deceased husband,
Ricardo Perez, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Gumersendo, Raquel,
Emilio a and Ricardo. Jr., executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement wherein Lorenzo
Perez, Emilia P. Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and
participation in lot No. 802 to Crispina Perez (Annex B of the complaint). On
December 30, 1959, Crispina Perez and her children,
Rosita Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania,
Sergio Aquitania and Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula, the remaining 2/3
western portion of Lot No. 802 with an area of 958 square meters (Annex C of the
complaint).
The action of the plaintiff is premised on the claim of co-ownership. From the deed of
sale executed in favor of the plaintiff, it can be seen that the 1/3 portion sold to plaintiff
is definitely identified as the 1/3 portion located on the southeastern part of Lot No.
802 and specifically bounded on the north by De Guzman Street, on the east
by Posadas street, on the sought by Perez street, and on the west by remaining
portion of the same lot, which contained an area of 640 square meters. And in the
deed of sale executed by CrispinaPerez and her children in favor of defendant
Elena Pajimula over the remaining 2/3 portion of Lot No. 802, said portion is identified
as the western portion of Lot No. 802 which is bounded on the north by Dc Guzman
street, on the east by properties of LeonardaEstoque, on the sought by the national
mad and on the west by Lots Nos. 799 and 801, containing an area of 958 square
meters.'
The appellant's stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative to convey the
southeastern third of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding the description
in the deed itself, for the reason that the vendor being a mere co-owner, had no right
to sell any definite portion of the land held in common but could only transmit her
undivided share, since the specific portion corresponding to the selling co-owner is not
known until partition takes place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs. Bautista
14Phil. 528). from this premise, the appellant argues that the sale in her favor,
although describing a definite area, should be construed as having conveyed only the
undivided 1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at the time bythe
vendor, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania. Wherefore, when the next day said vendor
acquired the 2/3 interest of her two other co-owners, Lot 802 became the common
property of appelant and Crispina Perez. Therefore, appellant argues,
when Crispina old the rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the former
was selling an undivided 2 /3 that appellant, as co-owner was entitled to redeem,
pursuant to Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.
"ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of arty of them, are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
common.
The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the
deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by plaintiff Estoque was different from that of
the defendants Pajimula; hence they never became co-owners, and the alleged right
of legal redemption was not proper. Estoque appealed.
We find no error in the order of dismissal, for the facts pleaded negate the claim that
appellant Estoque ever became a co-owner of appellee Pajimula.
(1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object
sold as the southeastern third portion of lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area
of 840 square meters, more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda.
de Aquitania could not have sold this particular portion of the lot owned in common by
her and her two brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that
she intended to sell to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot
aforementioned. There is nothing in the deed of sale to justify such inference. That
the seller could have validly sold her one-third undivided interest to appellant is no
proof that she did choose to sell the same. Ab posse ad actu non vale illatio.
(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been
ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the spec portion described in the
deed, the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day
(October 29, 1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the entire interest of bar
remaining co-owners (Annex B) and there became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of
the Rosario Cadastral survey (Llace, vs. Muñoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines clearly prescribes that -
"When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and
later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto such title passes by operation of law to
the buyer or grantee."

Pursuant to this rule, appellant Estoque became the actual owner of southeastern third
of lot 802 on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an undivided interest
in lot 802. And when eight years later Cris Perez sold to
the appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds of the same lot appellant did not acquire
a right to redeem the property thus sold, since the respective portions were distinct
and separate.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs

against appellant Estoque.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,

Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987
JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO
ONG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and the
CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 21, 1986 Decision * of the Court
of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 02635, "Julita Ong etc. vs. Allied Banking Corp. et al."
affirming, with modification, the January 5, 1984 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-35230.
The uncontroverted facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
...: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12,
Block 407, Psd 37326 with an area of 1960.6 sq. m. and Lot No. 1,
Psd 15021, with an area of 3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the name of "Alfredo Ong Bio Hong
married to Julita Go Ong "(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong died on
January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of
her husband's estate in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of
administration was registered on TCT No. 188705 on October 23,
1979. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold Lot No. 12 to Lim Che Boon,
and TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled and TCT No. 262852
was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot No. 12 (Exh. D-4).
On June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K.
Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking Corporation
to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. The
mortgage was registered on TCT No. 188705 on the same date with
the following notation: "... mortgagee's consent necessary in case of
subsequent alienation or encumbrance of the property other
conditions set forth in Doc. No. 340, Page No. 69, Book No. XIX, of
the Not. Public of Felixberto Abad". On the loan there was due the
sum of P828,000.00 and Allied Banking Corporation tried to collect it
from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of
the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had
allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the
bank averred that it was plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to
secure the court's approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the
defendant that she was processed the sum of P300,000.00 by the
JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the interest of the
loan.
Concluding, the trial court ruled:
Absent (of) any evidence that the property in
question is the capital of the deceased husband
brought into the marriage, said property should be
presumed as acquired during the marriage and,
therefore, conjugal property,
After the dissolution of the marriage with the death
of plaintiff's husband, the plaintiff acquired, by law,
her conjugal share, together with the hereditary
rights thereon. (Margate vs. Rabacal, L-14302,
April 30, 1963). Consequently, the mortgage
constituted on said property, upon express
authority of plaintiff, notwithstanding the lack of
judicial approval, is valid, with respect to her
conjugal share thereon, together with her
hereditary rights.
On appeal by petitioner, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the
appealed decision (Record, pp. 19-22). The dispositive portion of the appellate court's
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings instituted by defendant against plaintiff shall
be held in abeyance to await the final result of Civil Case No.
107089 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th Judicial District
Branch XXXII, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE ALFREDO ONG BIO: JULITA GO ONG,
ADMINISTRATRIX". In pursuance with which the restraining order of
the lower court in this case restraining the sale of the properties
levied upon is hereby ordered to continue in full force and effect
coterminous with the final result of Civil Case No. 107089, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
On April 8, 1986, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision (Ibid.,
pp. 24-29), but in a Resolution dated September 11, 1986, respondent court denied
the motion for lack of merit (Ibid., p. 23). Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 6-17).
The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 1986 (Rollo, p.
30), without giving due course to the petition, resolved to require private respondent to
comment thereon and it did on February 19, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 37-42). Thereafter, in a
Resolution dated April 6, 1987, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 43).
Petitioner filed her Memorandum on May 13, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 45-56), while private
respondent filed its Memorandum on May 20, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 62-68).
The sole issue in this case is —
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF
LAND UNDER PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT
OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
The instant petition is devoid of merit.
The well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
respect, carries even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in the
case at bar.
In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the administration of
petitioner — the wife of the deceased, is a community property and not the separate
property of the latter; (2) that the mortgage was constituted in the wife's personal
capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix; and (3) that the mortgage affects the
wife's share in the community property and her inheritance in the estate of her
husband.
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court and cited several cases wherein this Court
ruled that the regulations provided in the said section are mandatory.
While petitioner's assertion may have merit insofar as the rest of the estate of her
husband is concerned the same is not true as regards her conjugal share and her
hereditary rights in the estate. The records show that petitioner willingly and voluntarily
mortgaged the property in question because she was processed by JK Exports, Inc.
the sum of P300,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan; and that at the time she
executed the real estate mortgage, there was no court order authorizing the mortgage,
so she took it upon herself, to secure an order.
Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the
evidence, the Court of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity
and not in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband.
Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA 1483)
and Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further argues that in the
settlement proceedings of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal
partnership property of the marriage is under administration. While such may be in a
sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly
and voluntarily entered into by the petitioner. An opposite view would result in an
injustice. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493
of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of
his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Philippine National Bank vs. Court
of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under
administration, by authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of
judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights. The
fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is immaterial, insofar as her
conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for after all, she was
the ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is there
any claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of
any heir or anybody else have been prejudiced for impaired. As stated by Associate
Justice (later Chief Justice) Manuel Moran in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 73 Phil. 618
—
The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally
belonged to Juan Melgar. The latter died and the judicial
administration of his estate was commenced in 1915 and came to a
close on December 2, 1924, only. During the pendency of the said
administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of
the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase
to Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that during the period for the
repurchase she would continue in possession of the land as lessee
of the purchase. On December 12, 1920, the partition of the estate
left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the land in
question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed,
in payment of professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the
defendant-appellee Nicolas Rafols, who entered upon the portion
thus conveyed and has been in possession thereof up to the
present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover
said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the
other defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August
4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa
Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant, after trial, the lower court
rendered a decision absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of
the land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and declaring the
plaintiff owner of the other half by express acknowledgment of the
other defendants. The plaintiff appealed from that part of the
judgment which is favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that
Susana Melgar could not have sold anything to Pedro Cui because
the land was then in custodia legis, that is, under judicial
administration. This is error. That the land could not ordinary be
levied upon while in custodia legis, does not mean that one of the
heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or
might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary execution
of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid
interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by
an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the
 pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
administration.

The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot
adversely affect the substantiverights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not
inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband's death, and her
hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil
Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other
heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code
applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for
instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of
a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are
excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to
hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the
government.

Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel

may arise from the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was
intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a
refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would
result in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993
HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO and DEMOSTHENES P. ACEBEDO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL ACEBEDO, ALEXANDER ACEBEDO,
NAPOLEON ACEBEDO, RIZALINO ACEBEDO, REPUBLICA ACEBEDO,
FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and YU HWA PING, respondents.
Heminio L. Ruiz for petitioners.
Vicente D. Millora for private respondents.
Romero A. Yu for respondent Yu Hua Ping.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by
respondents-heirs and ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to
sell the remaining portions of said properties, despite the absence of its prior approval
as a probate court, is being challenged in the case at bar.
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties
located in Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of
about P30 million. Said estate allegedly has only the following unsettled claims:
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon
City;
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City;
c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel
Acebedo, and the incumbent Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein,
and the others are the private respondents.
Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen
years, respondents-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on October 4, 1989. The
said sale involved the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 155569,
120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in Quezon City, and form part of
the estate. The consideration for said lots was twelve (12) million pesos and by that
time, they already had a buyer. It was further stated in said Motion that respondents-
heirs have already received their proportionate share of the six (6) million pesos paid
by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of P6,000,000.00 is
more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they prayed
for the Court to direct the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-
administrator hereafter):
1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;
2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the
Estate; and
3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the
Estate.
To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an "Opposition to
Approval of Sale", to wit:
1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold some
real estate property of the Estate located at Balintawak, Quezon
City, without the knowledge of the herein administrator, without the
approval of this Honorable Court and of some heirs, and at a
shockingly low price;
2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection
to the approval of the sale, perpetrated in a manner which can even
render the proponents of the sale liable for punishment for contempt
of this Honorable Court;
3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable
Court to authorize the sale of the above mentioned property of the
Estate to generate funds to pay certain liabilities of the Estate and
with the approval of this Honorable Court if warranted, to give the
heirs some advances chargeable against theirs (sic) respective
shares, and, for the purpose to authorize the herein Administrator,
and the other heirs to help the Administrator personally or through a
broker, to look for a buyer for the highest obtainable price, subject
always to the approval of this Honorable Court.1
On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45)
days within which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price
higher than P12,000,000.00.
The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date,
petitioners have not found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they asked the Court,
on February 8, 1990, for an in extendible period of thirty days to look for a buyer.
Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public
document against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26,
1990. He initiated this complaint upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused
the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale wherein allegedly petitioner-
administrator's signature was made to appear. He also learned that after he confronted
the notary public of the questioned document, the latter revoked his notarial act on the
same.
On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration
by the Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute
Sale.
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer,
petitioner Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting them several
periods within which to look for a better buyer. Respondents filed a comment thereon.
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner-
administrator filed another "Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated May 10, 1990,
maintaining that the sale should wait for the country to recover from the effects of the
coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the properties should be divided among the heirs.
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and
Lease some of the Properties of the Estate". To this Motion, respondents filed an
Opposition on the following grounds : that the motion is not proper because of the
pending motion to approve the sale of the same properties; that said conditional sale
was initiated by petitioner-administrator who had earlier signed a receipt for
P500,000.00 as earnest money; that the approval of the sale would mean Yu Hwa
Ping's assumption of payment of the realty taxes; that the estate has no further debts
and thus, the intestate administrator may be terminated.
On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which, stated, among others, to wit:2
b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989,
praying that the new administrator be directed to sell the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor of
Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied; and
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some
properties of the estate at a just and reasonable amount, subject to
the approval of the Court.
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the
parties to a conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held, but still the
parties were unable to arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4, 1991, it was
continued, wherein the parties actually agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their
shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price already agreed upon, while
herein petitioners negotiate for a higher price with Yu Hwa Ping.
Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of the
Deed of Conditional Sale.
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the dispositive
portion of which states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted,
reconsidered and set aside, and another one is hereby issued as
follows:
1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989,
executed by the heirs-movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining
to their respective shares in the properties covered by TCT Nos.
155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City;
2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the
remaining portions of the said properties also in favor of Yu Hwa
Ping at the same price as the sale executed by the herein heirs-
movants;
3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total
remaining balance of the purchase price for the said lots within
TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice hereof;
4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in
contempt of court, resulting from his failure to submit the owner's
copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and 120145 is hereby denied.3
Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price
for the properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount of
P6,500,000.00.
Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21)
days thereafter, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court
reinstate its Order of August 17, 1990. To this, private respondents filed their
Opposition.4
Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. The motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were denied by
the respondent Court on August 23, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
hoping for the last time that they would be able to convince the Court that its Order
dated March 29, 1991 in effect approving the conditional sale is erroneous and beyond
its jurisdiction.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration for "lack of merit".
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order
dated March 29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners filed this
Petition for Certiorari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the
jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving
the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court
approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the remaining portion of said
properties?
We answer in the positive?
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court made a pronouncement that it is
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to
say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state
that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a
special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is
necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the
probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.12 In other words, the law does not prohibit a
co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in
common.13
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property
under administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al.,14 it was
said that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result
of the pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such administration.
The Court then relied on the provision of the Old Civil Code, Article 440 and Article
339 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493, respectively, in the new Civil
Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa: "Upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with
respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains
undivided'."
Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which
is unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private respondents'
right to alienate the decedent's property subject of administration, this Petition should
be dismissed for lack of merit.

We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.
conditional sale is null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale precisely was
made conditional, the condition being that the same should first be approved by the
probate court. SO ORDERED.

Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. 6 It is Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent's estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the
substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or
co-ownership among the heirs.7

This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell
whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under
administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate
court.8

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision9 stating that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the
moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there
are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs. 10

The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this
right.11 Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
G.R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992
DONATO S. PAULMITAN, JULIANA P. FANESA and RODOLFO
FANESA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIO PAULMITAN, ELENA PAULMITAN, ABELINO
PAULMITAN, ANITA PAULMITAN, BAKING PAULMITAN, ADELINA PAULMITAN
and ANITO PAULMITAN, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals, dated July 14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled "Alicio
Paulmitan, et al. v. Donato Sagario Paulmitan, et al." which affirmed the decision 2 of
the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial District,
Branch IV, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 11770.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, 3 left the two following
parcels of land located in the Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an
area of 1,946 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-
8376; and (2) Lot No. 1091 with an area of 69,080 square meters and covered by OCT
No. RO-11653. From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now deceased,
Agatona begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also died in
1953, 4 apparently shortly after his mother passed away, and Donato Paulmitan, who
is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the
third petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son
of Agatona Sagario, is survived by the respondents, who are his children, name: Alicio,
Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all surnamed Paulmitan.
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles
to the two lots mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on
August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of
Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that
he is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The affidavit was filed with the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No. RO-
8376 in the name of Agatona Sagario and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 35979 in Donato's name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the
same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. 5
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was
forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land was executed by the
Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental. 6
On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09. 7
On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan
filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.
Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as an
affirmative defense, contending that the Complaint was filed more than eleven years
after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan over the land as
consequence of the registration with the Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit
extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As regards Lot No. 1091,
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she acquired
exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor
by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the petitioners' affirmative defense of prescription with respect to Lot No.
757, the trial court issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint as to
the said property upon finding merit in petitioners' affirmative defense. This order,
which is not the object of the present petition, has become final after respondents'
failure to appeal therefrom.
Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20, 1977, the
trial court decided in favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the trial
court, the respondents, as descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan were entitled to
one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan to
his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not prejudice their rights. And the
repurchase by Juliana P. Fanesa of the land from the Provincial Government of
Negros Occidental did not vest in Juliana exclusive ownership over the entire land but
only gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the property.
The trial court ordered the partition of the land and directed petitioners Donato
Paulmitan and Juliana P. Fanesa to pay private respondents certain amounts
representing the latter's share in the fruits of the land. On the other hand, respondents
were directed to pay P1,479.55 to Juliana P. Fanesa as their share in the redemption
price paid by Fanesa to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause
of action pleaded in the complain as follows:
1. The deed of sale (Exh. "F") dated May 28, 1974 is valid insofar as
the one-half undivided portion of Lot 1091 is concerned as to vest
ownership over said half portion in favor of defendant Juliana
Fanesa and her husband Rodolfo Fanesa, while the remaining half
shall belong to plaintiffs, pro-indiviso;
2. Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province of Negros
Occidental, now covered by TCT No. RO-11653 (N.A.), is ordered
 partitioned. The parties must proceed to an actual partition by
property instrument of partition, submitting the corresponding
subdivision within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, and
should they fail to agree, commissioners of partition may be
appointed by the Court;
3. Pending the physical partition, the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental is ordered to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. RO-
11653 (N.A.) covering Lot 1091, Pontevedra Cadastre, and to issue
in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs and
defendants, one-half portion each,pro-indiviso, as indicated in
paragraph 1 above;
4. Plaintiffs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, defendant
Juliana Fanesa the amount of P1,479.55 with interest at the legal
rate from May 28, 1974 until paid;
5 Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana Paulmitan
Fanesa are ordered to account to plaintiffs and to pay them, jointly
and severally, the value of the produce from Lot 1091 representing
plaintiffs' share in the amount of P5,000.00 per year from 1966 up to
the time of actual partition of the property, and to pay them the sum
of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees as well as the costs of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition.
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the land in question, it is well
to review, initially, the relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan. When Agatona died in 1953, she was survived by two (2) sons, Donato and
Pascual. A few months later in the same year, Pascual died, leaving seven children,
the private respondents. On the other had, Donato's sole offspring was petitioner
Juliana P. Fanesa.
At the time of the relevant transactions over the properties of decedent Agatona
Sagario Paulmitan, her son Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children. It
is, thus, tempting to apply the principles pertaining to the right of representation as
regards respondents. It must, however, be borne in mind that Pascual did no
predecease his mother, 8 thus precluding the operation of the provisions in the Civil
Code on the right of representation 9 with respect to his children, the respondents.
When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato and
Pascual were still alive. Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil Code
that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent," 10 the right of ownership, not only of Donato but also of Pascual, over their
respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of law vested
in them in 1953 when their mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of Donato
and Pascual did not yet have any right over the inheritance since "[i]n every
inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
ones." 11 Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to inherit from
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing
away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of
the Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of debts of the deceased." 12 Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore,
co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents,
succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right
of ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children, who,
from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the
disputed decedent estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two
transactions, namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan;
and (b) her redemption of the land from the Provincial of Negros Occidental after it
was forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P.
Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that
portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. 13 The sale
did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land
which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with
the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property 14 and
consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is partitioned. In Bailon-
Casilao v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, outlined the
effects of a sale by one co-owner without the consent of all the co-owners, thus:
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in
Article 493 of the Civil Code, Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis
supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells
the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale
[Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under
the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition
affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
 would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
common [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently,
by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which
are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the
subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private
respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-
owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower
court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers
in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of
the land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter
ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2)
undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question
with the respondents, her first cousins.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of
the fact that when the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land
after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes, she redeemed it.
The contention is without merit.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor
give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same
issue raised by petitioners, the Court, in Adille v. Court of Appeals, 16 resolved the
same with the following pronouncements:
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire
exclusive ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject
of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join
him in its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on
the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of
the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand
redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect
to his share alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612, CIVIL CODE (1889), art.
(1514.). While the records show that petitioner redeemed the
property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did
not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to
end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no
doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
Under the Civil Code:
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-
owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or
right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may
exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses
and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-
ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-
ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code,
"may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality
does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the
co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607).
But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right
to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a
co-ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of
the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for
half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the
subject property for the amount due her. 17
Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed, for them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the
partition of the estate which represents the share of private respondents in the fruits of
the land. According to petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only.
This assigned error, however raises a factual question. The settled rule is that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review. As a general rule, findings of
fact made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.
Jose F. Manacop for petitioner.
Siruello, Muyco & Associates Law Office for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03933 declaring null and void the orders of
23 and 26 April, 1979, the judgment by default of 26 July 1979, and the order of 22
October 1979 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch 30, and
directing the trial court to set the case for pre-trial conference.
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of seven
(7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On 28 October
1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father
could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the
brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of
Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970,
Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be
equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners
with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment
of the house together with their father.
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers
agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the
meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of
their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent
that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof
divided among them.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the latter filed
on 12 January 1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that the they
could divide the proceeds between them.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the
basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also
prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father
died.
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to the
sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale would be
effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner,
he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property.
Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial on 26 April 1979 with the
lawyers of both parties notified of the pre-trial, and served with the pre-trial order, with
private respondent executing a special power of attorney to his lawyer to appear at the
pre-trial and enter into any amicable settlement in his behalf. 1
On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for respondent, filed a motion
to cancel pre-trial on the ground that he would be accompanying his wife to
Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.
On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without merit, the trial court
denied the motion and directed that the pre-trial should continue as scheduled.
When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April 1979, plaintiff and his
counsel appeared. Defendant did not appear; neither his counsel in whose favor he
executed a special power of attorney to represent him at the pre-trial. Consequently,
the trial court, on motion of plaintiff, declared defendant as in default and ordered
reception of plaintiff's evidence ex parte.
On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus motion to reconsider the
order of default and to defer reception of evidence. The trial court denied the motion
and plaintiff presented his evidence.
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court
found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the
basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of
his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and
lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants,
to delay partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to
demand partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant
for the former's share, the trial court held that this property should be sold to a third
person and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.
The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff
P1,200.00 as rentals2 from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from
the time the action was filed.
On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus motion for new trial but on 22
October 1979 the trial court denied the motion.
Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following orders
and decision of the trial court be set aside: (a) the order of 23 April 1970 denying
defendants motion for postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April 1979; (b) the order
of 26 April 1979 declaring him in default and authorizing plaintiff to present his
evidence ex-parte; (e) the default judgment of 26 July 1979; and, (d) the order dated
22 October 1979 denying his omnibus motion for new trial.
On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court of 26
April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default., The appellate court
found the explanation of counsel for defendant in his motion to cancel pre-trial as
satisfactory and devoid of a manifest intention to delay the disposition of the case. It
also ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion for postponement filed by
counsel for defendant who should not have been declared as in default for the
absence of his counsel.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in not holding
that the motion of defendant through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in
character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial.
The issues to be resolved are whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as
in default for his failure to appear at the pre-trial and in allowing petitioner to present
his evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial court correctly rendered the default
judgment against respondent.
We find merit in the petition.
As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-trial
is mandatory.3 A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited
or considered as in default.4 In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel
failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial, court has authority to declare
respondent in default.5
Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or
denial thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which should take into
account two factors in the grant or denial of motions for postponement, namely: (a) the
reason for the postponement and (b) the merits of the case of movant.6
In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for
respondent to cancel the pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's explanation that he
had to go to by boat as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and accompany her to
a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April 1979 where she was one of the principal
sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to justify postponement of the
pre-trial, and the Court of Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the denial. We
sustain the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the
postponement for lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory
process as pre-trial would require much more than mere attendance in a social
function. It is time indeed we emphasize that there should be much more than mere
perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial procedure. Its observance must be taken
seriously if it is to attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and inexpensive disposition of
cases.
Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days before the
scheduled pre-trial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not attend the pre-trial on
the scheduled date, respondent at least should have personally appeared in order not
to be declared as in default. But, since nobody appeared for him, the order of the trial
court declaring him as in default and directing the presentation of petitioner's
evidence ex parte was proper.7
With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which respondent
appellate court did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the Court holds that on the
basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented ex parte, petitioner
and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of
them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot
object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally
according to their respective interests.
Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner from the
time their father died in 1975 and to vacate the house so that it can be sold to third
persons. Petitioner alleges that respondent's continued stay in the property hinders its
disposal to the prejudice of petitioner. On the part of petitioner, he claims that he
should be paid two-thirds (2/3) of a monthly rental of P2,400.00 or the sum of
P1,600.00.
In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered respondent to vacate the property so
that it could be sold to third persons and the proceeds divided between them equally,
and for respondent to pay petitioner one-half (1/2) of P2,400.00 or the sum of
P1,200.00 as monthly rental, conformably with their stipulated sharing reflected in their
written agreement.
We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of
the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to
commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with
its order of 26 July 1979.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art.
498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-
owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others,
it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when
the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the
nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case,8 this Court upheld the order of the trial
court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common
pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without
paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common
long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner
not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.9 Each co-owner of property
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy
the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of
the
same. 10

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the
house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been
preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice
and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale
can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental
of P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to
vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to
petitioner.

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court
granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the
interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided
equally between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held
liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 16 October 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 69.12-P dated 16 July 1979 is REINSTATED, with the
modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate the premises in
question within ninety (90) days from receipt of this and to pay petitioner Virgilio B.
Aguilar a monthly rental of P1,200.00 with interest at the legal rate from the time he
received the decision of the trial court directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves
the premises.

The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to implement this decision
conformably with Art. 498 of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. This decision is
final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA
ONTE, petitioners,
vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO MORETO,
PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA
MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA,
JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO
MENDOZA, respondents.
E.P. Caguioa for petitioners.
Benjamin C. Yatco for respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-
Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Biñan.
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage,
they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land
Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters
respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the name of "Flaviano Moreto,
married to Monica Maniega."
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6)
children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed
Moreto.
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs
Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto.
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria
Tuiza.
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely,
herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff
Josefina Moreto.
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his
brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica
Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife
Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano
could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant
Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00.
The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area
of 781 square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in
the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was
acquired during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was
cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of
Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part
of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which
he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the
spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496
about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto
and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781
square meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495
and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1")
although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No.
1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged
their house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house
about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded
on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on
the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano
Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his
deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed without
the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano
Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and
hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as
regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs as
the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-
half portion thereof sold to the defendants. "After payment of the other half of the
purchase price"; to order the defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; to
order the defendants to pay actual and moral damages and attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs; to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August 1958
until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and occupancy of
the same.
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as
the lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers
believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it
was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the
defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed recited
that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion
consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their
sale transaction.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs
declaring the deed of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining to
the eastern portion of Lot 1496 covering an area of 781 square
meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square meters of which
plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners and entitled to its
possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of
1781 square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of
which defendants are declared lawful owners and entitled to its
possession.
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an
area of 390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be
entitled to a certificate of title covering said portion and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles issued to the
plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their respective portions.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of
Deeds of Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name
of Cornelio Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this
decision ordered cancelled. The defendants are ordered to
surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna the
owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 within
thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final for
cancellation in accordance with this decision.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the
province of Laguna for his information and guidance.
With costs against the defendants. 2
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts and
circumstances duly established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full
ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same.
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30,
1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had
already been dead six years before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega had already
been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The
records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and
divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176
amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition between
the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action
for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the property of a
community between the surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the
deceased Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this
bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the
legal partnership and becomes the property of a community, by
operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or the
widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-
owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and
benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
unless personal rights are in question. (Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17
Phil. 107)
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no
reason in law why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership with the
surviving husband for the management and control of the community property of the
marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather community of property,
between the heirs and the surviving husband might be formed without a written
agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court held that
"(a)lthough, when the wife dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the
community property, has authority to sell the property with•ut the concurrence of the
children of the marriage, nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the
children, with the result of bringing about a conventional ownership in common
between the father and children as to such property; and any one purchasing with
knowledge of the changed status of the property will acquire only the undivided
interest of those members of the family who join in the act of conveyance.
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the
vendees constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor
pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son of
the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a cemented piggery
coral was constructed by the vendees at the back of their house about one and one-
half meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees believed
all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which
according to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the
deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold as Lot 1495.
But actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the parties during the
proceedings of the case below, the area sold was within Lot 1496.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete
piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the
complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over nine (9)
years. And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica
Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956,
lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the
occupation, possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so
that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel
by laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches
is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of
abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting the
same. (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was
already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership
between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife,
Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is applicable and it provides a
follows:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involve. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership when
at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq.
meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their house and
also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an
adjacent coral for piggery.
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned
three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot
1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters.
The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are
contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot
4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot
1495 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot
4545. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not
separate properties located in different places but they abut each other. This is not
disputed by private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership
constituted or covered these three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano
Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters
as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his
share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq.
meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid
as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had
the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he
could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-
indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location
and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without
objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they
acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a
factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and
barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or title
in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased
spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale
executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00
and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs
of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to
comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the
obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering the ownership of
the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein
private respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other part to pay therefore a price certain
in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.
Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and
deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received
from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property
rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under
Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased
Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the
private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the
obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the
petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto)
and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation.
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners
for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-
surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a
segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496
and they are also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their
name based on the relocation survey.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and executed by
Flaviano Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid
in its entirely.

Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the
eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and whereon their
houses and piggery coral stand.

The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq.
meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of
Title to the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,

concur.
G.R. No. L-25014 October 17, 1973
DOLORES LAHORA VDA. DE CASTRO, ARSENIO DE CASTRO, JR., WILFREDO
DE CASTRO, IRINEO DE CASTRO and VIRGINIA DE CASTRO ALEJANDRO, (in
substitution for the deceased defendant-appellant ARSENIO DE CASTRO,
SR.)., petitioners,
vs.
GREGORIO ATIENZA, respondent.
Arsenio de Castro, Jr. and F.T. Papa for petitioners.
Dakila Castro and Z.D. de Mesa for respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as without merit and affirms the judgment of the
appellate court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-owner of an undivided one-
half interest in the fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third party, respondent
Atienza, independently of his co-owner (although said co-owner had also leased his
other undivided one-half interest to the same third party) and could likewise by mutual
agreement independently cancel his lease agreement with said third party. Said
predecessor-in-interest (and petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs)
therefore stands liable on his express undertaking to refund the advance rental paid to
him by the lessee on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the non-cancellation of
the co-owner's lease to elude such liability.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision affirming in toto the judgment of the Manila court
of first instance ordering therein defendant-appellant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. (now
deceased and substituted by above-named petitioners as his heirs) "to return to the
plaintiff (respondent) Gregorio Atienza the sum P2,500.00 with legal interest from the
date of the filing of complaint until fully paid plus the sum of P250.00 as attorney's fees
and the costs of the suit", found the following facts to undisputed:
On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de
Castro, Sr. leased to plaintiff a fishpond containing an area of 26
hectares situated in Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a bigger
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 196450 of
the registry of the property of Bulacan. The lessors are co-owners in
equal shares of the leased property.
According to the contract of lease (Exh. 1) the term of the lease was
for five years from January 24, 1956 at a rental of P5,000 a year, the
first year's rental to be paid on February 1, 1956, the second on
February 1, 1957 and the rental for the last three years on February
1, 1958. The first year's rental was paid on time.
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died.
In the month of November, 1956, plaintiff as lessee and defendant
Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside and
annul the contract of lease and for this purpose an agreement (Exh.
A) was signed by them, Exhibit A as signed by plaintiff and
defendant shows that Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro, widow of Tomas
de Castro, was intended to be made a party thereof in her capacity
as representative of the heirs of Tomas Castro.
Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows:
"2. Na sa pamamagitan nito ay pinawawalang kabuluhan namin ang
nasabing kasulatan at nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa amin
ni Arsenio de Castro at Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro ay isauli kay
GREGORIO ATIENZA ang tig P2,500.00 o kabuuang halagang
P5,000.00 na paunang naibigay nito alinsunod sa nasabing
kasulatan; na ang nasabing tig P2,500.00 ay isasauli ng bawat isa
sa amin sa o bago dumating ang Dec. 30, 1956."
Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A. Defendant did
not pay the P2,500.00 which under the above-quoted paragraph of
Exhibit A, he should have paid on December 30, 1956. Demand for
payment was made by plaintiff's counsel on January 7, 1957 but to
no avail, hence the present action.
On the conflicting contentions between the parties as to who between them would
attend to securing the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro (widow of Tomas
de Castro) to the agreement of cancellation of the lease with respondent Atienza, the
appellate court found that "the testimony of the defendant (Arsenio de Castro, Sr.) ...
supports the contention of the plaintiff (Atienza) "that it was the defendant Arsenio who
was interested and undertook to do so, citing Arsenio's own declaration that "I agreed
to sign this document (referring to the cancellation) because of my desire to cancel our
original agreement" and that his purpose in obtaining the cancellation of said lease
agreement with plaintiff Atienza was "(B)ecause I had the intention of having said
fishpond leased to other persons and I cannot lease it to third parties unless I can
secure the signature of Felisa Vda. de Castro."
The appellate court thus held in effect that as Arsenio "was the one interested in
cancelling the lease (Exh. 1), it stands to reason that he most probably undertook to
obtain the signature of Mrs. Castro [widow and successor-in-interest of his brother
Tomas]" and that he could not invoke his own failure to obtain such signature to elude
his own undertaking and liability to refund respondent (plaintiff) his share of the rental
paid in advance by respondent on the cancelled lease in the sum of P2,500.00.
The appellate court furthermore correctly held that the consent or concurrence of
Felisa Vda. de Castro (as co-owner in succession of Tomas) was not an essential
condition to the validity and effectivity of the agreement of cancellation of the lease
(Exhibit A) as between Arsenio and respondent-lessee, contrary to petitioners' claim,
holding that "(S)ince there is no specific provision in Exhibit A supporting defendant's
claim, we are not prepared to supply such condition unless the same can be deduced
from other evidence or unless the terms of Exhibit A cannot be performed by plaintiff
and defendant without Mrs. Castro being bound as a party thereto."

The issue is simply reduced to whether Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond

owned pro-indiviso by him with his brother Tomas (succeeded by Felisa Vda. de
Castro) could validly lease his half-interest to a third party (respondent
Atienza) independently of his
co-owner, and in case his co-owner also leased his other half interest to the same third
party, whether Arsenio could cancel his own lease agreement with said third party?

The appellate court correctly resolved the issue thus: "Our view of the contract of lease
Exhibit 1 is that each of the Castro brothers, leased his undivided one-half interest in
the fishpond they owned in common to the plaintiff. Could one of them have validly
leased his interest without the other co-owner leasing his own? The answer to this is
given by appellant in his own brief (p. 14) when he said that it would result in a
partnership between the lessee and the owner of the other undivided half. If the lease
could be entered into partially by one of the co-owners, insofar as his interest is
concerned, then the lease, Exhibit 1, can also be cancelled partially as between
plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, we conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz
Vda. de Castro is not essential for the cancellation of the lease of defendant's one-half
undivided share in the fishpond to plaintiff."

The appellate court's judgment is fully supported by the Civil Code provisions on the
rights and prerogatives of co-owners, and specifically by Article 493 which expressly
provides that

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefitspertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. *

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with costs against

petitioners.

Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137152. January 29, 2001]
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO N., THELMA
N., EUSEBIO N., RODOLFO N., all surnamed AGUILAR, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Orders
dated September 17, 1998 and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 168, Pasig City[1] dismissing the petitioners Amended Complaint in SCA No.
1427 for expropriation of two (2) parcels of land in Mandaluyong City.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168,
Pasig City a complaint for expropriation entitled City of Mandaluyong, plaintiff v.
Antonio N., Francisco N., Thelma N., Eusebio N., Rodolfo N., all surnamed Aguilar,
defendants. Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 1,847 square meters registered under Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names of the defendants, herein respondents,
located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong; on a portion
of the 3 lots, respondents constructed residential houses several decades ago which
they had since leased out to tenants until the present; on the vacant portion of the lots,
other families constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied; in 1983,
the lots were classified by Resolution No. 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land
reform under Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos; as a result
of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land
from respondents, but the latter refused to sell; on November 7, 1996, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association
of tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution No. 516, Series of
1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action
for the expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise
condominium for qualified occupants of the land; on January 10, 1996, Mayor Abalos
sent a letter to respondents offering to purchase the said property at P3,000.00 per
square meter; respondents did not answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for the
expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair market
value of P3,000.00 per square meter.[2]
In their answer, respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died in 1995,
denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos offer to purchase their lots. They
alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a
public purpose; the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for
expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized
housing; the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the
zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square
meter. As counterclaim, respondents prayed for damages of P21 million.[3]
Respondents filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing claiming that the defenses
alleged in their Answer are valid grounds for dismissal of the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and lack of cause of
action. Respondents prayed that the affirmative defenses be set for preliminary
hearing and that the complaint be dismissed.[4] Petitioner replied.
On November 5, 1997, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint and named as an
additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio
Aguilar with his heirs. Petitioner also excluded from expropriation TCT No. 59870 and
thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to
two (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters under TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767.[5]
The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on December 18,
1997. Respondents, who, with the exception of Virginia Aguilar and the Heirs of
Eusebio Aguilar had yet to be served with summons and copies of the Amended
Complaint, filed a Manifestation and Motion adopting their Answer with Counterclaim
and Motion for Preliminary Hearing as their answer to the Amended Complaint. [6]
The motion was granted. At the hearing of February 25, 1998, respondents
presented Antonio Aguilar who testified and identified several documentary
evidence. Petitioner did not present any evidence.Thereafter, both parties filed their
respective memoranda.[7]
On September 17, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended
Complaint after declaring respondents as small property owners whose land is exempt
from expropriation under Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the
expropriation was not for a public purpose for petitioners failure to present any
evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and
homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The court thus disposed of as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Amended Complaint is hereby ordered dismissed without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 29, 1998, the court denied
the motion. Hence this petition.
Petitioner claims that the trial court erred
IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS CONTENTION THAT THEY QUALIFY AS SMALL
PROPERTY OWNERS AND ARE THUS EXEMPT FROM EXPROPRIATION.[9]
Petitioner mainly claims that the size of the lots in litigation does not exempt the
same from expropriation in view of the fact that the said lots have been declared to be
within the Area for Priority Development (APD) No. 5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1967, as amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1517.[10] This declaration allegedly authorizes petitioner to
expropriate the property, ipso facto, regardless of the area of the land.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by
then President Marcos in 1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of
human communities from blight, congestion and hazard, and promotion of their
development and modernization, the optimum use of land as a national resource for
public welfare.[11] Pursuant to this law, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued in 1979
declaring the entire Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban
land reform. This was amended in 1980 by Proclamation No. 1967 and in 1983 by
Proclamation No. 2284 which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as
Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
In 1992, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 7279, the
Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. The law lays down as a policy that the
state, in cooperation with the private sector, undertake a comprehensive and
continuing Urban Development and Housing Program; uplift the conditions of the
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and resettlement areas by
making available to them decent housing at affordable cost, basic services and
employment opportunities and provide for the rational use and development of urban
land to bring about, among others, equitable utilization of residential lands; encourage
more effective people's participation in the urban development process and improve
the capability of local government units in undertaking urban development and housing
programs and projects.[12] Towards this end, all city and municipal governments are
mandated to conduct an inventory of all lands and improvements within their
respective localities, and in coordination with the National Housing Authority, the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the National Mapping Resource Information
Authority, and the Land Management Bureau, identify lands for socialized housing
and resettlement areas for the immediate and future needs of the underprivileged and
homeless in the urban areas, acquire the lands, and dispose of said lands to the
beneficiaries of the program.[13]
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions
in the law. Section 9 of R.A. 7279 provides:
Sec. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land.Lands for socialized housing shall be
acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal
Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS Sites
which have not yet been acquired;
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local
government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government
lands.
Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1)
government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or
abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development
(APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement
(SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands.
There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately-owned and
therefore last in the order of priority acquisition. However, the law also provides that
lands within the declared APDs which have not yet been acquired by the government
are fourth in the order of priority. According to petitioner, since the subject lots lie
within the declared APD, this fact mandates that the lots be given priority in
acquisition.[14]
Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate from the
other provisions of the law. It must be read together with Section 10 of R.A. 7279
which also provides:
Section 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of
this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land
assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture
agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That
expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted: Provided, further, That where expropriation is resorted to,
parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes
of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be
reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid
down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.[15]
For the purposes of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties
shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority
primarily through negotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are
actual occupants of the land shall be given the right of first refusal.
Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be acquired in several
modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land
swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the
government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8)
expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be
resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b)
parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.
Section 9 of R.A. 7279 speaks of priorities in the acquisition of lands. It
enumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the heirarchy in their
acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of land acquisition or the process of
acquiring lands for socialized housing. These are two different things. They mean that
the type of lands that may be acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to
be acquired only in the modes authorized under Section 10. The acquisition of the
lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and conditions set forth in
the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD, such as in the instant
case, may be acquired only in the modes under, and subject to the conditions of,
Section 10.
Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land
acquisition for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the
acquisition for socialized housing under said law. [16] It, however, did not state with
particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the
law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states expropriation shall
be resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Petitioner
alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. Petitioner, through
the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from respondents but the latter refused to
sell.[17] As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even
Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the
Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the subject property states
whether the city government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage, land
swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government,
or joint venture agreement under Section 9 of the law.
Section 9 also exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by small
property owners.[18] Petitioner argues that the exercise of the power of eminent domain
is not anymore conditioned on the size of the land sought to be expropriated. [19] By the
expanded notion of public use, present jurisprudence has established the concept that
expropriation is not anymore confined to the vast tracts of land and landed estates, but
also covers small parcels of land.[20] That only a few could actually benefit from the
expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. [21] It simply is
not possible to provide, in one instance, land and shelter for all who need them.[22]
While we adhere to the expanded notion of public use, the passage of R.A. No.
7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 introduced a limitation on the
size of the land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly
exempted small property owners from expropriation of their land for urban land
reform. R.A. No. 7279 originated as Senate Bill No. 234 authored by Senator Joey
Lina[23] and House Bill No. 34310. Senate Bill No. 234 then provided that one of those
lands not covered by the urban land reform and housing program was land actually
used by small property owners within the just and equitable retention limit as provided
under this Act.[24] Small property owners were defined in Senate Bill No. 234 as:
4. Small Property Ownersare those whose rights are protected under Section 9, Article
XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, who own small parcels of land within the fair
and just retention limit provided under this Act and which are adequate to meet the
reasonable needs of the small property owners family and their means of livelihood. [25]
The exemption from expropriation of lands of small-property owners was never
questioned on the Senate floor.[26] This exemption, although with a modified definition,
was actually retained in the consolidation of Senate Bill No. 234 and House Bill No.
34310 which became R.A. No. 7279.[27]
The question now is whether respondents qualify as small property owners as
defined in Section 3 (q) of R.A. 7279. Section 3 (q) provides:
Section 3 x x x (q). Small property owners refers to those whose only real property
consists of residential lands not exceeding three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) in
highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban
areas.
Small-property owners are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property
whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square
meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2)
that they do not own real property other than the same.
The case at bar involves two (2) residential lots in Mandaluyong City, a highly
urbanized city. The lot under TCT No. 63766 is 687 square meters in area and the
second under TCT No. 63767 is 949 square meters, both totalling 1,636 square
meters in area. TCT No. 63766 was issued in the names of herein five (5)
respondents, viz:
FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO N.
AGUILAR, JR., widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single and ANTONIO N. AGUILAR,
married to Teresita Puig; all of legal age, Filipinos.[28]
TCT No. 63767 was issued in the names of the five (5) respondents plus Virginia
Aguilar, thus:
FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO N.
AGUILAR, JR., widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single and ANTONIO N. AGUILAR,
married to Teresita Puig; and VIRGINIA N. AGUILAR, single, all of legal age,
Filipinos.[29]
Respondent Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other registered owners are
all siblings who inherited the subject property by intestate succession from their
parents.[30] Their father died in 1945 and their mother in 1976.[31] Both TCTs were
issued in the siblings names on September 2, 1987. [32] In 1986, however, the siblings
agreed to extrajudicially partition the lots among themselves, but no action was taken
by them to this end. It was only eleven (11) years later, on November 28, 1997 that a
survey of the two lots was made[33] and on February 10, 1998, a consolidation
subdivision plan was approved by the Lands Management Service of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources.[34] The co-owners signed a Partition
Agreement on February 24, 1998[35] and on May 21, 1998, TCT Nos. 63766 and
63767 were cancelled and new titles issued in the names of the individual owners
pursuant to the Partition Agreement.
Petitioner argues that the consolidation of the subject lots and their partition was
made more than six (6) months after the complaint for expropriation was filed on
August 4, 1997, hence, the partition was made in bad faith, for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of R.A. 7279.[36]
 At the time of filing of the complaint for expropriation, the lots subject of this case
were owned in common by respondents. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. [37] During the existence of the co-
ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community
property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the co-owner has is
an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. [38] Article
493 of the Civil Code however provides that:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
termination of the co-ownership.[39]
Before partition in a co-ownership, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his
undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or
mortgage his interest, except as to purely personal rights. [40] He may also validly lease
his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.[41] The
effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon
the partition of the property.[42]
Article 493 therefore gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right
to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest.[43] The co-owner, however, has no
right to sell or alienate a concrete specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
common, because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion
without any physical adjudication.[44] If the co-owner sells a concrete portion, this,
nonetheless, does not render the sale void. Such a sale affects only his own share,
subject to the results of the partition but not those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to the sale.[45]
In the instant case, the titles to the subject lots were issued in respondents
names as co-owners in 1987ten (10) years before the expropriation case was filed in
1997. As co-owners, all that the respondents had was an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the lots. This, however, did not mean that they could not
separately exercise any rights over the lots. Each respondent had the full ownership of
his undivided interest in the property. He could freely sell or dispose of his interest
independently of the other co-owners. And this interest could have even been attached
by his creditors.[46] The partition in 1998, six (6) months after the filing of the
expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership by converting into certain and definite
parts the respective undivided shares of the co-owners.[47] The subject property is not
a thing essentially indivisible. The rights of the co-owners to have the property
partitioned and their share in the same delivered to them cannot be questioned for
"[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership."[48] The partition was
merely a necessary incident of the co-ownership;[49] and absent any evidence to the
contrary, this partition is presumed to have been done in good faith.
Upon partition, four (4) co-owners, namely, Francisco, Thelma, Rodolfo and
Antonio Aguilar each had a share of 300 square meters under TCT Nos. 13849,
13852, 13850, 13851.[50] Eusebio Aguilars share was 347 square meters under TCT
No. 13853[51] while Virginia Aguilars was 89 square meters under TCT No. 13854.[52]
It is noted that Virginia Aguilar, although granted 89 square meters only of the
subject lots, is, at the same time, the sole registered owner of TCT No. 59780, one of
the three (3) titles initially sought to be expropriated in the original complaint. TCT No.
59780, with a land area of 211 square meters, was dropped in the amended
complaint. Eusebio Aguilar was granted 347 square meters, which is 47 square meters
more than the maximum of 300 square meters set by R.A. 7279 for small property
owners. In TCT No. 13853, Eusebios title, however, appears the following annotation:
subject to x x x, and to the prov. of Sec. 4 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to
the inheritance left by the deceased Eusebio N. Aguilar.[53]
Eusebio died on March 23, 1995,[54] and, according to Antonios testimony, the
former was survived by five (5) children.[55] Where there are several co-owners, and
some of them die, the heirs of those who die, with respect to that part belonging to the
deceased, become also co-owners of the property together with those who
survive.[56] After Eusebio died, his five heirs became co-owners of his 347 square-
meter portion. Dividing the 347 square meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4
square meters of the land subject of litigation.
Consequently, the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter
limit set in R.A. 7279. The second question, however, is whether the subject property
is the only real property of respondents for them to comply with the second requisite
for small property owners.
Antonio Aguilar testified that he and most of the original co-owners do not reside
on the subject property but in their ancestral home in Paco, Manila. [57] Respondents
therefore appear to own real property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the
records do not show that the ancestral home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it
stands are owned by respondents or any one of them. Petitioner did not present any
title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilars testimony.
On the other hand, respondents claim that the subject lots are their only
real property[58] and that they, particularly two of the five heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are
merely renting their houses and therefore do not own any other real property in Metro
Manila.[59] To prove this, they submitted certifications from the offices of the City and
Municipal Assessors in Metro Manila attesting to the fact that they have no registered
real property declared for taxation purposes in the respective cities. Respondents were
certified by the City Assessor of Manila;[60] Quezon City;[61] Makati City;[62] Pasay
City;[63] Paranaque;[64]Caloocan City;[65] Pasig City;[66] Muntinlupa;[67] Marikina;[68] and
the then municipality of Las Pias[69] and the municipality of San Juan del Monte [70] as
having no real property registered for taxation in their individual names.
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the possession of
respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other co-owners filed ejectment
cases against the occupants of the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Mandaluyong, Branches 59 and 60. Orders of eviction were issued and executed on
September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other occupants
from the land in question.[71]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the orders dated September
17, 1998 and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City
in SCA No. 1427 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46296 September 24, 1991
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACLANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, VIRGILIO DELIMA,
GALILEO DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS and PURIFICACION
BACUS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his
legal heirs, namely: FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN
NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA, ESTER
DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA, respondents.
Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing the trial court's judgment which declared as null and void the certificate of
title in the name of respondents' predecessor and which ordered the partition of the
disputed lot among the parties as co-owners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate court and
by the trial court are as follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar
Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino Delima later
died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio
Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No.
2744 of the property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the
Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed an
affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744
was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February 4,1954 in the name of
Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes
thereon from 1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita
Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an
action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No.
3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente
Delima was joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the latter
in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are the
declared owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate
presently covered by transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009, each sharing a
pro-indiviso share of one-fourth;
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus and
Purificacion Bacus (on-fourth);
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Pagano, Fidel, Virgilio and
Galileo Jr., all surnamed Delima (one-fourth); and
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily D.
Arias, Helen Niadas and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu Irenea, and Fely, all
surnamed Delima (one-fourth).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and the
Register of Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and issue in lieu
thereof another title with the above heirs as pro-indiviso owners.
After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the heirs of
Galileo Delima are ordered to turn a over to the other heirs their respective
shares of the fruits of the lot in question computed at P170.00 per year up to
the present time with legal (interest).
Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are ordered to
petition the lot in question and the defendants are directed to immediately
turn over possession of the shares here awarded to the respective heirs.
Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 54-55, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May
19, 1977, respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the
claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely
Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived their rights to the
property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining
balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of Appeals
erred:
1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of inheritance
is imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of prescription and laches have
already been waived.
2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners.(p.13, Rollo)
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners' action for
partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall enable
Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the
exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property. Article 494 of the
Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period
of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended
by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed
twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others,
but will be held to benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in
possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-
owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof
with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same
situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil, 857;
Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368). Thus, an
action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the
actual possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership (Del Blanco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1,
1987, 156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and
exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership (De Castro v. Echarri,
20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811).
In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked
or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as
exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that
such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust;
2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust;
and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive (Valdez v. Olorga,
No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39299,
October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of
partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name
of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new
owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the
other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the
purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of
the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-
18046, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance of land
based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the
date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for
purposes of the statute of limitations is counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-
31858, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420).
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima,
represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by
Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of
a new title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The
issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-
ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima
from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the
certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such
rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of
prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to
compel partition on February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription.
Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer
be invoked by them at this time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and
PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del
Rosario Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria
del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp.
116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his
first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4)
children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died
and was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo,
Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named
Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named
Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930.
They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on
February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died
in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired
when he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These
properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the
Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina,
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves
Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a
voluntary registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the
land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on
April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs.
Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots
Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the
respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot
No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common
father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs,
they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the
lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of
the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10).
Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were
impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the
suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and
agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits
(Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record
on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was
one for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was
denied by the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of
the Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous
application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim
were dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or
recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status
of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain
either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained.
(Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial
court committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo
Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they
(appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of
their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the
children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties
who eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of
reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided
rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees
shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the
parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo
Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal
obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court
on December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription
barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the
action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate.
The resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary
matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the
deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime,
Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children
and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on
the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with
the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing
estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be
declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs
their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the
deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the
nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be
granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs'
action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in
his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of
the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the
estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents
are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or
about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to
Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to
(him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace
of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were
known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced
to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106
[1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that
a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board
is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court;
Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85
SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but
it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted
in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230
[1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married
must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban,supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at
bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the
parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the
Family Code, there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The
fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated
(Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or
by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's
birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence
which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In
the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they
continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as
their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided,
these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time
and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived
together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court
mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana
Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private
respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the
time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is
inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private
respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for
whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117
SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs.
IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to
be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165
SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed
the extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the
properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid
repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming
petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-
ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the
present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands,
petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to
acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on
Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p.
14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners'
undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore
their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate
of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been
inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the
property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del
Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact,
sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163
without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a
valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455,
461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership,
must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The
act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-
owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive
notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens
title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to
say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation,
assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration operates as a universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-
heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private
respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners
because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after
learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 109910 April 5, 1995
REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and GRACIA G. SALVADOR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTO and ELPIA YABO, FRANCISCA YABO, et al.,
respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition is the legal determination made by the Court of Appeals on the
issues of which portion of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 formed part of the conjugal
assets of the spouses Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo, and of whether or not the
rights of Pastor's co-heirs in the estate of Maria Yabo were extinguished through
prescription or laches.
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Barrio Bulua,
Cagayan de Oro City, containing an area of 1,267 and 3,816 square meters,
respectively. Title thereto devolved upon his nine children, namely, Victoriano,
Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca, Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his
death sometime before or during the second world war.
On 28 April 1976, Pastor Makibalo, who is the husband of Maria Yabo, one of Alipio's
children, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5000, against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo for
"Quieting of Title, Annulment of Documents, and Damages." In the complaint, he
alleged that he owned a total of eight shares of the subject lots, having purchased the
shares of seven of Alipio's children and inherited the share of his wife, Maria, and that
except for the portion corresponding to Gaudencia's share which he did not buy, he
occupied, cultivated, and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully, and exclusively
the two parcels of land. He then prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9
of the lots in question.1
On 8 October 1976, the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the late Alipio
Yabo2 lodged with the same court a complaint for partition and quieting of title with
damages,3 docketed as Civil Case No. 5174, against Pastor Makibalo, Enecia Cristal,
and the spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. They alleged that Lot No. 6080 and
Lot No. 6180 are the common property of the heirs of Alipio Yabo, namely, the
plaintiffs, defendant Enecia Cristal, Maria Yabo and Jose Yabo, whose share had
been sold to Alberto Yabo; that after Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor and Maria
Makibalo, Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo became the de facto administrators of the
said properties; and that much to their surprise, they discovered that the Salvador
spouses, who were strangers to the family, have been harvesting coconuts from the
lots, which act as a cloud on the plaintiffs' title over the lots.
The plaintiffs then prayed that (a) they, as well as defendant Pastor Makibalo, in
representation of his wife, and Enecia Cristal, in representation of Gaudencia, be
declared as the owners of the lots; (b) the Salvador spouses be declared as having no
rights thereto except as possible assignees of their co-defendants, Pastor Makibalo
and Enecia Cristal; (c) the lots be partitioned according to law among the
aforementioned co-owners; and (d) the defendants be made to pay for the value of the
fruits they harvested from the lots and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, expenses of the litigation, and costs of the suit.
The two cases were consolidated and jointly heard by Branch 5 of the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan de Oro City.
By evidence, Pastor, Makibalo sought to prove the following allegations:
He was married to Maria Yabo who died on 17 March 1962.4 In August 1949, Jose and
Victoriano, both surnamed Yabo, sold their respective shares in the disputed lots to
one Pedro Ebarat, and in 1952 the latter sold both shares to Pastor Makibalo.5 Ebarat
formalized this conveyance by executing an Affidavit of Waiver and Quitclaim dated 30
May 1969 in favor of Pastor.6
On 16 January 1951, the heirs of the late Lope Yabo sold Lope's shares in the litigated
properties to one Dominador Canomon,7 who, in turn, sold the same to
Pastor.8 Canomon afterwards executed an Affidavit of Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of
the latter.9
Pastor Makibalo likewise purchased the shares of Baseliza in the two lots in 1942, of
Procopio in 1957, of Francisca in 1958, and of Pelagia in 1967. The only share he did
not buy was that of Gaudencia. After every purchase, he took possession of the
portions bought and harvested the products thereof. 10
In 1966, Pastor sold back to Alberto a portion of Lot No. 6180 which was formerly the
share of Alberto's father, Procopio. 11
In December 1968, Pastor mortgaged the two lots to the spouses Eulogio and
Remedios Salvador. 12 On 26 September 1978, he executed a document denominated
as a "Confirmation and Quitclaim" whereby he waived all his rights, interests, and
participation in the lots in favor of the Salvador spouses. 13
On the other hand, by their evidence, l4 the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo tried to
prove that they had repurchased from Pastor Makibalo the share of Procopio, which
was previously sold to Pastor, and had bought the shares of Jose and Maria. 15
Filoteo Yabo denied having sold the share of his father, Lope Yabo, in the contested
lots and disowned his signature and those of his mother, brothers, and sisters
appearing at the back of Exhibit "C". 16
Ignacio Yabo testified that his father, Victoriano Yabo, did not know how to write and
sign his name. He further declared that he had no knowledge that his father affixed his
thumbmark in the document marked as Exhibit "A" purporting to alienate his father's
share in the disputed lots. l7
On 15 January 1983, the trial court rendered its decision 18 holding as follows:
Assuming that the thumbmark on the typewritten name "Jose Yabo"
in Exh. 3 was that of Jose Yabo, Alberto Yabo and Elpia R. Yabo
purchased the share of Jose Yabo in bad faith because they knew
before and up to the execution of Exh. 3 on October 24, 1972 that
Jose Yabo was no longer the owner of that area because from the
documents she borrowed from Mrs. Salvador they came to know
that Jose Yabo had sold his shares to Pedro Ebarat, and they have
seen that Pastor Makibalo has been in possession of those shares
together with the seven others exclusively as owner, he having
mortgaged them to Mrs. Salvador.
As Jose Yabo was no longer the owner of the one-ninth (1/9) shares
which he sold to Alberto Yabo and Elpia Yabo under Exh. 3, the sale
is null and void, and Alberto and Elpia acquired nothing because
Jose Yabo had no more title, right or interest to dispose of.
...
Pastor Makibalo had been in possession of Jose Yabo's share since
1949 after purchasing it from Ebarat, and has been in possession
thereof up to September 26, 1978 when he sold it to the spouses
Eulogio Salvador and Remedios Salvador, who are now in
possession of the same.
Exh. A, evidencing the sale of Victoriano Yabo's share to Pedro
Ebarat was identified by the latter who testified that he sold it to
Pastor Makibalo in 1951. Exh. A is an ancient document — 1949
when the document came to existence up to now is more than 30
years, and the document had been in the possession of Pastor
Makibalo, then Remedios Salvador who had interest in its
preservation.
As regards the shares of Lope Yabo, the same had been sold by his
surviving spouse Juana Legaspi, and his children Filoteo, Andresa,
Jovita, Bonifacio, and Rundino for P105.00 on January 16, 1951 to
Dominador Conomon (Exh. C and C-1), who in turn sold it to Pastor
Makibalo in 1952, executing a formal Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim
on May 30, 1969
(Exh. D).
Exh. C is an ancient document, being more than 30 years old and
has been in the possession of Pastor Makibalo and then the
spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador — who had an interest in
its preservation. The claim of Filoteo Yabo that the signatures
appearing in Exh. C are not his and those of his brothers and sisters
are of no avail, for if they were not the ones who affixed those
signatures and so they did not sell the shares of their father Lope
Yabo, why did they not then take possession of said shares — they
remained silent from 1951 to September 16, 1976 a period of 25
years. They are now [e]stopped by laches.
And as regards the shares of Baseliza, Francisca and Pelagia, there
is no evidence presented to effectively rebut the testimony of Pastor
Makibalo that he acquired the shares of Baseliza Yabo in 1942 by
changing it with a buffalo; that he bought the shares of Francisca
Yabo in 1958 and that he bought the shares of Pelagia Yabo in
1967; Pastor Makibalo had been in possession of these shares from
the time he acquired them, continuously, adversely, openly, and
peacefully, as owner up to the time he sold his rights and interest
therein to the spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. The heirs of
Baseliza, Francisca and Pelagia have not taken any step to protect
their rights over those shares for over 40 years in the case of
Baseliza's share, for about 20 years in the case of Francisca's
share, and for more than 10 years in the case of Pelagia's share.
Laches, likewise has rendered their rights stale.
On March 10, 1966 Pastor Makibalo sold back to Alberto Yabo the
share of Procopio Yabo in Lot 6180 (Exh. 1 and 2), but there is
nothing to show that. Pastor Makibalo also sold back Procopio's
share in Lot 6080.
So then, by purchase, Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo acquired the
shares of Baseliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Procopio and Francisca,
or six (6) shares from Lots 6080 and 6180. These belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo. Maria
Yabo had also a share from Lots 6080 and 6180, and Pastor
Makibalo acquired the shares of Pelagia Yabo in both Lots 6080 and
6180. All in all; Pastor Makibalo acquired eight shares in both Lot
6080 and 6180.
While Maria Yabo died on March 17, 1962, and so one-fourth (1/4)
of the shares of Baseliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, and Francisca, or
one-fourth of five-ninth (5/9) of both lots and one-fourth (1/4) of Lot
6080 should go to the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria
Yabo by virtue of the provisions of Article 1001 of the New Civil
Code, the latter have lost their rights thereto by laches for their
inaction for a very long period and their rights have become stale.
On the other hand, Pastor Makibalo who had been in possession of
the whole of the eight shares in both Lots 6080 and 6180, enjoying
the fruits thereof exclusively, uninterruptedly, publicly, peacefully,
and continuously from the death of Maria Yabo up to the filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 on October 8, 1976, or a period of
14 years, had acquired title to the whole of the eight shares in Lot
 6080 and seven shares in Lot 6180 (the share of Procopio in Lot
6180 had been sold back to Alberto Yabo).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
finding Pastor Makibalo, now Eulogio Salvador and Remedios
Salvador the owner of eight (8) shares, equivalent to eight-ninth
(8/9) of Lot No. 6080, and of seven (7) shares, equivalent to seven-
ninth (7/9) of Lot No. 6180, and therefore, ordering the partition of
Lot 6080 so that the one-ninth (1/9) alloted to Gaudencia Yabo will
go to her heirs or their assigns, and the remaining eight-ninth (8/9)
will go to the spouses Eulogio Salvador and Remedios Salvador, as
successor of Pastor Makibalo, and the partition of Lot 6180 so that
the seven-ninth (7/9) portion which formerly belonged to Baseliza,
Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Maria, Francisca, and Pelagia will go to the
spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador, the one-ninth (1/9) which
formerly belonged to Procopio, will go to Alberto Yabo, and the
remaining one-ninth (1/9) which formerly belonged to Gaudencia,
will go to Gaudencia's heirs or their assigns.
Doc. No. 720, recorded on page 28 of Notarial Register No. VII, and
acknowledged before Notary Public Isidro S. Baculio (Exh. E)
[purportedly executed by Maria Yabo and Pastor Makibalo] is hereby
declared null and void, and so the Office of the City Fiscal is directed
to cause an investigation of this matter to find out the person or
persons responsible for the falsification of the said document, and if
the evidence warrants, to file the corresponding criminal action in
court. The Office of the City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City is,
likewise, directed to cause the cancellation of Tax Declarations Nos.
33553, marked as Exh. H-3, 33557, marked as Exh. H-2, both in the
name of Alberto Yabo, for having been issued on the basis of a
falsified document. Let copies of this decision be furnished the
Offices of the City Fiscal and City Assessor, both of Cagayan de Oro
City.
No pronouncement as to damages, attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED. 19
The defendants in Civil Case No. 5000 and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5174
appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals on 19 August 1983. 20
In its decision of 3 February 1993, 21 the Court of Appeals held that (a) Maria Yabo did
not sell her share to Alberto and Elpia Yabo; (b) prescription and laches have not run
against the private respondents with respect to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the
estate of her father and to her conjugal share in the portions acquired from her
brothers and sisters; and (c) Procopio never sold his share in Lot No. 6080 to Pastor
Makibalo. More specifically it stated:
Exh. E is the document found by the lower court to be a falsification.
This finding appellants do not dispute and have not raised an error.
...
While acknowledging. that upon the death of Maria Yabo on March
17, 1962, one-half (1/2) of the share of Maria Yabo in Lots 6080 and
6180 and one-half (1/2) of Maria Yabo's conjugal share in the
portions bought from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and
Francisca should go to the children of the brothers and sisters of
Maria in accordance with Article 1001 of the Civil Code, the lower
court rule that said children have lost their rights by laches "for their
inaction for a very long period and their rights have become stale"
(Decision, p. 16; Record, Vol. 2, p. 158).
Appellants in their second assignment of error aver that this is an
error.
We agree that the lower court erred.
While between March 17, 1962 when Maria Yabo died and October
8, 1976, when Civil Case No. 5174 for partition was filed, was a
period of more than fourteen (14) years, that alone to our mind
would not suffice to establish laches or prescription. Upon the death
of Maria Yabo, appellee Pastor Makibalo and appellants and the
other children of the brothers and sisters of Maria, by operation of
law become co-owners of the one-ninth (1/9) share of Maria as heir
of her father Alipio and the conjugal share of Maria in the portions
acquired from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and
Francisca. Time alone is not a decisive factor. Appellee Pastor
Makibalo, it must be remembered, is the husband of Maria and,
therefore, an uncle in-law of appellants. In our culture, a demand by
an heir or heirs for partition immediately upon the death of a relative
is more often taken not as a legitimate assertion of a right but of
something else, like greed. It must also be noted that the spouses,
the appellee Pastor Makibalo and his deceased wife Maria, were
childless and, therefore, appellants and the other children of the
brothers and sisters of Maria must have felt that at any rate the
property would go to them in the course of time. This probably
explains why appellants started asserting their right over the
property only after appellee Pastor Makibalo sold the same to the
spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. Besides, Lots 6080 and
6180 have a combined area only of 5,083 square meters and before
the development of Northern Mindanao, and even in 1962 when
Maria Yabo died, were not that valuable. This is shown by the fact
that each heir sold his other share only for P110.00.
As we have said not time alone. In the early case of Cortes v. Oliva,
33 Phil. 480, it was held that"(o)rdinarily, possession by one joint
owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will, as
 a rule, be held to be for the benefit of all. Much stronger evidence is
required to show an adverse holding by one of several joint owners
than by a stranger; and in such cases, to sustain a plea of
prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was
originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners,
and that his co-owners were apprised or should have been apprised
of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership before the alleged
prescription began to run (at page 484). This ruling on prescription
should apply with equal force to laches.
The third assignment of error challenges the finding of the lower
court that "there is nothing to show that Pastor Makibalo also sold
back Procopio's share in Lot 6080" (Decision, p. 16; Records, Vol.
2,p. 158).
Exhibits 1 and 2 cover only Procopio's share in Lot 6180. In other
words, Exhibits 1 and. 2 conveyed back to Alberto Yabo only his
father, Procopio's share in Lot 6180.
There is indeed no evidence that Pastor Makibalo also sold back to
Alberto, his father Procopio's share in Lot 6080.
But from the evidence it appears that Procopio Yabo never sold his
share in Lot 6080 to Pastor Makibalo. So there was no need to
convey back Procopio's share in Lot 6080.
This fact is evident from the Affidavit of Confirmation of Sale (Exh.
M) dated April 22, 1970, executed by Alberto Yabo, which is the very
document relied upon by the lower court (Decision, p. 11; Record,
Vol. 2, p. 153) in finding that "Alberto Yabo admitted that the share
of his father Procopio Yabo was previously bought by Pastor
Makibalo." A look at Exh. M, particularly par. 3 thereof, reveals that
AlbertoYabo merely acknowledged or confirmed the sale of his
father's share to Pastor Makibalo in Lot 6180. In effect, it at the
same time proves that Lot 6080 was never sold by Procopio to
appellee Pastor Makibalo; otherwise, it would have been included in
the said Affidavit of Confirmation of Sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale
(Exh. 2) subsequently executed by Pastor Makibalo in favor of
Alberto Yabo on April 23, 1970, further proves this point, since the
latter merely bought back what was previously sold, his father's
share in Lot 6180.22
The respondent court then concluded and held as follows:
In summary, appellee Pastor Makibalo and his assigns, the spouses
Eulogio and Remedios Salvador, are entitled only to one-half (½) of
the one-ninth (1/9) share of Maria and three-fourths (3/4) of the six-
ninth (6/9) shares acquired from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope,
Pelagia and Francisca. Accordingly, the partition should be done as
follows:
(1) 1/9 of Lots 6080 end 6180 should be given to
the heirs of Gaudencia Yabo or their successors
and assigns;
(2) 1/9 of Lot 6180 should go to Alberto Yabo and
his wife Elpia Yabo;
(3) 1/9 of Lot 6080 should be given to the heirs of
Procopio Yabo and their successors end assigns,
including Alberto Yabo;
(4) The 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in Lots 6080 and
6180 should be partitioned: One-half (1/2) for the
surviving spouse Pastor Makibalo (now the
spouses Eulogio Salvador and Remedios
Salvador) and the other half for the children of the
brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo in equal
shares.
(5) The remaining 6/9, one-half (1/2) of which is
conjugal between Maria Yabo and appellee Pastor
Makibalo should be partitioned three-fourths (3/4)
for Pastor Makibalo (now the spouses Eulogio
Salvador and Remedios Salvador) and one-fourth
(1/4) for the children of the brothers and sisters of
Maria Yabo in equal shares.
(6) Jose Yabo if he is still alive should participate
in the partition as heir of Maria otherwise he shall
be represented by his children.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, subject to the modification in
the partition, as indicated above, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs. The lower court is
directed if necessary to fully effect the partition, to conduct further
hearings and determine whether Jose Yabo is still alive and who are
the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo.23
Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the said-decision, Remedios Salvador, together
with her daughter, Ma. Gracia Salvador, as one of the successors-in-interest of
Eulogio M. Salvador who died during the pendency of the appeal, 24 elevated the case
to this Court contending that the respondent court erred in ruling that: (1) the shares of
Pelagia Yabo should be included in the partition; (2) prescription and laches have not
run against the private respondents in relation to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the
estate of her father and to her ½ conjugal share in those acquired by purchase; (3)
Procopio Yabo never sold to Pastor Makibalo his share in Lot No. 6080; and(4) Jose
Yabo should be allowed to participate as heir of Maria even as he had openly rejected
this option by refusing to participate in both civil cases. 25
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains .exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Since the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza,
Procopio, and Francisca in Lot No. 6180 and Lot No. 6080 had been purchased by
Pastor during his marriage with Maria, and there is no proof that these were acquired
with his exclusive money, the same are deemed conjugal properties. Not forming part
of the conjugal partnership are: (1) the 1/9 share inherited by Maria which remained as
her exclusive property pursuant to Article 146 (2) of the Civil Code; (2) the 1/9 share of
Gaudencia which was not sold to Pastor; and (3) the 1/9 share of Pelagia which was
acquired by Pastor in 1967 or five years after the death of his wife and which was
therefore his exclusive property.
There is, thus; merit in the petitioners' first assigned error. The Court of .Appeals
should have excluded from the conjugal partnership the share of Pelagia which Pastor
had acquired after his wife's death.
Upon Maria's death in 1962, the conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved. 26 Half of
the conjugal properties, together with Maria's l/9 hereditary share in the disputed lots,
constituted Maria's estate and should thus go to her surviving heirs. 27 Under Article
1001 of the Civil Code, her heirs are her spouse, Pastor Makibalo, who shall be
entitled to-one-half (1/2) of her estate, her brother, Jose, and the children of her other
brothers and sisters, who shall inherit the other half. There having been no actual
partition of the estate yet, the said heirs became co-owners thereof by operation of
law. 28
We now determine whether prescription and laches can be applied against the co-
heirs of Pastor Makibalo.
It has been said that Article 494 of the Civil Code which provides that each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the common property implies that an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. 29 The
imprescriptibility of the action cannot, however, be invoked when one of the co-owners
has possessed the property as exclusive owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it
by prescription. 30
What needs to be addressed first is whether or not Pastor Makibalo has acquired by
prescription the shares of his other co-heirs or co-owners. Prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership requires a continuous, open, peaceful, public, and adverse
possession for a period of time fixed by law.
This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall
not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of
them. 31 Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered
adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner,
his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and
fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve
as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence
that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. 32
Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que
trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon
must be clear and convincing. 33
In Pangan vs. Court of Appeals, 34 this Court had occasion to lay down specific acts
which are considered as acts of repudiation:
Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet
title to property, or for recovery of ownership thereof, held in
possession by the former, may constitute an act of repudiation of the
trust reposed on him by the latter.
The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and
clear repudiation of any trust, and the lapse of more than 20 years,
open and adverse possession as owner would certainly suffice to
vest title by prescription.
An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes within 10 years. And it is from the date
of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse
title for purposes of the statute of limitation is counted.
The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time
petitioners repudiated the trust relation in 1955 upon the filing of the
complaint for recovery of possession against private respondents so
that the counterclaim of the private respondents contained in their
amended answer wherein they asserted absolute ownership of the
disputed realty by reason of the continuous and adverse possession
of the same is well within the l0-year prescriptive period.
There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent
administrator of property causes the cancellation of the title thereto
in the name of the apparent beneficiaries and gets a new certificate
of title in his own name.
It is only when the defendants, alleged co-owners of the property in
question, executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof
obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor
and the issuance of a new one wherein they appear as the new
owners of a definite area each, thereby in effect denying or
repudiating the ownership of one of the plaintiffs over his alleged
share in the entire lot, that the statute of limitations started to run for
 the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a A I bought already.
declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights
thereunder. Q So, will you please tell the Honorable Court,
why Alberto Yabo is staying on that land when you
The records do not show that Pastor Makibalo adjudicated to himself the whole estate said you have bought that land already.
of his wife by means of an affidavit filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds as
allowed under Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, or that he caused the issuance A So, I sold back a portion to them because they
of a certificate of title in his name or the cancellation of the tax declaration in Alipio's requested me.
name and the issuance of a new one in his own name. The only act which may be
deemed as a repudiation by Pastor of the co-ownership over the lots is his filing on 28
April 1976 of an action to quiet title (Civil Case No. 5000). The period of prescription COURT: (To the witness.)
started to run only from this repudiation. However, this was tolled when his co-heirs,
the private respondents herein, instituted on 8 October 1976 an action for partition Q When was that when you said that Alberto Yabo
(Civil Case No. 5174) of the lots. Hence, the adverse possession by Pastor being for requested a portion?
only about six months would not vest in him exclusive ownership of his wife's estate,
and absent acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the action A In 1967.
for partition will not lie in favor of Pastor. 35

COURT:
The issue presented by the petitioners in their third assigned error involves a question
of fact. This Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to errors
of law. Thus; the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are as a rule deemed Q Did you give that portion which they requested?
conclusive. However, when the findings of facts of the appellate court vary with those
of the trial court, this Court has to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct A Their share being inherited from their father
findings. 36 Procopio was the portion they requested.

In the instant case, a conflict in the findings of facts of the lower courts exists. The trial COURT
court found that Pastor was the owner of Procopio's share in Lot No. 6080, as there
was nothing to show that he sold it back to Alberto Yabo. The respondent court on the
Q Yes. Did you grant that?
other hand, held that Procopio Yabo never sold his share in Lot No. 6080 to pastor,
thus, there was no need to convey it back to Procopio's son, Alberto.
A Yes.
At this juncture, it is worthy to quote pertinent portions of the testimony of Pastor
Makibalo: Q That is the area you sold to Alberto Yabo,
pursuant to his request?
COURT: (To the witness.)
A Because that was the land they inherited from
their father that was what they requested.
Q Where is AlbertoYabo living?

Q All right. So that, the area now being occupied

A It is there in their house at Bulua.
by Alberto Yabo?

ATTY. JARAULA: (Continuing.)

A Yes. That land in the Centro.

Q In whose land?
Q This is now identified as Lot No. 6180?

A Alipio Yabo's land.

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What relation has that land to the two (2)

ATTY. JARAULA: (Continuing.)
parcels of land under litigation?
 Q Where did you sign a document ceding that
portion requested by Alberto Yabo?
A We did not make any receipt in favor of
AlbertoYabo because they got only the receipt of
that of his father.
COURT: (To the witness.)
Q You mean to say, that the receipt which
Procopio signed when he sold his share for [sic]
the document which Alberto got?
A Yes.
COURT:
All right.
ATTY. JARAULA (Continuing.)
Q Now, for how much did you buy. the shares of
each of the brothers and sisters of your wife?
A One Hundred Ten (P110.00) Pesos.
Q When you sold back to Alberto Yabo, the
portion corresponding to the share of his father
Procopio in the Poblacion, how much did he pay
you?
A The same.
Q By the same, you are referring by the same
amount of One Hundred Ten (P110.00) Pesos?
A Yes, Sir. The same amount. 37
The petitioners contend that the sales or conveyances made by Alipio's heirs were for
their consolidated shares in the two lots. If this was so, and the receipt which Procopio
signed when he sold his consolidated share to Pastor was turned over to Alberto, the
inevitable conclusion is that Alberto redeemed his father's share in both lots, not only
in Lot: No. 6180. This conclusion is further buttressed by the above-quoted testimony
of Pastor that he bought the shares (consolidated) of each of Alipio's heirs for P110.00
and that when he sold back to Alberto the former share of Procopio, Alberto paid him
the same amount of P110.00.
However, since the share of Procopio in the two litigated parcels of land was
purchased by Pastor during his marriage with Maria, the same became conjugal
property, and half of it formed part of Maria's estate upon her death in 1962.
Accordingly, Pastor's resale in favor of Alberto could only be valid with respect to
Pastor's one-half (1/2) conjugal share and one-fourth (1/4) hereditary share as heir of
Maria. 38 The remaining one-fourth (1/4) should go to Pastor's co-heirs, the private
respondents herein.
Now on the fourth assigned error.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the land
sought to be partitioned must be joined as defendants in the complaints. All co-owners
and persons having an interest in the property are considered indispensable parties
and an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of said persons. 39 It has been
held that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. 40
It must be recalled that in Civil Case No. 5174 the private respondents sought the
partition of the two lots based on the co-ownership which arose from the right of
succession to Alipio's estate. Since Jose Yabo confirmed, through his thumbmark in
the verification of the complaint, that he had already parted with his share in Alipio's
estate, he in effect admitted that he had ceased to be a co-owner of the two lots which
comprised his father's estate. Thus, his non-joinder as a party-plaintiff in the complaint
would appear to be proper. He does not, as well, appear to be an indispensable party
in Civil Case No. 5000.
As it turned out, however, the evidence and the issues which cropped up rendered
imperative the determination of the conjugal assets of Pastor Makibalo and Maria
Yabo and the partition of the latter's estate among her heirs. Her estate consists of
one-half(½) of the conjugal properties, which should then be divided pursuant to Article
1001 of the Civil Code since the marriage produced no child; thus: one-half (½) to
Pastor, and the other half to her brother Jose, and to her nephews and nieces.
Insofar as the partition of Maria Yabo's estate is concerned, Jose is an indispensable
party. Strictly, the rule on indispensable parties may bar a partition of Maria's estate.
Considering, however, that such estate or its partition are but incidents in Civil Case
No. 5000 and Civil Case No. 5174, and the parties have not offered any objection to
the propriety of the determination and partition of her estate, then in the light of Section
11 of Rule 3 41 and Sections 1 and 5, Rule 10 42 of the Rules of Court, and following
the rulings of this Court in the 1910 case of Alonso vs. Villamor43 and the 1947 case
of Cuyugan vs. Dizon, 44 an amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 to
implead Jose Yabo as party plaintiff would be in order.
In Alonso, it was held that under Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure — whose
first paragraph is substantially the same as the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 10 — and
Section 503 thereof, this Court "has full power, apart from that power and authority
which is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and decision in this
case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the real party in interest." Our ruling
in Cuyugan states:
 We, however, do not believe that the case should be dismissed for
plaintiff's failure to join her husband. (Sec. 11, Rule 2, Rules of
Court). Nor should the case be remanded to the court below and a
new trial ordered on this account. The complaint may and should be
amended here, to cure the defect of party plaintiffs, after final
decision is rendered. Section 11, Rule 2, and Section 2, Rule 17,
explicitly authorize such procedure. As this Court had occasion to
say in Quison vs. Salud, (12 Phil., 109, 116), "a second action would
be but a repetition of the first and would involve both parties,
plaintiffs and defendant, in much additional expense and would
cause much delay, in that way defeating the purpose of the section,
which is expressly stated to be "that the actual merits of the
controversy may speedily be determined without regard to
technicalities and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner."
(See also Diaz vs. De la Rama, 73 Phil., 104)
(b) 1/4 for the other private respondents, including
Jose Yabo or his heirs;
(5) 5/9 shares which became the conjugal properties of Pastor
Makibalo and Maria Yabo to be divided thus:
(a) 3/4 for the petitioners (as successors-in-
interest of Pastor Makibalo), and
(b) ¼ for the private respondents, including Jose
Yabo or his heirs.
In sum, Lots Nos. 6180 anid 6080 should be partitioned as follows:

1/9 or 4/36 — to Guadencia Yabo's heirs or successors-in-interest;

To avoid further delay in the disposition of this case, we declare Civil Case No. 5174
as thus duly amended. Consequently, Jose Yabo may participate in the partition of the
estate of Maria Yabo. The fourth assigned error must then be rejected. 3/4 of 1/9 or 3/36 — to the spouses Alberto and Elpina Yabo;

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the appealed judgment should be modified as 8/36 — to the private respondents, including Jose Yabu or his heirs;
follows: (a) the former 1/9 share of Pelagia Yabo in Lots No. 6180 and 6080 which she
sold to Pastor should be treated as the latter's exclusive property which should now 21/36 — to the petitioners as successors-in-interest of Pastor
pertain to the petitioners, his successors-in-interest; and (b) the former 1/9 share of Makibalo.
Procopio Yabo in both lots should be divided as follows: 3/4 (respondent Pastor's 1/2
conjugal share and 1/4 representing his share therein as Maria's heir) for the spouses
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 8 February 1993 in
Alberto and Elpia Yabo, and 1/4 (representing the share therein of Maria's collateral
CA-G.R. CV No. 12839 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above.
relatives as Maria's heirs) for the private respondents, including Alberto and Jose
Upon the finality of this decision, let this case be forthwith remanded to the court a
Yabo. The partition of the two lots in controversy should therefore be made in this
quo for further proceedings on the partition of Lots Nos. 6180 and 6080 in conformity
wise:
with this decision.

(1) 1/9 share of Gaudencia Yabo should be allotted to her heirs or

No pronouncement as to costs.
successors-in-interest;

SO ORDERED.
(2) 1/9 share formerly belonging to Pelagia Yabo — to the
petitioners as successors-in-interest of Pastor Makibalo;
Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
(3) 1/9 hereditary share of Maria Yabo to be divided as follows:

(a) 1/2 for the petitioners (as successors-in-

interest of Pastor Makibalo), and

(b) 1/2 for the private respondents, including Jose

Yabo or his heirs;

(4) 1/9 share formerly belonging to Procopio Yabo to be divided

thus:

(a) 3/4 for Spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo, and

CELERINO E. MERCADO, G.R. No. 184109
Petitioner, children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided Lot No. 552 equally
Present: among themselves. Later, Dionisia died without issue ahead of her four siblings, and

Macario took possession of Dionisias share. In an affidavit of transfer of real

- versus - property[4] dated November 1, 1948, Macario claimed that Dionisia had donated her
CORONA, C.J.,
share to him in May 1945.

Chairperson,
Thereafter, on August 9, 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty Gullaba and Saida
BELEN* ESPINOCILLA** AND
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
FERDINAND ESPINOCILLA, Gabelo sold[5] 225 sq. m. to his son Roger Espinocilla, husband of respondent Belen
Respondents.
BERSAMIN, Espinocilla and father of respondent Ferdinand Espinocilla. On March 8, 1985, Roger
Espinocilla sold[6] 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. Per actual survey of Lot No. 552,
DEL CASTILLO, and
respondent Belen Espinocilla occupies 109 sq. m., Caridad Atienza occupies 120 sq.
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. m., Caroline Yu occupies 209 sq. m., and petitioner, Salvacion's son, occupies 132 sq.

Promulgated: m.[7]

February 1, 2012 The case for petitioner

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions: an area of 28.5 [8] sq. m.
DECISION
which he bought from Aspren and another 28.5 sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
but was occupied by Macarios house.[9] His claim has since been modified to an

alleged encroachment of only 39 sq. m. that he claims must be returned to him. He

The case
avers that he is entitled to own and possess 171 sq. m. of Lot No. 552, having

inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt
Petitioner Celerino E. Mercado appeals the Decision [1] dated April 28, 2008 and
Aspren. According to him, his mothers inheritance is 142.5 sq. m., that is, 114 sq. m.
Resolution[2] dated July 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
from Doroteo plus 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia. Since the area he occupies is only 132
87480. The CA dismissed petitioners complaint[3] for recovery of possession, quieting
sq. m.,[10] he claims that respondents encroach on his share by 39 sq. m.[11]
of title, partial declaration of nullity of deeds and documents, and damages, on the

ground of prescription.
The case for respondents
The antecedent facts
Respondents agree that Doroteos five children each inherited 114 sq. m. of Lot No.
Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, with an area of 570 sq. m., 552. However, Macarios share increased when he received Dionisias share. Macarios
located at Magsaysay Avenue, Zone 5, Bulan, Sorsogon. After he died, his five increased share was then sold to his son Roger, respondents husband and

father. Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of
acquisitive prescription and that there is no basis for petitioners claim of
encroachment.[12]
The trial courts decision
On May 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of petitioner and held
b) To leave as is the Deeds of Absolute Sale of May 11, 1983
and March 8, 1985, it having been determined that they did
not involve the portion belonging to [petitioner] x x x.
c) To effect an effective and real partition among the heirs for
purposes of determining the exact location of the share
(114 sq. m.) of the late Dionisia Espinocilla together with
the 28.5 sq. m. belonging to [petitioners] mother Salvacion,
as well as, the exact location of the 39 sq. m. portion
belonging to the [petitioner] being encroached by the
[respondents], with the assistance of the Commissioner
(Engr. Fundano) appointed by this court.

that he is entitled to 171 sq. m. The RTC found that petitioner inherited 142.5 sq. m. d) To hold in abeyance the transfer of possession of the 39 sq.
from his mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. The RTC m. portion to the [petitioner] pending the completion of the
real partition above-mentioned.[15]
computed that Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel and Macario each inherited 142.5 sq. m. of

Lot No. 552.Each inherited 114 sq. m. from Doroteo and 28.5 sq. m. from
The CA decision
Dionisia. The RTC further ruled that Macario was not entitled to 228 sq. m. Thus,
respondents must return 39 sq. m. to petitioner who occupies only 132 sq. m. [13]
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners complaint on

the ground that extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of
There being no public document to prove Dionisias donation, the RTC also held that
respondents. The CA found that Doroteos four remaining children made an oral
Macarios 1948 affidavit is void and is an invalid repudiation of the shares of his sisters
partition of Lot No. 552 after Dionisias death in 1945 and occupied specific
Salvacion, Aspren, and Isabel in Dionisias share. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire
portions. The oral partition terminated the co-ownership of Lot No. 552 in 1945. Said
said shares by prescription. The RTC further held that the oral partition of Lot No. 552
partition also included Dionisias share because the lot was divided into four parts
by Doroteos heirs did not include Dionisias share and that partition should have been
only. And since petitioners complaint was filed only on July 13, 2000, the CA
the main action. Thus, the RTC ordered partition and deferred the transfer of
concluded that prescription has set in.[16] The CA disposed the appeal as follows:
possession of the 39 sq. m. pending partition. [14] The dispositive portion of the RTC
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed May 15,
decision reads: 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint of the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the court [petitioner] is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.[17]
issues the following ORDER, thus -
The instant petition
a) Partially declaring the nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Property dated August 9, 1977 x x x executed by Macario
Espinocilla, Betty E. Gullaba and Saida E. Gabelo in favor The core issue to be resolved is whether petitioners action to recover the subject
of Roger Espinocilla, insofar as it affects the portion or the
share belonging to Salvacion Espinocilla, mother of portion is barred by prescription.
[petitioner,] relative to the property left by Dionisia
Espinocilla, including [Tax Declaration] No. 13667 and
other documents of the same nature and character which
emanated from the said sale;
Petitioner confirms oral partition of Lot No. 552 by Doroteo's heirs, but claims that his trust is for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse.[21] Prescription may

share increased from 114 sq. m. to 171 sq. m. and that respondents encroached on supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. [22]

his share by 39 sq. m. Since an oral partition is valid, the corresponding survey

ordered by the RTC to identify the 39 sq. m. that must be returned to him could be Then, too, respondents uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of
made.[18] Petitioner also alleges that Macario committed fraud in acquiring his share; Lot No. 552 was established. Macario occupied Dionisias share in 1945 although his

hence, any evidence adduced by him to justify such acquisition is claim that Dionisia donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit. We

inadmissible. Petitioner concludes that if a person obtains legal title to property by also agree with the CA that Macarios possession of Dionisias share was public and

fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called adverse since his other co-owners, his three other sisters, also occupied portions of
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party.[19] Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale made by Macario and his two daughters in favor of

his son Roger confirms the adverse nature of Macarios possession because said sale
The Courts ruling of 225 sq. m.[23] was an act of ownership over Macarios original share and Dionisias

share. In 1985, Roger also exercised an act of ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to

We affirm the CA ruling dismissing petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription. Caridad Atienza. It was only in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer

petitioners complaint, that respondents peaceful possession of the remaining portion

Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable (109 sq. m.) was interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription

property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down has already set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found Macarios 1948 affidavit

by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, void is of no moment. Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned with Macarios title or

peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be good faith. Accordingly, the RTC erred in ruling that Macario cannot acquire by

ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in prescription the shares of Salvacion, Aspren, and Isabel, in Dionisias 114-sq. m. share

good faith and with just title for 10 years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and from Lot No. 552.

other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.[20] Moreover, the CA correctly dismissed petitioners complaint as an action for

reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from

Here, petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents possession with his the time the right of action accrues.[24] This is the other kind of prescription under

assertion that Macarios fraudulent acquisition of Dionisias share created a constructive the Civil Code, called extinctive prescription, where rights and actions are lost by the

trust.In a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to lapse of time.[25]Petitioners action for recovery of possession having been filed 55

speak of and the so-called trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends years after Macario occupied Dionisias share, it is also barred by extinctive

holding the property for the beneficiary (Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel). The relation of prescription. The CA while condemning Macarios fraudulent act of depriving his three
trustee and cestui que trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive sisters of their shares in Dionisias share, equally emphasized the fact that Macarios

sisters wasted their opportunity to question his acts.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit

and AFFIRM the assailed Decision dated April 28, 2008 and Resolution dated July 22,

2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87480.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982 Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs. liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust

Co..............................................................................................
2,350.73
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

TOTAL..............................................................
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose P512,976.97
Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle
Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski. MENOS:

The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator
provided for substitutions. tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with VALOR LIQUIDO...........................................
only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of P507,976.97
First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was
appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
estate as follows:

A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas

INVENTARIO menores de edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818,
Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto,
con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. de la finca Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los
P500,000.00 legatarios nombrados, en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue
creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos
continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador,
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones Da. Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General
Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00 fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de
Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
por accion
................................................................................8,347.00
 b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la
nombrada Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v
fideicomisaria a saber:—
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D.
Juan Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y
encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V.
Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente
ordinadas, las usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los
nudo propietarios, podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero
los bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion alguna de los titulares
fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow
'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall
go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of
the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3)
with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the
widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with
respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda)
survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also
invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within
the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a
usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an
alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building
between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to
give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of
partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have
appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in
full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's
legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over
which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle
because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate.
The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno
dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not
entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions
even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so
that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art.
857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or
common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.)
According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really
only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The
others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to
substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs
should die before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it
refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the
fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to
preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the
second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the
legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a
favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar
reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The
appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow
Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled above,
the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with
Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived
the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But
dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes
refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code,
supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in
their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to
Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has
decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there
can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need
not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present
Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the
substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must
be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a
child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who
are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-
194.)
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that
the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables
aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able
to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange
for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a
usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is
the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby
ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor
of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.

(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the Aquino J., took no part.
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee
admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon
mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)

3. The usufruct of Wanda.

The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of
Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition
of lands by aliens.
G.R. No. L-45142 April 26, 1991
SIMPROSA VDA. DE ESPINA, RECAREDO ESPINA, TIMOTEO ESPINA, CELIA
ESPINA, GAUDIOSA ESPINA and NECIFORA ESPINA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. OTILIO ABAYA and SOFIA ESPINA and JOSE ESPINA, respondents.
Cipriano C. Alvizo, Sr. for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction seeking the nullification of the orders issued by the respondent Judge Otilio
Abaya, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Surigao
del Sur, Branch II, Lianga, Surigao del Sur in Civil Case No. L-108, entitled "Simprosa
Vda. de Espina, et. al. v. Sofia Espina, et. al." dated May 9, 1975 dismissing the
complaint for partition; July 25, 1975 denying the motion for reconsideration; August
13, 1975 denying the second motion for reconsideration and March 15, 1976 denying
plaintiffs' notice of appeal.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Marcos Espina died on February 14, 1953 and was survived by his spouses, Simprosa
Vda. de Espina and their children namely, Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudiosa,
Necifora, Sora and Jose, all surnamed Espina. Decedent's estate comprises of four (4)
parcels of land located at the Municipality of Barobo Province of Surigao del Sur.
On August 23, 1973 an action for partition of the aforementioned parcels of land was
filed by petitioners Simprosa and her children Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudencia
and Necifora.
The complaint alleges that parcel No. 1 is the exclusive property of the deceased,
hence the same is owned in common by petitioners and private respondents in eight
(8) equal parts, while the other three (3) parcels of land being conjugal properties, are
also owned in common, one-half (1/2) belongs to the widow Simprosa and the other
half is owned by her and her children in eight (8) equal parts.
It also alleges that parcel No. 1 has been subdivided into two lots. Lot No. 994 PL8-44
is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5570 in the name of one of the heirs,
Sofia Espina, who acquired the title as a trustee for the beneficiaries or heirs of
Marcos Espina, while lot No. 1329 PCS-44 is covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 3732 issued in the name of one of the heirs, Jose Espina as trustee for the heirs of
Marcos Espina. Said parcel of land is in the possession of petitioners and private
respondents who have their respective houses thereon.
Simprosa presently occupies parcel No. 2 while parcel No. 3 is occupied by Timoteo,
although the same is actually titled in the name of Sofia. Parcel No. 4 is occupied by
Recaredo.
Petitioners have several times demanded the partition of the aforementioned
properties, but notwithstanding such demands private respondents refused to accede.
Private respondents alleged in their answer that in or about April, 1951, the late
Marcos Espina and his widow, Simprosa, together with their children made a
temporary verbal division and assignment of shares among their children. After the
death of Marcos, the temporary division was finalized by the heirs. Thereafter the heirs
took immediate possession of their respective shares on April 20, 1952. Private
respondents took actual physical possession of their respective shares including the
portions ceded to them by Simprosa upon their payment of P50.00 each per quarter
starting April, 1952 until the latter's death pursuant to their contract of procession The
assignment of shares was as follows:
(a) To the surviving spouses, (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina, herein plaintiffs,
one-half (1/2) of the parcel of land adjudicated to each of said plaintiffs-heirs
and defendants;
(b) To each of the following compulsory heirs, to wit:
1. To Recaredo (sic) Espina, one-half (1/2) portion which contains an area of
one and three-fourths (1 3/4) hectares and which forms part of Parcel 4
whose description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel
IV has been in the possession of both Recaredo Espina and plaintiff
Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April 20, 1952 until the present time;
2. To Timoteo Espina, one half (1/2) portion which contains an area of not
less than one-half (1/2) hectare and which forms part of Parcel 3 whose
description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel III was
originally assigned by Marcos Espina who thereupon obtained an Original
Certificate of Title in her (sic) name but was finally adjudicated to said
Timoteo Espina in April, 1952, the other half (1/2) portion of which parcel III
was the share of the surviving spouses (sic), Simprosa Vda. de Espina, and
said Parcel III has been in the possession of said Timoteo Espina and
Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time as their
share;
3. To Cecilia (sic) Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and Necifora Espina, one-half
(1/2) portion, share and share alike which contains two (2) hectares and
which forms part of Parcel II whose description is given in paragraph III of the
complaint, the other half (1/2) of said Parcel III (sic) is the share of the
surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina, and said Parcel III (sic) has
been in the possession of said Cecilia. (sic) Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and
Necifora Espina and Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the
present time;
 4. To Sofia Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land included in the
deception of Parcel 1 in paragraph III of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of
said parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de
Espina and having been ceded by said Simprosa Vda. de Espina to said
Sofia Espina for a valuable consideration payable quarterly at the rate of
P50.00 beginning April, 1952 until her death, and said Sofia Espina has been
regularly paying to said Simprosa Vda. de Espina quarterly from April, 1952
the said amount of P50.00 until the present time, and by virtue of said
agreement, Sofia Espina obtained Original Certificate of Title in her name of
said parcel of land which is included in the description of said parcel 1, as her
exclusive property;
5. To Jose Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the other parcel of land included
in the description of Parcel 1 in paragraph 1 of the complaint, the other half
(1/2) of said parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa
Vda. de Espina and having been coded (sic) by said Simprosa Vda. de
Espina to said Jose Espina for a valuable consideration payable quarterly at
the rate of P50.00 beginning April, 1952 until her death, and said Jose Espina
has been regularly quarterly paying to said Simprosa Vda. de Espina from
April, 1952 until the present time, the said amount of P50.00, and by virtue of
said agreement, Jose Espina obtained Original Certificate of Title in his name
of said parcel of land which is included in the description of said Parcel 1 as
his exclusive property. (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
On February 13, 1974 private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
alleging the following grounds, to wit:
I
THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT FAIL TO CONFER
UPON THE COURT COMPLETE AND LAWFUL JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITION SINE QUA NON
CONCERNING SUIT BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY.
xxx xxx xxx
II
THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY . . . . STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
xxx xxx xxx
III
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE, (Motion to
Dismiss Complaint, pp. 1-5; Rollo, pp. 34-38)
xxx xxx xxx
On May 9, 1975 the trial court granted the motion and thereafter dismissed the
complaint. On May 23, 1975 petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the
following grounds, to wit:
1. THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL HAS NO LEGAL BASIS IN FACT
AND IN LAW.
2. THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE
CASE AT BAR. (Rollo, p. 50)
However, petitioners' motion was denied in an order dated July 23, 1975. On August
11, 1975 petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration stressing that they were
denied due process when their motion was not heard. Again said motion was denied
on August 13, 1975.
Thereafter, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on September 11, 1975 and a motion
for extension of time to file their Record on Appeal on September 18, 1975.
On March 15, 1976, the respondent judge disapproved petitioners' Record on Appeal
and appeal bond on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed out of time. Hence,
this petition. The petitioners raised four (,41) assignment of errors:
1. Whether or not an action for partition among co-heirs prescribes.
2. Whether or not an oral partition among co-heirs is valid.
3. Whether or not a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is indispensable
the lack of which is a deal of due process.
4. Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration is pro forma Rollo, p.
10)
Petitioners maintain that the present action is not for reconveyance but one for
partition. Hence, the rule insisted by the private respondents on prescriptibility of an
action for reconcile conveyance of real property based on an implied trust is not
applicable in the case at bar. In addition, petitioners, argue that private respondents
cannot set up the defense of prescription or laches because their possession of the
property no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership. (Memorandum for
Petitioners, p. 7)
However, the private respondents stress that 'any supposed right of the petitioners to
demand a new division or partition of said estate of Marcos Espina has long been
barred by the Statute of Limitations and has long prescribed." (Memorandum for
Private Respondents, p. 5)
The petitioners claim that the alleged oral partition is invalid and strictly under the
coverage of the statute of Frauds on two grounds, to wit:
Firstly, parcel No. 1 being an exclusive property of the deceased should have been
divided into eight (8) equal parts. Therefore, Simprosa . could only cede her share of
the land which is 1/8 portion thereof and cannot validly cede the shares of her then
minor children without being duly appointed as guardian.
Secondly, under Article 1358 of the New Civil Code, Simprosa could not have ceded
her right and that of her other children except by a public document. (Memorandum of
Petitioners, pp. 8-9)
On the other hand, private respondents insist that the oral partition is valid and binding
and does not fall under the coverage of the Statute of Frauds.
Petitioners claim that they were denied due process when the motion for
reconsideration was denied without any hearing.
However, private respondents maintain that the hearing of a motion for reconsideration
in oral argument is a matter which rest upon the sound discretion of the Court.
Finally, petitioners stress that the second motion for reconsideration is not pro forma,
thus, it suspends the running of the period of appeal. Hence, the notice of appeal was
timely filed.
On this point, private respondent maintain that the order of respondent judge dated
March 1 5, 1976 disapproving petitioners' Record on Appeal and appeal bond may not
properly be a subject of a petition for certiorari. (Memorandum of Private Respondents,
p. 13)
We find the petition devoid of merit.
We already ruled in Lebrilla, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72623,
December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 188; 192) that an action for partition is imprescriptible.
However, an action for partition among co-heirs ceases to be such, and becomes one
for title where the defendants allege exclusive ownership.
In the case at bar, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition cannot be invoked
because two of the co-heirs, namely private respondents Sora and Jose Espina
possessed the property as exclusive owners and their possession for a period of
twenty one (21) years is sufficient to acquire it by prescription. Hence, from the
moment these co-heirs claim that they are the absolute and exclusive owners of the
properties and deny the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer
one of partition but of ownership.
Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition.1âwphi1 "An
agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the
partition of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties.
The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a
conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the
property which belong to the co-owners." (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence
on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Edition, 182-183 citing Hernandez v.
Andal, et. al., G.R. No. L275, March 29, 1957)
Time and again, the Court stresses that the hearing of a motion for reconsideration in
oral argument is a matter which rests upon the sound discretion of the Court. Its
refusal does not constitute a denial of due process in the absence of a showing of
abuse of discretion. (see Philippine Manufacturing Co. v. Ang Bisig ng PMC et. al., 118
Phil. 431, 434)
The absence of a formal hearing on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration is
thoroughly explained in the order of the respondent judge dated August 13, 1975,
which is hereunder quoted as follows:
When the court issued its order of June 5, 1975 requiring counsel for
defendants to answer plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the court opted to
resolve plaintiffs' motion based on the pleadings of the parties, without further
oral arguments. The court considered the arguments of the parties stated in
their pleadings as already sufficient to apprise the court of the issues involved
in said motion.
Plaintiffs' allegation that the Clerk of Court failed to calendar their motion for
reconsideration for oral argument has not deprived the plaintiffs of any
substantial right or his right to due process.
SO ORDERED. (Memorandum of Private Respondents, pp. 1213)
A cursory reading of the aforequoted order will show that there was indeed no formal
hearing on the motion for reconsideration. There is no question however, that the
motion is grounded on the lack of basis in fact and in law of the order of dismissal and
the existence or lack of it is determined by a reference to the facts alleged in the
challenged pleading. The issue raised in the motion was fully discussed therein and in
the opposition thereto. Under such circumstances, oral argument on the motion is
reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked (see Ethel Case, et
al. v. Jugo, 77 Phil. 517, 522).
We adhere to the findings of the trial court that the second motion for reconsideration
dated August 11, 1975 is pro forma, to it
The grounds stated in said motion being in reiteration of the same grounds
alleged in his first motion, the same is pro-forma. (Order dated March 15,
1976, p. 2, Rollo, p. 74)
xxx xxx xxx
 Furthermore, the second motion for reconsideration has not stated new
grounds considering that the alleged failure of the Clerk of Court to set
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, although seemingly a different ground
than those alleged in their first motion for reconsideration, is only incidental to
the issues raised in their first motion for reconsideration, as it only refers to
the right of plaintiffs' counsel to argue his motion in court just to amplify the
same grounds already deed by the court. (Ibid, p. 3, Rollo, p. 75)

Therefore, it is very evident that the second motion for reconsideration being pro-
forma did not suspend the running of the period of appeal. Thus, the lower court
committed no error when it held that the notice of appeal was filed after the lapse of
thirty five (35) days, which is clearly beyond the period of thirty (30) days allowed by
the rules.

Finally, it has been a basic rule that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal which had
been lost. (see Edra v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75041, November 13,
1989, 179 SCRA 344) A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not
be a substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari(appeal)
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Escudero v. Dulay, G.R. No. 60578, February
23, 1988, 158 SCRA 69, 77)

The application of the abovecited rule should be relaxed where it is shown that it will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. (Ibid, p. 77) However, as
emphasized earlier, the case at bar is totally devoid of merit, thus, the strict application
of the said file will not in any way override sub-substantial justice.

Therefore, the delay of five (5) days in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for
extension to file a record on appeal cannot be excused on the basis of equity.

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the acts of respondent judge, in
dismissing the action for partition and in subsequently denying the motions for
reconsideration of the petitioners, does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 180269 February 20, 2013
JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR., substituted by his heirs, namely: FELICIDAD CUD
lAMA T VDA. DE CASILANG, JOSE C. CASILANG, JR., RICARDO C. CASILANG,
MARIA LOURDES C. CASILANG, CHRISTOPHER C. CASILANG, BEN C.
CASILANG, DANTE C. CASILANG, GREGORIO C. CASILANG, HERALD C.
CASILANG; and FELICIDAD Z. CASILANG, MARCELINA Z. CASILANG, JACINTA
Z. CASILANG, BONIFACIO Z. CASILANG, LEONORA Z. CASILANG, and FLORA
Z. CASILANG, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO Z. CASILANG-DIZON, MARIO A. CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG,
RODOLFO A. CASILANG, and ATTY. ALICIA B. FABIA, in her capacity as Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pangasinan and/or her duly authorized
representative, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619, which reversed and set aside the
Decision2 dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D.
Antecedent Facts
The late spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio) and Francisca Zacarias (Francisca) had
eight (8) children, namely: Felicidad Casilang (Felicidad), Ireneo Casilang (Ireneo),
Marcelina Casilang (Marcelina), Jacinta Casilang (Jacinta), Bonifacio Casilang
(Bonifacio), Leonora Casilang (Leonora), Jose Casilang (Jose) and Flora Casilang
(Flora). Liborio died intestate on October 11, 1982 at the age of 83, followed not long
after by his wife Francisca on December 25, 1982. Their son Bonifacio also died in
1986, survived by his child Bernabe Casilang (Bernabe), while son Ireneo died on
June 11, 1992, survived by his four (4) children, namely: Mario Casilang (Mario),
Angelo Casilang (Angelo), Rosario Casilang-Dizon (Rosario) and Rodolfo Casilang
(Rodolfo), herein respondents.
The estate of Liborio, which left no debts, consisted of three (3) parcels of land located
in Barangay Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan, namely: (1) Lot No. 4676, with an area
of 4,164 square meters; (2) Lot No. 4704, containing 1,164 sq m; and (3) Lot No.
4618, with 897 sq m.
On May 26, 1997, respondent Rosario filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Calasiao, Pangasinan a complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No.
847, to evict her uncle, petitioner Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that Lot No.
4618 was owned by her father Ireneo, as evidenced by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 555
issued in 1994 under her father’s name. On April 3, 1997, the respondents executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim3 whereby they adjudicated Lot No.
4618 to themselves. In the same instrument, respondents Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo
renounced their respective shares in Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario.
In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the "lawful, absolute, exclusive
owner and in actual possession" of the said lot, and that he acquired the same
"through intestate succession from his late father."4 For some reason, however, he and
his lawyer, who was from the Public Attorney’s Office, failed to appear at the
scheduled pre-trial conference, and Jose was declared in default; thus, the adverse
judgment against him.5
On February 18, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment finding Rosario to be the owner of
Lot No. 4618, and ordering Jose to remove his house, vacate Lot No. 4618, and pay
Rosario ₱500.00 in monthly rentals from the filing of the complaint until she was
placed in possession, plus attorney’s fees of ₱5,000.00, litigation expenses and costs.
On March 23, 1998, the MTC issued a writ of execution; and on August 28, 1998, a
Writ of Demolition6 was issued.
On June 2, 1998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 children of Liborio and
Francisca,7 filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Complaint, 8 docketed as Civil Case
No. 98-02371-D for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession
with Damages" against the respondents. On June 10, 1998, the petitioners moved for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, which
the RTC however denied on June 23, 1998.
Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition executed by Ireneo’s children over Lot No. 4618, as well as TD No. 555, and
by necessary implication its derivatives, TD No. 15177 (for the lot) and TD No. 15176
(for the house), both of which were issued in 1998 in the name of Rosario Casilang-
Dizon.9
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that all eight (8) children of Liborio entered
into a verbal partition of his estate, pursuant to which Jose was allotted Lot No. 4618
as his share; that Ireneo never claimed ownership of Lot No. 4618, nor took
possession of it, because his share was the southwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No. 4676,
containing an area of 1,308 sq m,10 of which he took exclusive possession during his
lifetime; that Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood, where he built
his family’s semi-concrete house just a few steps away from his parents’ old bamboo
hut; that he took in and cared for his aged parents in his house until their deaths in
1982; that one of his children has also built a house on the lot. 11 Jose, said to be the
most educated of the Casilang siblings, worked as an insurance agent.12 The complete
disposition of the intestate estate of Liborio per the parties’ verbal partition appears as
follows:
1. Lot No. 4676, with 4,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 534 in Liborio’s
name,13 was verbally partitioned among Marcelina (236 sq m), Leonora
(1,965 sq m), Flora (655 sq m), and Ireneo, represented by his children, the
herein respondents-defendants (1,308 sq m), as shown in a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated January 8, 1998, subsequently
executed by all the Casilang siblings and their representatives.
 2. Lot No. 4704, with 1,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 276 in Liborio’s
name,14 was divided among Jacinta and Bonifacio, who died in 1986 and is
now represented by his son Bernabe; and
3. Lot No. 4618, containing 897 sq m, declared since 1994 under TD No. 555
in Ireneo’s name,15 is now the subject of the controversy below. Jose insists
that he succeeded to it per verbal partition, and that he and his family have
always occupied the same peacefully, adversely and exclusively even while
their parents were alive.16
For her part, Rosario alleged in her answer with counterclaim, 17 which she filed on
September 15, 1998, that:
a) She is the actual and lawful owner of Lot No. 4618 with an area of 897
square meters, having acquired the same by way of a Deed of Extra judicial
Partition with Quitclaim dated 3 April 1997 which was duly executed among
herein Appellant ROSARIO and her brothers, namely, MARIO, ANGELO and
RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG;
b) Her ownership over subject property could be traced back to her late father
IR[E]NEO which the latter inherited by way of intestate succession from his
deceased father LIBORIO sometime in 1992; that the residential house
described in herein Appellee JOSE’s complaint is an illegal structure built by
him in 1997 without her (ROSARIO’s) knowledge and consent; that in fact, an
ejectment suit was filed against Appellee JOSE with the Municipal Trial Court
in Calasiao, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 847;
c) The subject lot is never a portion of Appellee JOSE’s share from the
intestate of his deceased father, LIBORIO; that on the contrary, the lot is his
deceased brother IR[E]NEO’s share from the late LIBORIO’s intestate estate;
that in fact, the property has long been declared in the name of the late
IRENEO as shown by Tax Declaration No. 555 long before his children
ROSARIO DIZON, MARIO, ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed
CASILANG, executed the Deed of Partition dated 18 February 1998; that
Appellee JOSE had actually consumed his shares which he inherited from his
late father, and after a series of sales and dispositions of the same made by
him, he now wants to take Appellants’ property;
d) Appellee JOSE is never the rightful owner of the lot in question and has
not shown any convincing proof of his supposed ownership; that the
improvements introduced by him, specifically the structures he cited are the
subject of a Writ of Demolition dated 28 August 1998 pursuant to the Order
dated 17 August 1998 of the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan;
e) No protestation or objection was ever made by Appellee JOSE in Civil
Case No. 847 (Unlawful Detainer case) where he was the defendant; that the
truth was that his possession of the subject property was upon the tolerance
and benevolence of his late brother IRENEO during the latter’s lifetime and
that Appellant ROSARIO;
f) The RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff would just be doing
her job if she and her deputies would implement the writ of
execution/demolition issued by the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan since it is
its ministerial duty to do so;
g) The Appellees have no cause of action; not having shown in their
complaint the basis, the reason and the very core of their claim as to why the
questioned document should be nullified.18 (Citation omitted)
In their reply19 to Rosario’s aforesaid answer, the petitioners asserted that the MTC
committed a grave error in failing to consider a material fact-that Jose had long been in
prior possession under a claim of title which he obtained by partition.
At the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the parties entered into the
following stipulations:
1. That the late LIBORIO is the father of FELICIDAD, MARCELINA,
JUANITA, LEONORA, FLORA and IRENEO, all surnamed CASILANG;
2. That the late LIBORIO died in 1982; That the late LIBORIO and his family
resided on Lot [No.] 4618 up to his death in 1982; That the house of the late
LIBORIO is located on Lot [No.] 4618;
3. That Plaintiff JOSE used to reside on the lot in question because there was
a case for ejectment filed against him;
4. That the house which was demolished is the family house of the late
LIBORIO and FRANCISCA ZACARIAS with the qualification that it was given
to the defendants;
5. That the action involves members of the same family; and
6. That no earnest efforts were made prior to the institution of the case in
court.20
Ruling of the RTC
After a full trial on the merits, the RTC in its Decision21 dated April 21, 2003 decreed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated April 3,
1997 null and void;
 2. Declaring plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. as the lawful owner and possessor
of the subject Lot No. 4618 and as such, entitled to the peaceful possession
of the same;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. attorney’s
fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of
₱5,000.00, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC affirmed Jose’s ownership and possession of Lot No. 4618 by virtue of the
oral partition of the estate of Liborio by all the siblings. In the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Quitclaim23 dated January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all the
eight (8) Casilang siblings and their legal representatives―with Ireneo represented by
his four (4) children, and Bonifacio by his son Bernabe―petitioners Jose, Felicidad,
Jacinta and Bernabe, acknowledged that they had “already received their respective
shares of inheritance in advance,"24 and therefore, renounced their claims over Lot
No. 4676 in favor of co-heirs Marcelina, Leonora, Flora and Ireneo, as follows:
We hereby RENOUNCED, WAIVED AND QUITCLAIM, all our rights, interests and
participations over the WHOLE parcel of land [Lot No. 4676], left by the late, LIBORIO
CASILANG, in favor of our coheirs, namely: MARCELINA Z. CASILANG-PARAYNO,
LEONORA Z. CASILANG-SARMIENTO, FLORA Z. CASILANG, MARIO A.
CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG, ROSARIO A. CASILANGDIZON AND
RODOLFO A. CASILANG.25
Thus, Jose expressly renounced his share in Lot No. 4676, which has an area of 4,164
sq m, because he had already received in advance his share in his father’s estate, Lot
No. 4618 with 897 sq m:
To the mind of the court, Jose Casilang could have not [sic] renounced and waived his
rights and interests over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his,
while the other lot, Lot [No.] 470[4], was divided between sister Jacinta Casilang and
brother Bonifacio Casilang[,] Sr., who was represented by his son. In the same [way]
as testified to by plaintiffs Felicidad Casilang and Jacinta Casilang, they signed the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim wherein they waived and renounced their
rights and interests over Lot [No.] 4676 because they have already received their
share, which is Lot [No.] 470[4].26
The RTC found baseless the claim of Rosario that Lot No. 4618 was an inheritance of
her father Ireneo considering that a tax declaration is not conclusive proof of
ownership. The RTC even noted that the tax declaration of Ireneo started only in 1994,
although he had been dead since 1992. "Such being the case, the heirs of Ir[e]neo
Casilang has [sic] no basis in adjudicating unto themselves Lot No. 4618 and
partitioning the same by executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim."27
Appeal to the CA
Undeterred, Rosario appealed to the CA averring that: (1) the lower court erred in
declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 as null
and void; and (2) the lower court erred in declaring Jose as the lawful owner and
possessor of the subject Lot No. 4618.28
In the now assailed decision, the CA reversed the RTC by relying mainly on the factual
findings and conclusions of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847, viz:
Per the records, the above described property was subject of Civil Case No. 847
decided by the MTC of Calasiao, First Judicial Region, Province of Pangasinan which
rendered a judgment, supra, in favor of Appellant ROSARIO ordering herein Appellee
JOSE and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the land of Appellant
ROSARIO. It was found by the MTC that the latter is the owner of the subject parcel of
land located at Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan; that the former owner of the land is
the late IRENEO (who died on 11 June 1992), father of Appellant ROSARIO; that
Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim was executed by and among the heirs of the late
IRENEO; that MAURO [sic], ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG
waived and quitclaimed their respective shares over the subject property in favor of
Appellant ROSARIO; that Appellee JOSE was allowed by the late IRENEO during his
lifetime to occupy a portion of the land without a contract of lease and no rentals being
paid by the former; that Appellant ROSARIO allowed Appellee JOSE to continue
occupying the land after the Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim was executed.29
Moreover, noting that the decision in Civil Case No. 847 in favor of Rosario was issued
on February 18, 1998 while the petitioners’ complaint in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D
was filed on June 2, 1998, the CA concluded that the latter case was a mere
afterthought:
If the latter has really a strong and valid reason to question the validity of the Deed of
Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim, supra, he could have done it soon after the said
Deed was executed on 3 April 1997. However, curiously enough, it was only when the
MTC ordered his eviction from the subject property that he decided to file the instant
case against the Appellants.30
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
Now in this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners maintain that:
IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY [OF] THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION
AND QUITCLAIM DATED APRIL 3, 1997, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GROSSLY VIOLATED THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR. AS
DIRECT COMPULSORY HEIR.31
Our Ruling and Discussions
There is merit in the petition.
Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the
defendant in an ejectment suit, but only to resolve the issue of possession; its
determination is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary action of
ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the
land. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory
action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is
that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits
(accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that
may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of
ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession
and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which also includes
recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover
possession.32
Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Summary Procedure governs the
two forms of ejectment suit, the purpose being to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property. They are not
processes to determine the actual title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are
empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits,
only to resolve the issue of possession and its determination on the ownership issue is
not conclusive.33 As thus provided in Section 16 of Rule 70:
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.―When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
It is apropos, then, to note that in contrast to Civil Case No. 847, which is an ejectment
case, Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and
Peaceful Possession;" it is an accion reinvindicatoria, or action to recover ownership,
which necessarily includes recovery of possession 34 as an incident thereof. Jose
asserts his ownership over Lot No. 4618 under a partition agreement with his co-heirs,
and seeks to invalidate Ireneo’s "claim" over Lot No. 4618 and to declare TD No. 555
void, and consequently, to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim
executed by Ireneo’s heirs.
It is imperative to review the CA’s factual conclusions since they are entirely
contrary to those of the RTC, they have no citation of specific supporting
evidence, and are premised on the supposed absence of evidence, particularly
on the parties’ verbal partition, but are directly contradicted by the evidence on
record.
It must be noted that the factual findings of the MTC, which the CA adopted without
question, were obtained through Summary Procedure and were based solely on the
complaint and affidavits of Rosario, after Jose had been declared in default. But since
a full trial was had in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the CA should have pointed out the
specific errors and weaknesses in the RTC’s factual conclusions before it could rule
that Jose was unable to present "any evidentiary support" to establish his title, and that
his continued possession of Lot No. 4618 was by mere tolerance of Rosario. At most,
however, the CA only opined that it was conjectural for the RTC to conclude, that Jose
had already received his inheritance when he renounced his share in Lot No. 4676. It
then ruled that the RTC erred in not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case
No. 847-that Jose’s possession over subject property was by mere tolerance. Said the
appellate court:
Given the claim of the Appellee that Lot [No.] 4618 was orally given/assigned to him
by his deceased father LIBORIO, or that his claim was corroborated by his sisters (his
co-plaintiffs-Appellees), or that their claim is indubitably tied up with the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim over Lot No. 4676, still We cannot fully agree with
the pronouncement of the court a quo that Appellee JOSE could not have renounced
and waived his rights and interest over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618
is not his. Wanting any evidentiary support, We find this stance as conjectural being
unsubstantiated by law or convincing evidence. At the most and taking the factual or
legal circumstances as shown by the records, We hold that the court a quo erred in not
considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847 ruling that herein Appellee
JOSE’s possession over subject property was by mere tolerance. Based as it is on
mere tolerance, Appellee JOSE’s possession therefore could not, in any way, ripen
into ownership.35 (Citations omitted)
By relying solely on the MTC’s findings, the CA completely ignored the testimonial,
documentary and circumstantial evidence of the petitioners, obtained by the RTC after
a full trial on the merits. More importantly, the CA did not point to any evidence of
Rosario that Ireneo had inherited Lot No. 4618 from Liborio. All it did was adopt the
findings of the MTC.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and unless the case falls under any of the
well-defined exceptions, the Supreme Court will not delve once more into the findings
of facts. In Sps. Sta. Maria v. CA,36 this Court stated:
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.
Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record. 37 (Citation omitted)
In the instant case, the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are starkly contrasting.
Moreover, we find that the CA decision falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) above,
which warrants another review of its factual findings.
The evidence supporting Rosario’s claim of sole ownership of Lot No. 4618 is
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim, which she executed with her brothers
Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo. There is no question that by itself, the said document
would have fully conveyed to Rosario whatever rights her brothers might have in Lot
No. 4618. But what needs to be established first is whether or not Ireneo did in fact
own Lot No. 4618 through succession, as Rosario claims. And here now lies the very
crux of the controversy.
A review of the parties’ evidence shows that they entered into an oral partition,
giving Lot No. 4618 to Jose as his share, whereas Rosario presented no proof
whatsoever that her father inherited Lot No. 4618 from his father Liborio.
Rosario’s only proof of Ireneo’s ownership is TD No. 555, issued in his name, but she
did not bother to explain why it was dated 1994, although Ireneo died on June 11,
1992. Liborio’s ownership of Lot No. 4618 is admitted by all the parties, but it must be
asked whether in his lifetime Liborio did in fact transmit it to Ireneo, and if not, whether
it was conveyed to him by Liborio’s heirs. It is imperative for Rosario to have presented
proof of this transfer to Ireneo, in such a form as would have vested ownership in him.
We find, instead, a preponderance of contrary evidence.
1. In his testimony, Jose claimed that his parents’ bamboo house in Lot No.
4618 disintegrated from wear and tear; so he took them in to his semi-
concrete house in the same lot, which was just a few steps away, and he
cared for them until they died; shortly before Liborio’s death, and in the
presence of all his siblings, his father Liborio assigned Lot No. 4618 to him as
his inheritance; his house was demolished in 1998 as a result of the
ejectment case filed against him; but his family continued to live thereat after
reconstructing the house; Ireneo and his family did not live in Lot No. 4618;
although Jose’s job as an insurance agent took him around Pangasinan, he
always came home to his family in his house in Lot No. 4618, which he used
as his permanent address; only Lot No. 4676 was included in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition dated January 8, 1998 because Lot No. 4618 had
already been distributed to Jose, and Lot No. 4704 had already been
assigned to Jacinta and Bonifacio as their share in their father’s estate. 38
2. Jose’s testimony was corroborated by petitioners
Felicidad,39 Jacinta,40 Leonora,41 and Flora,42 who all confirmed that their
brother Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 from his childhood up to the
present, that he took their aged parents into his house after their bamboo
house was destroyed, and he attended to their needs until they died in 1982.
The sisters were also one in saying that their father Liborio verbally willed Lot
No. 4618 to Jose as his share in his estate, and that their actual partition
affirmed their father’s dispositions. Jacinta claimed that she and Bonifacio
have since taken possession of Lot No. 4704 pursuant to their partition, and
have also declared their respective portions for tax purposes. 43 Flora
corroborated Jacinta on their taking possession of Lot No. 4704, as well as
that Jose built his house on Lot No. 4618 next to his parents and they came
to live with him in their old age. Flora affirmed that Exhibit "F" correctly
reflects their verbal partition of Lot No. 4676, and that she was fully in accord
with it. She added that Felicidad and Marcelina had since constructed their
own houses on the portions of Lot No. 4676 assigned to them. 44Felicidad
mentioned that in their partition, Ireneo was given a portion of Lot No. 4676,
while Lot No. 4704 was divided between Jacinta and Bonifacio, and Jose
alone got Lot No. 4618. Leonora confirmed that they were all present when
their father made his above dispositions of his estate.
3. Benjamin Lorenzo, a long-time neighbor of the Casilangs testified that
Jose’s house stands on Lot No. 4618 and Ireneo did not live with his family
on the said lot but was a tenant in another farm some distance away. 45
4. For her part, Rosario merely asserted that her father Ireneo succeeded to
Lot No. 4618 from Liborio, as shown in TD No. 555 (Exhibit "1"); that she and
her brothers extra-judicially settled Ireneo’s estate, and that they each waived
their shares in her favor; and, that she has been paying taxes on Lot No.
4618. Rosario admitted, however, that Jose has lived in the lot since he was
a child, and he has reconstructed his house thereon after its court-ordered
demolition.46 But Rosario on cross-examination backtracked by claiming that
it was her father Ireneo and grandfather Liborio who built the old house in Lot
No. 4618, where Ireneo resided until his death; he even planted various fruit
trees. Yet, there is no mention whatsoever to this effect by any of the
witnesses. Rosario also contradicted herself when she denied that Jose lived
there because his job as insurance agent took him away often and yet
admitted that Jose’s house stands there, which he reconstructed after it was
ordered demolished by the MTC. Inexplicably, Rosario disclaimed knowledge
of Ireneo’s share in Lot No. 4676, although she was a signatory, along with
her brothers and all the petitioners, in the deed of partition of the said lot,
whereby she got 1,308 sq m. Rosario also admitted that taxes were paid on
the lot only beginning in 1997, not before.47
5. Benjamin Dizon, husband of Rosario, testified that Rosario was losing
appetite and sleep because of the case filed by Jose; that Ireneo died in
another farm; that Ireneo had a house in Lot No. 4618 but Jose took over the
house after he died in 1992.48 Respondent Angelo, brother of Rosario,
claimed that when he was 13 or 14 years old, he heard his grandfather tell his
father Ireneo that he would inherit Lot No. 4618. On cross-examination,
Angelo insisted that his father had always lived with his family in his
grandfather’s house in Lot No. 4618, that Jose did not live there but was
given another lot, although he could not say which lot it was; he admitted that
his grandmother lived with Jose when she died, and Ireneo’s share was in Lot
No. 4676.49
6. On rebuttal, Jose recounted that after his four children were married,
Ireneo lived as a tenant in another farm; that during a period of illness he
lived in Manila for some time, and later resided in Cagayan with his two
married sons; and lastly on his return, worked as a tenant of the Maningding
family for about 10 years in Calasiao, staying in a hut one kilometer away.
Jose also claimed that Ireneo had asked Liborio for a portion of Lot No. 4676,
a lot which is bigger than Lot No. 4618 by several hundreds of square
meters.50
 7. On sur-rebuttal, Rosario claimed that her grandparents, father and mother
lived in Lot No. 4618 when she was a child until she married and left in 1976;
that her uncle Jose asked permission from Liborio to be allowed to stay there
with his family. She admitted that Jose built his house in 1985, three years
after Liborio died, but as if to correct herself, she also claimed that Jose built
his house in Lot No. 4676, and not in Lot No. 4618. (Contrarily, her aunt
Leonora testified that Jose built his house in Lot No. 4618 while their parents
were alive.)51 Moreover, if such was the case, Rosario did not explain why
she filed Civil Case No. 847, if she thought her uncle built his house in Lot
No. 4676, and not in Lot No. 4618.52 Rosario also claimed that Ireneo always
came home in the evenings to his father Liborio’s house from the Maningding
farm, which he tenanted for 10 years, but obviously, by then Liborio’s house
had long been gone. Again, confusedly, Rosario denied that she knew of her
father’s share in Lot No. 4676.
From the testimonies of the parties, we are convinced that the conclusion of the RTC
is well-supported that there was indeed a verbal partition among the heirs of Liborio,
pursuant to which each of his eight children received his or her share of his estate, and
that Jose’s share was Lot No. 4618.
The parties’ verbal partition is valid, and has been ratified by their taking
possession of their respective shares.
The validity of an oral partition is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In Vda. de Espina v.
Abaya,53 this Court declared that an oral partition is valid:
Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition. "An
agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the
partition of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties.
The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a
conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the
property which belong to the co-owners."54
In Maestrado v. CA,55 the Supreme Court upheld the partition after it found that it
conformed to the alleged oral partition of the heirs, and that the oral partition was
confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the heirs
subsequently.56 In Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot,57 the Supreme Court elaborated on the
validity of parol partition:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity
have enforce [sic] oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and
enforceable at law, equity will [in] proper cases, where the parol partition has actually
been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of
ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and
enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been
held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties
went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the
partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree
title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on
the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to
parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken
and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize
the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the
right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising
acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have
stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the
operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in
fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have
regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.58
Jose’s possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is well borne out by the
records. It is also consistent with the claimed verbal partition with his siblings, and fully
corroborated by his sisters Felicidad, Jacinta, Leonora, and Flora, who further testified
that they each had taken possession of their own shares and built their houses
thereon.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the
adverse claimant establishes a better right. 59 Moreover, under Article 541 of the Civil
Code, one who possesses in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal
presumption that he possesses with a just title, and he cannot be obliged to show or
prove it. Similarly, Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that actual possession under
a claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Thus, actual
possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in
accordance with an alleged partition are considered strong proof of an oral
partition60 which the Court will not hesitate to uphold.
Tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
It is settled that tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership,61 but when coupled with
proof of actual possession of the property, they can be the basis of claim of ownership
through prescription.62 In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. 63 We have seen
that there is no proof that Liborio, or the Casilang siblings conveyed Lot No. 4618 to
Ireneo. There is also no proof that Ireneo himself declared Lot No. 4618 for tax
purposes, and even if he or his heirs did, this is not enough basis to claim ownership
over the subject property. The Court notes that TO No. 555 was issued only in 1994,
two years after Ireneo's death. Rosario even admitted that she began paying taxes
only in 1997.64 More impmiantly, Ireneo never claimed Lot No. 4618 nor took
possession of it in the concept of owner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, Branch 41 in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.