Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No.

205505, September 29, 2015

A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the latter's approval must be obtained
through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v. COMELEC, We declared that it is the State,
acting through the COMELEC, that breathes life to a party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is
that the State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts entered into by the party-list
organization and its members - the Constitution and By-laws - such that any amendment to these
contracts would constitute a novation requiring the consent of all the parties involved. An amendment to
the bylaws of a party-list organization should become effective only upon approval by the COMELEC.

Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of filing of the amended by-laws and subsequent
conformity thereto of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under corporation law. Under the
Corporation Code, an amendment to a by-law provision must be filed with the SEC. The amendment
shall be effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of a certification that it is not inconsistent with the
Corporation Code.

Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine comes into
play. This rule provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is in equipoise, that is, when the
respective sets of evidence of both parties are evenly balanced, the party having the burden of proof
fails in that issue. Since neither party succeeds in making out a case, neither side prevails. The courts are
left with no other option but to leave them as they are. The consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of
the complaint/petition.

In Seneres v. COMELEC, the validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by Buhay Party-List through its
President, Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground that his term had expired at the time it was filed.
The Court applied by analogy the default rule in corporation law to the effect that officers and directors
of a corporation hold over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are
elected or appointed. Señeres ruled that the hold-over principle applies in the absence of a provision in
the constitution or by-laws of the party-list organization prohibiting its application.

In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and Bylaws of Ating Koop and We do not see
any provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in
accordance with corporation law, the existing Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with
full authority to bind the corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its
members on 14 November 2011, since no successors had been validly elected at the time, or since.

The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not
intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The
jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter
touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of Representatives is
anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A
party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.[38] Needless to say, bona fide membership in
the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office,
whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure.[39]

This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET jurisdiction over the
requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list organization. In Abayon v. HRET,[40] it was argued
that the petitioners did not belong to the marginalized and under-represented sectors that they should
represent; as such, they could not be properly considered bona fide members of their respective party-
list organizations. The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of
bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives.

San Juan Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015

The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared Marissa as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court: reversed the RTC's ruling
holding that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this
Court, we affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the
instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as
they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.

mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such
child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate,
which is a public document, (emphasis ours)
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the
interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857
should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The
records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.

Univ. of Immaculate Conception v. Office of the SOLE, G.R. NOS. 178085 - 178086, September 14, 2015

It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction
over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national
interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom.. The power is plenary
and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.
[20] (Emphasis in original.)

The powers of the Secretary in "national interest" cases are not set by metes and bounds. Rather, the
Secretary is given wide latitude to adopt appropriate means to finally resolve the labor dispute. The
doctrine of "great breadth of discretion"[21] possessed by the Secretary dates back to our earlier rulings
which recognized the broad powers of the former Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), which had
jurisdiction over national interest cases prior to the enactment of the Labor Code. In Philippine Marine
Radio Officers' Association v. CIR, decided in 1957, we held that "[i]f the [CIR] is granted authority to find
a solution in an industrial dispute and such solution consists in the ordering of employees to return back
to work, it cannot be contended that the [CIR] does not have the power or jurisdiction to carry that
solution into effect."[22] Again, in FEATI University v. Bautista: "Once the jurisdiction is acquired pursuant
to the presidential certification, the CIR may exercise its broad powers as provided in Commonwealth Act
103. All phases of the labor dispute and the employer-employee relationship may be threshed out
before the CIR, and the CIR may issue such order or orders as may be necessary to make effective the
exercise of its jurisdiction."[23] Judicial authorities defining the scope of the former CIR's power in
respect of national interest cases apply mutatis mutandis in cases involving the Secretary's assumption of
jurisdiction under Article 263(g).

In the Secretary's exercise of such broad discretion, the prevailing rule is that we will not interfere or
substitute the Secretary's judgment with our own, unless grave abuse is cogently shown.[24] And in
determining whether the acts of the Secretary constitute grave abuse of discretion, the standard we
apply is that of reasonableness.

In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[53] we summarized the guidelines when loss of confidence constitutes a
valid ground for dismissal:

[T]he language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states that the loss of trust and confidence must be
based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Such breach is willful if it is
done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act
done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Moreover, it must be based on substantial
evidence and not on the employer's whims or caprices or suspicions otherwise, the employee would
eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Loss of confidence must not be indiscriminately used as a
shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee was arbitrary. And, in order to
constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and shows that the
employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In addition, loss of confidence as a
just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a
position of responsibility, trust and confidence or that the employee concerned is entrusted with
confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the property
and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee
is penalized.[54]

In determining whether loss of confidence is a just cause for dismissal under Article 282(c), we laid down
the following requisites in the 2008 case of Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Baban:[55]

(a) The employee must hold a position of trust and confidence.

(b) There must be a willful ad that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.[56]

As a rule, loss of confidence may only be invoked by the employer against an employee occupying a
position of responsibility, trust and confidence[57] — hence, the first requisite. Ordinarily, this would
require us to make a determination with regard to the true nature of the Respondent Employees'
positions. But given the facts of this case, noting in particular the final and executory decision in the
Arbitration Case which deemed Respondent Employees as confidential employees, we only now need to
determine whether confidential employees hold positions of trust and confidence.

The leading case explaining what is a "position of trust and confidence" is Mabeza v. NLRC,[58] where we
held that:

[L]oss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust
and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and
custody of the employer's money or property. To (he first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those
vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such
managerial actions; and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those
who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of
money or property. ...[59]

Bristol Myers and subsequent cases[60] essentially follow the same formula by subdividing positions of
trust and confidence into two classes: managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-file employees.
Respondent Employees fall under the latter category.

We understand that Mabeza's failure to specifically mention the category of "confidential employees"
may cause some confusion, at least superficially, with respect to the applicability of Article 282(c) to this
specific class of employees. For the sake of avoiding any future misperception, we rule that confidential
employees must perforce hold positions of trust and confidence. Mabeza's silence regarding confidential
employees may simply be attributed to the fact that confidential employees do not constitute a distinct
category of employees based on the plain text of the Labor Code. But jurisprudence recognizes the
existence of such category,[61] and it has been held that confidentiality may attach to a managerial,
supervisory, or rank-and-file position.[62] As the commentator Azucena aptly notes:

... Confidentiality is not a matter of official rank, it is a matter of job content and authority. It is not
measured by closeness to or distance from top management but by the significance of the jobholder's
role in the pursuit of corporate objectives and strategy. In principle, every managerial position is
confidential — one does not become a manager without having gained the confidence of the appointing
authority. But not every confidential employee is managerial; lie may be a supervisory or even a rank-
and-file employee. Confidentiality, in other words, cuts across the pyramid of jobs from the base to the
apex, from messengerial to managerial.[63]

A confidential employee is defined as one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the
custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property.[64] For all intents and purposes,
the terms "confidential employee" and "employee holding a position of trust and confidence" are
synonymous. Fundamentally, the two categories mentioned in Mabeza are simply subcategories of the
broader category of confidential employees.

The essence of the second requisite is that the loss of confidence must be based on a willful breach of
trust founded on clearly established facts.[65] Here, it is not disputed that the Respondent Employees
refused to resign from the Union, notwithstanding the decision in the Arbitration Case. Respondent
Employees do not claim that they were coerced into retaining their union membership; in fact, they even
insist upon their right to join the Union. The voluntariness of Respondent Employees' refusal to vacate
their union membership — which constitutes the "willful act" — is therefore unequivocally established.

Halili v. Justice for Children International, G.R. No. 194906, September 09, 2015

While said clause is silent on the requirement of a legal cause for the same to be operative, the
fundamental principle — as above-stated — is that the law is read into every contract. Hence, the
contract's termination clause should not be interpreted as a form of blanket-license by which each of the
parties may just abdicate the contract at will. Rather, it is a clause which allows any of the parties to pre-
terminate the employment contract within the stipulated fixed-term period of one year, provided that
the party invoking the same has: (a) a legal cause for terminating it; and (b) notifies the other party in
writing four (4) weeks prior to the intended date of termination.

That the parties had intended to dispense with the need for a legal cause for the termination clause to
be operative does not sufficiently appear in this case. Had they so intended, then the contract should
have so indicated, as in Price v. Innodata Phils., Inc.,[37] which contractual provision explicitly allowing
the employer to pre-terminate the same "with or without cause" was, however, struck down as invalid:

As a final observation, the Court also takes note of several other provisions in petitioners' employment
contracts that display utter disregard for their security of tenure. Despite fixing a period or term of
employment, i.e., one year, INNODATA reserved the right to pre-terminate petitioners' employment
under the following circumstances:

6.1 x x x Further should the Company have no more need for the EMPLOYEE'S services on account of
completion of the project, lack of work (sic) business losses, introduction of new production processes
and techniques, which will negate the need for personnel, and/or overstafiing, this contract maybe pre-
terminated by the EMPLOYER upon giving of three (3) days notice to the employee.

xxxx

6.4 The EMPLOYEE or the EMPLOYER may pre-terminate this CONTRACT, with or without cause, by giving
at least Fifteen - (15) [day] notice to that effect. Provided, that such pre-termination shall be effective
only upon issuance of the appropriate clearance in favor of the said EMPLOYEE.

Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions, petitioners have no right at all to expect security of tenure,
even for the supposedly one-year period of employment provided in their contracts, because they can
still be pre-terminated (1) upon the completion of an unspecified project; or (2) with or without cause,
for as long as they are given a three-day notice. Such contract provisions are repugnant to the basic
tenet in labor law that no employee may be terminated except for just or authorized cause.

Under Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution, it is the policy of the State to assure the workers of
security of tenure and free them from the bondage of uncertainty of tenure woven by some employers
into their contracts of employment. This was exactly the purpose of the legislators in drafting Article 280
of the Labor Code - to prevent the circumvention by unscrupulous employers of the employee's right to
be secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements
inconsistent with the concept of regular employment.[38] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Here, it is clear that the first requisite of legal cause was not complied with by JFCI. No just or authorized
cause was proven by substantial evidence in support of its invocation of the termination clause stated in
its contract with Halili. As such, the pre-termination of the contract was infirm. Thus, considering further
that respondents' argument on its purported loss of trust and confidence in Halili cannot be taken into
account at this stage since it was belatedly raised for the first time on appeal,[39] the NLRC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Halili's dismissal was illegal. The CA's issuance of a writ of
certiorari was perforce improper.

Silang et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213189, September 08, 2015

Public officials who are directly responsible for, or participated in making the illegal expenditures, as well
as those who actually received the amounts therefrom - in this case, the disallowed CNA Incentives -
shall be solidarity liable for their reimbursement.

By way of exception, however, passive recipients or payees of disallowed salaries, emoluments, benefits,
and other allowances need not refund such disallowed amounts if they received the same in good faith.
[45] Stated otherwise, government officials and employees who unwittingly received disallowed
benefits or allowances are not liable for their reimbursement if there is no finding of bad faith.[46] In
Lumayna v. COA,[47] the Court declared that notwithstanding the disallowance of benefits by COA, the
affected personnel who received the said benefits in good faith should not be ordered to refund the
disallowed benefits. Similarly, in Querubin v. Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Office,
COA Regional Office VI, Pavia, Iloilo City,[48] the Court held:

Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of
subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received.
Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials
and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts
given were due to the recipients and the latter accept the same with gratitude, confident that they richly
deserve such benefits.

xxx Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but
disallowed by the COA.[49]

In this case, the majority of the petitioners are the LGU of Tayabas, Quezon's rank-and-file employees
and bona fide members of UNGKAT (named-below)[50] who received the 2008 and 2009 CNA Incentives
on the honest belief that UNGKAT was fully clothed with the authority to represent them in the CNA
negotiations.

Republic v. Cortez, Sr., G.R. No. 197472, September 07, 2015

As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from the military
reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject properties were alienable or disposable land
of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military
purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is primordial importance because it is
determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under
the Torrens system. Without first determining the nature and character of the land, all other
requirements such as length and nature of possession and occupation over such land do not come into
play. The required length of possession does not operate when the land is part of the public domain.

Landbank v. Belle Corp., G.R. No. 205271, September 02, 2015

Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond its
certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which would put a
party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the
presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is of course, expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of
land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the
occupants possess the land en concepto de dueño, in the concept of the owner. As is the common
practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a
cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out that the land he intends to buy is
occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as in this case, is not in actual possession, it would
then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant's possessory rights. The
failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and
would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a purchaser in good faith.[58]