Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 35, No. 3 (2013), pp.

305–32 DOI: 10.1355/cs35-3a

© 2013 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Southeast Asia in the

US Rebalance: Perceptions
from a Divided Region
EUAN GRAHAM

This article explores perceptions and reactions across Southeast Asia

towards the Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia. The
US approach has been dismissed as more rhetorical than substantive
grand strategy, its credibility under renewed scrutiny following
President Obama’s cancelled visit to Southeast Asia in October 2013.
Nonetheless, the rebalance has expanded from its origins in 2010–11,
acquiring diplomatic and economic “prongs” with a particular focus
on Southeast Asia, broadening the bandwidth of US engagement
beyond military diplomacy and force realignment. However, the US
“pivot” has had to contend with entrenched narratives of the US
role in the region oscillating between extremes of neglect or over-
militarization. The US-China strategic dynamic weighing over the
region, itself central to Washington’s strategic calculus across Asia,
has also coloured the lens through which Southeast Asians have
viewed the re-balance. Varied reactions to the US rebalance at the
national level in Southeast Asia are further suggestive of a sub-
regional divide between “continental” and “maritime” states that to
some extent predisposes their perspectives and orientation towards
the Great Powers.

Keywords: Southeast Asia, US foreign policy, defence, geopolitics, perceptions.

President Obama’s “no-show” at the October 2013 East Asia Summit

(EAS) and US-ASEAN Summit in Bali — compounded by cancelled

E uan G raham is a Senior Fellow at the Rajaratnam School of

International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

305

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bilateral visits to Malaysia and the Philippines either side — has

added to doubts already being expressed volubly within the
region about the durability and commitment of the US “pivot” or
“rebalance” to the wider region, particularly given Washington’s
claims to be pursuing a sub-regional focus on Southeast Asia.
There is, however, nothing especially new about alternating swings
in regional attitudes towards the United States. As Alice Ba has
argued, regional perceptions have tended to cast US policy towards
Southeast Asia in binary terms, alternating between the extremes
of over-militarization and “systemic neglect”.1 The first and second
George W. Bush administrations typified this curve, initially sparking
concerns that the United States was intent on opening up a
“second front” in the so-called “war on terror” in Southeast Asia,
yielding to disappointment at Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s
non-attendance at successive meetings of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF).2
The rebalance 3 to Asia — launched two years into Barack
Obama’s first term — initially re-awakened the over-militarization
critique of US policy, given its up-front focus on US force
realignment and rising tensions in the South China Sea. Within
the US military global commands structure, the Western Pacific and
eastern Indian Ocean fall within the Pacific Command (PACOM) and
Pacific Fleet’s area of responsibility. This automatically subsumes
Southeast Asia in a wider strategic context. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton’s intervention at the July 2010 ARF in Hanoi, and
her subsequent November 2011 Foreign Policy article — still the
closest document to an official doctrine for the pivot — clearly
signalled an intensification of US interest in the South China Sea.4
Attention in Southeast Asia was further garnered by Washington’s
apparent interest in a more “redistributive” footprint for the US
military forward-deployed presence in the Western Pacific, given its
top-heavy dispositions in Japan, South Korea and Guam. According
to Don Emmerson, “the pivot’s association with security unbalanced
the policy itself”, overshadowing the pivot’s economic rationale and
creating the impression that the “goal of tapping into the material
dynamism of emerging Asia seemed to be more of an afterthought”5.
Since 2012 there has been a conscious re-calibration to the pivot/
rebalance, widening the base of US engagement efforts to include
diplomatic and economic legs to match the already extended defence
component.
Although the pivot concept, as originally used by US officials,
“suggested the transfer of resources and strategic attention from the

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 307

Middle East and Europe to Asia”, the military substance — at least

in terms of additional US military deployments — in Southeast Asia
has been somewhat underwhelming.6 Nonetheless the region has
maintained a consistently high profile within the overall geographical
focus on Asia, borne out in the high number of senior administration
officials visiting the region, beginning with Hillary Clinton’s February
2009 visit to Jakarta in the early phase of the Obama presidency,
which was judged to be “the public relations highlight of her first
trip to Asia as Secretary of State”.7 Clinton went on to visit all
ten ASEAN capitals, while “a greater emphasis on Southeast Asia”
was further reflected in the thirteen visits to Asia made by Defense
Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta, as well as senior officials
and military officers including the National Security Advisor and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.8 Notwithstanding the cancellation
of two previous presidential visits to Southeast Asia before October
2013, the overall engagement effort has been relatively consistent,
given the considerable presidential “face time” invested in annual
attendance at both the EAS and APEC leaders meeting. The US
diplomatic focus on Southeast Asia has also benefited from the
Obama administration’s embrace of multilateralism, given ASEAN’s
importance as a hub for Asia-wide trade and security dialogues
and groupings.9 A recent study from the Center for New American
Security duly acknowledges the administration’s efforts to “expand
engagement with partners in Southeast Asia”.10
However, as doubts have accumulated about the fiscal sus-
tainability of the US forward-deployed posture and whether its
commitment is primarily rhetorical, the narrative has swung from
over-militarization back towards “neglect”, a theme reinforced in
recent media coverage.11 The trend was evident even before the
US federal government “shutdown” in October 2013, but has since
gathered momentum, especially given unfavourable comparisons
inevitably drawn with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang’s
inaugural and highly symbolic visits to the region.12 Pendulum-like
swings between these persistently polarized narratives about
America’s role in Southeast Asia prompt the question whether, in
fact, there is such a thing as a happy medium for US engagement
in Southeast Asia that is neither overbearing nor inattentive, and
how this might be defined?
In surveying regional attitudes towards the US rebalance,
there is a sub-theme to this article, premised on the assumption
that perceptions may be indicative of a widening divide between
“continental” and “maritime” Southeast Asia, porous though these

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labels evidently are. While it is not my intention to engage in a

systematic discourse analysis, to give my guiding assumptions and
analysis some grounding in local and elite opinion in Southeast
Asia, I have cited from a range of regional commentators, drawing in
particular from a National Bureau for Asian Research (NBR) report
on Asia-wide attitudes to the US pivot/rebalance strategy, published
in January 2013.13 I also adopt a definition of the strategy offered
within that report, as a “trident” combining the three prongs of
multilateral/bilateral diplomacy, trade and investment promotion,
and military presence.14

Recalibrating the Rebalance

While the primary focus of this analysis lies with the military and
diplomatic elements to US policy in Southeast Asia, the economic
prong, though less developed, is integral to understanding the
orientation of Southeast Asian states towards China and the United
States: specifically, whether America is perceived as a provider of
broad-based public goods to the region including military security,
or as lacking the economic foundation to sustain its engagement
beyond the short term and over-reliant on military levers to maintain
its influence. Economic factors are weighed closely if not always
accurately within the region in the comparison with China, since
it has overtaken the United States as the primary trading partner of
many — though not all — Southeast Asian countries.15
US Vice-President Joe Biden, in a speech delivered at George
Washington University ahead of his visit to Singapore in July
2013, noted that the United States has a bigger investment profile
than China in Southeast Asia, hence “President Obama has put
particular focus on Southeast Asia: ASEAN now represents a
US$2 trillion economy of 600 million people.”16 Trade may be a
limited indicator of “depth” and maturity to commercial relation­
ships, yet by 2010 the US relative market share of ASEAN’s trade
had more than halved, to 9 per cent, from 20 per cent in 1998.17
The Obama administration has appeared cognizant of the perception
problem this has posed for the credibility of the “pivot” in
Southeast Asia, as well as the genuine necessity of underpinning the
expansion of its defence and diplomatic relationships in Southeast
Asia with initiatives directed at economic revival.18 Hillary Clinton,
for example, focused on deepening US business partnerships as the
theme of her November 2012 “economic pivot” speech delivered,
notably, at Singapore Management University, while a sizeable

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 309

commercial delegation accompanied President Obama as he toured

mainland Southeast Asia in the lead-up to the 2012 EAS.
Meanwhile, to flesh out the multilateral and diplomatic aspects
to US regional engagement, the appointment of a US Ambassador
to ASEAN — resident in Jakarta since March 2011 — appears
designed to serve a twin objective: first, of endorsing ASEAN as the
main vehicle for Washington’s multilateral diplomacy in Southeast
Asia plus the wider region; and second, to deepen US engagement
across a raft of cross-cutting, transnational security and development
issues.19 However, bilateral relationships retain their traditional
importance, especially in the security realm.
Part of the problem that America faces in enhancing its political
leadership role in Southeast Asia is that power factors are difficult
to divorce from the economic policy realm. Indeed, China’s
diplomatic gains in the region since the late 1990s have been
delivered inseparably from economic initiatives, originating from
Beijing’s diplomatically effective if largely cost-free supportive
stance towards Southeast Asia as the region’s economies recovered
from the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis. Economic inducements
(real or apparent) were an effective tool of China’s regional diplomacy
in the decade that followed, as Beijing “attempted to co-opt …
Southeast Asian states by providing incentives in the form of
trade concessions, investments and large-scale Official Development
Assistance projects”. 20 Although China’s economic statecraft in
Southeast Asia has been characterized by regional analysts as an
exercise in soft power,21 an explicit linkage between geopolitical
influence and trade in Southeast Asia is increasingly acknowledged
in the mainstream Chinese media, while competitive comparisons
are drawn openly with the United States.22 China’s confidence
in the economic element of its statecraft has also taken on a
selectively punitive aspect since the denial of market access has been
employed by Beijing as a pressure tactic in maritime territorial
disputes in the East and South China Seas. In Southeast Asia,
the Philippines has become the primary target of economic as
well as diplomatic pressure from China, including the suspension
of banana imports in 2012, as tensions spiked with Manila over
Scarborough Shoal.23 President Benigno Aquino did not attend the
10th China-ASEAN Expo, held in Nanning in September 2013,
after China was reported to have linked his attendance to the
Philippines dropping its international arbitral proceedings that
challenge the legal basis for China’s territorial claims in the South
China Sea.24

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 310 Euan Graham

While such coercive tactics by China potentially cast the

United States in a comparatively favourable light, Washington has
faced a perception problem, beyond its declining relative share in
Southeast Asia’s trade, in how the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
which includes Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, has been readily
perceived as a sphere of influence vehicle for US grand strategy
that deliberately excludes China — this, in spite of the TPP’s
humble origins as a relatively obscure “mini-lateral” liberalization
initiative.25 As a tool of grand strategy for embracing less developed
economies, the TPP in fact carries a more basic limitation for the
United States, given that Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, generally
regarded as falling within China’s economic orbit, are unlikely
to clear its ambitiously high bar for admission, in contrast to
the more inclusive if less ambitious Regional Economic Comprehen­
sive Partnership and China’s existing free trade agreement with
ASEAN.

Divisive Dynamics
US-China competition is commonly identified by leading regional
commentators as an increasingly divisive dynamic for ASEAN. Hugh
White identifies Asia’s power shift as the underlying reason why
ASEAN is increasingly split on the South China Sea and sees some
form of accommodation of China’s “challenge” by the United States
as essential to avoiding conflict.26 White is not specific about what
this would entail for Southeast Asia, but it would presumably involve
a parallel accommodation of China by its “continental” Southeast
Asia neighbours and rival territorial claimants in the South China
Sea. Emmerson foresees the possibility that “if Sino-American rivalry
escalates, ASEAN’s members could split into China-deferring and
China-defying camps”.27 Evelyn Goh also identifies the US-China
dynamic — though differently interpreted — as the major wedge
in ASEAN’s cohesion. Goh sees Southeast Asia as facing a parallel
US-China “resurgence” in the region, requiring adaptive responses
that fit neither within the International Relations template of
bandwagoning or balancing behaviours.28 Both Goh and White agree
that ASEAN has lost its ability to control the Great Power dynamics
that are now dominating Southeast Asia’s strategic architecture, despite
the fact that regional institutions have been deliberately layered
around ASEAN in order to reinforce its self-styled “centrality” to
regional multilateralism. Awareness of these crumbling foundations
is leading individual ASEAN members to tacitly or overtly welcome

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 311

a revival of US interest and presence in the region for essentially

Realist logic. According to Goh:
Many East Asian states support or tolerate US hegemony because
of their belief that the distribution of benefits, while not ideal,
is preferable in this pluralist order than in any other alternatives
they can devise. They might construct secondary safety nets —
enmeshing China in the hopes of socialising it, financial regionalism,
cultivating gradual moral reconciliation — but in the meantime,
the strategic oxygen for such endeavours is perceived to flow
from the hard deterrence and guarantor-ship that the US alone
can provide.29

Even among Southeast Asian states that evince support for a

revitalized US presence as a hedge against China’s strategic intentions
and rapidly growing capabilities, anxiety is felt about a downward
spiral ensuing in US-China relations augmenting their own security
dilemma.
In terms of US force realignment, the military substance of the
rebalancing strategy so far has been modest within Southeast Asia,
headlined by the deployment of only the first of up to four Littoral
Combat Ships (LCS) to Singapore.30 The objective of a 60:40 split
between the Pacific and Atlantic-based fleets — as announced by
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta at the Shangri-la Dialogue in
June 201231 — remains a relative measure that does not guarantee
any absolute shift of military assets, and in terms of the basing
distribution of US submarines already in the Pacific, for example,
represents the status quo. The number of surface and subsurface
vessels assigned to PACOM could even hold constant, as US forces
are drawn down elsewhere. To a large extent the numbers and
home-porting debate is a distraction. Forward deployment and pre-
positioning reduce crisis reaction times, but the inherent mobility of
naval platforms means that, barring the parallel outbreak of crises
in different regions, substantial additional forces could be surged
to the Western Pacific if really needed. However, forward presence
is also linked to reassurance and deterrence, and it is at this
politico-diplomatic messaging level that the rebalance is primarily
intended to resonate, and Southeast Asia has been designated as
a target audience.
Despite the clear diplomatic signal of even-handed US engagement
with “continental” Southeast Asia that was intended by President
Obama’s high-profile visit to Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia so
soon after his re-election in November 2012, there is a discernible
tilt within the rebalancing strategy towards the maritime nations

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 312 Euan Graham

of Southeast Asia, as an extension of the wider US network of

“offshore” allies, quasi-allies and “trans-Pacific” trading partners.
This prompts the question of whether, beyond geography, is
there a meaningful geo-strategic distinction between continental
and maritime Southeast Asia? To what extent does this determine
capitals’ strategic orientation, towards China (itself no longer an
exclusively “continental” power), the United States — or others?

Southeast Asian Perspectives

According to Peter Jennings, Southeast Asia has featured prominently
in the rebalancing strategy, as Washington aims to strengthen its
bilateral and multilateral engagement with Southeast Asian countries.
Specifically, “US defence cooperation with Singapore has grown
substantially, and (the) United States has sought to build more
substantive defence ties with India, Indonesia, and Vietnam and revive
cooperation with old treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines.”32
Jennings also links Australia-US defence cooperation closely to
the sub-region: “(T)he most immediate strategic value of enhanced
cooperation is to provide a tangible expression of the US commitment
to the security of Southeast Asia, a region that has assumed greater
importance in US strategic thinking because of the competition for
influence between Asia’s major powers.”33
Without attempting an exhaustive regionwide survey, a few
states can be singled out that demonstrate Southeast Asia’s divided
strategic geography. The Philippines and Thailand are obvious
candidates for inclusion as US treaty allies; yet in their differing
responses they are also illustrative of Southeast Asia’s diverging
maritime and continental trajectories. Vietnam and Malaysia are
correspondingly interesting as partial outlier “swing states” with
the potential for pursuing strategic alignments that to a certain
extent “defy” their respective continental and maritime geographical
settings. Singapore, firmly “maritime” in its strategic and economic
orientation is now more important to Washington as a defence partner
and logistical host to US forces than Thailand, a formal treaty ally.
Singapore also maintains a diversified “portfolio” of defence and
security partnerships beyond the United States, including the need
to manage its economically important but complicated relations
with China. This is a basic dilemma that Singapore shares with
the rest of Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, another maritime
state but with particularly close economic ties to China and a
strong pan-Asian strain to its diplomacy. While Singapore is a close

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 313

US bilateral defence partner, it remains highly protective of ASEAN,

as a diplomatic “force multiplier” for smaller countries in Southeast
Asia. Hence some of Singapore’s diplomatic energies are channelled
via this multilateral route, as a potential constraint on bilateral
cooperation with the United States. Last and not least, Indonesia, as
ASEAN’s primus inter pares, counts for more than other members
simply in terms of its size, resource allocation and population.
Yet cultural reticence about leading from the front and the legacy
of non-alignment tends to see Jakarta observing equidistance in its
external relations, while adopting a behind-the-scenes brokering
role within ASEAN, as it has on the South China Sea.34 For the
US pivot and military strategy, Indonesia carries geopolitical weight
because of its position as an archipelagic state astride the major
bottle-neck straits connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Philippines: Closest and Keenest

Senior US military officers from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff downwards have repeatedly eschewed the need or desire for
new US bases as part of the rebalance.35 However, the Philippines
offers locational advantages to the United States that other potential
host nations in Southeast Asia either cannot or will not match.
In July 2012, the Aquino administration offered restored access to
US forces on terms not seen since the closure of US bases in 1992.36
It is likely that rotational deployments of ships, troops, and aircraft
to the Philippines will increase over the next few years.37 One of
the aims for Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s visit to Manila in
August 2013 was to conclude an agreement on rotational access for
the US Navy to the site of its former facility in Subic Bay.38 As
a sign of strengthening security relations, Washington and Manila
inaugurated a “2 plus 2” dialogue in 2012. Both sides reaffirmed
their treaty commitments, while the US government agreed to
nearly triple its military assistance to the Philippines to $30 million
— funds earmarked to rebuild maritime and air capabilities that
have atrophied beyond the point of obsolescence, as a result of
army dominance within the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The
US has delivered two, stripped down 1960s vintage ex-US Coast
Guard cutters, for refitting and commissioning into the Philippines
Navy, providing a basic offshore patrol capability.39 The US has
further offered capacity assistance to build up the Philippines newly
centralized National Coast Watch centre, and to share “real-time”
data on the South China Sea. As with Japan in the East China Sea,

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Washington officially takes a neutral position on disputed territorial

claims in the South China Sea, notwithstanding Hillary Clinton’s
November 2011 reference to the “West Philippine Sea”,40 Manila’s
preferred term for the South China Sea.41
The Philippines’ status as a US treaty ally brings a different
complexion to US interactions with other Southeast Asians claimants
in the South China Sea. According to Daljit Singh, Washington
“has been careful not to interpret the Mutual Defense Treaty in
a way which would embolden Manila to take risks, since the US
has only limited legal commitment to the defence of Philippine
territory as defined in the 1898 Paris Treaty”.42 While Philippine-
claimed territory in the South China Sea including Scarborough
Shoal and the Philippine-claimed segment of the Spratlys is not
expressly included within the scope of the US defence guarantee,
the US treaty commitment does extend to “public vessels” belonging
to the Philippines in the Pacific. Hence, “the US may risk hurting
its credibility if it fails to respond to an attack on a Philippine
ship or aircraft or even on Philippine armed forces in the South
China Sea”.43
Aside from “entrapment” concerns on Washington’s part,
concerning the possibility of being drawn into a conflict instigated
by the junior partner in an alliance, keeping within the volatile
limits of Philippine domestic sentiment over Status of Visiting
Forces issues will be a tricky balancing act for both governments
as the pivot continues and the US military presence becomes more
regular, particularly if US Marines from Okinawa are to form a major
part of the US rotational presence in future.44 Although the naval
footprint is generally less conspicuous than ground or air forces,
the grounding and destruction of the USS Guardian minesweeper
in January 2013 demonstrates that navies can attract their fair share
of negative publicity when things go awry.45
The Philippines has attracted its own share of negative sentiment
within ASEAN for appearing to cleave more closely to Washington
than other Southeast Asian states, and especially for its perceived
increased assertiveness on the South China Sea under the “cover” of
the US rebalance. This is also China’s complaint. Foreign Secretary
Albert del Rosario’s efforts to secure a mention of Scarborough
Shoal in an ASEAN joint statement in Phnom Penh in July 2012
were rebuffed,46 to Manila’s clear disappointment and significantly
sharpening the perception gap between an ambivalent ASEAN on one
hand, and a newly receptive and supportive US on the other.47

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 315

According to Goh, who characterizes the Aquino administration

as “making hay” in the sunshine provided by the US pivot,
Washington’s focus on the South China Sea “appeared in 2012 to
intensify the security dilemma by both emboldening the Philippines
and antagonising China into adopting stronger stances on their
territorial dispute”. 48 This had a knock-on regional impact of
“re-ignit(ing) ASEAN’s strategic ambivalence and disarray”.49
In response to ASEAN’s collective ambivalence to what Manila
perceives as a clear threat to its territory and maritime resources, the
Philippines has embraced self-help on the South China Sea beyond
simply moving closer to the United States. Its decision, announced
in January 2013, to seek an international arbitral tribunal ruling on
the validity of China’s South China Sea territorial claims shows an
emboldened approach to using the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as to level the playing field in its
dispute with Beijing.50 Following previous unsuccessful attempts
to enlist ASEAN support, the Philippines demonstrated a new
unilateralism in its approach on the South China Sea by acting
without consulting its ASEAN partners.

Vietnam: Calibrated Partnership

Despite speculation in some quarters that an incipient alliance
is developing between Vietnam and the United States,51 and the
conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding on defence relations
in 2011,52 Hanoi deliberately situates its growing security relationship
with the United States within the framework of an omni-directional
policy of energetic outreach that includes selected ASEAN partners,
middle and “upper middle” powers such as India, Japan, Russia,
South Korea and Australia, as well as European states. President
Truong Tan Sang paid a state visit to the United States in July,
shortly after his state visit to China, during which he welcomed US
backing for Vietnam’s stance in the South China Sea, albeit carefully
couched in the context of wider international support.53
Vietnam has maintained some distance in the military relationship,
despite American interest in regaining regular access to the naval
facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Vietnam’s reciprocal interest in
US arms sales. According to Carl Thayer, Hanoi is unlikely to raise
the prevailing limit on most foreign warships to one port call, per
country, per year.54 Access to Vietnamese facilities for ship repair may
allow for a partial way around this, but Vietnam’s attitude towards
enhanced defence links with Washington remains tempered less by

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 316 Euan Graham

the memory of the war with the United States than by a general
reluctance to concede a resident military presence to any foreign
power. Indeed, Vietnam’s cautious attitude towards expanding the
defence relationship with the United States probably owes as much
to the historical memory of Beijing’s hostile reaction to Vietnam’s
granting of naval basing rights to the Soviet Union in the late 1970s.
Not provoking China too much is a major factor in how Vietnam
calibrates its relationship with the United States.
Goh further ascribes Vietnam’s caution in moving closer to the
United States to its more independent military capabilities, as well
as its history of conflict with China:
In 2010, even while it sought US authority to pressure China
over the [South China Sea] disputes, Hanoi maintained close
strategic ties and even deference to Beijing. The Vietnamese
Deputy Defence Minister assured China that Vietnam would not
form an alliance with another country, allow foreign bases in its
territory, or develop relations with another country targeted at a
third party. The two sides also held five confidential meetings to
discuss principles for settling maritime disputes, and inaugurated
a bilateral Strategic Defence and Security Dialogue.55

Vietnam’s South China Sea strategy therefore needs to be interpreted

more broadly than bandwagoning with the US pivot, in which Hanoi
seeks a broad-based international stake in its security, including
deepening longstanding relations with India — which enjoys an
exemption to the single port-call restriction — and developing
incipient security ties with Japan, Australia and South Korea,
among others.56 Vietnam has also embraced UNCLOS as a means
of buttressing its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims against
Chinese challenges, but has not offered public support for the
Philippines legal manoeuvres. On the US side, there are also
inhibiting factors to the relationship including human rights con­
cerns, which situate Vietnam somewhat awkwardly as a non-
democratic outlier among Washington’s preferred security partners
in Southeast Asia.
Vietnam’s position on the porous continental/maritime identity
divide within Southeast Asia is especially interesting, and also
bears upon its external diplomatic orientation. Geographically, like
Thailand, it straddles both maritime and continental Southeast Asia,
and also like Thailand, Vietnam needs to face both ways. In terms
of its historical influences, Vietnam’s pre-colonial identity draws
from landward sources in which China was the predominant cultural
influence. Under French control, Vietnam’s identity was situated

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 317

within the wider construct of Indochina, which left a residual

westward-facing influence that transcended independence, explain­
ing Hanoi’s continuing close relationship with Laos, preoccupation
with land-based threats, including the 1979 border war with China
and the People’s Army of Vietnam’s decade-long, sapping entangle­
ment in Cambodia. Contemporary Vietnam’s increasing orientation
towards the “East Sea” may be explained partly by simple economic
necessity, as marine resources and seaborne trade account for
a rising proportion of national wealth. In grand strategy terms,
Vietnam’s focus on the South China Sea could be interpreted on
a higher level than “resource nationalism”, as a bid for strategic
re-orientation from “continental” to “maritime”. From this vantage
point, the pattern of Vietnam’s internationalization of the South
China Sea territorial disputes further suggests a conscious pursuit
of maritime partners, in which the United States and its navy
feature prominently, though not exclusively as part of a broad-based
incipient coalition.

Singapore: The Quasi-Ally

Singapore has served as an important logistical hub for the US
military since access to Changi Naval Base, Sembawang wharves and
Paya Lebar Air Base was made available to Washington, following
the closure of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay in the Philippines in
1991–92. In turn, Singapore has benefited from privileged access
to US training facilities and defence technology. The US-Singapore
defence relationship is governed under the terms of the 2005
Strategic Framework Agreement, an arrangement that is defined
below the threshold of an alliance and which Singapore has no
desire to change. Arguably, the decision to host up to four LCSs
in Singapore has re-cast the terms of its role in US strategy from
“strategic partner” to something closely resembling an ally, even
though the reality is that the LCS will spend the majority of their
time elsewhere and, in capability terms, do not change the game
in the US-China strategic balance. Singapore maintains that the
carefully calibrated status quo in its relations with Washington and
Beijing is preserved, but conflict scenarios positing US requests
to use military assets and facilities in Singapore would “require
extreme adroitness on the part of Singapore’s political leadership
and diplomats to ensure that the expanded security partnership with
the US would not incur the obligations and costs that only an ally
would usually be expected to bear”.57

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 318 Euan Graham

The numbers of navy vessels calling into Singapore tell their

own story. The US Navy accounts for one third of all foreign
warship visits into Changi Naval Base, which includes berthing
facilities purpose-built to handle US aircraft carriers, and over
two-thirds of all foreign warship calls into Sembawang base,
where a US logistics command servicing the Seventh Fleet is
located.58 Singapore’s Paya Lebar Air Base serves as a hub airport
for US military transport aircraft transiting through Southeast Asia.
Chinese warships call at Singapore rarely by comparison, apart from
occasional port visits during transits to and from anti-piracy duties
in the Indian Ocean.
Singapore, although a non-claimant in the South China Sea
has become more vocal on the issue since 2010, articulating that
its “critical” national interests are at stake where freedom of
navigation and over-flight are concerned, while urging restraint on
all claimant parties and calling for ASEAN unity in relation to the
Code of Conduct (CoC). Barry Desker has described Singapore’s
position on freedom of navigation as “similar to that of the
United States”.59
A congratulatory telegram from Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong to Barack Obama on his re-election victory welcomed the US
rebalance to Asia, including Southeast Asia and ASEAN. Moreover,
in his Central Party School address to China’s top leaders earlier
in 2012, a speech delivered in Mandarin, the prime minister
pointedly countered the notion of the US as a nation in decline.60
Prime ministerial statements dating back to the 1990s have hailed
the US role as regional security guarantor and emphasized the need
for an active US presence, going so far as to claim that “America
plays a role in Asia that China cannot replace.”61
However, these supportive statements need to be set in the
context of more qualified recent pronouncements, for example
Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam has warned against any zero-sum
anti-China attitude in a region that is “big enough to accommodate
a rising China and a reinvigorated US”.62 Singaporean unease with
the strategic side-effects of the pivot has mounted as splits within
ASEAN over the South China Sea have become deeper and more
public. Desker has more recently noted that a pivot “can move
either way”. 63 Prime Minister Lee described President Obama’s
absence from Bali for the October 2013 EAS and the US-ASEAN
summit as a “very great disappointment”.64
Academic opinion in the region has generally been cautious
on the pivot emphasizing the need for the US to adopt a non-

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 319

provocative approach that avoids signalling “containment” to China,

while echoing what has become a mantra about ASEAN’s fear of
being pushed into making exclusive choices between Beijing and
Washington. However, there is also Realist strain of thinking that
acknowledges “If handled properly, the US rebalancing strategy
has the potential to check any tendency on the part of Beijing to
create a China-centric order in the region and help nudge China
to become a responsible power.”65

Thailand: Leaning Landward

Although Thailand is designated as a “Major Non-NATO” ally
of the United States,66 Thai observers have prevailingly negative
opinions of the implications of the rebalance strategy for Southeast
Asia, turning the region into what Kitti Prasirtsuk has called
“a battlefield for alliance and partnership cultivation”.67 Kitti argues
that the strategy, aimed at tilting the balance of power in China’s
disfavour is bound to force a counter-response from China “by
increasing its military capabilities”, in turn leading to a regional
arms race among regional countries, especially those involved in
territorial disputes with China.68
The view from Thailand acknowledges that the US pivot offers
leverage against Beijing. However, as many ASEAN countries have
adopted a wait-and-see “hedging” strategy towards both China
and the United States “they fear that at some point they could
be forced to choose sides or asked to provide facilities to one
power that might agitate the other”. Kitti cites from a “closed-
door brainstorming session” involving thirty representatives from
Thailand’s major ministries, the private sector and academia which
concluded that “Thailand must look beyond the US alliance, which
was more advantageous during the Cold War, and strengthen
engagement with China.”69
As a result, Bangkok has become reticent in dealing with
Washington “especially on military matters”.70 One recent example
concerns US requests, in mid-2012, to use Thailand’s U-Tapao
air base. Two US requests were made nearly in parallel. In August,
the National Aeronautical Space Administration (NASA) asked
permission to use the U-Tapao to support its Southeast Asia
Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study. 71 Kitti
contends that the Thai authorities’ suspicions were aroused by
a separate Pentagon request shortly thereafter to use the facility
for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). As a

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 320 Euan Graham

result, NASA’s climate change project was rejected and awarded

instead to Singapore, while the Pentagon’s HADR request remained
outstanding.
US-Thailand relations received a diplomatic boost from President
Obama’s visit to Bangkok in November 2012, a visit that along
with stops in Myanmar and Phnom Penh revealed US engagement
efforts in a favourable light, given the widely held assumption
that pressure from China upon the Cambodian chair had played a
significant role in ASEAN’s public divisions over the South China
Sea at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, in July.72 Obama’s visit was
complemented by outreach in the defence relationship, as Secretary
of Defense Leon Panetta also travelled to Bangkok to sign the June
2012 Joint Vision Statement.73 This very public “revision” of the
Thailand-US Defence Alliance is supposed to cover new ground in
bilateral and multilateral interoperability and readiness. But how
much of this is substantive and how much is “makeover” remains
unclear.
Cobra Gold, and other regular exercises involving the US and
Thai armed forces, have been expanded to admit third-country
observers including Myanmar. Nonetheless, Thailand’s sensitivity
about granting the US access to its Vietnam-era air base at U-Tapao
“indicates that Bangkok’s foreign policy has become less balanced,
leaning more toward China”. 74 Thitinan Pongsudhirak offers a
more nuanced perspective, judging that “the US is not going away,
and China is not going to dominate ASEAN”, while “on peace and
stability, the US role will still be needed as a counterbalance”.75
Nonetheless, the “contrast could not be clearer” between Obama’s
non-attendance at the EAS and China’s renewed “charm offensive”
in Southeast Asia, which under the new leadership of “Xi and Li
reinforces the sense of the US being out-manoeuvred”.76
Despite its coveted Non-NATO treaty ally status, Thailand is
left hanging somewhat precariously in America’s rebalance. According
to Kitti “Bangkok understands that it is not in its interest to lean
toward China too much. Likewise, Thailand will not easily go along
with the US military strategy in the region but will continue to be
very cautious with any US initiative involving military and security
issues, even to a minimal degree.”77
Thailand’s ambivalence towards the military elements of
re-balancing is suggestive of the country’s predominantly landward
orientation, especially when it comes to relations with China, despite
Bangkok’s significant maritime interests, both facing on to the Straits
of Malacca and the Gulf of Thailand, itself an antechamber to the

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 321

South China Sea. Thailand’s willingness to accommodate China’s

rise is consistent with its conciliatory approach towards successive
hegemonic interlopers over the past 150 years, a survival strategy
that in part ensured that it alone escaped colonization within
Southeast Asia. Thailand’s domestic success at assimilating its
large ethnic Chinese population (Yingluk and Thaksin Shinawatra
included) further disposes Bangkok’s elite towards expectations of
“socialising” China within ASEAN structures, a diplomatic role that
Thailand has actively pursued while occupying the rotating chair
for coordinating ASEAN-China relations in 2012–15.

Indonesia: Leveraging the Elusive Equilibrium

Indonesia’s Great Power diplomacy (dispensing with the rhetoric
about a million friends and zero enemies) rests on the concept of
a “dynamic equilibrium”.78 This sounds rather like a euphemism
for a fluid balance of power or “hedging” strategy. Dewi Fortuna
Anwar draws the distinction thus: “Whereas the traditional concept
of balance of power is conflictual in nature, the concept of dynamic
equilibrium envisages a more cooperative system of relations
between powers without any clear-cut adversaries.”79 Indonesia,
while not in the business of offering to host foreign military forces
and historically very sensitive to the transit of warships and aircraft
through its archipelagic waters and airspace, will inevitably face an
increase in the number of transits and overflights as the US rotates
more of its forces in and out of Australia in the coming years.
This aversion translates into Indonesia’s longstanding preferences
for ASEAN neutrality as well as national and regional “resilience”.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as the most pro-US and
pro-Australian president in Indonesia’s history, appears willing to
tolerate this virtual foreign presence in and around the archipelago
for the same bottom-line reason as his maritime neighbours: as a
hedge against China. Again, according to Dewi Fortuna Anwar:
Beijing’s increasingly assertive behaviour in disputed maritime
areas in the South and East China seas has undermined some
of the results of China’s earlier charm offensive. Hence, there is
an urgent need for the development of a more robust regional
structure in which China’s overwhelming power can be
harnessed more peacefully and productively within an East Asian
community.80
Rising concern about China, however, does not mean a “free
pass” to the US and its allies. Hence, “while welcoming the US

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 322 Euan Graham

rebalancing toward Asia, some in Indonesia have raised concerns that

Washington has placed too much emphasis on the military dimension
of this strategy”.81
It should be pointed out that the Indonesian armed forces
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) although much less influential
as an institution and politically disengaged compared with the
Soeharto era, have long sought closer ties with the United States,
which dramatically curtailed training and other exchanges with
Jakarta following the violent separation of East Timor in 1999. The
TNI have also coveted restored access to US defence exports and
spare parts, which were subject to prolonged restrictions. Since
US-Indonesian military ties were fully restored in 2010, uniform
engagements have grown to over 200 separate interactions annually.
The United States has also initiated a “Defence Planning Dialogue”
with Indonesia and opened the door to future foreign military sales
reported to include Maverick air-to-ground missiles, Apache attack
helicopters and F-16 fighter jets.82
President Obama’s announcement in Canberra in November
2011 of the rotational basing of up to 2,500 US Marines in Darwin
met with a sharp response from the Indonesian foreign minister,
Marty Natalegawa, who warned that the move could provoke a
“vicious cycle of tensions and mistrust”.83 To deflect such concerns,
Obama — locally regarded as the most popular “Indonesian”
president in US history — offered reassurances to President
Yudhoyono at the 2011 EAS, in Bali, that the deployment of US
Marines is not aimed against any country but intended to improve
HADR readiness.84
Although elite opinion is privately reconciled to the reinvigorated
US presence in Indonesia’s backyard, and the TNI may in fact
actively welcome the opportunity to interact more with the US
Marines, Dewi Fortuna Anwar notes that “(a)t the national level,
Indonesians have also reacted negatively to the presence of US
troops. Darwin is located just a short distance from Indonesia’s
troubled province Papua, where the giant US mining company
PT Freeport Indonesia operates.”85
Historical memory in Indonesia is unpredictable, but in certain
quarters fears of US interference are stoked by the lingering memory
of covert US-led interventions during the regional rebellions of the
late 1950s, as well by the more recent experience of the international
military intervention into East Timor in 1999, which used Darwin
as its springboard. Such sentiments are currently expressed at
the margins of Indonesia’s security policy-making circles (and the

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 323

Australia-Indonesia security relationship is a good example of how

close government-to-government ties can endure even without evident
grassroots support). However, since President Yudhoyono must
step down in 2014, under a new and more stridently nationalistic
leadership, the narrative of Indonesia’s military “encirclement” by
the United States and its allies could yet play out detrimentally
for Indonesia’s acquiescence in the rebalance.
Maintaining the dynamic equilibrium also means that Indonesia
is not averse to receiving maritime capacity assistance “omni-
directionally”. China has been quick to jump in with offers of
surveillance hardware to plug gaps in the Sunda Strait, Karimata
and Makassar Straits that are intended to rival the US-installed
Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS), which is focused
on the western approaches to the archipelago.86
Although not in coordination with the United States, Indonesia
continues to play an unofficial lead role in pushing forward the
CoC. Following the debacle in Phnom Penh in July 2012, Jakarta
led a round of shuttle diplomacy to restore a measure of credibility
to ASEAN’s collective efforts, via “Six Principles” including “early”
conclusion of a CoC, continued self-restraint and commitment
among all claimants to peaceful dispute resolution consistent with
international law.

Malaysia: Practiced Ambivalence

At a February 2013 conference on the rebalance, Assistant Secretary
of Defense Mark Lippert noted amongst his examples of recent
US military activity in support of the rebalance the “first-ever
visit by a US aircraft carrier to the South China Sea port of Kota
Kinabalu”.87 He cited this visit as emblematic of a broadening of
US engagement with Malaysia. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
visited Kuala Lumpur in August 2013, holding discussions with
Prime Minister Najib Razak.88 Yet for the United States, Malaysia in
some ways is an unconvinced and ambivalent partner in maritime
Southeast Asia.
At the political level, Prime Minister Najib Razak has improved
Malaysia’s relations with America in a low profile way without any
abrupt departure from “Mahathirist” legacy positions, including an
active role within the Non-Alignment Movement, maintaining close
relations with Iran and a strong line against Israel.89 Even under
Mahathir and his successor Abdullah Badawi, Malaysia kept close
defence relations with Western countries through the Five Power

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 324 Euan Graham

Defence Arrangements, while concluding an Acquisition and Cross

Servicing Agreement, in May 2005, and other military exchanges
with the United States.90 Malaysia’s attitude on hosting foreign
armed forces — including foreign military involvement in the Straits
of Malacca — is broadly similar to Indonesia’s position. A strain
of grassroots and party-political anti-western sentiment is another
constraint on closer security cooperation with Washington. Malaysia’s
receptiveness to the US rebalancing strategy is further constrained by
Kuala Lumpur’s longstanding pursuit of close relations with China,
and its diplomatic alignment with Beijing’s exclusionary preferences
for the composition of ASEAN-hubbed fora such as the EAS and
the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus.
As an active claimant in the South China Sea, Malaysia does
have territorial and resource equities at stake as well as being
dependent on the sea to maintain internal communications. It
is relatively shielded by the geography of its Spratlys claims,
which lie further south than those occupied by the Philippines
and Vietnam but most of all by the strength of its political and
economic relationship with China. Kuala Lumpur’s approach on the
South China Sea has therefore been to “tuck in” behind ASEAN
on the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DoC) and other processes aimed at socializing China,
while pursuing its own periodic need for reassurance from Beijing
through bilateral channels. These preferences and concerns weigh
against any major upping of engagement with the United States,
especially on the military-to-military level, and the re-balance has
received an ambivalent response, at least publicly.91 The potential
for strategic dissonance between Malaysia and the United States
on the CoC was underlined in undiplomatic comments attributed
to Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein on the margins of
ASEAN and US meetings in Brunei in August 2013, when he
reportedly said, referring to the US, that “(j)ust because you have
enemies, doesn’t mean your enemies are my enemies”.92 Privately,
however, Malaysia continues to draw from its defence links with
the United States: advice from the US Marine Corps was sought
for the recent decision to create an amphibious unit within the
Royal Malaysian Armed Forces, based at Bintulu in East Malaysia,
in part as a deterrent in the face of increasing Chinese intrusions
into Malaysian waters and near Malaysian-claimed features in the
South China Sea.93
In an overarching US-China context, Malaysia is conceptually
interesting as a potential “swing” state and outlier in maritime

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 325

Southeast Asia. It follows that Malaysia could potentially pay a

relatively higher price than some of its maritime neighbours if
“forced to choose” its loyalties.

Conclusion
Southeast Asian attitudes towards the US rebalance have swung
back towards the narrative of “neglect” following the October 2013
federal government “shutdown” and cancelled presidential visits.
While the Obama administration has gone to substantial lengths to
seed bilateral and multilateral relations in Southeast Asia beyond
the superficial optic of attendance at annual summits, the diplomacy
behind the rebalance also relies on symbolic effects. The pendulum-
like swing back towards negative perceptions of Washington, as
domestically distracted and unable to sustain its attention on the
region, may be indicative of polarized regional narratives towards
the United States that are highly sensitive to presentational triggers.
Nonetheless, the fallout for the rebalance may be more than cosmetic,
given that none of the economic, diplomatic and security prongs
of the rebalance “trident” have yet reached an irreversible tipping
point in terms of regional acceptance, even from states that actively
support a strong US presence in the region.
Meanwhile, over a longer event horizon, the spectrum of
Southeast Asian perceptions of benefits, constraints and limitations
to the US rebalancing strategy is steadily widening. There is a
loose, geopolitical division within the region between continental
and maritime states that influences states’ orientation towards Great
Powers, with the “offshore” insular countries better disposed towards
an invigorated US presence. The divide, however, is porous, with
Vietnam and Malaysia serving as partial “outlier” counter-examples.
On the South China Sea, and the fundamental question lying behind
it about whether China poses a strategic threat to Southeast Asia,
ASEAN’s fragile unity has already been publicly shattered, causing
some of its individual members to seek closer relations with the
United States, while others tilt towards China. One of ASEAN’s long-
serving diplomatic rationales has been to “flatten” Southeast Asia’s
strategic geography, projecting an image of solidarity towards the
Great Powers that masks internal divisions, uppermost of which in
geopolitical terms is the continental versus maritime gap. Narrowing
this divide will require more than a reform of ASEAN’s decision-
making structures, but basically a new grand bargain among its
members. There is no sign yet that this is in prospect.

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 326 Euan Graham

NOTES
1
Alice Ba, “Systemic Neglect? A Reconsideration of US-Southeast Asia Policy”,
Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 (December 2009): 368–98.
2
Condoleezza Rice missed two out of the four annual ASEAN Regional Forums
held during her tenure as Secretary of State, in 2005 and 2007 respectively.
3
The terms “pivot” and “re-balance” are used interchangeably in this article.
However, the US policy focus on Asia under Obama was framed initially
more in terms of the “pivot” in State Department usage, associated in par-
­ticular with former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Kurt Campbell. The “re-balance” was more closely associated with
Pentagon parlance, but has since replaced the “pivot” as the preferred term
used in US official policy pronouncements, as seen for example in the
January 2012 Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense, signed by Barack Obama <www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_
Guidance.pdf>.
4
Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, November 2011,
<www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?
page=0,0>.
5
Donald Emmerson, “Challenging ASEAN: The US Pivot Through Southeast
Asia’s Eyes”, Global Asia 7, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 22–26.
6
Phillip Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia: US-China Relations and Regional
Security”, Strategic Forum [National Defense University], Number 281 (August
2013): 1–16.
7
Robert Sutter, “The Obama Administration and US Policy in Asia”, Contemporary
Southeast Asia 31, no. 2 (August 2009): 204–8.
8
Philip Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia”, op. cit. p. 5.
9
Sutter, “The Obama Administration”, op. cit., pp. 209–11.
10
Center for New American Security, “The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Rise of
Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties”, 2013, p. 8, <www.cnas.org/files/documents/
publications/CNAS_AsiaPowerWeb.pdf>.
11
See for example, Howard LaFranchi, “Obama cancels Asia trip: Is the US
‘pivot’ in jeopardy?”, Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 2013, and Andrew
Browne, “Asia Ponders U.S. Role Amid Syria Strife; Doubts Rise in Asia Over
U.S. Move to Rebalance Security Obligations Toward the Region”, Wall Street
Journal, 10 September 2013.
12
See for example Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Obama’s Summit Absence Needs to
be put in Perspective”, PacNet #76A, 15 October 2013.
13
National Bureau of Asian Research, “Roundtable Regional Perspectives on US
Strategic Rebalancing”, Asia Policy 15, no. 1 (January 2013): 1–44.
14
Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “Taiwan in an Asian ‘Game of Thrones’ ”,
ibid.
15
For a thoughtful analysis of the limitations to China’s international influence
deriving from its dominance as a trading power, see John Lee, “China: ‘largest

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 327

trading partner’ isn’t what it’s cracked up to be”, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute blog, The Strategist, 2 July 2013, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/author/
john-lee/>.
16
“Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on Asia-Pacific Policy”, 19 July 2013,
White House Website, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/
remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-asia-pacific-policy>.
17
Ernest Bower, “The U.S.-ASEAN Relationship in 2030”, Southeast Asia From
the Corner 3, issue 9 (10 May 2012): 1, <www.csis.org/publication/us-asean-
relationship-2030>.
18
On the US “perception problem”, see Christopher R. Hill, “The Obama Anti-
Doctrine”, Project Syndicate, 24 October 2013, <www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/on-the-causes-and-consequences-of-america-s-aimless-foreign-policy-
by-christopher-r--hill>.
19
“U.S. Engagement with ASEAN”, United States Mission to ASEAN, <www.
asean.usmission.gov/mission/participation.html>.
20
Renato Cruz de Castro, “The US-Philippine Alliance: An Evolving Hedge
against an Emerging China Challenge”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3
(December 2009): 409.
21
Ibid.
22
A recent Global Times editorial, for example, notes: “Thanks to its geopolitical
influence in this region, China possesses certain advantages that the White
House is envious of. Consequently, China has surpassed the US and become the
largest trading partner of ASEAN.” “SE Asia tests China’s diplomatic creativity”,
Global Times, 10 October 2013, <www.globaltimes.cn/content/816722.shtml#.
UnJVeCdQh3A>.
23
Andrew Higgins, “In Philippines, banana growers feel effect of South China
Sea dispute”, Washington Post, 10 June 2012, <www.articles.washingtonpost.
com/2012-06-10/world/35461588_1_chinese-fishermen-president-benigno-aquino-
iii-south-china-sea>.
24
Michaela Del Callar, “Aquino aborts expo attendance due to ‘unusual request’
by China”, GMA News, 2 September 2013, <www.gmanetwork.com/news/
story/324672/news/nation/aquino-aborts-expo-attendance-due-to-unusual-request-
by-china>.
25
The original “Pacific Four” or P4 agreement from which the TPP emerged
was concluded by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, in June 2005.
“Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations”, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, <www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-
Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/>.
26
Hugh White, The China Choice (Sydney: Black Inc, 2012).
27
Emmerson, “Challenging ASEAN”, op. cit, p. 25.
28
Evelyn Goh, “Evaluating Southeast Asian Strategies for Managing Great Power
Resurgence”, paper presented at a conference, The Growth of Chinese Power
and Changing Security Dynamics in Asia, S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, 22 February 2013, pp. 1–13. Cited with permission.
29
Ibid., p. 6.

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 328 Euan Graham

30
The LCS concept was conceived to enhance the US Navy’s ability to operate
in shallow water. It incorporates two radically different hull designs, each of
which are capable of supporting a variety of mission modules that in theory
can be swapped relatively quickly in order to meet changing requirements.
The first LCS, USS Freedom, arrived in Singapore in April 2013. However, the
LCS programme has encountered a number of mechanical and other teething
problems. Hence, it is likely to take several years to build up the “rotational”
presence. Euan Graham, “Freedom Arrives: What Next for the LCS?”, RSIS
Commentary 074/2013, 24 April 2013, <www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/
RSIS0742013.pdf>.
31
“(B)y 2020 the Navy will reposture its forces from today’s roughly 50/50 per
cent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between
those oceans. That will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of
our cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and submarines.” Keynote
speech, as delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, Shangri-La Hotel,
Singapore, 2 June 2012, US Department of Defense <www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1681>.
32
Peter Jennings, “The US Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: An Australian Perspective”,
“Roundtable Regional Perspectives”, op. cit.
33
Ibid.
34
See for example, “China closer to South China Sea Code of Conduct, Marty
says”, Jakarta Post, 3 May 2013, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/03/
china-closer-south-china-sea-code-conduct-marty-says.html>.
35
For example, General Martin Dempsey: “We’re not looking to station anybody
beyond where they are already based, because we do have to maintain a
balance of forward permanent presence and rotational presence.” Quoted by
Jim Garamone, “U.S.-Australia Conference Points to Possibilities”, American
Forces Press Service, 15 November 2012, <www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=118552>.
36
Ernest Bower, “Engagement in the Indo-Pacific: The Pentagon Leads By
Example”, Southeast Asia From the Corner IV, issue 17 (22 August 2013): 4,
<www.csis.org/publication/southeast-asia-corner-18th-k-streets-engagement-indo-
pacific-pentagon-leads-example>.
37
For example, according to Admiral Jonathan Greenert “2025 may see P-8A
Poseidon aircraft or unmanned broad area maritime surveillance aerial vehicles
periodically deploy to the Philippines or Thailand to help those nations with
maritime domain awareness”. Jonathan Greenert, “Navy 2015: Forward Warfighters”,
Proceedings 137, no. 12 (December 2011), <www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/
2011-12/navy-2025-forward-warfighters>.
38
Ernest Bower, “Engagement in the Indo-Pacific”, op. cit.
39
Sheldon Simon, “Philippines — An Exemplar of the US Rebalance”, Com­
parative Connections, September 2013, <www.csis.org/files/publication/1302qus_
seasia.pdf>.
40
Floyd Whaley, “Clinton Reaffirms Military Ties With the Philippines”, New York
Times, 16 November 2011, <www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/clinton-
reaffirms-military-ties-with-the-philippines.html?_r=0>.

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 329

41
Sheldon Simon, “Philippines”, op. cit.
42
Daljit Singh, “Pivoting Asia, Engaging China — American Strategy in East Asia
Today”, ISEAS Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
19 October 2012).
43
Ibid.
44
Since 2002 the US military has maintained a low-key but significant military
presence in southern Mindanao. From 2005 US forces provided direct non-
combat counter-terrorism support to the AFP. Larry Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf: Target
of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation”, US Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, 24 January 2007, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/
RL31265.pdf>.
45
Sam Bateman, “Grounding of USS Guardian in Philippines: Longer-term
Implications”, RSIS Commentary, Number 031/2013, S. Rajaratnam School
of International Studies, 15 February 2013, <www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/
Perspective/RSIS0312013.pdf>.
46
There is a parallel here with Vietnam’s earlier, unsuccessful attempt to enlist
ASEAN support for its claim (unique within ASEAN) to the Paracels during
the drafting process leading up to the 2002 DoC.
47
“The Emerging Asia Power Web”, op. cit., p. 29.
48
Goh, “Evaluating Southeast Asian Strategies”, op. cit.
49
Ibid.
50
Peter A. Dutton, “The Sino-Philippine Maritime Row: International Arbitration
and the South China Sea”, East and South China Sea Bulletin, Number 10,
Center for New American Security, 15 March 2013, pp. 1–9.
51
See for example, Nguyen Manh Hung, “Vietnam-US Relations: Past, Present
and Future”, Asia Pacific Bulletin [East-West Center], Number 69, 24 September
2010, <www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb069.pdf.>
52
US State Department, “Joint Statement on the Sixth U.S.-Vietnam Political,
Security, and Defense Dialogue”, 1 October 2013, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2013/10/215014.htm>.
53
“We appreciate and welcome the U.S. support for our stance … as well as the
stance of ASEAN related to this particular matter, and we appreciate the U.S.
support to solving the matter by peaceful means in accordance with international
law, Declaration on a Code of Conduct, and moving toward Code of Conduct.
We welcome the United States’ support as well as other countries’ support in
the matter in order to ensure peace, stability, prosperity not only in the East
Sea but also in the Asia Pacific and the world at large.” Joint remarks by
Presidents Troung Tan Sang and Barack Obama following their bilateral meeting
at the Oval Office, White House Office of the Press Secretary, 25 July 2013,
<www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/25/remarks-president-obama-and-
president-truong-tan-sang-vietnam-after-bila>.
54
Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam and the United States: Convergence but not
Congruence of Strategic Interests in the South China Sea”, paper presented to
the 4th Engaging With Vietnam Interdisciplinary Dialogue Conference, East-West
Center, Honolulu, 8–9 November 2012.

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55
Goh, “Evaluating Southeast Asian Strategies”, op. cit., p. 10.
56
Harsh Pant, “The India-Vietnam Axis”, Wall Street Journal, 22 September 2011,
<online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111903791504576584653465899250>.
57
Tim Huxley, “Singapore and the US: not quite allies”, The Strategist [Australian
Strategic Policy Institute], 30 July 2012, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/singapore-
and-the-us-not-quite-allies/>.
58
During the period 2010–13, US Navy vessels accounted for an annualised average
of one-third of foreign warships calling into Changi Naval Base (personal com­
munication with the US Senior Defense Official, Singapore). For Sembawang,
excluding refuelling operations, the US Navy accounted for 106 calls out of a
total of 127 in FY2010–11; 96 out of 151 in FY2011–12 and 110 out of 138 in
FY2012–13 (figures supplied via personal communication with the Royal Navy
Liaison Office, Sembawang wharves).
59
Barry Desker, “The Eagle and the Panda: An Owl’s View from Southeast Asia”,
Asia Policy 15, no. 1 (January 2013): 26–30.
60
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, “China and the World — Prospering and
Progressing Together”, Speech to the Central Party School in China (English
Translation), 6 September 2012, <www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/
speechesninterviews/primeminister/2012/September/speech_by_prime_
ministerleehsienloongatcentralpartyschoolenglish.html#.UnHNbOv2MdU>.
61
Cited in Goh, “Evaluating Southeast Asian Strategies”, op. cit., p. 9.
62
Cited in “Singapore warns US against anti-China election rhetoric”, BBC News
Online, 9 February 2012, <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16958611>.
63
Andrew Browne, “Asia Ponders U.S. Role Amid Syria Strife; Doubts Rise in
Asia Over U.S. Move to Rebalance Security Obligations Toward the Region”,
Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2013.
64
Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Remarks at the APEC CEO
Summit 2013 Panel Discussion, 6 October 2013, Prime Minister’s Office,
Singapore, <www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/speechesninterviews/
primeminister/2013/October/transcript-of-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-s-remarks-
at-the-pa.html#.UnHVZOv2MdU>.
65
C. Raja Mohan, “India: Between ‘Strategic Autonomy’ and ‘Geopolitical
Opportunity’”, in “Roundtable: Regional Perspectives”, op. cit.
66
The designation “Major Non-NATO ally” is less impressive than it sounds,
grouping Thailand along with other countries including Argentina, Morocco
and Pakistan, qualifying them as partners for the purposes of receiving military
assistance or defence exports. US-Thailand security relations date back to the
signing of the 1954 Manila Pact, the foundation treaty for the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organisation. While the latter arrangement formally lapsed in 1977, the
Manila Pact remains in force.
67
Kitti Prasirtsuk, “The Implications of US Strategic Rebalancing: A Perspective
from Thailand”, in “Roundtable: Regional Perspectives”, op. cit., p. 32.
68
Ibid., p. 33.
69
Ibid., p. 35.

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 Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 331

70
Ibid.
71
National Aeronautical Space Administration, “Southeast Asia Composition,
Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study (SEAC4RS) Planning Document”,
National Aeronautical Space Administration, 21 October 2010, <www.espo.nasa.
gov/pub/SEAC4RS-overview-21OCT2010.pdf>.
72
Carl Thayer’s blow-by-blow reconstruction of the AMM concludes that while
opinion is “divided on the details of and extent to which China influenced
Cambodia’s decision to block the AMM joint communiqué … few analysts argue
that Cambodia acted independently”. See “ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community Building?”, Japan Focus, undated
article, <www.japanfocus.org/-Carlyle_A_-Thayer/3813#sthash.Gn7fvbVY.dpuf>.
73
“Joint Statement of the Fourth United States-Thailand Strategic Dialogue”,
US Department of State, 14 June 2012, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/
192397.htm>.
74
Ibid., p. 35.
75
Thitinan, “US-China Obama’s Summit Absence”, op. cit.
76
Ibid.
77
Kitti Prasirtsuk, “The Implications of US Strategic Rebalancing: A Perspective
from Thailand”, op. cit.
78
See, for example, “Address by H.E. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on the Conferement (sic.) of the Doctorate
of Letters by the Macquarie University”, Sydney, 15 July 2013, <kemlu.go.id/
Documents/Remarks%20Menlu%20di%20Sydney/Remarks%20Dr.%20Marty%20
Natalegawa.pdf>.
79
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “An Indonesian Perspective on the US Rebalancing Effort
toward Asia”, National Bureau for Asian Research Commentary, 26 February
2013, <www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=320>.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
Bower, “Engagement in the Indo-Pacific”, op. cit.
83
Goh, “Evaluating Southeast Asian Strategies”, op. cit.
84
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “An Indonesian Perspective”, op. cit.
85
Ibid.
86
The IMSS consists of 18 coastal surveillance stations, 11 ship-based radars,
2 regional command centres and 2 fleet command centres in Jakarta and
Surabaya.
87
“Remarks by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs Mark Lippert At CSIS-Georgetown-U.S. Studies Center Conference The
Rebalance: One Year Later”, Georgetown Asian Studies Multimedia, 27 February
2013, <www.aspmedia.org/2013/podcast/the-rebalance-to-asia-remarks-by-assistant-
secretary-of-defense-aspa-mark-lippert/>.
88
Cheryl Pallerin, “Hagel Underscores Commitment to Partnership with Malaysia”,
American Forces Press Service, US Department of Defense, 25 August 2013,
<www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120670>.

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89
Malaysia and Israel do not have diplomatic ties.
90
Text of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Between the Government
of the United States and the Government of Malaysia, available from the US
Department of State Document database, <www.state.gov/documents/organization/
95585.pdf>.
91
Kuik Cheng Chwee, “Malaysia’s U.S. Policy Under Najib: Ambivalence No
More”, RSIS Working Paper Number 250, S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, Singapore, 5 November 2012, <www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/
WorkingPapers/WP250.pdf>.
92
William Choong, “Salami Slicing ASEAN Solidarity”, Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, The Strategist, 6 September 2013, <www.aspistrategist.org.
au/salami-slicing-asean-solidarity/>.
93
Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Malaysia to establish marine corps, naval base close to
James Shoal”, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 October 2013, <www.janes.com/
article/28438/malaysia-to-establish-marine-corps-naval-base-close-to-james-shoal>.

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