Drugs Juris 3

FIRST DIVISION
February 20, 2017
G.R. No. 208093
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the June 14, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C.
No. 00902, which affirmed the August 31, 2010 Judgment2 of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Zamboanga City in Criminal Case Nos. 5021 (19952) and 5022 (19953), finding appellant Salim
Ismael y Radang (Salim) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. In Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952), Salim was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165; and in Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953), he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years and pay a fine of
₱300,000.00 for illegal possession of shabu under Section 11 of the said law.
Factual Antecedents
Salim was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling and
possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The twin Informations3 instituted therefor
alleged:
In Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952)
That on or about August 25, 2003, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver,
transport, distribute or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver to SPO1 Roberto Alberto Santiago, PNP, Culianan Police
Station, who acted as poseur buyer, one (1) small size transparent plastic pack containing white
crystalline substance as certified to by PO1 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan as METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU), said accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953)
That on or about August 25, 2003, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control, two (2)
small size heat-sealed transparent plastic packs each containing white crystalline substance as
certified to by PO1 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan asMETHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU),
said accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on July 6, 2004, Salim, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges. Upon
termination of the joint pre-trial conference, trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution

Culled from the records4 were the following operative facts:
On August 25, 2003, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant reported to
SPO4 Menardo Araneta [SPO4 Araneta], Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Culianan Police
Station4 [at Zamboanga City], that a certain "Ismael Salim" was engaged in
selling shabu at Barangay Talabaan near the Muslim [c]emetery [in that city.
To verify the report, SPO4 Araneta instructed the said informant to [monitor] the area. After the
informant confim1ed that the said Ismael Salim was indeed selling illegal drugs in the reported area,
SPO4 Araneta formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO1 Enriquez, SPO1 Eduardo N. Rodriguez
(SPO1 Rodriguez), SPO1 Roberto A. Santiago (SPO1 Santiago) and PO2 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan
(PO2 Tan). It was then agreed that SPO1 Santiago would act as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rodriguez
as back-up. For the purpose, SPO4 Araneta gave SPO1 Santiago a [₱100] bill bearing Serial No.
M419145 as marked money [to be used] in the buy-bust operation.
Upon arrival at Barangay Talabaan, the team parked their service vehicle along the road. SPO1
Santiago, the confidential informant and SPO1 Rodriguez alighted from the vehicle and walked
towards the [area fronting] the Muslim cemetery. As they approached the area, the informant pointed
to a man wearing a brown T-shirt and black short pants with white towel around his neck [whom he
identified] as appellant Ismael Salim, the target of the operation.
SPO1 Santiago then [walked] towards appellant and [told] the latter that he [wanted] to buy shabu; to
this appellant replied "how much?" SPO1 Santiago answered that he [wanted to buy ₱100.00 worth
of the shabu, and gave appellant] the ₱100.00 marked money; [whereupon appellant] took from his
left pocket one plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance [which he] handed over to
SPO1 Santiago.
Upon seeing the exchange, SPO1 Rodriguez, who was positioned [some 10] meters away, rushed in
and arrested appellant[.] SPO1 Rodriguez made a precautionary search of appellant's body for any
concealed weapon[, and found none]. Instead, SPO1 Rodriguez found, tucked inside [appellant's left
front pocket the ₱100.00] marked money and two (2) more plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance wrapped in a golden cigarette paper.
The police officers then brought appellant to the Culianan Police Station [in Zamboanga City] with
SPO1 Santiago keeping personal custody of the items confiscated from [him]. At the [police] station,
the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation, the two
(2) plastic sachets also containing white crystalline substance[, and the ₱100.00] marked money
bearing Serial No. M419145 recovered from appellant's left pocket, were respectively turned over by
SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez to the Desk Officer, PO3 Floro Napalcruz [PO3 Napalcruz],
who likewise turned [these over] to the Duty Investigator, [PO2 Tan]. PO2 Tan then placed his initial
"RDT" on the items recovered from appellant.
PO2 Tan also prepared a request to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory 9, [at] Zamboanga City for
laboratory examination of the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance subject of the
sale between appellant and SPO1 Santiago, and the other two (2) plastic sachet[s] found inside
appellant's pocket by SPO1 Rodriguez.
After conducting qualitative examination on the said specimens, Police Chief Inspector [PCI]
Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist [Forensic Chemist Diestro], issued Chemistry Report No. D-
367-2003 dated August 25, 2003, finding [the above-mentioned] plastic sachets positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) a dangerous drug.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. Appellant denied both charges; he denied
selling shabu to SPO1 Santiago, just as he denied having shabu in his possession when he was
arrested on August 25, 2003.
According to appellant, on August 25, 2003, he went to a store to buy cellphone load so that he
could call his wife. After buying the cellphone load, he went back to his house on board a sikad-
sikad, a bicycle-driven vehicle with a sidecar. When he was about 160 meters away from the Muslim
cemetery in Barangay Talabaan, he was arrested by five persons in civilian attire who introduced
themselves as police officers. The police officers conducted a search on his person but did not find
any dangerous dn1gs. Thereafter, he was brought to Culianan Police Station where he was detained
for two days. Appellant insisted that he never sold shabu to the police officers who arrested him. He
said that the first time he saw the alleged shabu was when it was presented before the trial court. He
denied that the police officers had confiscated a cellular phone from him. He also asserted that all
these police officers took away from him was his money and that he had never met the said police
officers prior to his arrest.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 31, 2010, the RTC of Zamboanga City, Branch 12 rendered its Judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Sections 5 and 11,Article II of RA 9165.
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez who
conducted the buy-bust operation against appellant; it rejected appellant's defense of denial and
frame-up. The RTC noted that the defense of frame-up is easily concocted and is commonly used as
a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the comprehensive
dangerous drugs act.5 Moreover, other than the self-serving statements of appellant, no clear and
convincing exculpatory evidence was presented in the present case.
The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING; this Court hereby finds the accused herein,
SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases, for violation of Sections 5
and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 and hereby sentences the said accused, in Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952) for
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00), and in Criminal
Case No. 5022 (19953) for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to suffer the
penalty of Imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and to
pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The dangerous drugs seized and recovered from the accused in these cases are hereby ordered
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 and its in1plementing rules and guidelines.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Dissatisfied with the RTC's verdict, appellant appealed to the CA, but on June 14, 2013, the CA
affirmed in toto the RTC's Judgment. The CA held that the elements of both illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs had been duly proven in the instant case. The CA joined the RTC in
giving full credence to the testimonies of the aforementioned police officers, as they are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, no evidence to the contrary having been adduced
in the twin cases. Moreover, the CA found that in these cases, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drugs had not at all been compromised, but were in fact duly preserved.
The CA disposed as fol1ows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch 12,
Zamboanga City finding accused-appellant Salim Ismael y Radang guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.7
Taking exception to the CA's Decision, appellant instituted the present appeal before this Court and
in his Appellant's Brief8 argues that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN

[HIS] GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.9
It is appellant's contention that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because the
prosecution: (1) failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs allegedly seized from him and;
(2) likewise failed to comply with the strict requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165.
Our Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, 1he
prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.10 What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the
object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same
drugs seized from the accused.
On the other hand, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
established: "[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not
authorized by law; and [3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs."11
In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized from
the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the
integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of
custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed."12
After a careful examination of the records of the case, we find that the prosecution failed to establish
an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs in violation of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
The pertinent provisions of Section 21 state:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment-The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof;
Similarly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) further elaborate on the proper procedure
to be followed in Section 21(a) of RA 9165. It states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, inm1ediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further that non-compliance with these requirement" under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
In Mallillin v. People,13 the Court explained the chain of custody rule as follows:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent clain1s it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which
it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same. (Emphasis supplied)
The first link in the chain is the marking of the seized drug. We have previously held that:
x x x Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, 'planting,' or
contamination of evidence.14
It is important that the seized drugs be immediately marked, if possible, as soon as they are seized
from the accused.
Furthermore, in People v. Gonzales,15 the Court explained that:
The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related
items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying
signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon
arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of
dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to
set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment
they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby
forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately
upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the
preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, SPO1 Rodriguez testified on the seizure of the sachets of shabu he found in appellant's
possession alter the latter was arrested. SPO1 Rodriguez shared the details of how the seized drugs
were handled following its confiscation as follows:
RSP II Ivan C. Mendoza, Jr.:
Q: You are telling the Honorable Court that instead of finding concealed weapon, yon x x x found two
small sized heat-sealed transparent plastic bag[s]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where [were] these two small[-]sized heat-sealed transparent plastic [packs] found?
A: [In] his left-front pocket.

Q: Were they wrapped further in another piece of paper or were they just found in that pocket?
A: [They were] wrapped in a [golden-colored] cigarette paper.
Q: Would you x x x be able to remember that [golden- colored] cigarette paper? The wrapper of
plastic pack?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why will you be able to remember it?
A: Because I turned it over to the desk officer and the desk officer turned it over to the
investigator, the investigator marked it.
Q: Who is the investigator?
A: PO2 Rodolfo Tan.
Q: So did you see anything that the investigator Rodolfo Tan do in that golden paper?
A: He marked his initial [sic].
Q: Ah, you saw him [mark] an initial?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you see him [mark] on the paper?
A: RDT.
Q: And do you know the meaning of RDT?
A: Yes, Rodolfo Dagalea Tan. 16
The testimony of SPO l Rodriguez on the chain of custody of the seized drugs leaves much to be
desired. It is evident that there was a break in the very first link of the chain when he failed to mark
the sachet'3 of shabu immediately upon seizing them from the appellant. According to SPO1
Rodriguez, after finding sachets of shabu in appellant's possession, he turned the drugs over to the
desk officer. SPO1 Rodriguez did not even explain why he failed to mark or why he could not have
marked the seized items immediately upon confiscation. Allegedly, the desk officer, after receiving
the seized items from SPO1 Rodriguez, in turn handed them over to PO2 Tan. Notably, this desk
officer was not presented in court thereby creating another break in the chain of custody. Again, no
explanation was offered for the non-presentation of the desk officer or why he himself did not mark
the seized items. It was only upon receipt by PO2 Tan, allegedly from the desk officer, of the seized
chugs that the same were marked at the police station. This means that from the time the drugs
were seized from appellant until the time PO2 Tan marked the same, there was already a significant
gap in the chain of custody. Because of this gap, there is no certainty that the sachets of drugs
presented as evidence in the trial court were the same drugs found in appellant's possession.
SPO1 Santiago, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, was presented to corroborate the
testimony of SPO1 Rodriguez. However, his testimony likewise showed that the arresting officers did
not mark the seized drugs immediately after the arrest and in the presence of the appellant.
Similarly, no explanation was given for the lapse. SPO1 Santiago testified as follows:
Q: So what did you do with the small transparent sachet after police officer Rodriguez came to assist
you?
A: After the arrest of a certain Ismael we proceeded to our police station when we arrived
there I turnover [sic] the transparent sachet to our desk officer.
Q: Who was the desk officer?
A: At that time it was PO3 Floro Napalcruz.
Q: Did you notice anything that he did with the specimen that you turnover [sic] to him, if any?
COURT: You are referring to the desk officer?
RSPII IVAN C. MENDOZA, JR.: Yes, Your Honor.
A: During that time, Your Honor, I gave to him the, [sic] which I buy from him [sic] the one (1) piece
of transparent small sachet of shabu then after that I get [sic] out from the office.17
During cross-examination, SPO1 Santiago reiterated that he did not mark the seized drugs. The
sachets were marked after they were received by PO2 Tan.
Q: Now, you said that this plastic sachet taken from the suspect, you turned it over to the desk officer
of the police station?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After turning it over, you left?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You do not know what happened to the sachet?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not place your markings there?
A: None, sir.18
It is clear from the above that SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago did not mark the seized drugs
immediately after they were confiscated from appellant. No explanations were given why markings
were not immediately made. At this stage in the chain, there was already a significant break such
that there can be no assurance against switching, planting, or contamination. The Court has
previously held that, "failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused
casts doubt on the prosecution evidence warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt."19
Both arresting officers testified that they turned over the sachets of shabu to a desk officer in the
person of PO3 Napalcruz at the police station. Notably, PO3 Napalcruz was not presented in court to
testify on the circumstances surrounding the alleged receipt of the seized drugs. This failure to
present PO3 Napalcruz is another fatal defect in an already broken chain of custody. Every person
who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it was handled and preserved while in his or
her custody to prevent any switching or replacement.
After PO3 Napalcruz, the seized drugs were then turned over to PO2 Tan. It was only at this point
that marking was done on the seized drugs. He revealed in his testimony the following:
4th ACP RAY Z. BONGABONG:
Q: [After the apprehension] of the accused in this case, what happened?
A: SPO1 Roberto Santiago turned over to the Desk Officer one (1) small size heat-sealed
transparent plastic pack containing shabu, allegedly a buy[-]bust stuff confiscated from the subject
person and marked money while SPO1 Eduardo Rodriguez turned over two (2) small size heat[-
]sealed transparent plastic packs allegedly confiscated from the possession of the subject person
during a body search conducted and one (1) Nokia cellphone 3310 and cash money of ₱710.00.
x x xx
Q: You as investigator of the case what did you do, if any, upon the turn over of those items?
A: I prepared a request for laboratory examination addressed to the Chief PNP Crime Laboratory 9,
R. T. Lim Boulevard, this City.
Q: This small heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet if you can see this again, will you be able to
identify the same?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How?
A: Through my initial, Sir.
Q: What initial?
A: RDT
Q: What does RDT stands [sic] for?
A: It stands for my name Rodolfo Dagalea Tan.20
In fine, PO2 Tan claimed during his direct examination that he received the seized items from the
desk officer.
During cross-examination, however, PO2 Tan contradicted his previous statement on who turned
over the sachets of shabu to him, viz.:
ATTY. EDGARDO D. GONZALES:
Q: Santiago told you that he was the poseur buyer?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: He turned over to you, what?
A: He turned over to me small size heat[-]sealed transparent plastic pack containing white
crystalline substance, containing shabu.
x x xx
Q: You also identified two other pieces of sachet, correct, Sir?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Who turned over to you?
A: SPO1 Eduardo Rodriguez.21
Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized item subject of
the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of the illegal possession case. This
is material considering that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of shabu depends on the
quantity or weight of the seized drug.
Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting officers also
failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the presence of the appellant. This
requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It must be shown that the marking
was done in the presence of the accused to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were
properly preserved. Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.
The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs were
likewise omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. This break in the chain
tainted the integrity of the seized drugs presented in court; the very identity of the seized drugs
became highly questionable.
To recap, based on the evidence of the prosecution, it is clear that no markings were made
immediately after the arrest of the appellant. The seized drugs were allegedly turned over to desk
1âwphi1
officer PO3 Napalcruz but the prosecution did not bother to present him to testify on the identity of
the items he received from SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago. PO3 Napalcruz supposedly turned
over the drugs to PO2 Tan who marked the same at the police station. During his direct testimony,
PO2 Tan claimed that he received the drugs from PO3 Napalcruz. However, during his cross-
examination, PO2 Tan contradicted himself when he admitted receipt of the seized drugs from SPO1
Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez. Aside from these glaring infirmities, there was no inventory made, or
photographs taken, of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused or his representative, or in
the presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected official,
who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory as required by RA 9165 and its IRR.
Lastly, we note that the trial court, in its November 12, 2007 Order, already denied the admission of
Exhibits ''B-1" and "B-2" or the dn1gs subject of the illegal possession case. The relevant portions of
the Order are as follows:
Plaintiff's Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2" however are DENIED admission on the grounds that Exhibit "B-1"
submitted by the prosecution in evidence is merely a cigarette foil, whereas Exhibit "B-2" is a heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.0135 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride which
are inconsistent with its offer that Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2" are two (2) plastic heat sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing shabu with a total weight of 0.0310 gram.22
Surprisingly, however, the trial court rendered a verdict convicting the appellant of violating Section
11, RA 9165 on illegal possession of dangerous drugs based on the same pieces of evidence it
previously denied.
In sum, we find that the prosecution failed to: (1) overcome the presumption of innocence which
appellai1t enjoys; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of
custody of the seized drugs; and (3) offer any explanation why the provisions of Section 21, RA 9165
were not complied with. This Court is thus constrained to acquit the appellant based on reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed June 14, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR HC No. 00902, which affirmed the August 31, 2010 Judgment of Branch 12,
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in Criminal Case Nos. 5021 (19952) and 5022 (19953)
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, appellant Salim R. Ismael is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant,
unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the Court of the date of his
release or reason for his continued confinement within five days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. caguioa

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
CA rollo, pp. 101-109; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and concurred in by
Associate Justices Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and Edward B. Contreras.
2
Records, pp. 88-101; penned by Presiding Judge Gregorio V. De La Pena, III.
3
Id. at 1-2.
4
CA rollo, pp. 103-104.
5
Records, p. 98.
6
Id. at 100.
7
CA rollo, p. 108.
8
Id. at 14-34.
9
Id. at 16.
10
People v. Alberto, 625 Phil. 545, 554 (2010) citing People v. Dumlao, 584 Phil. 732, 739
(2009).
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 686 Phil. 137, 148 (2012) citing People v. Sembrano, 642 Phil.
11
476, 490-491 (2010).
Fajardo v. People, 691 Phil. 752, 758-759 (2012) citing People v. Gutierrez, 614 Phil. 285,
12
293 (2009).
13
576 Phil. 576, 587 (2008).
14
People v. Coreche, 612 Phil. 1238, l 244 (2009).
15
708 Phil. 121, 130-131 (2013).
16
TSN, December 8, 2006, pp. 7-8.
17
TSN, March 8, 2007, pp. 23-24.
18
TSN, March 9, 2007, p. 27.
People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1050 (2012), citing People v. Coreche, supra note
19
14; People v. Laxa, 414 Phil. 156 (2001); People v. Casimiro, 432 Phil. 966 (2002).
20
TSN, July 13, 2007, pp. 14-17.
21
Id. at 42-48.
22
Records, p. 68.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183700 October 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily weaken the
State's case against the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on
the pre-arranged signal from the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his
nonpresentation must be credibly explained and the transaction established by other ways in order
to satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the arresting lawmen did not
themselves participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2003, an information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 91651 (RA 9165)
was filed charging Pablito Andaya y Reano (Andaya). The accusatory portion of the information
reads:
That on or about December 16, 2002 at around 9:50 o'clock in the evening at Brgy. San Jose Sico,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell,
dispense or deliver, more or less 0.09 gram(s) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, which is a clear violation of the above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment,3 Andaya pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The CA summed up the versions of the parties, as follows:4
Five (5) witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: SPO4 Delfin Alea, SPO3 Nelio
Lopez, SPO2 Danilo Mercado, SPO4 Protasio Marasigan and Jupri Delantar.
SPO2 Delfin Alea testified that at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 16, 2002, their
asset who was conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya in Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas
City, arrived at their station. Said asset reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito. A
team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto
Villar and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of ₱100.00 bills both
duly marked "X" were recorded in the police blotter. Alea gave the marked bills to the asset. Upon
reaching the designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and occupied different
positions where they could see and observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Pablito's
house. Pablito came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito the marked
money. The asset received something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal signifying
consummation of the transaction was given. The team members approached Pablito and the asset,
introduced themselves as police officers and arrested accused. He was brought to the police station.
The arrival of the team was recorded in the police blotter. The merchandise handed by accused to
the asset was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. The
specimen was positive for methampethamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
SPO2 Lopez received the person of the accused, the marked money and the item accused handed
to the asset. Lopez prepared the request for laboratory examination. He also prepared the
documents required for filing of the case with the Public Prosecutor.
SPO2 Danilo Mercado recorded the marked bills in the police blotter before the buy-bust. Upon the
team's return, the marked money and the merchandise from accused were turned over to SPO2
Mercado. He prepared a complaint sheet. Thereafter, he turned over accused and the evidence to
the Police Investigator.
SPo4 Protacio Marasigan received a written request for laboratory examination of the subject
merchandise. He brought the request to the crime laboratory in Laguna.
Jupri Delantar, a Forensic Chemical Officer in Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna, conducted the
examination. The merchandise tested positive for shabu.
Accused-appellant denied the charge. He stated that at about 9: 15 in the evening of December 16,
2002 he was at home watching TV with his family when police officers arrived. When he opened the
door, a police officer poked his gun at him. Somebody else held a long firearm. Pablito was
handcuffed and brought outside. He refused to negotiate and asked for a warrant. The policemen
searched the house, turned over the beddings and uncovered their furniture. No gun nor shabu was
found. Pablito was brought to the police station and detained. After three (3) days he was released.
He received a subpoena from the Public Prosecutor afterwards.
His wife Crisanta, corroborated appellants' testimony. She added having told her husband about the
loss of their cellphone and the money in his wallet. She was asked to produce ₱5,000.00 which she
was unable to do. She was able to raise only ₱2,000.00.
Judgment of the RTC
On February 21, 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, in Batangas City (R TC) rendered its
judgment convicting Andaya as charged, and meted him the penalty of life imprisonment,5 viz:
In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation conducted on the night of December 16, 2002 is supported
by the police blotter wherein not only was the depaiiure and arrival of the operatives have been duly
recorded but also the two (2) pieces of marked one hundred peso bills. The arrest of the accused
was made after the police asset had given the pre-arranged signal outside his house. The marked
money was recovered from the very hand of the accused while the deck of crystalline substances
given to the asset upon the latter's handing over to the accused the marked money has been turned
over to the police by the asset. The crystalline substance when examined at the police crime
laboratory was found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride a dangerous and prohibited drug
and weighed 0.09 gram.
These foregoing facts have been clearly testified to by the Prosecution witnesses who are members
of the Philippine Integrated National Police Force stationed at Batangas City. No ill-motive has been
imputed to any of these police officers prior to and at the time the herein accused was arrested on
the night of December 16, 2002.
The accused and his wife as a defense denied the sale of shabu that fateful night. There were
allegations in their testimonies that the police demanded money from them. The wife of the accused
even testified that she gave P 1,500.00 to the police officer who then eventually released said
accused. And early on, she even claimed money and a cellphone were missing after the accused
was arrested in their house.
The testimonies of the accused and his wife are bereft of any corroborating evidence emanating
from a disinterested source. It is no less than self-serving devoid of any credence considering the
following circumstances:
1. Scrutinizing the entirety of the testimony of the accused and his wife Crisanta Andaya,
there are material variances gleaned therefrom. The accused himself never testified that he
was pushed to a chair and yet witness Crisanta Andaya said she saw her husband pushed to
a chair. Also, the accused said there were two guns poked at him when he opened the door
but his wife said only one was holding a gun while another had a long firearm on his
shoulder.
2. The testimony of the accused was that only ₱500.00 was taken by the police before his
release. But the wife said ₱1,500.00 was given to the police before the accused was
released. 3. The accused and his wife never made any complaint to the proper authorities as
regards the alleged loss of money and cellphone when the accused was arrested on
December 16, 2002. Neither was there any complaint filed by them for the alleged ₱500.00
or Pl1500.00 demanded from and given by them to the police.
4. The accused was a resident of Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City since the 1980's
why was it that it was at Rosario, Batangas where the accused was arrested. The Defense
gave no evidence to contest the presumption of guilt based on flight.
5. It is significant to note also that the accused never bothered to ask who was knocking at
his door past 9:00 o'clock in the evening. While his family was already lying in bed to sleep
he was still watching T.V. These actuations of the accused tend to support the fact that the
police asset had made a deal with the accused for the sale of shabu and was expecting the
asset to come that night.
In the light of all foregoing considerations, the Court is left with no alternative than to find the herein
accused criminally liable for the offense charged in the information.
Wherefore, accused Pablito Andaya y Reano is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. He is therefore sentenced to undergo life imprisonment
and to pay the costs of this action. The 0.09 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride subject of this
case is confiscated and directed to be proceeded against pursuant to law.
The accused may be credited with his preventive imprisonment if he is entitled to any.
SO ORDERED.6
Decision of the CA
In his appeal, Andaya contended:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S

SEARCH AND ARREST AS ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAIL URE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On February 11, 2008, the CA promulgated its assailed decision affirming the conviction,8 viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of Branch IV, RTC,
Fourth Judicial Region, Batangas City, in Criminal Case No. 12771 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Issues
Hence, Andaya appeals, insisting that the search of his house and his person and his arrest by the
police officers violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and that
the Prosecution's nonpresentation of the confidential informant was adverse to the Prosecution,
indicating that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and ( b) that the
dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti.10
We reiterate that a buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug
pusher.11 In such operation, the poseur buyer transacts with the suspect by purchasing a quantity of
the dangerous drug and paying the price agreed upon, and in turn the drug pusher turns over or
delivers the dangerous drug subject of their agreement in exchange for the price or other
consideration. Once the transaction is consummated, the drug pusher is arrested, and can be held
to account under the criminal law. The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust
operation is that the suspect is arrested in jlagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or
is in the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting
police officer or private person.12 The arresting police officer or private person is favored in such
instance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State,
and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond
reasonable doubt.13 This responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the
presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence.14
Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur buyer
himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-
arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-
bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya.
However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to
describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have
been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly
witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being
positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed
transaction.
The CA did not find anything wrong or odd in the non-presentation of the poseur buyer as a witness
against the accused. In fact, it justified the non-presentation as follows:
Appellant also questioned the failure of the prosecution to present the informer. The court is aware
of the considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution.
There is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. (People v.
Khor, 307 SCRA 295 [1999], citing People v. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995].) Foremost is the desire
to protect them from being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they
become known. (People vs. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004.)
In People vs Lopez (214 SCRA 323), it was held that there was no need for the prosecution to
present the confidential informer as the poseur buyer himself positively identified the accused as the
one who sold to him one deck of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." The trial court then
properly relied on the testimonies of the police officers despite the decision of the prosecution not to
present the informer.15
The foregoing justification by the CA was off-tangent and does not help the State's cause any. It is
1âw phi1
obvious that the rulings cited to supp01i the need to conceal the confidential infonnants' identities
related to the confidential informants who gave information against suspected drug dealers. The
presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those instances could
be excused because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused. In this case,
however, it was different, because the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were one and the
same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya.
Indeed, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 punishes "any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." Under the law,
selling was any act "of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical whether for money or any other consideration;"16 while delivering was any act "of knowingly
passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without
consideration."17 Given the legal characterizations of the acts constituting the offense charged, the
members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that they had seen
from their positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave something to
the poseur buyer. If the transaction was a sale, it was unwarranted to infer from such testimonies of
the members of the buy-bust team that what the poseur buyer handed over were the marked
₱100.00 bills and that what Andaya gave to the poseur buyer was the shabu purchased.
Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the reliance by the members of
the buy-bust team on the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. To start with, the record does
not show what the prearranged signal consisted of. It is fundamental enough to expect the State to
be clear and definite about its evidence of guilt, particularly here where the conviction of Andaya
would require him to spend the rest of his natural life behind bars. Nothing less should be done here.
Secondly, the reliance on the supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction
between the poseur buyer and Andaya was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly hearsay
character of the signal rendered it entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting members of the
buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the
consummation of the transaction. Their interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the
testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that
threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to
confront and test the credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it.
We should look at the situation of Andaya with utmost caution because of what our judicial
experience through the years has told us about unscrupulous lawmen resorting to stratagems of
false incrimination in order to arrest individuals they target for ulterior reasons. In this case, the arrest
did not emanate from probable cause, for the formless signal from the anonymous poseur buyer did
not establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. 1âwphi 1
In affirming the RTC's conviction of the accused, the CA observed that the defense of frame-up put
up by the accused was discredited by the absence of proof of "any intent on the paii of the police
authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty stands."18 Such outright rejection by the lower courts of Andaya's defense
of frame-up is not outrightly binding. For sure, the frame-up defense has been commonly used in
prosecutions based on buy-bust operations that have led to the an-est of the suspects.19 Its use
might be seen as excessive, but the failure of the accused to impute any ill motives to falsely
incriminate them should not deter us from scrutinizing the circumstances of the cases brought to us
for review. We should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the
crimes they have been charged with. The State must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of ill
motive to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them, then that would be the end of our
dutiful vigilance to protect our citizenry from false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware
that there have been in the past many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that
should heighten our resolve to strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.
Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just because the
lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the regularity of their performance of duty. The
presumed regularity is nothing but a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and
time-consuming task of establishing every detail of the performance by officials and functionaries of
the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much stronger and much firmer presumption of
innocence in favor of every person whose life, property and liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture
on the strength of a false accusation of committing some crime.20 The criminal accusation against a
person must be substantiated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court should steadfastly
safeguard his right to be presumed innocent. Although his innocence could be doubted, for his
reputation in his community might not be lily-white or lustrous, he should not fear a conviction for any
crime, least of all one as grave as drug pushing, unless the evidence against him was clear,
competent and beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the presumption of innocence in his favor
would be rendered empty.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on February 11,
2008; ACQUITS accused Pablito Andaya y Reano for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; and ORDERS his immediate release from confinement at the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City.
The Court DIRECTS that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement the immediate
release of Pablito Andaya y Reano, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause; and to report
his compliance within ten days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
2
Records, p. 1.
3
Id. at 17-18.
4
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
5
6
Id. at 40-42.
7
Id. at 23.
8
Rollo, pp. 2-10; penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with the
concurrence of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of the Comi) and
Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza.
9
CA rollo, p. 93.
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 123, 130; People v.
10
Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 303.
11
People v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013, 690 SCRA 159, 173.
12
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxxx
13
People v. Capuno, G.R. No. 185715, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 233, 242-243.
14
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 207.
15
Rollo, p. 7.
16
Section 3 (Definitions), ii, of Republic Act No. 9165.
17
Section 3 (Definitions), k, of Republic Act No. 9165.
18
Rollo, p. 9.
19
Cacao v. People, G.R. No. 180870, January 22, 2010, 610 SCRA 636, 650.
20
People v. Capuno, G.R. No. 185175, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 233, 252.
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 192261

THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
- versus - VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
GARET SALCENA Y ABAD,

VICTORINO,
Accused-Appellant. PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
November 16, 2011
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the February 9, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02894, which affirmed the July 10, 2007
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City, (RTC) in Criminal
Case No. Q-05-134553, finding accused Garet Salcena y Victorino (Salcena) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering
her to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
In the Information[3] dated May 24, 2005, Salcena, together with a certain
Arlene Morales Armas (Armas), was charged with illegal sale of shabu, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 2005, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there,
willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as
broker in the said transaction, zero point zero four gram (0.04) of
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, both Salcena and Armas entered a plea of NOT

GUILTY[4] to the offense charged. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution presented the testimonies of Barangay Security
Development Officer (BSDO) Ronnie Catubay (Catubay), the poseur buyer; BSDO
Elmer Esguerra (Esguerra); and Forensic Chemist Filipinas Francisco
Papa (Papa). The defense, on the other hand, presented the lone testimony of
Salcena.
The Version of the Prosecution
The Peoples version of the incident has been succinctly recited by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in its Brief[5] as follows:
In the afternoon of May 19, 2005, an informant reported to the

barangay tanods of Barangay San Antonio, SFDM, Quezon City, namely,
Ronnie Catubay and Elmer Esguerra, that appellant Garet was selling illegal
drugs. Responding to the report, the barangay tanods met in the afternoon
and plotted an entrapment against appellant. Barangay tanods Catubay and
Esguerra were assigned to act as poseur buyer and given a marked ₱100.00
bill by the barangay chairman. Thereafter, at around 5:20 p.m., the team
proceeded to No. 23 Paco Street, SFDM, Quezon City.
Upon arriving at the entrapment place, Catubay and Esguerra went

to appellant and asked if they could buy shabu. Appellant handed to
Catubay a plastic sachet containing shabu and in return received the ₱100
marked money. At this point, Catubay immediately arrested appellant and
recovered from her the marked money. Just as appellant was apprehended,
another woman (identified in court as Arlene M. Armas), ran from the
scene, prompting the tanods to arrest her. The two women were brought to
the BSDO office of the barangay hall of Barangay San Antonio for recording
purposes. After which, they were taken to the PNP Headquarter
in Camp Karingal in Quezon City.
Forensic Chemist Filipinas Francisco Papa of the CPD Crime

Laboratory conducted the test on the specimen submitted and the result
yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[6]
After the prosecution had formally offered its evidence and rested, co-accused
Armas filed a demurrer to evidence anchored on the ground that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution failed to meet that quantum of proof necessary to support
her criminal conviction for the offense charged. On March 15, 2006, the RTC
granted the demurrer and dismissed the charge against Armas.[7]
The Version of the Defense
In her Brief,[8] Salcena denied that she was caught, in flagrante, selling shabu and
claimed that she was just a victim of a frame-up. Her version of the events that
transpired in the afternoon of May 19, 2005 is diametrically opposed to that of the
prosecution. Thus:
On May 19, 2005, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, GARET

SALCENA and Arlene Armas were on board a tricycle en route to Pantranco.
Before they were able to reach their destination, two (2) barangay tanods
stopped their tricycle and asked them to step out.
Subsequently, the duo were invited to the barangay hall where they
were bodily frisked by a female barangay tanod. After they were frisked, the
lady tanod said, negative ito. Despite this, however, a male tanod said, kahit
na negative yan, positive yan.
Consequently, a plastic sachet was taken from the table of one of the
tanods and planted as evidence against the accused. The duo was
subsequently brought to the CampKaringal police station.
She vehemently denied the accusations against her.[9]
The Decision of the RTC
On July 10, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Salcena for illegal
sale of 0.04 gram of shabu. The trial court rejected her defenses of denial and frame-
up and accorded weight and credence to the collective testimonies of barangay
tanods, Catubay and Esguerra. The decretal portion of the RTC Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered finding the accused GARET

SALCENA y VICTORINO GUILTY of violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (for
pushing shabu) as charged and she is sentenced to suffer a jail term of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
The shabu in this case weighing 0.04 gram is ordered transmitted to

the PDEA thru DDB for disposal as per RA 9165.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused on the basis of the
testimonies of Catubay and Esguerra which it found credible and sufficient to sustain
the conviction. The CA was of the view that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty in favor of the barangay tanods was not sufficiently
controverted by Salcena. It stated that the prosecution was able to establish the
elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs as well as the identity of
Salcena as its author. The appellate court rejected the defense of frame-up for her
failure to substantiate the same.
Moreover, the CA held that the apprehending team properly observed the
procedure outlined by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the subject shabu was duly preserved. The appellate court also
sustained the RTC in holding that Salcenas constitutional right to counsel was never
impaired as she was adequately represented and assisted by a counsel at all stages of
the trial proceedings. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated February 9,
2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision

dated July 10, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103, Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. Q-05-134553 convicting accused-appellant of the
violation of Section 11, article II of R.A. No. 9165 and sentencing her to Life
Imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On February 22, 2010, Salcena filed a Notice of Appeal[12] which the CA gave
due course in its Minute Resolution[13] dated March 17, 2010.
In the Resolution dated July 2, 2010, the Court required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. The parties, however, manifested that they had
exhausted their arguments before the CA and, thus, would no longer file any
supplemental brief.[14]
The Issues
Insisting on her innocence, Salcena ascribes to the RTC the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT

OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY
OF THE ALLEGED SHABU WAS NEVER ESTABLISHED.
Salcena contends that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. She avers that both the RTC and the CA were mistaken in giving
undue credence to the testimonies of Catubay and Esguerra as well as in upholding
the validity of the alleged buy-bust operation. She decries that she was a victim of a
frame-up claiming that a barangay tanod merely planted the subject shabu on her for
the purpose of harassing her. She adds that the omission of the two barangay tanods
to observe the procedure outlined by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 impaired the
prosecutions case. She assails the prosecution for its failure to establish the proper
chain of custody of the shabu allegedly seized from her. Also, she submits that her
acquittal is in order in the light of the denial of her basic constitutional rights to
counsel and to due process.
The OSG, on the other hand, counters that the culpability of Salcena for the
crime of illegal sale of shabu was proven beyond reasonable doubt. It alleges that
contrary to her stance, she was afforded with adequate and effective legal
representation at all stages of the trial. It avers that there was proper coordination
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) before the buy-bust
operation was conducted, and that the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken
and cohesive chain of custody of the confiscated narcotic substance.
The Courts Ruling:
The foregoing assignment of errors can be synthesized into: first, the core
issue of whether there was a valid buy-bust operation; and second,
whether sufficient evidence exists to support Salcenas conviction for violation of
Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 9165.
Prefatorily, it must be emphasized that an appeal in a criminal case throws the

whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to cite, appreciate
and correct errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[15]
After a meticulous review and examination of the evidence on record, the

Court finds merit in the appeal.
True, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, as a rule, is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.
This rule, however, does not apply where it is shown that any fact of weight and
substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied by the trial
court.[16] The case at bar falls under the above exception and, hence, a deviation from
the general rule is justified.
Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched that in the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the
transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented
as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.[17] Implicit in all these
is the need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or regulated drug as evidence.
An assiduous evaluation of the evidence on record in its totality exposes flaws
in the prosecution evidence which raises doubt as to its claim of an entrapment
operation. Not all the elements necessary for the conviction of Salcena for illegal
sale of shabu were clearly established in this case.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been

accepted as valid and effective mode of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Law.[18] It has been proven to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug
dealers and of luring them out of obscurity.[19] To determine whether there was a
valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-
bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the
operation are clearly and adequately established through relevant, material and
competent evidence. The courts cannot merely rely on, but must apply with studied
restraint, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law
enforcement agents. Courts are duty-bound to exercise extra vigilance in trying drug
cases and should not allow themselves to be used as instruments of abuse and
injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for
drug offenses.[20]
The prosecution seeks to prove the entrapment operation through the

testimonies of barangay tanods Catubay and Esguerra. Accordingly, the innocence
or culpability of Salcena hinges on the issue of their credibility. In determining the
credibility of prosecuting witnesses regarding the conduct of a legitimate buy-bust
operation, the objective test as laid down in People v. De Guzman[21] is utilized.
Thus:
We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust operation

demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and
adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer for purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the
initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of
the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must
be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens
are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Applying this objective test, the Court is of the considered view that the
prosecution failed to present a complete picture of the buy-bust operation highlighted
by the disharmony and inconsistencies in its evidence. The Court finds loose ends in
the prosecution evidence, unsupported by coherent and rational amplification.
First, there are marked discrepancies between the Joint Affidavit of

[22]
Arrest dated May 21, 2005 (Exh. B) executed by the barangay tanods, Catubay
and Esguerra, and their testimonies before the RTC, relative to matters occurring
prior to the buy-bust operation. The Joint Affidavit states that a confidential
informant (CI) came to the Barangay Security and Development Office (BSDO) at
around 8:00 oclock in the morning of May 19, 2005 to inform Barangay Captain
Martin Dino (Dino) about the illegal drug trade activities of Salcena and her
companion, Arlene Armas; that Salcena asked the CI to look for buyers of her shabu;
that Dino coordinated with the Chief of DAID-SOTG, Police Superintendent
Gerardo Ratuita (P/Supt. Ratuita), who immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-
bust operation against Salcena and Armas composed of a certain Police Inspector
Alberto Gatus (P/Insp. Gatus) as team leader, BSDO Catubay as poseur- buyer while
BSDO Esguerra and the rest of the members, who were police officers, would serve
as members of the back-up team; that upon arrival of the team at the agreed meeting
place in front of Palamigan store, Barangay San Antonio, the CI and Catubay waited
for Salcena and Armas while Esguerra and the other team members monitored the
process of entrapment from a viewing distance.
Catubays testimony, however, was in stark contrast to the above declaration.
Thus:
Fiscal Gibson Araula
(On Direct Examination)
Q: Mr. Witness, do you remember where were you in the morning of May
19, 2005?
A: I was at the Barangay Hall
Q: What barangay is that?

A: Barangay San Antonio, District 1.
xxx
Q: How about in the afternoon of May 19?

A: In the afternoon the informant arrived at the barangay office.
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court what information that informant
relayed to your office?
A: According to the informant si Garet raw po ipapaano roon, nagbebenta.
Q: What do you mean by Nagbebenta?

A: Nagbebenta ng droga.
Q: Who received that information?

A: I and my colleague BSDO by the name of Elmer Esguerra.
xxx
Q: What was the action taken by you and your companion with respect to
that information?
A: We went to the place pointed out by the informant somewhere near San
Antonio, Sto. Nio Street.
Q: What time was that?

A: About 5:30 in the afternoon .
Q: Who were with you when you went there?

A: Elmer and I, sir.[23]
[Emphases supplied]
During cross-examination, Catubay maintained that he and Esguerra (not the

barangay chairman) were the ones informed by the CI about the drug pushing
activities of Salcena in the afternoon (not 8:00 oclock in the morning) of May 19,
2005 and that they were the only ones who went to the place named by the CI for the
conduct of the alleged buy-bust operation without the aid and support of any police
operative.
Atty. Concepcion
(Cross-examination)
Q: YOU SAID ON May 19, 2005 in the afternoon, you and certain BSDO
Elmer received information from confidential informant that Garet is
selling shabu, mr. witness?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You and Elmer proceeded to the place where that confidential informant
was telling this Garet is selling shabu, mr. witness?
A: Yes sir.
Q: With no other companion, no police officer, you conducted the buy bust
operation, mr. witness?
A: Yes sir.
xxx
Q: When you decided, you and Elmer decided to conduct the buy bust
operation, what preparation did you made, mr. witness?
A: We have a briefing sir.
Q: Can you tell us what the briefing all about between you and Elmer, mr.
witness?
A: Ako ang bibili at siya ang huhuli po.[24]
[Emphases supplied]
What then happened to the entrapment team which was supposedly formed for the
purpose of arresting Salcena red-handedly, and whose members were individually
named and enumerated in the Pre-Operation Report[25] (Exh. H)? They seemed to
have suddenly vanished into thin air when the operation was about to be set into
motion. Was an entrapment team really organized?
Second, Catubay and Esguerra made it appear in their joint affidavit that it
was the CI who had access to Salcena and who was tasked by the latter to look for
prospective buyers and to arrange for the sale and delivery of the shabu. While at the
witness stand, however, these two barangay tanods claimed that they directly
approached Salcena and bought shabu from her without the intervention and
participation of the CI. Should it not have been the CI, who was the conduit to the
pusher, who should have arranged for such a meeting?
The Court finds it hard to believe that these two barangay tanods were able to
pick the propitious time to be in front of the Palamigan store, Barangay San Antonio,
to consummate the alleged sale with Salcena who conveniently appeared thereat. It
must be stressed that neither Catubay nor Esguerra testified that the CI arranged the
time of the meeting with the alleged drug pusher and, yet, they astoundingly guessed
the time that Salcena would turn up on the scene.
Third, another slant that nags the mind of the Court is the confused narration
of prosecution witness Catubay anent how the sale occurred. The Court finds it hard
to believe the testimony of Catubay on the transaction he had with Salcena:
Fiscal Araula:
Q: When you arrived at that place what happened there?
A: I myself was intending to buy from Garet.
Q: Where?
A: Sa harap ng palamigan doon sa No. 32 yata.
Q: Where you able to talk to that person at that time?

A: I did not, I was not able to talk to her.
Q: You were not able to talk to her at that time?

A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: When the two of you were not able to talk to Garet, what did you do, if
any?
A: I was intending to buy shabu.
Q: To whom?
A: Garet and I did not talk to each other since I was buying shabu
nagkaabutan lang ho kami.
xxx
Q: In other words you were able to talk to Garet?
Court:
Abutan lang daw, walang usapan.
xxx
Q: How about the money you mentioned between the two of you that person
you mentioned Garet, what is the first, the money you gave to Garet or Garet
gave you the shabu?
A: Garet first gave the shabu and I gave her the money.
Q: Now when you said that you received the shabu in exchange to (sic)
P100.00 bill, what did you do after?
A: After I got the shabu we immediately arrested Garet.[26]
xxx
Q: Now, you said that you arrested Garet at that time, how about your c0-
BSDO officer, where was he?
A: In my right side.[27]
[Emphases Supplied]
Not even the barest conversation took place between the poseur-buyer and the
alleged drug peddler. Catubay, along with Esguerra, approached Salcena and then
the latter instantly handed over to him a small heat-sealed transparent plastic
containing suspected shabu. In turn, Catubay gave Salcena a ₱100.00 bill.
Thereafter, the barangay tanod arrested Salcena. The situation was simply ludicrous.
The Court is not unaware that drug transactions are usually conducted
stealthily and covertly and, hence, the parties usually employed the kaliwaan system
or the simultaneous exchange of money for the drugs. Still, it baffles the mind how
Salcena knew exactly who between Catubay and Esguerra would buy shabu, and
how much would be the subject of the transaction despite the absence of an offer to
purchase shabu, through words, signs or gestures, made by either of the two tanods.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but it must also be credible in itself such that common experience and observation
of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the
circumstances.[28] Catubays story of silent negotiation is just not credible. It simply
does not conform to the natural course of things.
Fourth, equally damaging to the cause of the prosecution is the confusion that
marks its evidence as to who confiscated the buy-bust money and from whom it was
seized. It was stated in both the Investigation Report[29] submitted by P/Supt. Ratuita
and the Joint Affidavit of Arrest that it was Esguerra who confiscated the buy-bust
money from the right palm of Armas because, allegedly, immediately after receiving
the ₱100.00 bill, Salcena passed the money to Armas. Catubay, however, claimed
that he recovered the buy-bust money from Salcena herself.
Q: Likewise when you arrested Garet where was the buy-bust money,
the ₱100.00 bill?
A: I also got the money from Garet.
Q: Where in particular, what part of her body?

A: Right pants pocket of her pantalon.
Court:
You mean to say you put your hand inside her pocket?
A: Yes, your Honor.[30]
The foregoing conflicting narrations and improbabilities, seemingly trivial
when viewed in isolation, cast serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses when considered together. Unfortunately, they were glossed over by the
RTC and the CA invoking the presumption that barangay tanod Catubay and
Esguerra were in the regular performance of their bounden duties at the time of the
incident. It should be stressed, however, that while the court is mindful that the law
enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself, constitute proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[31] The attendant circumstances negate the presumption accorded
to these prosecution witnesses.
Viewed vis--vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, it is pertinent to

mention the ruling in the case of People v. Angelito Tan[32] that courts are mandated
to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing and that the
presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of
every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused. In the case at
bench, the prosecution evidence, when placed under severe testing, does not prove
with moral certainty that a legitimate buy-bust operation was conducted against
Salcena.
Moreover, the Court finds the prosecution fatally remiss in establishing an
unbroken link in the chain of custody of the allegedly seized shabu. Thus, doubt is
engendered on whether the object evidence subjected to laboratory examination and
offered in court is the same as that allegedly sold by Salcena.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be

observed in establishing the corpus delicti the body of the crime whose core is the
confiscated illicit drug.[33] Hence, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must
be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.[34]
In People v. Kamad,[35] the Court enumerated the links that the prosecution
must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
These links in the chain of custody were not adequately established by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary records of the case. It
is significant to note that the testimonies of poseur-buyer Catubay and his back-up,
Esguerra, lack specifics on the post-seizure custody and handling of the subject
narcotic substance. Although Catubay testified that he seized the small plastic sachet
containing the suspected shabu from Salcena and brought it to the BSDO office, he
never disclosed the identity of the person/s who had control and possession of the
shabu at the time of its transportation to the police station. Neither did he claim that
he retained possession until it reached the police station.
Furthermore, the prosecution failed to supply vital details as to who marked
the sachet, where and how the same was done, and who witnessed the marking.
In People v. Martinez,[36] the Court ruled that the "marking" of the seized items, to
truly ensure that they were the same items that enter the chain and were eventually
the ones offered in evidence, should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator; and (2) immediately upon confiscation in order to protect innocent persons
from dubious and concocted searches and to shield the apprehending officers as well
from harassment suits based on planting of evidence and on allegations of robbery
or theft.
Records show that both the RTC and the CA agreed in holding that it was
Catubay who marked the plastic sachet containing the subject shabu. The RTC
wrote:
x x x. In passing, the court is satisfied that the plastic sachet at bench

was properly identified. Tanod Esguerra said he saw Tanod Catubay put
markings thereon and remembers the letters RC which letters appear on the
sachet. Tanod Catubay recalls that he marked the sachet but could not
remember if it is RC or GV.[37]
Excerpts from the assailed CA Decision on this score is hereto quoted, to wit:
xxx. Esguerra remembered that Catubay marked the plastic sachet

with the initials RC and Catubay, on the other hand, cannot remember if the
markings he made is GB or RC.[38]
xxx. In the instant case, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court
that when the sale transaction was consummated, the shabu was first
handed-over to the poseur-buyer, who placed the necessary markings in the
confiscated items.[39]
A perusal of the pertinent Transcript of Stenographic Notes, however, shows

that these observations are not reflected. Contrary to the findings of the RTC and
CA, there is nothing on record that Esguerra made a categorical declaration that he
saw Catubay put the marking RC on the plastic sachet. All that he testified to was
that he could identify the subject shabu because it had the marking RC.[40] Neither
was there any statement from Catubay that he placed markings on the plastic sachet
of shabu right after seizing it from Salcena. In fact, Catubay claimed that he could
not remember whether the marking was RC or GV. Thus:
Atty. Concepcion:
(On Cross- Examination)
Q: You identified the buy bust money because of the initial GB, am I correct
to say that, Mr. witness?
A: I could not recall if it is RC or G[V] sir.
Q: Why cant you remember, RC or G[V], what is the relation, Mr. witness?
A: RC refers to Ronnie Catubay sir.
Q: G[V]?
A: I dont know what it means sir. [41]
Verily, the records of the case do not provide for the identity of the officer
who placed the marking RC GVS 5-19-05 on the plastic sachet containing the
allegedly confiscated shabu and whether said marking had been done in the presence
of Salcena.
It is likewise noteworthy that the prosecution evidence is wanting as to the
identity of the police investigator to whom the buy-bust team turned over the seized
item; as to the identity of the person who submitted the specimen to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; as to whether the forensic chemist whose
name appeared in the chemistry report was the one who received the subject shabu
when it was forwarded to the crime laboratory; and as to who exercised custody and
possession of the specimen after the chemical examination and before it was offered
in court. Further, no evidence was adduced showing how the seized shabu was
handled, stored and safeguarded pending its offer as evidence in court.
While a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve, an

unbroken chain becomes indispensable and essential in the prosecution of drug cases
owing to its susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange.[42] Accordingly, each and every link in the custody must
be accounted for, from the time the shabu was retrieved from Salcena during the
buy-bust operation to its submission to the forensic chemist until its presentation
before the RTC. In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to do so.
Lastly, the subject 0.04 gram of shabu was never identified by the witnesses
in court. Neither BSDO Catubay nor BSDO Esguerra was confronted with the
subject shabu for proper identification and observation of the uniqueness of the
subject narcotic substance when they were called to the witness stand because at that
time, the subject shabu was still in the possession of the forensic chemist as
manifested by Assistant City Prosecutor Gibson Araula, Jr.[43] They were not given
an opportunity to testify either as to the condition of the item in the interim that the
evidence was in their possession and control. Said flaw militates against the
prosecutions cause because it not only casts doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti
but also tends to discredit, if not negate, the claim of regularity in the conduct of the
entrapment operation. The records bare the following:
Fiscal Gibson Araula

Q: If the transparent plastic sachet is shown to you, can you identify that
transparent plastic sachet?
A: Yes, sir. That is the one we got from her so we can remember it.
Q: Other than that you mentioned the one that you recovered, you cannot
identify the shabu other than what you mentioned now?
A: Makikilala po.
Q: How will you know that that is the shabu?

A: I knew it yun ang nahuli naming.
Fiscal Araula:
By the way your Honor the shabu was in possession of the chemist. Im going
to reserve the right to identify the shabu, your Honor.
Court:
Okay, granted.[44]
x x x.
Esguerra testified on this matter, as follows:
Q: The two accused were arrested at that time. What happened after that?
A: We brought them to Camp Karingal and turned them over together with
the evidences.
Q: You said you were able to turn over the shabu and the money. Can you
identify that shabu and the money?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because it has a marking, sir.
Q: What was the marking there that your companion was able to buy shabu
from Garet at that time, what marking was placed?
A: RC
Q: How about the money?

A: RC din po sir.
Fiscal Araula: Your Honor, may we reserve the right to present the
transparent plastic sachet?
Court: Okay, granted.[45]
Despite the reservation of the right, the prosecution never presented the
transparent plastic sachet for identification by the two barangay tanods.
In view of the loopholes in the prosecution evidence as well as the gaps in the
chain of custody, there is no assurance that the identity and integrity of the subject
narcotic substance has not been compromised. In Catuiran v. People,[46] the Court
held that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to
establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the
irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was
finally offered in court, fatally conflicted with every proposition relative to the
culpability of the accused.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. Concededly, the evidence for the defense is weak and
uncorroborated and could even engender belief that Salcena indeed perpetrated the
crime charged. This, however, does not advance the cause of the prosecution because
its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.[47] The prosecution has the burden to
overcome the presumption of innocence and prove the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the light of the failure of the prosecution evidence to pass the test of moral
certainty, a reversal of Salcenas judgment of conviction becomes inevitable. Suffice
it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.[48] In dubio pro
reo.[49]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The February 9, 2010 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02894 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused Garet Salcena y
Victorino is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged against her and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless she is being held for some other
lawful cause.
The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women

is ORDERED to forthwith implement this decision and to INFORM this Court,
within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date when Salcena was actually
released from confinement.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, per Special Order No.
1152 dated November 11, 2011.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-20.
[2]
Penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 12-16.
[3]
Records, pp. 1-2.
[4]
Id. at 38.
[5]
[6]
Id. at 62-64.
[7]
Records, pp. 72-74.
[8]
[9]
Id. at 34.
[10]
Id. at 16.
[11]
Id. at 99.
[12]
Id. at 100-101.
[13]
Id. at 104.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 30-36.
[15]
People v. Balagat, G.R. No. 177163, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 640, 644-645.
[16]
People v. Baga, G.R. No. 189844, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 743, 749.
[17]
People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 273, 283.
[18]
People v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008,566 SCRA 571, 594.
[19]
People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421, 439.
[20]
Valdez v. People, G.R.No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611, 633.
[21]
G.R. No. 151205, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 516, citing People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 621 (1999).
[22]
Records, pp. 6-7.
[23]
TSN, November 30, 2005, pp. 3-7.
[24]
TSN, December 14, 2005, pp. 5-7.
[25]
Records, p. 14.
[26]
TSN, November 30, 2005, pp. 8-12.
[27]
Id. at 14.
[28]
People v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57, 91(1997).
[29]
Records, pp.4-5.
[30]
TSN, November 30, 2005, pp. 14-15.
[31]
People v. Magat, G.R. No. 179939, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 86, 99.
[32]
432 Phi. 171, 198 (2002).
[33]
People v. Pagaduan, G.R. No. 179029, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 308, 322.
[34]
People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 186471, January 25, 2010, 611 SCRA 118, 132.
[35]
G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 307-308.
[36]
G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010, 637 SCRA 791, 818.
[37]
CA rollo, p. 16.
[38]
Id. at 84.
[39]
Id. at 97.
[40]
TSN, November 30, 2005, p. 36.
[41]
TSN, December 14, 2005, p. 8.
[42]
People v. Almorfe, G.R. No. 181831, March 29, 2010, 617 SCRA 52, 61-62.
[43]
TSN, November 30, 2005, p. 19 and 37.
[44]
Id. at 15-19.
[45]
Id. at 35-37.
[46]
G.R. No. 175647, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 567, 580.
[47]
People v. Santos, G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 489, 505.
[48]
People v. Milan, 370 Phil. 493, 506 (1999).
[49]
Latin legal maxim which literally means when in doubt, for the accused.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA A.K.A. FERNANDO

RANCHE ABANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and related items are
designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be presented against the accused. Their
observance is the key to the successful prosecution of illegal possession or. illegal sale of dangerous drugs."1
At issue in this case is whether appellant Fernando Ranche Havana a.k.a. Fernando Ranche Abana did in fact
sell or deliver to an alleged poseur-buyer some 0.03 gram of the banned substance Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, locally known as "shabu" on the late afternoon of November 4, 2005. The appellant insists
that he never did. The prosecution asserts the contrary.
On appeal is the May 31, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00688,
affirming the February 28, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 58 finding
Fernando Havana y Ranche a.k.a. Fernando Abana y Ranche (appellant) guilty of violating Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Factual Antecedents
In an Information4 dated November 18, 2005, the appellant was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs
committed as follows: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
That on or about the 4th day of November, 2005, at about 6:30 p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent and without authority
of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur[-]buyer the following: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance
containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as "SHABU", a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
cralawlawl ibra ry
ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
Appellant put in a negative plea. Trial then followed.
The prosecution's case is essentially erected upon the testimonies of PO2 Miguel R. Enriquez6 (PO2
Enriquez), SPO1 Rogelio J. Canete, Jr. (SPO1 Cañete), and Police Chief Inspector Mutchit G. Salinas (PCI
Salinas), all members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Police Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City
and documentary exhibits pertaining to the buy-bust operation. The combined testimonies and the
documentary exhibits tended to establish these facts: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl i brary
On the afternoon of November 4, 2005, a civilian informant, one "Droga", went to Police Station 10, Punta
Princesa, Cebu City and reported to the duty officer SPO1 Vicente R. Espenido, Jr. (SPO1 Espenido) that the
appellant was actively engaged in the illegal drug trade at Sitio Mangga, Punta Princesa, Cebu City. SPO1
Espenido immediately assembled a buy-bust team, with him as the team leader, the civilian asset and with
PO2 Enriquez, SPO1 Canete, and SPO1 Jasper C. Nuñez (PO2 Nuñez) as back-up. The police team
designated the unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer and provided him with a PI00.00 marked
money bill, with its serial number (SN003332) noted in the police blotter,7 to be used for the purpose of
buying shabu from appellant. The buy-bust operation was allegedly coordinated with the Office of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).8 When the police team reached the target area, the "civilian
informant" went to the house of appellant and called the latter. Hidden from view, some 15 meters away
from the house, the back-up operatives, PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Canete, saw the civilian informant talking
with the appellant. Not long after, they saw the "civilian informant" handling over the marked PI00.00 bill to
the appellant, who in exchange gave to the former a plastic pack containing 0.03 gram white crystalline
substance which these two suspected as shabu. The "civilian informant" then placed a face towel on his left
shoulder to signal that the sale had been consummated. SPO1 Espenido and his two companions rushed
towards the "civilian informant" and the appellant and arrested the latter after apprising him of his
constitutional rights. SPO1 Espenido recovered the P100.00 marked money from the appellant while the
plastic pack was given by the "civilian informant" to SPO1 Espenido.
The appellant was taken to the police station for investigation. The P100.00 marked money and the plastic
pack containing the suspected shabu were turned over to SPO2 Nuñez who marked the plastic pack with
"FA" the initials of herein appellant. He then prepared a letter requesting for examination9 of the item seized
from the appellant addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory. PCI Salinas, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory of Brgy. Apas, Cebu City, testified that he conducted a laboratory examination of the recovered
specimen10 that yielded "positive result for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.''11
The appellant denied that he was a shabu-seller; he also denied that he was arrested in a buy-bust
operation. He claimed that on that evening of November 4, 2005 he was eating bread when SPO2 Nuñez
barged inside his house, handcuffed him and brought him to the police precinct. He claimed that he was
mistaken for his neighbor "Narding" the real shabu-seller. His daughter, Maria Theresa, corroborated him.
The RTC found appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC ruling. The appellate court held that the non-submission of the pre-
operation report to the PDEA did not at all render the buy-bust operation irregular. What it held as important
is that the police officers were able to call the PDEA prior to the operation. The CA was convinced that all the
elements of the offense charged were established by the prosecution. The CA held that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated item had been preserved, despite the fact that the police officers did not
strictly adhere to the procedure outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165 which governs the so-called "buy-bust"
operations. It held that the police officers regularly performed their functions. Thus, in its Decision of May
31,2010, the CA decreed dispositively -
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 28, 2007
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-75283, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12 cralawlawlib rary
Aggrieved, appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of his conviction faulting the courts below for
convicting him of the crime charged. He questions in his Supplemental Brief: (1) the lack of pre-coordination
with the PDEA regarding the buy-bust operation, (2) the non-presentation in court of the unnamed "civilian
informant" as poseur-buyer, (3) the non-compliance by the police officers with the prescribed procedure
under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and lastly, the dubious chain of custody of the subject shabu.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmance of the appealed Decision arguing that the
essential elements of the offense charged had been adequately established and that the appellant's bare
denial cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimonies of the police operatives who are
presumed to have performed their duties regularly.
Our Ruling
The appeal is well-taken.
Prefatorily, we stress again that generally, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are entitled to great weight, and will not be disturbed on appeal.13 Even as this Court must defer to this
salutary rule, it must likewise pay homage to a higher duty which is to dispense real, conscientious and
honest-to-goodness justice by conducting a thorough examination of the entire records of the case based on
the settled principle that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review on all questions
including those riot raised by the parties.14
The appellant contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation report to the PDEA after the buy-
bust operation violates RA 9165; and that non-presentation of the unnamed "civilian informant" who
allegedly brokered the transaction with him casts serious doubts on the factuality of the buy-bust
operation.15
There is no merit in this contention.
We held in People v. Abedin16 that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before
police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation; that in fact, even the absence of coordination with the
PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation.17 Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to
the success in prosecuting drug-related cases.18 Informers are almost always never presented in court
because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Unless their testimony is absolutely
essential to the conviction of the accused, their testimony may be dispensed with since their narrations
would be merely corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team.
Adherence to the chain of custody rule not established.

In this ultimate recourse, appellant focuses his principal argument on the alleged failure of the prosecution
to establish a continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized illegal drug and the lack of integrity of
the evidence in view of the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
"In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly established: (1)
proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the
illicit drug as evidence."19 The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence beyond reasonable doubt plus the fact of its delivery and/or sale are both vital and
essential to a judgment of conviction in a criminal case.20 And more than just the fact of sale, "[o]f prime
importance therefore x x x is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond
reasonable doubt. In other words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous
drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first
place. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that in ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."21
The Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as "duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction."
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible
to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence
is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical,
or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering -without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain or custody rule.22 cralawlawl ibra ry
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, we find that the prosecution utterly failed to establish convincingly the
chain of custody of the alleged seized plastic pack subject matter hereof. In fact only PO2 Enriquez and SPOl
Canete testified in respect to the identity of the alleged evidence. However, from their testimonies, the
prosecution was not able to account for the linkages in the chain while the plastic pack was not or no longer
in their respective possession.
While both witnesses testified that after the sale and apprehension of the appellant, the poseur-buyer turned
over the subject pack of shabu to their team leader SPOl Espenido, there is no record as to what happened
after the turn-over. SPOl Espenido to whom the specimen was allegedly surrendered by the poseur-buyer
was not presented in court to identify the person to whom it was given thereafter and the condition thereof
while it was in his possession and control. The prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation for his
non-presentation as a witness. This is a significant gap in the chain of custody of the illegal stuff.
The prosecution's cause is also marred by confusion and uncertainty regarding the possessor of the pack
of shabu when it was brought to the police station. By PO2 Enriquez's account, it was SPO2 Nuñez who was
in of the same - an account which is at loggerheads with the claim of SPOl Canete that he was in custody
and possession thereof and that he personally brought the same to the police station. These police officers
cannot seem to agree on a point over which there could hardly be a disagreement. It must be observed that
SPO2 Nuñez who had supposedly taken custody of the substance following PO2 Enriquez's account was
likewise not presented in court to testify. Worse, the prosecution did not even try to reconcile this
inconsistency. Moreover, the prosecution failed to show how, when and from whom SPO2 Nuñez or SPOl
Canete received the evidence. There was no evidence on how they came into possession of the pack
of shabu. Again, this is a clear missing link in the chain of custody of the specimen after it left the hands of
SPOl Espenido.
We also take note that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to whom
the specimen was given at the police station. All that has been said is that the investigator, SPO2 Nuñez,
marked the specimen. But this statement did not necessarily mean that he was the same officer who
received the same from either PO2 Enriquez or SPOl Canete. In fact, there is a total want of evidence
tending to prove that fact. It must be recalled that SPO2 Nuñez did not take the witness stand to identify
the specific marking on the alleged specimen; neither did the prosecution adduce conclusive proof as to the
author of the handwriting affixed therein and admit the same as his own handwriting.
True, PO2 Enriquez claimed that he personally delivered to the crime laboratory the specimen attached to
the letter-request; nonetheless, he did not categorically testify that the substance presented in court was
the very same substance delivered to the crime laboratory for analysis. In fact, going by the records neither
of the two police officers testified that the substance delivered to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis
and later presented in court was the same substance seized from the appellant.
Nor can the prosecution gain from the testimony of the forensic chemist PCI Salinas. The records show that
there is nothing positive and convincingly clear from the testimony of PCI Salinas. She did not at all
categorically and straightforwardly assert that the alleged chemical substance that was submitted for
laboratory examination and thereafter presented in court was the very same substance allegedly recovered
from the appellant. If anything, the sum and substance of her testimony is that the alleged pack of shabu
submitted to her for laboratory examination showed that it was positive for methamphetylane hydrochloride
or shabu. She never testified where the substance came from. Her testimony was limited only on the result
of the examination she conducted and not on the source of the substance.
"[W]hile the chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in reality it is not, 'as it is almost
always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.'"23 As such, what is of utmost importance "is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused."24 In the case at bench, this Court finds it exceedingly difficult to
believe that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug have been properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. The inexplicable failure of the police officers to testify as to what they did with the
alleged drug while in their respective possession resulted in a breach or break in the chain of custody of the
drug. In some cases,25 the Court declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key
witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of the shabu plus the irregular manner which
plagued the handling of the evidence before the same was offered in court, whittles down the chances of the
government to obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case.
Here, apart from the utter failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, yet another
procedural lapse casts further uncertainty about the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. We refer to
the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the most rudimentary procedural safeguards relative to the
custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1),26 Article II of RA 9165. Here, the alleged
apprehending team after the alleged initial custody and control of the drug, and after immediately seizing
and confiscating the same, never ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor did it ever photograph
the same in the presence of the appellant from whom the alleged item was confiscated. There was no
physical inventory and photograph of the item allegedly seized from appellant. Neither was there any
explanation offered for such failure.
While this Court in certain cases has tempered the mandate of strict compliance with the requisite under
Section 21 of RA 9165, such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations27 can be applied
only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved as we stressed
in People v. Guru.28 In the case at bar, the evidentiary value and integrity of the alleged illegal drug had
been thoroughly compromised. Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the item in view of the
broken linkages in the chain of custody. In this light, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty accorded the buy-bust team by the courts below cannot arise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00688 dated
May 31, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Fernando Ranche Havana a.k.a. Fernando Ranche
Abana is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge, his guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE the accused from
custody, unless he is held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
People v. Relato, G.R. No. 173794, January 18, 2012. 663 SCRA 260, 262; People v. Zakaria, G.R. No.
181042, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 390, 391-392.
2
CA rollo, pp. 79-90; penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices
Pampio A. Abarintos and Myra V. Garcia-Femandez.
3
Records, pp. 73-80; penned by Judge Gabriel T. Ingles (now a member of the Court of Appeals).
4
Id at 1.
5
Id.
6
Also referred as PO3 Enriquez in some parts of the records.
7
Exhibit "B."
8
Exhibit "A."
9
Exhibit "C."
10
Exhibit "D."
11
Exhibit "E."
12
CA rollo, p. 89.
People v. Pepino-Consulta, G.R. No. 191071, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 276, 294 citing People v.
13
Kamad, 624 Phil. 289 (2010).
14
See People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 638, 646.
15
People v. Arriola, G.R. No. 187736, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 581, 602 citing People v. Roa, G.R. No.
186134, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 359.
16
G.R. No. 179936, April 12, 2012, 669 SCRA 322, 337-338. People v. Arriola, supra at 602-603,
citing People v. Roa, supra.
18
People v. Monceda, G.R. No. 176269, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 355, 370.
19
People v. Kamad, supra note 13 at 300.
20
People v. Obmiranis, 594 Phil. 561, 569 (2008).
21
Catuiran v. People, 605 Phil. 646, 655 (2009).
Mallillin v. People, 576 Phil. 576, 587-588 (2008), citing United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363,
22
366.
23
People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 357, 368.
24
Id.
25
Mallillin v. People, supra note 22; People v. Obminaris, supra note 20; People v. Garcia, 599 Phil. 416
(2009) and Cariño v. People, 600 Phil. 433 (2009).
26
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/
paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition
in the following manner: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
27
Section 21 (a): The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the appreheding officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.
28
G.R. No. 189808, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 544, 558.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199901 October 9, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GARYZALDY GUZON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 29 2010 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 02890, which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of
Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No. 11968-13, finding accused-appellant Garyzaldy Guzon
Guzon) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of shabu.
The facts
Guzon was accused of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, also known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in an Information3 dated November 23, 2005, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 22, 2005 at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, in the municipality of San
Nicolas, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one (1) heat-
sealed plastic sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu", a dangerous
drug, weighing 0.06 gram to a police asset of PNP San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, who posed as buyer in
a buy[-]bust operation without authority to do so.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, Guzon entered a plea of "not guilty."5 After pre- trial, trial on the merits ensued.
PO2 Elyzer Tuzon (PO2 Tuzon) testified for the prosecution. He claimed that on November 22,
2005, at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, he was on duty at the police station of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, when he received a telephone call from an unknown tipper that Guzon was engaged in
drug-pushing activity at Nalupta Street, Barangay 3, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. PO2 Tuzon relayed
the information to Officer-In-Charge Chief Police Inspector Jerico Baldeo (OIC Baldeo), who ordered
PO2 Tuzon and PO3 Cesar Manuel (PO3 Manuel) to verify the report. When PO2 Tuzon and PO3
Manuel failed to find Guzon at Nalupta Street, OIC Baldeo instructed them to seek the aid of an
asset.6
After an unnamed asset identified Guzon’s location, the police planned a buy-bust operation. PO2
Tuzon gave marked money to the asset designated to be the poseur-buyer of shabu. The asset was
instructed to remove his cap to signal that he had received the shabu from Guzon.7
The buy-bust operation ensued at Nalupta Street, where the asset approached Guzon . From afar,
PO2 Tuzon saw the asset hand three (3) marked ₱100.00 bills to Guzon, who then handed
something to the asset.8 After the asset removed his cap, the police ran towards Guzon to arrest him
. PO3 Manuel recovered the marked ₱100 bills from Guzon, while PO2 Tuzon received from the
asset the item purchased from Guzon.9 Guzon was brought to the San Nicolas Police Station, where
PO2 Tuzon prepared a Certification/Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items10, marked the seized
sachet with his initials "EAT",11 and then delivered the sachet to the police crime laboratory for
chemical examination.12 The sachet was received by PO3 Nolie Domingo (PO3 Domingo).13
Given a stipulation by the prosecution and the defense during the pre- trial, PO3 Domingo and
Police Senior Inspector Mary Ann Cayabyab (PSI Cayabyab), the Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Office who conducted the chemical examination, no longer
testified in court. The RTC’s pre-trial Order14provides:
The parties stipulated on the gist of the testimony of PO3 Nolie Domingo to the effect that as per
request for laboratory examination, he was the one who received the specimen from Elyzer Tuzon
and that he delivered the same to PSI Mary Ann Cayabyab. They also stipulated on the testimony of
PSI Cayabyab to the effect that after receiving the said specimen and found the specimen to be
shabu, thus, she issued her initial report and confirmatory report under Chemistry Report No. D-090-
2005 which were marked as Exhibits F and G, respectively. They further agreed that said forensic
chemical officer and PO3 Domingo could identify the said specimen and the labels as appearing
therein. The defense admitted the proffer without admitting that the specimen came from the
accused. The testimonies of PO3 Nolie Domingo and PSI Mary Ann Cayabyab were therefore
dispensed with. x x x.15
The Initial Laboratory Report16 and Chemistry Report17 referred to in the pre-trial Order both state
that the specimen, weighing 0.06 grams, that was submitted to the crime laboratory for examination
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
The defense presented the testimonies of Guzon, his friend Jesus Guira, Jr. (Guira) and brother
Edwin Guzon (Edwin).
Guzon denied the charge against him. He claimed that on the early afternoon of November 22,
2005, he had a drinking spree with Guira at the latter’s house in Barangay San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte.18 At past 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, his brother Edwin arrived and told him that PO3
Manuel wanted to talk to him. Guzon approached PO3 Manuel, who invited him to the municipal hall
but would not say the reason therefor.19 Guzon insisted that the matter be instead discussed near
Guira’s house, but PO3 Manuel declined. Thereafter, PO2 Tuzon arrived20 and upon his prodding,
Guzon agreed to go with them to the municipal hall.21 Only PO2 Tuzon went with Guzon inside the
municipal hall.22
PO2 Tuzon later brought Guzon to a police camp in Laoag City. While on board a patrol car on their
way to the camp, PO2 Tuzon realized that he forgot the shabu in his office drawer so they went back
to the municipal hall. Thereafter, they headed back to the police camp where, upon their arrival, PO2
Tuzon handcuffed Guzon before proceeding to the camp’s second floor.23
While at the second floor, PO2 Tuzon took a sachet from his pocket then handed it to a desk officer.
Guzon was instructed by a woman to fill a small bottle with his urine. After he complied, PO2 Tuzon
brought him back to San Nicolas.24
On the morning of November 23, 2005, Guzon was brought by PO2 Tuzon, PO3 Manuel and
another policeman to a place south of the City Hall of Laoag, near the corner of the Laoag-Solsona
terminal. There, Guzon saw PO3 Manuel take out three ₱100.00 bills from his wallet then hand them
to PO2 Tuzon. PO2 Tuzon left and when he returned, he handed photocopies of the ₱100.00 bills to
PO3 Manuel.25
Guira and Edwin also testified for Guzon’s defense. Guira claimed that at about 1:00 o’clock in the
afternoon on November 22, 2005, he was having a drinking session outside his house with Guzon
and several other persons.26At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Edwin arrived to inform Guzon
that PO3 Manuel was looking for him.27Guzon then left the place with PO3 Manuel, PO2 Tuzon and
one George.28 Edwin’s testimony also corroborated the account of Guzon, having testified that on
November 22, 2005, he was asked by PO3 Manuel on the whereabouts of Guzon.29 When he saw
his brother at Guira’s house, he approached him to say that PO3 Manuel was looking for him.30
The testimony of one Ronnie Dimaya was dispensed with after the prosecution admitted that the gist
of his testimony would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of Guira and Guzon.31
The RTC’s Ruling
On June 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision32 finding Guzon guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Garyzaldy Guzon GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged of illegal sale of shabu and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
The contraband subject hereof is hereby confiscated, the same to be disposed of as the law
prescribes.
SO ORDERED.33
Feeling aggrieved, Guzon appealed to the CA. Notwithstanding the RTC’s findings, he denied the
charge against him. He also questioned the credibility of PO2 Tuzon as a witness for the prosecution
and the police officers’ non-compliance with the chain of custody rule in handling the confiscated
shabu.
The CA’s Ruling
On June 29, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision34 denying the appeal. It reasoned that Guzon’s
defenses of denial and frame-up are common and could easily be fabricated; they could not prevail
over the positive identification of the accused by the police officer who testified for the prosecution.
In affirming Guzon’s conviction, the CA also cited the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty by the police operatives who conducted the buy-bust operation. As to the issue of chain
of custody, the CA rejected Guzon’s argument, and maintained that based on the evidence, the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu were preserved.
Hence, this appeal.
The Present Petition
Guzon seeks his acquittal mainly on the basis of the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of
custody of the subject drug. He argues35 that: (1) the evidence allegedly seized from Guzon could
have been planted; it was not immediately marked at the place of seizure; (2) there were no
photographs and physical inventory of the confiscated drug; (3) the prosecution failed to offer
justification for the absence of photographs and inventory; (4) the asset who acted as the poseur-
buyer was not identified; and (5) the prosecution failed to establish that the integrity of the seized
item was sufficiently preserved through an unbroken chain of custody.
This Court’s Ruling
The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits Guzon for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In Reyes v. CA,36 the Court emphasized that a "conviction must stand on
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, not on the weakness of the defense which the accused
put up. Evidence proving the guilt of the accused must always be beyond reasonable doubt. If the
evidence of guilt falls short of this requirement, the Court will not allow the accused to be deprived of
his liberty. His acquittal should come as a matter of course."37
In the instant case, Guzon was accused of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which
prohibits the sale of illegal drugs. The elements of the crime include: (a) the identities of the buyer
and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment for the thing.38 The Court explained in People v. Bautista39 that in drug-related
prosecutions, the State bears the burden not only of proving these elements of the offense under
R.A. No. 9165, but also of proving the corpus delicti , the body of the crime. The dangerous drug is
itself the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.40
"A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors."41 As in all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of
custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the
duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction.42 The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the
identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a
finding of guilt.43
To eliminate doubt, and even abuse, in the handling of seized substances, some safeguards for
compliance by law enforcement officers are established by law and jurisprudence. For one, Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165, upon which Guzon anchors his appeal, reads in part:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. ― The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
a copy thereof;
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, particularly Section 21 thereof,
further provides the following guidelines in the custody and control of confiscated drugs:
xxxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable , in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items ;
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The rule includes the proviso that procedural lapses in the handling of the seized drugs are not ipso
facto fatal to the prosecution’s cause, provided that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are preserved. In each case, courts are nonetheless reminded to thoroughly evaluate
and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that amount to a
gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards that are drawn by the law44 for the
protection of the corpus delicti. The strict demands and significant value of the chain of custody rule
were emphasized in the oft-cited Malillin v. People45 wherein the Court held:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates
the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.46 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
As Guzon correctly pointed out in his Supplemental Brief, there were several lapses in the law
enforcers’ handling of the seized item which, when taken collectively, render the standards of chain
of custody seriously breached. In a line of cases, the Court explained that the failure to comply with
the indispensable requirement of corpus delicti happens not only when it is missing, but also where
there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs which raise doubts on the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court.47 Upon review, the Court has determined that such
lapses and doubt mar the instant case.
First, the police officers who took part in the buy-bust operation failed to mark the seized item
immediately after its confiscation from Guzon. The Court explained in People v. Coreche48 the
importance in the chain of custody of the immediate marking of an item that is seized from an
accused, to wit:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time
they are seized from the accused until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.49 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Here, instead of immediately marking the subject drug upon its confiscation, PO2 Tuzon marked it
with his initials "EAT" only upon arrival at the police station.50 While the failure of arresting officers to
mark the seized items at the place of arrest does not, by itself, impair the integrity of the chain of
custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence,51 such circumstance, when taken
in light of the several other lapses in the chain of custody that attend the present case, forms part of
a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards that are drawn by the law,52 sufficient
to create reasonable doubt as to the culpability of the accused.
The Court has determined that although a physical inventory of the items seized during the buy-bust
operation forms part of the case records, the buy-bust team failed to fully comply with the
requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for its preparation and execution. Under the law,
the inventory must be made "in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom the items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof." These requirements are reiterated in
Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165. Non-compliant with such rules, however, the
Certification/Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items53in this case only bears the signatures of PO3
Manuel and PO2 Tuzon as apprehending officers. Although the Certification indicates the name of
Guzon under the section "With Conformity", it includes neither his signature nor of any other person
who is allowed by law to witness the required inventory. There is also no proof that a copy of the
inventory was received by any of the persons enumerated under the law.
Besides these deficiencies in the preparation of the inventory, no photograph of the seized item,
which is also required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, forms part of the case records.
The saving clause in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165 fails to remedy the lapses and save the
prosecution’s case. We have emphasized in People v. Garcia54 that the saving clause applies only
where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter cited justifiable
grounds.55 Failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be
adequately explained.56 Equally important, the prosecution must establish that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized item are properly preserved. The prosecution failed in this regard.
Taking into account the several rules and requirements that were not followed by the law enforcers,
there was an evident disregard on their part of the established legal requirements. Their breach of
the chain of custody rule, magnified by the prosecution’s failure to explain the deficiencies during the
trial, casts doubt on whether the item claimed to have been sold by Guzon to the police asset was
the same item that was brought for examination by the police crime laboratory and eventually
presented in court as evidence.
As further proof that the chain of custody rule was breached in this case, the Court points out the
discrepancy in the weight of the item that was supposedly seized following the buy-bust operation,
and that examined by PSI Cayabyab. We refer to the inventory prepared by PO3 Manuel and PO2
Tuzon on the items that were confiscated after the buy-bust operation:
One (1) piece small heat[-]sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules believed to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride locally known as "SHABU", weighing more or less .01 gram
including plastic material.
xxxx
The above enumerated and described items were properly marked with capital letters EAT
representing the name Elyzer Agarma Tuzon who was one of the apprehending police officers x x
x.57 (Emphasis ours)
The fact that the item sold by Guzon to the police asset weighed only 0.01 gram is provided in
several other documents: first, in the Joint Affidavit58 dated November 22, 2005 executed by PO3
Manuel and PO2 Tuzon; second, the September 22, 2005 entry in the San Nicolas Municipal Police
Station’s Temporary Police Blotter, as provided in a Certification59 dated November 22, 2005 issued
by OIC Baldeo; and third, the Memorandum60requesting for laboratory examination signed by OIC
Baldeo and which reads in part:
EXHIBIT: a) One (1) piece of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline
substance suspected to be shabu weighing more or less .01 gram including plastic sachet marked
hereto as exhibit EAT.61(Emphasis ours)
Clearly, the specimen submitted to the police crime laboratory weighed only 0.01 gram, even
including the plastic sachet that contained the substance.
It appears, however, that the specimen examined by PSI Cayabyab of the police crime laboratory
differed from the specimen allegedly seized by the police and brought for examination. The Initial
Laboratory Report62 prepared by PSI Cayabyab indicates that the specimen examined weighed
more, specifically at 0.06 gram, excluding its plastic container. Chemistry Report No. D-090-
200563 issued by PSI Cayabyab likewise provides the following details:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A – One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag with markings containing 0.06 gram of white
crystalline substance. xxx
xxxx
REMARKS:
Weight does not include plastic container. xxx.64 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly from the foregoing, the item that was allegedly obtained by the police from Guzon during the
buy-bust operation differed or, at the very least, was no longer in its original condition when
examined in the crime laboratory. The variance in the weight of the seized item vis-à-vis the
examined specimen and, ultimately, the detail provided in the Information, remained unaddressed by
the prosecution. The testimony of PO2 Tuzon offered no explanation for the difference. PO3
Domingo and PSI Cayabyab could have provided the clarification, but their testimonies were
dispensed with following the parties’ agreement during the pre-trial.65 The identity of the item
examined by PSI Cayabyab could have also been verified from the markings "EAT" that was made
by PO2 Tuzon on the plastic sachet. Her reports, however, made no specific reference to such
markings, as they merely described the subject specimen as "one (1)-heat-sealed transparent plastic
bag with markings containing 0.06g of white crystalline substance."66
The Court is mindful of the stipulations that were entered into by the parties during the pre-trial67 to
the effect that: (a) PO3 Domingo received the specimen from PO2 Tuzon and then delivered it to PSI
Cayabyab; (b) PSI Cayabyab received the specimen and when she found the specimen to be shabu
, she issued her initial and confirmatory reports; and (c) PSI Cayabyab and PO3 Domingo could
identify the specimen and the labels appearing thereon. These bare stipulations, however, merely
address the matter of the specimen’s transfer from one police officer to the next, without offering any
explanation as to the specimen’s condition during the transfers, how each person made sure that the
item was not tampered with or substituted, and an indication of the safeguards that were employed
to prevent any tampering or substitution. Given the considerable difference between the specimen’s
weight upon its seizure and its weight at the time of its examination, with the seized item’s weight
being a mere 16% of the examined specimen’s weight, the determination in this case of whether the
rationale for the chain of custody rule was duly satisfied necessitated a more intensive inquiry. The
prosecution’s failure to do so was fatal to its case. It failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the substance claimed to be seized during the buy-bust
operation was preserved. The doubt is resolved in Guzon’s favor, as the Court rules on his acquittal.
In drugs cases, the prosecution must show that the integrity of the corpus delicti has been
preserved. This is crucial in drugs cases because the evidence involved – the seized chemical – is
not readily identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered with or substituted.68 "Proof of
the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires not only the actual existence of the transacted
drugs but also the certainty that the drugs examined and presented in court were the very ones
seized. This is a condition sine qua non for conviction since drugs are the main subject of the illegal
sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be proven for the crime to
exist."69The flagrant lapses committed in handling the alleged confiscated drug in violation of the
chain of custody requirement even effectively negate the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the police officers’ duties, as any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance
and should make the presumption unavailable.70
In addition to the foregoing, the Court finds merit in Guzon’s argument that the non-presentation of
the poseur-buyer to the witness stand was fatal to the prosecution’s cause. We emphasize that in a
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must convincingly prove that the
transaction or sale actually transpired.71 In the instant case, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust
operation, a civilian, was the witness competent to prove such fact, given the testimony of PO2
Tuzon that at time the supposed sale happened, he and PO3 Manuel were positioned about 20
meters away from Guzon and the poseur-buyer. Although PO2 Tuzon testified during the trial on the
supposed sale, such information he could offer was based only on conjecture, as may be derived
from the supposed actions of Guzon and the poseur-buyer, or at most, hearsay, being information
that was merely relayed to him by the alleged poseur-buyer. Given the 20-meter distance, it was
unlikely for PO2 Tuzon to have heard the conversations between the alleged buyer and seller. True
enough, his testimony provided that he and PO3 Manuel merely relied on an agreed signal, i.e., the
poseur-buyer’s removal of his cap, to indicate that the sale had been consummated. On cross-
examination, PO2 Tuzon even admitted:
ATTY. BALUCIO:
Q And Mr. Witness, when you allegedly arrived at the target place, you were at a distance far away
from the alleged transaction, is it not?
A More or less twenty (20) meters, sir.
Q And that if any transaction have been (sic) transpired at that time, you did not hear it Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you did not also see if what was being handed at that time was shabu Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.72
In the absence of neither the poseur-buyer’s nor of any eyewitness’ testimony on the transaction, the
prosecution’s case fails. In People v. Tadepa,73 the Court explained that the failure of the prosecution
to present in court the alleged poseur-buyer is fatal to its case. Said the Court in that case, the
1âwphi1
police officer, who admitted that he was seven (7) to eight (8) meters away from where the actual
transaction took place, could not be deemed an eyewitness to the crime. The Court held, viz :
In People v. Polizon, we said –
We agree with the appellant’s contention that the non-presentation of Boy Lim, the alleged poseur-
buyer, weakens the prosecution’s evidence. Sgt. Pascua was not privy to the conversation between
Lim and the accused. He was merely watching from a distance and he only saw the actions of the
two. As pointed out by the appellant, Sgt. Pascua had no personal knowledge of the transaction that
transpired between Lim and the appellant. Since appellant insisted that he was forced by Lim to buy
the marijuana, it was essential that Lim should have been presented to rebut accused’s testimony.
The ruling in People v. Yabut is further instructive –
Well established is the rule that when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2)
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction. In the present case, accused-appellant’s version of the
circumstances leading to his apprehension constitutes a total denial of the prosecution’s allegations.
In this regard this Court has ruled that when there is such a divergence of accounts –
x x x it becomes incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut appellant’s allegation by presenting x x x

the alleged poseur- buyer. This it failed to do giving rise to the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced (Rule 131, Sec. 5 [e]). This failure constitutes a fatal flaw
in the prosecution’s evidence since the so-called (poseur-buyer) who was never presented as a
witness x x x is the best witness for the prosecution x x x.74(Emphasis ours)
The Court also ruled in People v. Olaes75, that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer was fatal to
the prosecution’s case, since the alleged sale transaction happened inside the accused’s house;
hence, it was supposedly witnessed only by the poseur-buyer, who then was the only person who
had personal knowledge of the transaction.76
While the Court, in several instances, has affirmed an accused’s conviction notwithstanding the non-
presentation of the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, such failure is excusable only when the
poseur-buyer’s testimony is merely corroborative, there being some other eyewitness who is
competent to testify on the sale transaction.77
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated June 29, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02890, which affirmed the Decision dated June 15, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 11968-13; and ACQUITS
accused-appellant GARYZALDY GUZON of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 11968-13 on
the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
immediately release Garyzaldy Guzon from custody, unless he is detained for some other lawful
cause.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions n the above
of the Court’s Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Acting member per Special Order No. 1545 Revised) dated September 16, 2013.
1Penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, with Associate Justices Remedios

Salazar-Fernando and Celia C Librea-Leagogo; concurring; rollo pp. 2-14.
2 Issued by Presiding Judge Philip G. Salvador; CA rollo pp. 27-41.
3 Id. at 9-10.
4 Id. at 9.
5 Id. at 27.
6 TSN, February 28, 2006, pp. 3-6.
7 Id. at 5-6, 8-9.
8 Id. at 11.
9 Id. at 12.
10 Records, p. 5.
11 TSN, February 28, 2006, p. 13.
12 Id. at 15.
13 Id. at 16.
14 Records, p. 24.
15 Id.
16 CA rollo, p. 54.
17 Id. at 55.
18 TSN, September 18, 2006, p. 3.
19 Id. at 5-7.
20 Id. at 7.
21 Id. at 8, 10.
22 Id. at 12.
23 Id. at 14-15.
24 Id. at 15-16.
25 Id. at 17-18.
26 TSN, August 3, 2006, pp. 3-4.
27 Id. at 6-7.
28 Id. at 8.
29 TSN, August 15, 2006, p. 4.
30 Id. at 7.
31 TSN, September 7, 2006, p. 4.
32 CA rollo, pp. 27-41
33 Id. at 41.
34
Rollo, pp. 2-14.
35 Id. at 47-49.
36 G.R. No. 180177, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 148.
37 Id. at 164-165, citing People v. Obeso, 460 Phil. 625, 641 (2003).
38People v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 184760, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 389, 400, citing People v.
Villanueva, 536 Phil. 998, 1004 (2006).
39 G.R. No. 177320, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 518.
40 Id. at 531-532.
41 People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 188, 199, citing People
v. Chua Uy, 384 Phil. 70, 85 (2000).
42 People v. Dumaplin, G.R. No. 198051, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 631.
43 People v. Remigio, G.R. No. 189277, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 336.
44 People v. Umipang, G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 324, 355.
45 576 Phil. 576 (2008).
46 Id. at 587-588.
47People v. Umipang, supra note 44, 355-356; People v. Relato, G.R. No. 173794, January
18, 2012, 663 SCRA 260, 270; People v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596
SCRA 350, 365.
48 G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350.
49 Id. at 357.
50 CA rollo, p. 29.
51People v. Umipang, supra note 44, at 351, citing Imson v. People, G.R. No. 193003, July
13, 2011, 653 SCRA 826.
52 Id. at 355.
53 CA rollo, p. 52.
54 G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259.
55 Id. at 272, citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194.
56 People v. Lorenzo, supra note 38, at 404.
57 Records, p. 5.
58 Id. at 3-4.
59 Id. at 7.
60 Id. at 10.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 11.
63 Id. at 19.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 24.
66 Id. at 11, 19; emphasis ours.
67 Id. at 24.
68 People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 173472, February 26, 2010, 613 SCRA 763, 768-769.
69People v. Nandi, G.R. No. 188905, July 13, 2010, 625 SCRA 123, 130, citing People v.
Zaida Kamad , G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 303.
70 People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 186387, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 616, 628.
71 People v. Orteza, 555 Phil. 700, 706 (2007).
72 TSN, May 9, 2006, p. 9.
73 314 Phil. 231 (1995).
74Id. at 239-240, citing People v. Polizon , G.R. No. 84917, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA
56 and People v. Yabut , G.R. No. 82263, June 26, 1992, 210 SCRA 394.
75 G.R. No. 76547, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 91.
76 Id. at 95.
77See People v. Orteza, supra note 71, at 709, citing People v. Uy, 392 Phil. 773, 786
(2000), People v. Ambrosio, 471 Phil. 241 (2004).
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208685, March 09, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODRIGO CASACOP Y DE CASTRO, Accused-

Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Failure to observe the chain of custody required under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 or failure to
sufficiently explain the reason for non-observance of the chain of custody creates reasonable doubt as to the
integrity of the corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs.
An Information was filed against accused-appellant Rodrigo Casacop (Casacop), the accusatory portion
stating:
That on or about July 24, 2002, in.the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rodrigo Casacop y de Castro without being
authorized/permitted by law did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a
poseur buyer for one hundred peso bill (P100.00) one (1) small heat-sealed transparent sachet containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing zero point zero four (0.04) gram, a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
POl Rommel Bautista (POl Bautista) testified that on July 24, 2002, around 9:00 a.m., he, together with
Chief Intelligence Officer SPO1 Alvin Glorioso, other police officers, and two (2) assets, conducted a buy-
bust operation in Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna against Casacop.2
The buy-bust operation was based on "information they received that [Casacop] was engaged in the sale of
illegal drugs."3
One of the assets acted as the poseur-buyer and brought with him marked money.4
According to POl Bautista, "[t]he poseur-buyer went to the house of [Casacop] to buy shabu."5
POl Bautista testified that he saw Casacop give something to the poseur-buyer. In turn, the poseur-buyer
handed over the PI 00.00 marked money to Casacop.6
After the transaction, the poseur-buyer raised his right hand; this was their pre-arranged signal.7
The police officers headed towards Casacop but he tried to escape. They gave chase and were able to
apprehend him.8
Casacop was apprised of his constitutional rights.9 The small heat-sealed plastic sachet, which the police
suspected to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), "was marked and sent to the Crime
Laboratory for examination."10
Casacop testified that around 9:00 a.m. of July 24, 2002, he was asleep in his home.11
Suddenly, someone banged on their door. Casacop was awakened by his wife Zenaida, thinking that he
might be arrested for failing to report to his parole officer.12
He jumped out of a window but was eventually arrested by POl Bautista.13
Zenaida Casacop corroborated her husband's testimony. She also testified that her husband did not sell any
shabu on July 24, 2002.14
Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna found Casacop guilty and sentenced him to life
imprisonment and a fine in the amount of P500,000.00.15 The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences accused RODRIGO CASACOP y DE CASTRO to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00.
The 0.04 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "shabu" is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government. Atty. Jaarmy Bolus Romero, Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately transmit
the 0.04 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "shabu" to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED.16
The trial court found Casacop's defense of denial weak compared to the positive testimony of POl Bautista.
No evidence was presented to show that POl Bautista had any motive to give false testimony.17As a police
officer, he was "presumed to have regularly performed his duty."18
On the other hand, Zenaida Casacop's testimony was biased, considering that she is Casacop's wife.19
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93 on November 10, 2008 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20 (Emphasis in the original)
Casacop filed the Notice of Appeal21 on January 9, 2013.
The Notice of Appeal was noted and given due course in the Resolution dated January 23, 2013 of the Court
of Appeals.22
The case records of CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03793 were elevated to this court on September 11, 2013.23
In the Resolution dated October 23, 2013, this court noted the records forwarded by the Court of Appeals.
This court notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from
notice.24
In the same Resolution, the Chief Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison was required to confirm
Casacop's confinement.25
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation26 stating that it would not file a supplemental brief
since all issues had been addressed in its Appellee's Brief dated March 14, 2010.27
Casacop's confinement at the New Bilibid Prison was confirmed by P/Supt. IV Venancio J. Tesoro in the letter
dated December 10, 2013.28
Counsel for Casacop filed the Manifestation29 on January 17, 2014 stating that he intended to file either a
Supplemental Brief or a Manifestation in lieu of a supplemental brief on February 2, 2014.30
Counsel for Casacop filed another Manifestation31 on February 3, 2014 stating that he intended to file a
Supplemental Brief on February 17, 2014.32
In the Resolution dated February 17, 2014, this court noted the Manifestations filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General and counsel for Casacop, as well as the letter of confirmation from P/Supt. IV Venancio J.
Tesoro. The Manifestation filed by counsel for Casacop dated February 3, 2014 was noted and granted.33
Casacop filed the Supplemental Brief34 on February 17, 2014. This was noted in the Resolution dated April
29, 2014. The same Resolution required counsel for Casacop to submit a soft copy of the Supplemental
Brief.35
On June 30, 2014, counsel for Casacop complied with the Resolution dated April 29, 2014.36 The Compliance
was noted in the Resolution dated August 13, 2014.37
The issue for resolution is whether the guilt of accused-appellant Rodrigo Casacop for violation of Section 5
of Republic Act No. 9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Based on the arguments raised in accused-appellant's Supplemental Brief, the issue may be sub-divided
into:
First, whether the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-
presentation of the informant in court;38
Second, whether the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-
observance of the required procedure in handling the seized item;39 and
Lastly, whether the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is sufficient to defeat the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant.40
Plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, argues that the prosecution was able to prove
all the elements of illegal sale of drugs.41
During trial, PO1 Bautista positively identified accused-appellant as the seller of shabu with whom the
poseur-buyer transacted.42
Further, PO1 Bautista identified the plastic sachet that he confiscated and the marked money in open
court.43 Thus, the prosecution was able to prove that the "identity and integrity of the corpus delicti was
properly preserved and the chain of custody was never compromised."44
Plaintiff-appellee also argues that the governing law in this case is Republic Act No. 6425 or The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Accused-appellant was arrested on July 24 2002, while Republic Act No. 9165 took effect
on August 2002.45
According to plaintiff-appellee, Republic Act No. 6425 did not provide for the proper procedure in handling
seized items. Nevertheless, the procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was complied with.46
With regard to the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer in open court, plaintiff-appellee cited People v.
Abbu,47 stating that:
[t]he failure to present in court the poseur-buyer did not affect the prosecution's case. In People vs.
Lucero, reiterating previous pronouncements, this court said: "It is now well-settled that except for a
situation where the appellant vehemently denies selling any prohibited drugs coupled with the inconsistent
testimonies of the arresting officers or coupled with the possibility that there exist reasons to believe that
the arresting officers had motives to testify against the appellant, or the situation where it was only the
informant-poseur-buyer who witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the informant-poseur-buyer
can be dispensed with as it will be merely corroborative of the apprehending officers-eyewitnesses'
testimonies.48
On the other hand, accused-appellant points out that POl Bautista gave inconsistent and contradictory
statements.49
In his Supplemental Brief, accused-appellant argues that there must be caution in giving credence to POl
Bautista's testimony since he did not have personal knowledge of the sale. It was the poseur-buyer, not POl
Bautista, who transacted with accused.50
Accused-appellant argues that the poseur-buyer, who was also the informant, did not testify in open
court.51 Further, the chain of custody was broken, as shown by POl Bautista's failure to state where the
plastic sachet was marked.52 The seized item was not inventoried by the arresting officers.53 Hence, POl
Bautista "did not perform his official duties."54
Assuming that the buy-bust operation and the warrantless arrest were valid, the police officers did not
comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Thus, accused must be acquitted.55
We grant the appeal and acquit accused-appellant Rodrigo Casacop y De Castro.
The elements of Section 556 of Republic Act No. 9165 are:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled
with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.57 (Citations omitted)
In dangerous drugs cases, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself. Thus, it is imperative that the
integrity of the seized dangerous drug be preserved.58
Accused-appellant alleges that the chain of custody was broken. He argues that the seized item should have
been marked immediately after it was confiscated.59
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argues that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
does not necessarily mean that the arrest is illegal.60 What is important is "the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items[.]"61
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the manner by which law enforcement officers should
handle seized items in dangerous drugs cases:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the-presence of the accused or the
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
2. Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
3. A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame,
a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty- four
(24) hours[.] (Emphasis supplied)
However, strict compliance with the chain of custody requirement is not always the case. Hence, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SECTION 21. . . .
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Remigio62 restated the chain of custody required in buy-bust operations as follows:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.63
The arguments of the parties in this case show that from the start of the buy-bust operation, there was
failure to observe the chain of custody.
The first link that must be proven is the seizure and marking of the seized item.
PO1 Bautista testified during direct examination as follows:
PROSECUTOR SERRRANO [sic] (On Direct Examination)

Q: So what did your asset do, if any?
A: He approached the house of the accused to buy shabu, Sir.
Q: And what happened after he approached the house of the accused
purposely to buy dangerous drug?
A: I saw the accused run out of his house and made transaction to [sic]
our poseur buyer, Sir.
Q: How far were you again[,] Mr. Witness[,] when you noticed that the
accused came out of his house and approached your asset?
A: More or less seven (7) meters, Sir.
Q: And what happened next as soon as the accused went out of his
house and approached your asset?
A: I saw the accused hand over something to our asset, Sir.64
The transaction was between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer, while POl Bautista watched the
transaction a few meters away.
His statement that he saw "accused[-appellant] hand over something" creates reasonable doubt whether the
item given by the poseur-buyer to POl Bautista is the same "something" that accused-appellant allegedly
gave the poseur-buyer.
Plaintiff-appellee alleges that accused-appellant tried to flee when he sensed that he would be arrested.65
From the time the transaction took place to the time accused-appellant was arrested, there is nothing on
record to show how the integrity of the seized item was preserved.
Plaintiff-appellee merely alleges that accused-appellant was arrested and was apprised of his constitutional
rights.66
Next, POl Bautista wrote "BOTE" on the marked money after it was confiscated from accused-appellant.67He
then gave the marked money to SPO1 Alvin Glorioso while the asset gave POl Bautista a "small heat sealed
transparent sachet of shabu[.]"68
In POl Bautista's testimony:
PROSECUTOR SERRANO (On Direct Examination)

Q: How about the item that was given by the accused to your asset,
what happened to that item?
A: It was handed over to me by our asset and I put the marking, Sir.
Q: Will you please describe to us that item that was handed over to you
by your asset, the very same item that the accused gave to your
asset in exchange for the marked money?
A: A small heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
substance suspected as shabu, Sir.
Q: You said you made marking on that sachet?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What else did you do[,] if any?
A: After I put the marking, we brought it to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory, Sir.69
PO1 Bautista's testimony is silent as to where the seized sachet was marked.70 In People v. Sabdula:71
We are not unaware that the seized plastic sachet already bore the markings "BC 02-01-04" when it was
examined by Forensic Chemist Jabonillo. In the absence, however, of specifics on how, when and where this
marking was done and who witnessed the marking procedure, we cannot accept this marking as compliance
with the required chain of custody requirement. There was also no stipulation between the parties regarding
the circumstances surrounding this marking. We note in this regard that it is not enough that the seized
drug be marked; the marking must likewise be made in the presence of the apprehended violator. As earlier
stated, the police did not at any time ever hint that they marked the seized drug.72 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution did not, at the very least, identify the person who turned the seized sachet over to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory when it was submitted for examination.73 Hence, there is another
break in the chain of custody.
We also note the discrepancy in the names of the police officers who examined the contents of the seized
sachet. According to plaintiff-appellee, the sachet was assigned Chemistry Report Number D-1652-02. Police
Senior Inspector Lorna Ravelas Tria conducted the examination of the contents in the sachet.74
However, the Court of Appeals' and the trial court's Decisions state that the contents of the sachet were
examined by Police Inspector Donna Villa Huelgas.75 This leads us to doubt whether the corpus delicti was
established.
The seized shabu weighed 0.04 grams, a miniscule amount. In People v. Holgado:76
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity
of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the
nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items
seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure;
and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession
of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating,
or tampering of evidence in any manner.
By failing to establish identity of the corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a failure to
establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-compliance
suffices as a ground for acquittal. As this court stated in People v. Lorenzo:
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with
moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and drug
paraphernalia will not secure a conviction. Not even the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties will suffice. In fact, whatever presumption there is as to the regularity of the manner by which
officers took and maintained custody of the seized items is "negated." Republic Act No. 9165 requires
compliance with Section 21.77(Emphasis in the original)
....
While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this circumstance
underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21....
....
Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act
No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be
scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be readily
planted and tampered.78
Applying People v. Holgado, the buy-bust team in this case should have been more meticulous in complying
with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 to preserve the integrity of the seized shabu. There is a greater
possibility of tampering or contaminating the corpus delicti, since 0.04 grams of shabu is a miniscule
amount. Worse, the buy-bust team did not even try to explain the reason for non-compliance with Section
21.
Non-presentation of the poseur-buyer also defeats the case of the plaintiff-appellee. The testimony of the
poseur-buyer is not "merely corroborative of the apprehending officers-eyewitnesses' testimonies[,]"79 as
plaintiff-appellee alleges. The poseur-buyer had personal knowledge of the transaction since he conducted
the actual transaction. PO1 Bautista was merely an observer from several meters away. Further, the amount
involved is so small that the reason for not presenting the poseur-buyer does not square with such a
miniscule amount.
Other requirements provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not complied with. No
inventory was conducted, and the records of this case do not show that the seized items were
photographed.80
During cross examination, PO1 Bautista stated:
Atty. Ilagan: Before you conducted this buy-bust operation[,] Mr. Witness[,]
do you remember if you prepared [a] pre-operation report?
A: I cannot recall, Sir.
Q: After you confiscated the alleged marked money from the accused,
did you prepare an inventory [,] Mr. Witness?
A: As far as I can recall, no Sir.
Atty. Ilagan: Do you remember[,] Mr. Witness[,] if you were authorized by
your Chief of Police to conduct this buy bust operation?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And who was the Chief of Police at that time?
A: It was Police Supt. Reyes, Sir.
Q: Was this authority in writing, Mr. Witness?
A: No, Sir.
Q: So you mean to say it was a mere verbal instruction?
A: Yes, Sir.81 (Citations omitted)
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot prevail over the presumption of
innocence of accused-appellant.82 It is not enough to convince this court that the non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was justified. In People v. Ong:83
To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in
effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the
operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the
courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents.84
Failure to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will result in the acquittal of the accused-
appellant. In People v. dela Cruz:85
Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the
offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these
offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused.86
Plaintiff-appellee's allegation that Republic Act No. 6425 was still in effect when accused-appellant was
apprehended is misleading. Republic Act No. 9165 was approved on June 7, 2002. It was published in the
Manila Times on June 19, 2002. Thus, when accused-appellant was apprehended on July 24, 2002, Republic
Act No. 9165 had taken effect. As discussed by the Court of Appeals:
As to the issue of non-compliance with the rules in handling and custody of confiscated illegal drugs, it is not
amiss to point out that Republic Act No. 9165 already took effect when the accused-appellant was
apprehended and charged for the illegal sale of drugs, contrary to what the Office of the Solicitor General
posited that the law effective at the time of the commission of the crime is Republic Act No. 6425.87 (Citation
omitted)
Finally, we reiterate our statements in People v. Holgado:
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving
small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish."
We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they
are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of
drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy
is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all
these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu
under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be
distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace.
We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.88
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03793 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Rodrigo Casacop y De Castro is
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this court
within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished to
the Director General of Philippine National Police and the Director General of Philippine Drugs Enforcement
Agency for their information.
The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride presented as
evidence to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Rollo, p. 3.
1
2
Id. at 4.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 5.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
16
Id. at 55.
17
Id. at 54.
18
Id.
19
Id.
Rollo, p. 15. The Court of Appeals Decision was penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybanez and
20
concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao (Chair) and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes of the
Fourteenth Division.
21
22
Id. at 117.
23
Rollo, p. 1.
24
Id. at 22.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 23-25.
27
Id. at 23.
28
Id. at 28.
29
Id. at 34-36.
30
Id. at 34.
31
Id. at 30-32.
32
Id. at 30.
33
Id. at 39.
34
Id. at 40-45.
35
Id. at 48-49.
36
Id. at 51-52.
37
Id. at 56.
38
Id. at 42.
39
Id. at 42-43.
40
Id. at 43.
41
CA rollo, p. 71.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 71-72.
44
Id. at 73.
45
Id. at 74.
46
Id.
47
317 Phil. 518, 524 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].
48
49
Id. at 42.
50
Id. at 43.
Rollo, p. 42.
51
52
Id.
53
Id. at 43.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved,
or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (PI00,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled
precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from
the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers,
or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemical trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug
and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the
proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be
imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes,
manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging
from One hundred thousand pesos (PI00,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this
Section.
People v. Almodiel, G.R. No. 200951, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 306, 316 [Per J. Carpio, Second
57
Division].
People v. Beran, G.R. No. 203028, January 15, 2014

58
17 [Per J. Reyes, First Division]. See also People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 683,
697 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
Rollo, p. 42.
59
60
CA rollo, p. 76.
61
Id.
62
G.R. No. 189277, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 336 [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
63
Id. at 351-352, citing People v. Kamad, 624 Phil. 289, 304 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
64
CA rollo, p. 80.
65
Id. at 82-83.
66
Id. at 69.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 75.
70
Id. at 45-46.
71
G.R. No. 184758, April 21, 2014 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
72
Id. at 7.
73
CA rollo, p. 48.
74
Id. at 69.
75
Id. at 54; Rollo, p. 13.
76
G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
77
Id. at 10, citing People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil. 393, 403 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division] and People v.
Navarrete, G.R. No. 185211, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 607, 618 [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
78
Id. at 14-15.
79
CA rollo, pp. 72-73; See also People v. Abbu, 317 Phil. 518, 524 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].
80
CA rollo, p. 10.
81
Id. at 45-46.
People v. Ong, 476 Phil. 553, 572 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
82
83
476 Phil. 553 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
84
Id. at 571-572.
85
G.R. No. 205821, October 1 2014 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
86
Id. at 7.
Rollo, p. 10.
87
88
G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MONIR JAAFAR Y TAMBUYONG, Accused-

Appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This reviews the Decision1 dated February 24, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR HC No. 01053-MIN
affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong for violation of Article II, Section 5
of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information, accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong (Jaafar) and Ahmad Gani y Idjirani (Gani)
were charged with violation of Republic Act No. 9165:
That on the 11th day of September 2009 at Barangay Port Area, Isabela City, Zamboanga Peninsula,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another, transport or distribute any dangerous drug,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1 Marlon Takazi M. Look, who acted as poseur-
buyer, one (1) [heat-sealed] transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing
0.0604 grams which when subjected to qualitative examination gave positive result to the tests for the
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU), knowing [the] same to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty.3 Trial on the merits ensued.4
According to the prosecution, at 8:00 a.m. on September 10, 2009, a male civilian informant reported to
Chief of Police, Police Superintendent Alberto Capacio Larubis (Chief Larubis) that a certain "Mana" was
selling methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) at the port area barangay located just beside the police
station.5 Mana was later identified as Jaafar, who sold shabu between 12:00 m.n. and 4:00a.m. to facilitate
the sale of the drug and evade arrest.6 Jaafar allegedly peddled shabu in his house.7
Chief Larubis instructed SPO4 Enrico Morales (SPO4 Morales) to form a team composed of SPO3 Tabunyag,
PO3 Perez, PO3 Hasim, PO2 Canete, PO2 Bobby Rey Bucoy (PO2 Bucoy), PO1 Insang, and PO1 Marlon
Takazi M. Look (PO1 Look) and to schedule a buy-bust operation the next day. He also instructed the team
to coordinate with agents from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).8 PO1 Look was designated
as the poseur-buyer while PO2 Bucoy and PDEA Agent Mark Dela Cruz were designated as the arresting
officers.9
On September 11, 2009, the buy-bust team left the police station at 1:45 a.m. and went to Jaafar's house.10
Jaafar met PO1 Look and the informant at the door of his house and asked them if they were buying
shabu.11 PO1 Look answered in the affirmative and gave Jaafar a marked P500.00 bill.12 Jaafar called for
Gani inside the house.13 Gani came out and handed Jaafar a sachet containing shabu.14 Jaafar gave the
sachet to PO1 Look, who immediately lit a cigarette—the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy-bust
team. 15
The police officers rushed to arrest Jaafar, but he managed to escape.16 Jaafar threw away the marked
P500.00 bill as he ran.17 Eventually, the arresting officers caught up with him 30 meters away from his
house.18
Immediately after the arrest, PO1 Look marked the confiscated sachet of shabu with his initials.19 He then
turned over the sachet and the marked P500.00 bill to their team leader, SPO4 Morales.20 The buy-bust
team brought Jaafar and Gani to the police station for investigation.21
Chief Larubis prepared a letter-request addressed to forensic chemist Melvin Manuel for the examination of
the contents of the sachet.22 Upon examination, the contents tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.23
In his defense, Gani testified that he was at an internet cafe located near the police station at 2:00 a.m. on
September 11, 2009.24 After stepping out of the establishment, Gani was suddenly apprehended by
unknown persons, who later identified themselves as PO1 Look and PO2 Bucoy.25 He was detained at the
police station for two (2) days and was subsequently transferred to the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology.26 Gani claimed that he did not know the reason for his arrest.27
Meanwhile, Jaafar testified that he was at the internet cafe at 12:00 m.n. on September 11, 2009, watching
people play video games.28 He left after two (2) hours and made his way home.29 Upon entering an alley,
Jaafar saw six (6) persons headed towards him.30 One of them pointed a gun at him and told him not to run.
Out of fear, he ran towards the main road.31 However, the six (6) persons, who turned out to be police
officers, caught up with him.32 They conducted a body search but found nothing since Jaafar was only
wearing boxer shorts and a t-shirt. Jaafar was detained after his arrest and brought to the Office of the City
Prosecutor at the City Hall of Isabela the next day.33
The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution clearly established all the elements of the crime of illegal
sale of drugs.34 Although the chain of custody rule was not strictly complied with, the trial court ruled that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu sachet had been duly preserved.35It applied the
legal presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the police officers.36
Jaafar primarily relied on denial for his defense and presented a different story of what had transpired. The
Regional Trial Court considered the version of the defense weak.37 It could not have foreclosed the
possibility that Jaafar committed the crime.38 The Regional Trial Court also found it unusual that Jaafar never
exhibited any form of resistance.39 Instead, he remained cool and calm.40 This, according to the Regional
Trial Court, was an unusual reaction since a person whose rights were allegedly transgressed would offer
some form of resistance.41
In its Decision42 dated May 15, 2012, the Regional Trial Court convicted Jaafar for violation of Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. However, it acquitted Gani for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Ahmad Gani Y Idjirani a.k.a. "Botchoy" is hereby ACQUITTED of
the above charge for want of sufficient evidence. The property bond posted for his provisional liberty is
ordered cancelled and returned to its lawful owner.
WHEREAS, accused Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong a.k.a. "Mana" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of illegal sale of 0.0604 gram of shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.43
Jaafar filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and raised the following errors: (1) the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the arresting team violated the chain of custody rule
under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.44
Jaafar argued that the shabu was not formally offered as evidence during trial; rather, it was only presented
during the hearing for the application for bail. Hence, the Regional Trial Court should not have considered
the shabu as evidence. Jaafar further argued that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of
custody of the shabu allegedly obtained from him. He pointed out that the police officers neither
photographed nor inventoried the seized shabu sachet and emphasized that there were no representatives
from the media and the Department of Justice as well as an elected public official to witness the
proceedings.45
On the other hand, the People of the Philippines argued that the alleged non-compliance with the chain of
custody rule was not fatal to the prosecution's case considering that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items were properly preserved.46
The Court of Appeals ruled that although the sachet of shabu was not formally offered in evidence during
trial, it was nevertheless identified by PO1 Look and the forensic chemist. Being part of their direct
testimonies, the shabu formed part of the records of the case. Hence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Regional Trial Court did not err in considering the shabu as evidence.47
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the Regional Trial Court with regard to the alleged violation of the
chain of custody rule. Although there was a departure in the procedure mandated under Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165, the Court of Appeals ruled that it did not automatically render the confiscated drugs
inadmissible since the integrity of the seized shabu had been kept intact.48
In its Decision49 dated February 24, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision in
toto.
Aggrieved, Jaafar filed a Notice of Appeal on March 20, 2015, which was noted and given due course in the
Court of Appeals Resolution dated May 11, 2015.50
In the Resolution dated October 7, 2015, this Court noted the records forwarded by the Court of Appeals
and informed the parties that they could submit their supplemental briefs.51
On November 25, 2015, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Manifestation stating that it would dispense with the filing of a supplemental brief since all its arguments had
been sufficiently raised in its Appellee's Brief dated August 22, 2013.52
On January 26, 2016, accused-appellant filed a similar Manifestation stating that he would no longer file a
supplemental brief and instead would adopt his appellant's brief.53
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether the guilt of accused appellant was proven beyond reasonable
doubt despite the non-observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
This Court grants the appeal and acquits accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong.
In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself.54Its
existence is essential to a judgment of conviction.55 Hence, the identity of the dangerous drug must be
clearly established.56
Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable.57 To determine their composition and nature, they must
undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to alteration,
tampering, or contamination.58 It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused
are the very same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence.59 The chain of custody,
as a method of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized drugs are
removed. 60
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the manner by which law enforcement officers should handle
seized dangerous drugs:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public officialwho shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 further provide:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of

the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the
prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers,61 this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground
that justifies departure from the general rule.62
This Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant non-
compliance with the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Although the buy-bust team marked63 and conducted a physical inventory64 of the seized sachet of shabu,
the records do not show that the seized sachet had been photographed.
Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the physical inventory was done in the presence
of accused-appellant or his representative, representatives from the media and the Department of Justice,
and an elected public official.65 The poseur-buyer, PO1 Look, testified as follows:
Q. Can you go over this Certificate of [Inventory], is there an entry

under the witnesses Media, do you see any name there and
signature?
A. No, sir[.]
Q. How about representative from Department of Justice, can you see

any name there and their corresponding signature?
A. None, sir[.]
Q. In the entry Elected Official, do you see any name there and their
signature?
A. None, sir.
Q. And lastly[,] the representative of the accused, can you see any
printed name there and signature?
A. None, sir.66
The buy-bust team had an entire day within which to coordinate with the persons required by law to be
present during the physical inventory of the seized drugs. The Chief of Police received the confidential tip
early in the morning.67 He immediately instructed SPO4 Morales to form a buy-bust team and coordinate
with agents from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.68 The buy-bust team had ample time to contact
an elected public official and representatives from the media and the Department of Justice.
The prosecution established during trial69 and on appeal70 that the buy-bust operation had been carefully
planned by narrating the events with intricate detail. However, at the same time, the prosecution relied
heavily on the exception to the chain of custody rule.71 Worse, the prosecution did not even offer any
explanation on why they failed to comply with what was mandated under the law. Indeed, if the police
authorities had carefully planned the buy-bust operation, then there was no reason for them to neglect such
important requirements. They cannot feign ignorance of the exacting standards under Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165. Police officers are presumed and are required to know the laws they are charged with
executing.
This Court cannot merely gloss over the glaring procedural lapses committed by the police officers,
especially when what had been allegedly seized from accused-appellant was only 0.0604 grams of
shabu.72 Recent cases73 have highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of seized drugs in the chain of
custody when only a miniscule amount of drugs had been allegedly seized from the accused.
In People v. Holgado,74 this Court held that "[c]ourts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs . .
. [as] they can be readily planted and tampered."75
Non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 casts doubt on
the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from accused-appellant. This creates reasonable doubt in the
conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 24, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01053-
MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong is ACQUITTEDfor failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court,
within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished to
the Director General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for their information.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Peralta, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2416-A dated January 4, 2017.
1
Rollo, pp. 3-11. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Pablito A. Perez of the Twenty-Second Division, Court of Appeals,
Cagayan de Oro City.
2
Id. at 5.
3
CA rollo, p. 66.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 67.
12
Id.
13
Rollo, p. 5.
14
CA rollo, p. 67.
15
Id.
16
Id.
Rollo, p. 5.
17
18
CA rollo, p. 67.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 68. In the Regional Trial Court Decision, it was indicated that Gani was at the internet cafe on
September 11, 2012.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
Rollo, p. 6.
28
29
CA rollo, p. 68.
30
Id. at 69.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 70.
35
Id. at 71.
36
Id. at 72.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 72.
39
Id. at 73.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 65-75. The Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Danilo M. Bucoy of Branch 2, Regional Trial
Court, Isabela City, Basilan.
43
Id. at 75.
Rollo, p. 6.
44
45
46
Id. at 88-91.
Rollo, pp. 7-8.

47
48
Id. at 8-10.
Rollo, pp. 3-10.

49
50
Id. at 1.
51
Id. at 17.
52
Id. at 19.
53
Id. at 25.
People v. Simbahon, 449 Phil. 74, 81 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
54
55
Id.
56
Id. See also People v. Laxa, 414 Phil. 156, 170 (2001) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; Mallillin v.
People, 516 Phil. 576, 586 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
Mallillin v. People, 516 Phil. 576, 588 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
57
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 586.
People v. Pringas, 558 Phil. 579, 593 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division).
61
62
Id. at 594.
Rollo, p. 9.
63
64
Id.
65
Rep. Act No. 9165, sec. 21(a).
66
CA rollo, p. 59.
Rollo, p. 4.
67
68
Id.
69
70
Id. at 84-86.
71
Id. at 89-90.
72
CA rollo, p. 14.
73
People v. Holgado, G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014, 732 SCRA 554, 569 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third
Division]; Tuano v. People, G.R. No. 205871, September 28, 2016 <
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/september2016/205871.pdf >
[Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; People v. Talvo, G.R. No. 215340, July 13, 2016 <
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/july2016/215340.pdf > [Per J. Leonen,
Second Division].
74
G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014, 732 SCRA 554 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
75
Id. at 576-577.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA A.K.A. FERNANDO

RANCHE ABANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and related items are
designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be presented against the accused. Their
observance is the key to the successful prosecution of illegal possession or. illegal sale of dangerous drugs."1
At issue in this case is whether appellant Fernando Ranche Havana a.k.a. Fernando Ranche Abana did in fact
sell or deliver to an alleged poseur-buyer some 0.03 gram of the banned substance Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, locally known as "shabu" on the late afternoon of November 4, 2005. The appellant insists
that he never did. The prosecution asserts the contrary.
On appeal is the May 31, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00688,
affirming the February 28, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 58 finding
Fernando Havana y Ranche a.k.a. Fernando Abana y Ranche (appellant) guilty of violating Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Factual Antecedents
In an Information4 dated November 18, 2005, the appellant was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs
committed as follows: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
That on or about the 4th day of November, 2005, at about 6:30 p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent and without authority
of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur[-]buyer the following: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance
containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as "SHABU", a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
cralawlawl ibra ry
ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
Appellant put in a negative plea. Trial then followed.
The prosecution's case is essentially erected upon the testimonies of PO2 Miguel R. Enriquez6 (PO2
Enriquez), SPO1 Rogelio J. Canete, Jr. (SPO1 Cañete), and Police Chief Inspector Mutchit G. Salinas (PCI
Salinas), all members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Police Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City
and documentary exhibits pertaining to the buy-bust operation. The combined testimonies and the
documentary exhibits tended to establish these facts: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl i brary
On the afternoon of November 4, 2005, a civilian informant, one "Droga", went to Police Station 10, Punta
Princesa, Cebu City and reported to the duty officer SPO1 Vicente R. Espenido, Jr. (SPO1 Espenido) that the
appellant was actively engaged in the illegal drug trade at Sitio Mangga, Punta Princesa, Cebu City. SPO1
Espenido immediately assembled a buy-bust team, with him as the team leader, the civilian asset and with
PO2 Enriquez, SPO1 Canete, and SPO1 Jasper C. Nuñez (PO2 Nuñez) as back-up. The police team
designated the unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer and provided him with a PI00.00 marked
money bill, with its serial number (SN003332) noted in the police blotter,7 to be used for the purpose of
buying shabu from appellant. The buy-bust operation was allegedly coordinated with the Office of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).8 When the police team reached the target area, the "civilian
informant" went to the house of appellant and called the latter. Hidden from view, some 15 meters away
from the house, the back-up operatives, PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Canete, saw the civilian informant talking
with the appellant. Not long after, they saw the "civilian informant" handling over the marked PI00.00 bill to
the appellant, who in exchange gave to the former a plastic pack containing 0.03 gram white crystalline
substance which these two suspected as shabu. The "civilian informant" then placed a face towel on his left
shoulder to signal that the sale had been consummated. SPO1 Espenido and his two companions rushed
towards the "civilian informant" and the appellant and arrested the latter after apprising him of his
constitutional rights. SPO1 Espenido recovered the P100.00 marked money from the appellant while the
plastic pack was given by the "civilian informant" to SPO1 Espenido.
The appellant was taken to the police station for investigation. The P100.00 marked money and the plastic
pack containing the suspected shabu were turned over to SPO2 Nuñez who marked the plastic pack with
"FA" the initials of herein appellant. He then prepared a letter requesting for examination9 of the item seized
from the appellant addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory. PCI Salinas, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory of Brgy. Apas, Cebu City, testified that he conducted a laboratory examination of the recovered
specimen10 that yielded "positive result for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.''11
The appellant denied that he was a shabu-seller; he also denied that he was arrested in a buy-bust
operation. He claimed that on that evening of November 4, 2005 he was eating bread when SPO2 Nuñez
barged inside his house, handcuffed him and brought him to the police precinct. He claimed that he was
mistaken for his neighbor "Narding" the real shabu-seller. His daughter, Maria Theresa, corroborated him.
The RTC found appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC ruling. The appellate court held that the non-submission of the pre-
operation report to the PDEA did not at all render the buy-bust operation irregular. What it held as important
is that the police officers were able to call the PDEA prior to the operation. The CA was convinced that all the
elements of the offense charged were established by the prosecution. The CA held that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated item had been preserved, despite the fact that the police officers did not
strictly adhere to the procedure outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165 which governs the so-called "buy-bust"
operations. It held that the police officers regularly performed their functions. Thus, in its Decision of May
31,2010, the CA decreed dispositively -
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 28, 2007
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-75283, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12 cralawlawlib rary
Aggrieved, appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of his conviction faulting the courts below for
convicting him of the crime charged. He questions in his Supplemental Brief: (1) the lack of pre-coordination
with the PDEA regarding the buy-bust operation, (2) the non-presentation in court of the unnamed "civilian
informant" as poseur-buyer, (3) the non-compliance by the police officers with the prescribed procedure
under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and lastly, the dubious chain of custody of the subject shabu.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmance of the appealed Decision arguing that the
essential elements of the offense charged had been adequately established and that the appellant's bare
denial cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimonies of the police operatives who are
presumed to have performed their duties regularly.
Our Ruling
The appeal is well-taken.
Prefatorily, we stress again that generally, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are entitled to great weight, and will not be disturbed on appeal.13 Even as this Court must defer to this
salutary rule, it must likewise pay homage to a higher duty which is to dispense real, conscientious and
honest-to-goodness justice by conducting a thorough examination of the entire records of the case based on
the settled principle that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review on all questions
including those riot raised by the parties.14
The appellant contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation report to the PDEA after the buy-
bust operation violates RA 9165; and that non-presentation of the unnamed "civilian informant" who
allegedly brokered the transaction with him casts serious doubts on the factuality of the buy-bust
operation.15
There is no merit in this contention.
We held in People v. Abedin16 that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before
police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation; that in fact, even the absence of coordination with the
PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation.17 Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to
the success in prosecuting drug-related cases.18 Informers are almost always never presented in court
because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Unless their testimony is absolutely
essential to the conviction of the accused, their testimony may be dispensed with since their narrations
would be merely corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team.
Adherence to the chain of custody rule not established.
In this ultimate recourse, appellant focuses his principal argument on the alleged failure of the prosecution
to establish a continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized illegal drug and the lack of integrity of
the evidence in view of the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
"In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly established: (1)
proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the
illicit drug as evidence."19 The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence beyond reasonable doubt plus the fact of its delivery and/or sale are both vital and
essential to a judgment of conviction in a criminal case.20 And more than just the fact of sale, "[o]f prime
importance therefore x x x is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond
reasonable doubt. In other words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous
drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first
place. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that in ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."21
The Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as "duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction."
picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible
to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence
is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical,
or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering -without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain or custody rule.22 cralawlawl ibra ry
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, we find that the prosecution utterly failed to establish convincingly the
chain of custody of the alleged seized plastic pack subject matter hereof. In fact only PO2 Enriquez and SPOl
Canete testified in respect to the identity of the alleged evidence. However, from their testimonies, the
prosecution was not able to account for the linkages in the chain while the plastic pack was not or no longer
in their respective possession.
While both witnesses testified that after the sale and apprehension of the appellant, the poseur-buyer turned
over the subject pack of shabu to their team leader SPOl Espenido, there is no record as to what happened
after the turn-over. SPOl Espenido to whom the specimen was allegedly surrendered by the poseur-buyer
was not presented in court to identify the person to whom it was given thereafter and the condition thereof
while it was in his possession and control. The prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation for his
non-presentation as a witness. This is a significant gap in the chain of custody of the illegal stuff.
The prosecution's cause is also marred by confusion and uncertainty regarding the possessor of the pack
of shabu when it was brought to the police station. By PO2 Enriquez's account, it was SPO2 Nuñez who was
in of the same - an account which is at loggerheads with the claim of SPOl Canete that he was in custody
and possession thereof and that he personally brought the same to the police station. These police officers
cannot seem to agree on a point over which there could hardly be a disagreement. It must be observed that
SPO2 Nuñez who had supposedly taken custody of the substance following PO2 Enriquez's account was
likewise not presented in court to testify. Worse, the prosecution did not even try to reconcile this
inconsistency. Moreover, the prosecution failed to show how, when and from whom SPO2 Nuñez or SPOl
Canete received the evidence. There was no evidence on how they came into possession of the pack
of shabu. Again, this is a clear missing link in the chain of custody of the specimen after it left the hands of
SPOl Espenido.
We also take note that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to whom
the specimen was given at the police station. All that has been said is that the investigator, SPO2 Nuñez,
marked the specimen. But this statement did not necessarily mean that he was the same officer who
received the same from either PO2 Enriquez or SPOl Canete. In fact, there is a total want of evidence
tending to prove that fact. It must be recalled that SPO2 Nuñez did not take the witness stand to identify
the specific marking on the alleged specimen; neither did the prosecution adduce conclusive proof as to the
author of the handwriting affixed therein and admit the same as his own handwriting.
True, PO2 Enriquez claimed that he personally delivered to the crime laboratory the specimen attached to
the letter-request; nonetheless, he did not categorically testify that the substance presented in court was
the very same substance delivered to the crime laboratory for analysis. In fact, going by the records neither
of the two police officers testified that the substance delivered to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis
and later presented in court was the same substance seized from the appellant.
Nor can the prosecution gain from the testimony of the forensic chemist PCI Salinas. The records show that
there is nothing positive and convincingly clear from the testimony of PCI Salinas. She did not at all
categorically and straightforwardly assert that the alleged chemical substance that was submitted for
laboratory examination and thereafter presented in court was the very same substance allegedly recovered
from the appellant. If anything, the sum and substance of her testimony is that the alleged pack of shabu
submitted to her for laboratory examination showed that it was positive for methamphetylane hydrochloride
or shabu. She never testified where the substance came from. Her testimony was limited only on the result
of the examination she conducted and not on the source of the substance.
"[W]hile the chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in reality it is not, 'as it is almost
always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.'"23 As such, what is of utmost importance "is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused."24 In the case at bench, this Court finds it exceedingly difficult to
believe that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug have been properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. The inexplicable failure of the police officers to testify as to what they did with the
alleged drug while in their respective possession resulted in a breach or break in the chain of custody of the
drug. In some cases,25 the Court declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key
witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of the shabu plus the irregular manner which
plagued the handling of the evidence before the same was offered in court, whittles down the chances of the
government to obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case.
Here, apart from the utter failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, yet another
procedural lapse casts further uncertainty about the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. We refer to
the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the most rudimentary procedural safeguards relative to the
custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1),26 Article II of RA 9165. Here, the alleged
apprehending team after the alleged initial custody and control of the drug, and after immediately seizing
and confiscating the same, never ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor did it ever photograph
the same in the presence of the appellant from whom the alleged item was confiscated. There was no
physical inventory and photograph of the item allegedly seized from appellant. Neither was there any
explanation offered for such failure.
While this Court in certain cases has tempered the mandate of strict compliance with the requisite under
Section 21 of RA 9165, such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations27 can be applied
only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved as we stressed
in People v. Guru.28 In the case at bar, the evidentiary value and integrity of the alleged illegal drug had
been thoroughly compromised. Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the item in view of the
broken linkages in the chain of custody. In this light, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty accorded the buy-bust team by the courts below cannot arise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00688 dated
May 31, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Fernando Ranche Havana a.k.a. Fernando Ranche
Abana is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge, his guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE the accused from
custody, unless he is held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
People v. Relato, G.R. No. 173794, January 18, 2012. 663 SCRA 260, 262; People v. Zakaria, G.R. No.
181042, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 390, 391-392.
2
CA rollo, pp. 79-90; penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices
Pampio A. Abarintos and Myra V. Garcia-Femandez.
3
Records, pp. 73-80; penned by Judge Gabriel T. Ingles (now a member of the Court of Appeals).
4
Id at 1.
5
Id.
6
Also referred as PO3 Enriquez in some parts of the records.
7
Exhibit "B."
8
Exhibit "A."
9
Exhibit "C."
10
Exhibit "D."
11
Exhibit "E."
12
CA rollo, p. 89.
People v. Pepino-Consulta, G.R. No. 191071, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 276, 294 citing People v.
13
Kamad, 624 Phil. 289 (2010).
14
See People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 638, 646.
15
People v. Arriola, G.R. No. 187736, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 581, 602 citing People v. Roa, G.R. No.
186134, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 359.
16
G.R. No. 179936, April 12, 2012, 669 SCRA 322, 337-338. People v. Arriola, supra at 602-603,
citing People v. Roa, supra.
18
People v. Monceda, G.R. No. 176269, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 355, 370.
19
People v. Kamad, supra note 13 at 300.
20
People v. Obmiranis, 594 Phil. 561, 569 (2008).
21
Catuiran v. People, 605 Phil. 646, 655 (2009).
Mallillin v. People, 576 Phil. 576, 587-588 (2008), citing United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363,
22
366.
23
People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 357, 368.
24
Id.
25
Mallillin v. People, supra note 22; People v. Obminaris, supra note 20; People v. Garcia, 599 Phil. 416
(2009) and Cariño v. People, 600 Phil. 433 (2009).
26
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/
paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition
in the following manner: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after seizure
27
Section 21 (a): The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the appreheding officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.
28
G.R. No. 189808, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 544, 558.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 212196, January 12, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMIL DORIA DAHIL AND ROMMEL CASTRO Y
CARLOS, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 27, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05707, which affirmed the July 17, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles
City (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. DC 02-376, DC 02-377 and DC 02-378, finding accused Ramil Doria
Dahil (Dahil) and Rommel Castro (Castro) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate Informations before the RTC. In
Criminal Case No. DC 02-376, Dahil and Castro were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 for the sale of 26.8098 grams of marijuana in the Information which reads: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to a poseur
buyer six (6) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY SIX GRAMS AND EIGHT THOUSAND
NINETY EIGHT TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (26.8098), which is a dangerous drug, without authority
whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377, Dahil was charged with possession of 20.6642 grams of marijuana in
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information which reads:
chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and custody and control Five (5) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops
weighing TWENTY GRAMS AND SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY TWO TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM
(20.6642), which is a dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378, Castro was charged with possession of 130.8286 grams of marijuana in
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information which reads:
chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and custody and control One (1) brick in form wrapped in masking tape of
dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing ONE HUNDRED THIRTY GRAMS and EIGHT THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (130.8286), which is a dangerous drug, without
authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On November 14, 2002, Castro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Dahil, on the other hand, filed a
motion for reinvestigation and his arraignment was deferred. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented
PO2 Arieltino Corpuz (PO2 Corpuz) and SPO1 Eliseo Licu (SPO1 Licu), as witnesses.
On August 6, 2009, the RTC discovered that Dahil was never arraigned through inadvertence.6 The RTC
informed the parties of the situation and the defense counsel did not interpose any objection to the
reopening of the case and the arraignment of Dahil. The latter was then arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, the public prosecutor manifested that he was adopting all the evidence already adduced.
Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of weeks, the agents of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3, conducted surveillance and casing operations relative to the
information they received that a certain alias “Buddy” and alias “Mel” were trafficking dried marijuana in TB
Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City. On September 29, 2002, the Chief of
PDEA formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was composed of four (4) police officers,
namely, Sergeant Juanito dela Cruz (Sergeant dela Cruz), as team leader; and PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Licu and
PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2 Corpuz was designated as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Licu was assigned as
his back-up.
The team proceeded to the target place at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening. Upon arriving, PO2 Corpuz
together with the informant went to the house of Dahil which was within the TB Pavillon compound. When
PO2 Corpuz and the informant were in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The informant then
introduced PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil asked PO2 Corpuz how much would he be buying
and the latter answered that he would buy P200.00 worth of marijuana. At this juncture, Dahil took out from
his pocket six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After checking the items,
PO2 Corpuz handed two (2) P100.00 marked bills to Castro.
Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off his cap to signal that the sale had been consummated. The rest of
the buy-bust team then rushed to their location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil and
recovered from his possession another five (5) plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu
searched the person of Castro and confiscated from him one (1) brick of suspected marijuana.
Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs, were then brought by the buy-bust team to the
PDEA office. There, the seized items were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu. First, the six (6) plastic
sachets of marijuana which were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked with “A-1” to “A-6” and with
letters “RDRC,” “ADGC” and “EML.” Second, the five (5) plastic sachets recovered from Dahil were marked
with “B-1” to “B-5” and with letters “RDRC,” “ADGC” and “EML.” Finally, the marijuana brick confiscated
from Castro was marked “C-RDRC.” Sergeant dela Cruz then prepared the request for laboratory
examination, affidavits of arrest and other pertinent documents. An inventory of the seized items7 was also
prepared which was signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz brought the confiscated drugs
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, which subsequently yielded
positive results for marijuana.
The prosecution and defense entered into stipulation as to the essential contents of the prospective
testimony of the forensic chemist, to wit:chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
1. That a laboratory examination request was prepared by PO3 Dela Cruz;
2. That said letter request for laboratory examination was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga;
3. That Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran David is a forensic chemist;
4. That said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance subject of the letter
request with qualification that said request was not subscribed or under oath and that the
forensic chemist has no personal knowledge as from whom and where said substance was
taken;
5. That the result of the laboratory examination is embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-0518-
2002; and
6. The findings and conclusion thereof.8
The prosecution was ordered to formally offer its evidence on March 7, 2007.9 After much delay, the public
prosecutor was finally able to orally submit his formal offer of exhibits after almost two years, or on January
6, 2009.10 He offered the following documentary evidence: (1) Joint Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial
Investigation Report, (3) Photocopy of the marked money, (4) Brown envelope containing the subject illegal
drugs, (5) Inventory of Property Seized, (6) Laboratory Examination Request, and (7) Chemistry Report No.
D-0518-2002.
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver came looking for him after he
had arrived home. He saw the tricycle driver with another man already waiting for him. He was then asked
by the unknown man whether he knew a certain Buddy in their place. He answered that there were many
persons named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted from the vehicles parked in front of his house and
dragged him into one of the vehicles. He was brought to Clark Air Base and was charged with illegal selling
and possession of marijuana.
For his part, Castro testified that on September 29, 2002, he was on 4th Street of Marisol, Barangay Ninoy
Aquino, Angeles City, watching a game of chess when he was approached by some men who asked if he
knew a certain Boy residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not know the said person and
then the men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought him to Clark Air Base where he was charged with
illegal possession of marijuana.
RTC Ruling
In its Decision,11 dated July 17, 2012, the RTC found both accused liable for violating Sections 5 and 11 of
R.A. No. 9165, and imposed upon them the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 each for
the crime of illegal sale of marijuana; Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14)
Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P300,000.00 each for the crime of illegal
possession of marijuana.
The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the case of selling and possession of illegal
drugs against the accused. All the elements of the crimes were established. To the trial court, the evidence
proved that PO2 Corpuz bought marijuana from Dahil. The latter examined the marijuana purchased and
then handed the marked money to Castro.
The marked money was lost in the custody of the police officers, but the RTC ruled that the same was not
fatal considering that a photocopy of the marked money was presented and identified by the arresting
officers.12 It did not give credence to the defense of frame-up by Dahil and Castro explaining that it could
easily be concocted with no supporting proof.
CA Ruling
The accused then appealed to the CA. In their Brief for the Accused-Appellants,13 they argued that there
were irregularities on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal items seized from
them. The prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the procedural safeguards which generated
clouds of doubts as to the identity of the seized items presented in evidence. 14 chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry
In its Brief for the Appellee,15 the OSG contended that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of
the crime of illegal sale and possession of marijuana. As to the chain of custody procedure, it insists that the
prosecution witnesses were able to account for the series of events that transpired, from the time the buy-
bust operation was conducted until the time the items were presented in court.
The CA denied the appeal in its Decision, dated September 27, 2013. In its view, the prosecution was able
to establish that the illegal sale of marijuana actually took place. As could be gleaned from the testimony of
PO2 Corpuz, there was an actual exchange as Dahil took out from his pocket six (6) sachets containing
marijuana, while PO2 Corpuz handled out the two (2) P100.00 marked bills, after they agreed to transact
P200.00 worth of the illegal drug.16 The charge of illegal possession of marijuana, was also thus established
by the prosecution.17 Another five (5) plastic sachets of marijuana were recovered from Dahil’s possession
while one (1) brick of marijuana from Castro’s possession.18 chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
It was likewise proven that the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused during the buy-bust operation were
the same drugs presented before the RTC. As testified to by PO2 Corpuz, the six (6) plastic sachets of
marijuana, which were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked “A-1” to “A-6” and with letters “RDRC,”
“ADGC” and “EML,” the five (5) plastic sachets recovered in the possession of Dahil were marked “B-1” to
“B-5” and with the initials “ADGC” and “EML,” while the marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was marked
“C-RDRC.”19 chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody. PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu
testified that the said drugs were marked at the police station. An inventory of the seized items was made
as shown by the Inventory Report of Property Seized, duly signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. The Request for
Laboratory Examination revealed that the confiscated drugs were the same items submitted to the PNP
crime laboratory for examination. On the other hand, Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002 showed that the
specimen gave positive results to the test of marijuana. The accused failed to show that the confiscated
marijuana items were tampered with, or switched, before they were delivered to the crime laboratory for
examination.20 chanRoblesvi rtua lLaw lib rary
Hence, this appeal.
This appeal involves the sole issue of whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied
with the chain of custody procedure required by R.A. No. 9165. cralawred
The Court’s Ruling
Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty
of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are
assigned or unassigned.21 Considering that what is at stake here is no less than the liberty of the accused,
this Court has meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case and finds that
there is merit in the appeal. The Court holds that that there was no unbroken chain of custody and that the
prosecution failed to establish the very corpus delicti of the crime charged.
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to be an
effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-
bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is
susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. 22 chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in every
prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the dangerous
drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in court were the same
substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known under R.A. No. 9165 as
the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.23 In People v. Catalan,24 the Court said: chanrob lesvi rtual lawlib rary
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the
Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand,
the Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in
the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court.
Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain of custody, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, explains the said term as
follows: cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
As a means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies
that: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
Specifically, Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165
enumerates the procedures to be observed by the apprehending officers to confirm the chain of custody, to
wit:
chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items;
xxx
The strict procedure

under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 was not
complied with.
Although the prosecution offered in evidence the Inventory of the Property Seized signed by the arresting
officers and Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not
observed. The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to immediately
(1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
First, the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and confiscation as it was
only done at the police station. Notably, Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR allows the inventory to be done
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures. In this case, however, the prosecution did not even claim that the PDEA Office
Region 3 was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where the drugs were seized. The prosecution also failed to
give sufficient justification for the delayed conduct of the inventory. PO2 Corpuz testified, to wit: c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Q: What documents did you ask Kgd. Abel Pamintuan to sign?

A: The inventory of the property seized, sir.
Q: And did he sign that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was he when he signed that?
A: In our office, sir.
Q: Already in your office?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who prepared the inventory of the property seized?
A: Our investigator, sir.
Q: And that was prepared while you were already at your office?
A: Yes, sir, because we did not bring with us the material or equipment for
the preparation of the documents so, we invited him to our office.25
PO2 Corpuz gave the flimsy excuse that they failed to immediately conduct an inventory because they did
not bring with them the material or equipment for the preparation of the documents. Such explanation is
unacceptable considering that they conducted a surveillance on the target for a couple of weeks.26 They
should have been prepared with their equipment even before the buy-bust operation took place.
Second, there is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized.
According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant dela Cruz who prepared the said document.27 PO2 Cruz on the
other hand, testified that it was their investigator who prepared the document while SPO1 Licu’s testimony
was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator.28 chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were photographed in the presence of the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official. During the cross-examination, PO2 Corpuz testified: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
Q: After you arrested Ramil Dahil, did you conduct the inventory of the
alleged seized items?
A: Yes, sir (sic).
Q: Where did you conduct the inventory?
A: In our office, ma’am
Q: Were pictures taken on the alleged seized items together with Ramil
Dahil?
A: No, ma’am.29 chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
[Emphases supplied]
SPO1 Licu when cross-examined on the same point, testified this was: chan rob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
Q: After you conducted the alleged buy-bust operation, did you conduct an
inventory of the alleged seized items?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were the accused assisted by counsel at the time you conduct the
inventory?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: Were pictures taken on them including the alleged seized items?
A: Pictures were taken on the accused, ma’am.
[Emphasis supplied]
In other words, when questioned on the conduct of the inventory, PO2 Corpuz testified that no pictures of
the seized items were taken while SPO1 Licu said that pictures of the accused were taken. From the vague
statements of the police officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the alleged drugs were indeed taken.
The records are bereft of any document showing the photos of the seized items. The Court notes that SPO1
Licu could have misunderstood the question because he answered that “pictures were taken on the accused”
when the question referred to photographs of the drugs and not of the accused.
The prosecution failed to

establish that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized
items were preserved.
Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to establish the rigorous requirements of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165, jurisprudence dictates that substantial compliance is sufficient. Failure to strictly comply with the
law does not necessarily render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible. 30 The issue of non-compliance with the said section is not of admissibility, but of weight to be
given on the evidence.31 Moreover, Section 21 of the IRR requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect
adherence," as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.32 chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, the proper chain of
custody of the seized items must be shown. The Court explained in People v. Malillin33 how the chain of
custody or movement of the seized evidence should be maintained and why this must be shown by
evidence, viz:chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
In People v. Kamad,34 the Court identified the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of
the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
First link: Marking of the

Drugs Recovered from the
Accused by the Apprehending
Officer
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately
after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting
point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence
serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.35 cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
It must be noted that marking is not found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from the inventory-taking and
photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this
Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.36chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed their initials on the seized
items. They, however, gave little information on how they actually did the marking. It is clear, nonetheless,
that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings were only placed at
the police station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, to wit: chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Q: So, after recovering all those marijuana bricks and plastic sachets of
marijuana and the marked money from the accused, what else did you
do?
A: We brought the two (2) suspects and the evidence and marked money to
our office, sir.
Q: So, in your office, what happened there?
A: Our investigator prepared the necessary documents, sir, the request for
crime lab examination, joint affidavit of arrest, booking sheet, and all
other documents necessary for the filing of the case against the two (2),
sir.
xxx
Q: What about the marijuana, subject of the deal, and the one which you
confiscated from the accused, what did you do with those?
A: Before sending them to Olivas, we placed our markings, sir.37
Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region 3, the seized items were not marked. It
could not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs were handled. The Court must conduct
guesswork on how the seized drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in transit.
Evidently, the alteration of the seized items was a possibility absent their immediate marking thereof.
Still, there are cases when the chain of a custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the seized
items is allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is
done in the presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases.38 Even a less stringent application of the
requirement, however, will not suffice to sustain the conviction of the accused in this case. Aside from the
fact that the police officers did not immediately place their markings on the seized marijuana upon their
arrival at the PDEA Office, there was also no showing that the markings were made in the presence of the
accused.
PO2 Corpuz testified that they only placed their markings on the drugs when they were about to send them
to Camp Olivas for forensic examination. This damaging testimony was corroborated by the documentary
evidence offered by the prosecution. The following documents were made at the PDEA Office: (1) Joint
Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Inventory of Property Seized, and (4) Laboratory
Examination Request. Glaringly, only the Laboratory Examination Request cited the markings on the seized
drugs. Thus, it could only mean that when the other documents were being prepared, the seized drugs had
not been marked and the police officers did not have basis for identifying them. Considering that the seized
drugs were to be used for different criminal charges, it was imperative for the police officers to properly
mark them at the earliest possible opportunity. Here, they failed in such a simple and critical task. The
seized drugs were prone to mix-up at the PDEA Office itself because of the delayed markings.
Worse, not all of the seized drugs were properly marked. As noted by the RTC, Exhibit B-3 RC RD,39Exhibit
A-5 RC RD and Exhibit A-6 RD RC40 did not have the initials of the apprehending officers on the back.
Bearing in mind the importance of marking the seized items, these lapses in the procedure are too
conspicuous and cannot be ignored. They placed uncertainty as to the identity of the corpus delicti from the
moment of seizure until it was belatedly marked at the PDEA Office.
Similarly, in People v. Garcia,41 the Court considered the belated marking of the seized drug by the
apprehending officer in acquitting the accused in the case. The officer testified that he marked the
confiscated items only after he had returned to the police station. Such admission showed that the marking
was not done immediately after the seizure of the items, but after the lapse of a significant intervening time.
Second Link: Turnover of the

Seized Drugs by the Apprehending
Officer to the Investigating Officer
The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer. Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a
supervising officer, who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing.42 This is a
necessary step in the chain of custody because it will be the investigating officer who shall conduct the
proper investigation and prepare the necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the
investigating officer must have possession of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the required documents.
The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin.43 Surprisingly, there was no testimony from
the witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an
investigator in a drug-related case to effectively perform his work without having custody of the seized
items. Again, the case of the prosecution is forcing this Court to resort to guesswork as to whether PO2
Corpuz and SPO1 Licu gave the seized drugs to SPO4 Jamisolamin as the investigating officer or they had
custody of the marijuana all night while SPO4 Jamisolamin was conducting his investigation on the same
items.
In People v. Remigio,44 the Court noted the failure of the police officers to establish the chain of custody as
the apprehending officer did not transfer the seized items to the investigating officer. The apprehending
officer kept the alleged shabu from the time of confiscation until the time he transferred them to the forensic
chemist. The deviation from the links in the chain of custody led to the acquittal of the accused in the said
case.
Third Link: Turnover by the

Investigating Officer of the Illegal
Drugs to the Forensic Chemist
From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs
arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the
substance. In this case, it was only during his cross-examination that PO2 Corpuz provided some
information on the delivery of the seized drugs to Camp Olivas, to wit: chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Q: How about the alleged marijuana, you stated that the same was brought
to the crime laboratory, who brought the same to the crime lab?
A: Me and my back-up, ma’am.
Q: When did you bring the marijuana to the crime lab for examination?
A: I think it was the following day, ma’am.45
As can be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, very little detail was offered on how the seized
marijuana was handled and transferred from the PDEA Office in Angeles City to the crime laboratory in
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. PO2 Corpuz kept possession of the seized drugs overnight without
giving details on the safekeeping of the items. The most palpable deficiency of the testimony would be the
lack of information as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas.
Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran, the forensic chemist who conducted the tests on the subject drugs, did not appear
in court despite the numerous subpoenas sent to her.46 Instead, the prosecution and the defense agreed to
stipulate on the essential points of her proffered testimony. Regrettably, the stipulated testimony of the
forensic chemist failed to shed light as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas. One of the
stipulations was “that said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance of the letter-request
with qualification that said request was not subscribed or under oath and that forensic chemist has no
personal knowledge as from whom and where said substance was taken.”47 This bolsters the fact that the
forensic chemist had no knowledge as to who received the seized marijuana at the crime laboratory.
The recent case of People v. Beran48 involved irregularities in the third link. The police officer, who both
served as apprehending and investigating officer, claimed that he personally took the drug to the laboratory
for testing, but there was no showing who received the drug from him. The records also showed that he
submitted the sachet to the laboratory only on the next day, without explaining how he preserved his
exclusive custody thereof overnight. All those facts raised serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item have not been fatally compromised. Hence, the accused in the said case was also
acquitted.
Fourth Link: Turnover of the

Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the
Forensic Chemist to the Court.
The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the court when
presented as evidence in the criminal case. No testimonial or documentary evidence was given whatsoever
as to how the drugs were kept while in the custody of the forensic chemist until it was transferred to the
court. The forensic chemist should have personally testified on the safekeeping of the drugs but the parties
resorted to a general stipulation of her testimony. Although several subpoenae were sent to the forensic
chemist, only a brown envelope containing the seized drugs arrived in court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on
the essential links in the chain of custody, the prosecutor propounded questions concerning the location of
the misplaced marked money, which was not even indispensable in the criminal case.
The case of People v. Gutierrez50 also had inadequate stipulations as to the testimony of the forensic
chemist. No explanation was given regarding the custody of the seized drug in the interim - from the time it
was turned over to the investigator up to its turnover for laboratory examination. The records of the said
case did not show what happened to the allegedly seized shabu between the turnover by the investigator to
the chemist and its presentation in court. Thus, since there was no showing that precautions were taken to
ensure that there was no change in the condition of that object and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession thereof, the accused therein was likewise acquitted.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that, indeed, there was no compliance with the
procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 because of the inadequate physical inventory and
the lack of photography of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from Dahil and Castro. No explanation was
offered for the non-observance of the rule. The prosecution cannot apply the saving mechanism of Section
21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 because it miserably failed to prove that the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items were preserved. The four links required to establish the proper chain of custody
were breached with irregularity and lapses.
The Court cannot either agree with the CA that the evidentiary rule involving the presumption of regularity
of the performance of official duties could apply in favor of the police officers. The regularity of the
performance of duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the police officers because the records were
replete with indicia of their serious lapses.51 The presumption stands when no reason exists in the records
by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance, the
presumption of regularity will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused to be
presumed innocent.52 chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized marijuana that the
prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the
elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.53 chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
For said reason, there is no need to discuss the specific defenses raised by the accused. chanrobles law
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 27, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 05707 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Ramil Doria Dahil and
Rommel Castro y Carlos, are ACQUITTED of the crime charged against them and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision and to inform this Court
of the date of the actual release from confinement of the accused within five (5) days from receipt of copy.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry
Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
*
Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No. 1910, dated
January 12, 2015.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias and Associate
Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring; rollo, pp. 1-19.
2
Penned by Judge Omar T. Viola; CA rollo, pp. 45-56.
3
Records, p. 1.
4
Id. at 17.
5
Id. at 30.
6
Id. at 219.
7
Id. at 16.
8
CA rollo, p. 49.
9
Records, p. 176.
10
Id. at 208.
11
12
Id. at 54.
13
Id. at 25-43.
14
Id. at 41.
15
Id. at 75-87.
Rollo, p. 10.
16
17
Id. at 9-11.
18
Id. at 13.
19
Id. at 12.
20
Id. at 15-16.
People v. Balagat, 604 Phil. 529, 534 (2009).

21
People v. Garcia, 599 Phil. 416, 426-427 (2009).

22
23
People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 192432, June 23, 2014.
24
G.R. No. 189330, November 28, 2012, 686 SCRA 631, 644.
25
TSN, April 29, 2004, pp. 8-9.
26
Records, p. 10.
Rollo, p. 6.
27
28
TSN, August 17, 2006, p. 25.
29
TSN, May 5, 2006, p. 20.
30
People v. Resurreccion, 618 Phil. 520, 530 (2009).
People v. Domado, 635 Phil. 78, 93 (2010).

31
People v. Salvidar, G.R. No. 207664, June 5, 2014.

32
Malillin v. People, 576 Phil. 576, 587 (2008).

33
34
624 Phil. 289, 304-306 (2010).
People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 279, 289-290.
35
People v. Sabdula, G.R. No. 184758, April 21, 2014.

36
37
TSN, April 29, 2004, pp. 9-10.
People v. Resurrecion, supra note 30, at 531.

38
39
TSN, August 17, 2006, p. 18.
40
Id. at 22.
41
Supra note 22.
People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010, 637 SCRA 791, 812.
42
43
Records, p. 11.
People v. Remigio, G.R. No. 189277, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 336, 353.
44
45
TSN, May 25, 2006, p. 22.
46
Records, pp. 90, 102, 105, 110, 112, 115.
47
CA rollo, p. 49.
People v. Beran, G.R. No. 203028, January 15, 2014.

48
Rollo, p. 6.
49
50
614 Phil. 285 (2009).
People v. Catalan, supra note 24, at 647.
51
People v. Mendoza, supra note 23.

52
People v. Garcia, supra note 22, at 436.

53

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FIRST DIVISION

February 20, 2017

G.R. No. 208093

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952)

In Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953)

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:

Cost against the accused.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA disposed as fol1ows:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN

The appeal is meritorious.

The pertinent provisions of Section 21 state:

Furthermore, in People v. Gonzales,15 the Court explained that:

RSP II Ivan C. Mendoza, Jr.:

A: [In] his left-front pocket.

A: [They were] wrapped in a [golden-colored] cigarette paper.

Q: Why will you be able to remember it?

Q: Who is the investigator?

A: PO2 Rodolfo Tan.

A: He marked his initial [sic].

Q: Ah, you saw him [mark] an initial?

Q: What did you see him [mark] on the paper?

Q: And do you know the meaning of RDT?

A: Yes, Rodolfo Dagalea Tan. 16

A: At that time it was PO3 Floro Napalcruz.

COURT: You are referring to the desk officer?

RSPII IVAN C. MENDOZA, JR.: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: After turning it over, you left?

Q: You do not know what happened to the sachet?

Q: You did not place your markings there?

4th ACP RAY Z. BONGABONG:

Q: [After the apprehension] of the accused in this case, what happened?

A: Through my initial, Sir.

Q: What does RDT stands [sic] for?

A: It stands for my name Rodolfo Dagalea Tan.20

ATTY. EDGARDO D. GONZALES:

Q: Santiago told you that he was the poseur buyer?

Q: He turned over to you, what?

Q: You also identified two other pieces of sachet, correct, Sir?

Q: Who turned over to you?

A: SPO1 Eduardo Rodriguez.21

Accordingly, appellant Salim R. Ismael is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. caguioa

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

476, 490-491 (2010).

G.R. No. 183700 October 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

The CA summed up the versions of the parties, as follows:4

Judgment of the RTC

In his appeal, Andaya contended:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

The appeal is meritorious.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO