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No. L-66620.

September 24, 1986


REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-
PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
Jurisdiction; Where a plaintiff sues a defendant the total demand furnishes the
jurisdictional test irrespective of whether the several causes of action arose out of
different transactions, although their joinder would be merely permissive, not
mandatory.—This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former
and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate
causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos,
then the regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of action are
separate and independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not
mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty
thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or municipal trial court.

Same; Where two or more plaintiffs sue one defendant in a single complaint or
one plaintiff sues several defendants in a single complaint, based on several causes of
action for or against each, respectively, the totality rule applies only where (a) the
causes of action arose from the same series of transactions; and (b) there is a common
question of fact or law among them.—Under the present law, the totality rule is applied
also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a
defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate
causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However,
the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more
defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there
should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.

Same; Same.—The difference between the former and present rules in cases of
permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the
case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions to the totality rule.
In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86 Phil. 523), where twenty-nine dismissed
employees joined in a complaint against the defendant to collect their respective claims,
each of which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total
exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then the
municipal court had jurisdiction. In said case, although the plaintiffs’ demands were
separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was authorized under
Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test. In the case
of International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil. 470), where twenty-five dismissed
teachers jointly sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the
municipal court had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although
the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties
plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.
Same; Same.—Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming they do
not fall under the Labor Code) would be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Similarly, in the above-cited cases of Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez
(supra), if the separate claims against the several defendants arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they
would now be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Same; Same.—In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of
Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of
the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the
claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither
of which falls within its jurisdiction.

APPEAL by certiorari from the order of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

FERIA, J.:

The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(1) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the
requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which
provides as follows:

“Permissive joinder of parties.—All persons in whom or against whom any right


to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may
make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he
may have no interest.”

Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-
Phillipps of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which
dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did not attach to his petition
a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire original record of the case
shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 39 of BP
129. This provision applies only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the
Court of Appeals (Section 20 of the Interim Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition for
review on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Section 25 of the
Interim Rules).

However, the order appealed from states that the first cause of action alleged in the
complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of
P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner
on various occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was
against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount
ofP10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchasedon credit from
petitioner on several occasions from March,1981 to January, 1982.

On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said
respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial
court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more
than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that
although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the
amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
respondent. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion
joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. As above stated, the trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the
“novel” totality rule introduced in Section 33(1) of BP 129 and Section 11 of the Interim
Rules.

The pertinent portion of Section 33(1) of BP 129 reads as follows:

“x x x Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between
the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective
of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. x x
x”

Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:

“Application of the totality rule.—In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is
dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate
sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of
whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any
demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically
alleged.”

Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent portion of


the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads
as follows:

“x x x Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or
causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to
different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. x x x”
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality rule was
reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in
all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions.

This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former and
present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes
of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in
all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same
or different transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the
regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate
and independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and
any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less
may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial
court.

On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and present rules in
cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant
join in a single complaint. Under the former rule, “where the claims or causes of action
joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each
separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test” (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 as amended, supra). This was based on the ruling in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs.
Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. As worded, the former rule applied only to cases of
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to cases of
permissive joinder of parties defendant, as may be deduced from the ruling in the case
of Brillo vs. Buklatan, thus:

“Furthermore, the first cause of action is composed of separate claims against


several defendants of different amounts each of which is not more than P2,000
and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court under section 88
of Republic Act No. 296. The several claims do not seem to arise from the same
transaction or series of transactions and there seem to be no questions of law or
of fact common to all the defendants as may warrant their joinder under Rule 3,
section 6. Therefore, if new complaints are to be filed in the name of the real
party in interest they should be filed in the justice of the peace court.” (87 Phil.
519, 520, reiterated in Gacula vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 142, 146)

Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more
plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint,
as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more
defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the
two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of
law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.

The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive joinder of
parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de
Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions to the totality rule. In the case of
Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86 Phil. 523), where twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in
a complaint against the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was
within the jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total exceeded the
jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then the municipal court had
jurisdiction. In said case, although the plaintiffs’ demands were separate, distinct and
independent of one another, their joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3
and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test. In the case of International
Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil. 470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly
sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the municipal court had
jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although the total exceeded,
its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6
of Rule 3.

Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming they do not fall under the
Labor Code) would be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. Similarly, in the
above-cited cases of Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez(supra), if the separate
claims against the several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would now be under
the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.

In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as


defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the
jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one
complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in
each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject
to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3
of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that
there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents
Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to


costs. SO ORDERED.

No. L-40010. May 26, 1975.*


RUSSEL R. ENERIO, DARROW O. ENERIO, and VIRGINIA RODRIGUEZ,
plaintiffs, vs. HON. NESTOR B. ALAMPAY, SONETRAN CO., INC.,
ERNESTO KHO, and MAX VILLEGAS Y YANSON, respondents.
Courts; Jurisdiction; In assessing whether a claim for damages falls within
jurisdiction of a court of first instance or a municipal court the total demand, including
the claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, should be included.—
The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between the same
parties, i.e., the total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the
basis of jurisdiction and for determining the jurisdictional amount in civil cases. Here
petitioners’ total claim of P978.00 for actual damages, P10,000.00-moral damages,
P15,000.00-exemplary damages and P3,000.00-attorney’s fees, etc., was clearly in
excess of P10,000 and therefore properly fell within the jurisdiction of respondent court
of first instance.

Same; Same; Trial court may not motu proprio and without hearing exclude from
the jurisdictional amount the claims for moral and exemplary damages.—The
respondent court could not arbitrarily isolate petitioners’ lesser claim for actual
damages and without hearing and proofs rule out petitioners’ other claims for moral and
exemplary damages as “bloated” and summarily dismiss motu proprio the case as not
falling within its jurisdiction contrary to the very allegations on the face of the
complaint.

Same; Same; Pre-trial; Trial court may narrow down issue of amount of
recoverable damages at the pre-trial if it believes that plaintiffs claim for damages had
been exaggerated. But it has to assume jurisdiction over the case and render judgment
instead of dismissing the same and shifting jurisdiction to the municipal court.—
Respondent’s contention in their comment that “since the award of said amount (of
moral and exemplary damages) is discretionary on its (respondent court) part, it
believed that plaintiffs cannot recover a total amount in excess of P10,000.00, hence,
there is basis for the court in dismissing the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction”
is manifestly erroneous. If such were the case, respondent court should have narrowed
down the issue at the pre-trial to the question and amount of recoverable damages, if
any, and proceeded to receive the parties’ proofs thereon and thereafter rendered
judgment on the merits, even utterly refusing any award of moral or exemplary damages
to petitioners if this were its determination. This simply means that it should have
properly assumed and exercised its jurisdiction and disposed of the case on the merits
rather than erroneously dismissed the complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction with all
the attendant delay caused thereby and the remand of the case back to it.

PETITION for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. Alampay, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court sets aside respondent court’s dismissal order for alleged lack of
jurisdiction. The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between
the same parties furnishes the jurisdictional test and since petitioners’ total claim for
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees was clearly in excess of
P10,000.00 and came close to P30,000.00, it properly fell within the jurisdiction of
respondent court of first instance.
On May 27, 1974, petitioners as plaintiffs filed with respondent court of first instance
of Negros Occidental presided by respondent Judge Nestor B. Alampay a complaint for
the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation totalling close to P30,000.00 against private respondents Sonetran Co., Inc.,
Ernesto Kho and Max Villegas y Yanson as defendants as a result of the physical injuries
caused petitioner-minor, Russel Enerio, eight years of age (herein represented by his
parents, the co-petitioners) when bumped on the road on January 15, 1974 by a
passenger bus of respondents driven allegedly “in a very reckless, negligent and
imprudent manner” by respondent Max Villegas.

Respondents filed in due course their answer with counter-claim for P20,000.-moral
damages and P2,000.-attorney’s fees.

Pre-trial was held by respondent court on November 27, 1974 and on said date,
without its jurisdiction having been questioned or placed in issue by respondents, it
issued moto proprio an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that “without the
claims for moral and exemplary damages, this case will not fall within the jurisdiction of
the court of first instance,” without prejudice to re-filing in the court of proper
jurisdiction and without costs, as petitioners-plaintiffs had been allowed by it to file the
case as paupers-litigants. The pertinent portion of the dismissal order reads as follows:

“At the pre-trial of this case the attention of the counsel for the plaintiffs was
drawn to the allegations of the complaint which limit the claim for actual
damages of the plaintiff minor, Russel Enerio, to the amount of P478.00
corresponding to hospital and doctor’s bills and medicines and for the
miscellaneous expenses attendant to his care after he was bumped by a passenger
bus of the defendant company. In same complaint, plaintiff Darrow O. Enerio,
father of said minor, claims the amount of P500.00, representing his alleged loss
of income during the period while attending to his injured son. All such claim for
actual damages would thus be in the total amount of only P978.00.

Along with these considerations, the court notes that plaintiffs seek moral
damages in the sum of P10,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of
P15,000.00 and an award for attorney’s fees of P3,000.00 and expenses of
litigation in the sum of P500.00. Without the claims for moral and exemplary
damages, this case will not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance.

“It is therefore the considered view of the court, considering the minimal amount
of the claim of the plaintiffs for actual damages, that the moral and exemplary
damages recited and claimed for in the complaint is but an obvious means taken
to circumvent the provisions of the Judiciary Act with respect to the jurisdiction
of inferior courts and the Courts of First Instance, respectively. The
disproportionate and bloated claims for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees in this instance reflect that such were merely placed in the
complaint in order to shift jurisdiction to this court, but that under the recited
facts this case should not be taken cognizance of due to the limited amount that is
actually involved. To tolerate the imposition of this case on this court can open
the floodgates to parties who may then institute slight physical injury cases in the
Courts of First Instance on mere assertions of clearly disproportionate and
imprudent claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, with the
resulting effect of adding burden to the docket and load of the superior courts.

xxx xxx x x x.”

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal order. Upon
consideration of respondents’ comment and of petitioners’ reply thereto, the Court
resolved to treat the case as a special civil action and dispense with the filing of briefs for
an expeditious determination of the simple issue of jurisdiction involved.

It is well settled and beyond question that the jurisdiction of a court over a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, and since petitioners’ complaint
asserted a total demand, exclusive of interest of over P10,000.00 (and sought recovery
of damages of close to P30,000.00) the case clearly falls within the original jurisdiction
of respondent court of first instance as provided by section 44 of the Judiciary Act,
Republic Act 296 as amended.

The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between the same
parties, i.e. the total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the
basis of jurisdiction and for determining the jurisdictional amount in civil cases. Here 1

petitioners’ total claim of P978.00 for actual damages, P10,000.-moral damages,


P15,000.-exemplary damages and P3,000.-attorney’s fees, etc., was clearly in excess of
P10,000.00 and therefore properly fell within the jurisdiction of respondent court of
first instance. Respondent court could not arbitrarily isolate petitioners’ lesser claim for
actual damages and without hearing and proofs rule out petitioners’ other claims for
moral and exemplary damages as “bloated” and summarily dismiss motu proprio the
case as not falling within its jurisdiction contrary to the very allegations on the face of
the complaint.

Petitioners contend with reason that their complaint asserted lawful demands for the
imposition of moral and exemplary or corrective damages against respondents “to serve
as deterrent against reckless driving” on the basis of their specific allegations in their
complaint that respondents’ bus “was running very fast and was being driven ... in a very
reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, in utter violation of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law and the traffic rules and regulations and without due regard to life and
property” and “that as a result of the injuries received by minor plaintiff, plaintiffs
suffered physically and underwent mental torture and worried, wounded feelings,
serious anxiety...”2

Petitioners have disclaimed any “bloating” of their claim for moral and exemplary
damages as merely surmised by respondent court without having given petitioners their
day in court and without having received the proofs of the parties. Petitioners rightfully
contend that it is not the lesser nature of the injuries suffered by the minor or the
relatively modest amount of actual damages incurred by them in the hospitalization of
the injured son and the father’s loss of income but the gross and wanton negligence of
private respondents in the operation of their public vehicle which resulted in the injuries
inflicted upon the minor (as alleged and if proven by them at the trial) that would be
decisive and controlling on the matter of moral and exemplary damages claimed by
them. Petitioners have cause to complain, therefore, that respondent court in
refusing motu proprio to take cognizance of the case on the ground that the claims for
damages were “bloated” in effect prejudged the case without hearing and without the
evidence, and wrongfully barred them from seeking moral and exemplary damages in
excess of P10,000.00 by dismissing their suit before it and requiring them to file their
action in the inferior courts, where their total claim for damages would be limited to not
more than P10,000.00.

There appears no valid justification in the record for respondent court’s bare
conclusion that petitioners’ claim for damages were “bloated” in order to shift
jurisdiction to it rather than to the inferior courts and that the filing of the case with it
amounted to an “imposition of this case on this court.”

Respondents’ contention in their comment that “since the award of said amount (of
moral and exemplary damages) is discretionary on its (respondent court) part, it
believed that plaintiffs cannot recover a total amount in excess of P10,000.00, hence,
there is basis for the court in dismissing the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction”
is manifestly erroneous. If such were the case, respondent court should have narrowed
down the issue at the pre-trial to the question and amount of recoverable damages, if
any, and proceeded to receive the parties’ proofs thereon and thereafter rendered
judgment on the merits, even utterly refusing any award of moral or exemplary damages
to petitioners if this were its determination. This simply means that it should have
properly assumed and exercised its jurisdiction and disposed of the case on the
merits rather than erroneously dismissed the complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction
with all the attendant delay caused thereby and the remand of the case back to it.

ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby annulled and set aside
and the case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for trial and adjudication on the
merits. Without costs.

Notes.—A civil action to annul an order of a justice of the peace court obtained
through fraud falls within the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance. (Ragudo vs.
Pasno, 4 SCRA 926).
Where the complaint does not show prior possession and neither does it allege that
plaintiff was deprived of possession by any of the means mentioned in Rule 72 of the
Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth, that would
have made out a case for forcible entry, nor that the right of possession of the defendant
had terminated, and occupancy was being unlawfully withheld so as to constitute
unlawful detainer, the Court of First Instance, not Justice of the Peace Court shall have
jurisdiction (Valderrama Lumber Manufacturer’s Co., Inc. vs. L. S. Sarmiento Co.,
Inc., 5 SCRA 287).

Laws conferring jurisdiction on inferior courts of demands below certain amounts do


not forbid a determination of said demands in the superior court, where they are
connected with larger claims or with a type of demand solely within the jurisdiction of
the superior court. (Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. vs. Compania General de Tabascos
de Filipinas, 19 SCRA 874).

In case of a concurrent jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that the court first acquiring


jurisdiction excludes the other courts. (Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 551). Thus, where
the assignment of a case to the municipal court was made after the Court of First
Instance had no longer exclusive but concurrent jurisdiction over the case, the
assignment is erroneous, for well-settled is the rule that where several courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over the same offense, the court which first acquire jurisdiction
of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the others. (Encarnacion vs. Baltazar, 1
SCRA 860).

After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the


merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the Court.
(People vs. Munar, 53 SCRA 278).

No. L-75919. May 7, 1987. *

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.,


petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON
and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Complaint; Filing Fees; Environmental facts of


Magaspi vs. Ramolete case, different from case at bar.—lnthe Magaspi case, the action
was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the
filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of
the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that
since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and
the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." Hence, as the amended
complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the
amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee. In the
present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the
complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages
and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the
amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket
fee regardless of actual date of filing in court.—As reiterated in the Magaspi case the
rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the present case the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee.
Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court.
For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could
be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the
amount of damages in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.—The
Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment
of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and
not in the amended complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Court frowns at practice of counsel who
filed the original complaint of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in
the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint which is clearly intended to thwart payment of correct filing fees.—
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the
practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P 78
million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other
purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when,
even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation,
petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of
the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when
in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that
the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel
wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body
of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the
required docket f ee is obvious.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Warning of Supreme Court that drastic action
will be taken upon a repetition of the unethical practice.—The Court serves warning
that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirement that henceforth all complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and that the damages
should be considered in the assessment of the filing fees; Any pleading that fails to
comply with the requirement shall not be accepted or admitted.—To put a stop to this
irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment
of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement
shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee; An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction in the court, much less payment of the docket
fee based on amount in the amended pleading Magaspi vs. Ramolete case which is
inconsistent with this decision, is reversed.—The Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.

PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J.:

Acting on the motion f or reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of


January 28, 1987 and. another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral
argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the
Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case f or oral argument is denied.

Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the
basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. They contend
1

that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the filing fee should be levied by
considering the amount of damages sought in the original complaint.

The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that—
• 1.The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land with damages, while the present case is an action for torts and
2

damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining order,
etc.3

• 2.In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment
of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and
delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of
actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the
amounts specified therein. However, in the present case, the prayer is for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of
the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million
paid by the plaintiff s for the property in question, to attach such property of
defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered,
and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale
of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of
plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe
proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of
the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to
make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified
in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over
P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.
5

Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the
nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an
action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated
were treated as merely ancillary to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only
P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff s fee were paid.6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe
gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is
both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of
complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for
specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation
is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the
prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the
amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the f iling fee.
When this under-assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention
of this Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered
by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an
amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable
Corporation as co-plaintiff and by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in
the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After
this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re-assessment of the docket
fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the
trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts
which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still
no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was
admitted.

On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay
the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original
complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely ancillary or incidental to the
action for recovery of ownership and possession of real property.8An amended
complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the
Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed
for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted.9

In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the
basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to
be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of an
"honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court
"had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper
and regular."10Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the
allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the
computation of the filing fee.11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the
allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an
action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in
court."12Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court.13For all legal purposes there is no
such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the
order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions
taken by the trial court are null and void.

The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of
assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint and not in the amended complaint.

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the
practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78
million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other
purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when,
even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation,
petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of
the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint It was only when in
obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the
amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel
wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P 10,000,000.00 in the body
of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the
required docket fee is obvious.

The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this
unethical practice.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only
in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered
in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with
this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on
the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case14 in so far
as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. SO


ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 79937-38.February 13, 1989. *

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J. WARBY,
petitioners, vs.HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch
104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Statutes regulating the procedure of


courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage.—On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling
in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said
civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchesterruling as yet. Further, private
respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v.
Ramolete,wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. The contention that Manchester cannot
apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Complaint; Docket Fees; It is not only the filing
of the complaint, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.—It is not simply the
filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; PermissiveCounterclaims; Third-Party


Claims; Permissive counter-claims, third-party claims and the like shall not be
considered filed until and unless the prescribed filing fee is paid.—The same rule
applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.
The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no
case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Lien; When the judgment of
the courts awards a claim not specified in the pleading, the additional filing fee shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.—Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee
but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk
of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.

On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of
a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of
its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was
declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.

On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially
against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as
additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of
litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the
amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint
to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which
prompted petitioners’ counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by
respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case.

Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other
cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this
Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive
that they be reraffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge
Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then
vacant.

On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case
No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and
that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of
court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise
required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their
complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-
41177 was temporarily assigned, issued an order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to
issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case
of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.

On Jaunary 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by


petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent
including the two additional defendants aforestated.

Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q-41177 was thereafter
assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental
Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court’s letter-report
signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15,
1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount
sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a “Compliance”
and a “Re-Amended Complaint” stating therein a claim of “not less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory damages” in the prayer. In the body of the said
second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second
amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance
with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk
of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court
based on private respondent’s claim of “not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages” amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently
paid by private respondent.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning
the said order of Judge Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an


additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about
P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00. 1

On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others,
as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:


1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. L-09715 insofar as it
seeks annulment of the order
• (a)denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended,
and
• (b)granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course
to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing
fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the
docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the basis of the
amount of P25,401,707.00.” 2

Hence, the instant petition.

During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of
respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on
April 28, 1988.3

The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that
the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of
non-payment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be
true that private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as
herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in
the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should
be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same,
petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising
therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest
ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, as follows:
4

“The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.”

On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot
apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in
court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that
what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court
5

held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid
was insufficient.

The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6

In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, this Court held that the payment of the full
7

amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a
forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00
as required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving
notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of
the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held
that the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the
appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.

In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become
8

a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor
General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5-1/2 months
prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration
was not filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be
filed at least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro,this
Court concluded that the filing of petitioner’s declaration of intention on October 23,
1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.

In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were
9

applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of
proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by
law. However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said
10

period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to
be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.

Again, in Garica vs. Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must
11

be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that
said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same
decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may
have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same
court.

Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is
12

deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its
filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession
of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the
payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and 10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and
void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper
title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00
from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as
moral damages, attorney’s fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action
and exemplary damages in the amount ofP500,000.00.

The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount
of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action
was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed
value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court
ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,l04.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the
Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary
damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral
damages as the court may determine, attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of
the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition
notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court
reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed
and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee
in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be based on
the amended complaint.

The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to
have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We
reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct
amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that
there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket
fee in that as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of
P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one for damages, We upheld the
assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended
complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages
alleged in the original complaint.

However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester.


Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of
the action against the defendants’ announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by
the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property of defendants
that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing,
the issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale
of the subject property and annul defendants’ illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff.
It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally,
actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be
proved during the trial for attorney’s fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to
declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for
purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total
amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.

Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the
docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount
involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the
allegations of the complaint as well as its designation that the action was one for
damages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed
the correct docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million,
although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended
complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and
eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The
prayer in the original complaint was maintained.

On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the
said case and other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial court
directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which
they were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the
amount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of
damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.

Applying the principle in Magaspi that “the case is deemed filed only upon payment
of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court,” this Court held that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon
the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and
void.13

The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment
of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts
and circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original
complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the
prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund
of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages.
The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private
respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be
awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body
of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70.
Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the
additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than
P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an


additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately
P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee
of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on
August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional
docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation
of Manchester,on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of
P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of
P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended
and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that
private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The
pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not
only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended
complaint.

However, in Manchester,petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee untill the
case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud
committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted
inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchestermust have had that sobering influence on private respondent
who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered
his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as
may be ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the
lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine
and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to
pay the same. Thus, the Court rules as follows:
• 1.It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
• 2.The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing
fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
• 3.Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the
same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine
the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total
amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as
may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private
respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.

Note.—Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction
in the court, much less payment of the docket fee based on amount in the amended
pleading. (Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562.)

G.R. Nos. 88075-77.December 20, 1989. *

MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL,


petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM, Davao del Norte,
Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez and Hon. Jesus
Matas, respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of Court, and GODOFREDO
PINEDA, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgment; Dismissal of petition for failure to


comply with Circular No. 1-88; Copies of challenged orders were not certified by the
clerk of court or his duly authorized representative but by petitioner’s counsel which is
not allowed.—It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Court’s Circular No.
1-88 (effective January 1, 1989). The copies of the challenged Orders thereto attached
were not certified by the proper Clerk of Court or his duly authorized representative.
Certification was made by the petitioners’ counsel, which is not allowed.

Same; Same; Actions; Jurisdiction; Determinative of the court’s jurisdiction in


actions for recovery of possession of real property is the nature thereof, not the
amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with the issue of title or
possession, and regardless of the value of the property.—It is true that the complaints
do not state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also
true, however, that the actions are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They
are principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion
publiciana. Determinative of the court’s jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature
thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with the
issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously,
an action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de
posesion) or the title thereof, or for partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a
mortgage on, said real property—in other words, a real action—may be commenced and
prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary
damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts under B.P. 129;
Application of the rule.—Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over “all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.” The rule applies regardless of the value of the real
property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule
also applies even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of
damages; the amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the
Court’s jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases—e.g., actions simply for
recovery of money or of personal property, or actions in admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction—in which the amount claimed, or the value of the personal property, is
determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal property or the amount
claimed should exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Filing Fees; Circular No. 7ofthe Supreme Court cannot
be invoked as authority for dismissal of the actions at bar; Circular was avowedly
inspired by the Manchester ruling.—Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988,
cannot thus be invoked, as the petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal of the
actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7, 1987), has but
limited application to said actions, as shall presently be discussed. Moreover, the rules
therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified by the Court’s subsequent
decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos..79937-38,
February 13, 1989.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Purpose of Circular No. 7.—Circular No. 7 was
aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer of their complaints
“any specification of the amount of damages,” the omission being “clearly intended for
no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead
the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirement in Circular No. 7 that


complaints, etc. should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer has not been altered; New rule that trial
courts are now authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but
not beyond the prescriptive or reglementary period; For damages arising after the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee shall constitute a
lien on the judgment.—As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that
complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has
not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent “amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading,”
the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the
pleading—i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading—as
to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the action is purely for recovery of
money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount
claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs.—Where the action is purely for the
recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate
amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or
similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, “specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules to be applied where the complaint
or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages, and there is no
precise statement of the amounts being claimed, or where the pleading specifies the
amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient.—Two situations may arise.
One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or
damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event
the rule is that the pleading will “not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.” In other words, the complaint or pleading may be
dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged,
although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint
and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-
barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the
fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a
reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon
such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the
action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right
of action.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the action involves real property and a
related claim for damages, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both the value
of the property and the total amount of related damages sought; Rule where no
amounts of the damages are specified.—Where the action involves real property and a
related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a)
the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time
of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such
reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in in the
meantime. But where—as in the case at bar—the fees prescribed for an action involving
real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual,
moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed.
The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property,
acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the
prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may
not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of
lack of specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for
damages as to which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or
allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege
the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees
therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.

JOINT PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to review the orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, Br. 1 and 2.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


RESOLUTION

NARVASA, J.:

In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, three (3) actions for recovery of
1

possession (acciones publicianas ) were separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda


2

against three (3) defendants, docketed as follows:


• 1)vs. Antonia NoelCivil Case No. 2209
• 2)vs. Ponciano PanesCivil Case No. 2210
• 3)vs. Maximo TacayCivil Case No. 2211.
Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Branch I of the Trial Court,
presided over by Judge Marcial Hernandez. Civil No. 2210 was assigned to Branch 2,
presided over by Judge Jesus Matas.

The complaints all alleged the same essential facts: (1) Pineda was the owner of a
3

parcel of land measuring 790 square meters, his ownership being evidenced by TCT No.
T-46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the
land by mere tolerance; (3) having himself need to use the property, Pineda had made
demands on the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor,
but these demands had been refused; and (4) the last demand had been made more than
a year prior to the commencement of suit. The complaints prayed for the same reliefs, to
wit:
• 1)that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied by the defendants;
• 2)that defendants and their “privies and allies” be ordered to vacate and deliver the
portions of the land usurped by them;
• 3)that each defendant be ordered to pay:
• 1)P2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;
• 2)“Actual damages, as proven;”
• 3)“Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court may fix;” 4

• 4)“P30,000.00, “as attorney’s fees, and representation fees of P5,000.00 per day of
appearance;”
and
• 4)that he (Pineda) be granted such “further relief and remedies x x just and equitable in
the premises.”
The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation (evidently made by
plaintiffs counsel) reading, “P5,000.00 as and for,” immediately above the typewritten
words, “Actual damages, as proven,” the intention apparently being to make the entire
phrase read, “5,000.00 as and for actual damages as proven.” 5

Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants by common


counsel. Every motion alleged that the Trial Court had not acquired jurisdiction of the
6

case—

“. . . for the reason that the x x complaint violates the mandatory and clear
provision of Circular No. 7 of the x x Supreme Court dated March 24, 1988, by
failing to specify all the amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from
defendant;” and
“. . . for x x failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic requirement as to
the assessed value of the subject lot in dispute.”

Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 2210 but ordered
the expunction of the “allegations in paragraph 11 of the x x complaint regarding moral
as well as nominal damages.” On motion of defendant Panes, Judge Matas later ordered
7

the striking out, too, of the “handwritten amount of ‘P5,000.00 as and for,’ including the
typewritten words ‘actual damages as proven’ x x in sub-paragraph b of paragraph 4 in
the conclusion and prayer of the complaint x x.” 8

The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered 2211 and 2209 were also
denied in separate orders promulgated by Judge Marcial Fernandez. His Order in Case
9

No. 2209 dated March 15, 1989 (a) declared that since the “action at bar is for
Reivindicatoria, Damages and Attorney’s fees x x (d)efinitely this Court has the exclusive
jurisdiction,” (b) that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages “are only one
aspect of the cause of action,” and (c) because of absence of specification of the amounts
claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, they should be “expunged from the
records.”

Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and Fernandez in the
rendition of the Orders above described, the defendants in all three (3) actions have
filed with this Court a “Joint Petition” for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction,” praying essentially that said orders be annulled and respondent judges
directed to dismiss all the complaints “without prejudice to private respondent Pineda’s
re-filing a similar complaint that complies with Circular No. 7.” The joint petition (a)
re-asserted the proposition that because the complaints had failed to state the amounts
being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages, the Trial Courts aquo had not
acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in question—indeed, the respondent
Clerk of Court should not have accepted the complaints which initiated said suits, and
(b) it was not proper merely to expunge the claims for damages and allow “the so-called
cause of action for ‘reivindicatoria’ to remain for trial” by itself. 10

The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. It should be dismissed for
failure to comply with this Court’s Circular No. 1-88 (effective January 1, 1989). The
copies of the challenged Orders thereto attached were not certified by the proper Clerk
11

of Court or his duly authorized representative. Certification was made by the petitioners’
counsel, which is not allowed.

The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally important reason. It fails
to demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judges in
rendering the Orders complained of or, for that matter, the existence of any proper
cause for the issuance of the writ of mandamus. On the contrary, the orders appear to
have correctly applied the law to the admitted facts.

It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral
and nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the actions are not basically for the
recovery of sums of money. They are principally for recovery of possession of real
property, in the nature of an accion publiciana. Determinative of the court’s jurisdiction
in this type of actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly
arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the
value of the property. Quite obviously, an action for recovery of possession of real
property (such as an accion plenaria de posesion) or the title thereof, or for partition or
12

condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property —in other13

words, a real action—may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying


claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action would fall
within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over “all civil actions which involve the title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.” The rule applies regardless of the value of the real property
14

involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies
even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the
amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Court’s
jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases—e.g., actions simply for recovery of
money or of personal property, or actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction —in
15 16

which the amount claimed, or the value of the personal property, is determinative of
17

jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal property or the amount claimed should
exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court.

Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked, as the
petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular,
avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7, 1987), has but limited application to said
actions, as shall presently be discussed. Moreover, the rules therein laid down have
since been clarified and amplified by the Court’s subsequent decision in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer
of their complaints “any specification of the amount of damages,” the omission being
“clearly intended for no other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing
fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee.” The following
rules were therefore set down:
• 1.All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
the filing fees in any case.
• 2.Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted
nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
• 3.The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
• 1.It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
(also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of
• the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
• 2.The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing
fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
• 3.Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the
same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.”
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions,
answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What
has been revised is the rule that subsequent “amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading,” the trial court now
being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has
been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the pleading—i.e., damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading—as to which the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the
“sum claimed,” on the one hand, or the “value of the property in litigation or the value of
the estate,” on the other. There are, in other words, as already above intimated, actions
18

or proceedings involving real property, in which the value of the property is immaterial
to the court’s jurisdiction, account thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal
fees; and there are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery of
money and/or damages, in which the value of the property or the amount of the demand
is decisive of the trial court’s competence (aside from being the basis for fixing the
corresponding docket fees). 19

Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are
assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and
costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7
of this Court, “specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of
the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case.”

Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a
claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts
being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will “not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.” In other words, the
complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are
unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit
amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the
meantime become time-barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount
of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the
court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance
thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take
cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and
consequently barred the right of action.

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the
legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the
total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action
if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite
fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of
full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of
course, prescription has set in in the meantime. But where—as in the case at bar—the
fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of
certain of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction
over the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint
or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that
authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof. What should
be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are
stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time
for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of
damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant
prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

Notes.—Jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the


commencement of the action. (Lee vs. Municipal Trial Court of Legaspi, 145 SCRA
408.)

There is no rule authorizing a court personnel or branch clerk of court to issue a


“notice of case status.” (Koh vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 259.)

G.R. No. 149227. December 11, 2003. *

LA SALETTE COLLEGE, Represented by Its President, FR. ROMEO


GONZALES, MS; and JESUS T. BAYAUA, Dean of Student Services,
petitioners, vs. VICTOR C. PILOTIN, respondent.

Actions; Appeals; Docket Fees; Pleadings and Practice; The payment of docket
fees is not a trivial matter—these fees are necessary to defray court expenses in the
handling of cases.—The payment of docket fees is not a trivial matter. These fees are
necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. For this reason, and to
secure a just and speedy disposition of every action and proceeding, the Rules on Civil
Procedure mandates the payment of docket and other lawful fees within the prescribed
period. Otherwise, the jurisdiction of the proper court to handle a case is adversely
affected.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Full payment of the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional, for the perfection of the appeal.—
Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the following requirements must be complied
with. First, within 15 days, a notice of appeal must be filed with the court that rendered
the judgment or final order sought to be appealed; second, such notice must be served
on the adverse party; and third, within the same 15-day period, the full amount of
appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the court that
rendered the judgment or final order. It should be noted that full payment of the
appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional, for
the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to act on
the subject matter of the action, and the decision or final order sought to be appealed
from would become final and executory.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to pay appellate docket fees within the reglementary
period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal, which power should be
used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances.—Notwithstanding the mandatory nature
of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict
application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the
reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such
power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of
circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.

Attorneys; Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties but, first and
foremost, officers of the court—they are obliged to observe rules of procedure in good
faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.—On this point, petitioners’
counsel is reminded of the role that lawyers play in the dispensation of justice. Bayas v.
Sandiganbayan held thus: “Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties but,
first and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their duties—assisting in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice—is more significant than that of [the cause
of] their client, rightly or wrongly. x x x. We stress that candor in all dealings is the very
essence of membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are obliged to observe rules of
procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.”

Docket Fees; The payment of docket fees is an essential requirement for the
perfection of an appeal.—We stress that the payment of docket fees is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement for the perfection of an
appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action, and the decision or final order sought to be appealed from
becomes final and executory. As laid down in Barangay 24 of Legaspi City v. Imperial:
“The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is purely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the
statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and
failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the
appeal.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

An appeal is not perfected by the mere filing of a Notice of Appeal that has been served
on the adverse party. The docket fees must likewise be paid within the reglementary
period. Petitioners have failed to show why they merit an exception to these stringent
rules.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
1

set aside the November 16, 2000 and the June 22, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of
2 3

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV UDK No. 0236C. The November 16, 2000 Resolution
disposed as follows:

“In view of the foregoing, Appellee’s ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ is GRANTED.


The Resolution, dated March 14, 2000, is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE
and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.” 4

The June 22, 2001 Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the trial court as follows:
5

“[Respondent] is a bonafide student of [petitioner] College dating back [to] the


school year 1988-1989 taking up the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce.
In the enrollment period for the second semester held on October 22 to
November 5, 1993, [respondent] was denied re-enrollment, despite repeated
pleas by x x x himself and by other interested parties and his lawyer.

“On November 16, 1993, he filed his complaint and asked for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel [petitioner college to] re-
admit him. On December 28, 1993, an Order was issued directing [petitioner
college] to admit [respondent] for the second semester but still [petitioner
college] refused to re-admit [respondent], despite implementation of said order
and the pleas of [respondent] thru his counsel so that he could catch up with the
bulk of the school days of the semester and could graduate.

“Because of the adamant refusal of [respondent] school in re-admitting him and


his defiance to the order and because the period of the second semester [was]
already about to close, [respondent] amended his complaint and concentrate[d]
on damages, hence, this case.

“On the other hand, the [petitioner college] alleged that it opened its enrollment
period for the second semester of school year 1993-1994 on 11 October 1993 up to
22 October, 1993 to 05 November, 1993. However, classes for the second
semester of that school year commenced on 25 October, 1993. During these
periods for enrolment, [respondent] never enrolled with the x x x College and
neither did he accomplish the basic requirements for enrolment. However, on 05
November, 1993, the x x x College was in receipt of a letter from Atty. Quirino L.
Pilotin dated on that same date requesting for a reconsideration of an alleged
decision denying enrolment to the [respondent]. Upon receipt of the said letter, it
was endorsed to [Respondent] Bayaua who in turn wrote Atty. Pilotin explaining
among others that was not denied enrolment but rather [the] latter did not enroll
with the said College. Considering, however, that the x x x College started its
regular classes on 25 October, 1993, in the event [respondent] was able to enroll
on 6 November, 1993, he would have then exceeded the required absences for his
supposed enrolled subjects.
“Since plaintiff failed to enroll on the last day for enrolment, there is no reason
why the x x x College should relax its rules to accommodate [respondent]. The x x
x College merely imposed its disciplining authority when it sets dates for the
period to enroll and the matter of admission of students is within the ambit of
academic freedom and beyond the province of the Courts to decide.” 6

On November 17, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of


respondent. Petitioners received the Decision on November 26, 1998. On the same date,
7

they filed a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC approved on December 2, 1998.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration thereof on the ground of petitioners’ failure


to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period. The trial court, however, denied
the Motion in its April 23, 1999 Order. 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its November 29, 1999 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal of petitioners for
their failure to pay “the required docketing fee within the period for filing an
appeal.” But, upon their motion, the CA granted, in a Resolution dated March 14, 2000,
9

reconsideration of their appeal, which it reinstated “in the interest of substantial justice
and considering that [petitioners] already paid the docket fees.” Respondent moved for
10

a reconsideration on March 29, 2000.

After reexamining the records of the case, the CA, in the challenged November 16,
2000 Resolution, dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners, because “the docket fees
were only paid after one (1) year and eleven (11) months from the filing of the notice of
appeal.” It deemed it imperative to reverse the March 14, 2000 Resolution “to conform
11

with the law and long settled jurisprudence” on the matter. Thus, in the June 22, 2001
12

Resolution, it denied their Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition. 13

Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
• “1.Whether or not the appeal was seasonably filed;
• “2.With all due respect, the Court of Appeals did not have the authority to dismiss
the appeal.” 14

In the main, the case revolves around the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees.

The Court’s Ruling


The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue: Timeliness of Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees


The payment of docket fees is not a trivial matter. These fees are necessary to defray
court expenses in the handling of cases. For this reason, and to secure a just and speedy
15

disposition of every action and proceeding, the Rules on Civil Procedure mandates the
16 17

payment of docket and other lawful fees within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the
jurisdiction of the proper court to handle a case is adversely affected. 18

The above rule applies squarely to this case, in which the judgment issued by the
RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, was elevated to the CA for review. Rule
41 of the Rules on Civil Procedure provides the essential requirements for making such
an appeal, as follows:

“SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.—


“(a) Ordinary appeal.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken
by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. x x x.
“x x x x x x x x x
“SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. x x x.
“SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees.—Within the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to
the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.
“SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.—A party’s appeal by notice of
appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due
time. “x x x x x x x x x.
“In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties. “x x x x x x x x x.”

Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the following requirements must be complied
with. First, within 15 days, a notice of appeal must be filed with the court that rendered
the judgment or final order sought to be appealed; second, such notice must be served
on the adverse party; and third, within the same 15-day period, the full amount of
appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the court that
rendered the judgment or final order.

It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory, even jurisdictional, for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise,
19 20

the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject matter of the action, and the
21

decision or final order sought to be appealed from would become final and executory. 22

In the present case, petitioners insist that they seasonably paid the docket fees. After
resolving thrice the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees, the CA finally found
that these had been paid one (1) year and 11 days from the filing of their notice of appeal.
To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners received the November 17, 1998
RTC Decision. Consequently, they had 15 days to file their Notice of Appeal. They did so
on November 26, 1998, but failed to pay the docket fees. A review of the records shows
that they paid these only on July 8, 1999, or after almost seven (7) months from the
23

mandated last day for payment, which was December 11, 1998. Clearly, the November
17, 1998 RTC Decision, which petitioners sought to appeal, had long become final and
executory.

Relaxation of the Rule on Nonpayment of Docket Fees

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate


docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the
following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second,such power should be used by the court
in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all
attendant circumstances. 24

In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, the payment of the


25

docket fees was delayed by six (6) days, but the late payment was accepted, because the
party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying those
fees. Yambao v. Court of Appeals saw us again relaxing the Rules when we declared
26

therein that “the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees
if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x x x the failure to pay the
correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake,
excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the
appellant.”27

In the present case, petitioners have not shown any satisfactory reason to warrant the
relaxation of the Rules. In fact, the manner in which they presented their case before us
leaves too much to be desired. Indeed, we are almost tempted to say that they tried to
mislead—nay, deceive—this Court as well as the appellate court.

The present case calls for the adjudication of whether petitioners paid the docket fees
on time. Hence, it is essential that they specify the exact dates when they filed their
notice of appeal and paid the corresponding docket fees. But nowhere in their pleadings
did they do so. All they said was that the appeal had been seasonably filed.

In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an appeal as enumerated


earlier, petitioners should have (1) filed a notice of appeal with the RTC of Santiago,
Isabela; within 15 days from the issuance of the trial court Decision being appealed; (2)
paid the docket fees within the same period; and (3) served the notice to the adverse
party.

True, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period, but they
paid the docket fees only seven (7) months thereafter. They adamantly insisted on page
6 of their Petition that “the appeal was seasonably filed,” but later said that the “the
28
appeal fee was paid immediately after 23 April 1999 when the court a quodenied the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration and approved the appeal. x x x. With the
foregoing therefore, the notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the payment of
docket fees on time.” 29

They admitted, though, that because of the “excusable negligence or mistake” of their
counsel, the official receipts for the Notice of Appeal had not been attached. They
reasoned that they had failed to transmit the proof of payment of the docket fees to the
CA, because such “provision of civil procedure was relatively new x x x at that time.” At 30

any event, respondent denies being served such notice. 31

Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was interrupted by respondent’s


motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s approval of petitioners’ notice of appeal, the
required docket fees for the latter were still not paid on time. From November 23, 1998,
when petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal, until April 23, 1999, when the trial court
approved it with finality, they made no effort to pay those fees. It took them more than
two (2) months to “immediately pay” the docket fees after being informed of the April
23, 1999 Order denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order
approving petitioners’ Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly reflected sincere
willingness to abide by the Rules, especially when respondent had raised the very issue
of nonpayment of docket fees as early as December 28, 1998.

On this point, petitioners’ counsel is reminded of the role that lawyers play in the
dispensation of justice. Bayas v. Sandiganbayan held thus:32

“Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties but, first and foremost,
officers of the court. As such, one of their duties—assisting in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice—is more significant than that of [the cause of]
their client, rightly or wrongly. x x x. We stress that candor in all dealings is the
very essence of membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are obliged to
observe rules of procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.”
33

We stress that the payment of docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure, but an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
34

payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, and the decision or final order sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory. As laid down in Barangay 24 of Legaspi City v. Imperial:
35 36

“The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is purely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law. Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an
appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment much less to entertain the appeal.” 37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolutions
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Notes.—While a court may refuse to entertain a suit for non-payment of docket fees,
such failure does not preclude it, however, from taking cognizance of the case as
circumstances may so warrant or when the ends of justice would be best served if the
case were to be given due course—the failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a
discretionary authority, not mandatory charge, on the part to dismiss an appeal. (Public
Estates Authority vs. Yujuico, 351 SCRA 280[2001])

Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. (Cabutihan vs.
Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation, 383 SCRA 353[2002])

G.R. No. 116121. July 18, 2011.*


THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR., represented by Ruben
Reinoso Jr., petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO TAPALES,
JOSE GUBALLA, and FILWRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondent.
**

Actions; Docket Fees; The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory; Where the party does not deliberately intend to
defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by
the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal
doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989)
and not the strict regulations set in Manchester v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562
(1987), will apply.—The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562
(1987), it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however,
relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170
SCRA 274 (1989), wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
required. Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, 529 SCRA 334
(2007), the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud
the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules
by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine
enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set
in Manchester, will apply.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While there is a crying need to
unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for
resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for it is far better to dispose of a case
on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in
injustice.—While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there
is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for
it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on
a technicality that may result in injustice. In this case, it cannot be denied that the case
was litigated before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a decision. While
it was at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was
only the CA which motu propiodismissed the case for said reason. Considering the
foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so that the
petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the
appellate level rather than fail to secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to
promote the administration of justice.

Same; Same; Same; The intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full
opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in
view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules.—The Court also takes
into account the fact that the case was filed before the Manchester ruling came out.
Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the
petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was
applied to the cases of FarEastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA
30 (1998), and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga, 427 SCRA 796
(2004), In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat
(Mactan), 312 SCRA 463 (1999), it was stated that the “intent of the Court is clear to
afford litigants full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement
of sanctions in view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules.”
In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket
fees on time.

Same; Same; Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or
a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned
shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in
satisfaction of said lien.—The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between
the actual fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of
court which shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 141
which provides: SEC. 2. Fees in lien.—Where the court in its final judgment awards a
claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading,
the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the
judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the
corresponding fees.

Same; Same; Remand of Cases; Considering that the case at bench has been
pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are already before this Court,
a remand of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) would only unnecessarily prolong its
resolution—in the higher interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties from
further delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits.—As the Court has taken the
position that it would be grossly unjust if petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a
strict application of the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA. Considering,
however, that the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the
records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of the case to the CA would only
unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher interest of substantial justice and to
spare the parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits.

Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive


proof of fault in automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in
the sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit the
jeepney.—While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in
automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the
police officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit the jeepney. The evidentiary
records disclosed that the truck was speeding along E. Rodriguez, heading towards
Santolan Street, while the passenger jeepney was coming from the opposite direction.
When the truck reached a certain point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front
portion of the truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney, causing
damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of the jeepney. The
truck driver should have been more careful, because, at that time, a portion of E.
Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in the middle
thereof.

Same; Same; Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to


another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his employee.—
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly
arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the selection or supervision of his employee. Thus, in the selection of
prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualification, experience and service record. With respect to the supervision of
employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts
must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the May 20, 1994 Decision and June
1

30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 19395, which set
2
aside the March 22, 1988 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Manila (RTC) for non-payment of docket fees. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE
and REVERSED and the complaint in this case is ordered DISMISSED.
No costs pronouncement.
SO ORDERED.”

The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a passenger jeepney and a
truck at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of June 14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue,
Quezon City. As a result, a passenger of the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was
killed. The passenger jeepney was owned by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven by
Alejandro Santos (Santos), while the truck was owned by Jose Guballa (Guballa)and
driven by Mariano Geronimo (Geronimo).

On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners)filed a complaint for damages


against Tapales and Guballa. In turn, Guballa filed a third party complaint against
Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation (FGAC) under Policy Number OV-09527.

On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and
against Guballa. The decision in part, reads:

“In favor of herein plaintiffs and against defendant Jose Guballa:


1. For the death of Ruben Reinoso, P30,000.00
Sr……………….
2. Loss of earnings (monthly income at the 120,000.00
time of death (P2,000.00 Court used P1,000.00
only per month (or P12,000.00 only per year) &
victim then being 55 at death had ten (10) years
life expectancy …
3. Mortuary, Medical & funeral expenses and 15,000.00
all incidental expenses in the wake in serving
those who
condoled……………………………………………….…….
4. Moral damages 50,000.00
…………………..…………………...
5. Exemplary damages 25,000.00
……………...………………….
6. Litigation expenses …………………………………. 15,000.00
7. Attorney’s fees ……………………….………………. 25,000.00
Or a total of P250,000.00
For damages to property:
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales and against
defendant Jose Guballa:
or a total of P44,000.00
Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party defendant Filwriters Guaranty
Assurance Corporation, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of said 3rd party
plaintiff by way of 3rd party liability under policy No. OV-09527 in the amount of
P50,000.00 undertaking plus P10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the Court that plaintiffs,
defendant Ponciano Tapales and 3rd Party plaintiff Jose Guballa established their claims
as specified above, respectively. Totality of evidence preponderance in their favor.

JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In favor of plaintiffs for the death of Ruben Reinoso,
Sr………………………………………………………….P250,000.00;
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to damage of his passenger
jeepney…………………………………….…P44,000.00;
In favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No. OV-
09527………………………………………………....P60,000.00;
All the specified accounts with 6% legal rate of interest per annum from date of complaint
until fully paid (Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260; and finally;8

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994, set aside and
reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint on the ground of
non-payment of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine laid down
in Manchester v. CA.4 In addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had
set in, petitioners could no longer pay the required docket fees.5

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision but it


was denied in a resolution dated June 30, 1994.6 Hence, this appeal,
anchored on the following
GROUNDS:
A. The Court of Appeals MISAPPLIED THE RULING of the Supreme Court
in the case of Manchester Corporation vs. Court of Appeals to this case.
B. The issue on the specification of the damages appearing in the prayer of
the Complaint was NEVER PLACED IN ISSUE BY ANY OF THE PARTIES IN
THE COURT OF ORIGIN (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) NOR IN THE COURT
OF APPEALS.
C. The issues of the case revolve around the more substantial issue as to
the negligence of the private respondents and their culpability to
petitioners.”
The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester should not have been applied
retroactively in this case, since it was filed prior to the promulgation of
the Manchester decision in 1987. They plead that though this Court stated that failure to
state the correct amount of damages would lead to the dismissal of the complaint, said
doctrine should be applied prospectively.

Moreover, the petitioners assert that at the time of the filing of the complaint in 1979,
they were not certain of the amount of damages they were entitled to, because the
amount of the lost income would still be finally determined in the course of the trial of
the case. They claim that the jurisdiction of the trial court remains even if there was
failure to pay the correct filing fee as long as the correct amount would be paid
subsequently.

Finally, the petitioners stress that the alleged defect was never put in issue either in
the RTC or in the CA.

The Court finds merit in the petition.

The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires
8 9

jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict
application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory
10

pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise
that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees required. Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank
11

v. Ros, the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud
12

the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules
by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine
enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set
in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several instances,
allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La
Salette College v. Pilotin, the Court stated:
13

“Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of


appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the
following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the
court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances.”14

While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the
other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for it is far
15

better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a
technicality that may result in injustice.

In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and said
trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-
payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the CA which motu
propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the
rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on
the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure justice on a technicality, for,
indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to
hinder but to promote the administration of justice. 16

The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before
the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively,
liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling.
Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company
v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga. In the
17 18

case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan), it was 19

stated that the “intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply
with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the recency of the
changes introduced by the new rules.” In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket fees on time.

We held in another case:

“x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to
effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts
have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on
the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate
rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend
the Rules, or except a particular case from its operation.”20

The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between the actual fees paid
and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of court which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 141 which provides:

“SEC. 2. Fees in lien.—Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim
not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the
party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the
judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the
corresponding fees.”

As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if petitioners’
claim would be dismissed on a strict application of the Manchester doctrine, the
appropriate action, under ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the
case to the CA. Considering, however, that the case at bench has been pending for more
than 30 years and the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of the case
to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher interest of
substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the
case on the merits.

The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso, the jeepneypassenger, died as a result of the
collision of a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening
along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. It was established that the primary cause of
the injury or damage was the negligence of the truck driver who was driving it at a very
fast pace. Based on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities and the narration
of the jeepneydriver and his passengers, the collision was brought about because the
truck driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left side portion of the road in
an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade, hitting the passenger jeepney as a consequence.
The analysis of the RTC appears in its decision as follows:13

“Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced as well as proper consideration


of all the circumstances and factors bearing on the issue as to who is responsible for
the instant vehicular mishap convince and persuade this Court that preponderance
of proof is in favor of plaintiffs and defendant Ponciano Tapales. The greater mass of
evidence spread on the records and its influence support plaintiffs’ plaint including
that of defendant Tapales.

The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136), reads as follows:

“Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway.—Unless a different course of


action is required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or
property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance
therewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle on
highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward
him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction,
and when turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle
shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the highway.”

Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this Court is convinced of the
veracity of the version of the passenger jeepney driver Alejandro Santos,
(plaintiffs’ and Tapales’ witness) that while running on lane No. 4 westward bound
towards Ortigas Avenue at between 30-40 kms. per hour (63-64 tsn, Jan. 6, 1984)
the “sand & gravel” truck from the opposite direction driven by Mariano
Geronimo, the headlights of which the former had seen while still at a distance of
about 30-40 meters from the wooden barricade astride lanes 1 and 2, upon
reaching said wooden block suddenly swerved to the left into lanes 3 and 4 at high
speed “napakabilis po ng dating ng truck.” (29 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985) in the process
hitting them (Jeepney passenger) at the left side up to where the reserve tire was
in an oblique manner “pahilis” (57 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985). The jeepney after it was
bumped by the truck due to the strong impact was thrown “resting on its right side
while the left side was on top of the Bangketa (side walk)”. The passengers of the
jeepney and its driver were injured including two passengers who died. The left
side of the jeepney suffered considerable damage as seen in the picture (Exhs. 4 &
5-Tapales, pages 331-332, records) taken while at the repair shop.
The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the effect that the “gravel
& sand” truck was running in high speed on the good portion of E. Rodriguez
Avenue (lane 1 & 2) before the wooden barricade and (having in mind that it had
just delivered its load at the Corinthian Gardens) so that when suddenly
confronted with the wooden obstacle before it had to avoid the same in a manner
of a reflex reaction or knee-jerk response by forthwith swerving to his left into the
right lanes (lanes 3 & 4). At the time of the bumping, the jeepney was running on
its right lane No. 4 and even during the moments before said bumping, moving at
moderate speed thereon since lane No. 3 was then somewhat rough because being
repaired also according to Mondalia who has no reason to prevaricate being
herself one of those seriously injured. The narration of Santos and Mondalia are
convincing and consistent in depicting the true facts of the case untainted by
vacillation and therefore, worthy to be relied upon. Their story is forfeited and
confirmed by the sketch drawn by the investigating officer Pfc. F. Amaba, Traffic
Division, NPD, Quezon City who rushed to the scene of the mishap (Vide:
Resolution of Asst. fiscal Elizabeth B. Reyes marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-Tapales,
pp. 166-168, records; the Certified Copy found on pages 598-600, ibid, with the
attached police sketch of Pfc. Amaba, marked as Exh. 8-Tapales on page 169, ibid;
certified copy of which is on page 594, ibid) indicating the fact that the bumping
indeed occurred at lane No. 4 and showing how the ‘gavel & sand’ truck is
positioned in relation to the jeepney. The said police sketch having been made
right after the accident is a piece of evidence worthy to be relied upon showing the
true facts of the bumping-occurrence. The rule that official duty had been
performed (Sec. 5(m), R-131, and also Sec. 38, R-a30, Rev. Rules of Court)—there
being no evidence adduced and made of record to the contrary—is that said
circumstance involving the two vehicles had been the result of an official
investigation and must be taken as true by this Court.”21

While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile
collisions, the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the police
22

officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit the jeepney. The evidentiary records
disclosed that the truck was speeding along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan
Street, while the passenger jeepneywas coming from the opposite direction. When the
truck reached a certain point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front portion of the
truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney, causing damage to both
vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of the jeepney. The truck driver
should have been more careful, because, at that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue
was under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in the middle thereof.

The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner, Guballa,
failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring and supervision of his
employee. Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, provides:

“Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
xxxx
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.”

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there


instantly arises a presumption juris tantumthat the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his
employee. Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
23

examine them as to their qualification, experience and service record. With respect to
the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary
evidence. Thus, the RTC committed no error in finding that the evidence presented by
24

respondent Guballa was wanting. It ruled:

“x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa, attempted to overthrow this


presumption of negligence by showing that he had exercised the due diligence
required of him by seeing to it that the driver must check the vital parts of the
vehicle he is assigned to before he leaves the compound like the oil, water, brakes,
gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that Geronimo had been driving for him
sometime in 1976 until the collision in litigation came about (5-6 tsn, ibid); that
whenever his trucks gets out of the compound to make deliveries, it is always
accompanied with two (2) helpers (16-17 tsn, ibid). This was all which he considered
as selection and supervision in compliance with the law to free himself from any
responsibility. This Court then cannot consider the foregoing as equivalent to an
exercise of all the care of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
his driver Mariano Geronimo.”25

Following the guidelines enunciated in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, petitioners are entitled to the payment of 12% legal interest per
26

annum on the total amount awarded to be computed from the time of finality of
judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 1994 Decision and June 30,
1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the March
22, 1988 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila, is REINSTATED, with
the MODIFICATION that the private respondents should, as they are hereby ordered to,
pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from the finality of this judgment
until fully paid.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, or his duly authorized
deputy, is hereby ordered to compute the correct docket fees and to enforce the
judgment lien by collecting the additional fees from the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
Notes.—In this case, the principle of social justice—that she who has less in life
should have more in law—ought to find a measure of relevance more weighty than
technicalities. (Brutas vs. Court of Appeals, 369 SCRA 8 [2001])

Payment of docket fees is not necessary for a court to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a compulsory counterclaim. (Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, 569 SCRA
503 [2008])

G.R. No. 176339. January 10, 2011.*


DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM and LELY KUNG
LIM, petitioners, vs.SECURITY BANK CORP., TITOLAIDO E.
PAYONGAYONG, EVYLENE C. SISON, PHIL. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
AGENCY CORP. and GIL SILOS, respondents.

Actions; Docket Fees; Plaintiffs’ failure to pay the additional filing fees due on
additional claims does not divest the court of jurisdiction it already had over the
case.—On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs’ failure to pay
the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action. But what the
plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The
RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their
original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same. The
plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did
not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.

Same; Ex Parte Hearings; Evidence; Witnesses; An ex parte hearing which had


been properly authorized cannot be assailed as less credible.—The Bank belittles the
testimonies of the petitioners’ witnesses for having been presented ex partebefore the
clerk of court. But the ex parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be
assailed as less credible. It was the Bank’s fault that it was unable to attend the hearing.
It cannot profit from its lack of diligence.

Lease; Damages; Even if the lease has already lapsed, the lessor has no business
harassing and intimidating the lessee and its employees.—While the lease may have
already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their
employees. The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and
building guards.

Actions; Supplemental Complaint; Docket Fees; A supplemental complaint is like any


complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing—
the rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental
complaints.—As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint, their
stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid
the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But
this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the
judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the
court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. None of these circumstances obtain in this
case. Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that
the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while
petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their
omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees
because the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any
complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing.
The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental
complaints. To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up the question of
their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no
effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming
of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no
excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court. Consequently, the trial
court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed.

Same; Same; Same; It is not for a party to a case, or even for the trial court, to waive the
payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint—only the Supreme
Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are
embodied in its rules.—Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-
payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The
implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission.
But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the
additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant
exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its
rules.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on claims embodied in
the plaintiff’s supplemental complaint filed without prior payment of the corresponding
filing fees.

The Facts and the Case

From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by petitioner spouses
Domingo Lim and Lely Kung Lim (the Lims) took out loans from respondent Security
Bank Corporation (the Bank) that totaled P92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on
time, the Lims assigned some of their real properties to the Bank to secure the same,
including a building and the lot on which it stands (the property), located at M. de Leon
St., Santolan, Pasig City.1

In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All
Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business although the Lims were to use part
of the property as their residence. DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease contract
from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-
terminate the lease. The contract also provided that, should the Bank decide to sell the
property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.

On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave notice to DMI that it
was pre-terminating the lease on December 31, 1999. Wanting to exercise its right of
first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the Bank the terms of its purchase. DMI offered
to pay the Bank P8 million for the property but the latter rejected the offer, suggesting
P15 million instead. DMI made a second offer of P10 million but the Bank declined the
same.

While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they continued to use
the property in their business. But the Bank posted at the place private security guards
from Philippine Industrial Security Agency (PISA). The Lims also claimed that on
several occasions in 2000, the guards, on instructions of the Bank representatives
Titolaido Payongayong and Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances to the place and
barred the Lims as well as DMI’s employees from entering the property. One of the
guards even pointed his gun at one employee and shots were fired. Because of this, DMI
was unable to close several projects and contracts with prospective clients. Further, the
Lims alleged that they were unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and
personal items left at the property.

The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City for damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or
preliminary injunction against the Bank and its co-defendants Payongayong, Sison,
PISA, and Gil Silos.2 Answering the complaint, the Bank pointed out that the lease
contract allowed it to sell the property at any time provided only that it gave DMI the
right of first refusal. DMI had seven days from notice to exercise its option. On
September 10, 1999 the Bank gave notice to DMI that it intended to sell the property to
a third party. DMI asked for an extension of its option to buy and the Bank granted it.
But the parties could not agree on a purchase price. The Bank required DMI to vacate
and turnover the property but it failed to do so. As a result, the Bank’s buyer backed-out
of the sale. Despite what happened, the Bank and DMI continued negotiations for the
purchase of the leased premises but they came to no agreement.

The Bank denied, on the other hand, that its guards harassed DMI and the Lims. To
protect its property, the Bank began posting guards at the building even before it leased
the same to DMI. Indeed, this arrangement benefited both parties. The Bank alleged
that in October of 2000, when the parties could not come to an agreement regarding the
purchase of the property, DMI vacated the same and peacefully turned over possession
to the Bank.

The Bank offered no objection to the issuance of a TRO since it claimed that it never
prevented DMI or its employees from entering or leaving the building. For this reason,
the RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI and the Lims to enter the building and get the
things they left there. The latter claimed, however, that on entering the building, they
were unable to find the movable properties they left there. In a supplemental complaint,
DMI and the Lims alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such properties, resulting
in additional actual damages to them of over P27 million.

The RTC set the pre-trial in the case for December 4, 2001. On that date, however,
counsel for the Bank moved to reset the proceeding. The court denied the motion and
allowed DMI and the Lims to present their evidence ex parte. The court eventually
reconsidered its order but only after the plaintiffs had already presented their evidence
and were about to rest their case. The RTC declined to recall the plaintiffs’ witnesses for
cross-examination but allowed the Bank to present its evidence.3 This prompted the
Bank to seek relief from the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually from this Court but to
no avail.
During its turn at the trial, the Bank got to present only defendant Payongayong, a
bank officer. For repeatedly canceling the hearings and incurring delays, the RTC
declared the Bank to have forfeited its right to present additional evidence and deemed
the case submitted for decision.

On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a decision in favor of DMI and the Lims. It
ordered the Bank to pay the plaintiffsP27,974,564.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00
as moral damages, P500,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney’s
fees. But the court absolved defendants Payongayong, Sison, Silos and PISA of any
liability.

The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things
the RTC’s authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees
on their supplemental complaint. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the CA, the
latter found for the Bank, reversed the RTC decision, and dismissed the complaint as
well as the counterclaims.5 DMI and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration but the
CA denied the same, hence this petition.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate plaintiff’s
supplemental complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the
amounts of damages they claim in it;
2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment committed against
DMI and its representatives; and
3. Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims for the machineries, equipment,
and other properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the property.

The Court’s Rulings

One. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs’ failure to
pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action.

But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental
Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they
filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the
same. The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional
claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.6

Two. As to the claim that Bank’s representatives and retained guards harassed and
intimidated DMI’s employees and the Lims, the RTC found ample proof of such
wrongdoings and accordingly awarded damages to the plaintiffs. But the CA disagreed,
discounting the testimony of the police officers regarding their investigations of the
incidents since such officers were not present when they happened. The CA may be
correct in a way but the plaintiffs presented eyewitnesses who testified out of personal
knowledge. The police officers testified merely to point out that there had been trouble
at the place and their investigations yielded their findings.

The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners’ witnesses for having been
presented ex parte before the clerk of court. But the ex partehearing, having been
properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was the Bank’s fault that it
was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of diligence.

Domingo Lim and some employees of DMI testified regarding the Bank guards’
unmitigated use of their superior strength and firepower. Their testimonies were never
refuted. Police Inspector Priscillo dela Paz testified that he responded to several
complaints regarding shooting incidents at the leased premises and on one occasion, he
found Domingo Lim was locked in the building. When he asked why Lim had been
locked in, a Bank representative told him that they had instructions to prevent anyone
from taking any property out of the premises. It was only after Dela Paz talked to the
Bank representative that they let Lim out.7

Payongayong, the Bank’s sole witness, denied charges of harassment against the
Bank’s representatives and the guards. But his denial came merely from reports relayed
to him. They were not based on personal knowledge.

While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and
intimidating the Lims and their employees. The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against the Bank for the acts of
their representatives and building guards.

Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint,
their stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they
had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the
judgment award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a
successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were
incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the
award.8 None of these circumstances obtain in this case.

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages
that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same.
And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave
no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said that they did
not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental
complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint
need to be paid upon its filing.9 The rules do not require the court to make special
assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their
failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no
effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for decision,
assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in. Clearly,
plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court.
Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not
filed.

Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of
additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The
implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such
omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the
payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the
Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and
these exemptions are embodied in its rules.
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA, plaintiffs had the burden of proving that
the movable properties in question had remained in the premises and that the bank was
responsible for their loss. The only evidence offered to prove the loss was Domingo
Lim’s testimony and some undated and unsigned inventories. These were self-serving
and uncorroborated.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and REINSTATES with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case 68184.
The Court DIRECTS respondent Security Bank Corporation to pay petitioners DMI and
spouses Domingo and Lely Kung Lim damages in the following amounts: P500,000.00
as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 for attorney’s
fees. The Court DELETES the award of actual damages of P27,974,564.00. SO
ORDERED.

Note.—A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee. (Soller vs. Commission on Elections, 339 SCRA 685 [2000])

G.R. No. 154061. January 25, 2012.*


PANAY RAILWAYS INC., petitioner, vs. HEVA MANAGEMENT and
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PAMPLONA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, and SPOUSES CANDELARIA DAYOT and EDMUNDO
DAYOT, respondents.
Remedial Law; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Statutes and rules regulating
the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at
the time of their passage.—Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are
considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of
procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate
any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural
laws and rules. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.”

Same; Appeals; Docket Fees; The payment of the full amount of the docket fees is
an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal.—As early as 1932, in Lazaro v.
Endencia, we have held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

Same; Same; The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process.—The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.

Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Procedural rules are not to be


belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a
party’s substantive rights.—We have repeatedly stated that the term “substantial
justice” is not a magic wand that would automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all
other rules, they are required to be followed, except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the
client.—We cannot consider counsel’s failure to familiarize himself with the Revised
Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the application of the Rules. It is well-
settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This principle is based on the rule
that any act performed by lawyers within the scope of their general or implied authority
is regarded as an act of the client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the
counsel of petitioner may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the amended decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


SERENO, J.:

The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City of a Notice of Appeal for petitioner’s failure to pay the corresponding docket
fees.

The facts are as follows:

On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc., a government-owned and


controlled corporation, executed a Real Estate Mortgage Contract covering several
parcels of lands, including Lot No. 6153, in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure
P20 million worth of loan and credit accommodations. Petitioner excluded certain
portions of Lot No. 6153: that already sold to Shell Co., Inc. referred to as 6153-B, a road
referred to as 6153-C, and a squatter area known as 6153-D.1

Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to extra-judicially
foreclose the mortgaged properties including Lot No. 6153. On 20 January 1986, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank as the highest bidder and purchaser.
Consequently, the sale of Lot No. 6153 was registered with the Register of Deeds on 28
January 1986 and annotated at the back of the transfer certificates of title (TCT)
covering the mortgaged properties.

Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the basis of a
Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner failed to exercise the right
to redeem the properties. The corresponding TCTs were subsequently issued in the
name of the bank.

On 12 February 1990, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against petitioner.
During the proceedings, petitioner, through its duly authorized manager and officer-in-
charge and with the assistance of counsel, filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw
Motion for Suspension of the Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.2 The
pertinent portions of the Manifestation and Motion state:

“3. That after going over the records of this case and the case of Traders
Royal Bank vs. Panay Railway, Inc., Civil Case No. 18280, PRI is irrevocably
withdrawing its Motion for Suspension referred to in paragraph 1 above, and its
Motion for Reconsideration referred in paragraph 2 above and will accept and
abide by the September 21, 1990 Order denying the Motion For Suspension;
4. That PRI recognizes and acknowledges petitioner (TRB) to be
the registered owner of Lot 1-A; Lot 3834; Lot 6153; Lot 6158; Lot
6159, and Lot 5 covered by TCT No. T-84233; T-84234; T-84235; T-
84236; T-84237, T-84238 and T-45724 respectively, free of liens and
encumbrances, except that portion sold to Shell Co. found in Lot 5.
That Petitioner (TRB) as registered owner is entitled to peaceful
ownership and immediate physical possession of said real properties.
5. That PRI further acknowledges that the Provincial Sheriff validly
foreclosed the Real Estate Mortgage erected by PRI due to failure to
pay the loan of P20,000,000.00. That TRB was the purchaser of these lots
mentioned in paragraph 4 above at Sheriff’s Auction Sale as evidenced by the
Certificate of Sale dated January 20, 1986 and the Certificates of Titles issued to
Petitioner;
6. That PRI further manifests that it has no past, present or future
opposition to the grant of the Writ of Possession to TRB over the
parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 4 above and subject of this
Petition and even assuming “arguendo” that it has, PRI irrevocably
waives the same. That PRI will even assist TRB in securing possession
of said properties as witness against squatters, illegal occupants, and
all other possible claimants;
7. That upon execution hereof, PRI voluntarily surrenders physical
possession and control of the premises of these lots to TRB, its
successors or its assigns, together with all the buildings, warehouses,
offices, and all other permanent improvements constructed thereon
and will attest to the title and possession of petitioner over said real
properties.” (Emphasis supplied)

TCT No. T-84235 mentioned in the quoted portion above is Lot No. 6153, which is
under dispute.

It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial foreclosure included
some excluded properties in the mortgage contract. Thus, on 19 August 1994, it filed a
Complaint for Partial Annulment of Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with
Addendum; Cancellation of Title No. T-89624; and Declaration of Ownership of Real
Property with Reconveyance plus Damages.3

It then filed an Amended Complaint4 on 1 January 1995 and again filed a Second
Amended Complaint5on 8 December 1995.

Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on these grounds:


(1) petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a waiver, an abandonment and
an extinguishment of petitioner’s claim or demand; (3) petitioner failed to state a cause
of action; and (4) an indispensable party, namely TRB, was not impleaded.

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order6 granting the Motion to Dismiss of
respondents. It held that the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner was a judicial
admission of TRB’s ownership of the disputed properties. The trial court pointed out
that the Manifestation was executed by petitioner’s duly authorized representative with
the assistance of counsel. This admission thus operated as a waiver barring petitioner
from claiming otherwise.
On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the necessary
docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on
the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.

In its Opposition,7petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar with the
revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective only on 1 July 1997. Its
representative was likewise not informed by the court personnel that docket fees needed
to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, it contended that the
requirement for the payment of docket fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the
RTC for a liberal interpretation of the procedural rules on appeals.

On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order8dismissing the appeal citing Sec. 4
of Rule 419 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the Order10 alleging that the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed the Notice of Appeal.
Petitioner also alleged that the court erred in failing to relax procedural rules for the
sake of substantial justice.

On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion.11

On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it strictly applied procedural rules.

On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision12 on the Petition. It held that
while the failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of
Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CA and
not the trial court. Thus, appellate court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the appeal and set aside the latter’s assailed Order dated 29
September 1997.

Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.

It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CA’s Decision, this Court issued
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1 May 2000,
amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The
circular expressly provided that trial courts may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss
an appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period. Subsequently, Circular No. 48-200013 was issued on 29
August 2000 and was addressed to all lower courts.

By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned Orders of the
trial court by issuing the assailed Amended Decision14 in the present Petition granting
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration.

The CA’s action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration alleging
that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive effect. It also alleged that
the CA should consider the case as exceptionally meritorious. Petitioner’s counsel, Atty.
Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he was yet to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules
of Court, which became effective a little over a month before he filed the Notice of
Appeal. He was thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the
dismissal of the case.
On 30 May 2002, the CA issued the assailed Resolution15 denying petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s dismissal of the Notice of
Appeal. Petitioner contends that the CA had exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice
of Appeal at the time of filing. Alternatively, petitioner argues that while the appeal was
dismissible for failure to pay docket fees, substantial justice demands that procedural
rules be relaxed in this case.

The Petition has no merit.

Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to
actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and
rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely
affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held
that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist
on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure.”16 More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was
not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to
speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.

The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal has no
merit. When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-
10-SC, the RTC’s dismissal of the action may be considered to have had the imprimatur
of the Court. Thus, the CA committed no reversible error when it sustained the dismissal
of the appeal, taking note of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of its
Decision.

As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,17 we have held that the payment of the full
amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. The
Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees.18

Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.19

We have repeatedly stated that the term “substantial justice” is not a magic wand that
would automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all other rules, they are required to be
followed, except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of their
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.20

We cannot consider counsel’s failure to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of
Court as a persuasive reason to relax the application of the Rules. It is well-settled that
the negligence of counsel binds the client. This principle is based on the rule that any act
performed by lawyers within the scope of their general or implied authority is regarded
as an act of the client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel of
petitioner may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.21

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.

Petition denied.
Notes.—National Power Corporation (NPC) can no longer invoke Republic Act No.
6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its basis for
exemption from the payment of legal fees. (In Re: Exemption of the National Power
Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, 615 SCRA 1 [2010])

The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction,
the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. (Government Service
Insurance System vs. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero, 632 SCRA 5 [2010])

G.R. No. 158239. January 25, 2012.*


PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, petitioner, vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL.,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; “Final Order” and “Interlocutory Order,”


Distinguished.—The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-
Garrido v. Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553 (2011), thuswise: The distinction between a final order and
an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce
by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the
case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with
preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The
test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order
or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?
If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

Same; Same; The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals.—Whether an order is
final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is
appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable;” but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action
for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v.
Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553 (2011), is apt: xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an
interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily
suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the
appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for
a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses,
for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by
him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been
rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment
itself. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed
to be resorted to.
Same; Same; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; Under the fresh period rule, an aggrieved
party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reckoned from
receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.—Section 3
of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of
appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall
be allowed. (n) Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13,
2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his
motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of
the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the
Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633
(2005), by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is
allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned
from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Same; Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of
certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.—The
Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and Issuance of Owner’s Duplicate
Certificates of Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner, 624 SCRA 81
(2010): Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum,
other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more
pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of
reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicatain the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to
be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least
such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should
be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to resjudicata in the other. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must
involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical
causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were
questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

BERSAMIN, J.:

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s
motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the
particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to
leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. 1Accordingly, the
claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to
appeal the denial.2

Antecedents
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for
consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional
sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located
in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay
P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the
registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration being
undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita
become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal),
and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the
balance and proceed with the application for registration.3

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue,
the vendor’s undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole
surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve
the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the
parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.4Faced with Priscilla’s refusal
to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific
performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in
Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97 entitled Ramon C.
Javellana, represented by Atty. Guillermo G. Blanco v. Priscilla Alma Jose.

In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution of the deed of
conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00 and had taken
possession of the parcels of land; that he had paid the balance of the purchase price to
Juvenal on different dates upon Juvenal’s representation that Margarita had needed
funds for the expenses of registration and payment of real estate tax; and that in 1996,
Priscilla had called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the parcels of land; and
that he had told her then that the parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had been
sold to him.5

Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of


preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels
of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to
execute a final deed of sale in his favor.6

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by
prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.7

The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998. 8However,
upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and
granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her
due to her not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for
not being a party thereto; that there was no evidence showing the payment of the
balance; that he had never demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or
Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal; and
that his claim of paying the balance was not credible.9

Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of evidence of


full payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings; and that in resolving a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in
the complaint were hypothetically admitted and only the allegations in the complaint
should be considered in resolving the motion.10 Nonetheless, he attached to the motion
for reconsideration the receipts showing the payments made to Juvenal.11 Moreover, he
maintained that Priscilla could no longer succeed to any rights respecting the parcels of
land because he had meanwhile acquired absolute ownership of them; and that the only
thing that she, as sole heir, had inherited from Margarita was the obligation to register
them under the Torrens System

On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any
reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.13

Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order, 14which
the RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).

In his appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the following as errors of
the RTC,15 to wit:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT
PLAINTIFF-APELLANT HAD LONG COMPLIED WITH THE FULL PAYMENT OF THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY
TAKEN ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTY UPON THE SIGNING
OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING TWO CONFLICTING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL [CODE], PARTICULARLY ARTICLE
1911, IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERMS OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BEING NOT A
PARTY TO THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY HER MOTHER IN FAVOR
OF PLAINTFF-APPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND CAN NOT BE COMPELLED TO
DO THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE SAID DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT
HEARING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; that the appeal
was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.16

It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorariin the
CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint (CA-
G.R. SP No. 60455). On August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari,17finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the orders, and holding that it only committed, at most, an error of judgment correctible
by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.

On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. CV No.


68259,18 reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and
remanding the records to the RTC “for further proceedings in accordance with
law.”19The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action; that
Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita with respect
to the parcels of land; that Margarita’s undertaking under the contract was not a purely
personal obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was consequently bound to
comply with the obligation; that the action had not yet prescribed due to its being
actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible brought by Javellana who had
actual possession of the properties; and that based on the complaint, Javellana had been
in actual possession since 1979, and the cloud on his title had come about only when
Priscilla had started dumping filling materials on the premises.20

On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, 21 stating that it
decided to give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had
no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension of
time to file his appellant’s brief; that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the
amplest opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities,
such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was given the
discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.
Issues

Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in not
outrightly dismissing Javellana’s appeal because: (a) the June 21, 2000 RTC order was
not appealable; (b) the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three days; and (c)
Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to
assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending in the
CA. She posited that, even if the CA’s decision to entertain the appeal was affirmed, the
RTC’s dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless be upheld because the complaint
stated no cause of action, and the action had already prescribed.

On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by Priscilla involved
questions of fact not proper for the Court to review through petition for review
on certiorari; that the June 21, 2000 RTC order, being a final order, was appealable;
that his appeal was perfected on time; and that he was not guilty of forum shopping
because at the time he filed the petition for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68259 was different from the issue of grave abuse of discretion raised in
CA-G.R. SP No. 60455.

Ruling

The petition for review has no merit.

Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the


order of dismissal was a final order and appealable

Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an
appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no
appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.

Priscilla’s submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.

First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to
be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was
clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final
and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,22 thuswise:

“The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding
or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court
has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test
to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the
order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is
final.”

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal


is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final
judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that
“appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable;”23but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special
civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given
in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:

“xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the
lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in
the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate


special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then
is certiorariunder Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.”

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order
or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an
order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order.24

II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA

Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out
that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion
for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied
his motion for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he
received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July
16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on
July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days
beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.

Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:


“Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new


trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.”

Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or
until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his
motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his
filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as
Priscilla insists.

The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering


that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals,25 by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or
final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration, to wit:

“The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing
appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court
allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to
file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.”26

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already
retroactively extended the fresh period rule to “actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.”27 According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:28
“Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do
not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
the retroactive operation of statutes―they may be given retroactive effect on actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no
vested rights in rules of procedure.

The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days
within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration
is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the
“fresh period rule” should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the “fresh period rule” will amount to
injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were
issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and
final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical
that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will
enjoy the benefit of the “fresh period rule” while those later rulings of the lower courts
such as in the instant case, will not.”29

Consequently, we rule that Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to
the fresh period rule.

III
No forum shopping was committed

Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a notice of appeal
and a petition for certiorari against the same orders. As earlier noted, he denies that his
doing so violated the policy against forum shopping.

The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re:
Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and Issuance
of Owner’s Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G.
Lim, Petitioner:30

“Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum
shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties,
identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the
elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicatain the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be
a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at
least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to resjudicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject
matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned,
two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.”

Should Javellana’s present appeal now be held barred by his filing of the petition
for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was yet pending?

We are aware that in Young v. Sy,31 in which the petitioner filed a notice of appeal to
elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-suit to the CA and a
petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the same orders four months later, the Court
ruled that the successive filings of the notice of appeal and the petition for certiorari to
attain the same objective of nullifying the trial court’s dismissal orders constituted
forum shopping that warranted the dismissal of both cases. The Court said:

“Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition


for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced
the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way of the
instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of litis pendentia are present between the
two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both suits are
founded on exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject matter—the RTC Orders
which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases,
the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted,
the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the
judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.
xxxx
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot hedge her
case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags
significantly behind the others, she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as a
demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been speedy or adequate enough, in
order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the
filing of multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner couches it,
becomes a “precautionary measure” for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a
favorable decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to
put right. In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the grave evil
sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two
competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party
litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their
luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any
violation of these rules results in the dismissal of the case.”32

The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,33which likewise involved the
successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari to challenge the same
orders, with the Court upholding the CA’s dismissals of the appeal and the petition
for certiorarithrough separate decisions.
Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here even if the orders
of the RTC being challenged through appeal and the petition for certiorari were the
same. The unjustness exists because the appeal and the petition for certiorariactually
sought different objectives. In his appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to
undo the RTC’s erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his
judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in due course by
the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective “to prevent
(Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment
case until his appeal is finally resolved,” as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 60455.34
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping
designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of
suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize considering that the
appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas CA-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt
with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical
malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or
judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet
decided CA-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.

Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial approaches to


be the result of the tactical misjudgment by Javellana’s counsel on the efficacy of the
appeal to stave off his caretaker’s eviction from the parcels of land and to prevent the
development of them into a residential or commercial subdivision pending the appeal.
In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred that his appeal was
“inadequate and not speedy to prevent private respondent Alma Jose and her
transferee/assignee xxx from developing and disposing of the subject property to other
parties to the total deprivation of petitioner’s rights of possession and ownership over
the subject property,” and that the dismissal by the RTC had “emboldened private
respondents to fully develop the property and for respondent Alma Jose to file an
ejectment case against petitioner’s overseer xxx.”35Thereby, it became far-fetched that
Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the policy against forum
shopping.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated on November 20, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—An ordinary appeal of a judgment by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from,
except in the meantime, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed, in which case,
appellant is given a “fresh period” of fifteen (15) days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing the motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. (PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Milan, 617 SCRA
258 [2010])
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint was not merely an interlocutory order
but a final disposition of a complaint. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Umandap, 635
SCRA 116 [2010])

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