I.

INTRODUCTION/ GENERAL CONSIDERATION

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.

[GR No. 86995 03 September 1992]

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

Facts: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the
Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at
ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification
requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on
December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built
Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the
afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5,
1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were
considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of
PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list
of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the
acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted,
the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting
the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on
the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818.
They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was
served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.

Issue: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD

1818?

Held: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if
not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-
owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered
by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of
the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its
accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized
representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to
loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious
detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of
the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and
maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said
decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction
issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs.
Sucaldito).
 De la Llana vs. Alba

[GR No. 57883, 12 March 1982]

Facts:

De la Llana, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition (considered by this
Court as an action for prohibition), seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. BP 129 mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of
Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies
a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

Issue:

Whether the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed
by incumbent Justices and judges Under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in
the process to abolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary
consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from
removal, a power that is now vested in the Supreme Court. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a
non existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an
office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to
its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the Supreme Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that
there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that the Supreme Court does not render
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme
Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then,
it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is
there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is
no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to
be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the
exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would
thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with
the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way to do so.

The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any
unconstitutional taint must be applied. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous
test of constitutionality. Further, it is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither
agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it
has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that the Supreme
Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. It is a cardinal article of faith
of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a
government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either
expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the
body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a
public trust." That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a
public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his
responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to
assure judicial independence is to be viewed. There is no reason to assume that the failure of this
suit to annul BP 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of
justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary
unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust
reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the
appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient
judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the
fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three
departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill
the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution.
II.POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

[151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]

Facts:

The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National
Internal Revenue Code provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready
for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured
or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price
orrental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audio visual program.”

“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other
fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
Manila Commission.”

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such
unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty
percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement
and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales
and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby
depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. The unregulated
activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held:

Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a
public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property
rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the
DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. We find no clear
violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987
as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of
the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes
containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in
government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business." WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is
hereby dismissed. No costs.
 United States vs Ang Tang Ho

[43 Phil 1]

Facts:

In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules
and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August
1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO
fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher
than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919,
he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an
undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

Issue:

Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

Held:

First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot
be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law
and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO,
ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY,
REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

[G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987]

Facts:

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for
the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of
executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling
of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Held:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending
EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The
supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not
see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in
one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there.

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright.
Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due
process.
 MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
[G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989]

Facts:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to
return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to
issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return
to the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcos’s from returning to the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by
executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President
such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19),treaty
making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power(Section 22), informing
power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
 Isidro Cariño vs The Commission on Human Rights

[204 SCRA 483 ]

Facts:

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and
decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were
suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990,
DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the
suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the
meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the
CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to
Secretary Cariño.

Issue:

Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as
the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

Held:

No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all
forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try
and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from
proceeding with the trial.
 Laguna Lake Development Authority vs Court of Appeals

[GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995]

Facts:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It
was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

Issue:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising
the region?

Held:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general
law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general
law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code,
which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
 RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor
Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987]

Facts:

In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal
Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978,
he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of
P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General
Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change
in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was
increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and
his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred
to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division
with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on
the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp.
80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner
filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated
November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had
been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal on a technicality.

Held:

Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:

SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of notice thereof.

SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within
which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. The record shows that the employer (petitioner
herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of
Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations
Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November
15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no
room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that
administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect
(Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]). Under the above-quoted
provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final
and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.

Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent
promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly
efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance.
Perfection cannot after all be demanded.

WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.

 Blas F. Ople vs Ruben D. Torres, et al.

[293 SCRA 141 / GR No. 127685, 23 July 1998, J. Puno]

Facts:

Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification

Reference System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.

Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of
them is that: The establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System
requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges
that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects
the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy.

On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive and
administrative powers of the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress.

Issue:

Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate.

Held:

Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution
has vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad,
general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.

The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also
has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control
to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.

From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order.

The Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The Court
rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative
Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and incorporates in a unified document the major
structural, functional and procedural principles of governance and embodies changes in
administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the people.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of
1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy
of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights
of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals
with a subject that should be covered by law.

Petition is granted and A.O. No. 308 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
 ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

[January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)]

Facts:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the
TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also
encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue:

Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is
an executive function.

Held:

No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by
final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do
not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to
life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the three branches of our government.
 Republic v. Court of Appeals

[200 SCRA 226]

Facts:
Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank questioned the decision of the CA
which dismissed the petition of the former on the ground of lack of capacity to sue.
Issue:
Whether or not administrative agency has only such powers as expressly granted to it by law and
those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?
Held:
The SC ruled in the negative.
In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as “government body charged with the
administering and implementing particular legislation” examples are workers compensation
commissions and the like. The term “agency”includes any department, independent
establishment, commission, administration, authority or bureau.
 Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs Garcia

[239 SCRA 538 (1994)]

Facts:

The Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center (KMU) assails the constitutionality and validity of a
memorandum which, among others, authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or
decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefore with the LTFRB, and
without hearing and approval thereof by said agency.

Issue:

Whether or not the absence of notice and hearing and the delegation of authority in the increase
or decrease of transportation fares to provincial bus and jeepney operators is illegal?

Held:

Under Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, the legislature delegated to the defunct
Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. LTFRB, the existing
regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order 202. The authority
given by the LTFRB to the bus operators to set fares over and above the authorized existing fare is
illegal and invalid, as it is tantamount to undue delegation of legislative authority. Under the
maxim potestas delegate non delegari potest – “what has been delegated cannot be delegated.”
The policy allowing provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares would result not
only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at
the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares, every hour, every day, every month or
every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it necessary to do so. Furthermore,
under the Section 16 (a) of Public Service Act, there must be proper notice and hearing in the
fixing of rates, to arrive at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both the public utility and the
public.
 Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. de la Serna

[228 SCRA 329, Dec. 10, 1993]

Facts:
Romulo, Mabana, Buenaventura, Sayoc & de los Angeles vs. Home
Development Mutual Fund,
[333 SCRA 777]
 PHIL. ASSOC. SERVICE EXPORTERS INC. vs TORRES

[212 SCRA 298, G.R. No. 101279, August 6, 1992]

Facts:

As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in
Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of
deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum
Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers
for Hong Kong.

PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to
prohibit their implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; that the
assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and
oppressive; and that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.

Issue:

Whether or not the questioned circulars are a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to
the executive branch of Government.

Held:

Yes. It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful
reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the
"administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the
respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450).

The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of
police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine,
limit or stop" and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of
the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA
218).
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the
executive branch of Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and
unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative
Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and
4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)

Art. 5.Rules and Regulations.— The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged
with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation.
(Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)

Sec. 3.Filing—

(1)Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it . Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are
not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party
or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4.Effectivity

In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book,
each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided

unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules
known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
 YAOKASIN V. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (1989)

[180 SCRA 591]

Facts:

On May 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized sacks of refined sugar, which were being
unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs.

Petitioner presented a sales invoice to prove that the sugar was purchased locally. The District
Collector of Customs, Yutangco, however, proceeded with the seizure of the bags of sugar.

On June 1988, show-cause hearings with Yutangco, were conducted and was held in favor of
petitioner.

Days later, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Board (EIIB) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, for "further hearing on the merits", based on evidence that the seized sugar was
of foreign origin. The case was indorsed to Customs Commisioner, Mison. Petitioner opposed the
motion for being merely pro forma and/or that the same was, in effect, a motion for new trial.
Petitioner also applied for and secured a writ of replevin from the RTC.
On July 1988, Mison, reconsidered the June 1988 decision, now in favor of the government.
Petitioner now contends that the June 1988 decision became final and executory, in view of the
absence of an appeal therefrom by the "aggrieved party" (himself) within the 15-day period
provided for in Sec. 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code
The Customs argue that since the June 1988 decision is adverse to the government, the case
should go to Mison on automatic review, pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 20-87.
Issue:

Whether the June 1983 decision became final and executory.

Held:
NO. The memorandum order implements Section 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP)
which provides that where a decision of a Collector of Customs in such seizure and protest cases is
adverse to the government, it shall automatically be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs
which, if affirmed, shall automatically be elevated for final review by the Secretary of Finance.

Section 12 of the IRP applies in this case. Section 12 of the IRP and Section 2313 of the Tariff and
Customs Code do not conflict with each other. They may co-exist. Section 2313 of the Code
provides for the procedure for the review of the decision of a collector in seizure and protest cases
upon appeal by the aggrieved party. On the other hand, Section 12 of the IRP refers to the general
procedure in appeals in seizure and protest cases with a special proviso on automatic review
when the collector's decision is adverse to the government. Section 2313 and the proviso in
Section 12, although they both relate to the review of seizure and protest cases, refer to two
different situations — when the collector's decision is adverse to the importer or owner of the
goods, and when the decision is adverse to the government.

Issue:
Is the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-
87 valid when these laws have not been published in the Official Gazette?

Held:
Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is enforceable. The requirement of Art.
2 of the Civil Code does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customs collectors. Also in the
Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette,
states that administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no
general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with
Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of
persons, hence no general applicability therefore need not be published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not administrative issuances are considered laws which require publication in the
Official Gazette for their effectivity.

RULING:

It depends. Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the Official Gazette,
does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 which is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of
Customs addressed to his subordinates, the customs collectors. Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an
Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette) enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette besides legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines. Executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
shall also be published in the Official Gazette, except such as have no general applicability. CMO
No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an
issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs
collectors). It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all
concerned.
Lina vs Carino

[221 SCRA 515]