CONSTITUTION NOTES

Servus Legis

BORJ DISTURA
 Constitutional Law I (Prof. Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola)
OUTLINE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Prof. Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola
Arellano University School of Law
First Semester, SY 2013-2014
III-A. The State
I. Concept
A. Definition – (CIR v. Campos Rueda)
A State is a politically organized sovereign community, independent of outside control, bound by
ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, and acting through government
functioning under a regime of law.

B. Distinction from “Nation”

State Nation
A legal or juristic concept An ethnic or racial concept
A state is an ideal person, intangible and A group of people bound together by certain
immutable characteristics such as language, customs and
traditions.

A group of people.
Not subject to external control May not be independent from external control

C000 Collection of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda, GR L-13250, 29 October 1971, En

Banc, Fernando [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1971/oct1971/gr_13250_1971.html) <
FACTS:
Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as
administrator of the estate of the late EstrellaSoriano Vda. De
Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P161,974.95 as deficiency estate
and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal
properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national
having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the
time of her death in 1955.
Rueda’s request for exemption was denied on the ground that
the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying
the claim for tax exemption. However, respondent denied this
request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity with
Tangier, which was moreover a mere principality, not a foreign
country.
Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country,'
used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power
which, although not an international person in the sense of
international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon
intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing therein,
or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is,
therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been
recognized by our Government in order to entitle the petitioner to
the exemption benefits of the last provision of Section 122 of our
Tax Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites of statehood or at least so much
thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an
international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country"
to fall within the exemption of Section122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code
DECISION:
Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals Ruling.
If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in
line with Pound's formulation that it be apolitically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by
ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
through a government functioning under a regime of law.
It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed
as an organized corporate society under a government with the
legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
 The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a
definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and
maintaining its separate international personality.
State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects,
claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other
institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power
entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the
conditions of a legal order and to enter into international
relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law does
not exact independence as a condition of statehood.
This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny
principality that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international
personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt
category.

C. Context when the Constitution addresses the State

II. Elements (4 elements: People, Territory, Government, Sovereignty)
A. Territory
1. Definition: The territory of a state includes not only the land over which its jurisdiction extends, but also
the rivers, lakes, bays and airspace above it. The domain of the State may be described as terrestrial,
fluvial or maritime. (Magsalin, 64)

2. Scope of Philippine territory. ( Article I of the 1987 Constitution )

NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.

a. Background
(Section 1, Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the provisions of this Act
and the name "The Philippines" as used in this Act shall apply to and
include the Philippine Islands ceded to the United States Government by
the treaty of peace concluded between the United States and Spain on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, the boundaries of
which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with those islands
embraced in the treaty between Spain and the United States concluded at
Washington on the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred.

(Article I, 1935 Constitution 14 March 1935)

THE NATIONAL TERRITORY
Section 1. The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the United States
by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on the
tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the limits which are
set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the
treaty concluded at Washington between the United States and Spain on the
seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, and the treaty concluded between
the United States and Great Britain on the second day of January, nineteen
hundred and thirty, and all territory over which the present Government of the
Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.

(Article I, 1973 Constitution 17 January 1973)

NATIONAL TERRITORY
Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the
islands and waters embraced therein, and all the other territories belonging to the
Philippines by historic or legal title, including the territorial sea, the air space, the
subsoil, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and the submarine areas over which
the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

(See also Article III of Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain 10 December 1898; 1898 Treaty of
Peace)

Article III.
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine
Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:
 A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north
latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one
hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th)
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred
and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to
the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45']) north
latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4
[degree symbol] 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of
longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree
symbol] 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one
hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35')
east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7
[degree symbol] 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees
and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north to its intersection with the one
hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich,
thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of
north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of
longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth
(118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars
($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the
present treaty.

(Sole Article, Treaty Between Spain and the United States for the Cession of Outlying Islands of the
Philippines 7 November 1900)
SOLE ARTICLE
Spain relinquishes to the United States all title and claim of title; which she may
have had at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and
all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines
described in Article III of that Treaty and particularly to the islands of Cagayan
Sulu and Sibutu and their dependencies, and agrees that all such islands shall
be comprehended in the cession of the Archipelago as fully as if they had been
expressly included within those lines.

The United States, in consideration of this relinquishment, will pay to Spain the
sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) within six months after the
exchange of the ratifications of the prescut treaty.

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by ·and
with the advice and consent of the
Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, after approval
by the Cortes of the Kingdom, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at
Washington as soon as possible.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this Treaty and
have hereunto affixed our seals.
Done in duplicate at the city of Washington, the 7th day of November, in the year
of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred.

(Articles 1 to 4, Convention regarding the Boundary between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North
Borneo 2 January 1930)
Article 1.
It is hereby agreed and declared that the line separating the islands belonging to
the Philippine Archipelago on the one hand and the islands belonging to the
State of North Borneo which is under British protection on the other hand shall be
and is hereby established as follows:

Article 2.

The line described above has been indicated on Charts Nos. 4707 and 4720,
published by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, corrected to the 24th
July, 1929, portions of both charts so marked being attached to this treaty and
made a part thereof. It is agreed that if more accurate surveying and mapping of
North Borneo, the Philippine Islands, and intervening islands shall in the future
show that the line described above does not pass between Little Bakkungaan
and Great Bakkungaan Islands, substantially as indicated on Chart No. 4720, the
boundary line shall be understood to be defined in that area as a line passing
between Little Bakkungaan and Great Bakkungaan Islands as indicated on the
chart, said portion of the line being a straight line approximately 307° 40' true
drawn from a point on the parallel of 6° o' north latitude to a point on the meridian
of longitude of 117° 58' east of Greenwich.

It is likewise agreed that if more accurate surveying and mapping shall show that
the line described above does not pass between the Mangsee Islands and
Mangsee Great Reef as indicated on Chart No. 4720, the boundary shall be
understood to be denned in that area as a straight line drawn from the
 intersection of the parallel of 7° 24' 45" north latitude and the meridian of
longitude of 117° 25' 30" east of Greenwich, passing through Mangsee Channel
as indicated on attached Chart No. 4720 to a point on the parallel of 7° 40' north
latitude.

Article 3.
All islands to the north and east of the said line and all islands and rocks
traversed by the said line, should there be any such, shall belong to the
Philippine Archipelago and all islands to the south and west of the said line shall
belong to the State of North Borneo.

Article 4.
The provisions of Article 19 of the Treaty4 between the United States of America,
the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan limiting naval armament, signed at
Washington on the 6th February, 1922, shall, so long as that Treaty remains in
force, apply in respect of all islands in the Turtle and Mangsee Groups which are
or may be deemed to be comprised within the territories of the Philippine
Archipelago on the one hand and of the State of North Borneo on the other hand
in consequence of the establishment of the line fixed by the preceding articles of
the present Convention. In the event of either High Contracting Party ceding,
selling, leasing or transferring any of the islands in question to a third party
provision shall be made for the continued application to such island of the
aforementioned Article 19 of the Treaty between the United States of America,
the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan limiting naval armament, signed at
Washington on the 6th February, 1922, provided that Treaty is still in force at the
time of such cession, sale, lease or transfer.

(Republic Act 3046 17 June 1961)

AN ACT DEFIN[E]ING THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES.
The black-lines show the 1898 Treaty of Paris territorial limits; the blue lines are the baselines under RA
3046, as amended by RA 5466; and the green lines are the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) under the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Source: National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority

(Republic Act 5446 18 September 1968)

(Presidential Decree 1596 11 June 1978)

Section 1. The area within the following boundaries:
KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP
From a point [on the Philippine Treaty Limits] at latitude
7º40' North and longitude 116º00' East of Greenwich,
thence due West along the parallel of 7º40' N to its
intersection with the meridian of longitude 112º10' E,
thence due north along the meridian of 112º10' E to its
intersection with the parallel of 9º00' N, thence
northeastward to the intersection of parallel of 12º00' N
with the meridian of longitude 114º30' E, thence, due East
along the parallel of 12º00' N to its intersection with the
meridian of 118º00' E, thence, due South along the
meridian of longitude 118º00' E to its intersection with the
parallel of 10º00' N, thence Southwestwards to the point of
beginning at 7º40' N, latitude and 116º00' E longitude;

including the sea-bed, sub-soil, continental margin and space shall belong
and be subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines. Such area is hereby
constituted as a distinct and separate municipality of the Province of
Palawan and shall be known as "Kalayaan."

Source: http://itouchmap.com/i/map/pg.gif

(Presidential Decree 1599 11 June 1978)

Section 1. There is hereby established a zone to be known as the exclusive
economic zone of the Philippines. The exclusive economic zone shall
extend to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the
baselines from which the territorial sea is measured: Provided, That, where
the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive
economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring state, the common
boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the state concerned or
in accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles of
international law on delimitation.
 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7d/Zonmar-en.svg/493px-Zonmar-en.svg.png

(Republic Act 9522 10 March 2009)

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all
portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without
limitation, RA 7160 , otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.
The Supreme Court upheld RA 9522 which includes the "Regime of Islands" shown
here with the baselines (appearing as blue lines). The black lines show the 1898
Treaty of Paris limits which petitioners Magallona and Roque had insisted should
have been the basis of determining the internal waters of the Philippines. Source:
National Mapping and Resource Information Authority
Source: http://www.klsreview.com/HTML/2009Jan_Jun/20090320_02.jpg

http://i167.photobucket.com/albums/u157/jibrael_2007/Jibrael%202008/map4_projectedregimes.jpg
2009 Republic Act No. 9522 AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC
BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 10 December 1982.

1978 Presidential Decree No. 1596: Declaring Certain Area Part of the Philippine Territory and
Providing for their Government and Administration. Philippines. 11 June 1978.

1978 Presidential Decree No. 1599: Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other
Purposes. Philippines. 11 June 1978.

1968 Republic Act. No. 5446: An Act to Amend Section One of Republic Act. No. 3046, Entitled
“An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines.” Philippines. 18
September 1968.

1961 Republic Act No. 3046: An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the
Philippines. Philippines. 17 June 1961.
 1898 The Treaty of Paris. France. 10 December 1898.

C100 Magallona v. Ermita, GR 187167, 16 August 2011, En Banc, Carpio [J]

(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/aug2011/gr_187167_2011.html)
RA 9522 is Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms
of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the
Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others,
that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional.
Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this
also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a “archipelagic” waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
(innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation
of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de
masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area
but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to
acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or
loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription
and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines.
The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210 sq.
na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA
9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea
around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal
waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and
UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the
exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of
islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they
are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be
enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is
because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the
provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through
effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we
exercisetreaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforcecustoms, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to
exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the
UNCLOS.

b. Jurisdiction over territory

(1)Waters – (UNCLOS Art. 49)
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic
waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to
their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.

Addendum
(UNCLOS Art. 46)
(a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by one or more
archipelagos and may include other islands;

(b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of islands,

interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely
interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an
intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically
have been regarded as such.

(UNCLOS Art. 47)

Archipelagic baselines
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines
joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs
of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included
the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the
water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9
to 1.
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum
length of 125 nautical miles.

Right of Innocent Passage (UNCLOS Art 53)

1. An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable
for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or
over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea.

2. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea
lanes and air routes.

Suspension of the Right of Innocent Passage (UNCLOS Art 52, par. 2)

The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships,
suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of
foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such
suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published.

Vocabulary: Straight Baseline, Archipelagic baseline, territorial sea, EEZ

(Exclusive Economic Zone), Contiguous Zone, Continental Shelf

(2) Foreign bases (Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution)

Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.

Addendum:
 The goal of the EDCA is to “promote peace and security in the region.” While outlining new
defense-cooperation measures, the Agreement also allows for the United States to respond
more quickly to environmental and humanitarian disasters in the region.

Designed to build off of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the 1999 Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA), the EDCA reaffirms mutual cooperation between the United
States and the Philippines to develop their individual and collective capacities to resist
armed attack by: improving interoperability of the two country’s armed forces, promoting
long-term modernization, helping maintain and develop maritime security, and expanding
humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters.

The Agreement allows for U.S. forces and contractors to operate out of “Agreed Locations,”
which are defined as: “facilities and areas that are provided by the Government of the
Philippines through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and that United States
forces, United States contractors, and others as mutually agreed”. The Agreement hands
over all operational controls of these “Agreed Locations” to the United States, and allows
U.S. forces to preposition and store defense materiel, equipment, and supplies. The
Agreement makes clear that this materiel cannot include nuclear weapons.

The EDCA is effective for ten years, unless both the United States and the Philippines
formally agree to alter it. Importantly, the United States is not allowed to establish any
permanent military base, and must hand over any and all facilities in the “Agreed Locations”
to the Philippine government upon the termination of the Agreement.
(http://www.gov.ph/2014/04/28/qna-on-the-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/)

REAGAN v. CIR 1969

"By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the
Philippine Government merely consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given
purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein."

"This provision is not and cannot on principle or authority be

construed as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine
Government. If anything, it is an emphatic recognition and
reaffirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the bases and of
the truth that all jurisdictional rights granted to the United States
and not exercised by the latter are reserved by the Philippines for
itself."

(a) Background

B. People – Inhabitants of the territory. It is an aggregate of individual living together as a

community. It is used in the Constitution in 3 senses: inhabitants, electors, and citizens

1. As inhabitants – all persons who dwell or sojourn in the Philippines, regardless of whether they
aliens or transients.
2. As electors – group of citizens lawfully authorized to exercise the right of suffrage.

Addendum
a. Who can be electors. (Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution)
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.

(1) Background (See Article V, Section 3 of the 1935 Constitution)

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are
able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year
and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of suffrage
to women, if in a plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose within two years
after the adoption of this Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand
women possessing the necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the
question.
(Article VI, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution)

Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not otherwise

disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy,
property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of,
suffrage. The Batasang Pambansa shall provide a system for the purpose of
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the vote.

b. Secrecy and sanctity of ballots (Article V, Section 2, first paragraph,

first clause of the 1987 Constitution)

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the

secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the
illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they
shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the
ballot.

(1) Background (See Article VI, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution)

Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy,
property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of,
suffrage. The Batasang Pambansa shall provide a system for the purpose of
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the vote.

(2) System for disabled and illiterates (Article VI, Section 2, second
paragraph of the 1987 Constitution)
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the
illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons.

c. System for Absentee Voting (Article V, Section 2, first paragraph,

second clause of the 1987 Constitution)
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.

(1) Background (See Republic Act 9189 (13 February 2003)

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING
BY QUALIFIED CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES ABROAD, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Sec. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections,
may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under

this Act:

1. Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine
laws;

2. Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who
have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;

3. Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year,
including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as
defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having
been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty; Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the
right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided,
further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments issued by
foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of
judgments;
4. An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall
be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

5. Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or

incompetent by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by
the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments
concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such
person is no longer insane or incompetent.

C200 Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, GR 157013, 10

July 2003, En Banc, Austria-Martinez [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jul2003/gr_157013_2003.html) <

Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a

declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1 suffer from constitutional
infirmity.

RA 9189 sec 5 (4) CONSTI ART V, Sec.1 & 2

An immigrant or a permanent resident
who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes,
upon registration, an affidavit
prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she
shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3)
years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be the
cause for the removal of the name of
the immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised
by all citizens of the Philippines, not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are
at
least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote, for at
least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide
a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a
system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.

Macalintal

That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant

abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided
he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that
a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election;

SC

Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of

an affidavit to qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or
permanent residents, to vote. He focuses solely on Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of
Section 2 empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the

first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that
Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.

Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person

cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an
absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee
remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are

dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.

Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his
residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered
the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to
establish a system for overseas absentee voting. And the registration
of a voter (absentee) in a place other than his residence of origin has
not been deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or loss of such
residence of origin.

The framers intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino

citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The
Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach
voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for

Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1.
By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction,
which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the
strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency
requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad.
The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though
they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution.

If actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no

sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to
establish a system for absentee voting.

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself

is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in
Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or
permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression
that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not
correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d)
violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a
promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise."
 It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an
affidavit or a promise to "resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval
of his/her registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare that
they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they
must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall
be cause for the removal" of their names "from the National Registry
of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote
in absentia."

Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino

voter permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old,
not otherwise disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine
citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her intentions to
return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to
register and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other
foreign service establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over
the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes
of the elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean election.

C201 Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission on Elections, GR 162759,

4 August 2006, En Banc, Garcia [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_162759_2006.html) <

Facts:
Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to
avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in
the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the
requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under
Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the
compliance of the 1 year residency.

Ruling:
The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship
under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.

Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the

residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting
mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a system
wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not
residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote.

The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of
suffrage provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189

3. As citizens – those who possess the citizenship requirement of the constitution

a. Definition and Nature
b. Who are citizens of the Philippines? (Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution)
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the

Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner

provided by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the
law to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest

and shall be dealt with by law.

C300 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, GR 161434, 3

March 2004, En Banc, Vitug [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/mar2004/gr_161434_2004.html) <
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the
presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material
facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a
natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.
Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec,
contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Whether Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions
regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to
“contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the
Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding
Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental

law on respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo,
as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a
Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other
evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954
was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such
that Lorenzo Poe would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being
so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---
respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie,
though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of
paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate.
The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on
 the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of
bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born
only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s
citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced
by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

(1) Background / Citizens of the Philippines prior to adoption of 1987 Constitution

(a) Articles 17 to 19 of the Spanish Civil Code; Amendment XIV of the United States
Constitution;
LIBRO PRIMERO. BOOK I
DE LAS PERSONAS On persons
TÍTULO PRIMERO. TITLE ONE
DE LOS ESPAÑOLES Y EXTRANJEROS On Spaniards and foreigners
Artículo 17. Article 17.
1. Son españoles de origen: 1. The following persons are Spaniards by birth:
• Los nacidos de padre o madre españoles. a) Those born of a Spanish mother or father.
Los nacidos en España de padres extranjeros si, al b) Those born in Spain of foreign parents if at least
menos, uno de ellos hubiera nacido también en one of them should also have been born in Spain.
España. Se exceptúan los hijos de funcionario The children of a diplomatic or consular officer
diplomático o consular acreditado en España. credentialed in Spain shall be excepted from this
• Los nacidos en España de padres extranjeros, si rule.
ambos carecieren de nacionalidad o si la c) Those born in Spain of foreign parents if both of
legislación de ninguno de ellos atribuye al hijo una them should be without nationality or if the
nacionalidad. legislation of neither should grant a nationality to
• Los nacidos en España cuya filiación no resulte the child.
determinada. A estos efectos, se presumen d) Those born in Spain of uncertain filiation. For
nacidos en territorio español los menores de edad these purposes, minors whose first known place of
cuyo primer lugar conocido de estancia sea existence is in Spanish territory shall be presumed
territorio español. born within Spanish territory.
2. La filiación o el nacimiento en España, cuya 2. Filiation or birth in Spain determined after the
determinación se produzca después de los person is eighteen shall not by themselves
dieciocho años de edad, no son por sí solos causa constitute grounds
de adquisición de la nacionalidad española. El to acquire Spanish nationality. The interested party
interesado tiene entonces derecho a optar por la shall then be entitled to opt for Spanish nationality
nacionalidad española de origen en el plazo de dos by birth within two years counting from such
años a contar desde aquella determinación. determination.

Artículo 18. Article 18.

La posesión y utilización continuada de la
nacionalidad española durante diez años, con
buena fe y basada en un título inscrito en el
Registro Civil, es causa de consolidación de la
nacionalidad aunque se anule el título que la
originó.
The possession and continued use of Spanish
nationality for ten years, in good faith and based on
a title registered in the Civil Registry shall constitute
grounds for the consolidation of Spanish
nationality, even if the title which originated should
be annulled.

Artículo 19. Article 19.

1. El extranjero menor de dieciocho años adoptado
por un español adquiere, desde la adopción, la
nacionalidad española de origen.
2. Si el adoptado es mayor de dieciocho años
podrá optar por la nacionalidad española de origen
en el plazo de dos años a partir de la constitución
de la adopción.
1. A foreigner younger than eighteen adopted by a
Spaniard shall acquire Spanish nationality by birth
as of the adoption.
2. If the adoptee should be older than eighteen, he
may opt for Spanish nationality by birth within two
years following the adoption.

(b) Article IX, Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain (10 December 1898)
Article IX.
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell
or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their
industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may
reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

C300 In the matter of the petition of J. Garcia Bosque for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippine Islands, GR 666, 14 January 1902, En Banc, Arellano
[CJ] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1902/jan1902/gr_666_1902.html)

FACTS:
TREATY OF PARIS ART. 9
This provision accorded those residing in the Philippines, who were not
natives, the right of electing to leave the country, thus freeing themselves
of subjection to the new sovereign, or to continue to reside in the
territory.
An EXPIRATION of the term of eighteen months (18 months) without
their making an express declaration of intention to retain their Spanish
nationality will result in the loss of the latter, such persons thereby
becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same manner as the
natives of these Islands.

The period of eighteen months began on April 11, 1899, and expired on
October 11, 1900.

The petitioner absented himself from these Islands on May 30, 1899, and
remained absent therefrom during the whole period. It was in January,
1901, that he returned to these Islands.

WHETHER THE PETITIONER LOST HIS SPANISH NATIONALITY

AND BECAME A SUBJECT OF NEW SOVERIEGN

RULING
From this conduct on the part of the petitioner it is evident that he elected
to preserve his Spanish nationality, which he carried with him on his
departure.
The conditions which gave rise to the presumptive change of nationality
were:
i. residence
ii. and the lapse of eighteen months without express declaration to
the contrary;
these two conditions not being fulfilled there was no change of national
status.
The Government and courts of these Islands should not act with less
circumspection in the matter, and invade the sovereign rights of Spain by
giving the presumptive nationality established by Article IX of the treaty
of Paris an extent not warranted by the conditions upon which it
depends, to wit, residence coupled with failure to make an express
declaration to the contrary.

The petitioner cannot, therefore, be considered to have lost his Spanish

nationality by reason of his residence in the territory after the 11th of
October, 1900, and his failure to make declaration of his intention to
preserve it within the period agreed upon by the high contracting parties
to the treaty of Paris, and to have adopted the nationality of the native
subjects under the presumption arising from the conditions expressed.

The new petition presented by him for admission to the bar of these
Islands must therefore be denied, and it is so ordered.
(c) Section 4, Philippine Organic Act of 1902
[1] Citizens at the adoption of the Cooper Act

Sec. 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to

reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine (APRIL 11, 1899), and then
resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands
and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

(d) Section 2 of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916;

[1] Citizens at the adoption of the Jones Law
[2] Subsequently naturalized

Section 2.―Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were:
a. Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and
b. their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
c. except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
d. and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
1. those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions,
2. the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such
3. other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein.

[a] Act 2927 (26 March 1920)

Philippine citizenship may be acquired by:
(a) Natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under
the Jones Law;
(b) Natives of the Insular possessions of the United States;
(c) Citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the
laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if
residing therein.

[b] Act 3448 (28 November 1928)

(e) Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution;

[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
[2] Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
[3] Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
[4] Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship. (Infra. C301 Ma v. Fernandez (Mat G. Catral)
[a] Commonwealth Act 625
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of the
Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
 oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.

[5] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

C301 Ma v. Fernandez (Mat G. Catral), GR 183133, 26 July

2010, First Division, Perez [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/jul2010/gr_183133_2010.html) <

FACTS
Petitioners (Balgamelo, Felix Jr., Valeriano, Lechi Ann, Arceli, Nicolas
and Isidro are children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese, and
Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.

They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country
for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and
received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do
not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even
traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in
the Philippines.

During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration
their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs).

Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed

Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the
1935 Constitution.

Petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered

in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30)
years after they elected Philippine citizenship.

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are the

following: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest
civil registry. Here, petitioners complied with the first and second
requirements upon reaching the age of majority. However, registration of
the documents of election with the civil registry was done belatedly.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are considered citizens of the Philippines

although statutory formalities of electing citizenship were not completed
on time.

RULING
Yes, they are Filipino citizens. Under the facts peculiar to the petitioners,
the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should
be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.
Their exercise of suffrage, being elected to public office, continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts
showing exercise of Philippine citizenship do not on their own take
the place of election of citizenship.

But where, as here, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe,
registration of the documents of election beyond the timeframe
should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship
have been done publicly, consistently and continuously.

These acts constitute constructive registration. In other words, the

actual exercise of Philippine citizenship for over half a century by the
petitioners is actual notice to the Philippine public, which is equivalent to
formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
 It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid
requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer
Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming
the fact that citizenship has been claimed. Having a Filipino mother is
permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance.

The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat
that election and negate the permanent fact that petitioners have a
Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with
subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.

(f) Article III, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution;

[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
[2] Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
[3] Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five. (1935)
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

(2) Principles of Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis (Art IV, Sec. 1 par 2 and 3)
C400 Roa v. Insular Collector of Customs, GR L-7011, 30
October 1912, En Banc,
Trent [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1912/oct1912/gr_l-7011_1912.html)
(Principle of Jus Soli is applied. Important case for succeeding decisions
on issues about citizenship until the cases of Jose Tan Chong v. Secretary
of Labor and Lam Swee Sang vs The Commonwealth Of The Philippines.)

FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
recommitting the appellant, Tranquilino Roa, to the custody of the Collector of
Customs and declaring the Collector's right to effect appellant's deportation to
China as being a subject of the Chinese Empire and without right to enter and
reside in the Philippine Islands. There is no dispute as to the facts.

Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands,
on July 6, 1889. His father was Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a native of China, and
his mother was Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country. His parents were
legally married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth.

The father of the appellant went to China about the year 1895, and died there
about 1900. Subsequent to the death of his father, in May, 1901, the appellant
was sent to China by his mother for the sole purpose of studying (and always
with the intention of returning) and returned to the Philippine Islands on the
steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu October 1, 1910, from Amoy,
China, and sought admission to the Philippine Islands. At this time the appellant
was a few days under 21 years and 3 months of age.

After hearing the evidence the board of special inquiry found that the appellant
was a Chinese person and a subject of the Emperor of China and not entitled to
land.

In view of the fact that the applicant for admission was born in lawful wedlock
On appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs this decision was affirmed, and the
Court of First Instance of Cebu in these habeas corpus proceedings remanded
the appellant to the Collector of Customs
Under the laws of the Philippine Islands, children, while they remain under
parental authority, have the nationality of their parents. Therefore, the legitimate
children born in the Philippine Islands of a subject of the Emperor of China are
Chinese subjects and the same rule obtained during Spanish sovereignty

ISSUE: Whether Roa is a citizen of the Philippines

RULING
YES, The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was
therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having
expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country.

We therefore conclude that the appellant is a citizen of the Philippine Islands and
entitled to land. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellant is
ordered released from custody, with costs de oficio.
C401 Torres v. Tan Chim, GR L-46593, 3 February 1940, En
Banc, Laurel [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1940/feb1940/gr_l-46593_1940.html) <
(Principle of Jus Soli is applied to Alejandro Tan Bangco)

FACTS
Tan Chim arrived at the port of Cebu on January 18, 1937, and sought admission
as a minor son of Alejandro Tan Bangco.

After hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry decided to deny him entry on the
ground that the status of his father had not been passed upon by the Secretary of
Labor.
A petition was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which ruled that
Alejandro Tan Bangco was a Filipino citizen jus soli, having been born in Manila
on February 27, 1893.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by decision of February 27, 1893, upheld the
conclusion of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a Filipino citizen

RULING: (Same as Roa v. Collector of Custom, supra)

We have not failed to reflect on the far-reaching consequences of our decision in
this case, but considering the fact that the mother of Alejandro Tan Bangco, who
is the father of the herein applicant, is a Filipina, and, under our Constitution,
Alejandro Tan Bangco would have the option, upon reaching majority, to adopt
Filipino citizenship (par. 4, sec. 1, Art. IV, Constitution); considering the benign
policy of giving greater political recognition to women, to the extent that in United
States marriage of an American woman to a foreigner does not operate loss of
her citizenship; and in view of Commonwealth Act No. 63, which is indicative of
this political recognition, however partial, accorded to Filipino women; we are of
the opinion and so hold that the applicant, being a minor child of Alejandro Tan
Bangco who was a Filipino citizen at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, is a Filipino citizen.

Addendum (NB. The jurisprudence under jus soli and jus

sanguinis)
A comparison between this case and that of Roa v. Collector of Customs,
Similar
(1) in that Roa was born in the Philippines in 1889, whereas Alejandro Tan
Bangco (father of the petitioner) was born here in 1893, both before the advent of
American sovereignty;
(2) the fathers of both Roa and Tan Bangco were of Chinese nationality and their
mothers, Filipino;
(3) at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain, both were minor residents of the Philippines; and
(4) both, in their boyhood, went to China for the purpose of studying there,
returning thereafter to the Philippines.

The dissimilarities are:

(1) Roa returned to the Islands after the attaining the age of maturity, whereas
Tan Bangco returned to this country when still a minor; and
(2) the father of Roa was domiciled in the Philippines until the year 1895 when he
went to China and never returned, dying therein 1900, whereas, in the present
case the record is silent on this point.

The similarities are very close and the dissimilarities are in favor of Alejandro Tan
Bangco.

Roa’s subsequent cases

Vaño vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil., 480)
United States vs. Ang (36 Phil., 858)
United States vs. Lim Bin (36 Phil., 927)
Go Julian vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (45 Phil., 290)
Haw. vs. Collector of Customs, (59 Phil., 612)

It is urged upon us by the Solicitor-General that we reexamine and reverse

the doctrine laid down in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, because the
law, we are now informed, had been misconstrued and misapplied by this court
in that case. A suggestion of this kind should be sympathetically received but for
the fact that the principle of territoriality or jus soli adopted in Roa Collector of
Customs, supra, does not have to be set aside by this Court for the reason that
the principle is no longer pre-dominating in this jurisdiction after taking effect of
the Constitution of the Philippines, which has mainly adopted the contrary
principle of jus sanguinis. If, however, what is suggested is that the case at bar
because of the embodiment of a new policy on citizenship in the Constitution, we
are of the opinion that this cannot be done unless we give a retroactive effect to
the Constitution.

We hold that the present case is still governed by, and should be decided on the
authority of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, (read: principle of jus soli) for
the following reasons:.

1. As already observed, the present case is similar to Roa vs. Collector of

Customs, supra, in that the facts determinative of citizenship in both relate to
events which had taken place before the advent of American sovereignty.

2. We should not overlook the fact that the rule laid down in the Roa case had
been adhered to and accepted for more than 20 years before the adoption of
our Constitution; not only this Court but also inferior courts had consistently and
invariably followed it; the executive and administrative agencies of the
Government had theretofore abided by it; and the general public had acquiesced
in it.

3. When in Roa vs. Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein to

be a citizen of the Philippines, that declaration was a statement of a general
principle applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually but to all those who
were in the same situation, that is to say, to all persons born in the Philippines
before the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, of Chinese father and Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at
the time mentioned in the treaty of peace. This was the rule at the time of
the adoption of our Constitution. The members of the Constitutional
Convention were also aware of this rule, and in abrogating the doctrine laid
down in the Roa case, by making the jus sanguinis the predominating principle in
the determination of Philippine citizenship, they did not intend to exclude those
who, in the situation of Tranquilino Roa, were citizens of the Philippines by
judicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the constitution.

4. In the case of Commonwealth of the Philippines vs. Gloria Baldello, G. R.

No. 45375, promulgated April 12, 1939, it should be noted we relied however
indirectly on Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra and cited Commonwealth Act
No. 63, which Act is but a partial expression of the modern tendency in the
United States to accord distinct personality to married woman providing
that the marriage of an American woman to a foreigner does not operate
loss of American citizenship.

C402 Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, GR 47616, 16

September 1947, En Banc, Padilla [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1947/sep1947/gr_47616_1947.html) <
(DOCTRINE OF JUS SOLI is not applied)

JOSE TAN CHONG vs.THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

LAM SWEE SANG vs THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE
PHILIPPINES
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor
Lucas Lacson for appellants. Antonio V. Raquiza for appellee.

FACTS
The petitioner in the first case was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in
July 1915, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, lawfully
married, left for China in 1925 (10 years old), and returned to the
Philippines on 25 January1940 (25 years old).

The applicant in the second case was born in Jolo, Sulu, on 8 May
1900, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother they are
presumed to be lawfully married. From the date of his birth up to
16 November 1938 (38 years old), the date of filing of his
application for naturalization, and up to the date of hearing, he had
been residing in the Philippines (since birth). He is married to a
Filipino woman and has three children by her. He speaks the
local dialect and the Spanish and English languages.

On 15 October 1941, SC affirmed the grant of the writ of

habeas corpus applied for by Tan Chong (born on July 1915
at San Pablo Laguna), on the ground that he, being a native of
the Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a
citizen of the Philippines. In Lam Swee Sang vs.
Commonwealth of the Philippines, SC rendered a decision
dismissing the petition of the applicant for naturalization The
dismissal of the petition implies and means that there was no
need of naturalization for the applicant who is a Filipino
citizen.

On 21 October 1941, a motion for reconsideration was filed in

both cases by the Solicitor General. SG said they are not citizens
of the Philippines under and pursuant to the laws in force at the
time of their birth.

Dec. 8, 1941, Bombing of Pearl Harbor. This motion for

reconsideration was pending in this Court when the Pacific
was broke out.

1947. Upon petition of the Assistant Solicitor General, Mr. Roberto

A. Gianzon, the records were reconstituted.

Upon these reconstituted records, we now proceed to dispose of

the motion for reconsideration.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the principle
of jus soli applies in this jurisdiction.

It is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States which provides that "All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside."

The principle of jus soli was the rule in this jurisdiction until the
30th of September, 1939, when in the case of Chua vs.
Secretary of Labor, this Court abandoned it and held that a
person of Chinese parentage born in the Philippines in 1941
is NOT a citizen thereof, because she followed the citizenship
of her Chinese parents and she is not a citizen of the
Philippines under the provisions of section 2 of the Jones
Law, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916.

But in the cases of Torres and Gallofin vs. Tan Chim (69 Phil.,
518), decided on 3 February 1940 (69 Phil., 518), and Gallofin vs.
Ordoñez, decided on 27 June 1940 (70 Phil., 287), this Court
reverted to the rule of jus soli laid down in the cases prior to the
decision in the case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor, supra.

The Solicitor General held that a person born in the Philippines

of alien parentage is not a citizen thereof, because the
common law principle of jus soli or the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitutiton of United States was not
extended to the Philippines — the same opinions upon which
the Solicitor General had relied in the case of Chua vs. The
Secretary of Labor, supra, in his contention that the rule applying
the principle of jus soli in this jurisdiction should be
abandoned — urges upon this Court to reconsider its decisions in
the cases under consideration.

In the case of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, commenting on sec.

4 of the Philippine Bill, as amended, this Court said:
By section 4 the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place
of birth (jus soli) which prevails in the United States was
extended to the Philippine Islands, but WITH LIMITATIONS.
Under section 4 every person born after the 11th of April, 1889, of
parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who
continued to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth
ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands.

Further commenting on section 4, this Court said:

This section declares that a certain class of inhabitants shall be

citizens of the Philippine Islands. It does not declare that other
inhabitants shall not be citizens. Neither does it declare that
other inhabitants shall be deemed to be aliens to the
Philippine Islands, and especially it does not declare that a
person situated as in the appellant shall not be nor shall not
elect to be a citizen of the country on his birth.

We are not unmindful of the importance of the question submitted

to us for decision. We know that the decision upon the motion for
reconsideration in these cases is momentous. We have given the
time and the thought demanded by its importance. While birth is
an important element of citizenship, it alone does not make a
person a citizen of the country of his birth.
Some of the important elements that would make a person living
in a country a citizen:
(a) Youth spent in the country;
(b) intimate and endearing association with the citizens among
whom he lives;
(c) knowledge and pride of the country's past;
(d) belief in the greatness and security of its institutions, in the
loftiness of its ideals, and in the ability of the country's
government to protect him, his children, and his earthly
possessions against perils from within and from without;
(e) and his readiness to defend the country against such perils.
Citizenship is a political status.

Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented.

But the application of the principle of jus soli to persons born in
this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance
which in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of
which such persons might claim to be citizens.

The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to

precedents. The principle of stare decisis does not and should not
apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law.
The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or
rule found to be in violation of the law in force.

Considering that the law in force and applicable to the petitioner

and the applicant in the two cases at the time of their birth is sec.
4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by Act
of 23 March 1912, which provides that only those "inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands," we are of the opinion and so hold that the
petitioner in the first case and the applicant in the second case,
who were born of alien parentage, were not and are not, under
said section, citizens of the Philippine Islands.
Accordingly, the decision of this Court in the first case confirming
the lower court's judgment is set aside; the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Manila appealed from is reversed; the
petitioner is recommitted to the custody of the Commissioner
of Immigration to be dealt with in accordance with law; and
the decision of this Court in the second case is set aside; the
decree of thecCourt of First Instance of Zamboanga appealed
from granting the applicant's petition for naturalization filed
on16 November 1938 is affirmed, for the applicant comes under
section 1 (a), Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and possesses
the qualifications required by section 3 of the same Act, as
amended, which was the law in force at the time of the filing of the
petition for naturalization. No costs shall be taxed in both cases.

C403 Valles v. Commission on Elections, GR 137000, 9 August

2000, En Banc,
Purisima [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137000_2000.html)
(Principle of jus sanguinis, How Philippine citizenship is acquired
Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of
other citizenship)

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a

Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen,
she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later
married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process
not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her
disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE:
Whether Rosalind is a Filipino

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution
took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and
the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones
Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the
same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established
the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue

of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind
 Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at
most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting
to her possession of dual citizenship.

(3) Election of Citizenship

C501 Republic of the Philippines v. Sagun, GR 187567, 15 February 2012, First
Division, Villarama Jr. [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/feb2012/gr_187567_2012.html)
Nora Fe Sagun filed Judicial Declaration of Election of Filipino
Citizenship and was granted but the SolGen sought for reversal of the
decision.

Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese

national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on
August 8, 1959 in Baguio City3 and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of
33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was
notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not
recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

Petitioner asserts that respondent’s petition before the trial court

seeking a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship
undeniably entails a determination and consequent declaration of her
status as a Filipino citizen which is not allowed under our legal
system.

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether

respondent’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2)
whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

(1) Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific
declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such
pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist
for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said
breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of
the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a
pronouncement is beyond judicial power.

(2)
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter
was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the
Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1,
Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:xxx(4) Those

whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship
of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age
of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
 provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines.17 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states
that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are
Philippine citizens.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section

1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure
that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine

citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and
(3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry.

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted

for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the
right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien
Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to
register as an alien.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still

the trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine
citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid
election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn
statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her
claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12
years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that
respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within
a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and
was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under
Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within
three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.27 Moreover, there
was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay
and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to

comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and
effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot
assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar
acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the
place of election of Philippine citizenship.

Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements,

respondent’s petition before the trial court must be denied.

(4) Naturalization
(a) Judicial (Commonwealth Act 473 [17 June 1939]) – a.k.a REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW
[1] Qualifications (Sections 2 and 3, CA 473)
Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to Section four of this Act, any person having the
following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
 First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less
than ten years (10);
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal
Philippine languages;
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the
Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed
as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen.cban robles virtual law library

Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under
the second condition of the last preceding Section shall be understood as reduced to
five years (5) for any petitioner having any of the following qualifications:
1. Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of
any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;
2. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;
3. Being married to a Filipino woman;
4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private
school not established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular
nationality or race, in any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less
than two years;
5. Having been born in the Philippines.

C600 Republic of the Philippines v. Li Yao, GR L-35947, 20 October 1992,

Third Division, Romero [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/oct1992/gr_35947_1992.html) <

William Li Yao was naturalized by way of fraud. (Under-declaration of income tax

or tax evasion etc.) This is the basis of the cancellation of his citizenship by virtue
of Commonwealth act 473 Sec 18 and Sec 2 par 3 (good moral and
irreproachable character)

1. POLITICAL LAW; REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW (OTHERWISE KNOWN AS COM.

ACT OF 473); SEC. 18(A) THEREOF; GROUNDS FOR DENATURALIZATION. — Section 18
(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the Revised Naturalization Act, provides that a naturalization
certificate may be cancelled" [i]f it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained
fraudulently or illegally." It is indisputable that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it
is subsequently discovered that the applicant therefor obtained it by misleading the court upon
any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate.
Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision
rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any matter that would support a judgment
cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement
thereof.

2. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT OF IRREPROACHABLE CHARACTER UNDER SEC. 2

THEREOF; EVASION OF TAX OBLIGATIONS; GROUNDS FOR DENATURALIZATION; CASE
AT BAR. — The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding of
evasion of payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requiring, among others, that applicant conduct himself "in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation
with constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living," to strip him of
his citizenship without going into the other grounds for cancellation presented by the Solicitor
General. In the case entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Naturalization as Citizen of the
Philippines, Lim Eng Yu v. Republic, it was held that the concealment of applicant’s income to
evade payment of lawful taxes show that his moral character is not irreproachable, thus
disqualifying him for naturalization.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF PAYMENT OF TAX LIABILITY. — Assuming arguendo,
that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax liability under P.D. No. 68 which
granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a sufficient ground for lifting the order of the lower
court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate of naturalization. The legal effect of payment
under the decree is merely the removal of any civil, criminal or administrative liability on the part
of the taxpayer, only insofar as his tax case is concerned.

4. ID.; ID.; RIGID ENFORCEMENT AGAINST THE APPLICANT. — Taking into account
the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the Government and
against the applicant, this Court has repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant
failed to meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino
citizenship. More specifically, the Court has had occasion to state: "Admission to citizenship is
one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a
privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict
compliance with the law." Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price which should be
cherished and not taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not
stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground for divesting one of said
citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the law must be proved to the
satisfaction of the Court.
C601 Republic of the Philippines v. Lao Ong, GR 175430, 18 June 2012, First
Division, Del Castillo [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jun2012/gr_175430_2012.html)

FACTS
 On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for
Naturalization.
 Respondent Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese
citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958.
 He is registered as a resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of
registration and a native-born certificate of residence. He has been continuously
and permanently residing in the Philippines from birth up to the present.
 Ong can speak and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy.
 He took his elementary and high school studies at the Sacred Heart School for
Boys in Cebu City, where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and the Philippine
Constitution are taught.
 He then obtained a degree in Bachelor of Science in Management from the
Ateneo De Manila University on March 18, 1978.
 On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen. They
have four children. The children of school age were enrolled at exclusive
schools.
 Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a “businessman/business manager”
since 1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00. When he
testified, however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated
from college in 1978.
 Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business.
 Respondent further testified that he socializes with Filipinos; celebrates the
Sinulog, fiestas, birthdays, and Christmas.[44] He is a member of the Alert/
React VII Communications Group and the Masonic organization.
 On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ong’s petition
 On January 31, 2003, the Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed to
the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ong’s petition
despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth
paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
 The appellate court dismissed the Republic’s appeal.
 The appellate court denied the Republic’s motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution dated November 7, 2006.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of
the Revised Naturalization Law.

HELD
 Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the
applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law.

In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ong’s

compliance with the qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the
Revised Naturalization Law, which provides: He must own real estate in the
Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency,
or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of “some known lucrative trade,

profession, or lawful occupation” means that the employment gives one an
income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the
object of charity or a public charge.”

The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the

testimonial evidence. The applicant provided no documentary evidence, like
business permits, registration, official receipts, or other business records to
demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead, Ong relied
on his general assertions to prove his possession of “some known lucrative
trade, profession or lawful occupation.” Bare, general assertions cannot
discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization.

The Court finds the appellate court’s decision erroneous. First, it should not have
included the spouse’s income in its assessment of Ong’s lucrative income.
Second, it failed to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on
Ong’s expenses vis-à-vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b)
that his proven average gross annual income around the time of his application,
which was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor
children; and (c) that Ong’s children were all studying in exclusive private schools
in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that
Ong’s income had an appreciable margin over his known expenses.

There is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an

appreciable margin of income over expenses.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the
qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth
paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law.

[2] Disqualifications (Section 4, CA 473)

Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
1. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and
ideals of the Filipinos;
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the
period of such war;
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose laws do not grant Filipinos
the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

[3] Declaration of Intention (Sections 5 and 6, CA 473)

Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine
citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice, a declaration under
oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth
name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the
date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines, and the
place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid
until lawful entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place,
and manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor
children, if any, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as
part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two
photographs of himself.
[4] Petition and proceedings thereto
[a] Sections 7 to 11, CA 473
{1} Contents
{2} Nature of naturalization proceedings
{3} Construction of naturalization laws
{4} Burden of proof to show compliance with naturalization law
{5} Objection may be had at any stage
{6} Res Judicata?
C602 Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, GR L-21289, 4
October 1971, En Banc, Barredo [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1971/oct1971/gr_21289_1971.html) <
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose authorized stay in the
Philippines was to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes the ground that the
marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically confer on the
latter Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all the
qualifications required for applicant for naturalization (CA 473), even she has
proven that she possesses none of the disqualifications in said law.

ISSUE:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage
to a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully
naturalized ipso facto, provided that she does not possess all of the
disqualifications enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)
C603 Ngo Burca v. Republic of the Philippines, GR L-24252, 15 June
1973, En Banc, Antonio [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1973/jun1973/gr_24252_1973.html) <
(Modified decision on naturalization ipso facto by marrying a Filipino Citizen – see Moy Ya Lim Yao)

In resume, therefore, since Our opinion in the decision January 30, 1967, requiring an alien woman married to Filipino
who desires to be a citizen of this Country, to submit a judicial proceeding in all respects similar to a
naturalization case, wherein in addition, she has to prove not only that she not laboring under any of the
disqualifications under section but also possesses all the qualifications set forth in section 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, conflicts with Our ruling Moy Ya Lim Yao, the decision has to that extent be consider modified. 1
We cannot, however, affirm petitioner's claim Filipino citizenship in these proceedings. That is a matter which in
accordance with Our suggestion in Moy Ya Lim Yao the appropriate governmental agency, such as the
Commissioner on Immigration, shall have to pass upon.

C604 Gonzales v. Pennisi, GR 169958, 5 March 2010, Second Division,

Carpio [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/mar2010/gr_169958_2010.html)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in finding that
respondent is a Filipino citizen.

Petitioners allege that respondent’s petition was filed out of time (1

day). Petitioners further allege that respondent’s voluntary departure
from the Philippines had rendered the petition moot. Finally,
petitioners allege that the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of
recognition as a Filipino citizen and the issuance of the deportation
order against him are valid.

Ruling:
Hence, we sustain the Court of Appeals in accepting the petition for
review although it was filed one-day late.

Therefore, we rule that respondent’s deportation did NOT render the

present case moot.

In this case, we sustain the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented
before the BI and the DOJ, i.e., (1) certified photocopy of the certificate
of birth of Quintos, and a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that Quintos was born on 14 August
1949 of Filipino parents, Felipe M. Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, in
Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; (2) certified true copy of the
certificate of marriage of respondent’s parents dated 9 January 1971,
indicating the Philippines as Quintos’ birthplace; (3) certified true copy of
 Quintos’ Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her
nationality as Filipino; (4) certified true copy of respondent’s birth
certificate stating that he was born on 13 March 1975 and indicating the
Philippines as his mother’s birthplace; and (5) certified true copy of the
letter dated 14 July 1999 of the Australian Department of Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs, stating that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not
been granted Australian citizenship, have more probative value and must
prevail over the statements of Soliman and Peralta before the Senate
Committees. The Committee Report on respondent stated:

We further sustain the Court of Appeals that there could be reasons why
the Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in the census, such
as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their
absence in the master’s list of voters, they could have failed to
register themselves as voters. The late registration of Quintos’
certificate of live birth was made 10 years after her birth and not
anytime near the filing of respondent’s petition for recognition as Filipino
citizen. As such, it could not be presumed that the certificate’s late
filing was meant to use it fraudulently. Finally, the Australian
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself attested that as
of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship.
Respondent submitted a certified true copy of Quintos’ Australian
certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino.
These pieces of evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted by
Soliman and Peralta to the Senate Committees.
[b] Commonwealth Act 535 (amendatory to CA 473)
[c] Republic Act 530 [1950]
[5] Issuance of Certificate, Records and Fees (Sections 12 to 14, CA 473)
[a] Oath
[b] Correction of entries?
C605 Republic v. Lim, GR 153883, 13 January 2004, First Division, Ynares-
Santiago [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jan2004/gr_153883_2004.html ) <
FACTS
In 1999, Chuley Lim filed a petition for correction of entries in her birth certificate with the regional
trial court of Lanao del Norte. Her maiden name was Chuley Yu and that’s how it appears in all her
official records except that in her birth certificate where it appears as “Chuley Yo”. She said that it
was misspelled. The Republic of the Philippines through the local city prosecutor raised the issue of
citizenship because it appears that Lim’s birth certificate shows that she is a Filipino. The prosecutor
contends that Lim’s father was a Chinese; that she acquired her father’s citizenship pursuant to the
1935 Constitution in place when she was born; that she never elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority (she is already 47 years old at that time); that since she is a Chinese,
her birth certificate should be amended to reflect that she is a Chinese citizen. Lim contends that she
is an illegitimate child hence she is a Filipino.
ISSUE: Whether Lim is a Chinese citizen.
HELD: No. The provision which provides the election of Filipino citizenship applies only to legitimate
children. In the case at bar, Lim’s mother was a Filipino. Lim’s mother never married the Chinese
father of Lim hence Lim did not acquire the Chinese citizenship of her father. What she acquired is
the Filipino citizenship of her mother. Therefore, she is a natural born Filipino and she does not need
to perform any act to confer on her all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship.

[c] Cancellation of Alien Citizen Registration?

[6] Effect on wife and children (Section 15, CA 473)
[7] Cancellation
[a] Presentation of proof to allow cancellation of naturalization certificate for one
who is already a citizen
[b] Estoppel?
(b) Administrative
[1] Letter of Instructions 270
[2] Republic Act 9139 (The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000; 8 June 2001)
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2001/ra_9139_2001.html
(c) No judicial declaration of citizenship / declaratory judgment
C606 Yung Uan Chu v. Republic of the Philippines, GR L-34973, 14 April 1988,
Second Division, Paras [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/apr1988/gr_l_34973_1988.html) <
Chinese citizen married to a filipino husband.
c. Natural born citizens (Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution)
C700 Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, GRs 92191-92, 30 July 1991
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jul1991/gr_92191_92_92202_03_1991.html) <
(1) Kinds of citizenship
C701 Bengson III v. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, GR 142840, 7 May
2001, En Banc, Kapunan [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/may2001/gr_142840_2001.html)
(2) Requisites to be deemed natural born citizen
(3) Background (See Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution)
(a) Difference between natural-born citizens under 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
(4) Recovery of the original nationality by repatriation
(5) Retention of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act 9225 (29 August 2003)
d. Loss and retention of Citizenship (Article IV, Sections 3 and 4 of the 1987 Constitution)
(1) Loss
(a) Background (See prior American rules on loss of citizenship prior to 1935; Article IV, Section 2
of the 1935 Constitution; Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1973 Constitution)
C800 Commonwealth of the Philippines v. Baldello, GR L-45375, 12 April 1939, En
Banc, Moran [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1939/apr1939/gr_l-45375_1939.html)
C801 In RE Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, GR L-83882, 24 January 1989, En Banc, Padilla
[J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jan1989/gr_l83882_1989.html) <
(2) Reacquisition
C802 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, GR 87193, 23 June 1989, En Banc,
Cruz [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jun1989/gr_87193_1989.html ) <
Frivaldo case 1
(a) Background (See Articles 21 and 22 of the Spanish Civil Code; prior American rules on loss
of citizenship prior to 1935; Article IV, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution; Article III, Sections 2
and 3 of the 1973 Constitution)
[1] Naturalization.
C803 Republic v. de la Rosa, GR 104654, 6 June 1994, En Banc, Quiason [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_104654_1994.html) < Frivaldo case 2
[2] Repatriation.
[a] Commonwealth Act 63 [21 October 1936]
[b] Republic Act 965 (20 June 1953)
[c] Republic Act 2630 (18 June 1960)
[d] Republic Act 2639 (18 June 1960)
[e] Presidential Decree 725 (5 June 1975)
C804 Angat v. Republic of the Philippines, GR 132244, 14 September 1999,
Third Division, Vitug [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/sep1999/gr_132244_1999.html) <
C805 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, GR 120295, 28 June 1996, En
Banc, Panganiban [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jun1996/gr_120295_1996.html) < Frivaldo case 3
[e] Republic Act 8171 (23 October 1995)
C806 Altajeros v. Commission on Elections, GR 163256, 10 November
2004, En Banc, Azcuna [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_163256_2004.html) <
C807 Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, GR 125793, 29 August 2006, Third
Division, Velasco Jr. [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_125793_2006.html) <
[f] Republic Act 9225 (29 August 2003)
[3] Direct Act of Congress
e. Dual allegiance (Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution) (n)
(1) Dual citizenship and Dual allegiance
(a) Prior to RA 9225
C900 Aznar v. Commission on Elections, GR 83820, 25 May 1990, En Banc, Paras
[J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/may1990/gr_83820_1990.html) <
C901 Mercado v. Manzano, GR 135083, 26 May 1999, En Banc, Mendoza [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/may1999/gr_135083_1999.html) <
(b) RA 9225
C901 AASJS v. Datumanong, GR 160869, 11 May 2007, En Banc, Quisumbing [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_160869_2007.html) <
C902 Cordora v. Commission on Elections, GR 176947, 19 February 2009, En
Banc, Carpio [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/gr_176947_2009.html) <
f. Privileges and rights of citizens
(1) Public Office
(a) In general
CA00 Lopez v. Commission on Elections, GR 182701, 23 July 2008, En Banc
Resolution, Reyes RT [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/jul2008/gr_182701_2008.html)
<
(b) Dual citizenship
CA01 Jacot v. Dal, GR 179848, 27 November 2008, En Banc, Chico-Nazario [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_179848_2008.html) <
CA02 Japzon v. Commission on Elections, GR 180088, 19 January 2009, En Banc,
Chico-Nazario [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jan2009/gr_180088_2009.html) <
CA03 De Guzman v. Commission on Elections, GR 180048, 19 June 2009, En
Banc, Ynares-Santiago [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jun2009/gr_180048_2009.html) <
CA04 Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, GR 198742, 10 August 2012,
En Banc, Reyes [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_198742_2012.html)
(2) Practice of Profession
CA05 In RE Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Ching, BM 914, 1
October 1999, En Banc Resolution, Kapunan [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/courts/bm/bm_914_1999.html) <
CA06 Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, BM
1678, 17 December 2007, En Banc, Corona [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/bm_1678_2007.html)
CA07 RE Petition to Re-Acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the Philippines,
Epifanio B. Muneses, BM 2112, 24 July 2012, En Banc Resolution, Reyes [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jul2012/bm_2112_2012.html)
(3) Ownership of land
CA08 Lee v. Republic of the Philippines, GR 128195, 3 October 2001, First Division,
Pardo [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/oct2001/gr_128195_2001.html) <
CA09Muller v. Muller, GR 149615, 29 August 2006, First Division, Ynares-Santiago
[J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_149615_2006.html) <
CA0A Borromeo v. Descallar, GR 159310, 24 February 2009, First Division, Puno
[CJ] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/gr_159310_2009.html) <
CA0B Matthews v. Taylor, GR 164584, 22 June 2009, Third Division, Nachura [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jun2009/gr_164584_2009.html) <
(4) Franchises / Public Utilities / Industry
CA0BInitiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services
Inc. (IDEALS Inc.) v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM), GR 192088, 9 October 2012, En Banc, Villarama [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/oct2012/gr_192088_2012.html) <
(5) Right to stay in the Philippines
CA0C Djumantan v. Domingo, GR 88358, 30 January 1995, En Banc, Quiason [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/jan1995/gr_99358_1995.html) <
C. Government
1. Definition
CB00 People v. Sandiganbyan, GR 145951, 12 August 2003, First Division, Ynares-
Santiago [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/aug2003/gr_145951_2003.html) <
CB01 Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, GR 155650, 20 July
2006, En Banc, Carpio [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jul2006/gr_155650_2006.html) <
2. Constituent vs Ministrant Functions
CC00 Valmonte v. Belmonte, GR 74930, 13 February 1989, En Banc, Cortes [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/feb1989/gr_74930_1989.html) <
CC01 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Anson Rivera, GR 182431, 17 November 2010,
First Division, Perez [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/nov2010/gr_182431_2010.html) <
3. Parens Patriae
a. Donations
CD00Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorras
de Manila, GR L-9959, 13 December 1916, En Banc, Trent [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1916/dec1916/gr_l-9959_1916.html) <
CD01Gonzales v. Marcos, GR L-31685, 31 July 1975, En Banc, Fernando [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/jul1975/gr_l_31685_1975.html) <
b. Public Morals
CD02 Fernando v. Court of Appeals, GR 159751, 6 December 2006, Third Division,
Quisumbing [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_159751_2006.html) <
c. Women
CD03 Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, GR 80116, 30 June 1989, Second Division, Regalado [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jun1989/gr_80116_1989.html) <
d. Minors and incapacitated
(1) Support and benefits, Adoption, etc.
CD04 Cabanas v. Pilapil, GR L-25843, 25 July 1974, Second Division, Fernando [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/jul1974/gr_l_25843_1974.html) <
CD05 Lahom v. Sibulo, GR 143989, 14 July 2003, First Division, Vitug [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jul2003/gr_143989_2003.html) <
CD06 Dela Cruz v. Gracia, GR 177728, 31 July 2009, Second Division, Carpio Morales
[J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_177728_2009.html) <
CD07 Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, GR 123450, 31 August 2005, Third Division,
Corona [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/aug2005/gr_123450_2005.html) <
(2) Penal confinement
(3) Abuse
CD08Malto v. People, GR 164733, 21 September 2007, First Division, Corona [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/sep2007/gr_164733_2007.html) <
CD09 People v. Diaz, GR 130210, 8 December 1999, En Banc, Bellosillo [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/dec1999/gr_130210_1999.html) <
e. Retirees
CD0A Bacolod City Water District v. Bayona, GR 168780, 23 November 2007, En
Banc, Carpio [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/nov2007/gr_168780_2007.html) <
4. De Jure Government/Criteria for Legitimacy
5. De Facto governments
CE00 Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, GR L-5, 16 November 1945, En Banc
Resolution, Feria [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1945/nov1945/gr_l-5_1945.html) <
6. Government distinguished from Administration
7. Other classifications of Governments
D. Sovereignty
1. Definition
2. Dual Aspect, Kinds & Characteristics
3. Dominium & Imperium
4. Effects of Change in Sovereignty
CF00 See Macariola v. Asuncion (supra., A001)
5. Effects of Military Occupation
6. Territorial, personal and extraterritorial jurisdiction
7. Acts of the State
CF01 In RE Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago, GR 82544, 28 June 1988, Second Division,
Melencio Herrera [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jun1988/gr_82544_1988.html) <