OUTLINE IN REMEDIAL LAW 1

Atty. Victor Y. Eleazar

Arellano University School of Law

I. General Principles

A. Concept of Remedial Law

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

REMEDIAL LAW is that branch of law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion [Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640]. It is also known as
Adjective Law.

B. Substantive Law as Distinguished from Remedial Law

SUBSTANTIVE LAW is one which creates, defines, and regulates rights concerning life,
liberty, or property, or the power of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of
public affairs.

PROCEDURAL LAW is the method of conducting a judicial proceeding. It includes whatever

is embraced in the technical terms, pleadings, practice, and evidence. It is the means by
which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put to action
[Manila Railroad vs. Atty. General, 20 Phil. 523].

JURISDICTION is the power to hear and decide cases [Herrera vs. Baretto & Joaquin, 25
Phil. 245]. It is the power with which courts are invested with the power of administering
justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to
dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties [Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina, 166 SCRA 39].

JURISDICTION VENUE

The authority to hear and determine a case The place where the case is to be heard or
tried

A matter of substantive law A matter of procedural law

Establishes a relation between the court Establishes a relation between plaintiff and
and the subject matter defendant, or petitioner and respondent

Fixed by law and cannot be conferred by May be conferred by the act or agreement
the parties of the parties

B. Rule-making Power of the Supreme Court

Sec. 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states, ―The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: … (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of the
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

1. Limitations on the rule-making power of the

Supreme Court

See also Sec. 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states: ―The Congress shall
have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof…

Note that in Sec. 5, only paragraphs (1) and (2) speak of the jurisdiction over cases.
Jurisdiction over these cases represents the irreducible jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
They include original jurisdiction over cases affecting diplomatic representatives and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and
appellate jurisdiction over enumerated types of cases.

Art. VI, Section 30, 1987 Constitution: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.

Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

The SC declared as unconstitutional Sec. 27 of Rep. Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) together with Sec. 7, Rule III of Adm. Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman) and any other provision of law or issuance implementing RA 6770
insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court.

Sec. 27 of RA 6770 reads: ―… In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or

decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.‖ According to the SC, this provision violates the proscription in Sec.
30 of Art. VI of the Constitution, which reads: ―No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its
advice and concurrence.‖

In Kuizon v. Desierto, G.R. NO. 140619-24, March 9, 2001, SC explained that with its ruling
in Fabian, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. If what is assailed is an incident
in a criminal case, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which should
be filed with the Supreme Court. This was reiterated in Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. No.
1609098, October 12, 2006, where the SC ruled that the remedy to challenge the
Resolution of the Ombudsman at the conclusion of a preliminary investigation was to file a
petition for certiorari with the SC under Rule 65.

2. Power of the Supreme Court to amend and suspend

procedural rules

Both the 1935 Constitution (Article VIII, Sec. 13) and 1973 Constitution (Article X, Sec. 5
(5) provided that rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court may be ―repealed,

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altered, or supplemented‖ by the legislature. No similar provision appears in the 1987
Constitution.

Note, in Echegaray v. The Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999), Justice
Puno said that Congress no longer has the power to amend the Rules of Court. He said,

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court
for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the
manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of
the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has
no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power
conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

The rule-making power of the SC was applied in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633. It held –

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.

(Article VIII, Sec. 5 (5), 1987 Constitution) It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules
governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43
and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may
consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40

governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal

within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of
receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies

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 disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use
of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of
the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP
129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the
disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18,
1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The
fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to
review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to
deliver justice fairly.

Basic principles in Jurisdiction:

(1) PRINCIPLE OF THE EXERCISE OF EQUITY JURISDICTION is a situation where the

court is called upon to decide a controversy and release the parties from their
correlative obligations but if it would result in adverse consequences to the
parties and the public, the court would go beyond its power to avoid negative
consequences in the release of the parties [Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA
793; Naga Telephone Co. vs. CA, 48 SCAD 539].

In Agne vs. Director of Lands, where the evidence showed that the plaintiff is
the true owner of the land subject of the free patent and title was granted to
another and that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in
possession thereof, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and
without ordering the cancellation of said title issued upon the patent, may
direct the defendant registered owner to reconvey the property to the
plaintiff. Further, if the determinative facts are before the Court and it is in a
position to finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of justice
will be subserved by such a resolution and thereby obviate the needless
protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case of the trial
court. The Court saw no need for remanding the case for further proceedings,
and held that the facts and the ends of justice in this case require the
reconveyance of the disputed lot.

In Poso v. Mijares, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1693, August 21, 2002, the Supreme
Court held that the general rule that it this does not review a trial court’s
decision in an administrative proceeding since its main concern therein is to
determine the ethical responsibilities of judicial conduct is not controlling. The
facts of the case calls for the exercise of equity jurisdiction to the end that we
render complete justice to all affected parties. As we have said, ―Equity as the
complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where
courts, of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to
adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent
so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the
form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed

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 by different courts.‖ Indeed, a court of equity which has taken jurisdiction and
cognizance of a cause for any purpose will ordinarily retain jurisdiction for all
purposes and award relief so as to accomplish full justice between the party
litigants, prevent future litigation and make performance of the court’s decree
perfectly safe to those who may be compelled to obey it.

In this case, the respondent Judge was not only dismissed from the service
but likewise his Resolution in the criminal case reducing the penalty to 6
years to enable the accused to avail of probation was considered void. In
Crim. Case No. 2477, the accused pleaded guilty to homicide was sentenced
to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. On motion for reconsideration,
respondent judge modified the sentence to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of
prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor. This
was further reduced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as
minimum to 6 years of prision correccional as maximum, thus enabling the
accused to apply for probation. The Resolution was set-aside in the
administrative case.

(2) ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION:

(1) Jurisdiction over the (2) Jurisdiction over the (3) Jurisdiction over the res
subject matter or nature of parties
the case

It is conferred by law (BP Jurisdiction over the person It is acquired by the seizure
129), and does not depend of the plaintiff is acquired by
of the thing under legal
on the objection or the acts the filing of the initiatory process whereby it is
or omissions of the parties pleading, like a complaint. brought into actual custody
or anyone of them [Republic of law, or it may result from
vs. Sangalang, 159 SCRA Jurisdiction over the person the institution of a legal
515]. of the defendant is acquired proceeding wherein the
by the proper service of power of the court over the
It is not waivable, except in summons, or by his thing is recognized and
cases of estoppel to voluntary appearance in made effective [Banco-
question or raise jurisdiction court and his submission to Español Filipino vs. Palanca,
[Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 the authority of the court 37 Phil. 291].
SCRA 29]. [Paramount Industries vs.
Luna, 148 SCRA 564].
It is determined upon the
allegations made in the
complaint, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is
entitled or not, to recover
upon the claim asserted
therein, a matter resolved
only after and as a result of
the trial.

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Caution should be exercised in applying the doctrine of laches or stale demands in Tijam.
The principle of estoppel as a defense to a jurisdictional error is more of an exception rather
than the rule. In Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25 (1982), the Supreme Court observed
that Tijam was developing into a general rule rather than as an exception. Thus, in
Calimlim, the SC refused to apply Tijam and instead accorded supremacy to the time-
honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or estoppel.

In Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, Justice Nachura
reviewed the different cases involving estoppel by jurisdiction and noted that
the Court itself has wavered on this. Nonetheless, we should bear in mind
that estoppel is not favored because it is in the nature of forfeiture of.
Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is
void.

(3) ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:

(1) Territorial jurisdiction (2) Jurisdiction over the (3) Jurisdiction over the
subject matter person of the accused

It is determined by the It is determined by the It is acquired by the

geographical area over
which a court presides, and
the fact that the crime was
committed, or any of its
essential ingredients took
place within said area [US
vs. Jueves, 23 Phil. 100].
allegations of the complaint voluntary appearance or
or information in accordance surrender of the accused or
with the law in force at the by his arrest [Choc vs. Vera,
time of the institution of the 64 Phil. 1066].
action, not at the time of its
commission [US vs. Mallari,
24 Phil. 366].

CLASSES OF JURISDICTION:

General – power to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from
the plenary powers of the court.

Special or Limited – restricts the courts jurisdiction only to particular cases and subject
to such limitations as may be provided by the governing law.

Original – power of the court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial
action for the first time under conditions provided by law.

Appellate – authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or

judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review.

Exclusive – power to adjudicate a case or proceeding to the exclusion of all other

courts at that stage.

Concurrence/Confluent/Coordinate – power conferred upon different courts, whether of

the same or different ranks, to take cognizance at the same stage of the same case in
the same or different judicial territories.

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 D. Nature of Philippine Courts

1. Meaning of a court

Courts are judicial tribunals in the administration and dispensation of justice. They
exist in every civilized country to resolve and end disputes in accordance with the law
peacefully, orderly, authoritatively, definitely, and finally. A court is a body in the
government to which the public administration of justice is delegated.

2. Court as distinguished from a judge

The words ―courts and judges‖ are used synonymously and interchangeably,
generally speaking. But there is an important distinction between the court, as an entity,
and the person who occupies the position of a judge. Courts may exist without a present
judge. There may be a judge without a court. The judge may become disqualified, but
such fact does not destroy the court. It simply means that the there is no judge to act in
the court. The courts of the Philippine Islands were created and the judges were appointed
thereto later. In a few instances, the judges were appointed before the courts were
established. A person may be appointed a judge and be assigned to a particular district or
court subsequently. (Pamintuan v. Llorente, G.R. No. L-10144, January 27, 1915)
Jurisdiction is vested in the court and not in the judge.

3. Classification of Philippine courts

4. Courts of original and appellate jurisdiction

Courts of original jurisdiction – Those where a case is originally commenced.

Appellate courts – Those courts where a case is reviewed.

5. Courts of general and special jurisdiction

Courts of general jurisdiction – Courts which take cognizance of all cases, civil or criminal,
except those assigned to special courts and courts of limited jurisdiction.

Courts of special jurisdiction – In Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1954,
the SC explained that when the then CFI takes cognizance of election protests, it acts as
courts of special jurisdiction. In this sense, they have a limited jurisdiction. Thus, the CFI
has no jurisdiction over an election protest until the special facts upon which it may take
jurisdiction are expressly shown in the motion of protest. There is no presumption in favor
of jurisdiction of a court of limited or special jurisdiction.

6. Constitutional and statutory courts

Constitutional courts – Those created by the Constitution itself, e.g., the Supreme Court.
(Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Statutory courts – Those created by the legislature. The CA, the RTC, and the MTC were
created by B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.

7. Courts of law and equity

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 Courts are first and foremost courts of law. Equity should be applied only in the
absence of any law governing the relationship between the parties. While equity might tilt
on the side of one party, the same cannot be enforced so as to overrule positive provisions
of law in favor of the other. Equity cannot supplant or contravene the law. The rule must
stand no matter how harsh it may seem.

Go Tamio v. Ticson, G.R. No. 154895, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 44

In this case, the SC reiterated the rule that a lessee is not allowed to challenge the title of
the lessor. It is immaterial whether the lessor had any title at all to the property at the time
the lease was commenced. However, considering the peculiar circumstances availing in the
case, equity demands that such rule be relaxed. It would be grossly unjust if after having
paid the owner prior rentals, petitioner would still be required to pay again the same rental
arrearages to the lessor for the latter’s retention of the property after the termination of the
sublease contract. Note that the sublease had already expired, and that the arrearages refer
to a subsequent period not covered by the said sublease.

Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and to complete justice where
courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards
the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.

Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we

are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we
administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is
that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with
justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an
illustration.

This case involves the application of Art. 1088, which reads: ―Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.‖ Jurisprudence explained that the notice must be in
writing and not mere actual knowledge. The SC, while conceding the absence of any written
notice, could not accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the
sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such
notice, the courts would be closing their eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably
false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is
clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. The SC was then
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although
not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

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 8. Principle of judicial hierarchy

Although the SC, the CA and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The
concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs
an absolute, unrestricted freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(―inferior‖) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is an established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the court’s docket. (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc.
(CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010)

9. Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial

stability

DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference

in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in
adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the competence of a court to
entertain a motion, much less issue an order, relative to a subject matter which is under
the custodia legis of another court by virtue of a prior writ of attachment. Indeed, the
policy of peaceful co-existence among courts of the same judicial plane, so to speak,
was aptly described in Parcon vs. CA, 111 SCRA 262:

...Jurisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge, and
as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a
judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on the
same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and
processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the
various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as
they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent
and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments.

a. Non-interference in Associations

Courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of an unincorporated

association so as to settle disputes between the members on question of
policy, discipline, or internal government, so long as the government of the
society is fairly and honestly administered in conformity with its laws and the
law of the land and no property or civil rights are invaded. Under such
circumstances, the decision of the governing body or established private
tribunal of the association is binding and conclusive and not subject to review
or collateral attack in the courts. (Lions Club International v. Amores, 121
SCRA 621)

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 b. Non-interference of courts of coordinate jurisdiction

No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or

orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant
the relief sought by injunction. This doctrine of non-interference is premised
on the principle that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not
be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. For
example, cases wherein an execution order has been issued, are still pending,
so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.
Since a particular court had already acquired jurisdiction over the collection
suit and rendered judgment in relation thereto, it retained jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts over its judgment, including all
incidents relative to the control and conduct of its ministerial officers, namely
the sheriffs. Thus, the issuance by another RTC of the writ of preliminary
injunction in was a clear act of interference with the judgment of Bacolod
RTC. (Go v. Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Negros Occidental, G.R.
No. 154623, March 13, 2009)

II. Jurisdiction

A. Jurisdiction over the parties

1. How jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired

Jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the plaintiff and the subject matter
by the filing of the complaint or petition. An action or proceeding is commenced by
the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading. By that act, the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter or nature of the action or proceeding is invoked or
called into activity and it is thus, that the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. It is by that self-same act of the plaintiff or petitioner
of filing the complaint or petition by which he signifies his submission to the court’s
power and authority that jurisdiction is acquired by the Court over his person.

2. How jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained by the service of

summons or other coercive process upon him or by his voluntary submission to the
authority of the court.

B. Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Jurisdiction over the subject or nature of action is conferred by law. It is

properly invoked by filing the complaint or information.

1. Meaning of jurisdiction over the subject matter

Case: Locsin v. Nissan Lease Phils. Inc., G.R. No. 185567, October 20, 2010 – concept of
primacy to the element of jurisdiction

Locsin, at the time of his severance from Nissan, was the latter’s corporate officer.
Given Locsin’s status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has
jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with Nissan.

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 In this case, the SC gave precedence to the merits of the case and primacy to the
element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and rule on a case and is the
threshold element that must exist before any quasi-judicial officer can act. The Labor
Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin brought, and should
not be allowed to continue to act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction has become
obvious, based on the records and the law, even if there was a procedural flaw in
questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling
will only cause substantial delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the
point of injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the merits of
termination of relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate dispute
on this point before the appropriate RTC.

Civil Service Commission v. Andal, GR. No. 185749, December 16, 2009 – jurisdiction over
court personnel

In previous cases, the Civil Service Commission recognized the disciplinary jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court over court personnel. This is consonant with Section 6, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof. Thus: ―Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.‖ By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s administrative
compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Re: Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC Las Pinas
Branch 275 suspending Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, same court, A.M. 07-2-93-RTC,
October 29, 2009 – not even presiding judge has disciplinary authority over his personnel

The guidelines in effect at that time the case happened were already those found in A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC, which took effect in 2004 or two years before the administrative charge of
neglect of duty was made against Genabe. Judge Maceda should have applied these new
guidelines and not Circular No. 30-91.

Section 1, Chapter VIII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which provides the guidelines for
administrative discipline of court employees over light offenses, states:

SECTION. 1. Disciplinary jurisdiction over light offenses.– The

Executive Judge shall have authority to act upon and investigate
administrative complaints involving light offenses as defined under the Civil
Service Law and Rules (Administrative Code of 1987), and the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic
Act No. 6713), where the penalty is reprimand, suspension for not more than
thirty (30) days, or a fine not exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary, and as
classified in pertinent Civil Service resolutions or issuances, filed by (a) a
judge against a court employee, except lawyers, who both work in the same
station within the Executive Judge’s area of administrative supervision; or (b)
a court employee against another court employee, except lawyers, who both
work in the same station within the Executive Judge’s area of administrative
supervision.

In the preceding instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the necessary inquiry and
submit to the Office of the Court Administrator the results thereof with a recommendation

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as to the action to be taken thereon, including the penalty to be imposed, if any, within
thirty (30) days from termination of said inquiry. At his/her discretion, the Executive Judge
may delegate the investigation of complaints involving light offenses to any of the Presiding
Judges or court officials within his/her area of administrative supervision.

In the case of a complaint (a) filed against court employees who are lawyers, or (b) filed by
private complainants against court employees, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, the same
shall be forwarded by the Executive Judge to the Office of the Court Administrator for
appropriate action and disposition. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline erring court
personnel, under their supervision and charged with light offenses, is limited to conducting
an inquiry only. After such inquiry, the executive judge is required to submit to the OCA the
results of the investigation and give a recommendation as to what action should be taken.
An executive judge does not have the authority to act upon the results of the inquiry and
thereafter, if the court employee is found guilty, unilaterally impose a penalty, as in this
case. It is only the Supreme Court which has the power to find the court personnel guilty or
not for the offense charged and then impose a penalty.

In the present case, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for the offense of neglect of duty.
Under Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense which carries a penalty of one
month and one day to six months suspension for the first offense. Under A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC, an executive judge may only conduct an investigation for all offenses. After the
investigation, the executive judge is mandated to refer the necessary disciplinary action to
this Court for appropriate action.

2. Jurisdiction versus the exercise of jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law while the exercise of jurisdiction

unless otherwise provided by the law itself is governed by the Rules of Court or by
the orders issued from time to time by the Supreme Court.

Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that
jurisdiction.

3. Error of jurisdiction as distinguished from error of judgment

After a court has obtained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter
of the action, the failure to give notice of subsequent steps in the proceedings does
not deprive the court of jurisdiction. If substantial injury results from the failure of
notice and complaint is duly made thereof, the act of the court may be held to be
erroneous and will be corrected in the proper proceeding but is not an act without or
in excess of jurisdiction and is not void.

The term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or officer has
jurisdiction over a case but transcended the same or acted without authority.

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 4. How jurisdiction is conferred and determined

Only the Constitution or law confers jurisdiction over the subject matter. It cannot be fixed
by the will of parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by,
any act or omission of the parties.

On the other hand, what determines the nature of the action as well as the court, which has
jurisdiction over the case, is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his complaint.

Gustilo v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 175497, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 619

Petitioner Mary Joy Anne and respondent Jose Vicente III are children of the late Atty.
Armando Gustilo with different mothers. The decedent owned several properties and was
the president of A.G. Agro-Industrial Corporation in Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. Following
their father’s death, Mary Joy and Jose Vicente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), adjudicating between themselves their father’s properties. One of these was
Hacienda Imelda, which the MOA assigned to Mary Joy. However, the hacienda’s title
remained in the name of A.G. Agro. Mary Joy immediately took possession of the land and
planted sugarcane on it. In 1997 Jose Vicente, as president of A.G. Agro, leased Hacienda
Imelda and its farm implements to respondent Tita Sy Young for five agricultural crop years
from 1997 until 2002. Being financially hard up, Mary Joy could not do anything about it.
When the lease contract was about to expire, Mary Joy advised Young to surrender the land
to her. But the latter refused to yield possession and continued to cultivate the same for
sugarcane. This prompted Mary Joy to file an action against Jose Vicente and Young for
recovery of possession of the hacienda, cancellation of the lease contract, and damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City. Jose Vicente filed a motion to dismiss
mainly on the ground that the Cadiz RTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-
corporate disputes, the proper forum being a specially designated commercial court.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Jose Vicente and dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction without prejudice to the re-filing of the case in the proper court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mary Joy’s action presents an intra-corporate dispute that belongs to
the jurisdiction of a specially designated commercial court.

RULING: It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. It can be gleaned from Mary Joy’s allegations in her complaint
that her case is principally one for recovery of possession. Immediately upon the execution
of the MOA in 1993, Mary Joy took possession of Hacienda Imelda and started planting
sugarcane on it. In 1997 Young, with the use of force, took over the property with the farm
equipment and implements. Despite several demands to vacate and surrender Hacienda
Imelda, Young continued to cultivate and plant sugarcanes on the property up to 2002, and
even entered into a new lease contract with Jose Vicente.

According to the SC, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party
in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has
in his favor priority in time he is entitled to remain on the property until a person having a
better right lawfully ejects him.

Here, Jose Vicente and Young mainly argued in their Motion to Dismiss that inasmuch as the
subject property is in the name of A.G. Agro, the nature of the claim or controversy is one

13
of intra-corporate. The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession is a
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to
possess, independently of title. But where the parties raise the issue of ownership, as in this
case, the courts may pass upon such issue to determine who between the parties has the
right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not final and binding as regards
the issue of ownership; it is merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession
when it is inseparably connected to the issue of ownership. The adjudication on the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving
title to the property. Also, any intra-corporate issues that may be involved in determining
the real owner of the property may be threshed out in a separate proceeding in the proper
commercial court.

5. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

It is incumbent upon the party who has an administrative remedy to pursue

the same to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention.
The Court has consistently reiterated the rationale behind the doctrine of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies:

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with
matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the
other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a
better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by
their superiors if given a chance to do so… It may be added that strict
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number
of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded
dockets.

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies, however, does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies only
renders the action premature, that the ―claimed cause of action is not ripe for
judicial determination.‖ (Merida Waterworks District v. Bacarro, G.R. No.
165993, September 30, 2008)

PRINCIPLE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular
case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction
of the court. (Pimentel v. Senate Committee as a Whole, G.R. No. 187714,
March 8, 2011)

This precludes courts from resolving, in the first instance, controversies falling
under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Courts recognize that
administrative agencies are better equipped to settle factual issues within

14
 their specific field of expertise because of their special skills and technical
knowledge. For this reason, a premature invocation of the court’s judicial
power is often struck down, unless it can be shown that the case falls under
any of the applicable exceptions. (Cabungcal v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 160367,
December 18, 2009)

Justice Herrera emphasized that the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and failure to exhaust
administrative remedies are not synonymous and should be distinguished from one another.
In US v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), Justice Harlan explained that exhaustion
applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone;
judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has ruled its course. Primary
jurisdiction on the other hand applies where a claim is originally cognizable by the courts
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which under a regulatory scheme have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its views.

In Tassy v. Brunswick, the Court held that the pertinent question to ask is whether referral
to the agency is necessary to promote uniformity and whether the agency’s expertise would
assist the court in resolving difficult factual issues. Simply put, the primary jurisdiction
doctrine asks whether an agency’s review of the facts will be a material aid to the court
ultimately charged with applying those facts to the law.

6. Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction

RULE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION – After its jurisdiction attached, this jurisdiction

cannot be ousted by subsequent events such as the temporary transfer of evidence and
material records of the proceedings to another tribunal exercising its own jurisdiction over
another election contest pursuant to the Constitution. This is the rule of adherence of
jurisdiction. (Mendoza v. Comelec, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009)

INSTANCES WHEN A COURT MAY LOSE JURISDICTION EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN ATTACHED TO
IT:

1 When a subsequent law provides a prohibition for the continued exercise of

jurisdiction [Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, 21 SCRA 717].

2 Where the law penalizing an act which is punishable is repealed by a subsequent

law. The reason is that the State loses the power to prosecute when the law is
repealed, hence, the court has no more power to decide [People vs. Pastor, 77
Phil. 1000].

3 When accused is deprived of his constitutional right such as where the court fails
to provide counsel for the accused who is unable to obtain one and does not
intelligently waive his constitutional right [Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663].

4 When the proceedings in the court acquiring jurisdiction is terminated,

abandoned or declared void [Seven vs. Pichay, 108 Phil. 419].

5 When the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it intended
to operate as to actions pending before its enactment [Bengzon vs. Inciong, 91
SCRA 284].

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6 Once appeal has been perfected [Alma vs. Abbas, 18 SCRA 836].

7 When the law is curative [Garcia vs. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331].

7. Objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter

Lhuillier v. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010

Lhuillier filed a complaint for damages against British Airways before RTC of Makati. British
Airways moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case
based on the Warsaw Convention. According to SC, the Warsaw Convention has the force
and effect of law in this country. It applies because the air travel where the alleged tortious
conduct occurred was between the UK and Italy, which are both signatories to the
Convention. Since the Convention applies, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action is governed by the provisions thereof. Under Article 28 (1) of the Convention, the
plaintiff may bring the action for damages before: (a) the court where the carrier is
domiciled; (b) the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; (c) the court
where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or, (c) the
court of the place of destination.

In this case, British Airways is domiciled in UK with London as its principal place of business.
It appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy and the place of destination is also
Rome, Italy. Lhuillier therefore has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in
Italy or in London, UK. The RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction over the case filed by
Lhuillier.

Machado v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 156287, February 16, 2010

The case involved the jurisdiction of the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP). Under EO 561, the COSLAP may in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and
resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering for
instance the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action: (a) between
occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; (b)
between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; (c) between
occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants; (d) Petitions for classification,
release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and, (e) other similar land
problems of grave urgency and magnitude. In this case, however, the properties involved in
the dispute are private lands owned by private parties, none of who is a squatter, a patent
lease agreement holder, a government reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a
member of any cultural minority.

Moreover, the dispute between the parties can hardly be classified as critical or explosive in
nature that would generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation that would require
immediate and urgent action. The issues raised in the case primarily involve the application
of the Civil Code provisions on Property and the Easement of Right of Way.

Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties’ action or
conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal
where none, by law, exists.

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The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. However, if the
lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such,
for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such
theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position – that the lower
court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is
conferred by law and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.

8. Effect of estoppel on objections to jurisdiction

Kukan International Corp. v. Hon. Reyes, G.R. No. 182729, September 29, 2010

In this case, judgment was rendered against Kukan Inc. When the decision became final, a
writ of execution was issued against it. The Sheriff then levied on various personal
properties found at what was supposed to be Kukun Inc.’s office. Kukan International Corp.
then filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. Plaintiff insisted that applying the principle of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction, execution should proceed even against Kukan
International Corp. It further argued that the filing of the Affidavit and subsequent pleadings
amounts to voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

The prevailing rule is La Naval Drug v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78, where SC held that a
special appearance before the court challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a
motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds is not tantamount to estoppel
or waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person and such is not
constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

The principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and the resulting treatment of two
related corporations as one and the same juridical person with respect to a given
transaction, is basically applied only to determine established liability; it is not available to
confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not
impleaded in a case. Elsewise put, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject
to the court’s process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. In that situation, the court
has not acquired jurisdiction over the corporation and hence, any proceeding taken against
the corporation and its property would infringe on its right to due process.

C. Jurisdiction over the issues

An expression used to direct the attention to whether the issue being tried and decided is
within the issues raised by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the subject is conferred by law
while the jurisdiction over the issues is conferred by the pleadings and is conferred upon by
the parties and may therefore be waived such as when an issue not raised in the pleadings
is tried by implied consent.

Note Sec. 5, Rule 10: Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. –

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings… If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if
the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby…

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 D. Jurisdiction over the res or property in litigation

The court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant. Process
served by the court is not enforceable beyond the territorial limits of the Philippines. An
action may be filed against a non-resident defendant which affects the personal status of
the plaintiff or for the purpose of proceeding against the property of a non-resident
defendant such as foreclosure of mortgage or to obtain a writ of attachment under Section
15, Rule 14. But in such cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is immaterial
so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is essential in actions in personam not in
actions in rem or quasi in rem so long as the court does not render personal judgment
against the defendant. Thus, an action to foreclose a mortgage against a non-resident
defendant upon whom service has been effected exclusively by publication is valid but no
personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered.

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either: (a) by the seizure of the property under legal
process whereby it is brought into actual custody of law – actual seizure may be effected by
attachment proceedings; or (b) it may result from the institution of legal proceedings
wherein under special provisions of law, the power of the court is recognized and made
effective – Example: land registration cases or probate proceedings where jurisdiction is
obtained by compliance with procedural requisites such as publication. Lack of notice in a
land registration case confers no jurisdiction to the court.

E. Jurisdiction of Courts

1. Supreme Court

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT (SC):

1. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and other petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive

agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the SC en banc, and all other cases
which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be
decided with the concurrence of the majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberation on the issues in the case and voted thereon

3. Cases on matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the

concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence
of at least three of such Members.

4. The Supreme Court has the power to:

(a) exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus

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(b) review, revise, reverse, modify, of affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulations is in question;

(2) all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;

(3) all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;
(4) all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed in reclusion perpetua
or higher;

(5) all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT

Rule 2, Sec. 3: Court en banc matters and cases. – The Court en banc shall act on the
following matters and cases:

(a) Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or

executive agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
(b) Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty or
reclusion perpetua;
(c) Cases involving novel questions of law;
(d) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
(e) Cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;
(f) Cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a
judge, the disbarment of a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period
of more than one year, or a fine exceeding 40,000 pesos;
(g) Cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in
the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of
attorneys, or the lifting of a judge’s suspension or a lawyer’s suspension from
the practice of law;
(h) Cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice,
or any Associate Justice of the collegial appellate courts;
(i) Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or by a
Division may be modified or reversed;
(j) Cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;
(k) Cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
(l) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on
businesses or affects the welfare of the community;
(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion
of at least 3 Members of the Division who are voting and present, are
appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc;
(n) Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its
attention; and,
(o) All matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all
courts and their personnel.

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Rule 2, Sec. 11: Actions on cases referred to the Court en banc. – The referral of a Division
case to the Court en banc shall be subject to the following rules:

(a) The resolution of a Division denying a motion for referral to the Court en banc
shall be final and shall not be appealable to the Court en banc;
(b) The Court en banc may, in the absence of sufficiently important reasons,
decline to take cognizance of a case referred to it and return the case to the
Division; and
(c) No motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the court en banc declining
cognizance of a referral by a Division shall be entertained.

Rule 2, Sec. 14: Per curiam decisions. – Unless otherwise requested by the Member
assigned to write the opinion of the Court, the decision or resolution shall be rendered per
curiam

(a) Where the penalty imposed is dismissal from service, disbarment, or

indefinite suspension in administrative cases; or
(b) In any other case by agreement of the majority of the Members or upon
request of a Member.

Rule 3, Sec. 2: The Court not a trier of facts. – The Court is not a trier of facts; its role is to
decide cases based on the finding of fact before it. Where the Constitution, the law or the
Court itself, in the exercise of its discretion decides to receive evidence, the reception of
evidence may be delegated to a Member of the Court, or to one of the appellate courts or its
justices who shall submit to the Court a report and recommendation on the basis of the
evidence presented.

Rule 3, Sec. 2: Advisory opinions proscribed. – The Court cannot issue advisory opinions on
the state and meaning of laws, or take cognizance of moot and academic questions, subject
only to notable exceptions involving constitutional issues.

Rule 3, Sec. 3: Cases when the Court may determine factual issues. – The Court shall
respect the factual findings of lower courts, unless any of the following situations is present:

(a) The conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and

conjecture;
(b) The inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(c) There is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) The judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) The findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) The collegial appellate court went beyond the issues of the case, and their
findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee;
(g) The findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of
the trial court;
(h) Said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(i) The facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
(j) The findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on the
supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(k) All other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower
courts’ findings of fact.

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Rule 10, Sec. 2: Confidentiality of court sessions. – Court sessions are executive in
character, with only the Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential
and shall not be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as
authorized by the Court…

In re: Letters of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza re: G.R. No. 178083 – Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), et al., A.M.
No. 11-10-1-SC, March 13, 2012 – illustration where the SC applied its Internal Rules to
recall its Resolution.

In particular, the SC discussed Rule 2 (The Operating Structures), Sections 7 (Resolutions of

motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed resolutions and all other
motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division) and 9 (Effect or
reorganization of Divisions on assigned cases) thereof, and Rule 8 (Inhibition and
Substitution of Members of the Court), Section 3 (Effects of Inhibition) thereof.

Thus, the majority of the SC held the view that Section 7 of Rule 2 should have prevailed in
considering the raffle and assignment of cases after the 2 nd MR was accepted as against the
general rule on inhibition under Section 3, Rule 8. The underlying reason is Section 4 (3) of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states: ―Cases or matters heard by a division
shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such members. Accordingly, the majority
concluded that the ponente on the merits of the case on review should be chosen from the
remaining participating justices, namely: Justices Peralta and Bersamin. Thus, it recalled the
September 7, 2011 Resolution, which resolved to deny with finality PAL’s 2 nd MR. Ironically,
as pointed out in the dissent, Justices Brion, Peralta and Bersamin together with Justices
Perez and Mendoza constituted the Second Division that issued the September 7, 2011
Resolution.

Can the Supreme Court be a party to a case? In A.M. No. 2011-07-SC, October 4, 2011,
658 SCRA 401, the Supreme Court was the complainant against the respondents-employees
of the SC. The case was entitled ―Supreme Court, Complainant verses Eddie V. Delgado,
Utility Worker II, et al.‖ After the initial investigation, the Office of Administrative Services
of the SC conducted a formal investigation. The OAS then directed the respondents to
submit their respective written explanations. Thereafter, the OAS submitted to the SC its
recommendations finding the respondents guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the
dismissal of one of the respondents and the suspension of the remaining 2 respondents. The
SC modified the findings and recommendations and dismissed from the service all 3
respondents for grave misconduct.

2. Court of Appeals

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS (CA): Rep. Act No. 8246 – increasing the number of
CA Justices to 69

2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals:

Presiding Justice and 68 Associate Justices; sits en banc or in 23 divisions of 3

Justices each

17 Divisions in Manila, 3 Divisions in Cebu, and 3 Divisions in Cagayan de Oro

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 Sits en banc in the exercise of administrative, ceremonial and non-adjudicative
functions

In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, A.M.
No. 08-8-11-CA, September 9, 2008, 564 SCRA 365, the SC had the occasion to discuss
some of the pertinent provisions of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA). The
case resulted in the dismissal of Justice Vicente Q. Roxas from the service, the suspension
of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. for two (2) months without pay, the severe reprimand of
Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez Jr., the reprimand of Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, and
the admonition of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal.

Here, Justice Roxas ignored or refused to act on the motion for his inhibition in violation of
Rule V, Sec. 3 of the IRCA, which provides that the Justice concerned should resolve such
motion in writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding
Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court. According to the SC, the
obligation of the Justice to act on a motion for inhibition under the IRCA is mandatory.

Under Sec. 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is
authorized to act on any matter not covered by the Rules. According to the SC, PJ Vasquez
Jr. was indecisive in dealing with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He vacillated
and temporized on resolving the impasse between Justice Sabio Jr. and Justice B.L. Reyes
over the chairmanship of the Division that should hear and decide the Meralco case. He
should have convened the Court en banc as soon as the alleged bribery attempt on Justice
Sabio Jr. was reported to him for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court calling
for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes of the Court.
Hence, it was an administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc under Sec. 5 (c),
Rule I of the IRCA which provides that the Court en banc shall adopt … policies for the
protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes.

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas

corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs

3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,

orders, or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or
omissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948

4. The CA shall have the power to receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in (a) cases falling within its original
jurisdiction, such as actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs, (b) cases falling
within its appellate jurisdiction where a motion for new trial based only on newly
discovered evidence is granted by it.

3. Court of Tax Appeals – Rep. No. 9503 increasing the number of

CTA Justices to 9

22
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving

disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving

disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where
the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which
case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;

3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax

cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction;

4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for

customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of
property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Customs;

5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;

6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him

automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are
adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;

7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of non-

agricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the
case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and
countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and
Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either
party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.

b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from

violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and
other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of
Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the principal amount o taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties,
claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified
amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA
shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously

23
 instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filling of such civil action separately from the
criminal action will be recognized.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the

Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their
respected territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of

the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax
cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.

c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving

final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and
penalties: Provided, however, That collection cases where the principal
amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed
is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the
proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional
Trial Court.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders

of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by
them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions

or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction. (Rep. Act No. 1125 as
amended by Rep. Act No. 9282)

4. Sandiganbayan

As restructured, the Sandiganbayan is presently composed of a Presiding Justice and

fourteen (14) Associate Justices who sit in five (5) Divisions of three Justices each in the
trial and determination of cases.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is perhaps one of the most often amended provisions
from the 1973 Constitution to RA 8249 of 1997. Before RA 8249, jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was determined on the basis of the penalty imposable on the offense
charged. Then, it was amended such that regardless of the penalty, so long as a public
officer committed the offense charged, the Sandiganbayan was vested with jurisdiction.
Under RA 8249, to determine whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, lawyers must
look into two (2) criteria, namely: the nature of the offense and the salary grade of the
public official.

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Thus, Sec.4 of RA 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original exclusive
jurisdiction over:

I.) Violations of RA 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Law);

II.) RA 1379 (Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired Wealth);

III.) Crimes by public officers or employees embraced in Ch. II, Sec.2 Title VII, Book II of
the RPC (Crimes committed by Public Officers) namely:

a) Direct Bribery under Art. 210 as amended by BP 871, May 29, 1985;

b) Indirect Bribery under Art. 211 as amended by BP 871, May 29, 1985;

c) Qualified Bribery under Art. 211-A as amended by RA 7659, Dec. 13, 1993 (Note: RA
7659 which imposed the death penalty on certain heinous crimes was repealed by RA 9346
which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty);

d) Corruption of public officials under Art. 212

where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:

a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;

b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panglungsod, city

treasurers, assessors, engineers and other department heads;

c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

d) Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher
rank;

e) Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of Provincial Director and those
holding the rank of Senior Superintendent or higher;

f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants; officials and the prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

g) President, directors or trustees or managers of government owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

2) Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989;

3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provision of the Constitution;

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 4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provision of the Constitution;

5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

IV.) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed in
relation to their office by the public officials and employees mentioned above;

V.) Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO 1, 2, 14 & 14-A
issued in 1986

VI.) Petitions for issuance of Writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
Provided, jurisdiction is not exclusive of the Supreme Court

VII.) Petitions for Quo Warranto arising or that may arise in cases filed or that may be filed
under EO 1, 2, 14 & 14-A

VIII.) OTHERS provided the accused belongs to SG 27 or higher:

a.) Violation of RA 6713 - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

b.) Violation of RA 7080 - THE PLUNDER LAW

c.) Violation of RA 7659 - The Heinous Crime Law (Note: repealed by RA 9346)

d.) RA 9160 - Violation of The Anti-Money Laundering Law when committed by a

public officer (Note: amended by RA 10167 which waived the requirement for the
AMLC to give notice to suspected launderers that their bank deposits are being
monitored)

e.) PD 46 referred to as the gift-giving decree which makes it punishable for any
official or employee to receive directly or indirectly and for the private person to give
or offer to give any gift, present or other valuable thing on any occasion including
Christmas, when such gift, present or valuable thing is given by reason of his official
position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favors or the giver hopes
or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the public official
or employee concerned in the discharge of his official functions. Included within the
prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainment in honor of the official or
employee or his immediate relatives.

f.) PD 749 which grants immunity from prosecution to any person who voluntarily
gives information about any violation of Art.210, 211 or 212 of the RPC, RA 3019,
Sec.345 of the NIRC, Sec. 3604 of the Customs and Tariff Code and other provisions
of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials
concerned and other laws, rules and regulations penalizing graft, corruption and
other forms of official abuse and who willingly testifies against the public official or
employee subject to certain conditions.

It should be noted that private individuals can be sued in cases before the Sandiganbayan if
they are alleged to be in conspiracy with the public officer.

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The Sandiganbayan is vested with Appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of the RTC whether in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction over
crimes and civil cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
but which were committed by public officers below Salary Grade 27.

Consider the following:

(1) If the accused is a municipal mayor charged with malversation, which court has
jurisdiction over him? It is the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the municipal
mayor. It is the official’s grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around.
To determine whether the official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
reference should be made to Rep. Act no. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services,
Position, Titles and Salary Grades. An official’s grade is not a matter of proof but a matter of
law which the court must take judicial notice. Sec. 444 (d) of the Local Government Code
provides that the municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 as prescribed under Rep. Act No. 6758 and the
implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto. (Llorente Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
122297-98, January 19, 2000)

(2) If the accused is a municipal mayor charged with rape, which court has jurisdiction over
him? The offense would fall under ―Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed in relation to their office by the public officials and employees
mentioned above.‖ There must however be a showing that the offense charged was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused mayor;
otherwise, jurisdiction is with the regular courts.

5. Regional Trial Courts

JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (RTC):

1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation

In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623 (1979), the SC held that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance,
support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the
validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid
and for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance.

27
The case of Lu v. Lu Ym Sr., G.R. No. 153690, is a classic illustration of the degree of
difficulty involved in determining whether a case is capable or incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The objective of the complaint in that case was to declare as null and void the
issuance of 600,000 unsubscribed and unissued shares in Ludo and Luym Development
Corporation (LLDC) for a price of 1/18 of their real value for being inequitable, having been
done in breach of director’s fiduciary’s duty to stockholders, in violation of the minority
stockholders’ rights, and with unjust enrichment. The complaint alleged the value of the
shares as Php1,087,055,105. Is this an action incapable or capable of pecuniary estimate?
In the August 26, 2008 Decision penned by Justice Nachura, he concluded that the subject
matter of the complaint was incapable of pecuniary estimation. There was no dissent. Upon
Motion for Reconsideration, the same division resolved on August 4, 2009 that the
complaint was capable of pecuniary estimate. Justice Nachura wrote, upon deeper reflection
and to the extent of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiffs from the sale of the
shares, the action can be characterized as capable of pecuniary estimation. Justice Carpio-
Morales wrote a dissent. When the matter was brought up to the SC En Banc, the Court
through Justice Carpio-Morales resolved that the subject matter of the complaint was
incapable of pecuniary estimate. (February 15, 2011) Justice Nachura dissented.

Note that the Court cited its internal rules to justify the case being decided by the court en
banc.

Another case of interest is Mijares v. Hon. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005,
involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment against the Marcos Estate. The petitioners
obtained a judgment from the US District Court an award of over US$1.964 Billion but paid
only Php410 as docket fees. Is this capable of pecuniary estimate? According to Justice
Tinga, the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate,
thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision then governs
the proper computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? For this case and other
similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it
does, ―other actions not involving property.‖

Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for
―other actions not involving property.‖ The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing
fees.

Not all cases that are incapable of pecuniary estimate are cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court. Under the Rep. Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) as amended, Sec. 417
thereof, actions to enforce an amicable settlement or arbitration award regardless of the
amount involved is cognizable by the city or municipal court. Under Sec. 418 of RA 7160, an
action to repudiate an amicable settlement is likewise cognizable by the city or municipal
court.

The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement
of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-
judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an
action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does
not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the
right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the
amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months
from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period.
The use of the word "may" clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised

28
Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely optional in nature. (Ramnani v. Court of
Appeals, 360 SCRA 645)

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159411, March 18, 2005, although the "Kasunduan"
executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner’s non-compliance paved the way
for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise,
following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it
as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when
he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement
of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. Respondent was
not limited to claiming P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the
"Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability
but merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation which the
parties hope to prevent by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective
positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing. Under the "Kasunduan,"
respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the
lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder. It is undisputed
that herein petitioner did not.

2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000,
or for civil actions in Metro Manila where such value exceeds P50,000 except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC

3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim
exceeds P300,000, or in Metro Manila where such demand or claim exceeds
P400,000

4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds P300,000 or probate matters in Metro Manila where such value
exceeds P400,000

5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations

6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising juridicial or quasi-judicial functions

Daichi Electronics Manufacturing v. Villarama, G.R. No. 112940, November 21, 1994

The employee violated paragraph five of their Contract of Employment dated August 27,
1990, which provides:

That for a period of two (2) years after termination of service from
EMPLOYER, EMPLOYEE shall not in any manner be connected, and/or
employed, be a consultant and/or be an informative body directly or
indirectly, with any business firm, entity or undertaking engaged in a business
similar to or in competition with that of the EMPLOYER.

Daichi claimed that Limjuco became an employee of Angel Sound Philippines Corporation, a
corporation engaged in the same line of business as that of Daichi within two years from
January 30, 1992, the date of Limjuco’s resignation. Daichi further alleged that Limjuco is

29
holding the position of Head of the Material Management Control Department, the same
position he held while in the employ of Daichi. Daichi sought to recover liquidated damages
in the amount of P100,000.00 as provided for in paragraph seven of the contract, which
provides:

That a violation of the conditions set forth in provisions Nos. (2) and (5) of
this contract shall entitle the EMPLOYER to collect from the EMPLOYEE the
sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) by way of liquidated
damages and likewise to adopt appropriate legal measures to prevent the
EMPLOYEE from accepting employment and/or engaging, directly or indirectly,
in a business similar to or in competition with that of the EMPLOYER, before
the lapse of the aforesaid period of TWO (2) YEARS from date of termination
of service from EMPLOYER.

This issue is: Is petitioner's claim for damages one arising from employer-employee
relations?

Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to
recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondent's breach of
his contractual obligation to its "damage and prejudice" (Rollo, p. 57). Such cause of action
is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular
courts. More so when we consider that the stipulation refers to the post-employment
relations of the parties.

Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article
217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection with
any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the
other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee
relations.

Yusen Air and Sea Service v. Villamor, 467 SCRA 168

Claim for damages under Art. 217 of the Labor Code to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter
must have reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that article.
When the cause of action is based on quasi delict or tort which has no reasonable
connection with any of the claims provided for in Art. 217, jurisdiction over the action is
with the regular courts.

In Yusen Air, the claim for damages is based on breach of employment contract prohibiting
engagement in competing business after two years from resignation.

Comelec v. Judge Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, G.R. No. 171208, September 7, 2007 – Section 268
of the Omnibus Election Code specifically provides, regional trial courts have exclusive
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code
"except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote." How about
violation of Section 261 (z) (3) of the Omnibus Election Code which penalizes "Any person
who votes in substitution for another whether with or without the latter’s knowledge and/or
consent" with a penalty of imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than 6
years?

While BP Blg. 129 lodges in municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts and municipal
circuit trial courts jurisdiction over criminal cases carrying a penalty of imprisonment of less
than one year but not exceeding six years, following Section 268 of the Omnibus Election

30
Code, any criminal action or proceeding which bears the same penalty, with the exception of
the therein mentioned two cases, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional
trial courts.

7. In all civil actions and civil proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian
Relations as now provided by law

8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds P300,000, or in such other cases in Metro Manila
where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds P400,000

6. Family Courts

Rep. Act No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997)

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of
age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age or
where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and
ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred.

Under RA 9344, Sec. 6 thereof, a child in conflict with the law who is 15 years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. A
child above 15 years of age but below 18 years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability unless he acted with discernment.

The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to

Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code."

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the

latter;

c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;

d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those

relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together
under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership
of gains;

e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;

f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines";

g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent of

neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the
suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable

31
under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other
related laws;

h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;

i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;

j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic
Act No. 7658; and

k) Cases of domestic violence against (RA 9262 of VAWCA):

1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are
likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats
and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom
movement; and
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions
prejudicial to their development.

If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal
proceedings and the corresponding penalties.

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case
pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.

7. Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts

JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL

CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS:

In Civil Cases –

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing
fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions

This (Sec. 33 (1) of B.P. 129 as amended) embodies the totality rule, which simply means
that where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of

32
the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out
of the same or different transactions. Example is the case of Pantranco North Express v.
Standard Insurance Co., G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005, where the victim and the
insurance company were co-plaintiffs in a suit against the bus company responsible for the
vehicular accident.

Note that the first level courts now have jurisdiction over probate proceedings, testate or
intestate, where the value of the estate does not exceed in Php300,000, or in Metro Manila
where such estate does not exceed Php400,000. On the other hand, Rule 73, Sec. 1 states
that ―If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First of any
province in which he had estate…‖ Rule 73 and Rule 74 should be considered as having been
amended because of Rep. Act No. 7691.

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession

3. Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots."

Republic Act No. 7691 expanded the MTC’s jurisdiction to include other actions involving
title to or possession of real property (accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria) where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in
Metro Manila). Because of this amendment, the test of whether an action involving
possession of real property has been filed in the proper court no longer depends solely on
the type of action filed but also on the assessed value of the property involved. More
specifically, since MTCs now have jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion
reinvindicatoria (depending, of course, on the assessed value of the property), jurisdiction
over such actions has to be determined on the basis of the assessed value of the property.
(Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 172217, September 18, 2009)

What if the complaint does not state the value of the property?

In Bernardo v. Villegas, G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010, the complaint failed to allege the
assessed value of the real property involved. Although appellant indeed raised the issue of
jurisdiction in his answer, he had not filed a motion to dismiss on this ground nor reiterated
the matter thereafter but actively participated in the proceedings after the denial of his
demurrer to evidence anchored on the failure of the plaintiffs to identify in their complaint
all the heirs of the registered owner and supposed lack of technical description of the
property in the certificate of title. The Court then considered the appellant estopped to
question the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the case having
actively pursued throughout the trial, by filing various pleadings and presenting all relevant

33
documentary and testimonial evidence, his theory that the portion occupied by him is not
covered by the Torrens title of Villegas.

In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, 531 SCRA 104, Court held that a complaint must allege
the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the
action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined
by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and
the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
some or all of the claims asserted therein. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.

In the case of Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corp. v. Formaran III, 578
SCRA 283, the defendant filed an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that the docket
fees should be computed in accordance with Section 7 (a), not Section 7 (b) (1), of Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on August
16, 2004. True enough, as recomputed by the Clerk of Court, the docket fees should have
been P720,392.60 and not only P13,644.25 as what the plaintiff paid when it filed the
complaint.

Section 7 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. –

a) For filing an action … if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF

INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving
property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE
CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION ... AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is:
[Table of fees omitted.]

If the action involves both a money claim and relief pertaining to property,
then the fees will be charged on both the amounts claimed and value of property
based on the formula prescribed in this paragraph a.

Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 562) –

The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading.

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion (170 SCRA 274) -- Modified
ruling in Manchester and decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made
on the justification that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees required.

34
In Criminal Cases –

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances

committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of the kind, nature, value or amount
therof; provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. [Sec. 2,
RA 7691].

In Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, the offense committed was reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide which was filed with the RTC although the imposable
penalty for the crime was prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, or 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

Delegated jurisdiction –

Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. –

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no
controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective
claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.

Note: Thus, decisions of the Metropolitan Trial Court exercising delegated jurisdiction would
be appealable to the Court of Appeals, with the appellant filing a notice of appeal.

8. Shariah Courts

Strictly speaking, Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the integrated judicial system of
the Philippines. Section 2 of the Judiciary Reorganization Acts of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129)
enumerates the courts covered by the Act, comprising the integrated judicial system.
Shari'a Courts are not included in the enumeration notwithstanding that, when said B.P. Blg.
129 took effect on August 14, 1981, P.D. No. 1083 (otherwise known as "Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines") was already in force. The Shari'a Courts are mentioned in
Section 45 of the Act only for the purpose of including them "in the funding appropriations."
(Bar Matter No. 702, May 12, 1994) Note however that Article 137 of PD 1083 states that
the Shari’a courts are created as part of the judicial system and are courts of limited
jurisdiction.

1. The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and

filiation arising under this Code;

35
 (b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property

(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation
or correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book
Two of this Code;

(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are
Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and

(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas

corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

2. Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have
original jurisdiction over:

(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of

name and commitment of an insane person to an asylum;

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d)
wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Circuit Court; and

(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the
parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.

Appellate jurisdiction

(1) Shari'a District Courts shall have appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the
Shari'a Circuit Courts within their territorial jurisdiction.

(2) The Shari'a District Court shall decide every case appealed to it on the basis of
the evidence and records transmitted as well as such memoranda, briefs or oral
arguments as the parties may submit.

F. Jurisdiction over small claims, cases covered by the rules

on Summary Procedure and Barangay Conciliation

RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction.

A. Civil Cases:

1. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer irrespective of the amount of
damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney’s fees are awarded, the
same shall not exceed P20,000.00.

36
 2. All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiff’s claim does not exceed P100,000.00 or P200,000.00 in MeTC, exclusive of interest
and costs.

B. Criminal Cases:

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2. Violations of the rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) – see also Rule
111, Sec. 1 (b);
5. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged is imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or a fine not exceeding P1,000.00, or
both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil
liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not
exceed P10,000.00.

This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiff’s cause of action is pleaded
in the same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor
to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case
subject to ordinary procedure.

RULES ON BARANGAY CONCILIATION

Adm. Circular No. 14-93

I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised

Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P. D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs.
399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior recourse thereto is a pre-
condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except in the
following disputes:

[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality

thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to
the performance of his official functions;
[3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and
municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to
amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical
entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation
proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules];
[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other
and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of
imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00);

37
 [7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from
being committed or further continued, specifically the following:

[a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or

detention [See Sec. 412 (b) (1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law];
[b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his
rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived of or on
acting in his behalf;
[c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support
during the pendency of the action; and
[d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;
[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657];
[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee
relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as
amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation
and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the
Department of Labor and Employment];
[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed
directly in court [See Sanchez vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459].

II. Under the provisions of R. A. 7160 on Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation, as

implemented by the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Justice, the certification for filing a complaint in court or any government office
shall be issued by Barangay authorities only upon compliance with the following
requirements:

[1] Issued by the Lupon Secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman
(Punong Barangay), certifying that a confrontation of the parties has taken
place and that a conciliation settlement has been reached, but the same has
been subsequently repudiated (Sec. 412, Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law; Sec. 2[h], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);
[2] Issued by the Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Pangkat Chairman
certifying that:
[a] a confrontation of the parties took place but no
conciliation/settlement has been reached (Sec. 4[f], Rule III,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); or
[b] that no personal confrontation took place before the Pangkat
through no fault of the complainant (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules).
[3] Issued by the Punong Barangay as requested by the proper party on the
ground of failure of settlement where the dispute involves members of the
same indigenous cultural community, which shall be settled in accordance
with the customs and traditions of that particular cultural community, or
where one or more of the parties to the aforesaid dispute belong to the
minority and the parties mutually agreed to submit their dispute to the
indigenous system of amicable settlement, and there has been no settlement

38
 as certified by the datu or tribal leader or elder to the Punong Barangay of
place of settlement (Secs. 1,4 & 5, Rule IX, Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules); and
[4] If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved
unsuccessful, there having been no agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410 [b],
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 1, c. (1), Rule III, Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules), or where the respondent fails to appear at the
mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8, a, Rule
VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), the Punong Barangay shall not cause
the issuance at this stage of a certification to file action, because it is now
mandatory for him to constitute the Pangkat before whom mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be held.

III. All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the
Regional Trial Court shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if there has been
compliance with prior Barangay conciliation procedure under the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations as a pre-condition to judicial
action, particularly whether the certification to file action attached to the records of the case
comply with the requirements hereinabove enumerated in Par. II;

IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is
a pre-condition for formal adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon motion of defendant/s, not for lack of
jurisdiction of the court (or) for failure to state a cause of action but for prematurity or
failure to comply with a condition precedent for filing the claim; and refer the case motu
proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority applying by analogy Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par.,
of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law which reads as follows:

"The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the
Lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio
refer case to the Lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

SMALL CLAIMS COURT

SEC. 2. Scope. — This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions before the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts for payment of money where the value of the claim does not
exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.

SEC. 4. Applicability. — The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions
which are: (a) purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is
solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money, and (b) the civil aspect of criminal
actions, either filed before the institution of the criminal action, or reserved upon the filing
of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule 111 of the Revised Rules Of Criminal
Procedure.

These claims or demands may be:

(a) For money owed under any of the following:

1. Contract of Lease;
2. Contract of Loan;
3. Contract of Services;

39
 4. Contract of Sale; or
5. Contract of Mortgage;

(b) For damages arising from any of the following:

1. Fault or negligence;
2. Quasi-contract; or
3. Contract;

(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award

involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417

In Orbe v. Gumarang, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1792, September 28, 2011, 658 SCRA 231,
respondent judge was found guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision and violation of
the rule of procedure for small claims cases. According to the SC, the theory behind the
small claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring practical justice to the parties
when the disputed claim is small because the time and expense required by the ordinary
litigation process is so disproportionate to the amount involved that it discourages a just
resolution of the dispute. The small claims process is designed to function quickly and
informally. There are no lawyers, no formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of evidence.

Thus, the intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide cases falling under the
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases which is within 5 days from the receipt of the
order of assignment is very clear. The exigency of prompt rendition of judgment in small
claims cases is a matter of public policy. There is no room for further interpretation. He is
duty-bound to adhere to the rules and decide small claims cases without undue delay.

G. Totality Rule

Where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the
same or different transaction. (Sec. 33 (1), B.P. No. 129, as amended)

NOTE: We will follow the totality rule in BP 129 because it is elementary in statutory
construction that in case of conflict, substantive law prevails over procedural laws.

END OF FIRST PART

oooOOOooo

40
 OUTLINE IN REMEDIAL LAW 1
Atty. Victor Y. Eleazar
Arellano University School of Law
PART II

III. Civil Procedure

A. Actions

Manchester Rule – All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

Sun Insurance case – Relaxation of the rule

a. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but also
the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
b. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefore is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
c. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

Ballatan v. Court of Appeals, March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 34, summarized the different
principles for the court to acquire jurisdiction upon payment of the docket fee:

a. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint
must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.
b. In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property and
the amount of damages claimed, if any. Under Rule 141, Sec. 7 (a), the basis of
computing the docket and filing fees in cases involving property is the fair market
value of the real property in litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current
zonal valuation of the BIR, whichever is higher, or if there is none, the stated value
of the property in litigation or the value of the personal property in litigation as
alleged by the claimant.
c. If the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court
acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the
court may grant, barring prescription.

41
 d. Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of certain
related damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action,
may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages.
e. Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on motion,
a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege the precise
amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fees.
f. If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise after the filing
of the complaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute
a lien on the judgment award. The same rule also applies to third-party claims and
other similar pleadings.

Heirs of the late Reinoso Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116121, July 18, 2011, 654 SCRA
1

The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory.
In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule
was however relaxed two years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Asuncion,
wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional fees required. Thus, in the more recent case of
United Overseas Bank v. Ros, the Court explained that where the party does not
deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its
willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional fees when required by the court, the
liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester will apply. It has been on record that the Court in several instances allowed the
relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits.

Fedman Development Corp. v. Agcaoili, G.R. No. 165025, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 354 –
The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of
filing, the TC still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable
time as the court may grant, barring prescription. (Ballatan v. CA, 304 SCRA 34) The
―prescriptive period‖ that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which
a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be paid before the
lapse of the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3,
Title V, Book III of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions.

In line with Sec. 6, Rule 1 on the liberal construction of the Rules, consider the classic
statement of the Court in Alonso v. Villamor:

The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other
purposes than to cure it does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its
presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. A
litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled
and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys
the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels,
are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper

42
 office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court
of these Islands for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been
prejudiced thereby. (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315)

Filing Fees

Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corp. v. Formaran, G.R. No. 175914,
February 10, 2009 – A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a
real action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property
involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In
computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying
on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real
properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.

Montaner v. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009 – Filing the
appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the case paid less than the
correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of
court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court.
In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction because of
a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees.
However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.

Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nacional de Paris, G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 2005 – In this case,
BNP filed on September 7, 1998 before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint
against Proton praying that they be ordered to pay (1) US$1,544,984.40 plus accrued
interest and other related charges thereon subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid
and (2) an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from petitioners as attorney's fees. It
was assessed by the Makati RTC Clerk of Court the amount of Php352,116.30, which BNP
paid. According to the SC, The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by
taking into consideration "the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the property in
litigation." As regards the exchange rate applied by the Clerk of Court, the SC held that in
the absence of any office guide of the rate of exchange which said court functionary was
duty bound to follow, he is presumptively correct in applying US $1 = P43 because of the
presumption of regularity of the clerk of court's application of the exchange rate, this
however is disputable. As such, the presumption may be overturned by the requisite
rebutting evidence. In the case at bar, Proton have adequately proven with documentary
evidence that the exchange rate when the complaint was filed on September 7, 1998 was
US $1 = P43.21, and not US $1 = P43 as what the Clerk of Court applied.

Request for National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients from Paying Filing
and Docket Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009 -- Under the IBP’s Guidelines
Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the IBP
(Guidelines on Legal Aid), the combined "means and merit tests" shall be used to determine
the eligibility of an applicant for legal aid. According to the SC, the "means and merit tests"
appear to be reasonable determinants of eligibility for coverage under the legal aid program
of the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be improved to ensure that any exemption from the
payment of legal fees that may be granted to clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices of
the various IBP chapters will really further the right of access to justice by the poor. This will

43
guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor trivialized. Thus, the SC
promulgated A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of
Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid and of the Legal Aid Offices
in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall be observed by
the NCLA and the legal aid offices in IBP chapters nationwide in accepting clients and
handling cases for the said clients.

Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re: exemption from legal and filing fees of the Good
Shepherd Foundation Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009 Resolution -- Can the
Courts grant to foundations who work for indigent and underprivileged people, the same
option granted to indigent people? No. The clear intent and precise language of the
aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may
be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that
of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess
property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person,
therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent
litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and
underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised
the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can
suffer.

Under Sec. 5, Rule 1, a civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in
court.

Can you file a complaint or petition by registered mail? SBC Notes wrote ―An action can be
commenced by filing the complaint by registered mail. In which case, it is the date of
mailing that is considered as the date of filing and not the date of the receipt thereof by the
clerk of court.‖ Consider also Sec. 3 of Rule 13, which reads: ―The filing of pleadings…shall
be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to
the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail.‖ How about the payment for
the filing fee? The same section further reads: ―In the second case, the date of the mailing
of … pleadings, or any other paper or payments or deposits, as shown by the post
office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of
their filing, payment, or deposit in court.‖

1. Meaning of ordinary civil actions

Rule 3, Sec. 3 (a): A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary
actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

2. Meaning of special civil actions

It is also civil action and governed by the rules for ordinary action but because of its
peculiary nature, it is subject to the specific rules prescribed for them, particularly Rule 62
to Rule 71, depending on the special civil action involved.

44
 3. Meaning of criminal actions

Rule 3, Sec. 3 (b): A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an
act or omission punishable by law.

4. Civil actions versus Special proceedings

Civil actions as a rule is governed by the ordinary rules, which is from Rule 1 to 56. Special
civil actions are likewise governed by the ordinary rules but because of its peculiar nature, it
is subject to the specific rules under Rule 62 to 71 depending on the special civil action
involved.

5. Personal actions and real actions

real action: (a) subject is the ownership or possession of real property

(b) founded on privity of real estate
(c) filed in the court where the property or any part
thereof is situated
(d) example: accion reinvindicatoria

personal action: (a) personal property is sought to be recovered or

where damages for breach of contract are sought
(b) founded on privity of contract
(c) filed in the court where the plaintiff or any of the
defendants reside at the option of the plaintiff
(d) example: action for a sum of money

Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Spouses Plaza, G.R. No. 154489, July 25, 2003 – An action
to compel the mortgagee to accept payment and for the consequent cancellation of a real
estate mortgage is a personal action if the mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage and
the mortgagor is in possession of the premises since neither the mortgagor’s title to nor
possession of the property is in question. (see Carandang v. Court of Appeals, 15 April
1988, 160 SCRA 266) Contrary to petitioners’ contention, respondents do not question the
validity of the real estate mortgage they entered into. In fact they uphold its validity since
they are willing to pay their obligation under the contract after which the contract should
then be declared without legal effect. Also, there is as yet no transfer of title from
respondents to petitioners. Respondents maintain that the title remains in their name and
they are still in actual physical possession of the property. There is no foreclosure yet of the
mortgage. Hence, there is no title to the land to be affected by the action.

mixed action: (a) both real and personal properties are involved
(b) founded on privity of real estate and contract
(c) the rules on venue of real actions shall govern
(d) example: accion reinvindicatoria with a claim for
damages

6. Local and transitory actions

local action must be brought in a particular place where the subject property or a portion
thereof is located unless there is an agreement to the contrary (Sec. 4, Rule 4). Example:
action to recover real property

45
transitory action is dependent on the place where the party resides regardless of where the
subject cause of action arose (Sec. 4, Rule 4). Example: action to recover sum of money

7. Actions in rem, in personam and quasi in rem

Actions in rem: (a) directed against the thing itself

(b) jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not
required
(c) a proceeding to determine the state or condition of
a thing
(d) judgment is binding on the whole world
(e) example: probate proceeding

Actions in personam: (a) directed against the particular person

(b) jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is required
(c) an action to impose a responsibility or
liability upon a person directly
(d) judgment is binding only upon the parties
impleaded or their successors in interest
(e) example: action for specific performance

Actions quasi in rem: (a) directed against particular persons

(b) jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not required as long as jurisdiction over
the res is acquired
(c) a proceeding to subject the interest of a
named defendant over a particular property
to an obligation or lien burdening it
(d) judgment is binding upon particular persons
(e) example: action for partition

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the
recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged
tortious act. The damages claimed in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of the
injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by
the plaintiff. This money claim is the principle sought, and is not merely incidental thereto
or a consequence thereof. (Iniego v. Judge Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006)

If it is capable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction will depend on the value of the demand
exclusive of interests, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
costs, or value of the property in controversy that will determine the jurisdiction of the
court. The other form of damages even if not essential for purposes of jurisdiction must
however be specified in the filing fees.

Ultimate Objective Test – If the relief demanded is one which may not be granted under the
law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of the action. The relief to which the
plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint although it is not the
relief demanded is what determines the nature of the action. Thus, a prayer for annulment
or rescission of the sale does not operate to effect the fundamental and prime objective and
nature of the action, which is to recover real property and is thus a real action. The
annulment of the sale is only secondary.

46
Incidental Test – If it is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, it is capable of pecuniary
estimation. Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money or is purely incidental to or as a consequence of the principle relief sought like
specific performance, action for support or for annulment of contract, it is not capable of
pecuniary estimation.

Mere Consequence Test – An action to compel defendant to accept the goods and pay
damages, rescission of contract and reimbursement of contract price, and action for specific
performance of stipulation in a lease contract such as to maintain the lessee in peaceful
possession of the premises were held to be incapable of pecuniary estimation as the
amounts to be collected are but a consequence of specific performance which fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of amount sought to be recovered.

Consider the case of Lu v. Lu Ym Sr., G.R. No. 153690 discussed in Part I. In the August 26,
2008 Decision penned by Justice Nachura, the SC concluded that the subject matter of the
complaint was incapable of pecuniary estimation. There was no dissent. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration, the same division resolved on August 4, 2009 that the complaint was
capable of pecuniary estimate. Justice Nachura wrote, upon deeper reflection and to the
extent of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiffs from the sale of the shares, the
action can be characterized as capable of pecuniary estimation. Justice Carpio-Morales
wrote a dissent. When the matter was brought up to the SC En Banc, the Court through
Justice Carpio-Morales resolved that the subject matter of the complaint was incapable of
pecuniary estimate. (February 15, 2011) Justice Nachura dissented.

Expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation and accordingly falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the subject property. (Barangay San Roque
v. Pastor, G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000)

According to Herrera, jurisdiction to annul or rescind settlements or arbitration before the

Katarungan Pambarangay or to enforce amicable settlement or award before the Barangay,
which are cases incapable of pecuniary estimation, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the municipal trial court of the Barangay involved. The authority of the MTC to determine
questions incapable of pecuniary estimation under the above formulation is therefore
beyond cavil.

Classification of actions for enforcement of foreign judgment – Although classified as one

capable of pecuniary estimation, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate,
thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7 (a) of Rule 141. The applicable provision is
Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 involving ―other actions not involving property‖ where only the
blanket filing fee of minimal amount of Php2,000.00 is required. (Mijares v. Ranada, G.R.
No. 139325, April 12, 2005)

1. Meaning of cause of action

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.

Requisites of a right of action: (a) the existence of a legal right of the

Plaintiff
(b) a correlative obligation of the
defendant to respect plaintiff’s right;
and,
(c) an act or omission of the defendant
in violation of the plaintiff’s legal

47
 right

2. Right of Action versus Cause of action

Elements of a Right of Action:

(a) The existence of a cause of action defined as the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another
(b) The performance of all conditions precedent to the bringing of the action
(c) The right to bring and maintain the action must be in the person instituting it

Conditions precedent

(a) exhaustion of administrative remedies

(b) arbitration as a condition precedent for court action
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) – recourse may be
availed of whenever the contract contains a clause for the submission of a
future controversy to arbitration
Rep. Act No. 9285 or Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004
Barangay Conciliation (Katarungang Pambarangay)

Article 151, Family Code – If it is shown that no earnest efforts were in fact made to settle
the controversy among members of the same family, the case must be dismissed.

3. Failure to state a cause of action

Where there is a defect or an insufficiency in the statement of the cause of action, a

complaint may be dismissed not because of an absence or a lack of cause of action but
because the complaint ―states no cause of action.‖ (Sec. 1 [g], Rule 16) The dismissal will
therefore be anchored on a failure to state a cause of action.

This does not mean that the plaintiff has no cause of action. It only means that the
plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient for the court to know that the rights of the plaintiff
were violated by the defendant.

4. Test of the sufficiency of a cause of action

The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of
action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint.

5. Splitting a single cause of action and its effects

Splitting of a single cause of action – the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others

Filing of one – Rule 16, Section 1 (e) – that there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause
Judgment upon the merits – Rule 16, Section 1 (f) – that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment…

A party cannot split a single cause of action into parts and sue on each part separately.

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Rules in actions ex-delicto:

A single tort gives rise but to one cause of action no matter how many items of
damages may have been caused to one person
When by a single delict or wrong, several rights are violated belonging to different
persons, several causes arise on behalf of such persons
Where a person is guilty of two culpable transgressions on the property rights of
another, such as the ruination of the agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of the
property and for the unauthorized use of said property as a dumpsite or depot, he
may be held liable to pay damages for both the reasonable value of the use of the
land and the occupation of the premises
When there are separate tortuous acts resulting in different injuries, separate causes
of action arise and several actions may be maintained
But if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts for breach of contract of
carriage and for quasi-delict, only one cause of action arises even if the negligent act
was committed by several persons. Double recovery for the same act or omission is
prohibited.

Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corp., G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 155
– The first ejectment case was filed before the lease contract expired. Allegedly, the lessee
violated the contract, which provided that he may not utilize the subject premises for other
purposes without the lessor’s prior written consent. The lessee however constructed
restaurant buildings and other commercial establishments on the lot wihtout first securing
the required written consent from the lessor and the necessary permits from the
association. The MTC decided the case in favor of the lessor. However on appeal the case
was reversed the decision on the ground that it was being prematurely filed. The lessor then
went to the CA on petition for review.

While the petition for review was pending, the lessor filed the second ejectment suit on the
ground of expiration of the lease contract, which the MTC granted. However, on appeal, the
RTC reversed the decision on the ground of litis pendentia. On petition for review, the CA
reinstated the MTC decision holding that there was no litis pendentia because the two civil
cases have different causes of action.

According to the SC, generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If
two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or
a judgment on the merits in any one is a ground for the dismissal of the others.

Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action to wit: (a) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and
second causes of action (also known as the ―same evidence‖ test); (b) whether the
defenses in one case may be used to substantitate the complaint in the other; and, (c)
whether the casue of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint. Of the 3, the 3rd one is especially applicable to this case. The facts clearly show
that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the lessee’s violation of
stipulations in the lease contract while the filing of the second case was based on the
expiration of the lease contract. At the time the lessor filed the first ejectment complaint,
the lease contract was still in effect. It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that
the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the
respondent as a ground for ejecting the lessee. Thus, the cause of action in the second case
was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.

49
VYE’s comment: The cause of action is one for unlawful detainer. There may be different
grounds for filing the unlawful detainer such as violation of the stipulations of the contract,
non-payment of rent, or expiration of the lease contract. It would appear that the SC has
sanctioned the filing of successive complaints for unlawful detainer for as long as the ground
therefor is different. Consider the following problem: The lessee violated the stipulations of
the lease contract but continued to pay the rent. The lessor then filed a complaint for
unlawfuly detainer on this ground. While the case is pending, the lessee failed to pay the
rent. Can the lessor file another complaint for unlawful detainer on this ground?
Subsequently, the lease contract expired. Can the lessor file a third complaint for unlawful
detainer on this ground even if the first and second complaints are still pending?

6. Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action

Joinder of causes of action – a party may in one pleading assert in the alternative or
otherwise as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party subject to
the following conditions:

a. the part joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties
b. the joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules
c. where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different
venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein;
and
d. where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction

Note: The absence of unity of problems is no longer a bar to joinder of causes of action. The
present rule removed the restriction of venue, jurisdiction, and causes of action arising from
money, the same nature or character or similar transactions. The only grounds to refuse
joinder of causes of action are: (1) the rules on joinder of parties which requires that (a) the
claims arise from the same or series of transactions, and (b) there is a common question of
law or fact; (2) it must not be cognizable by different tribunals; and, (3) joinder of ordinary
and special civil actions. The restriction on joinder of parties does not apply where the
parties are the same although the causes of action are separate and distinct from one
another.

A claim on a promissory note against three defendants may not be joined with a claim
under another promissory note against two of the defendants for there is a misjoinder of
parties, the third defendant in the first cause of action not having an interest in the second
cause of action. (1 Moran, p. 195, 1995 Ed., cited in 1 Herrera, p. 325, 2000 Ed. and 1
Herrera, p. 499, 2007 Ed.)

Problem based on Riano’s Civil Procedure: D is the debtor of C for P350T due on January 5,
2008. D likewise owes C P350T due on February 13, 2008. Both debts are evidenced by
distinct promissory notes. D has not paid the debts despite demand. Each debt is a separate
cause of action because each is the subject of different transaction. However, under the rule
on joinder of causes of action, C may file a single suit against D for the collection of both
debts, despite the claims being actually separate causes of actions and having arisen out of
different transactions.

Assume that aside from the above claims, C as lessor also wants to eject D from the
apartment occupied by D as lessee. May the action be joined with the claims for money? No.
An action for ejectment is a special civil action. This kind of action cannot be joined with

50
ordinary actions. The joinder does not include special civil actions or those actions governed
by special rules. The rule is clear: ―The joinder shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules.‖ (Sec. 5 (b), Rule 2, Rules of Court) Confusion in the
application of procedural rules would certainly arise from the joinder of ordinary and special
civil actions in a single complaint.

Supposing C’s lawyer still filed in one complaint the money claims and complaint for
ejectment, what should be done? D cannot file a motion to dismiss because misjoinder of
causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. (Sec. 6, Rule 2) On motion of D
or on the initiative of the court, the causes of action can be severed and proceeded with
separately. Since the ejectment complaint is outside the jurisdiction of the RTC, upon
severance it will have to be dismissed, not because of misjoinder of causes of action, but
because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.

C. Parties to Civil Actions

1. Real Parties in interest; Indispensable parties; Representatives as

parties; Necessary parties; Indigent Parties; Alternative defendants

Pro-forma party

Navarro v. Escobido, November 27, 2009 -- Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the
conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on contract of partnership; being a co-owner
the wife can file the complaint for recovery of property without including the husband; the
husband is not an indispensable party and he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma
party to the suit based on Section 4 of Rule 3.

NOTE: The statement of the court in the decision that non-joinder of indispensable party is
not a ground to dismiss action IS MISLEADING. The effect of failure to include an
indispensable party is found in Section 7 under which there will be no final determination of
the action. Section 11 on effects of non-joinder of parties must be read in relation to Section
7. When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed
(Arcelona v. CA, 280 SCRA 20)

Carandang v. De Guzman, November 29, 2006 – The wife in this case was not an
indispensable party in the action for recovery of money; as such, she need not be
impleaded in the suit.

Personality to sue

Within the framework of the Constitution, the Estate should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof the exercise of those rights
and fulfilment of those obligations of his Estate which survives after his death. (Limjoco v.
Intestate of Fragante, G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948)

Since an estate is a juridical person, the administrator may file the complaint directly to
court, without the same going to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration. (Vda. de Borromeo v.
Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217)

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Indispensable party

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course,
the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable
parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the
action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present. (Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250;
reiterated in Bulawan v. Aquende, June 22, 2011 where an indispensable party was not
impleaded in the case)

In Bulawan v. Aquende, the SC noted that during the proceedings before the trial court, the
answers of Yap and the Register of Deed should have prompted the trial court to inquire
further whether there were other indispensable parties who were not impleaded. The trial
court should have taken the initiative to implead Aquende as defendant or to order Bulawan
to do so as mandated under Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The burden to implead
or to order the impleading of indispensable parties is placed on Bulawan and on the trial
court, respectively.

In Sepulveda Jr. v. Pelaez, (January 31, 2005) 450 SCRA 302, when an indispensable party
is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. Explaining Sec. 7 of Rule 3, Justice
Regalado said, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court
that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is mandated to implead all the
indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present. One who is a party to a case is not bound by any
decision of the court, otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. Without the
presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment
and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure of the private respondent to
implead the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and
the appellate court’s exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders
or judgments rendered therein a nullity. To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Hence, the trial court should
have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Similarly, in Moldes v. Villanueva, 468 SCRA 697 (August 31, 2005), all heirs are
indispensable parties to an action to nullify a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Quitclaim. The absence of indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void. Explaining Sec. 7 of Rule 7, Justice Calleja wrote, ―An indispensable party is
one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. A party who has
not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of
such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. He is a person in whose absence there cannot be a
determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable. In Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo v. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, the Court
held that the joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of
indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.
Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of

52
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, with no
authority to act not only as to the absent party but also as to those present. The
responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.
Likewise, in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Hon. Floro T. Alejo, the Court ruled
that the evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and
necessary parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the
parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the
judgment. A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable
parties.

VYE’s comment: Following these pronouncements, can you now move to dismiss a
complaint because not all indispensable party has been impleaded? No. Under Sec. 11, Rule
3, non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. What then is your
remedy in case there is failure or refusal to implead an indispensable party? Sec. 9 of Rule 3
speaks of non-joinder of necessary party. It then outlines the procedure to ―not join‖ a
necessary party. Thus, ―whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary
party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is
omitted. Should the Court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the
inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.‖
SBC Notes further states: ―Only when the party ordered to implead the indispensable party
refuses or fails to do so shall the case be dismissed on the ground of disobedience to the
Rules or orders of the court under Sec. 3, Rule 17.

But what if the plaintiff fails to implead an indispensable party. In the cases of Sepulveda Jr.
and Moldes, the plaintiffs therein was of the belief that there was no need to implead these
parties, yet the SC said this is fatal to the complaint.

VYE’s opinion: The court’s attention should be called regarding the omission. In turn, the
court will have to require the plaintiff to implead the omitted indispensable party. In the
event that the TC disagrees and sees no need to implead the party, as in the cases of
Sepulveda Jr. and Moldes, any judgment therein is assailable. Note that in the cases of
Sepulveda Jr. and Moldes, it was the SC who noted the fatal omission and set aside the
decision of the TC and CA on this ground, which was not even raised by the appellant.

Indispensable party v. Necessary party

The case of Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113,
illustrates the difference between an indispensable party and a necessary part. Crisanta is
the owner of a parcel of land, which she sold in favor of Marcos, Andres and Bienvenido.
Subsequently, Andres and Bienvenido sold their shares in favor of Marcos. Marcos then sold
the land in favor of the Spouses Luzame. Crisanta now filed a complaint for reformation of
the Deed of Sale and the annulment of the sale. She claimed that the sale in favor of
Marcos should be considered an equitable mortgage and there the subsequent sale in favor
of the Spouses Luzame should be annulled. She sued Marcos and the Spouses Luzame.
However, the trial court was of the belief that Andres and Bienvenido are indispensable
parties and should be impleaded. Is the trial court correct?

Under Section 7, Rule 3, indispensable parties must always be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them. Necessary parties must be joined,
under Section 8 of the same Rule, in order to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid
multiplicity of suits.

53
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree
would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their
presence. Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in
their absence without affecting them.

In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres and Bienvenido to be
safeguarded if the sale should be held to be in fact an absolute sale or if the sale is held to
be an equitable mortgage. Defendant Marcos became the absolute owner of the subject
property by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of the aforementioned defendants in the
property. Said defendants no longer have any interest in the subject property. However,
being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in order
to settle all the possible issues of tile controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an
absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will have been
amply protected. Spouses Luzame in any event may enforce their rights against defendant
Marcos.

In fact Crisanta was not after defendants Andres and Mangubat as shown by their non-
inclusion in the complaint and their opposition to the motion to include said defendants in
the complaint as indispensable parties. It was only because of the order of the court a quo
that they included the said defendants in the complaint. The lower court erroneously held
that the said defendants are indispensable parties.

This notwithstanding, defendants Andres and Bienvenido not being indispensable parties but
only proper parties, their joinder as parties defendants was correctly ordered being in
accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.

Indigent party

A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of
Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid and of the
Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the
National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the
Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

ARTICLE IV
Tests of Indigency

Section 1. Tests for determining who may be clients of the NCLA and
the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters. – The NCLA or the chapter legal aid
committee, as the case may be, shall pass upon requests for legal aid by the
combined application of the means and merit tests and the consideration of
other relevant factors provided for in the following sections.

Section 2. Means test; exception. – (a) This test shall be based on the
following criteria: (i) the applicant and that of his immediate family must have
a gross monthly income that does not exceed an amount double the monthly
minimum wage of an employee in the place where the applicant resides and
(ii) he does not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the
current tax declaration of more than Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00)
Pesos.

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 In this connection, the applicant shall execute an affidavit of indigency
(printed at the back of the application form) stating that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor own any
real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of
a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the applicant’s affidavit. The
latest income tax return and/or current tax declaration, if any, shall be
attached to the applicant’s affidavit.

(b) The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under
the developmental legal aid program such as overseas workers, fisherfolk,
farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women, children and
other disadvantaged groups.

Section 3. Merit test. – A case shall be considered meritorious if an

assessment of the law and evidence at hand discloses that the legal service
will be in aid of justice or in the furtherance thereof, taking into consideration
the interests of the party and those of society. A case fails this test if, after
consideration of the law and evidence presented by the applicant, it appears
that it is intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work
oppression or wrong.

Section 4. Other relevant factors that may be considered. – The effect

of legal aid or of the failure to render the same upon the rule of law, the
proper administration of justice, the public interest involved in a given case
and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be considered.

When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the
affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the
applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present
Section 19 of Rule 141—that is, the applicant's gross income and that of the applicant's
immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an
employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more
than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the
applicant meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent
litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it
would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has "no money or
property sufficient and family." In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce
countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the
trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition,
Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of
such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on
newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court
determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court,
execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to
such other sanctions as the court may impose. (Algura v. LGU of City of Naga, October 30,
2006)

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 2. Compulsory and permissive joinder of parties

Pantranco North Express v. Standard Insurance, 453 SCRA 482 (March 16, 2005) --
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the
plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of
the Rules on jurisdiction and venue. In this case, the insured and the insurance company
filed the complaint against Pantranco North. The claim of the insured was for the balance of
the cost of the repair while the insurance company’s claim was for the amount it paid to the
assured as the subrogee. Thus, there is a single transaction common to all, that is,
Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of
fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to
both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners. To
determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence
which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to
authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against
petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of
action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in
order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy
and orderly administration of justice.

3. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

Ablaza v. Republic, August 11, 2010

May a brother bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of
his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code? Both the trial court
and CA held that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the
action.

According to the SC, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother
under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code.

Note that the original case was a special proceeding entitled In re: Petition for the
Nullification of the marriage contract between Crescencio and Leonila. According to the SC,
Leonila the wife and Leila the alleged daughter should be named parties to the case, they
being indispensable parties to the case. Justice Bersamin explained that it is not fatal since
petitioner can still amend the petition in order to implead an indispensable party to the
case.

What about A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC? According to the SC, although A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that only the husband or wife may file a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages, this limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. In
Carlos v. Sandoval (574 SCRA 116), the following are excepted from the limitation: (a)
those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and, (b)
those marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and those marriages
celebrated under the Family Code but before March 15, 2003.

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Relucio v. Lopez (January 16, 2002) – In a petition for appointment of sole administratrix of
conjugal partnership of properties, forfeiture, etc., the mistress is a total stranger to the
suit. She is not an indispensable party or even a necessary party. A real party in interest is
one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit." In this case, the
mistress would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630. If she is
not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is
one without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Her participation in
Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a
judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with
respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J.
Lopez' conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property
co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable
against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can the mistress be a necessary party in Special Proceedings
M-3630. A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as
party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the context of her petition
in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were
ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give
support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with
petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with
respondent.

4. Class Suit

In Adm. Matter No. 88-1-646: Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doña Paz to
set aside the Order of Judge B.V. Chingcuangco, promulgated on March 31, 1988, 159 SCRA
623, the SC took occasion to distinguish the rules on permissive joinder of parties and class
suit. What is contemplated in a class suit is that (a) the subject matter in controversy is of
common or general interest to many persons, and (b) those persons are so numerous as to
make it impractical to bring them all before the court to join them all as parties. On the
other hand, if there are many persons who have distinct, separate rights against the same
party or group parties, but those rights arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions and there are common questions of fact or law resulting therefrom the former
may join as plaintiffs in one action against the same defendants.

The last sentence of Rule 3, Sec. 12 on Class Suit reads: ―Any party in interest shall have
the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.‖ This is one instance where
intervention is a matter of right and not addressed to the discretion of the court.

5. Suits against entities without juridical personality

Rule 3, Sec. 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. – When two
or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter
into a transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are
generally or commonly known.

In the answer of such defendant, the names and addresses of the persons
composing said entity must all be revealed.

Rule 14, Sec. 8. Service upon entity without juridical personality.

-- When persons associated in an entity without juridical personality are sued
under the name by which they are generally or commonly known, service
may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon any one of them, or

57
 upon the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in
such name. But such service shall not bind individually any person whose
connection with the entity has, upon due notice, been severed before the
action was brought.

Rule 36, Sec. 6. Judgment against entity without juridical personality. —

When judgment is rendered against two or more persons sued as an entity
without juridical personality, the judgment shall set out their individual or
proper names, if known. (6a)

6. Effect of death of party litigant

Borlongan v. Buenaventura (February 27, 2006) – Under Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, the perfection of an appeal by way of a petition for review before the SC
is conditioned upon the following requisites: (1) payment of the required docket and other
lawful fees; and (2) the filing of the verified petition within 15 days from receipt of the
assailed decision or within the extended period granted by the Court. In this case,
Borlongan paid the docket and other fees. However, he failed to satisfy the second requisite
because he died on April 11, 2005 before he could file the petition. The petition filed and
verified by Borlongan’s counsel is a mere scrap of paper because he no longer has the
authority to represent his deceased client. The settled rule is that attorney-client
relationship is terminated upon the client’s death. A dead client has no personality and
cannot be represented by an attorney.

D. Venue

Note the rule on venue on actions governed by special rules.

Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of voidable

marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), Sec. 4 thereof states that venue is where petitioner or
the respondent has been residing for at least 6 months prior to the date of the filing, or in
the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner.

Rule on Legal Separation (A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC), Sec. 2 (c) thereof provides for a similar
rule on venue.

Rule on Adoption of Minors (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC), Sec. 6 thereof, venue is where the
prospective adoptive parents reside.

1. Venue versus Jurisdiction

a) Venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; jurisdiction is the authority to
hear and determine a case

b) Venue is a matter of procedural law; jurisdiction is substantive

c) Venue established a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and

respondent; jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter

d) Venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties; jurisdiction is fixed by
law and cannot be conferred by agreement of the parties

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e) Venue is not a ground for a motu proprio dismissal (except in cases subject to summary
procedure; Sec. 4, Rule on Summary Procedure); lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter is a ground for a motu proprio dismissal

2. Venue of real actions

General Milling Corp. v. Uytengsu, 494 SCRA 241 – The complaint sought the delivery of
OCTs. According to the SC, the case is not a real action requiring the allegation of the
assessed value of the property but one which was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
complaint based its cause of action on petitioner’s refusal to surrender the OCTs. As primary
relief, the complaint sought the delivery by petitioner of the said OCTs. Clearly, the subject
matter of the case at bar was not a real action requiring an allegation of the assessed value
of the property but one which was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, it was within
the jurisdiction of the RTC. Any other consequence of the primary relief sought in the
complaint could not properly be a basis for impugning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

3. Venue of personal actions

Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp. v. Goldstar Elevators Phils., 473 SCRA 705 – For
practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation. Since the principal place
of business of a corporation determines its residence or domicile, then the place indicated in
its articles of incorporation becomes controlling in determining the venue for this case.

Golden Arches Development Corp. v. St. Francis Square Holding Inc., 640 SCRA 227 –
Although respondent’s Amended Articles indicates that its principal business address is at
―Metro Manila‖, venue was properly laid in Mandaluyong since that is where it had actually
been residing or holding its principal office at the time it filed its complaint.

4. Venue of actions against non-residents

Rule 4, Sec. 3: Venue of actions against non-residents. -- If any of the

defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant
located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the
court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any
portion thereof is situated or found.

5. When the Rules on Venue Do not Apply

Rule 4, Sec. 4: When Rule not applicable. -- This Rule shall not apply:

(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or

(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the
action on the exclusive venue thereof.

Consider the case of Villanueva v. Judge Mosqueda, G.R. No. L-58287, August 19, 1982,
where the supplementary lease agreement of between the lessor and lessee provided that if
the lessor violates the contract, he can be sued in Manila and if the lessee violates the
contract, he can be sued in Masantol, Pampanga. Bonifacio resided at Masantol. Villanueva
resided in Tondo while the leased premises was located in Manila. The lessor then filed an
ejectment suit in Masantol, Pampanga. The lessee moved to dismiss the complaint for

59
improper venue. The Municipal Trial Court denied the motion, The lessee filed a petition for
certiorari with the then CFI of Pampanga but it dismissed the petition. Thus, the lessee went
to the SC on certiorari.

The SC held that the Municipal Trial Court of Masantol, Pampanga like any other inferior
courts has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain ejectment suits. It explained that Sec.
1 of Rule 4 providing that ―Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried
in the Municipal Trial Court of the Municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or
a portion thereof is situated‖ does not refer to the jurisdiction over the subject matter but
only to the place where the ejectment suit may be brought. Sec. 4, Rule 4 further provides
that the rule on venue shall not apply where the parties have validly agreed in writing
before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.

6. Effects of Stipulations on Venue

In Unimasters Conglomeration Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 119657, February 7, 1997, the
agreement read as follows: ―All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the
proper Courts of Quezon City.‖ The complaint for damages was however filed in Tacloban
City where Unimasters holds office. Is venue properly laid?

According to the SC, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and
suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only
and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements
on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or
complementary of said rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of
the venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different from those specified
by said rule, does not, without more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive
one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing
their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by
them, regardless of the general precepts of Rule 4; and any doubt or uncertainty as to the
parties' intentions must be resolved against giving their agreement a restrictive or
mandatory aspect. Any other rule would permit of individual, subjective judicial
interpretations without stable standards, which could well result in precedents in hopeless
inconsistency.

In his separate opinion, Justice Regalado, suggested what he termed as ―some parametric
qualifications‖ in agreements demanding literal compliance by the parties:

The rule is that if the parties to a contract merely agree on the venue of any
case arising therefrom, in addition to or aside from the legal venue provided
therefor by the Rules of Court or the law, that stipulation is merely permissive
and the parties may choose to observe the same or insist on the alternative
venues in the Rules or the law.

If, on the other hand, such venue stipulation contains qualifying, restrictive,
mandatory or exclusionary terms indicating that the additional forum shall be
the unalterable venue of prospective suits ex contractu between them, then
such agreement shall necessarily be observed to the exclusion of and shall
bar resort to another forum which would otherwise have been the
reglementary prescription of venue for the case.

Of the latter genre are the use of such qualifying words like exclusively, only,
solely, limited to, in no other place, to the exclusion of, or other terms

60
 indicative of a clear and categorical intent to lay the venue at a specific place
and thereby waiving the general provisions of the Rules or the law on venue
or proscribing the filing of suit in any other competent court.

These guidelines should accordingly be drawn from the decision in this case,
viz.: (1) the agreement on venue shall, in the first instance, be normally
considered as merely permissive; (2) to be restrictive, the language or
terminology employed in the stipulation must be unequivocal and admit of no
contrary or doubtful interpretation; (3) in case of irreconcilable doubt, the
venue provision shall be deemed to be permissive; and (4) in ascertaining the
intent in that provision which reasonably admits of more than one meaning,
the construction should be adopted which most conduces to the convenience
of the parties.

E. Pleadings

1. Kinds of Pleadings

Lucas v. Judge Fabros (January 31, 2000) – case under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
The prohibited pleading of a motion for reconsideration applies only where the judgment
sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held by the SC in Joven v.
Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 700 involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991:
"The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment
rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case." Here, the order of dismissal
issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary
conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion
for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under
Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving
due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint.

NB: The Order subject of the motion for reconsideration dismissed the complaint because of
the failure of the plaintiff and his counsel to appear at the preliminary conference despite
due notice.

In Jalique v. Dandan (November 28, 2003), the SC emphasized the liberal interpretation of
the rules saying that not all lawyers are gifted with the skill to craft pleadings that fully
meet the requirements as to substance and form. In this case, the defendant instead of
filing an answer to the complaint for ejectment submitted a Joint Counter Affidavit. This
case calls for a liberal, not a technical and rigid, interpretation of the rules on Summary
Procedure in the light of the presence rather than a total absence of a responsive pleading.
A perusal of the respondents’ Joint Counter Affidavit shows that it disputed the material
allegations of the Complaint and presented valid issues for the lower court’s resolution, such
as the ownership of the subject lot, the period of lease, right of reimbursement for
improvements and the right to eject respondents. "Rules of pleadings are intended to secure
a method by which the issues may be properly laid before the court. When those issues are
already clear before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be
given undue importance. What is important is that the case be decided upon the merits and
that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points."

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 a. Complaint

Rule 6, Sec. 3: Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the

plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and residences of the plaintiff
and defendant must be stated in the complaint. (3a)

b. Answer

Rule 6, Sec. 4: Answer. — An answer is a pleading in which a defending party

sets forth his defenses. (4a)

(1) Negative defenses

Rule 6, Sec. 5 (a): A negative defense is the specific denial of the material
fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or
causes of action.

(2) Negative pregnant

A negative pregrant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or

at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged
with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July
15, 2003)

(3) Affirmative Defenses

Rule 6, Sec. 5 (b): An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter

which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading
of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The
affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment,
illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in
bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance. (5a)

c. Counterclaims

Rule 6, Sec. 6: Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is any claim which a

defending party may have against an opposing party. (6a)

(1) Compulsory counterclaim

Rule 6, Sec. 7: Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is

one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such
a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the
amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the
Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount. (n)

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Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 159746, July 18, 2012
Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain
the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC,
the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.

A compulsory counterclaim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer
shall be contained therein. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a compulsory counterclaim not set up shall be barred.

The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the
following, to wit:

(a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim
largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent
the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as
well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such
that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court?

Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation between the
claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim. Such relationship exists when
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial
duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve
the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic
controversy between the parties. If these tests result in affirmative answers, the
counterclaim is compulsory.

The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned. The
Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case because both arose out of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted to secure the payment of
petitioners’ credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with Shell. Specifically, the
right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure, such that there would not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila
case had Shell not validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramon’s cause of
action for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in
the Manila case. Thus, the Makati RTC could not have missed the logical relation between
the two actions.

(2) Permissive counterclaim

Banco de Oro v. Court of Appeals, 468 SCRA 166 (August 25, 2005) – The counterclaim
must be existing at the time of filing the answer, though not at the commencement of the
action for under Section 3 of the former Rule 10, the counterclaim or cross-claim which a
party may aver in his answer must be one which he may have "at the time" against the
opposing party. That phrase can only have reference to the time of the answer. Certainly a
premature counterclaim cannot be set up in the answer. This construction is not only explicit

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from the language of the aforecited provisions but also serves to harmonize the aforecited
sections of Rule 10, with section 4 of the same rule which provides that "a
counterclaim…which either matured or was acquired by a party after serving his pleading
may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim…by supplemental
pleading before judgment." Thus a party who fails to interpose a counterclaim although
arising out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff’s
suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his answer is not thereby
barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation.

While BDO could have, after the Locsins filed on March 26, 1999 a Supplemental Complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-98-35337, set up, in its Supplemental Answer, its claim subject of Civil
Case No. MC-99-935, again assuming arguendo that it is a Compulsory Counterclaim, the
setting up of such "after-acquired counterclaim," is merely permissive, not compulsory.

(3) Effect on the Counterclaim when the complaint is

dismissed

Rule 17, Sec. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. – Except as provided in

the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal,
the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a
separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he
manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same
action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court.

Rule 17, Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable
cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of
the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant
to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.

VYE’s comment: The right to prosecute the counterclaim is available if the dismissal is upon
motion of the plaintiff or due to the fault of the plaintiff. In both instances, the dismissal of
the complaint shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless…he manifests his preference to have his
counterclaim resolved in the same action.

d. Cross-claims

Rule 6, Sec. 8: Cross-claim. – A cross-claim is any claim by one party against

a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-
claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may

64
 be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant.

May a plaintiff file a cross-claim against his co-plaintiff? Yes, the rules simply refer to a
party against a co-party.

May a third-party defendant file a crossclaim against the plaintiff? Yes, under Sec. 13, Rule
6, ―In proper cases, he (third-party defendant) may also assert a counterclaim against the
original plaintiff in respect of the latter’s claim against the third-party plaintiff.

e. Third (fourth, etc.) party complaints

Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc. v. Paras, G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012 – Requisites
for a 3rd party action are:

(a) that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the action;
(b) that the claim against the 3rd party defendant must belong to the original
defendant;
(c) the claim of the original defendant against the 3rd party defendant must
be based upon the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant; and,
(d) the defendant is attempting to transfer to the 3 rd party defendant the
liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.

See Samala v. Judge Victor, 170 SCRA 453 (February 21, 1989) for remedy over. – Emerita
was a passenger of a jeepney driven by Virgilio and owned by spouses Garcia. A bus driven
by Leonardo and owned by Purificacion bumped the back portion of a delivery van which in
turn collided with the jeepney resulting in injuries to Emerita. The latter filed a complaint for
damages based on breached of contract of carriage against Virgilio and the spouses Garcia.
In turn, the spouses Garcia filed a 3 rd party complaint against Purificacion and Leonardo.
The latter defendants filed a 4 th party complaint against Imperial Insurance Inc., the insurer
of the bus.

Sec. 13, Rule 6 states that the 3 rd party defendant may allege in his answer his defenses,
counterclaims or cross-claims including such defense that the 3 rd party plaintiff may have
against the original plaintiff’s claim. In proper cases, the 3rd party defendant may also
assert a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect of the latter’s claim against 3rd
party plaintiff.

Note that Sec. 11 of Rule 6 mentions ―contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.‖ Under this Rule, a person not a party to an action
may be impleaded by the defendant either (a) on an allegation of liability to the latter; (b)
on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff; or, (c) both (a) and (b). The situation in (a)
is covered by the phrase ―for contribution, indemnity or subrogation‖ while (b) and (c) are
subsumed under the catch all phrase ―or any other relief in respect of his opponent’s claim.‖
Thus, it is not a pre-requisite for attachment of the liability to 3 rd party defendant and its
driver that 3rd party plaintiff be first declared and found liable to the plaintiff for the breach
of its contract of carriage with him.

In Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko (27 SCRA 418), the
SC emphasized the nature of a third-party complaint, particularly its independence from the
main case:

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 The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a "third
party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by
the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party
defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief,
in respect of the plaintiff’s claim. The third-party complaint is actually
independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. Were
it not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed
independently and separately from the original complaint by the defendant
against the third-party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-
party defendant or so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action in
respect of plaintiff’s claim against a third party in the original and principal
case with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessary
proliferation of lawsuits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation the
entire subject matter arising from one particular set of facts. … When leave to
file the third-party complaint is properly granted, the Court renders in effect
two judgments in the same case, one on the plaintiff’s complaint and the
other on the third-party complaint. When he finds favorably on both
complaints, as in this case, he renders judgment on the principal complaint in
favor of plaintiff against defendant and renders another judgment on the
third-party complaint in favor of defendant as third-party plaintiff, ordering
the third-party defendant to reimburse the defendant whatever amount said
defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff in the case. Failure of any of said parties
in such a case to appeal the judgment as against him makes such judgment
final and executory….

It follows then that the plaintiff in the main action may not be regarded as a party to the
third-party complaint; nor may the third-party defendant be regarded as a party to the
main action. As for the defendant, he is party to both the main action and the third-party
complaint but in different capacities – in the main action, he is the defendant; in the third-
party complaint, he is the plaintiff.

CDCP v. Cuenca, 466 SCRA 714 (August 12, 2005) – Phrase ―remedy over‖ was further
explained. In this case, Malayan Insurance filed a complaint for sum of money against Ultra
International, Edilberto and Rodolfo praying for indemnity of the amount it paid to
Goodyear. Rodolfo file a motion for leave to file 3 rd party complaint against CDCP now PNCC.
The TC held Ultra International and PNCC jointly and solidarily liable to Malayan Insurance
under the indemnity agreement. It dismissed the complaint against Edilberto and Rodolfo.
Ultra International and PNCC appealed the decision to the CA but Malayan Insurance did
not. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in toto. PNCC then appealed to the SC.
According to the SC, the 3rd party defendant cannot be held jointly and severally liable with
the 3rd party plaintiff where case against some of the 3 rd party defendant plaintiffs was
dismissed. If only the 3rd party defendant files an appeal, the decision in the main case
becomes final. Therefore, the CA’s decision in the main action holding Ultra International
liable to Malayan Insurance and dismissing the case as against the Cuencas became final
and executory when none of the said parties filed an appeal with the SC. The SC further
held 3rd party plaintiff Rodolfo impleaded PNCC as a remedy over, and not as one directly
liable to Malayan Insurance. Since PNCC’s liability is grounded on that of Cuenca’s, it is
imperative that the latter be first adjudged liable to Malayan Insurance before PNCC may be
held liable.

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 f. Complaint-in-intervention

Rule 19, Section 1: Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.

Rule 19, Sec. 3: Pleadings-in-intervention. – The intervenor shall file a

complaint-in-intervention if he asserts a claim against either or all of the
original parties, or an answer-in-intervention if he unites with the defending
party in resisting a claim against the latter.

To warrant intervention, two requisites must concur: (a) the movant has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, and (b) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of
being properly decided in a separate proceeding. (Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
386 SCRA 110) The interest, which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must involve the
matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. (Garcia v. David, 67
Phil. 279 (1939)

In Bon-Mar Realty and Sport Corp. v. Spouses de Guzman, G.R. No. 182136-37, August 29,
2008, Bon-Mar was allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. 56393 since he is not a mere
stranger to the litigation but a necessary party who must be joined in the suit if complete
relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action.

g. Reply

Rule 6, Sec. 10: Reply. – A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which
is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by
way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new
matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the
answer are deemed controverted.

If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters
so alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or supplemental
complaint.

The rule is, if a party does not file a reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are
deemed controverted. When is a reply necessary? Herrera cites 3 instances:

(a) where the answer alleges the defense of usury in which case a reply under
oath should be made; otherwise, the allegation of usurious interest shall be
deemed admitted (Sun Bros. Appliances Inc. v. Caluntad, 16 SCRA 895
(1966); See also last sentence of Sec. 11, Rule 8 which reads: ―Allegations of
usury in a complaint to recover interest are deemed admitted if not denied
under oath.‖ In Sun Bros, the SC held if it is alleged that defendant entered

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 into a contract of loan with plaintiff in which the latter collected a usurious
interest there is need to deny the transaction under oath, and if no oath is
taken the only thing admitted is the allegation that the interest is usurious
and not that the contract entered into is a loan. The nature of the transaction
is not admitted. The fact that what is alleged is that the transaction was a
loan under the guise of a conditional contract of sale and that by increasing
its price by 150% the consideration became usurious, such is not deemed
admitted by the mere failure to deny the answer under oath. This transaction
must still be proven before usury can be invoked.

(b) where the defense in the answer is based on an actionable document, a

reply under oath pursuant to Sec. 8, Rule 8 must be made; otherwise, the
genuineness and due execution of the document shall be deemed admitted
(Toribio v. Bidin, 134 SCRA 162 (1985). In Toribio, the SC observed that the
situation obtaining is not a common one. The usual case is between plaintiff
and defendant where, the latter, as his defense, would present a document to
which both parties are parties and which states that the former relinquishes
his rights to the defendant. In the case at bar, we have a situation where the
defendant presented a document in his defense, a document to which the
plaintiff is a party but to which defendant is not. Thus, the question arises as
to whether or not the document is included as a necessary part of the defense
so as to make it actionable. The SC then noted that the deed of sale executed
by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio is an essential and
indispensable part of their defense to the allegation that the petitioners had
never disposed of their property. Thus, Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8 apply and
the proper procedure was for the petitioners to specifically deny under oath
the genuineness and due execution of the questioned deeds of sale and to set
forth what they claim to be the facts. However, the oversight or negligence of
petitioners' counsel in not properly drafting a reply to the answer and an
answer to the counter claim is not necessarily fatal to their cause.

(c) Reply is necessary to set up affirmative defenses on the counterclaim

(Rosario v. Martinez, 92 Phil. 1064 (1952).

2. Pleadings allowed in small claim cases and cases covered by the

rules on summary procedure

In small claim cases, the pleadings allowed are: (a) verified Statement of Claim; (b) verified
Response; (c) compulsory counterclaim, which shall be incorporated in the response; and,
(d) permissive counterclaim provided that the amount and nature thereof are within the
coverage of the Rule and the prescribed docket and other legal fees are paid.

In cases covered by the rules on summary procedure, the pleadings allowed are: (a)
complaint; (b) compulsory counterclaims and crossclaims pleaded in the answer; and, (c)
answer.

3. Parts of a pleading

a. Caption

Rule 7, Section 1: Caption. – The caption sets forth the name of the court,
the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned.

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The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be
named in the original complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it
shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an
appropriate indication when there are other parties.

Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.

b. Signature and address

Rule 7, Sec. 3: Signature and address. – Every pleading must be signed by

the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address
which should not be a post office box.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the
same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this
Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly
report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action.

c. Verification and certification against forum shopping

Rule 7, Sec. 4: Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by

law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on

"information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks
a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Rule 7, Sec. 5: Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or

principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by

mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be

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 cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Note special rules of procedure in Declaration of Nullity of Void Marriages. Sec. 8 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC states that the answer must be verified by the respondent himself and not by
counsel or attorney-in-fact. Sec. 5 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC on Legal Separation
provides for a similar rule.

The person who should verify the pleading is not necessarily the plaintiff or principal party.
It must be verified by a person who can attest that the allegations contained in the pleading
are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

Not all pleadings have to be verified. Pleadings covered by the rules on summary procedure
must be verified. Thus, a complaint for collection of a sum of money not covered by the
rules on summary procedure need not be verified but must contain a certification against
forum shopping.

(1) Requirements of a corporation executing the

verification/certification of non-forum shopping

Vda. De Formoso v. PNB, June 1, 2011

Respecting the appellate court’s dismissal of petitioners’ appeal due to the failure of some of
them to sign the therein accompanying verification and certification against forum-shopping,
the Court’s guidelines for the bench and bar in Altres v. Empleo, which were culled "from
jurisprudential pronouncements," are instructive:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the
jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the
requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum
shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the

requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein

does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The Court may
order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who

has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

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 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by
its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to
relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of
"special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the

plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of
them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with
the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed

by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf.

Bank of Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals (October 6, 2010) -- The requirement under
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. The
subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a party's failure to comply
therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court excused the non-compliance
with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, it found
special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of said
Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable.

In this case, BPI did not submit any proof of authority in the first instance because it did not
believe that a board resolution evidencing such authority was necessary. It even claimed
that it was not required to submit one. Later, it merely attached to its opposition a special
power of attorney issued by Mr. Kabigting, a bank vice-president, granting Asis and Ong the
authority to file the complaint. Thus, no direct authority to file a complaint was initially ever
given by BPI – the corporate entity in whose name and behalf the complaint was filed. Only
in its Reply to the Comment to plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss did BPI "beg
the kind indulgence of the Honorable Court as it inadvertently failed to submit with the
Special Power of Attorney the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo
Kabigting to appoint his substitutes." Even this submission, however, was a roundabout way
of authorizing the filing officers to file the complaint.

Thus, under the given facts, the SC concluded that, rather than an inadvertence, there was
an initial unwavering stance that the submission of a specific authority from the board was
not necessary. In blunter terms, the omission of the required board resolution in the
complaint was neither an excusable deficiency nor an omission that occurred through
inadvertence. In the usual course in the handling of a case, the failure was a mistake of
counsel that BPI never cared to admit but which nevertheless bound it as a client.

Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141947, July 5, 2001 – It is true that insofar as
verification is concerned, the SC has held that there is substantial compliance if the same is
executed by an attorney, it being presumed that facts alleged by him are true to his
knowledge and belief. However, the same does not apply as regards the requirement of a

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certification against forum shopping. Section 3, Rule 46, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure explicitly requires –

x x x The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such
other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform
the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom x x x

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the certification must be made by petitioner
himself and not by counsel since it is petitioner who is in the best position to know whether
he has previously commenced any similar action involving the same issues in any other
tribunal or agency.

Petitioners argue that while it may be true that they are in the best position to know
whether they have commenced an action or not, this information may be divulged to their
attorney and there is nothing anomalous or bizarre about this disclosure. They further
maintain that they executed a Special Power of Attorney specifically to authorize their
counsel to execute the certification on their behalf.

We are aware of our ruling in BA Savings Bank v. Sia that a certification against forum
shopping may be signed by an authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be disclosed in such document. However, BA Savings Bank must be
distinguished from the case at bar because in the former, the complainant was a
corporation, and hence, a juridical person. Therefore, that case made an exception to the
general rule that the certification must be made by the petitioner himself since a corporation
can only act through natural persons. In fact, physical actions, e.g., signing and delivery of
documents, may be performed on behalf of the corporate entity only by specifically
authorized individuals. In the instant case, petitioners are all natural persons and there is no
showing of any reasonable cause to justify their failure to personally sign the certification. It
is noteworthy that PEPSI in its Comment stated that it was petitioners themselves who
executed the verification and certification requirements in all their previous pleadings.
Counsel for petitioners argues that as a matter of policy, a Special Power of Attorney is
executed to promptly and effectively meet any contingency relative to the handling of a
case. This argument only weakens their position since it is clear that at the outset no
justifiable reason yet existed for counsel to substitute petitioners in signing the certification.
In fact, in the case of natural persons, this policy serves no legal purpose. Convenience
cannot be made the basis for a circumvention of the Rules.

Petition for Relief from Judgment is an initiatory pleading

Norris v. Parentela Jr. (February 27, 2003) -- Petition for relief from judgment is a new
petition where a party seeks relief based on grounds different from those in the original
case namely FAME. It is an initiatory pleading that requires a certification against forum
shopping.

Observation: Note that under Rule 38, the petition shall be filed ―in such court and in the
same case‖ where the judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is

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thereafter taken against a party in any court through FAME. (Sec. 1, Rule 38) It will also be
filed ―in such court and in the same case‖ where the judgment or final order is rendered by
any court in a case, and a party thereto, by FAME has been prevented from taking an
appeal. (Sec. 2, Rule 38)

Do you serve a copy of the petition on the adverse party pursuant to Rule 13? According to
Sec. 4, Rule 38, if the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify relief, the court
shall issue an order requiring the adverse party to answer the petition within 15 days from
receipt thereof. The order shall be served in such manner as the court may direct together
with copies of the petition and the accompanying affidavits. It would appear then that there
is no need to serve the petition on the adverse party before filing the same. Rather, the
court will serve a copy of the petition and the accompanying affidavits on the adverse party
together with the Order requiring it to file its answer.

In Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (508 SCRA
79) cited in The Parents-Teachers Association of St. Matthew Christian Academy v. Metro
Bank, G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010, where the issue of validity of the Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping was questioned in an application for the issuance of a Writ of Possession,
the SC held that:

x x x it bears stressing that a certification on non-forum shopping is required

only in a complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this case,
the subject petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by private
respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although private respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more properly a motion. What
distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the
title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion
is not to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of
the case where the motion is filed.

It is not necessary to initiate an original action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property to acquire possession. Even if the application for the writ of
possession was denominated as a ―petition‖, it was in substance merely a motion. Indeed,
any insignificant lapse in the certification on non-forum shopping filed by the MBTC did not
render the writ irregular. After all, no verification and certification on non-forum shopping
need be attached to the motion.

See also Ancheta v. Metrobank, 470 SCRA 157, where the SC held that a petition for a writ
of possession under Rule 7 of Act No. 3135 is not a complaint or an initiatory pleading.

d. Effect of the signature of counsel in a pleading

It constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.

4. Allegations in a pleading

a. Manner of making allegations

Rule 8, Section 1. In general. – Every pleading shall contain in a methodical

and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on

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 which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be,
omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.

If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and

their applicability to him shall be clearly and concisely stated.

(1) Condition precedent

Rule 8, Sec. 3. Conditions precedent. – In any pleading a general averment of

the performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent shall be sufficient.

(2) Fraud, mistake, malice, intent, knowledge and other

condition of the mind, judgments, official documents or
acts

Rule 8, Sec. 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. – In all averments of

fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be
stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the
mind of a person may be averred generally.

b. Pleading an actionable document

Rule 8, Sec. 7. Action or defense based on document. – Whenever an action

or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of
such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit,
which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like
effect be set forth in the pleading.

Rule 8, Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. – When an action or defense

is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness
and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the
adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when
the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused.

Asian Construction and Development Corp. v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 176949, June 27, 2012 –
Charge invoices are not actionable documents per se as these ―only provide details on the
alleged transactions. These documents need not be attached to or stated in the complaint
as these are evidentiary in nature.

In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 567, the document
whose genuineness and due execution is deemed admitted need not be formally offered in
evidence. The effect is to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of expressly presenting such
documents as evidence since they are considered as judicial admissions.

The following defenses, not being inconsistent with the genuineness and due execution are
not waived despite failure to specficially deny under oath the actionable document: (a)
Fraud; (b) Estoppel; (c) Want or Illegality of Consideration; (d) Mistake; (e) Payment; (f)
Minority or Imbecility; (g) Duress; (h) Statute of Limitations; and, (i) Compromise. The

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following defenses are however deemed waived: (a) Forgery in the signature; (b)
Unauthorized signature as in the case of an agent signing for the principal; (c) the
Corporation was not authorized under its charter to sign the instrument; (d) Want of
delivery; or, (e) at the time the document was signed, it was not in the words and figures
exactly as set out in the pleading.

c. Specific denials

(1) Effect of failure to make specific denials

Rule 8, Sec. 10. Specific denial. – A defendant must specify each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies
to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny
only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.

(2) When a specific denial requires an oath

Rule 8, Sec. 11, ―Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are
deemed admitted if not denied under oath.‖

5. Effect of failure to plead

Rule 9, Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. – If the defending party fails to answer
within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming
party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the
defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.
Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.

The rule refers to a defending party, which means that it is not only a defendant who fails to
answer who may be declared in default.

May a defendant who fails to answer a complaint that has been amended as a matter of
right be declared in default? No because ―an answer earlier filed may serve as the answer to
the amended complaint if no new answer is filed.‖

May a plaintiff who fails to answer a compulsory counterclaim be declared in default? As a

rule, an answer to a counterclaim or cross-claim is required and faillure to answer is a
ground for default. However, a counterclaim need not be answered where the answer would
be a repetition of the allegations in the complaint (Navarro v. Bello, 102 Phil. 1019 (1958)
or where the issues raised in the counterclaim are inseparable from those posed in the
complaint. (Sarmiento v. Juan, 120 SCRA 403) Thus, a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to
answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, principally because the
issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations in the
complaint. (Gojo v. Goyala, 35 SCRA 557)

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May a defendant who fails to answer a supplemental complaint be declared in default? No,
the answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to the supplemental complaint if no
new or supplemental answer is filed. (Rule 11, Sec. 7, 2 nd sentence)

1. Failure to plead defenses and objections

Can the trial court motu proprio dismiss the complaint?

Under Sec. 1, Rule 9, ―… when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the court has no jurisdicition over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.‖

Under Sec. 4 of Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the court from an examination of the
allegations therein and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright
on any of the grounds apparent therefrom for the dismissal of a civil action. Thus, the court
may motu proprio dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue if its apparent on
the allegations of the complaint.

2. Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim

Rule 11, Sec. 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer. – A

counterclaim or a cross-claim which either matured or was acquired by a
party after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be
presented as a counterclaim or a cross-claim by supplemental pleading before
judgment.

Rule 11, Sec. 10. Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. – When a pleader fails
to set up a counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or
excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up
the counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment before judgment.

The plaintiff may still set up a counterclaim by amending the complaint as a matter of right
or at any time before a responsive pleading is served.

6. Default

a. When a declaration of default is proper

Rule 9, Sec. 3, ―If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed
therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the
defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default.‖

b. Effect of an order of default

Rule 9, Sec. 3 (a): Effect of order of default. - A party in default shall be

entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.

Pascua v. Florendo (April 30, 1985) -- Complainants are not automatically entitled to the
relief prayed for once the defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted
only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and
the facts proven by the presenting party. It would be meaningless to require presentation of

76
evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would automatically
be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his
prayer. See also Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank, March 21, 2006.

In Gajudo, SC explained that the proscription against the award of unliquidated damages is
significant because it means that the damages must be proved convincingly in accordance
with the quantum of evidence required in civil cases.

c. Relief from an order of default

Rule 9, Sec. 3 (b): Relief from order of default. - A party declared in default
may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under
oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that
he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set
aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of
justice.

In Lina v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 637 (1985), the SC discussed the various remedies of
a defendant declared in default:

(a) file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground
that his failure to answer was due to FAME, and that he has a meritorious
defense;
(b) if judgment has been rendered, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
(c) if the defendant discovers the default after the judgment has become final
and executory, he may file a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38;
(d) he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary
to the evidence or the law.

In Lina, Justice Herrera dissented citing Dimayacyac v. CA, 93 SCRA 265 (September 27,
1979), insisting that certiorari still lies when such appeal does not prove to be a more
speedy and adequate remedy. In Dimayacyac, Justice Abad Santos said, the ordinary
remedy which should be availed by a party who has been declared in default and judgment
rendered against him is that of appeal and not certiorari. The rule is not without exceptions.
Thus, although appeal is available, certiorari still lies when such appeal does not prove to be
a more speedy and adequate remedy.

In Arquero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168053, September 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 70, citing
the case of Martinez v. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 134,
explained that the 4th remedy, which is an appeal from the judgment, is anchored on Sec. 2,
Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Even after the deletion of that provision under the 1997 Rules,
the SC did not hesitate to expressly rely on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement
that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered against him. The
defaulted defendant has the right to appeal and assail the judgment on the ground that the
amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the
plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is
contrary to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or
reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Court
of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby allowed to regain his right to adduce
evidence, a right which he lost in the TC when he was declared in default, and which he
failed to have vacated.

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 Note that the appellate court can review the assailed decision and is not precluded
from reversing the same based solely on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.

d. Effect of a partial default

Rule 9, Sec. 3 (c): Effect of partial default. - When a pleading asserting a

claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties,
some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case
against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the
evidence presented.

e. Extent of relief

Rule 9, Sec. 3 (d): Extent of relief to be awarded. - A judgment rendered

against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind
from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

In what other instance may a judgment by default be rendered even if the defendant has
filed an answer? Under Sec. 5, Rule 29, ―If a party or an officer or managing agent of a
party wifully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being
served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 25 after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may
strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or prooceeding
or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion,
order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred b the other, including attorney’s fees.‖

f. Actions where default are not allowed

Rule 9, Sec. 3 (e): Where no defaults allowed. - If the defending party in an

action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there
is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated.

Note special rule of procedure on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage, Sec. 8 (2)
thereof, which states: If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare
him or her in default. Sec. 8 (3) further states that where no answer is filed or if the answer
does not tender an issue, the court shall order the Public Prosecutor to investigate whether
collusion exists between the parties.

Special rule of procedure in Legal Separation, Sec. 5 (b) and (c) provides for a similar rule.

END OF SECOND PART

oooOOOooo

78
 OUTLINE IN REMEDIAL LAW 1
Atty. Victor Y. Eleazar
Arellano University School of Law
PART III

7. Filing and Service of pleadings

Note distinction between substituted service of summons and substituted service of

pleadings.

Under Sec. 8, Rule 13, if service of pleadngs, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other
papers cannot be made either by personal service or by mail because the office and place of
residence of the party or his counsel is unknown, substituted service may be made by
delivering a copy to the clerk of court with proof of failure of both personal service and
service by mail. The service is complete at the time of such delivery.

Under Sec. 7, Rule 14, if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 14, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

I. Payment of docket fees

Sec. 1, Rule 141: Upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an
action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full, unless a staggered
basis of payment is allowed by the Rules. xxx

II. Filing versus service of pleadings

Distinguish between substituted service of pleading and substituted service of summons –

Under Sec. 8, Rule 13, ―If servie of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and
other papers cannot be made under the two preceding sections, the office and place of
residence of the party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by delivering the
copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail.
The service is complete at the time of such delivery.‖ Under Sec. 7, Rule 14, ―If, for
justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.‖

III. Periods of filing of pleadings

In what instances is the period to answer within 15 days?

a. Answer to a complaint, within 15 days after service of summons unless a

different period is fixed by the court. (Rule 11, Sec. 1)

b. Answer to an amended complaint when the amendment is made as a matter

of right, within 15 days after being served with a copy thereof. (Rule 11, Sec. 3)

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 c. Answer to a third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, within 15 days after service
of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court. (Rule 11, Sec. 5)

The period is 10 days in the following instances:

a. In cases covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, defendant shall within

10 days from service of summons file his answer to the complaint. (Sec. 5, Rules on
Summary Procedure)

b. Answer to an amended complaint when the amendment is not a matter of

right, within 10 days from notice of the order of admitting the same. (Rule 11, Sec. 3, 2 nd
paragraph)

c. Answer to an amended counterclaim, amended cross-claim, amended third

(fourth, etc.)-party complaint, and amended complaint-in-intervention, within 10 days from
notice of the order of admitting the same. (Rule 11, Sec. 3, 3 rd paragraph)

d. Answer to a counterclaim or cross-claim must be answered within 10 days

from service. (Rule 11, Sec. 4)

e. A reply may be filed within 10 days from service of the pleading responded to.
(Rule 11, Sec. 6)

f. A supplemental complaint may be answered within 10 days from notice of the

order admitting the same. (Rule 11, Sec. 7)

In what instance is the period different from either 10 or 15 days?

a. Where the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity and service of

summons is made on the government official designated by law to receive the same, the
answer shall be filed within 30 days after receipt of summons by such entity. (Rule 11, Sec.
2)

b. Where the defendant is served summons by publication under Sec. 15, Rule
14. Any order granting suh leave shall specify a reasonable time which shall not be less
than 60 days after notice within which the defendant must answer.

IV. Manner of filing

Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court.
(Rule 13, Sec. 2)

Rule 13, Sec. 3: Manner of filing. – The filing of pleadings, appearances,

motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by
presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to
the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case, the
clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the
second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other
papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the
envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing,
payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of
the case.

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 V. Modes of service

Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made
either personally or by mail. (Rule 13, Sec. 5)

(1) Personal service

Rule 13, Sec. 6: Personal service. – Service of the papers may be made by
delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his
office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is
found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by
leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the
evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if known, with a person of
sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

(2) Service by mail

Rule 13, Sec. 7: Service by mail. – Service by registered mail shall be made
by depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to
the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if
known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the postmaster to
return the mail to the sender after ten (l0) days if undelivered. If no registry
service is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee,
service may be done by ordinary mail.

In Benguet Electric Coop v. NLRC, 209 SCRA 55 (May 18, 1992) estabished the rule that the
transmission through a private carrier or letter forwarder is not a recognized mode of filing
pleadings. The date of actual receipt by the court and not the date of delivery to the private
courier is deemed the date of the filing of the pleading.

(3) Substituted service

Rule 13, Sec. 8: Substituted service. – If service of pleadings, motions,

notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under the two
preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his
counsel being unknown, service may be made by delivering the copy to the
clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by
mail. The service is complete at the time of such delivery.

Substituted service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers
should be distinguished from substituted service of summons.

(4) Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions

Rule 13, Sec. 9: Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. –

Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by
registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear
in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be
served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.

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 (5) Priorities in modes of service and filing

In City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011, 656
SCRA 102, the SC noted that the counsel for the City holds office in Dumaguete City,
Negros Oriental, in the Visayas while the counsel for the PPA holds office in Quezon City,
Metro Manila in Luzon. Given the considerable distance between the offices of these two
counsels, personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other was clearly not
practical and a written explanation as to why personal service was not done would only be
superfluous.

(6) When service is deemed complete

Rule 13, Sec. 10: Completeness of service. – Personal service is complete

upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration
of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five
(5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster,
whichever date is earlier.

(7) Proof of filing and service

Rule 13, Sec. 12: Proof of filing. – The filing of a pleading or paper shall be
proved by its existence in the record of the case. If it is not in the record, but
is claimed to have been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by the
written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court on a
copy of the same; if filed by registered mail, by the registry receipt and by
the affidavit of the person who did the mailing, containing a full statement of
the date and place of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed
envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with
instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10)
days if not delivered.

Rule 13, Sec. 13: Proof of service. – Proof of personal service shall consist of
a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or
the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date,
place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof
shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance
with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall
be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by
the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.

8. Amendment

a. Amendment as a matter of right

Amendment in case of jurisdictional issues on the original pleading

Herrera in his book Remedial Law said, ―The rule that a plaintiff may not amend his cause of
action for purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction which it does not have under the
original complaint, only applies if a responsive pleading had already been filed and
therefore, leave of court is required. Before the filing of a responsive pleading, the plaintiff

82
may amend his pleading as a matter of course without leave of court, and this is true even
if a motion to dismiss has been filed, because the latter is not a responsive pleading.‖

Thus, in Soledad v. Mamangun, 8 SCRA 110 (1963), the contention that the Municipal Court
erred in admitted the amended complaint because it has no jurisdiction over the original
complaint was held as untenable because of plaintiff’s right to amend his pleading once as a
matter of course even if there is a pending motion to dismiss.

Riano in his book Civil Procedure said, ―A fair reading of jurisprudence recognizes the right
of pleader to amend his complaint before a responsive pleading is served even if its effect is
to correct a jurisdictional defect. The argument that the court cannot allow such type of
amendment since the court must first possess jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint before it can act on any amendment has no application upon an amendment that
is made as a matter of right.‖

Amendment in case of lack of cause of action in original pleading

May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual
of a cause of action during the pendency of the case? This was the basic issue raised in
Swagman Hotels and Travel Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 455 SCRA 175. According to the SC, a
complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an
amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action
while the case is pending.

The curing effect under Sec. 5, Rule 10 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at
the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the
essential facts.

b. Amendments by leave of court

c. Formal amendment

d. Amendments to conform to or authorize presentation of

evidence

e. Different from supplemental pleadings

f. Effect of amended pleading

F. Summons

Philamlife v. Breva, 442 SCRA 217 (November 11, 2004) – Case should not be dismissed
simply because original summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive,
for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a court complaining that he
had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An
alias summons can be actually served on said defendant.

1. Nature and purpose of summons in relation to actions in personam,

in rem and quasi in rem

2. Voluntary appearance

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In Atiko Trans Inc. and Cheng Lie Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance Inc., G.R. No. 167545, August 17, 2011, Atiko Trans was served with summons
thru its cashier Cristina while Cheng Lie, a foreign shipping company doing business in the
Philippines thru its duly authorized shipagent defendant Atiko Trans, was served with
summons thru its agent. Both defendants were declared in default. Judgment was then
rendered against the two defendants by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Atiko
Trans then filed its Notice of Appeal to the Regional Trial Court, its Memorandum of Appeal,
its Motion for Reconsideration, and its Petition for Review of the decision of the RTC. It
never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person.

According to the SC, when the defendant is a domestic corporation, service of summons
may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by
proper service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly
objecting to the court’s jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, viz:

SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in

the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

In the case at bench, when Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion
for Reconsideration of the Decision of the RTC, and Petition for Review, it never questioned
the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person. The filing of these pleadings seeking affirmative
relief amounted to voluntary appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of
jurisdiction moot. In Palma v. Galvez (615 SCRA 86) this Court reiterated the oft-repeated
rule that "the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court."

Moreover, petitioners’ contention is a mere afterthought. It was only in their Memorandum

filed with this Court where they claimed, for the first time, that Atiko was not properly
served with summons. In La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals (236 SCRA 78) it
was held that the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably
raised. Failing to do so, a party who invoked the jurisdiction of a court to secure an
affirmative relief cannot be allowed to disavow such jurisdiction after unsuccessfully trying
to obtain such relief.

MeTC however did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie. Before it was
amended by A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC, Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the defendant
is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the
Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers
or agents within the Philippines.

Elucidating on the above provision of the Rules of Court, this Court declared in Pioneer
International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr. (535 SCRA 584) that when the defendant is a foreign
juridical entity, service of summons may be made upon:

84
 1. Its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose;
2. The government official designated by law to receive summons if the
corporation does not have a resident agent; or,
3. Any of the corporation’s officers or agents within the Philippines.

In the case at bench, no summons was served upon Cheng Lie in any manner prescribed
above. It should be recalled that Atiko Trans was not properly served with summons as the
person who received it on behalf of Atiko, cashier Cristina, is not one of the corporate
officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The MeTC acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Atiko Trans not thru valid service of summons but by the
latter’s voluntary appearance. Thus, there being no proper service of summons upon Atiko
to speak of, it follows that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng
Lie. To rule otherwise would create an absurd situation where service of summons is valid
upon the purported principal but not on the latter’s co-defendant cum putative agent
despite the fact that service was coursed thru said agent. Indeed, in order for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant foreign private juridical entity under
Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there must be prior valid service of summons
upon the agent of such defendant.

Also, the records of this case is bereft of any showing that cashier Cristina is a government
official designated by law to receive summons on behalf of Cheng Lie or that she is an
officer or agent of Cheng Lie within the Philippines. Hence, her receipt of summons bears no
significance insofar as Cheng Lie is concerned. At this point, we emphasize that the
requirements of the rule on summons must be strictly followed, lest we ride roughshod on
defendant’s right to due process.

With regard to Cheng Lie’s filing of numerous pleadings, the same cannot be considered as
voluntary appearance. Unlike Atiko Trans, Cheng Lie never sought affirmative relief other
than the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person.
From the very beginning, it has consistently questioned the validity of the service of
summons and the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person.

It does not escape our attention though that Cheng Lie’s pleadings do not indicate that the
same were filed by way of special appearance. But these, to our mind, are mere
inaccuracies in the title of the pleadings. What is important are the allegations contained
therein which consistently resisted the jurisdiction of the trial court. Thus, Cheng Lie cannot
be considered to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the courts.

In fine, since the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie, its decision
insofar as Cheng Lie is concerned is void. Thus, Cheng Lie was improperly declared in
default.

Applying the above disquisition, the MeTC likewise erred in declaring Cheng Lie in default.
Settled is the rule that a defendant cannot be declared in default unless such declaration is
preceded by a valid service of summons.

3. Personal service

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON

FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY. As amended, said provision of the Rules of Court
now reads:

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 SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a
foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may
be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if
there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on
any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no
resident agent, service may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through
any of the following means:

a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign

country with the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;
b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country
where the defendant may be found and by serving a copy of the summons
and the court order by-registered mail at the last known address of the
defendant;
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof
of service; or
d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.

4. Substituted service

In Samartino v. Raon (July 3, 2002), the return failed to show the reason why personal
service could not be made. It failed to state that prompt and personal service was rendered
impossible. Thus, the substituted service was considered ineffective. SC cited SC Adm.
Circular No. 59 issued on November 19, 1989 which stressed the importance of strict
compliance with the requisites for a valid substituted service of summons. It states: ―The
substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in
person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find
the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in
the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the
usual method of service.‖

The return must show the following: (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons
within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; (c) state
that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing
in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business of the
defendant. (Jose v. Boyon, October 23, 2003)

Note, in Jose, when substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly
because efforts to serve the summons personally on the defendants failed, the plaintiffs
filed a motion for leave to effect summons by publication, which was granted. The SC held
that ―extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the
action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself instead of
against the defendant’s person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendants and the
purpose is to subject that individual’s right in a piece of property to the obligation or loan
burdening it. In the instant case, what was filed before the TC was an action for specific
performance directed against the defendants. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of
land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue since they did not assert any
interest or right over it. Moreover, an action for specific performance is an action in
personam. Having failed to serve the summons on defendants property, the RTC did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons.

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VYE’s comment: In Jose, Justice Panganiban made a sweeping statement that service of
publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem but not in personal suits such as
an action for specific performance. Herrera noted that under previous rulings, summons by
publication has been held as not permissible in actions in personam. This according to
Herrera is ―too broad and should not be made to apply to resident defendants. It is only
when the defendant is not a resident of the Philippines and cannot be found in the
Philippines that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over its person in actions in personam.

In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals (September 25, 1998), the SC explained that in an
action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court
to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who
does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as
provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14. If he cannot be personally served with summons service
may be affected by substituted service in accordance with Sec. 8. If he is temporarily out of
the country, any of the of the following modes of servie may be resorted to: (1) substituted
service set forth in Sec. 8; (2) service outside the country with leave of court; (3) service by
publication also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam who cannot be be

personally served with summons may be summoned either by means of substituted service
in accordance with Rule 14, Sec. 8 or by publication as provided in Sec. 17 and 18 of the
same Rule.

It is when the action in personam is against a non-resident defendant who cannot be found
in the Philippines and does not voluntarily submit himself to the jurisdiciton of the
Philippines that summons by publication cannot be made upon him for the purpose of
acquiring jurisdiction. In such case, personal service of summons within the state is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This method of service is possible
if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person, and therefore cannot validly try and decide the
case against him.

Manotoc v. CA, 499 SCRA 21 (August 16, 2006)

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service -- The party relying on substituted service or
the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a
"reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time
frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility
of loss, if any, to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set
period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the
return of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of
the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of
summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal
service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable
time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is
what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the
end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to
submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return
provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to
be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the

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succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered
"reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care,
utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the
expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to
accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is
expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted
service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually
resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at
least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must
cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return -- The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the
facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to
find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in
the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to
locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of
defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must
be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of
Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the
Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated
November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating
the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which
should be made in the proof of service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion -- If the substituted service will be effected at
defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and
discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has
attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the
ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient
discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the
import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to
the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus,
the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter
would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is
of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether said
person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of
Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge -- If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s
office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in
charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be
the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager;

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and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the
defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction
on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.

Pascual v. Pascual (December 4, 2009) – reiterated the guidelines in Manotoc.

5. Constructive service (by publication)

a. Service upon a defendant where his identity is unknown or

where his whereabouts are unknown

b. Service upon residents temporarily outside the Philippines

6. Extra-territorial service, when allowed

7. Service upon prisoners and minors

8. Service upon public corporations

The case of Republic v. Domingo, G.R. No. 175299, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 621,
emanated from a complaint for specific performance with damages against the DPWH,
Region III. Summon was issued and served on the DPWH, per the Proof of Service, ―through
Nora Cortez, Clerk III of said office as shown by her signature and stamped mark received
by said office appearing on the original summons.‖ DPWH was declared in default and
Domingo was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The judgment of default became final
and thereafter, a writ of execution was issued against DPWH. The OSG then filed a petition
for annulment of judgment with the CA arguing that the Republic was not impleaded as an
indispensable party. The CA dismissed the petition.

According to the SC, ―when a suit is directed against an unincorporated government agency,
which because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical peronality of its own, the suit is
agains the agency’s principal, i.e., the State. In Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of
Appeals, 562 SCRA 422, where summons was served on the Bureau of Telecommunications
(BuTel) which was an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), the SC cited Rule 14, Sec. 13 which provides that where the
defedant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the
Solicitor General. The BuTel is an agency attached to the DOTC created under E.O. No. 546
on July 23, 1979… It is indisputedly part of the Republic and summons should have been
served on the Solicitor General.

In this case, the complaint for specific performance with damages is against the DPWH,
Region III. The DPWH and its regional office are merely agents of the Republic, which is the
real party in interest. Thus, as mandated by Sec. 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.

It is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the
complete determination of the action. It was incumbent upon Domingo to name and implead
the proper defendant in his complaint, which is the Republic, and cause the service of
summons to made upon the officer mandated by law. The fact that the OSG entered its
appearance in other civil cases where the summons were served only upon the DPWH
Region III has no bearing in this case.

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VYE’s COMMENT: Rule 14, Sec. 13, says ―service may be effected on the Solicitor General‖
implying that it is an option and that the summons may be served on the government
agency concerned. Apparently, this kind of interpretation is not valid. The SC was emphatic
in Republic v. Domingo that ―summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.‖

9. Proof of service

G. Motions

1. Motions in general

a. Definition of a motion

b. Motions versus pleadings

c. Contents and form of motions

d. Notice of hearing and hearing of motions

Jehan Shipping Corp. v. NFA, 477 SCRA 781 – the purpose of the rule is deemed duly
served if the adverse party has been heard through pleadings filed in opposition to the
motion.

In City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011, 656
SCRA 102, the SC citing the case of Philippine National Bank v. Paneda, G.R. No. 149236,
February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 639, held that even if the motion may be defective for failure
to address the notice of hearing of said motion to the parties concerned, the defect was
cured by the court’s taking cognizance thereof and the fact that the adverse party was
otherwise notified of the existence of said pleading. There is substantial compliance with the
foregoing rules if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the other
party.

e. Omnibus motion rule

f. Litigated and ex parte motions

Examples of non-litigated motions:

In de los Reyes v. Ramnani, G.R. No. 169135, June 18, 2010, the petitioner argued that the
subject motion was defective for lack of a notice of hearing. According to the SC, the motion
was a non-litigious motion. While, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for
hearing under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-
litigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of
sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. Hence, the subject
motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. At any rate, the trial court gave
petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a Comment/
Opposition on March 1, 2004 before the trial court. Petitioner cannot, therefore, validly
claim that he was denied his day in court.

g. Pro-forma motions

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 2. Motions for Bill of Particulars

a. Purpose and when applied for

What pleadings can be the subject of a motion for bill of particulars?

Rules say, ―Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a definite statement or
for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. Thus, the following
pleadings are covered: (a) Complaint, the Answer being the responsive pleading; (b)
Answer, the Reply being the responsive pleading; (c) Counter-claim or cross-claim, the
answer thereto being the responsive pleading; (d) Third-Party Complaint, the answer
thereto being the responsive pleading; and (e) Reply, but no responsive pleading is
permitted by the Rules.

The Rules further state, ―if the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10)
days from service thereof.‖ Herrera said, if the pleading is a reply, this is just like saying if
no responsive pleading is permitted by the Rules. The former Rule reads, ―Before
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules …‖

Period to file responsive pleading in case of amendment pursuant to an order granting bill of
particulars

Problem: Defendant filed a motion for bill of particulars, which the trial court granted. Thus,
plaintiff was directed to comply with the order. Under Rule 12, Sec. 3, if the motion is
granted, compliance must be effected within 10 days from notice of the order. The plaintiff
in this case has the option to file a separate pleading or an amended pleading, serving a
copy thereof on the adverse party. What if the plaintiff opted to file a separate pleading?
Upon receipt of the separate pleading, the defendant has to file his responsive pleading
according to Sec. 5 of Rule 12, within the period to which he was entitled at the time of the
filing his motion, which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event.

What if the plaintiff opted to file an amended complaint, how many days does the defendant
has to file his responsive pleading? Do we apply Sec. 3 of Rule 11, which states, ―Where the
plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the
same within 15 days after being served with a copy thereof.‖ Or, do we apply Sec. 5 of Rule
12, giving the defendant the remaining period to which he was entitled at the time of the
filing of his motion for bill of particulars, which shall not be less than 5 days in any event.

VYE’s position: We should apply Rule 12 because the amendment was made pursuant to an
order directing the plaintiff to submit a bill of particulars or a more definite statement of any
matter alleged in the complaint. In other words, the amendment in this case was not made
as a matter of right pursuant to the provisions of Rule 10.

b. Actions of the court

c. Compliance with the order and effect of noncompliance

d. Effect on the period to file a responsive pleading

3. Motion to Dismiss

a. Grounds

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Article 151 (Family Code) – No suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

b. Resolution of Motion

c. Remedies of plaintiff when the complaint is dismissed

d. Remedies of the defendant when the motion is denied

e. Effect of dismissal of complaint on certain grounds

f. When grounds pleaded as affirmative defenses

g. Bar by dismissal

h. Distinguished from demurrer to evidence under Rule 33

H. Dismissal of Actions

Under Sec. 1, Rule 17, the complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. It
is therefore possible that the plaintiff would file a notice of dismissal without his knowing
that an answer has been served on him and filed with the Court by registered mail. And the
Court acting upon the notice issued an order confirming the dismissal.

What if it turns out that indeed an answer has been filed in court and served on the plaintiff
by registered mail before the notice of dismissal was filed? If before the court could issue an
order confirming the dismissal it receives the answer or motion for summary judgment, the
court should disregard the notice of dismissal. The plaintiff would then have to file a motion
under Sec. 2. If it issues an order confirming the dismissal but eventually receives the
answer or motion for summary judgment, the defendant will have to file the appropriate
motion questioning the confirmation of the dismissal. The court may then have to disregard
the notice of dismissal in view of the filing of an answer or motion for summary judgment.

1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff; Two-dismissal rule

In Strongworld Construction Corp. v. Perello, 496 SCRA 700 – dismissals based on pars. (f),
(h) and (i) of Section 1 bar the refiling of the same action or claim, or with prejudice.
Dismissal based on the rest of the grounds enumerated are without prejudice because they
do not preclude the refiling of the same action.

In Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago, 494 SCRA 393 – Under Sec. 3, Rule 17, the dismissal
of the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the
dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. The dismissal of the complaint is
without prejudice to the right of the defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

2. Dismissal upon motion by plaintiff; effect on existing counterclaim

3. Dismissal due to the fault of plaintiff

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Problem: Is the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff under Sec. 3, Rule
17 also without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim? VYE
maintains that the defendant can insist on his counterclaim although the provision that the
dismissal is limited to the complaint is found only in Sec. 2. After all, if the consequence of a
dismissal of the complaint upon motion of the plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim, with more reason should it be without prejudice to
said right of the defendant if the dismissal of the complaint is due to the fault of the
plaintiff.

4. Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint

I. Pre-trial

1. Concept of pre-trial

2. Nature and purpose

3. Notice of pre-trial

4. Appearance of parties; effect of failure to appear

In case of non-appearance of the plaintiff at the pre-trial, the action may be dismissed
under Sec. 5, Rule 18. Can the defendant insist on his counterclaim? Justice Feria opined
that the ―defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff may be allowed to present
evidence on his counterclaim, if any.‖ (See Herrera, p. 817)

Paredes v. Verano (October 12, 2006) -- The absence of counsel for defendants at pre-trial
does not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the
presentation of evidence ex parte. It bears stressing that nothing in the Rules of Court
sanctions the presentation of evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for defendant
is absent during pre-trial. The Rules do not countenance stringent construction at the
expense of justice and equity. In this case, the defendants were present but their counsel
did not appear despite due notice.

5. Pre-trial brief; effect of failure to appear

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (August 16, 2004) Guidelines to be observed by trial judges and clerks
of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures. Some features
are as follows:

1. Summons shall contain a reminder to defendant to observe restraint in filing a

motion to dismiss and instead allege the grounds thereof as defenses in the answer.

2. Issue an order requiring the parties to avail of interrogatories to parties (Rule

25), request for admission by adverse party (Rule 26), or make use of depositions under
Rule 23 or other measures under Rules 27 and 27 within 5 days from filing of the answer.

3. Within 5 days from filing of reply, plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that
the case be set for pre-trial conference. If he fails to do so, the Branch COC shall issue
notice of pre-trial.

4. Pre-trial Brief. No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered

during the trial in support of a party’s evidence-in-chief other than those that had been

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earlier identified and premarked during the pre-trial except if allowed by the court for good
cause shown. Brief must indicate the approximate number of hours that will be required by
the parties for the presentation of their respective witnesses. Rule on contents of pretrial
brief must be strictly complied with. The parties are bound by representations and
statements in their respective pretrial briefs.

5. Refer the case to the Philippine Mediation Center for purposes of mediation if
available.

6. Pre-marking of exhibits before the Branch COC and attached to the records
after comparison.

7. Minutes of preliminary conference. Note, preliminary conference under Rules

on Summary Procedure is different.

8. Active role of the judge in pre-trial

9. Adhere to the one-day examination of witness rule

10. Most important witness rule

11. Use of affidavits of witnesses as direct examination. In question and answer

form.

6. Distinction between pre-trial in civil case and pre-trial in criminal

case

The Rules on pre-trial are different in petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage and
legal separation.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. – (a) If the petitioner
fails to appear personally, the case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a
duly authorized representative appears in court and proves a valid excuse for
the non-appearance of the petitioner.

(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall
proceed with the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the
non-appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen days thereafter a
report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion
between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.

A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC

Section 10. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (1) If the petitioner
fails to appear personally, the case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a
duly authorized representative appears in court and proves a valid excuse for
the non-appearance of the petitioner.

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 (2) If the respondent filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall
proceed with the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the
non-appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen days a report to
the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion between
the parties. If there is no collusion the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.

Note that in the pre-trial, the presence of the petitioner is mandatory. He/she cannot simply
appear through his/her attorney-in-fact. If he/she cannot attend the pre-trial conference,
his/her counsel must prove a valid excuse for his/her non-appearance.

On the other hand, if the defendant filed his answer but fails to appear in the pre-trial
conference, the court should proceed with the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to
conduct a collusion investigation. Note that a collusion investigation was not necessary in
the first place since the defendant had filed an answer.

7. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

J. Intervention

Intervention is never an independent action but is auxillary and supplemental to the existing
litigation. It is merely collateral, accessory, or ancillary to the principal action.

Is intervention an initiatory pleading requiring a certification against forum shopping? Under

Sec. 3, Rule 19, the intervention shall be made by complaint filed and served in regular
form and may be answered as if it were an original complaint. VYE maintains that the
complaint-in-intervention is an initiatory pleading.

1. Requisites for intervention

In Virra Mall Tenants Association Inc. v. Virra Mall Greenhills Association Inc., G.R. No.
182902, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 728, the SC citing the case of Executive Secretary v.
Northeast Freight, G.R. No. 179516, 17 March 2009, 581 SCRA 736, held that –

Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the

court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the
statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a
person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both;
or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As
regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such
interest must be of a direct and immediate character so that the intervenor
will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The
interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere
curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and
contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral.
However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest, permission to
intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which
is limited by considering "whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or
not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

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The SC further held that although VMTA could always file a separate case against Ortigas,
original plaintiff in the case, allowing VMTA to intervene will facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and avoid a multiplicity of suits.

2. Time to intervene

Although Sec. 2, Rule 19 says the motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court, intervention was allowed even on appeal; allowed
to interven in a case pending before the SC; allowed after judgment where it is necessary to
protect some interest which cannot otherwise be protected; and, may be allowed for the
purpose of preserving the intervenor’s right to appeal.

In Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91486, September 10, 2003, the Republic through
the OSG intervened in the case when the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
pending before the SC. According to the SC, the rule on intervention, like all other rules of
procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for
justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding
technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court
has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial court. In one
case, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment
was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.

In Mago v. Court of Appeals, intervention was granted even after the decision became final
and executory, thus –

…The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of

the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the same. But needless to say, this discretion should be exercised
judiciously and only after consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in
the case.

3. Remedy for the denial of motion to intervene

K. Subpoena

Sec. 2, Rule 21 enumerates the persons who may issue a subpoena. Under Sec. 3, Rule 32,
the commissioner ―may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum…‖

1. Subpoena duces tecum

2. Subpoena ad testificandum

Grounds for quashal of subpoenas: If subpoena duces tecum, it may be quashed on the
ground that (a) it is unreasonable and oppressive; (b) the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear; (c) if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is
issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof; or, (d) the witness
fees and kilometrage allowed by the Rules were not tendered when the subpoena was
served. If subpoena ad testificandum, it may be quashed on the ground that (a) the witness
is not bound thereby; or (b) the witness fees and kilometrage allowed by the Rules were not
tendered when the subpoena was served.

3. Service of subpoena

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 4. Compelling attendance of witnesses; Contempt

5. Quashing of subpoena

L. Modes of Discovery

1. Depositions pending action; Depositions before action or pending

appeal

Cojuangco v. Caluag, L-7952, July 30, 1955, Unreported – trial court has jurisdiction to
direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for so
ruling.

That the right of a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not exactly absolute is
implicit in the provisions of the Rules of Court cited by appellants themselves, sections 16
and 18 of Rule 24, which are precisely designed to protect parties and their witnesses,
whenever in the opinion of the trial court, the move to take their depositions under the
guise of discovery is actually intended to only annoy, embarrass or oppress them. In such
instances, these provisions expressly authorize the court to either prevent the taking of a
deposition or stop one that is already being taken. (Caguiat v. Hon. Guillermo E. Torres,
G.R. No. L-25481, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 106)

a. Meaning of deposition

b. Uses; Scope of examination

A party without court intervention can take a deposition of any person after answer has
been served. This right however is not absolute. The trial court may in its discretion order
that a deposition shall not be taken. The TC’s discretion on this matter must nonetheless be
exercised not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law. (Autographics Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 198) In
Autographics, PAL resorted to deposition during the trial stage of witnesses, which it
intended to present in court but opted to do so by deposition. Also, the Notice to Take
Deposition indicated that it will be before a Judge in Makati or his Branch Clerk of Court.

c. When may objections to admissibility be made

In Veran v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 438, considering that the deposition was taken long
after the answer had been filed and served, there was no need to seek the approval of the
TC for the taking of the deposition, notice of such taking being sufficient. Leave of court for
taking depositions should however be distinguished from the approval of the court for the
use of the deposition. Thus, with regard to the use of a deposition, there is occasion for the
court to exercise its discretion, the proper time being when the deposition is formally
offered in evidence.

d. When may taking of deposition be terminated or its scope

limited

2. Written interrogatories to adverse parties

a. Consequences of refusal to answer

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 b. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories

3. Request for Admission

a. Implied admission by adverse party

b. Consequences of failure to answer request for admission

c. Effect of admission

d. Effect of failure to file and serve request for admission

4. Production or inspection of documents or things

5. Physical and mental examination of persons

Agustin v. CA (June 15, 2005) – Motion for the issuance of an order directing all the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28. This was the first case
where the admissibility of DNA testing as a means of determining paternity was the focal
issue in controversy.

Herrera v. Alba (June 15, 2005) – Motion to Direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to
abbreviate proceedings. The issue was whether a DNA testing is a valid probative tool in this
jurisdiciton to determine filiation. The case used the Vallejo standards outlined in People v.
Vallejo.

6. Consequences of refusal to comply with modes of discovery

M. Trial

1. Adjournments and postponements

2. requisites of motion to postpone trial

a. for absence of evidence

b. for illness of party or counsel

3. Agreed statement of facts

4. Order of trial; reversal of order

5. Consolidation or Severance of hearing or trial

Yu v. Basilio Magno Construction, G.R. No. 138701-02 (October 17, 2006) – when two or
more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must
be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to
settle expeditiously the issues involved.

6. Delegation of reception of evidence

7. Trial by commissioners

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 a. Reference by consent or ordered on motion

b. Powers of the commissioner

c. Commissioner’s report; notice to parties and hearing on the

report

N. Demurrer to Evidence

1. Ground

2. Effect of denial

3. Effect of grant

4. Waiver of right to present evidence

5. Demurrer to evidence in a civil case versus demurrer to evidence in

a criminal case

Rule 119, Sec. 23. After prosecution rests its case, court may dismiss action on ground of
insuffficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard, or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed with or without leave of
court.

If court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court,
accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence of prosecution.

Accused has non-extendible period of 5 days after prosecution rests its case to move for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. If granted, he has non-extendible period of 10
days to file demurrer to evidence from notice.

An order denying motion for leave of court or demurrer to evidence itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

O. Judgments and Final Orders

1. Judgment without trial

2. Contents of a judgment

3. Judgment on the pleadings

The answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements for a specific
denial set out in Sec. 10 of Rule 8; and, it would admit the material allegations of the
adverse party’s pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but
also if it omits to deal with them at all.

In default under Rule 9, the judgment shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind
from that prayed for. Liquidated damages are not to be awarded. It provides: ―Thereupon,

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the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading
may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant in pre-trial under Rule 18, it ―shall be a cause
to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on
the basis thereof.‖

In judgment on the pleadings under Rule 34, the court may direct judgment on such
pleading.

Can a motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted ex parte? The SC in Dino v.
Valencia, 175 SCRA 406, explained that Sec. 1 of Rule 34 (formerly Sec. 1 of Rule 19) does
not state whether the motion for judgment on the pleading may be considered ex-parte or
only after notice of hearing served on the adverse party. A motion for a judgment on the
pleadings, where the answer admits all the material averments of the complaint is one that
may be considered ex-parte because, upon the particular facts presented and laid before
the court, the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment. Besides, the purpose of the law in
requiring the filing of motions at least 3 days before the hearing thereof is to avoid surprises
upon the opposite party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the
movant. This purpose has been sufficiently complied with, the petitioner having filed an
opposition to the said motion.

Note, under Sec. 2, Rule 18, during the pre-trial, the court shall consider ―(g) the propriety
of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action
should a valid ground therefor be found to exist.‖

4. Summary judgments

By genuine issue is meant an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith and patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.

Estrada v. Consolacion (June 29, 1976), 71 SCRA 523, illustrates the effect of non-
familiarity with the rule on summary judgment. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint for
damages that his wife was a passenger of a jeepney owned and operated by the defendant;
that as a common carrier, defendant were by law and contract obliged to conduct his wife
safely to her destination. The defendant alleged in his answer that the cause of the accident
was the negligence of third persons over whom she had no supervision and control. She
then filed a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact in the case except as to the amount of damages
defendant was seeking from the plaintiff by way of counterclaim. Her motion was supported
by affidavits and annexes. Plaintiff opposed the motion but failed to present any counter-
affidavit. The TC then issued an order decreeing that the defendant have judgment
summarily against plaintiff, and set the case for hearing to determine the amount of
damages due the defendant on her counterclaim.

The majority opined that what was only an interlocutory order directing that a hearing be
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of damages. It was a determination
of the TC of a preliminary point or directing some steps in the proceedings but not a
disposition of the merits. There was no judgment yet and therefore the petition for certiorari
was premature.

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Justice Barredo while concurring in the results explained that it is only from the
consideration and appraisal of the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their
witnesses in their affidavits submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition
that the TC may determine if there is a triable genuine issue. When a party against whom a
summary judgment is asked fails to submit counter-affidavits to support the opposition, a
summary judgment is reasonably, if not undeniably proper.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (July 15, 2003), 406 SCRA 190 – The phrase ―anytime after
the pleading in answer thereto has been served‖ means ―at any stage of the litigation.‖
Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or
that the defenses raised by the defendants are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for
summary judgment.

Bank of Philippine Islands v. Yu, G.R. No. 184122, January 20, 2010

A summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or the
parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact. Here, to resolve the issue of the excessive
charges allegedly incorporated into the auction bid price, the RTC simply had to look at a)
the pleadings of the parties; b) the loan agreements, the promissory note, and the real
estate mortgages between them; c) the foreclosure and bidding documents; and d) the
admissions and other disclosures between the parties during pre-trial. Since the parties
admitted not only the existence, authenticity, and genuine execution of these documents
but also what they stated, the trial court did not need to hold a trial for the reception of the
evidence of the parties.

BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper given the following issues that the
parties raised: 1) whether or not the loan agreements between them were valid and
enforceable; 2) whether or not the Yus have a cause of action against BPI; 3) whether or
not the Yus are proper parties in interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are estopped from
questioning the foreclosure proceeding after entering into a compromise agreement with
Magnacraft; 5) whether or not the penalty charges and fees and expenses of litigation and
publication are excessive; and 6) whether or not BPI violated the Truth in Lending Act.

But these are issues that could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the
pleadings and the admissions of the parties. Indeed, BPI has failed to name any document
or item of fact that it would have wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. A trial would
have been such a great waste of time and resources.

Estate of Lim Cheng v. Bacala, G.R. No. 149603, March 14, 2007

The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to
tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions
that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the court is justified in dispensing
with the trial and rendering summary judgment. It was devised to aid parties in avoiding
the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

In this case, the parties agreed that a committee be formed to conduct an ocular inspection
to determine whether they are claiming the same property. The trial court approved the
finding of the committee, stated in the Commissioner’s Report, that respondents are
claiming a property which is also being claimed by petitioner. Considering that the parties
agreed to the formation of a committee, they are bound by its finding. It is settled that
when a referee (the commissioners in this case) is appointed, he becomes for the time
being an accredited agent and an officer of the court, and the reference is clearly a judicial

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proceeding. What the referee does while acting within the scope of his official duty is,
therefore, in the contemplation of law, done by the court itself. Hence, his conclusions must
be assumed to be correct until error is properly shown, which is not so in the present case.

It must be recalled that respondents’ main defense is that they are occupying a property
different from that being claimed by petitioner. Consequently, based on the Commissioner’s
Report, respondents failed to prove that they are the rightful owners of the disputed land
considering that what they own is a different area.

At any rate, petitioner has shown that as early as August 19, 1939, the Tribunal de
Apelacion (now Court of Appeals) rendered a Decision declaring Lim Ching, the predecessor
of Atty. Jose Lim, herein representative of petitioner, the owner of the property.

Clearly, a summary judgment was correctly rendered by the trial court since there was no
more genuine factual issue to be resolved.

It is settled that a court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on
motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. In
such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, G.R. No. 175291, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 643 –
The SC citing Asian Construction and Development Corp. v. Philippine Commercial
International Bank, 488 SCRA 192, explained the concept of summary judgment in this
wise:

Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at

weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby
avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

Uner the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no

genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-
blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when
the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not
genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a
matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary
judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material
fact.

a. for the claimant

b. for the defendant

c. when the case not fully adjudicated

d. affidavits and attachments

5. Judgment on the pleadings versus summary judgments

In Basbas v. Sayson, G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 151, the SC
distinguished judgment on the pleadings from summary judgments in this wise: ―Simply
stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the
presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any

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issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof
and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. (Tan v.
De la Vega, 484 SCRA 538) On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the
material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words
raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not
genuine. A ―genuine issue‖ means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not
constitute a genuine issue for trial. (Wood Technology Corp. v. Equitable Banking Corp., 451
SCRA 724)

6. Rendition of judgments and final orders

Separate judgment – Sec. 5, Rule 36 – When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, the court, at any stage, upon determination of the issues material to a particular
claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject
matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim.

Several judgment – Sec. 4, Rule 36 – In an action against several defendants, the court
may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them,
leaving the action to proceed against the others. Justice Feria pointed out that a several
judgment is an example of a multiple appeal. Justice Herrera however observed that under
Sec. 1 (f), Rule 41, no appeal may be taken from ―a judgment or final order for or against
one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-
party complaints while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom.‖

Partial judgment – Sec. 4, Rule 35 – If on motion for summary judgment, judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing
such further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed
established and trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.

A partial summary judgment does not however finally dispose of the action. It is merely an
interlocutory order and not a final judgment and is not appealable. As explained in GSIS v.
Philippine Village Hotel, 438 SCRA 567, ―what the rules contemplate is that the appeal from
the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with the judgment that may be
rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the material facts on which a
substantial controversy exists.

Fernando v. Santamaria (December 10, 2004) - a case of several judgment

- Fernando obtained on 3 separate occasions a loan from Chua for 5.5 Million. As security
she executed a REM over her Makati property. Before the 3rd loan could be released, she
executed a Deed of Absolute sale over the property in favor of Chua in consideration of 3
Million upon the assurance of Borres who acted as Chua's agent that the deed was a mere
formality. She learned that her title was cancelled and a new one was issued to Chua. She
also learned that Chua sold the property to Uy and a new title was issued in favor of the
latter.

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- Fernando then filed the following causes of action: (a) annulment of the deeds of sale in
favor of Chua and Uy and the cancellation of the titles issued in the name of Chua and Uy;
(b) recovery of certain amounts of money from Borres; and (c) recovery of damages against
all the defendants.

- RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint against Chua and Uy but the case was to
proceed against Borres.

- Notice of appeal should be accompanied by a record on appeal. Rationale is to enable the

appellate court to decide the appeal without the original records. Which should remain with
the court a quo pending disposal of the case with respect to the other defendants.

Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the 1987 Constitution on periods to decide cases – All cases or
matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within 24
months from date of submission for the SC and, unless reduced by the SC, 12 months for
all lower collegiate courts, and 3 months for all other lower courts.

In Echaus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57343, July 23, 1990, 199 SCRA 381, there was
allegedly a verbal order approving the record on appeal in open court. What was
subsequently released by the Court was an order holding in abeyance the approval of the
record on appeal until after the consideration and resolution of the other party’s pending
motion. According to Justice Narvasa, ―Time honored and of constant observance is the
principle that no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence
until and unless it is set down in writing, signed, and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the
Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that
indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof
is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order
or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft
thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party.
In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service
on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has
plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party
or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has
not attained finality.‖

In Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Liwanag Paras Brios, et al., (September 19, 1988) 165
SCRA 464 (1981), the SC was emphatic that the TC’s power to alter or modify or even set
aside its own decisions can only be done at anytime before the decision becomes final. Once
a judgment has become final and executory, the TC can no longer amend or correct except
for clerical errors or mistakes.

Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 434

As an incident to this case, Justice Ruben Reyes was administratively held liable for
causing the release to the pubic an unpromulgated Decision of the SC en banc which
contained the signatures of 14 Associate Justices. The CJ had yet to sign the Decision and
certify the same. Justice Reyes was eventually meted with a penalty of a fine of Php500T.

In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision
dated April 1, 2009 is a complete turn-around from the ruling embodied in the Decision
written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which, although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed
by fourteen (14) Associate Justices and approved by the Court en banc on July 15, 2008. He

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decried the absence of an explanation in the Decision dated April 1, 2009 for the said
departure or turn-around.

Such a position deserves scant consideration.

The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections, held that a decision must not only be
signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be
considered a Decision, to wit:

[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly
promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no
decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court
after the deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at
the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of
no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of
this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast
their votes, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when
they have to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what
they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and
deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and
promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the
deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon
no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for
determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for
designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is
that decision binding unless and until signed and promulgated.

We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed
by the ponente. Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already
signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and register a
qualification or dissent as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated.
A promulgation signifies that on the date it was made the judge or judges
who signed the decision continued to support it.

Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the
confidential internal deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A
decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated. Until such operative act
occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have
already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of
signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and
had signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one’s vote, thereby preserving
one’s freedom of action.

7. Entry of judgment and final order

P. Post Judgment Remedies

1. Motion for New Trial or reconsideration

a. Grounds

Sec. 5, Rule 37 allows the filing of a second motion for new trial. According to Justice Feria,
the second motion for new trial may be filed within the remaining period after deducting the

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time during which the first motion was pending. The motion must be based on a ground not
existing when the first motion was made; otherwise, it will not interrupt the period within
which to appeal.

b. When to file

According to Feria, ―The second motion for new trial may be filed within the remaining
period after deducting the time during which the first motion was pending.‖ Herrera noted
that under Rules 42, 43 and 45, the computation of the period to file a petition for review
(or appeal by certiorari) is either from receipt of the decision or notice of the denial of a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration and the period to file is not from receipt
of the decision but from receipt of the notice of the denial of the motion.

c. Denial of the motion; effect

Antonio v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 185663, June 20, 2012 – Since there
is no bar for petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration so as to give the RTC opportunity
to reverse itself before elevating the matter for the appellate courts’ review, appeal is the
prescribed remedy from the denial of such motion and not another motion for
reconsideration. While Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court includes ―an order denying
a motion for new trial or reconsideration‖ in the enumeration of unappealable matters, this
Court clarified in Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. (433 SCRA 631) that such refers to a
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and the denial of a motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal is a final order, therefore, appealable. Moreover, a
second motion for reconsideration from a final judgment or order is prohibited, hence, can
never interrupt the period to perfect an appeal.

d. Grant of the motion; effect

e. Remedy when motion is denied, Fresh 15-day period rule

Neypes v. CA - SC cited cases of Quelnan v. VHF Phil. (July 7, 2004) and Apuyan v.
Haldeman (September 20, 2004) where it was held that an order denying a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment is a final order contemplated in Sec. 3, Rule 41. In both
cases, the SC said the petitioner had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file
a notice of appeal.

Note: 2nd par. of Sec. 3, Rule 41 says..."The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a
timely motion for new trial or reconsideration..."
SC held (a) to standardize the appeal periods and (b) to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, it was deemed practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days. The rule
applies to Rule 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45.

2. Appeals in General

a. Judgments and final orders subject to appeal

Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553 -- The
distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes
of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but
the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet

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to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done
in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the
subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple
appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of
time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the
parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and
as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory
order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with
the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.

b. Matters not appealable

Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012

It is true that the original text of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly limited an appeal to a judgment or final order, and proscribed the taking of an
appeal from an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration, among others, viz:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or

final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief
from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession
or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other
ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or
in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,
while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action

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 under Rule 65. (n)

The inclusion of the order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for
reconsideration in the list of issuances of a trial court not subject to appeal was by reason of
such order not being the final order terminating the proceedings in the trial court. This
nature of the order is reflected in Section 9 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which declares that such order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not
appealable, ―the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.‖

In Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo Mores
and Virginia Lopez, the Court further expounded:

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration

independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion
for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new
evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a
reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues,
contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are
excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final
order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a
motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial
court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final
order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the
denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or
final order itself.

In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., however, the Court has interpreted the proscription
against appealing the order denying a motion for reconsideration to refer only to a motion
for reconsideration filed against an interlocutory order, not to a motion for reconsideration
filed against a judgment or final order, to wit:

[T]his Court finds that the proscription against appealing from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration refers to an interlocutory order, and not
to a final order or judgment. That that was the intention of the above-quoted
rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455 (1971), cited in
above-quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in which this Court held that
an order denying a motion to dismiss an action is interlocutory, hence, not
appealable.

The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an
interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue
inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal. The
appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or
order and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.

The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a

complaint is not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts
an end to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter
therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than to
execute the order.

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 Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal
of the order of dismissal itself.

The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999
Order denying his Omnibus Motion—Motion for Reconsideration should thus
be deemed to refer to the January 17, 1999 Order which declared him non-
suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.

If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for

reconsideration is applied to any order, then there would have been no need
to specifically mention in both above-quoted sections of the Rules ―final
orders or judgments‖ as subject of appeal. In other words, from the entire
provisions of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that what is
proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order.

In Apuyan v. Haldeman, too, the Court categorized an order denying the motion for
reconsideration as the final resolution of the issues a trial court earlier passed upon and
decided, and accordingly held that the notice of appeal filed against the order of denial was
deemed to refer to the decision subject of the motion for reconsideration.

Subsequently, in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, where the decisive issue was whether or not
the appeal was taken within the reglementary period, with petitioners contending that they
had timely filed their notice of appeal based on their submission that the period of appeal
should be reckoned from July 22, 1998, the day they had received the final order of the trial
court denying their motion for reconsideration (of the order dismissing their complaint),
instead of on March 3, 1998, the day they had received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint, the Court, citing Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. and Apuyan v.
Haldeman, ruled that the receipt by petitioners of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration filed against the dismissal of their complaint, which was a final order,
started the reckoning point for the filing of their appeal, to wit:

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is
one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do
with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.

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 As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the ―final
order,‖ not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint.
Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration
only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet
lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the ―final order,‖ receipt of which

triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal – the February
12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing
the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon
receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside.
When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal
the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing
his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise
dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days
after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was
appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it
was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues
raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v.

Haldeman et al. where we again considered the order denying petitioner
Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final order, which finally disposed
of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view that the

order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the
final order contemplated in the Rules.

As the aftermath of these rulings, the Court issued its resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to
approve certain amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court effective on
December 27, 2007. Among the amendments was the delisting of an order denying a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration found in Section 1,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of what are not appealable. The amended rule
now reads:

Section 1. Subject of appeal.— An appeal may be taken from a judgment or

final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief
from judgment;
(b) An interlocutory order;
(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

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 (d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession
or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other
ground vitiating consent;
(e) An order of execution;
(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or
in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,
while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
and
(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an

appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65.

Based on the foregoing developments, Shell and Tabangao’s appeal, albeit seemingly
directed only at the October 5, 1999 denial of their motion for reconsideration, was proper.
Thus, we sustain the CA’s denial for being in accord with the rules and pertinent precedents.
We further point out that for petitioners to insist that the appeal was limited only to the
assailed resolution of October 5, 1999 was objectively erroneous, because Shell and
Tabangao expressly indicated in their appellant’s brief that their appeal was directed at both
the February 3, 1998 decision and the October 5, 1999 resolution.

c. Remedy against judgments and orders which are not

appealable

d. Modes of appeal

(1) Ordinary appeal

(2) Petition for review

(3) Petition for review on certiorari

Sevilleno v. Carilo (September 14, 2007) -- Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of
a case is a matter of law. Consequently, issues which deal with the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter of a case are pure questions of law.

e. Issues to be raised on appeal

Can the appellate court consider matters not assigned as errors on appeal? In General
Milling Corp. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 193723, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 256, citing the case of
Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, 327 SCRA 283, the SC explained that
an appellate court has a broad discretionary power in waiving the lack of assignment of
errors in the following instances:

(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter;
(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within contemplation of law;
(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is
necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or
to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;

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 (d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial
court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted
which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error
assigned; and,
(f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned is dependent.

In General Milling Corp. case, par. (c) was applied for according to the SC, there would be a
just and complete resolution of the appeal if there is a ruling on whether the Spouses
Ramos were actually in default in their obligation to GMC.

f. Period of appeal

Rule 41, Sec. 3 - "However, appeals in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from."

g. Perfection of appeal

h. Appeal from judgments or final orders of the MTC

i. Appeal from judgments or final orders of the RTC

Macawiwili Gold Mining And Development Co. v. CA (October 12, 1998) -- 3 modes of
appeal from decisions of the RTC

- ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41 where judgment was rendered in
a civil or criminal case by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The appeal is
taken on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.

- petition for review under Rule 42 where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction. The appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law.

- petition for review on certiorari to the SC under Rule 45. The appeal is elevated to the SC
only on questions of law. (see Republic v. Malabanan, October 6, 2010)

j. Appeal from judgments or final orders of the CA

k. Appeal from judgments or final orders of the CTA

l. Review of final judgments or final orders of the COA

m. Review of final judgments or final orders of the COMELEC

n. Review of final judgments or final orders of the CSC

o. Review of final judgments or final orders of the Ombudsman

p. Review of final judgments or final orders of the NLRC

q. Review of final judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial

agencies

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Rom v. Roxas & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 169331, September 5, 2011, 656 SCRA 691 – Sec. 61 of
R.A. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR ordrrs are governed by the Rules of
Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary. In this case, the petitioners should
have assailed before the CA the Orders of the DAR through a Petition for Review under Rule
43. Instead, it pursued a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Angeles v. Gaite, November 25, 2009 – The SC upheld Memo Circular No. 58 issued by the
Office of the President issued on June 30, 1993 which states: ―No appeal from or petition for
review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigation
of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President except those involving
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.‖

Auto Prominence Corp. v. Winterborn, January 27, 2009, 577 SCRA 51 – In this case, the
investigating prosecutor found probable cause for estafa and filed the Information. Upon
Petition for Review, the Department of Justice reversed the resolution and directed the
withdrawal of the Information. Before the Regional Trial Court, accused filed an Urgent
Motion for the Determination or Re-determination of Probable Cause and/or Motion to Defer
Proceedings, or in the alternative, Motion for Re-Investigation with Motion to Recall Warrant
of Arrest. From the DOJ, complainant filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning
the resolution. The Court of Appeals however dismissed the petition. Complainant then went
to the SC, which considered the issue moot and academic when the RTC resolved to dismiss
the Information although there was still a pending Motion for Reconsideration.

Fildams Pharma Inc. v. Court of Appeals, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 460 – The SC citing
Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 618, Rule 43 is not the proper remedy. The remedy
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion is to present evidence; otherwise, certiorari
under Rule 65.

Orosa v. Roa, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 22 – Although the SC said Rule 43 is not proper, it
made no reference at all to previous rulings except the Bautista case. According to the SC,
the remedy is a petition for review to the Office of the President.

Tan v. People, April 12, 2002 – Justice Vitug said neither the Constitution nor the Rules of
Criminal Procedure exclusively vests in the SC the power to hear cases on appeal in which
only an error of law is involved. The Court of Appeals under Rule 42 and 44 is authorized to
determine errors of fact, of law, or both. Justice Quisumbing however qualified that the
mixed questions of law and fact that may be raised in the Court of Appeals is not a pure
question of law. The phrase errors of fact, or law, or both found in Rule 42 and any quesiton
of fact or law in Rule 44 must be understood to mean question of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law when referring to cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals.

END OF THIRD PART

oooOOOooo

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 OUTLINE IN REMEDIAL LAW 1
Atty. Victor Y. Eleazar
Arellano University School of Law
PART IV

3. Relief from judgments, orders and other proceedings

Is the remedy available in criminal cases? In Basco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125290,
February 29, 2000, the SC reversed and set aside the order of the TC denying the petition
for relief from judgment in the criminal case. In Hilario v. People, 551 SCRA 191, the case
was remanded to the TC to hold hearings on the petition for relief from judgment and rule
on the merits. Accused alleged he instructed his lawyer to appeal the judgment of conviction
but his lawyer did not. In Del Rosario v. Cedillo, 441 SCRA 70, the SC deferred ruling on the
administrative liability of the judge because of a pending petition for relief from judgment in
the criminal case filed by the complainant.

Mesina v. Meer, G.R. No. 146845, July 2, 2002

Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional
circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present.
Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial
or appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.

Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed
within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other
proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most
importantly, it should be filed with the same court, which rendered the decision, viz:

"Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. -

When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in
the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside."

As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the
petition for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or final order of
municipal trial courts should be filed with the regional trial court, viz:

"Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for Relief from Judgment of

inferior court. - When a judgment is rendered by an inferior court on a case,
and a party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has
been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from
taking an appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the
province in which the original judgment was rendered, praying that such
judgment be set aside and the case tried upon its merits.

Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or
other proceeding thereof. - When a judgment order is entered, or any other
proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud,

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 accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside."

Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present Rule extends the remedy
of relief to include judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals since the Rule uses the
phrase "any court". We disagree.

The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform

procedure for municipal and regional trial courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan
trial courts as courts of record. While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court", it refers only to
municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts.

The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by
separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by
additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it
stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.

a. Grounds for availing of the remedy

Samonte v. S.F. Naguiat Inc. (October 2, 2009) -- Petitioner’s claim that Section 1, Rule 38
of the Rules of Court does not require that petitioner should state the reason why he did not
avail of the remedy of appeal deserves scant consideration. His failure to avail of the
remedy of appeal within the reglementary period despite receipt of the RTC decision
rendered the same final and executory. He cannot be allowed to assail the RTC decision
which had become final in a petition for relief from judgmen when there was no allegations
of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence which prevented him from interposing
an appeal. Such appeal could have corrected what he believed to be an erroneous judicial
decision. To reiterate, petition for relief is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy which is not
present in petitioner’s case. Thus, petitioner's resort to a petition for relief under Rule 38
was not proper and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petition for relief from judgment.

Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition must be accompanied with
affidavits of merits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
upon by petitioner and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of
action or defense as the case maybe. While a petition for relief without a separate affidavit
of merit is sufficient where facts constituting petitioner’s substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be, are alleged in a verified petition since the oath elevates the
petition to the same category as a separate affidavit, the petition for relief filed by petitioner
was not even verified. Thus, the CA did not err in no longer considering the merits of the
case.

b. Time to file petition

c. Contents of petition

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155450, August 6, 2008, the SC held that the
petition for annulment of decree complied with the procedural requirements under Rule 47.
Thus, it properly alleged lack of jurisdiction as the ground for the annulment of the decree.
Since the complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action,

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petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.
(Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 [2004])

4. Annulment of Judgments or final orders and resolutions

Sec. 1, Rule 47, refers to ―judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the
Regional Trial Court.‖ It is not available in criminal cases. In Llamas v. Court of Appeals,
September 29, 2009, reiterating the case of People v. Bitanga, 525 SCRA 623, the SC held
that remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases.

a. Grounds for annulment

Manila v. Gallardo-Manzo, G.R. No. 163602, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 20 – Case
stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by respondents against petitioners. The MeTC
ruled in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MeTC decision and found
that the petitioners have exercised their option to buy the leased property but the
respondents refused to honor the same. Thus, the RTC directed the respondents to execute
a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners. The respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was denied for having been filed out of time. About 4 years later,
respondents filed a petition for annulment of judgment assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC
to direct them in an ejectment case to execute a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners. The
CA annulled the decision of the RTC saying that the RTC clearly acted without jurisdiction
when it ordered the respondents to sell their properties to the petitioners. The order to sell
can be made only by a court in an action for specific performance under its exclusive
jurisdiction and not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in an appealed ejectment suit.
Worse, the relief granted by the same court was not even prayed for by the petitioners in
their Answer and position paper before the MeTC.

According to the SC, lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter
of the claim. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiciton, petitioner
must show not merely an abuse of discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law.

There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate jurisdiction over ejectment cases
decided by the MeTC. A judgment in a detainer case disposes of no other issue than
possession and establishes only who has the right of possession but by no means
constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. In
this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of petitioners
when instead of simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs
due to the petitioners, it ordered the respondents to execute a deed of absolute sale in
favor of the petitioners on the basis of its own interpretation of the contract of lease which
granted the petitioners the option to buy the leased premises. This cannot be done in an
ejectment case.

However, such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal is but an exercise of
jurisdiction of the RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause,
and not the decision rendered therein. The ground for annulment of decision is absence of,

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or no jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition
because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Antonio v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 185663, June 20, 2012 – Apart from
the requirement that the existence of ―extrinsic fraud‖ or ―lack of jurisdiction‖ should be
amply demonstrated, one who desires to avail this remedy must convince that the ordinary
and other appropriate remedies, such as an appeal, are no longer available for causes not
attributable to him. This is clearly provided under Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

A petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on ―extrinsic fraud‖ and ―lack of
jurisdiction‖ and cannot prosper on the basis of ―grave abuse of discretion‖. By anchoring
her petition on the alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her
complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for reconsideration, petitioner, is, in effect,
enlarging the concept of ―lack of jurisdiction‖. As this Court previously clarified in Republic
of the Philippines v. ―G‖ Holdings, Inc. (512 Phil. 253) ―lack of jurisdiction‖ as a ground for
the annulment of judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not contemplate ―grave abuse of
discretion‖ considering that ―jurisdiction‖ is different from the exercise thereof.

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional

cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders
and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The underlying reason is traceable to
the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment.
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause
involved therein should be laid to rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on
the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at
some definite date fixed by law. (Ramos v. Judge Combong Jr., 510 Phil. 277)

The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final, are ultimately
void. Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant
another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it
enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an
absolute nullity to begin with. (Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39)

Villanueva v. Nite, July 25, 2006 – Example of extrinsic fraud

Barco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120587, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 162 – case
involving illegitimacy

b. Period to file action

c. Effects of judgment of annulment

5. Collateral attack of judgments

Q. Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

Execution is a process provided by law for the enforcement of a final judgment. It is issued
against the judgment debtor or obligor.

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 1. Difference between finality of judgment for purposes of appeal; for
purposes of execution

Final judgment or order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates the
particular proceedings or action leaving nothing to be done by the court but to enforce by
execution what has been determined.

Thus, the test to determine whether a judgment or order is final or interlocutory is to

ascertain if the judgment or order leaves nothing more for the court to do with respect to
the merits of the case. If it leaves nothing more for the court to do, then it is final;
otherwise, it is an interlocutory order.

2. When execution shall issue

a. Execution as a matter of right

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. – Execution shall issue

as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of
the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment
obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry
thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of
justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

b. Discretionary execution

Sec. 2. Discretionary execution.

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.— On motion of the

prevailing party will notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it
has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record
or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or
final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a

special order after due hearing.

(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments.— A several separate

or partial judgment may be executed under the same terms and conditions as
execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.

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 Sec. 3. Stay of discretionary execution.

Discretionary execution issued under the preceding section may be stayed

upon approval by the proper court of a sufficient supersede as bond filed by
the party against whom it is directed, conditioned upon the performance of
the judgment or order allowed to be executed in case it shall be finally
sustained in whole or in part. The bond thus given may be proceeded against
on motion with notice to the surety.

Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal.

Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and

such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be
immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not
be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial
court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may make an
order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction,
receivership, accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as
may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the
adverse party.

Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment.

Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on

appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of
restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under
the circumstances.

Urban Bank Inc. v. Pena, G.R. No. 145817, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 418

In this case, execution pending appeal was granted by the lower court. In this case,
the trial court supported its discretionary grant of execution based on the alleged collection
suit filed against Peña by his creditor friend for PhP3,000,000. According to the SC, the
mere fact that Atty. Peña was already subjected to a collection suit for payment of the loan
proceeds he used to perform his services for Urban Bank is not an acceptable reason to
order the execution pending appeal against the bank. Financial distress arising from a lone
collection suit and not due to the advanced age of the party is not an urgent or compelling
reason that would justify the immediate levy on the properties of Urban Bank pending
appeal. That Peña would made liable in the collection suit filed by his creditor-friend would
not reasonably result in rendering illusory the final judgment in the instant action for
agent’s compensation.

Peña’s purported difficulty in paying the loan proceeds used to perform his services
does not outweigh the injury or damages that might result should Urban Bank obtain a
reversal of the judgment, as it did in this case.

Thus, the SC concluded that the pendency of a collection suit by a third party
creditor which credit was obtained by the winning judgment creditor in another case, is not
a sufficiently good reason to allow execution pending appeal as the Rules of Court provide.

On the other hand, the CA affirmed the grant of the execution pending appeal citing
as additional reason the closure of the bank. According to the SC, petitioner's allegedly

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precarious financial condition, however, is not by itself a jurisprudentially compelling
circumstance warranting immediate execution. The financial distress of a juridical entity is
not comparable to a case involving a natural person — such as a very old and sickly one
without any means of livelihood, an heir seeking an order for support and monthly
allowance for subsistence, or one who dies.

Indeed, the alleged financial distress of a corporation does not outweigh the long
standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments. Certainly, a
juridical entity like petitioner corporation has, other than extraordinary execution,
alternative remedies like loans, advances, internal cash generation and the like to address
its precarious financial condition.

Execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy allowed only when there are
reasons to believe that the judgment debtor will not be able to satisfy the judgment debt if
the appeals process will still have to be awaited. It requires proof of circumstances such as
insolvency or attempts to escape, abscond or evade a just debt. In Florendo v. Paramount
Insurance Corp. (20 January 2010, 610 SCRA 377), the SC explained that the execution
pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that execution issues as a matter of
right, when a judgment has become final and executory:

As such exception, the court’s discretion in allowing it must be strictly

construed and firmly grounded on the existence of good reasons. "Good
reasons," it has been held, consist of compelling circumstances that justify
immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances
must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should
the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would
make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and
justice, a tool of oppression and inequity.

The presence or the absence of good reasons remains the yardstick in allowing the
remedy of execution pending appeal, which should consist of exceptional circumstances of
such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer, should
the appealed judgment be reversed later. Thus, the Court held that even the financial
distress of the prevailing company is not sufficient reason to call for execution pending
appeal:

In addressing this issue, the Court must stress that the execution of a
judgment before its finality must be founded upon good reasons. The
yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of
exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or
damage that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be
reversed later. Good reason imports a superior circumstance that will
outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party. In the case at bar, petitioner
failed to show "paramount and compelling reasons of urgency and justice."
Petitioner cites as good reason merely the fact that "it is a small-time building
contractor that could ill-afford the protracted delay in the reimbursement of
the advances it made for the aforesaid increased costs of . . . construction of
the [respondent's] buildings."

In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals (23 September 1997, 279

SCRA 364), the Court denied execution pending appeal to a juridical entity which allegedly
was in financial distress and was facing civil and criminal suits with respect to the collection
of a sum of money. It ruled that the financial distress of the prevailing party in a final

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judgment which was still pending appeal may not be likened to the situation of a natural
person who is ill, of advanced age or dying as to justify execution pending appeal:

It is significant to stress that private respondent Falcon is a juridical

entity and not a natural person. Even assuming that it was indeed in financial
distress and on the verge of facing civil or even criminal suits, the immediate
execution of a judgment in its favor pending appeal cannot be justified as
Falcon’s situation may not be likened to a case of a natural person who may
be ill or may be of advanced age. Even the danger of extinction of the
corporation will not per se justify a discretionary execution unless there are
showings of other good reasons, such as for instance, impending insolvency
of the adverse party or the appeal being patently dilatory. But even as to the
latter reason, it was noted in Aquino vs. Santiago (161 SCRA 570 [1988]),
that it is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision he
rendered as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not within
competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution pending
appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as its
basis for finding good reason to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can
appreciate the dilatory intent of an appeal as an additional good reason in
upholding an order for execution pending appeal which may have been issued
by the trial court for other good reasons, or in cases where the motion for
execution pending appeal is filed with the appellate court in accordance with
Section 2, paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

What is worse, only one case was actually filed against Falcon and this
is the complaint for collection filed by Solidbank. The other cases are
"impending", so it is said. Other than said Solidbank case, Falcon’s survival as
a body corporate cannot be threatened by anticipated litigation. This
notwithstanding, and even assuming that there was a serious threat to
Falcon’s continued corporate existence, we hold that it is not tantamount nor
even similar to an impending death of a natural person. The material
existence of a juridical person is not on the same plane as that of human life.
The survival of a juridical personality is clearly outweighed by the long
standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments.

In cases where the two or more defendants are made subsidiarily or solidarily liable
by the final judgment of the trial court, discretionary execution can be allowed if all the
defendants have been found to be insolvent. Considering that only Urban Bank, and not the
other eight individual defendants, was later on considered by the Court of Appeals to have
been "in danger of insolvency," is not sufficient reason to allow execution pending appeal,
since the liability for the award to Peña was made (albeit, mistakenly) solidarily liable
together with the bank officers.

In Flexo Manufacturing Corp. v. Columbus Food, Inc., and Pacific Meat Company,
Inc. (11 April 2005, 455 SCRA 272), both Columbus Food, Inc., (Columbus Food) and Pacific
Meat Company, Inc., (Pacific Meat) were found by the trial court therein to be solidarily
liable to Flexo Manufacturing, Inc., (Flexo Manufacturing) for the principal obligation of
PhP2,957,270.00. The lower court also granted execution pending appeal on the basis of the
insolvency of Columbus Food, even if Pacific Meat was not found to be insolvent. Affirming
the reversal ordered by the Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that since there was another
party who was solidarily liable to pay for the judgment debt, aside from the insolvent
Columbus Food, there was no good reason to allow the execution pending appeal:

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 Regarding the state of insolvency of Columbus, the case of Philippine National Bank
v. Puno (10 February 1989), the SC held:

"While this Court in several cases has held that insolvency of the
judgment debtor or imminent danger thereof is a good reason for
discretionary execution, otherwise to await a final and executory judgment
may not only diminish but may nullify all chances for recovery on execution
from said judgment debtor, We are constrained to rule otherwise in this
particular case. In the aforecited cases, there was either only one defeated
party or judgment debtor who was, however, insolvent or there were several
such parties but all were insolvent, hence the aforesaid rationale for
discretionary execution was present. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that,
assuming MMIC is insolvent, its co-defendant PNB is not. It cannot, therefore,
be plausibly assumed that the judgment might become illusory; if MMIC
cannot satisfy the judgment, PNB will answer for it. It will be observed that,
under the dispositive portion of the judgment hereinbefore quoted, the
liability of PNB is either subsidiary or solidary.

Thus, when there are two or more defendants and one is not insolvent,
the insolvency of a co-defendant is not a good reason to justify execution
pending appeal if their liability under the judgment is either subsidiary or
solidary. In this case, Pacific was adjudged to be solidarily liable with
Columbus. Therefore, the latter is not the only party that may be answerable
to Flexo. Its insolvency does not amount to a good reason to grant execution
pending appeal.

Similarly, the trial court in this case found Urban Bank and all eight individual bank
officers solidarily liable to Atty. Peña for the payment of the PhP28,500,000 award. Hence,
had the judgment been upheld on appeal, Atty. Peña could have demanded payment from
any of the nine defendants. Thus, it was a mistake for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed
execution pending appeal based solely on the receivership of Urban Bank, when there were
eight other individual defendants, who were solidarily liable but were not shown to have
been insolvent. Since Urban Bank’s co-defendants were not found to have been insolvent,
there was no good reason for the Court of Appeals to immediately order execution pending
appeal, since Atty. Peña’s award could have been satisfied by the eight other defendants,
especially when the de Leon Group filed its supersedeas bond.

In addition, a judgment creditor of a bank, which has been ordered by the BSP to be
subject of receivership, has to fall in line like every other creditor of the bank and file its
claim under the proper procedures for banks that have been taken over by the PDIC. Under
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653, otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act, which
prevailed at that time, once a bank is under receivership, the receiver shall immediately
gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the bank and administer the same
for the benefit of its creditors and all of the bank’s assets shall be considered as under
custodial legis and exempt from any order of garnishment, levy, attachment or execution.
In the Minute Resolution of the Monetary Board of the BSP, Urban Bank was not only
prevented from doing business in the Philippines but its asset and affairs were placed under
receivership as provided for under the same law. In fact, even Peña himself assured the
PDIC, as receiver of Urban Bank, that he would not schedule or undertake execution sales
of the bank’s assets for as long as the bank remains in receivership. Until the approval of
the rehabilitation or the initiation of the liquidation proceedings, all creditors of the bank
under receivership shall stand on equal footing with respect to demanding satisfaction of

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their debts, and cannot be extended preferred status by an execution pending appeal with
respect to the bank’s assets:

… [t]o execute the judgment would unduly deplete the assets of respondent
bank to the obvious prejudice of other creditors. After the Monetary Board
has declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations,
the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the
depositors and creditors. After its insolvency, one creditor cannot obtain an
advantage or preference over another by an attachment, execution or
otherwise. Until there is an approved rehabilitation or the initiation of the
liquidation proceedings, creditors of the bank stand on equal footing with
respect to demanding satisfaction of their debts, and cannot be afforded
special treatment by an execution pending appeal with respect to the bank’s
assets.

Moreover, assuming that the CA was correct in finding a reason to justify the
execution pending appeal because of the supervening event of Urban Bank’s closure, the
assumption by the EIB of the liabilities of Urban Bank meant that any execution pending
appeal can be granted only if EIB itself is shown to be unable to satisfy Peña’s judgment
award of PhP28,500,000. That is not at all the case. In just one particular sale on execution
herein, EIB offered to answer in cash for a substantial part of Peña’s claims, as evidenced
by EIB’s capacity and willingness to redeem the executed properties (condominium units
sold to intervenor Unimega) by tendering manager’s checks for more than PhP22 Million
which is already 77.57% of Peña’s total award from the trial court. The fact that EIB’s offer
to take over Urban Bank means it was able to satisfy the BSP’s concern that all legitimate
liabilities of Urban Bank be duly discharged.

Neither will the Court accept the trial court’s unfounded assumption that Urban
Bank’s appeal was merely dilatory, as in fact, the PhP28,500,000 award given by the trial
court was overturned by the appellate court and eventually by this Court.

Moreover, at the time the Special Order of Judge Henry Trociño of the RTC-Bago City
came out in 1999, Urban Bank had assets worth more than PhP11 Billion and had a net
worth of more than PhP2 Billion. There was no reason then to believe that Urban Bank could
not satisfy a judgment of PhP28,500,000, a sum that was only 1% of its net worth, and 1/5
of 1% of its total assets of PhP11,933,383,630. Urban Bank was even given a Solvency,
Liquidity and Management Rating of 82.89 over 100 by no less than the BSP and reportedly
had liquid assets amounting to PhP2,036,878. In fact, no allegation of impending insolvency
or attempt to abscond was ever raised by Atty. Peña and yet, the trial court granted
execution pending appeal.

Since the original order granting execution pending appeal was completely void for
containing no justifiable reason, it follows that any affirmance of the same by the Court of
Appeals is likewise void.

As an exception to the general rule that only final judgments may be executed, the
grant of execution pending appeal must perforce be based on "good reasons." These
reasons must consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which will
outweigh the injury or damages suffered, should the losing party secure a reversal of the
judgment or final order. The circumstances that would reasonably justify superior urgency,
demanding interim execution of Peña’s claims for compensation and/or damages, have
already been settled by the financial capacity of the eight other co-defendants, the approval
of the supersedeas bonds, the subsequent takeover by EIB, and the successor bank’s stable

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financial condition, which can answer for the judgment debt. Thus, Peña’s interest as a
judgment creditor is already well-protected.

3. How a judgment is executed

Urban Bank Inc. v. Pena, G.R. No. 145817, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 418

First, contrary to the general rules on execution, no opportunity was given to Urban Bank or
the other co-defendants to pay the judgment debt in cash or certified check. Before
proceeding on the levying and garnishing personal and real properties, demand must be
made by the sheriff against the judgment debtors, Urban Bank and the eight other
individual bank officers, for the immediate payment of the award subject of the execution
pending appeal. It has not been shown whether Urban Bank and its officers and directors
were afforded such an opportunity. Instead of garnishing personal properties of the bank,
the sheriff inexplicably proceeded to levy substantial real properties of the bank and its
officers at the onset.

Second, assuming that Urban Bank and its officers did not possess sufficient cash or funds
to pay for the judgment debt pending appeal, they should have been given the option to
choose which of their properties to be garnished and/or levied. In this case, Urban Bank
exercised its option by presenting to the sheriff various parcels of land, whose values
amount to more than PhP76,882,925 and were sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt.
Among those presented by the bank, only the property located in Tagaytay was levied upon
by the sheriff. No sufficient reason was raised why the bank’s chosen properties were
rejected or inadequate for purposes of securing the judgment debt pending appeal. Worse,
the Sheriff proceeded with garnishing and levying on as many properties of Urban Bank and
its officers, in disregard of their right to choose under the rules.

Third, the public auction sales conducted in the execution pending appeal sold more
properties of Urban Bank and the directors than what was sufficient to satisfy the debt.
Indeed, the conservative value of the properties levied herein by the sheriff amounting to
more than PhP181,919,190, consisting of prime condominium units in the heart of the
Makati Business district, a lot in Tagaytay City, shares in exclusive clubs, and shares of
stock, among others, was more than sufficient to answer for the PhP28,500,000 judgment
debt six times over. Rather than stop when the properties sold had approximated the
monetary award, the execution sale pending appeal continued and unduly benefitted Atty.
Peña, who, as judgment creditor and, at times, the winning bidder, purchased most of the
properties sold.

Fourth, it was supremely disconcerting how Urban Bank, through its successor EIB, was
unduly deprived of the opportunity to redeem the properties, even after presenting
manager’s checks equal to the purchase price of the condominium units sold at the
execution sale. No reason was offered by the trial court or the sheriff for rejecting the
redemption price tendered by EIB in order to recover the properties executed and sold in
public auction pending appeal.

Finally, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there was already a sufficient
supersedeas bond given to answer for whatever monetary award will be given in the end.
To recall, the De Leon Group had already tendered a supersedeas bond of PhP40,000,000 in
the Court of Appeals to prevent execution pending appeal over their properties. In fact,
even Urban Bank tendered a separate supersedeas bond of equal amount with this Court,
for a total of PhP80,000,000 to secure any judgment to be awarded to Atty. Peña. That
execution sales over the properties of judgment debtors proceeded despite the three-fold

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value of securities compared to the amount of the award indicates bad faith, if not malice,
with respect to the conduct of the execution pending appeal.

a. Execution by motion or by independent action

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory

judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date
of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.

According to Herrera, the statement in the present rule that: ―The revived judgment may
also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by
action before it is barred by the statute of limitations‖ is in consonance with and a return to
the doctrine in PNB v. Bondoc, 14 SCRA 770 that the 10-year prescriptive period commence
to run from the date of finality of the revived judgment and not of the original judgment.
Consequently, for as long as the original judgment was revived within the prescriptive
period the revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within 5 years from the date
of its entry and thereafter be revived by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations. This abandons PNB v. Deloso, 32 SCRA 266; Continental Bank v. Tiongco, 94
SCRA 715; and, Luzon Surety Co. v. IAC, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 652, and all other
decisions to the same effect.

Feria points out that this rule abandons the ruling in the case of Luzon Surety Co. v. IAC to
the effect that there can be only one action for revival of judgment and that the revived
judgment can only be enforced by motion for execution or money claim within five years
from its entry. The rule follows the old ruling in the case of PNB v. Bondoc that a revived
judgment is again enforceable by motion within 5 years and by another action within 10
years from its finality.

Riano similarly opined that some rulings (PNB v. Deloso; Luzon Surety Co. Inc. v. IAC) after
PNB v. Bondoc held that the 10-year period should run from the finality of the original
judgment and not from the finality of the revived judgment. The ruling in Deloso practically
abandoned Bondoc on the matter of the reckoning point of the prescriptive period. Bondoc,
however, was resurrected in the present provision of Sec. 6 of Rule 39 which declares in its
last sentence that ―The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within 5 years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.‖

Riano further opined that the new action, i.e., to revive the judgment would necessarily
raise fundamental issues of whether or not the plaintiff has a right to have the judgment
revived and to have a new right of enforcement from its revival, issues by their nature are
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Inevitably, he wrote, ―a litigant may find himself in a
situation where he files the action in the Regional Trial Court to revive a judgment rendered
by a Municipal Trial Court.‖

VYE’s comments: Consider the case of Mijares v. Hon. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12,
2005. According to the SC, the action to enforce a foreign judgment is capable of pecuniary
estimation but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate,
thus placing it beyond the ambit of Sec. 7 (a) of Rule 141. In this case, the applicable
provisionis covered by Sec. 7 (b) (3) involving as it does ―other actions not involving

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property.‖ Following this ruling, an action to revive a judgment is capable of pecuniary
estimation.

b. Issuance and contents of a writ of execution

Sec. 8. Issuance, form and contents of a writ of execution.

-- The writ of execution shall: (1) issue in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines from the court which granted the motion; (2) state the name of
the court, the case number and title, the dispositive part of the subject
judgment or order; and (3) require the sheriff or other proper officer to whom
it is directed to enforce the writ according to its terms, in the manner herein
after provided:

(a) If the execution be against the property of the judgment obligor, to satisfy
the judgment, with interest, out of the real or personal property of such
judgment obligor;

(b) If it be against real or personal property in the jands of personal

representatives, heirs, devisees, legatees, tenants, or trustees of the
judgment obligor, to satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of such
properties;

(c) If it be for the sale of real or personal property, to sell such property,
describing it, and apply the proceeds in conformity with the judgment, the
material parts of which shall be recited in the writ of execution;

(d) If it be for the delivery of the possession of real or personal property, to

deliver the possession of the same, describing it, to the party entitled thereto,
and to satisfy any costs, damages, rents, or profits covered by the judgment
out of the personal property of the person against whom it was rendered, and
if sufficient personal property cannot be found, then out of the real property;
and

(e) In all cases, the writ of execution shall specifically state the amount of the
interest, costs, damages, rents, or profits due as of the date of the issuance
of the writ, aside from the principal obligation under the judgment. For this
purpose, the motion for execution shall specify the amounts of the foregoing
reliefs sought by the movant.

c. Execution of judgments for money

In Cometa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, February 6, 2001, the SC explained that
the manner of execution of money judgments is governed by Section 15, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which was then in force, thus:

Sec. 15. Execution of money judgments. – The officer must enforce an

execution of a money judgment by levying on all the property, real and
personal property of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may be
disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or
on a sufficient amount of such property, if there be sufficient, and selling the
same, and paying to the judgment creditor or his attorney, so much of the
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the
judgment and the accruing costs must be delivered to the judgment debtor,

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 unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court. When there
is more property of the judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and accruing costs, within the view of the officer, he must levy only
on such part of the property as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and
costs. xxx (emphasis and italics supplied)

NB: This has been amended. See Sec. 9, Rule 39. The pertinent provision of Sec. 9 (b),
Rule 39, states: ―If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the
officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature
whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution
giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or par thereof may be
levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the
option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.‖

VYE’s comment: Although Sec. 9 (b), Rule 39 simply state the ―officer shall levy upon the
properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution…‖ this should not be license
for the sheriff to levy on all of the properties of the judgment obligor. He should levy only
on such part of the property as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs.

This provision should be read in relation to the foregoing, Section 21, also of Rule 39,
provides that –

SEC. 21. How property sold on execution; Who may direct manner and order
of sale. – All sales of property under execution must be made at public
auction, to the highest bidder, between the hours of nine in the morning and
five in the afternoon. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the
execution, no more shall be sold. When the sale is of real property,
consisting of several known lots, they must be sold separately; or, when a
portion of such real property is claimed by a third person, he may require it to
be sold separately. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual
delivery, it must be sold within view of those attending the sale and in such
parcels as are likely to bring the highest price. The judgment debtor, if
present at the sale, may direct the order in which property, real or personal,
shall be sold, when such property shall consist of several known lots or
parcels which can be sold to advantage separately. Neither the officer holding
the execution nor his deputy can become a purchaser, nor be interested
directly or indirectly in any purchase at such sale. (emphasis and italics
supplied)

NB: This is now Sec. 19 of Rule 39. The present rule still retains the same wording of the
sentence in italics. Thus, ―… After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution,
no more shall be sold and any excess property or proceeds of the sale shall be promptly
delivered to the judgment obligor or his authorized representative, unless otherwise
directed by the judgment or order of the court. When the sale is of real property, consisting
of several known lots, they must be sold separately…‖

In Cometa, the subject lots were sold en masse, not separately as above provided. To
satisfy the judgment in the amount of Php57,396.85, the sheriff levied on execution and
sold in public auction 3 commercial lots located at Guadalupe, Makati, which were
conservatively valued at Php500T. The unusually low price for which they were sold to the

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vendee, not to mention his vehement unwillingness to allow redemption therein, only serves
to heighten the dubiousness of the transfer.

Thus, the SC ordered the respondents to accept the tender of redemption made by the
petition and to deliver the proper certificate of redemption to the latter.

If the sheriff levied on 30 parcels of land to satisfy a claim of Php300T and eventually sold
the same in public auction, what should the judgment debtor do? According to the SC in
Guiang v. Co, G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004, the remedy is to file a motion to nullity the
levy and sale of the properties at public auction in violation of Secs. 15 and 21, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court before the trial court. This is conformably with the ruling in Deltaventures
Resources Inc. v. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521, where the SC explained that whatever
irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the alias writ of execution should be
referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is because
any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power for the advancement of
justice to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.

Thereafter, the remedy of the judgment debtor from an adverse resolution of the TC on its
motion would be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, if the trial
court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

d. Execution of judgments for specific acts

Sec. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.

(a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts; vesting title. - If a

judgment directs a party who execute a conveyance of land or personal
property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other
specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the
time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the
disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act
when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party. If real or personal
property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a
conveyance thereof may be an order divest the title of any party and vest it in
others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due
form of law.

(b) Sale of real or personal property.— If the judgment be for the sale of real
or personal property, to sell such property, describing it, and apply the
proceeds in conformity with the judgment.

(c) Delivery or restitution of real property.- The officer shall demand of the
person against whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real
property is rendered and all person claiming rights under him to peaceably
vacate the property within three (3) working days, and restore possession
thereof to the judgment obligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust and such
persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary of appropriate peace
officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to
retake possession, and place the judgment obligee in possession of such
property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall
be satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.

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 (d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution.- When the
property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or
planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy,
demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court
issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the
former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the
court.

(e) Delivery of personal property.- In judgments for the delivery of personal

property, the officer shall take possession of the same and forthwith deliver it
to the party entitled thereto and satisfy any judgment for money as therein
provided.

e. Execution of special judgments

Sec. 11. Execution of special judgments. – When a judgment requires the

performance of any act other than those mentioned in the two preceding
sections, a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of
execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the
same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to
obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he
disobeys such judgment.

f. Levy on execution in general

de los Reyes v. Ramnani, G.R. No. 169135, June 18, 2010

A judgment debt is enforced by the levy and sale of the debtor’s property. The issuance of
the final certificate of sale to the purchaser at the execution sale is a mere formality upon
the debtor’s failure to redeem the property within the redemption period.

In this case, after the case was decided on October 11, 1977, a writ of execution was issued
by the TC. On June 6, 1978, the sheriff conducted a public auction over the property levied
upon on execution. A writ of possession was issued on November 17, 1978. On March 8,
1990, the certificate of sale was annotated on the title. Thereafter, the taxes due on the
sale were paid were paid on September 26, 2001. It was only on February 17, 2004 that the
respondent filed a motion for the issuance of a final certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner
argued that the October 11, 1977 Decision was not timely executed because of respondent’s
failure to secure the final certificate of sale within 10 years from the entry of said judgment.
This is erroneous. As correctly held by the trial court, the October 11, 1977 Decision was
already enforced when the subject property was levied and sold on June 6, 1978 which is
within the five-year period for the execution of a judgment by motion under Section 6, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.

It is likewise not disputed that petitioner failed to redeem the subject property within one
year from the annotation of the certificate of sale on TCT No. 480537. The expiration of the
one-year redemption period foreclosed petitioner’s right to redeem the subject property and
the sale thereby became absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final certificate of sale is a
mere formality and confirmation of the title that is already vested in respondent. Thus, the
trial court properly granted the motion for issuance of the final certificate of sale.

g. Effect of levy on third persons

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Solidum v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161647, June 22, 2006

Pursuant to Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, a third-party claimant has
two remedies, such as, an action for damages against the sheriff to be brought within 120
days from the filing of the bond, and a separate and independent action to vindicate his
claim to the property. In the case at bar, petitioner's and intervenor's remedy against the
bond proved to be unavailing because of the disputed order of the respondent Judge
cancelling the indemnity bond. Such an order as well as the order denying a motion to
reconsider the same in effect discarded or quashed the third-party claims. What then would
the remedy be of the third-party claimants?

In the case of Serra vs. Rodriguez, xxx this Court (First Division), thru Mr. Justice Makasiar,
ruled:

From the denial of a third-party claim to defeat the attachment caused

to be levied by a creditor, neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the
proper remedy. The remedy of petitioner would be to file a separate and
independent action to determine the ownership of the attached property or to
file a complaint for damages chargeable against the bond filed by the
judgment creditor in favor of the provincial sheriff.

In Lara vs. Bayona, L-7920, May 10, 1955, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Concepcion, later
Chief Justice, in denying the petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the lower court
quashing the third-party claim of a chattel mortgagee, held:

Pursuant to this provision, nothing contained therein shall prevent

petitioner "from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action."
Neither does the order complained of deprive petitioner herein of the
opportunity to enforce his alleged rights by appropriate proceedings. In short,
he has another "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law," and, hence is not entitled either to a writ of certiorari or to a writ of
prohibition.

The Court further held that since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to the
action, he could not, strictly speaking, appeal from the order denying its claim, but should
file a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or a complaint for
damages against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff. The rights
of a third-party claimant should be decided in a separate action to be instituted by the third
person. In fine, the appeal that should be interposed, if the term "appeal" may be properly
employed, is a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or complaint for
damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the
sheriff.

In Buado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009, the SC held that ―Apart from
the remedy of terceria available to a third-part claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure
suit against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title
and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a third-party claimant may also resort to an
independent separate action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession
of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and
detention of the property. If a separate action is the recourse, the third-party claimant must
institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the
action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim
in the court that issued the writ.

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 A third-party claim must be filed a person other than the judgment debtor or his
agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim.

This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but
whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the
judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?"

In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the
property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, which was later
adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the husband of the
judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged
against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya, the Court
stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was
issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of
ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property.

Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the
judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. We do not agree.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the
Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either

spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of
property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil

obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.

To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to
the conjugal partnership.

In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third-
party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce "a judgment for
support" filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since the
obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but
on his separate property.

In Rural Bank of Santa Barbara (Pangasinan) Inc. v. Manila Mission of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints Inc., G.R. No. 130223, August 19, 2009, the SC considered the

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Motion to Release Property from Attachment filed by respondent before the RTC as a Motion
for Intervention in Civil Case No. D-10583, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 16,
Rule 39, in relation to Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. Respondent, to vindicate its claim to
the subject property, may intervene in the same case, i.e., Civil Case No. D-10583,
instituted by petitioner against the spouses Soliven, in which the said property was
attached. Respondent has the personality to intervene, as it "is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof." The RTC, in acting upon and granting the Motion to Release
Property from Attachment in its Order dated 9 October 1995, is deemed to have allowed
respondent to intervene in Civil Case No. D-10583.

4. Properties exempt from execution

Sec. 13. Property exempt from execution. – Except as otherwise expressly

provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from
execution:

(a) The judgment obligor's family home as provided by law, or the homestead
in which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection therewith;

Spouses de Mesa v. Spouses Acero, G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012 – Although the
property sold in execution sale was the family home of the petitioners, the SC held that the
claim for exemption from execution should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the
sale of the property in public auction.

The rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution,
could be summarized as follows:

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from
the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are
considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987.
There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were
thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.

The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction.

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 Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have
been exempt from execution, we nevertheless rule that the CA did not err in dismissing the
petitioners’ complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA that
the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
As the CA aptly pointed out:

In the light of the facts above summarized, it is evident that appellants did
not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly,
reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time
after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on
execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution
and defeat the very purpose of execution – to put an end to litigation. x x x

The foregoing disposition is in accord with the Court’s November 25, 2005 Decision in
Honrado v. Court of Appeals, where it was categorically stated that at no other time can the
status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its exemption
from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction:

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption
should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at
public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to
claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of
exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as
such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the
time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter;

"In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for
exemption) must be made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that
it must be made within a reasonable time, or promptly, or before the creditor
has taken any step involving further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or
at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale, or before
the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority."

In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that appellants

did not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly,
reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time
after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on
execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution
and defeat the very purpose of execution—to put an end to litigation. We said
before, and We repeat it now, that litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now rule
that claims for exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of

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 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on execution
by the sheriff. (citations omitted)

Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of Appeals, this Court stated that:

Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house

and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence; there is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153
of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and
as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. x x
x (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the
subject property before the sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now
are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later
claiming the said exemption.

Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the
repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is likewise
without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment.

The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set
up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the
levy or a reasonable time thereafter.

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse before
claiming that the subject property is a family home and its exemption from execution and
forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject property to be levied
upon and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property
was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s Torrens title
was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudio’s name, still, the petitioner remained
silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, or
approximately four (4) years from the time of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed
that the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.

For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right
within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or
declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the
prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the
subject property as a family home.

The petitioners’ negligence or omission renders their present assertion doubtful; it appears
that it is a mere afterthought and artifice that cannot be countenanced without doing the

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respondents injustice and depriving the fruits of the judgment award in their favor. Simple
justice and fairness and equitable considerations demand that Claudio’s title to the property
be respected. Equity dictates that the petitioners are made to suffer the consequences of
their unexplained negligence.

(b) Ordinary tools and implements personally used by him in hs trade,

employment, or livelihood;

(c) Three horses, or three cows, or three carabaos, or other beasts of burden
such as the judgment obligor may select necessarily used by him in his
ordinary occupation;

(d) His necessary clothing and articles for ordinary personal use, excluding
jewelry;

(e) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and used
for that purpose by the judgment obligor and his family, such as the
judgment obligor may select, of a value not exceeding one hundred thousand
pesos;

(f) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for four months;

(g) The professional libraries and equipment of judges, lawyers, physicians,

pharmacists, dentists, engineers, surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other
professionals, not exceeding three hundred thousand pesos in value;

(h) One fishing boat and accessories not exceeding the total value of one
hundred thousand pesos owned by a fisherman and by the lawful use of which
he earns his livelihood;

(i) So much of the salaries, wages, or earnings of the judgment obligor of his
personal services within the four months preceding the levy as are necessary
for the support of his family;

(j) Lettered gravestones;

(k) Monies benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner

growing out of any life insurance;

(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such
support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government;

(m) Properties specially exempt by law.

But no article or species of property mentioned in his section shall be exempt

from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its price or upon a
judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage thereon.

In Golden Sun Finance Corp. v. Albano, A.M. No. P-11-2888, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 375,
the SC held that in determining properties to be levied upon, the Rules require the sheriff to
levy only on those ―properties of the judgment debtor‖ which are ―not otherwise exempt
from execution.‖ For purposes of the levy, a property is deemed to be belong to the
judgment debtor if he holds a beneficial interest in such property that he can sell or

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otherwise dispose of for value. In a contract of mortgage, the debtor retains beneficial
interest over the property notwithstanding the encumbrance, since the mortgage only
serves to secure the fulfillment of the principal obligaiton. Indeed, even if the debtor
defaults, this fact does not operate to vest in the creditor the ownership of the property; the
creditor must still resort to foreclosure proceedings. Thus, a mortgaged property may still
be levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment debtor’s obligations, as what happened
in the present case. After ascertaining the judgment debtor’s interest over the property, the
sheriff can properly enforce the levy thereon.

5. Proceedings where property is claimed by third persons

Rule 39, Sec. 16: If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the
judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or
right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the
same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the
officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand
of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a
sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such
value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for
damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless
the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing
of the bond.

The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any
third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such
claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action,
or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action
against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.

When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer
duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or
levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the
Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall
be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.

a. in relation to third party claim in attachment and replevin

Sec. 14, Rule 57: If the property attached is claimed by any person other
than the party against whom attachment had been issued or his agent, and
such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves such affidavit
upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the attached property, and
a copy thereof upon the attaching party, the sheriff shall not be bound to
keep the property under attachment, unless the attaching party or his agent,
on demand of the sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify
the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property
levied upon. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
decided by the court issuing the writ of attachment. No claim for damages for
the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond
unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from
the date of the filing of the bond.

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The sheriff shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of such
property to any such third-party claimant, if such bond shall be filed. Nothing
herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the attaching party from
claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or
plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.

When the writ of attachment is issued in favor of the Republic of the

Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not
be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a result of the
attachment, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held liable
therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the
National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for the purpose. (14a)

Sec. 7, Rule 60: If the property taken is claimed by any person other than the
party against whom the writ of replevin had been issued or his agent, and
such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds therefor, and serves such affidavit upon the
sheriff while the latter has possession of the property and a copy thereof upon
the applicant, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under
replevin or deliver it to the applicant unless the applicant or his agent, on
demand of said sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify
the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property
under replevin as provided in section 2 hereof. In case of disagreement as to
such value, the court shall determine the same. No claim for damages for the
taking or keeping, of the property may be enforced against the bond unless
the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the filing of the bond.

The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of such
property, to any such third-party claimant if such bond shall be filed. Nothing
herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the applicant from claiming
damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly
spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.

When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines,
or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be
required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a result of the
replevin, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held liable
therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the
National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for the purpose. (7a)

6. Rules on Redemption

Sec. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. – Real property sold as
provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately,
may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following
persons:

(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part
of the property;

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 (b) A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage
on the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the lien under
which the property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a
redemptioner.

In Cayton v. Zeonnix Trading Corp., G.R. No. 169541, October 9, 2009, the Mañoscas
mortgaged their property in favor of Family Savings Bank in May 1980. Therafter, Zeonnix
filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages and prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment against the Mañoscas. The mortgaged property was levied on attachment, which
was annotated on the title in July 1981. Thereafter, the Mañoscas sold the property in favor
of Cayton for which they executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in
September 1981. The deed however was not registered because the title was with Family
Savings Bank. In the meantime, a decision was rendered in the complaint for a sum of
money holding the Mañoscas liable to Zeonnix. Subsequently, Cayton defaulted in the
payment of the mortgage. Thus, Family Savings extrajudicially foreclosed the property.
Cayton was declared the highest bidder. Who may redeem the property that was
foreclosed?

Sec. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. – Real property sold as
provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately,
may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following
persons:

(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part
of the property;

(b) A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage

on the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the lien under
which the property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a
redemptioner.

Right of redemption is the prerogative to reacquire a mortgaged property after

registration of the foreclosure sale. It exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure unless the mortgagee
is a bank. An attaching creditor acquires the right to redeem the debtor’s attached property
subsequently foreclosed extra-judicially by a third party.

The "successor-in-interest" of a judgment debtor includes one to whom the debtor

has transferred his statutory right of redemption; one to whom the debtor has conveyed his
interest in the property for the purpose of redemption; one who succeeds to the interest of
the debtor by operation of law; one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of the
property sold; or his spouse or heirs.

A "redemptioner," on the other hand, is a creditor with a lien subsequent to the

judgment which was the basis of the execution sale. If the lien of the creditor is prior to the
judgment under which the property was sold, he is not a redemptioner and, therefore,
cannot redeem because his interests in his lien are fully protected, since any purchaser at
public auction of said property takes the same subject to such prior lien which he has to
satisfy. Unlike the judgment debtor, a redemptioner must prove his right to redeem by
producing the documents called for by Section 30, Rule 39 (Proof required of redemptioner)
of the Rules of Court.

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 In the instant case, the Caytons aver that as successor-in-interest of the Mañoscas
by virtue of the deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage, they have a better right
than Zeonnix to redeem the property. This stance deserves scant consideration.

Indeed, they are successors in interest of the Mañoscas. However, their supposed
title or right over the property is unregistered and, as such, the same cannot affect third
persons. This is because it is registration that is the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned. A deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument, except a will, purporting to convey or affect conveyance involving registered
land, shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority of the Register of Deeds to make
registration.

The unregistered sale of the house and lot to the Caytons by the Mañoscas cannot
prejudice the right of redemption granted by law in favor of Zeonnix. The levy on
attachment of Zeonnix on the subject property was duly recorded on TCT No. S-90836.
Thus, the levy on attachment created a constructive notice to all persons from the time of
such registration. The record is notice to the entire world. All persons are charged with the
knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion
of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with
notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the
record discloses.

When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is constructive notice of
its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under the rule of notice,
it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the
title. Such presumption is irrefutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption may not be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith.
Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.
Such presumption may not be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains, any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts that the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation.

Zeonnix has acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over the foreclosed
properties. By virtue of the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 2173, it had the right to redeem
the property. This is pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118,
which provides:

SECTION 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under

the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in
interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any
person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of
trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time
within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such
redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and
sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act.

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 The writ of attachment entitled the attaching creditor to exercise the right to redeem
the foreclosed properties. A writ of attachment that has been levied on real property or any
interest therein belonging to the judgment debtor creates a lien which nothing can destroy
but its dissolution.

Urban Bank Inc. v. Pena, G.R. No. 145817, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 418

The rule is that, where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled –
on appeal or otherwise – the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or
reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances. (Sec. 5,
Rule 39) The Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to equity, in case the
executed judgment is reversed on appeal. "In an execution pending appeal, funds are
advanced by the losing party to the prevailing party with the implied obligation of the latter
to repay the former, in case the appellate court cancels or reduces the monetary award."

The SC adopted with modification the rules of restitution expounded by retired Justice
Florenz D. Regalado in his seminal work on civil procedure. (See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. I, 2002 Ed., p. 424) In cases in which restitution of the prematurely
executed property is no longer possible, compensation shall be made in favor of the
judgment debtor in the following manner:

a. If the purchaser at the public auction is the judgment creditor, he must pay the
full value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest.

b. If the purchaser at the public auction is a third party, and title to the property has
already been validly and timely transferred to the name of that party, the judgment
creditor must pay the amount realized from the sheriff’s sale of that property, with
interest.

c. If the judgment award is reduced on appeal, the judgment creditor must return to
the judgment debtor only the excess received over and above that to which the
former is entitled under the final judgment, with interest.

In summary, Urban Bank is entitled to complete restoration and return of the properties
levied on execution considering the absolute reversal of the award of damages, upon the
payment of the judgment debt herein amounting to PhP4,500,000, with interest as indicated
in the dispositive portion. With respect to individual petitioners, they are entitled to the
absolute restitution of their executed properties, except when restitution has become
impossible, in which case Peña shall be liable for the full value of the property at the time of
its seizure, with interest. Whether Urban Bank and the bank officers and directors are
entitled to any claim for damages against Peña and his indemnity bond is best ventilated
before the trial court, as prescribed under the procedural rules on execution pending appeal.

7. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive

redemptions

In Cayton v. Zeonnix Trading Corp., G.R. No. 169541, October 9, 2009, the SC explained
Sec. 28, which reads –

Section 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive
redemptions; notice to be given and filed. – The judgment obligor, or
redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time
within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale,

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 by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per
month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together
with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have
paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the
same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that
of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was
made, the amount of such lien, with interest.

Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60) days after
the last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption,
with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amount of any assessments
or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after redemption
by him, with interest on such last-named amount, and in addition, the
amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with
interest. The property may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so
disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60) days
after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last previous
redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any
assessments or taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the
redemption thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of any liens held
by the last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest.

Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the
sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of deeds of the place, and if any
assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires
any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof
must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registry of
deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without
paying such assessments, taxes, or liens.

Accordingly, to constitute valid redemption, the amount tendered must comply with the
following requirements: (1) it should constitute the full amount paid by the purchaser; (2)
with one percent per month interest on the purchase price in addition, up to the time of
redemption; (3) together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser
may have paid thereon after purchase; (4) interest on the taxes paid by the purchaser at
the rate of one percent per month, up to the time of the redemption; and (5) if the
purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the
judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with
interest.

In exercising the right of redemption, the tender of payment must be for the full amount of
the purchase price. Otherwise, to allow payment by installments would be to allow the
indefinite extension of the redemption period.

The amount tendered by Zeonnix may be considered sufficient for purposes of redemption,
although it failed to include the amount of taxes paid by the Caytons. The payment of the
full amount of the purchase price and interest thereon should be deemed as substantial
compliance, considering that Zeonnix immediately paid the amount of taxes when apprised
of the deficiency.

In Estanislao, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court relaxed its rules on the redemptioner’s
failure to pay the taxes paid by the purchaser. The Court ruled in this wise, viz.:

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 There are additional amounts to be made in order to effect a valid redemption
required by law, but, as respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. failed to comply with
certain requirements, petitioners' failure to pay these additional amounts may
be considered excused. As provided in Rule 39, §30 of the 1964 Rules of
Court, the redemptioner must also pay the assessment or taxes paid by the
purchaser. However, the latter must give notice to the officer who conducted
the sale of the assessments or taxes paid by him and file the same with the
Registry of Deeds. x x x.

xxxx
Petitioners were not furnished by respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. such
statement of account. Neither was such statement filed with the Registry of
Deeds. Respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. claimed that a statement of account
(Exh. 8-C and Exh. 8-D) was furnished the office of Atty. Basco, the notary
public who had conducted the sale, as received by Elizabeth Roque, an
employee therein. However, Atty. Basco denied having received the
statement. Petitioners were therefore justified in not paying any assessments
or taxes which respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. may have paid.

Likewise, in Rosales v. Yboa, the Court ruled that the failure to pay the delinquent real
estate taxes on the property will not render the redemption void. This is in consonance with
the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption. The pertinent
portion of the decision reads:

In fine, We hold that the failure of the mortgagor Pedro Oliverio to tender the
amount of P745.47 representing the delinquent real estate taxes of the
subject property, the registration fee of P3.00 and the interest thereon of
P0.04, the Sheriff's Commission in the sum of P99.82, and the deficiency
interest on the purchase price of the subject property, will not render the
redemption in question null and void, it having been established that he has
substantially complied with the requirements of the law to effect a valid
redemption, with his tender of payment of the purchase price and the interest
thereon within twelve (12) months from the date of the registration of the
sale. This ruling is in obedience of the policy of the law to aid rather than to
defeat the right of redemption.

In Yap v. Dy Sr., G.R. No. 171868, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 593, the SC explained that the
tender of the redemption money may be made to the purchaser of the land or to the sheriff.
If made to the sheriff, it is his duty to accept the tender and execute the certificate of
redemption.

In this case, the Real Estate Mortgages covered 6 lots. The mortgagor defaulted. Thus, the
mortgagee extrajudically foreclosed the mortgage and was the highest bidder for the 6 lots.
Can the redemptioner redeem only 2 lots or is he obliged to redeem all 6 lots?

The SC explained that the requisites for a valid redemption are: (1) the redemption must be
made within 12 months from the time of the registration of the sale in the Office of the
Register of Deeds; (2) payment of the purchase price of the property involved plus 1%
interest per month thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the
amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after the
purchase, also with 1% interest on such last named amount; and, (3) written notice of the
redemption must be served on the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the
Register of Deeds of the province.

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The SC further explained that the doctrine of indivisibility of mortgage under Art. 2089 of
the Civil Code does not apply once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure
thereof. Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof, said doctrine
of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with the full payment of the debt, there is nothing
more to secure. Thus, there is nothing in the law that prohibits piecemeal redemption of
properties sold at one foreclosure proceeding.

8. Examination of Judgment Obligor When Judgment is unsatisfied

When the return of a writ of execution issued against property of a judgment obligor,
or any one of several obligors in the same judgment, shows that the judgment remains
unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the judgment obligee, at any time after such return is made,
shall be entitled to an order from the court which rendered the said judgment, requiring
such judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning his property and income
before such court or before a commissioner appointed by it, at a specified time and place;
and proceedings may thereupon be had for the application of the property and income of
the judgment obligor towards the satisfaction of the judgment. But no judgment obligor
shall be so required to appear before a court or commissioner outside the province or city in
which such obligor resides or is found.

9. Examination of Obligor of Judgment Obligor

When the return of a writ of execution against the property of a judgment obligor
shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, and upon proof to the
satisfaction of the court which issued the writ, that a person, corporation, or other juridical
entity has property of such judgment obligor or is indebted to him, the court may, by an
order, require such person, corporation, or other juridical entity, or any officer or member
thereof, to appear before the court or a commissioner appointed by it, at a time and place
within the province or city where such debtor resides or is found, and be examined
concerning the same. The service of the order shall bind all credits due the judgment obligor
and all money and property of the judgment obligor in the possession or in the control of
such person, corporation, or juridical entity from the time of service; and the court may also
require notice of such proceedings to be given to any party to the action in such manner as
it may deem proper.

10. Effect of Judgment or Final Orders

Under Sec. 47, Rule 39, the effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

1. In case of a judgment or final order against

a) a specific thing, or
b) in respect to the probate of a will, or
c) the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or
d) in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
status of a particular person or his relationship to
another,

it shall be conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or

administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person.
However, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration

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 shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate.

2. In other cases, the judgment or final order is,

a) with respect to the matter directly adjudged,

or
b) as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto,

it shall be conclusive between the parties and their successors in

interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity.

In Co v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 160265, July 13, 2009, the SC held that under
the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, the judgment in the labor case bars the case against
the accused for violation of SS laws as the relief sought in the latter case is inextricably
related to the ruling in the labor case to the effect that the private complainants are not
employees of the petitioner-accused. Although the case involves a criminal charge, still the
findings in the labor case are binding herein because the same facts are the subject of both
cases. What is decisive is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory judgment
preclude the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicita and
even under the doctrine of law of the case – the relitigation of the same issue in another
action so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those
in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to be binding
between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and
enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since such issue had
already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least
by conclusiveness of judgment.

Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Sec. 47 (b)
and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Sec. 47 (c). Both concepts are
founded on the principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary public policy against
unnecessary multiplicity of suits. Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata in in
pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a court’s final judgment should not be litigated
upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely burdens the courts and
the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that
could be devoted to worthier cases.

In sum, the final and executory NLRC decision to the effect that the accused were not the
employees of the accused was binding to the criminal case for violation of SS laws.

3. In any other litigation between the same parties or their

successors in interest,

a) that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former

judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or
b) which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto,

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 it shall be conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest

In Selga v. Brar, G.R. No. 175151, September 21, 2011, the SC explained ―Jurisprudence
taught us well that res judicata under the first concept under Rule 39, Sec. 47 (b) or as a
bar against the prosecution of a second action exists when there is identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action in the first and second actions. The judgment in the first
action is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in
privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In
contrast, res judicata under the second concept under Rule 39, Sec. 47 (c) or estoppel by
judgment exists when there is identity of parties and subject matter but the causes of
action are completely distinct. The first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved
herein.

In her Complaint in Civil Case No. 276, respondent already alleged her right to
redemption and prayed, among others, the RTC-Branch 55 to order respondent legally
entitled to redeem the subject property for the price of P52,000.00. The Decision dated
May 8, 1996 of the RTC-Branch 55 neither discussed respondent’s right to redemption nor
ordered in its decretal portion for petitioners to accept respondent’s offer to redeem the
subject property. In consonance with the provisions of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of
Court cited above, we hold that all the matters within the issues raised in Civil Case No. 276
were laid before RTC-Branch 55 and passed upon by it. Resultantly, the silence of the
Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case No. 276 on respondent’s right to redemption
invoked by the latter does not mean that RTC-Branch 55 did not take cognizance of the
same, but rather, that RTC-Branch 55 did not deem respondent entitled to said right.

Regardless of whether or not RTC-Branch 55 erred in not ordering the redemption by

respondent of the subject property in the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case No. 276,
said judgment can no longer be reviewed or corrected by RTC-Branch 56 in Civil Case No.
573. Any error committed by RTC-Branch 55 in the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case
No. 276 could only be reviewed or corrected on appeal. Although respondent initially filed an
appeal of said judgment before the Court of Appeals, she eventually filed a motion to
withdraw the same, which was granted by the appellate court. Hence, the Decision dated
May 8, 1996 attained finality.

11. Enforcement and Effect of Foreign Judgments or Final Orders

Sec. 48, Rule 39, the effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or

final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

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 R. Procedure before the Court of Appeals

1. Original cases (Rule 46)

2. Preliminary Conference (Rule 48)

3. Oral Argument (Rule 49)

4. Dismissal of Appeal (Rule 50)

5. Judgment (Rule 51)

Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio
Rosete v. SEC), September 9, 2008

IRCA, Sec. 2 Rule VI provides: When, in an original action or petition for review, any of
these actions or proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course; (2) granting of writ of
preliminary injunction; (3) granting of new trial; and, (4) granting of execution pending
appeal, have been taken, the case shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is
assigned for study and report and the Justices who participated therein, regardless of their
transfer to other Divisions in the same station. Thus, the questions posed were as follows:

- Will the case remain with Justice Sabio as Acting Chairman of the Special 9 th
Division who participated in the initial resolution of the case?
- Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with Justice Reyes as Chairman?

PJ Vasquez was of the opinion that the Special 9 th Division should continue resolving
the injunction prayer in the petition because it was the Division that issued the Resolution
granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Furthermore, the 9th Division may not be allowed to resolve the
pending incidents because 2 of its members Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not participate
in the hearing.

Heirs of JBL Reyes v. CA, 338 SCRA 282 – The SC emphatically ruled that the CA has no
authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision. Discretionary
execution under Rule 39 is allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial
court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. A judgment of
the CA cannot be executed pending appeal. Once final and executory, the judgment must be
remanded to the lower court where a motion for its execution may be filed only after its
entry. In other words, before its finality, the judgment cannot be executed. There can be no
discretionary execution of a decision of the CA.

6. Motion for Reconsideration (Rule 52)

7. New Trial (Rule 53)

8. Internal Business (Rule 54)

9. Publication of Judgments and Final Resolutions (Rule 55)

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S. Procedure before the Supreme Court

1. Original cases

2. Preliminary Conference

3. Oral Argument

4. Judgment

People v. Caruncho, January 23, 1994, a case of much ado about nothing. It shows how
time is a crucial factor in resolving a case. According to Justice Herrera, as of September 20,
1982, the consensus then was: 10 voted to grant the petition, 2 voted to dismiss it, while 2
took no part. As of September 30, 1982, 6 voted to grant the petition, 5 voted to dismiss it
while 2 took no part. As of June 23, 1983, 4 voted to grant the petition, 7 voted to dismiss
it, 2 took no part while 1 was absent. As of September 27, 1983, 5 voted to grant the
petition, 5 voted to dismiss, 2 took no part and 1 was on sick leave. Eventually, the petition
was dismissed for lack of necessary votes to grant the same.

5. Motion for Reconsideration

a. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or

final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. Comelec

In the original decision of the Court promulgated on November 18, 2008, the SC en
banc by a majority vote struck down the 16 Cityhood laws.

The SC en banc by a majority denied the first motion for reconsideration on March
31, 2009.

The SC en banc by a split vote denied the second motion for reconsideration on April
28, 2009. With the denial of the second motion for reconsideration, the Decision of the SC
became final and executory and recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

On December 21, 2009, the SC en banc unprecedentedly reversed the November 18,
2008 Decision. The majority explained that the 6-6 vote on the second motion for
reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, the minority opined that the tie-vote cannot result in any order or
directive.

END OF PART IV
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