INTERVENTION JURISPRUDENCE

Metropolitan Bank vs. Presiding Judge, GR No. 89909, Sep 21, 1990

The contention of petitioner that the order of the lower court, dated June 2, 1988, has the effect of
allowing the intervention suit to prosper despite the dismissal of the main action obviously cannot be
upheld.

There is here no final dismissal of the main case. The aforementioned order of the lower court has the
effect not only of allowing the intervention suit to proceed but also of vacating its previous order of
dismissal. The reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights of
the intervenor is proper. The joint motion of therein plaintiff and the original defendants to dismiss the
case, without notice to and consent of the intervenor, has the effect of putting to rest only the
respective claims of the said original parties inter se, but the same cannot in any way affect the claim of
private respondent which was allowed by the court to intervene without opposition from the original
parties. A resume of pertinent rulings on the matter would be in order.

Intervention is defined as "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the
court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or
uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of
them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others;
the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which
such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be
affected by such proceedings."[4]

Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the
parties to an action, or against both, may intervene in such action, and when he has become a party
thereto it is error for the court to dismiss the action, including the intervention suit on the basis of an
agreement between the original parties to the action. Any settlement made by the plaintiff and the
defendant is necessarily ineffective unless the intervenor is a party to it.[5]

By the very definition of "intervention," the intervenor is a party to the action as the original parties and
to make his right effectual he must necessarily have the same power as the original parties, subject to
the authority of the court reasonably to control the proceedings in the case.[6]

Having been permitted to become a party in order to better protect his interests, an intervenor, is
entitled to have the issues raised between him and the original parties tried and determined.[7] He had
submitted himself and his cause of action to the jurisdiction of the court and was entitled to relief as
though he were himself a party in the action.[8]

After the intervenor has appeared in the action, the plaintiff has no absolute right to put
the intervenor out of court by the dismissal of the action. The parties to the original suit have no power
to waive or otherwise annul the substantial rights of the intervenor. When an intervening
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petition has been filed, a plaintiff may not dismiss the action in any respect to the prejudice of
the intervenor.[9]

It has even been held that the simple fact that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's action does
not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor.[10] An intervenor has the right to claim the benefit
of the original suit and to prosecute it to judgment. The right cannot be defeated by dismissal of the suit
by the plaintiff after the filing of the petition and notice thereof to the other parties. A person who has
an interest in the subject matter of the action has the right, on his own motion, to intervene and
become a party to the suit, and even after the complaint has been dismissed, may proceed to have any
actual controversy established by the pleadings determined in such action. The trial court's dismissal of
plaintiff's action does not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor.[11]

The intervenor in a pending case is entitled to be heard like any other party.[12] A claim in intervention
that seeks affirmative relief prevents a plaintiff from taking a voluntary dismissal of the main
action.[13] Where a complaint in intervention was filed before plaintiff'saction had been expressly
dismissed, the intervenor's complaint was not subject to dismissal on the ground that no action was
pending, since dismissal of plaintiff's action did not affect the rights of the intervenor or affect the
dismissal of intervenor's complaint.[14] An intervenor's petition showing it to be entitled to affirmative
relief will be preserved and heard regardless of the disposition of the principal action.[15]

As we ruled in Camacho vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,[16] the rationale whereof is clearly applicable to
the present controversy -

"There is no question that intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. Hence, it was
previously ruled that the final dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal of said
ancillary action. The main action having ceased to exist, there is no pending proceeding whereon the
intervention may be based. In the case at bar, however, there was no such final or complete dismissal
but rather an approval of a compromise agreement which was embodied in what was specifically
designated as a 'Partial Decision' affecting only the interests of herein petitioner and the defendant in
said case but not those of her co-plaintiff municipality and the intervenor. The clear intent of the court
below in making the partial decision is to make a reservation to determine the rights of
the intervenor and, presumably, the plaintiff municipality. There may be nothing much left to be done
with respect to the main case but as far as the proceedings in the trial court are concerned, the
controversy therein has not been fully settled and the disposition of the case is definitely incomplete."

Moreover, to require private respondent to refile another case for the settlement of its claim will result
in unnecessary delay and expenses and will multiplicity of suits and, therefore, defeat the very purpose
of intervention which is to hear and determine at the same time all conflicting claims which
may be made on the subject matter in litigation, and to expedite litigation and settle in one action and
by a single judgment the whole controversy among the persons involved.[17]

On the propriety of the order dated January 11, 1988, admitting private respondent's amended
complaint in intervention, we sustain respondent Court of Appeals in upholding the same. Incidentally,
it will be recalled that petitioner was granted the opportunity to file, as it did file, its answer to the
amended complaint in intervention and it even interposed a counterclaim in the process.
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Now, the granting of leave to file an amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case or that it
was made to delay the action.[18] Once exercised, that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal, except
in case of abuse thereof.[19]

In the case at bar, a reading of the amended complaint in intervention shows that it merely supplements
an incomplete allegation of the cause of action stated in the original complaint so as to submit the real
matter in dispute. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it does not substantially
change intervenor's cause of action or alter the theory of the case, hence its allowance is in order.

As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:

"In both the Intervention Complaint and the Amended Complaint in Intervention, the private
respondent seeks the payment to it of the amount of P150,000.00 which should have been paid to it
from out of the P650.000.00 which the petitioner as plaintiff in CC 86-3618 had referred to in
pars. 3.11.2 and 3.11.3 of its complaint as cost of installation of the airconditioning units under the
agreement of sale (between plaintiff Metrobank and GEE Inc.) dated June 29, 1984 and so basically, the
Amended Complaint In Intervention did not really detract or depart from that basic claim."[20]

In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, what
is to be ascertained is whether the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal
obligation wholly different from that which was stated in the original complaint. An amendment will not
be considered as stating a new cause of action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show
substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the
same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where averments which were implied are
made in expressed terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced
remains the same.[21]

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in
order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.[22] This liberality is greatest in the early stages of
a lawsuit,[23] especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint in intervention was made
before trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare
for trial.

On the issue regarding the propriety of the intervention, suffice it to state that petitioner's failure to
interpose a timely objection when the motion for leave to intervene was filed by private respondent
bars the former from belatedly questioning the validity of the same on appeal. In any event, the trial
court duly considered the circumstances and granted the motion, which order was not seasonably
questioned by petitioner thus evincing its approval of the court's action.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of respondent Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.