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1
and Social Cognition
Galen V. Bodenhausen and Kurt Hugenberg
Introduction
A
t the most basic level, minds are structured in ways that permit the suc-
cessful navigation of challenges related to survival and reproduction. In
general terms, the mental operations that are most central to achieving
success in the face of such challenges involve the recognition of opportunities and
threats and the generation of appropriate strategies for exploiting (or avoiding)
them. Although the minds of our hominid ancestors might have been primarily
concerned with tasks such as recognizing edible substances and dangerous preda-
tors, the modern human mind often has a vast array of preoccupations (e.g., science,
philosophy, entertainment, etc.) that bear little direct relation to survival or repro-
ductive concerns. What can explain our comparatively rich cognitive capacities
as a species? One compelling answer to this question lies in the extremely social
nature of human beings. From early ancestral times, the homo genus has been
typified by a high degree of sociality, with individuals living in highly interdepen-
dent groups (e.g., Leakey, 1978). To survive and thrive in such a context, the ability
to understand other humans is key. Few skills would afford greater advantages
than the ability to understand the minds of other group members—to understand
their intentions (e.g., to cooperate or compete), to learn what they know (e.g., where
threats and opportunities lie), and to manipulate what they believe. Possession of
such cognitive skills would greatly increase the probability of successful repro-
duction, and progeny who inherited these skills would enjoy similar advantages.
Indeed, this particular repertoire of skills appears to be fundamental in setting
humans (and perhaps their closest primate relatives) apart from other animals
(e.g., Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). From this perspective,
1
2 social cognition: the basis of human interaction
the human cognitive architecture owes its sophistication to the affordances and
constraints of sociality (e.g., Brewer, 2004; Byrne, 2000; Cummins, 1998; Seyfarth
& Cheney, 1994).
To know the minds of others, we must attend to and perceive the available
cues, whether in their verbal or nonverbal behavior, that contain information
about their inner qualities. The field of social cognition emerged from the study
of this process of person perception, which focused on the perceiver’s ability to
discern others’ states (e.g., emotions) and traits (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; for a
review, see Jones, 1990). Researchers in this tradition have generally assumed
that cognitive representations of actors (and of the contexts in which they behave)
mediate behavioral responses to the social world (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Wyer
& Carlston, 1979). These representations confer meaning onto the sensory input
that is received, and in so doing, they potentiate corresponding responses. In
short, thinking is for doing. The underlying model is schematically depicted in
Figure 1.1. Provide captions for
both Figure 1.1 and
When conceptualized in this way, perception is essentially the interface Figure 1.2.
between the outer and inner worlds. Social targets and the contextual stimuli of
the outer environment create signals (visual, auditory, etc.) that can be sensed,
and the perceiver receives these signals and converts them into psychologically
meaningful representations that define our inner experience of the world. The
process of perception is governed both by “bottom-up” sensory input and by
“top-down” imposition of meaning based on template matching and other pat-
tern recognition processes that allow for the structuring and interpretation of
the input (e.g., Marr, 1982; Triesman & Gelade, 1980). Once a meaningful per-
cept is achieved, it serves as input to higher-order cognition, including inferences
about the target’s goals and intentions. This interpretation of target input then
guides the perceiver’s response.
As a simple example, consider walking into your kitchen and observing a per-
son brandishing an object that appears, on the basis of various visually detectable
features, to be metallic and pointed. The ability to infer the states and traits of this
person will clearly be of some use here. Is the person smiling? If so, is the smile
serene or maniacal? If it is maniacal, is it sincerely or playfully so? Prior knowledge
about the specific actor (e.g., one’s spouse) or general type of actor (e.g., females), as
well as other contextual cues, will be used to determine whether the actor is men-
acing and, correspondingly, whether approach or avoidance is appropriate. This
Please verify
throughout that all
Selective Attention in Perception
headings have been
assigned the correct While perception is the first step in social cognition, attention is commonly con-
level.
sidered the first step in perception. One of the most common, yet most powerful,
metaphors for understanding attention is that it functions as something akin to a
“spotlight” (e.g., Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). This spotlight of attention can illumi-
nate only a limited amount of information at any one time, facilitating the percep-
tion of those focal stimuli. Thus, not all stimuli in the perceptual field receive equal
attention; instead, some stimuli are selected for relatively intense scrutiny, making
them more likely to reach the threshold of awareness (Posner, 1994), while oth-
ers are processed only superficially, receiving little of our precious attention. This
model of attention recognizes the processing bottleneck inherent in our cognitive
system (Broadbent, 1958). We can only keep so many things in focal attention at
any given time.
Indeed, this problem of selecting which stimuli will receive attention and
which will be ignored is one of the central problems of the cognitive system. From
shoppers searching the supermarket shelves for their favorite brand of dishwash-
ing detergent, to entomologists searching the forest floor for a particular species of
insect, our attentional systems must select important or goal-relevant stimuli from
the environment while simultaneously ignoring or even suppressing the process-
ing of distracting detergents, bugs, or other stimuli in general. These two separate
needs, attention and inattention, are subserved by different cognitive mechanisms,
leading to an outcome called selective attention.
Despite the phenomenological experience of attention being a unitary construct,
recent theory and research in both psychology and neurology suggest that the ori-
enting function of attention is actually composed of at least three separate pro-
cesses (e.g., Posner, Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal, 1984): disengaging attention from
an initial target, moving attention to a new target, and then reengaging attention.
4 social cognition: the basis of human interaction
perceivers have highly accessible attitudes, regardless of their valence, will tend
to attract attention during the preattentive scan. Importantly, however, only atti-
tude objects with relatively strong hedonic consequences (i.e., highly accessible
attitudes) are proposed to grab attention. Across four studies, Fazio and colleagues
found that perceivers have better memory for attitude-evoking targets that are
both integral (Experiments 1 and 2) and incidental (Experiment 3) to perceiv-
ers’ task goals as well as attitude-evoking targets interfering with perceivers visual
searches (Experiment 4).
As discussed, affective states such as anxiety can lead to a focus of attention on
anxiety-provoking stimuli. Affective states influence not only the direction of atten-
tion, but also the breadth of attentional focus (see Derryberry & Tucker, 1994, for a
review). Although the spotlight metaphor is one of the most common in the discus-
sion of attention, a competing metaphor is one of the zoom lens (Eriksen & Yeh,
1985). For attention to be at its most functional, we should be able to broaden or
constrict the scope of attention, depending on our goals and motivations. During
a particularly intensive search or a very challenging task, it may be quite useful
to focus our attention on a very small number of relevant stimuli, whereas dur-
ing other tasks, focusing on global at the expense of local information may be of
greater use.
One motivational variable that influences the scope of attention is an orienta-
tion toward approach versus avoidance. Specifically, people who are exposed to
approach-related cues or who are enacting approach-related behaviors appear to
adopt a wider attentional focus and show greater flexibility in attention allocation
compared to people in an avoidance orientation (Förster, Friedman, Ozelsel, &
Denzler, 2006; Friedman & Förster, 2005). Other research suggests that emotional
states may similarly modulate attentional breadth, with anxiety narrowing attention
(Easterbrook, 1959; Tyler & Tucker, 1982), whereas happiness is associated with a
broader focus (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984). Clearly, affective and motivational fac-
tors can exert marked effects on both the scope and direction of attention.
Holding Attention
As noted, the phenomenological experience of attention is that it is a unified pro-
cess; however, attention is constituted by not just what grabs our attention, but also
what holds our attention. In fact, despite the relatively large literature described
regarding attention capture, relatively recent theory regarding attention suggests
that much of what was previously thought to capture attention instead influences
the hold component of attention. Indeed, distinguishing what attracts versus what
holds attention is an increasingly important focus within attention research.
For example, Fox and colleagues (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001;
Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002) called into question the attention-capturing power
of negative stimuli, such as angry faces and negative words. In particular, much of
this previous literature relies heavily on Stroop or Stroop-like tasks (e.g., Pratto &
John, 1991) and dot-probe paradigms (e.g., MacLeod et al., 1986) in which criti-
cal to-be-ignored stimuli appear within foveal vision, whose sudden appearance
will already automatically draw visual attention. In both tasks, perceivers must
8 social cognition: the basis of human interaction
everyday attentional failures. In any case, the available evidence makes it clear that
the interplay of facilitatory and inhibitory processes, as modulated by the goals,
emotions, and motives of the perceiver, guide attention to just a subset of the avail-
able stimulus field. Once captured, these attended stimuli can receive additional
processing. Although the importance of facilitatory processes in biasing attention
has long been appreciated, only relatively recently have several social psychological
studies confirmed that inhibitory processes constrain the focus of attention in both
person perception (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995) and self-perception
(e.g., Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004); for a review, see Bodenhausen, Todd, and
Becker (in press).
pattern, whereas the degree of prevention focus was related to the speed with
which perceivers could discern the local details within the global pattern. Thus,
perceptions are organized not only in terms of self-serving motivations but also
in terms of the general orientations toward self-regulation that are captured in
regulatory focus theory.
One specific model that captures this perspective very well is Fazio’s attitude-to-
behavior process model (Fazio, 1986), which has been incorporated into his more
recent MODE model (e.g., Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005). The model assumes
that selective perception is a key mediator of attitude-behavior consistency. When
an attitude is activated in memory, it can influence online processes of perception
that imbue the attitude object and the surrounding circumstances with meaning
and thereby inform overt behavioral responses. For example, if proenvironmental
attitudes are accessible and become activated, an empty beverage container on the
ground may be perceived as a recyclable object. Once so defined, the perceiver
may pick it up and carry it to a suitable recycling bin. If the proenvironmental
attitude had been inaccessible, the same object might have merely been perceived
as garbage and left lying on the ground (or put into a garbage can). The mean-
ing conferred in the process of perceiving the environment is therefore critical in
determining how the perceiver will act. Thus, the social psychological view has
been that differences in the way different people react to the same stimulus or situ-
ation are attributable to the different attitudes, beliefs, emotional states, motives,
and past experiences that have shaped their construals of the environment (Ross
& Nisbett, 1991).
This traditional view has been challenged in provocative ways by recent
research that questions the necessity of conceptual mediation of the linkages
between perception and action. According to this view, perception can sometimes
directly produce action without any intervening process of appraising the meaning
of the perceived stimuli. The growing body of supportive literature suggests the
necessity of amending our schematic model (see Figure 1.2).
Some neuroanatomical evidence supports the possibility that perceptual input
is indeed processed in two separate pathways, one for appraising its meaning and
one for directly organizing behavioral responses (Norman, 2002). Thus, there
appear to be good biological reasons for expecting both direct and indirect (con-
strual-mediated) influences of perception on action.
The evidence for direct perception ® behavior linkages comes from studies
of automatic behavior (for a review, see Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007).
In these studies, researchers use priming techniques to expose participants to
particular stimuli and then show that exposure to the stimuli exerts measurable
effects on behavior, even though perceivers would have no logical reason to see
any connection between the prime stimuli and their own responses (i.e., there is
no plausible conceptually mediated pathway connecting perception of the prime
to the measured behavior). For example, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) showed
that activation of words associated with the elderly caused participants to walk
more slowly (an elderly behavioral trait). Although conscious appraisals do not
appear to be relevant for effects of this sort, it is clear that the conceptual system
is playing a role in that perception of the elderly related primes is governed by top-
down expectancies that have presumably been learned. Indeed, automatic behav-
ior effects resulting from stereotype activation have been shown to vary with the
idiosyncratic strength of the relevant stereotype (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & Van
Knippenberg, 2000). In this case, the conceptual system (specifically, the meaning
associated with the category “elderly”) biases the perceptual system, which then
exerts a direct influence on the action system. As Dijksterhuis et al. (2007) pointed
out, perceived environmental stimuli can influence behavior by directly activating
motor programs, as may be the case in some forms of the phenomenon of motor
mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), or by activating traits or goals that in turn
potentiate relevant behavioral responses.
Given the available evidence for both a relatively conscious, indirect, construal-
based pathway connecting perception to action as well as a more unconscious,
direct pathway, it is likely the most satisfying theoretical accounts of the connec-
tions between perception and action will incorporate (at least) two distinct medi-
ating causal processes. One such model is the reflective-impulsive model (RIM)
proposed by Strack and Deutsch (2004). According to the RIM, perception of a
stimulus can result in the direct activation of behavior representations via spread-
ing activation processes, potentially producing corresponding impulsive behaviors
(e.g., seeing a bowl of peanuts may trigger eating of the peanuts even if one is not at
all hungry, with little in the way of thoughtful construal taking place). In contrast,
perception can also activate relevant knowledge and conscious reasoning processes
(i.e., reflection) that produce a more thoughtful construal of the stimulus and may
result in quite different behavioral consequences (e.g., thinking about the facts
that one is not really hungry and that one is trying to lose some weight, the visually
detected peanuts are construed as a high-calorie impediment to a more swimsuit-
ready physique and are passed up). Although a clear distinction is drawn between
these two pathways connecting perception and action, the RIM also recognizes
that the pathways can and do interact in significant ways.
Conclusion
There is a long and venerable tradition of studying social perception and seeking to
understand how meaning is extracted from incoming information about the social
world. This interest extends back even into the heyday of behaviorism, reflecting
the adamant belief of social psychologists that, no matter how influential the exter-
nal environment is in shaping behavior, that impact is mediated by cognitive mech-
anisms occurring within the active mind of a perceiving organism. Nevertheless, a
major trend in recent decades has been the increasing appreciation that many vital
Attention, Perception, and Social Cognition 17
aspects of social perception happen very rapidly and automatically, in ways that are
often completely opaque to the perceiver’s conscious mind. Perception often seems
inextricably linked to conscious experience, in that we are aware of that which we
attend to and perceive. But, the top-down shaping of attention and perception
typically occurs behind the curtain of consciousness, in the patented black box
of the behaviorists. However, as we develop ever-more-powerful techniques for
studying these unconscious mental processes, much has been learned—and much
remains to be learned—about the perceptual processes that transform the buzzing
confusion of the outer world into a meaningful and coherent inner world and that
permit organized and adaptive action.
Note
1. We focus our attention primarily on the visual modality of perception because the
bulk of the available research on social perception has focused on visual informa-
tion. However, analogous processes undoubtedly operate in auditory perception, and
recent research has even documented subtle influences of olfactory perception in
directing social preferences (e.g., Li, Moallem, Paller, & Gottfried, 2007).
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