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TANADA vs TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985

FACTS:
Petittioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent government
officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. The petitioners are invoking the right to be informed
on matters of public concern (Sec. 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution).
The petitioners are also invoking that for laws to be valid and enforceable,
they must be published in the Official Gazette.
The respondents contended that the case should be dismissed outright on
the ground that petitioners have no legal standing to carry out such petition
since they are not personally and directly prejudiced by the non-publication
of the issuances in question. Respondents also contended that the
publication in the Official Gazette is a non-requirement for laws which
provide their own affectivity date. Since the issuances in question contain
the date of effectivity, publication is not necessary.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal personality or standing to
carry out the instant petition and whether publication is necessary for laws
which have its own effectivity date.

HELD:
The Court recognizes a private citizen’s legal personality since the right
sought to be enforced by the petitioners is a public right recognized by the
Constitution.

The Court anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that:

“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.”

Publication is indispensable because without such publication, there would


be no adequate notice to the general public of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conducts as citizens. It would render injustice to
punish or burden a citizen for the transgression of law which he had no
notice.

It is the respondent officials’ duty to enforce the Constitutional rights of the


people to be informed on matters of public concern. Thus, the publication
of all presidential issuances of “public nature” or of general applicability” is
mandated by law. Unless so published, laws shall have no binding force or
effect.

PEOPLE vs QUE PO LAY


G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954

FACTS:
Que Po Lay was convicted at the Court of First Instance of Manila for
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Section 34 of
Republic No. 265. The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange
consisting of U.S dollars, checks and money orders amounting to about $
7,000. He failed to sell the said currency to the Central Bank through its
agents one day following the receipt of such currency as required by
Circular No.20. The appellant was sentenced to six months imprisonment
and a fine of Php 1, 000.
The appellant based the appeal on the claim that said circular was not
published on the Official Gazette prior to the act of omission of the
appellant, thus, said circular has no force and effect.

Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949. It was not
published until November 1951, or after three months after appelant’s
conviction of its violation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not:

1. Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, not being a statute or a law should be
subjected to publication requirement stated in Article 2 of the Civil Code;
2. The appellant is liable to the said Circular No. 20 when the latter was only
published after about three months of his conviction.
HELD:
1. Circular No. 20 is not a statute or a law but it is being issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, therefore it has the force
and effect of the law. Circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for
its violation should be published before becoming effective. It is based on
the general principle that before the public is bound by penal provisions, the
people should be officially informed of its contents and penalties.
2. Appellant could not be held liable for the violation of Circular No. 20 for it
was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign
exchange.

CONSUNJI VS. COURT OF APPEALS


GR No. 137873, 20 April 2001

FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker
of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig
City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed a
complaint for damages at the RTC of Pasig against the deceased’s employer,
D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of
the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in
favor of the widow Maria Juego.

ISSUES:
Whether or not:

1. The petitioner can be held liable under the grounds of negligence.


2. The injured employee or his heirs have the right to choose between availing
themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages in
cases of employer’s negligence.

HELD:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “the thing or transaction speaks for itself”
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res
ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or
inference of appellant’s negligence arises.
Claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment
could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law. In availing
its remedies, claimants are deemed to have waived their right of the
remedies provided by other laws. However, this is an exception because
private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed
her claim for death benefits, otherwise, she would have opted to avail of a
better remedy than that of which she already had.

CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY


G.R. No. L-15127

30 May 1961

FACTS:
Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university where plaintiff finished
his law studies up to the first semester of his fourth year. Plaintiff was
awarded with scholarship grants and his tuition fees were returned to him
at the end of each semester. Plaintiff left the defendant’s law school and
enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year at the College of Law of
Abad Santos University where he graduated.

He applied to take the bar examination in with which he needed the


transcript of records from defendant Arellano University. The defendant
demanded that he had paid back the P1, 033.87, noting the contract that he
signed stated that in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the
University, he waives his right to transfer to another school without having
refunded to the defendant the equivalent of the scholarship cash.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract between Cui and the respondent university,
whereby the former waives his right to transfer to another school without
having refunded to the defendant the equivalent of the scholarship is valid
or not.

HELD:
The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent on September
10, 1951, is a direct violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and
void. The contract was contrary to sound policy and civic honesty. The
policy enunciated in Memorandum No.38, 1949 is sound policy.
When students are given full or partial scholarships it is understood that
such scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other
fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently
charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution.

MICIANO vs. BRIMO


50 PHIL 867

FACTS:

A will of an American testator provided that his estate should be disposed


of in accordance with the Philippine law. The testator further provided that
whoever would oppose his wishes that his estate should be distributed in
accordance with Philippine laws would forfeit their inheritance.

ISSUE:

Will there be forfeiture as stated in the will of the testator?

HELD:
A testator’s wishes must be given paramount importance, however, if the
wishes of the testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that
provision in a will should not be given effect. A person’s will is merely an
instrument which is PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It should be
subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws.

The case at bar falls under the Lex Rei Sitae doctrine; where the estate of a
decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his national law. He
cannot provide otherwise.

The Supreme Court held that those who opposed would not forfeit their
inheritance because that provision is not legal.

PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA


174 SCRA 653

30 June 1989|

FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married in Germany to private
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national. They have a child
who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany on January 1983.The divorce decree was
promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

Six months after the divorce was granted private respondent filed 2
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while
still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as
1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE:

Whether a person could still be prosecuted of bigamy after a divorce decree


was already issued?

HELD:
The law specifically provides that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country and said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines.

In the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer


the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.

ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ


G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in
Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the


Makati RTC. Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from
Germany. The decree provides that the parental custody of the children
should be vested to Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss the
nullity case as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, which was
granted by respondent Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that the case should proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga
partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues
of support and custody of their children.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the granting the motion to dismiss the nullity case valid ; it
is valid to assume jurisdiction to tackle child custody and support.

HELD:
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet
attained finality. The court can modify or alter a judgment even after the
same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering
its decision unjust and inequitable. Where certain facts and circumstances
justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative
in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognized in


our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, such as custody must still be
determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment, it must be shown that the parties opposed to
the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so. In the present
case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court. The trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody,
care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.

GARCIA-RECIO vs RECIO
366 SCRA 4372

2 October 2002

FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and
wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, their marriage was dissolved by a
divorce decree, issued by an Australian Family Court.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia in Cabanatuan


City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. Their conjugal assets were divided on
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she only learned of
Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson in November 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether the divorce decree submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as
evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolve him of
bigamy.

HELD:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce
decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the
respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, it does not prove
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. The decree, being a foreign
document was inadmissible to court because it was not authenticated by the
consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

A document may be proven as an official record of a foreign country by


either:

1. an official publication;
2. attested by the officer having legal custody of the document;
3. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
4. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or
consular officer stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and
5. authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court ordered thr RTC to remand trial in the purpose of submitting
evidence that Recio was legally capacitated to marry Garcia in 1994,
otherwise declare the marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy for
having established two subsisting marriages.

NIKKO HOTEL vs. REYES


GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005

FACTS:
On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby
of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years
back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday
party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried
a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon as
it was ready but to his embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive
Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the
people around them. He was escorted by a policeman out of the hotel. All
these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the
manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people
including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him
as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s
group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter
was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt. She asked Mr.
Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party
should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She was
even polite in asking the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how


close Ms.Lim was when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes
answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the
close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be
heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to
know what happened.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party.

HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr.
Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive
on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that
Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Petitioners cannot be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and
20 of the Civil Code.

Under the doctrine of violenti non fit injuria, to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury. The doctrine refers to self-inflicted injuries or to
consent to it which precludes the recovery of damages by one knowingly
and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.
QUISUMBING vs MERALCO
GR No. 142943, 3 April 2002

FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a
house located at Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on
March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors were conducting a routine on the
spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house. Permission was
granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. It was found that the meter had been
tampered with and the information was relayed to the secretary who
conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors
brought the meter to their laboratory for further verifications. If proven
that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily
disconnect the electric services.

The inspectors returned and informed plaintiff of the findings of the


laboratory. And unless they pay the amount of P178, 875.01 representing
the difference in the bill, their electric supply will be disconnected.

The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not

1. MERALCO acted without due process and lack of regard for Quisumbings’
rights and reputation.
2. The Quisumbings be entitled for damages.
HELD:
Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right
against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or
correction for public.

The Court recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of


electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the
rights of the people. Meralco may immediately disconnect service in cases
of meter tampering, but it has to be personally witnessed and attested by an
officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official or ERB
representative was present.

Supreme Court ordered the plaintiff to pay respondent the billing


differential 0f P193, 332. 96 while MERALCO was ordered to pay
petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees.

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA


219 SCRA 115

FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get
married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan, he was an Iranian medical
exchange student. He later courted her and proposed marriage. The
petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents.

The petitioner forced the respondent to live with him in his apartment. She
filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening
her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school
and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner
administered a drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live
with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed
that he never proposed marriage, neither sought consent and approval of
Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his
apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his
passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements
of actual expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause claim for
damages.
HELD:

Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court


held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to
consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the
woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive
promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a


deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual
damages should be paid for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner
even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.

TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAÑO


G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965

FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly married by a military
chaplain in one of Pastor’s friend’s house. Upon learning about the secret
marriage, Vicenta’s parents arranged for them to be married properly in a
church so as to validate their marriage as advised by a priest. Vicenta
opposed to a second marriage after receiving an anonymous letter alleging
that Pastor and is having an amorous relationship with matchmaker Pacita
Noel. Vicenta continued to live with her parents and Pastor went back to
work in Manila. Although still solicitous of her husband’s welfare in her
letters, she was not as endearing and becomes less and less until they
became estranged.

Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for
non-prosecution because she never went to any of the set hearings. Without
informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single and left for the United States. She filed for
divorce (1950) against Pastor in Nevada on the ground of “extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character” which the Nevada court granted even when
she was not yet an American citizen (1958).
Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against Vicenta F. Escaño, her
parents Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections. He asked for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce decree granted by the Nevada Court is valid
2. Can the parents be held liable for the failure of the marriage
HELD:
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party. That the remarriage of divorced wife and her
co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter
to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one party
entitles the other to recover damages;

That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort
does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their
part.

ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE


G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004

FACTS:
Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Binas in 1955 and they separated in
1966. He contracted a second marriage to Narcisa Arcena in 1966 then
Narcisa went to Japan. While Narcisa was in Japan, he married Zenaida for
the second time in 1989.

Narcisa came home in 1992 and discovered Salvador’s affair with Fe


Corazon Palto and his second marriage to Zenaida. The event was followed
by Salvador’s filing of an annulment case and the other hand, Narcisa filed
for bigamy against Salvador.
In his defense, Salvador contended that Narcisa consented to his marriage
to Zenaida and that the bigamy case should be suspended since the
annulment case is prejudicial.

ISSUES:
Is the resolution of the annulment case a requisite for the bigamy case to
prosper?

HELD:
Annulment has no bearing upon determination of petitioner’s innocence or
guilt in bigamy. The only requirement for bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

Even void and voidable marriages shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise by the Court. Salvador’s marriages to Zenaida and Narcisa are
both subsisting, which makes him guilty of bigamy.

A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action


considering that a crime is committed against the state. Bigamy is a public
offense which can be denounced by even a civic-spirited citizen who may
come to know of it.

QUIMIGUING vs. ICAO


34 SCRA 132

FACTS:
The petitioner Carmen Quimiguing and the defendant Felix Icao, were
neighbors in Dapitan City. They had close and confidential relations.
Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal
knowledge with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and
without her consent. Carmen got pregnant despite of the drugs supplied by
defendant. As a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.

Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s
fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del
Norte on the ground of lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend
the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby
girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the
original complaint averred no cause of action”.

ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff has a right to claim support and damages.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, yet unborn, is given by law
a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The
conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons
who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in
Article 742.

Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is
an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man
forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear
violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation
for the damage caused.

GELUZ vs. CA
2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazo’s wife Nita Villanueva, came to know petitioner
physician Antonio Geluz, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became
pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. To
conceal the pregnancy from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by
Geluz. She had an abortion again on October 1953 since she found it
inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC.

After two years, on February 21, 1955, she got pregnant again and had yet
another abortion at Geluz’ clinic. Oscar at this time was in the province of
Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t
have any idea nor has he given consent on the abortion.

ISSUE:

Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,


could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:
The concept of provisional personality cannot be invoked to obtain
damages in behalf of an aborted child. Both trial court and Court of Appeals
were unable to find any basis for an award of moral damages. Oscar’s
indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections.

Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned


his wife’s indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages
of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries.

It shows that his real motive is to obtain large money from the payment to
be made since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s
fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was
clearly exaggerated.

DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA


G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933

FACTS:
Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s
brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant was an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got
pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant


visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a Rev Father
confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the
child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters
which are solicitous of Antonia and the baby’s welfare. He made hospital
arrangements through his friend for Antonia’s delivery.

After giving birth, they lived together for about a year. When Antonia
showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and
married another woma.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant
who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name
Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first
planned.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre and the other letters written by defendant to
Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether the defendant should be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael
Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father and the other letters to Antonia
are sufficient proof of paternity. The mere requirement is that the writing
shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was
long enough to reveal the father’s resolution to admit the status”.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court compelling
Syquia to provide support for the child Ismael Loanco.

LIMJUCO vs. THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE


45 OG No. 9, p.397

FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a
certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San
Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said
plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate
is a contravention of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.

HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality
because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered
as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and
distribution of his properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of
juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation
of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights
involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public
Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of
said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion,
both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed
extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution.

DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC


G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976

FACTS:
On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a judgment ordering
defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino
Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958.
The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said
amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
“is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with
law, for the satisfaction of the judgment”.
Upon defendants’ failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the
decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic
Products, Inc., ordered the “foreclosure” of the surety bond and the sale at
public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security
under the bond. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of
November 20, 1962.

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960
when the action was filed. Oria’s death was not known to Quality Plastic
AND that Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending. On
March 1, 1963 all testamentary heirs in Oria’s duly probated will, sued
Quality Plastic Products, Inc., for the annulment of the judgment against
Oria and the execution against his land.

ISSUE:
Does the Court have jurisdiction for the execution of Oria’s estate?

HELD:
The lower court’s judgment against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over
his person. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity,
which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through
death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

The execution sale of Oria’s land is also void. However, Quality plastics
cannot be held liable for damages and other costs because they were in
good faith in including Oria as defendant for no one informed them of his
death.

MO YA LIM YAO vs. COMM. IMMIGRATION


41 SCRA 292

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeng came to the Philippines from Hongkong in a temporary
visitor’s visa good for 1 month. She was asked to pay a bond of P1, 000 with
the condition to depart on before the expiration period to stay. She was able
to obtain repeated extensions until Feruary 13 1962, in a period of 10
months.
On January 1962, she got married to Mo Ya Lim Yao a.k.a Edilberto
Aguinaldo, a Filipino citizen. 18 months after her first arrival, the Comm.
On Immigration confiscated her bond and ordered immediate arrest and
deportation on the grounds of expiration of authorized stay. Defendant
filed for injunction but was denied.

Comm. On Immigration allege that marriage to Lim is an evidence of


evading the expiration of her authorized stay. They also contended that Lau
Yuen Yeung is disqualified for naturalization because she cannot read nor
write English or Tagalog and lastly, being a temporary visitor, she should
depart and get the necessary visa for permanent stay before reentering the
Philippines.

ISSUES:
1. Can the Court rightfully allege that the marriage was done for convenience?
2. Is the inability to speak or write English or Tagalog a ground for
disqualification to be a citizen?
3. Does marriage to a Filipino citizen automatically makes an alien into a
citizen?
HELD:
No one, not even the Court can rightfully allege that a marriage is done for
convenience to avoid deportation. Marriage is a sacred vow between two
people in accordance with law and no person can be a judge to the motives
of those who contract marriage. Lau Yuen Yeung became a citizen of the
Philippines by virtue of her marriage to Edilberto Aguinaldo.

The Comm. of Immigration or any of its representatives is permanently


enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of
the bond of Lau Yuen Yeung.

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC


G.R No. 120295, 28 June 1996

FACTS:
Juan Frivaldo filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on March 20, 1995.
Raul Lee made a petition to cancel the COC for being disqualified to seek
public office because he was not a Filipino Citizen, which was granted by
the COMELEC.
Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsideration which remained unacted upon
until after May 1995 election. His candidacy continued and he was elected
as Governor. However, the COMELEC affirmed his disqualification on May
11, 1995. Raul Lee having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes was
proclaimed Governor.
Frivaldo filed a petition to annul the proclamation on the grounds that: 1.
He took an Oath of Allegiance on June 30 as his petition for naturalization
in September 1994 had been granted; 2. There is no more legal impediment
for his proclamation; 3. The Vice Governor and not Lee should occupy the
seat as Governor in case of vacancy due to disqualification.

ISSUE:
Is Juan Frivaldo a Filipino Citizen during his election as Governor?

HELD:
Yes. It is true that he was disqualified by the Court in the 1988 and 1992
elections on the issue of his citizenship and he was stateless when he filed
his COC for the 1995 elections, thus making him ineligible to hold public
office. But his case is unique and the law should be interpreted liberally on
his favor.

1. He sought American citizenship to escape prosecution of the Martial Law,


not to denounce his being a Fiipino.
2. He took an Oath of Allegiance every time he files his COC despite being
denied several times.
3. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-acquire his
citizenship despite technical setbacks.
4. Assured of a life of ease and plenty as an American Citizen he opted on
returning and serving his country which gives no doubt as to his loyalty and
dedication to this country.
5. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times which
makes him deserving to govern the people.
Frivaldo was upheld as the rightful Governor of Sorsogon and granted
Filipino citizenship.

UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC


95 P.R. 890
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental on October 6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and
secondary education. He went to the United States, where, from 1947 to
1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in
California. In April of 1950 he returned to the Philippines for a four -month
vacation, then on July 15, 1950, filed an application for naturalization.
Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a postgraduate course,
in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He finished this
course in July 1951 but did not return to the Philippines until October 13,
1951.

Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as
used in the aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous
with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until
another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to
be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in
staying in the United States, at that time being, merely to study.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, when
petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition.

HELD:

While domicile and residence mean the same thing, residence combined
with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode,
fixed permanently for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a
residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to
the true domicile.

Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his
petition for naturalization and did not return until several months after the
first date set for the hearing, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under
oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines “from the date of
the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship”, he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment
in his favor.

However, the denial of his petition does not bar him to reapply for
citizenship and undergo the same process again. He has to be committed to
comply with the requirements.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC


248 SCRA 300

FACTS:
Imelda was a little over 8 years old when her parents established domicile
in Tacloban, Leyte. She finished her studies and got her degree in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She
went to Manila in 1952 to work for her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office at the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman
of Ilocos Norte and consequently became a registered voter there.

When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in
San Juan. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during
1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative


of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, also
a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification” with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.

The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under


residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words “since
childhood” in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on
March 29, 1995 and that “she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the
fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said
months.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The
court favors the conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7
months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s


domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term
“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.
When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile
of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
action of returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban,
her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in
her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
The petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the
First District of Leyte.

STAR PAPER CORP. vs. SIMBOL


G.R. No. 164774. April 12, 2006
FACTS:
Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products. The
company policies stated that:

 New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a


relative, up to the 3rd degree already employed by the company.
 In case of two employees decided to get married, one of them should resign
to preserve the policy stated above.
The complainants alleged that they were co-employees and they got
married co-e. They were compelled to resign because of the company
policy. They lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice.

ISSUE:
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the
same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution
and the Labor Code or is it a valid exercise of management prerogative

HELD:
There are two types of employment policies involving spouses:

 No-spouse employment policies – policies banning only spouses from


working in the same company
 Anti-nepotism employment policies – those banning all immediate family
members, including spouses, from working in the same company
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove
two factors:

1. That the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential


operation of the job involved; and
2. That there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of
the job.
In the case at bar, there is no a reasonable business necessity. The
employees were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked
to resign when they married a co-employee. Star Paper failed to show how
the marriages of the employees could be detrimental to its business
operations. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married
to each other will be less efficient.

PT&T vs. NLRC


272 SCRA 596

FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de
Guzman as reliever for employees on leave in two instances. On September
2, 1991, de Guzman was asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee
where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the
application form that she was single although she had contracted marriage
a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its
branch supervisor required her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting
married women for employment.

She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor
Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that
petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the
status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had
been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.

ISSUE:
Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate
the services of an employee.

HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women,
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female
employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and
employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best
business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or
those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman


worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination
provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution.
The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were
dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women
are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because
of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an


employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or
tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”

ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR


A.M. No. P-02-1651

FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a widow and works as a court interpreter. She was
charged with committing “Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct” under the
Administrative Code for living with a man not her husband and having
borne a child within the live-in set-up. She asserted that her conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious belief and has the
approval of her congregation with the “Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness.” It allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations, thus making the
union moral and bindings.

Soledad was abandoned by her husband when she started the live-in set-up.
Eventually, he died which lifts her legal impediment to marry but her
partner is not eligible for marriage yet. The above-mentioned declaration is
done with diligent investigation as to backgrounds of the members who
avail of it.

Once all legal impediments are lifted, the validity of the declaration ceases
and the couple should legalize their union.

ISSUE:
Can ones religious belief and practice enough reason to dismiss the charge
and to justify a conjugal arrangement?

HELD:
Soledad’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she made out a case
for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to “freedom of
religion”.

Man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State. Soledad’s


sincerity and centrality of her claimed religious belief and practice is
beyond doubt.

The administrative complaint was dismissed.

GOITIA vs CAMPOS-RUEDA
35 PHIL 252

FACTS:

Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married in Manila on
January 7, 1915. They established their residence and lived together for a
month.

The husband demanded from his wife to perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs which the wife refused to perform. The husband
continually demanded such lewd acts from his wife. The constant refusal of
the wife induced the husband to inflict physical injuries. This forced Eloisa
to leave the conjugal home and take refuge in the home of her parents.

Eloisa demanded financial support from Jose. The Court held that the
defendant cannot be compelled to support the wife except in his own house,
unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation.

ISSUE:
Would the husband be compelled to provide financial support for his wife
who refuses to live with him?
HELD:
The act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife as a natural and legal duty. This obligation is not
terminated by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection.

Separation and divorce arguments to create financial obligation is weak


because separate maintenance is a specific duty mandated by the State and
is not payable either as damages or as penalty.

EUGENIO vs. VELEZ


185 SCRA 45

FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and was confined by the petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his
palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. She cohabited with the
petitioner against her will and always had the intention of escaping. She
died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence on
Aug. 28, 1988.

Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters (Vargases) filed a petition for
Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
alleging. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner
refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the ground that a
corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. The court
ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy
but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:
Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?

HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of
the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased was an unmarried man
or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve
upon the nearest kin of the deceased.”

Petitioner’s claim that he is the spouse cannot be valid as contemplated


under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common
law marriages where “a man and a woman not legally married who cohabit
for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions”.

In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has
a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON


237 SCRA 249

FACTS:
Complainants work in MTC-Tinambak, Camarines Sur. They alleged that
Judge Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a
marriage license. Hence, couples were able to get married just by paying
the marriage fees to respondent. As a consequence, the marriage contracts
of the couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the
date of solemnization reasoning out that he had to wait for the marriage
license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days
after the marriage ceremony.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondent.


Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under
Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license
requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the
same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. The spouses
subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the
civil registrar.

The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon
did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are
not included. The marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid
embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage
contract.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

HELD:
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable. He was
found guilty of solemnizing marriages without a marriage license
His claim that Abellano and Edralin executed a joint affidavit that they have
been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already would
show that Abellano is less than 13 years old when they started living
together which. He is found to be negligent in his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false
joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.

WASSMER vs. VELEZ


12 SCRA 648

FACTS:
Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get married. They applied
and acquired marriage license and set the wedding on September 4, 1954.
Necessary publication and preparations including sending off invitations
were done.

Two days before the scheduled wedding, Francisco went home to his
province without properly notifying Beatriz. He sent a telegram that they
have to postpone the wedding because his mother opposes it. He gave an
assurance that he will return but he never did.

Beatriz sued for damages, Francisco filed no answer and was declared in
default. The Court ordered Francisco to pay for actual damages, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Francisco filed a petition for relief
from orders and motion for a new trial. The court then proposed for
amicable settlement.

Francisco contended that his failure to marry beatriz was due to fortuitous
event and circumstances beyond his control.

ISSUE:
Can a person be held liable for walking out of his own wedding?

HELD:
YES. Breech of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong however,
that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that “any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.”

Plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which


was subsequently issued and their wedding was set. Necessary preparation
and publicity were done only for the defendant to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized. This is contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
This Court’s opinion, considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15, 000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.

NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY


A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309, 19 July 1996
FACTS:
Rodolfo Navarro lodged a complaint against Judge Hernando Domagtoy for
two acts:

1. For solemnizing the wedding between Gaspar Tabadan and Arlyn Borga.
The groom is merely separated from his wife. The judge relied on the
affidavit by the MTC Judge of Basy that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have
not seen each other for almost seven years, thus the presumption that she is
already dead.
2. For solemnizing a wedding between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma
Del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Domagtoy can be held liable of the above acts.

HELD:
1. Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
of the first wife’s presumptive death. In the absence of which, he remains
married to the first wife thus, legally incapacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage. It was an error to have accepted a joint affidavit. The judge’s
negligence resulted to solemnizing a bigamous marriage.
2. The justification that the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was
solemnized in his home on the basis of an affidavit submitted by Gemma
alone is erroneous. According to the Family Code, marriage can be
solemnized outside of the Court’s jurisdiction upon “request of both parties
in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.”
Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months and given a stern warning
that repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

ARAÑES vs. JUDGE OCCIANO


A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B.
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Arañes and Orobia as husband and wife until her husband passed away.
Since the marriage was a nullity, she was deprived to inherit the “vast
properties” left by Orobia and to receive the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo


to solemnize the marriage of the parties having been assured that all the
documents to the marriage were complete. He agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala at MTC Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17
February 2000, Arroyo requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan.

He discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license so he suggested resetting it. Due to the earnest pleas of the parties,
he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He
reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him
the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his
sala which never materialized.

Petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Court Administrator. That after reading the Comment filed by
respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered
by her conscience.

ISSUES:
Can the judge be liable for solemnizing a marriage outside of his
jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license given his reason
of human compassion and given the fact that the petitioner already desisted
from her complaint?

HELD:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority
of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. The
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.”

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited


to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law
and subjects him to administrative liability.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage


without the requisite marriage license. It is the marriage license that gives
the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance


filed by petitioner. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice,
as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of


the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5, 000.00
pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

LIM TANHU vs. REMOLETE


66 SCRA 425

FACTS:
Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, a Chinese
citizen partner, owner with controlling interest of Glory Commercial Co.
Antonio Lim Tahhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name
but wer mere employees of Chuan, both are naturalized Filipinos.

Tan Put alleged that Tan Hu and several others took actual/active
management of the partnership through fraud and machination. She is
claiming entitlement to the share of capital and profits including assets
acquired during the lifetime of Chuan, being the widow of the latter.

Chuan died in 1966 which dissolved the partnership and shares


corresponded to him ws given to his legitimate wife Ang Siok Tin and his
chidren, all residing in Hongkong. Defendants contended that Tan Put is
merely a common-law wife. Their union was dissolved by Chuan himself
when he was still alive and she was given a settlement. They were unable to
bear a child who would have been a lawful heir of Chuan.

ISSUE:
Is Tan Put entitled to claim Chuan’s share in the company?

HELD:
Primary evidence of marriage is the authentic copy of the Marriage
certificate. Other competent evidence may also be accepted when the
absence of the Marriage Certificate is satisfactorily explained. Certification
of the person who solemnized the wedding is not admissible evidence of
marriage.

Agreement with Chuan which was signed by Tan Put that she received
settlement for property interests when they terminated their common-law
union has greater weight over the certification issued by Mons. Jose M.
Recoleto which does not show the reason why there was no Marriage
Certificate. In as much as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.

VDA DE CHUA vs. CA AND CASTRO


G.R. No. 118635, 5 March 1998

FACTS:
Florita Vallejo lived out of wedlock with Roberto Lim Chua, single and
begot two children with him. Chua died intestate in May 28, 1992. Florita
filed for petition for declaration of heirship and guardianship for her sons
and real and personal properties of their minor children.

Court ordered hearing and publication of the said petition in Maguindanao,


Cotabato City and Davao City.
Antoinetta Garcia Vda de Chua filed an opposition to dismiss due to
improper venue since the deceased died in Davao, then Davao RTC has the
proper jurisdiction. The court denied the motion for lack of merit.

During the hearing, Garcia contended that she was the legal wife and that
Chua resides in Davao at the time of his death. She presented a photocopy
of their Marriage Certificate. She also submitted TCT, Residence certificate,
ITR and passport all stating that he is married.

Florita On the other hand submitted birth certificates of their children as


well as certification from the Local Civil Registrar that Chua does not have
existing marriage registered. Judge Banzali also denied having solemnized
the said wedding.

ISSUE:
Where is the deceased’s residence and could Antoinetta be the legal wife
and heir of Chua?

HELD:
Evidence proved that Chua’s residence is in Cotabato although he frequents
Davao and usually stays there for business purposes.

Garcia was unable to establish proof of her alleged marriage which


consequently denies her entitlement to oppose Vallejo’s petition.

 Photostat copy of the marriage certificate cannot be admitted as evidence.


Only the original or an authenticated copy would suffice as evidence of
marriage.
 Certification from the Local Civil Registrar that no such marriage was
recorded and certification from the alleged solemnizing officer denying the
act made her evidence as well as the other documents worthless.
REPUBLIC vs. CA AND CASTRO
G.R. No. 103047, 12 September 1994

FACTS:
Angelina M. Castro file a petition for judicial decree of nullity of marriage
with Edwin Cardenas on the ground that no Marriage License was ever
issued to them prior to the solemnization of the marriage. Edwin failed to
file an answer and was declared in default.

Angelina and Edwin had a civil wedding with Judge Pablo Malvar in Pasay
City without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Cardenas procured the
requirements including the marriage license in Pasig MM. They cohabited
for four months and bore a child. They parted and the child was adopted by
Castro’s brother with the consent of Cardenas.

SCRO of Pasay issued a certification that marriage license of the spouses


does not appear from their registry. Castro also testified that she did not
apply for marriage license and did not sign anything until the marriage
certificate.

The lower court denied the petition stating that the certification is
inadequate to establish non-issuance of the marriage license. The inability
to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was none
issued.

ISSUE:
Would the documentary and testimonial evidence presented be sufficient to
grant a decree of nullity?

HELD:
At the time of their marriage the governing law was the New Civil code
which states that the absence of a marriage license would render the
marriage void ab initio.

 The fact that only Castro testified cannot be held against her. Her husband’s
default after duly served with notice cannot be faulted on Castro.

 The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Castro which was


undisputed by any party, sufficiently established the absence of the marriage
license. Thus, marriage was null and void ab initio.
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino married Richard Upton, a U.S. citizen in
Hongkong in 1972. They had two children. They got divorced in Nevada
U.S.A in 1982 and both certified that they do not have any community
property to divide. Alice remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.

Upton filed a suit in June 1983 stating that Reyes’ business in Manila is
conjugal property. He demands to render an accounting to the business and
declare his right to manage the business. Reyes moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the action is barred by the previous judgment in Nevada
divorce wherein they both acknowledged having no community property as
of June 11, 1982.

Reyes’ motion was denied by the lower court stating that the property is
located in the Philippines so that the divorce decree has no bearing.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce of the parties to their property in
the Philippines?

HELD:
Pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of the
petitioner. He has no standing to sue in the case where the husband is
entitled to control over conjugal assets.

 The divorce obtained abroad being valid in his country’s court may be
recognized in the Philippines. The divorce decree granted in Nevada
released Reyes from the marriage for the marriage had been severed by one
party ceases to bind either.
 Getting a divorce decree in the US court and contending that it is not valid
and binding in the Philippines being contrary to local law and public policy
estopped Upton’s declaration.
REPUBLIC vs. ORBECINDO
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecindo and Lady Myros Villanueva got married in May 24,
1981. Both are Filipino citizens. They cohabited and had two children.
Villanueva went to the U.S. in 1986 with one son.

Villanueva became a naturalized American citizen and sometime in the year


2000, Orbecindo learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and
remarried. Orbecindo then filed a petition for authority to remarry. The
court granted the petition since there was no opposition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code

HELD:
Petition for authority to remarry constituted a petition for the declaratory
relief. The following are the requisites:

1. Justiciable controversy
2. Controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse
3. That the party seeking relief has a legal interest
4. The issue is ripe for judicial determination
ARTICLE 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried can also be allowed to remarry.

However, the present petition of Orbecindo has no sufficient evidence


submitted and on record and are only based on bare allegations that his
wife was a naturalized American citizen, had obtained divorce decree and
had remarried an American. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon submission of evidence in his favor.

NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG


328 SCRA 122

FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. Almst two years thereafter Pepito
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. Petitioners filed a


petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would
affect petitioner’s successional rights.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no


cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?

Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with


defendant is valid

HELD:
The two marriages involved herein is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite
of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio.
The 5-year cohabitation period should be the years immediately preceding
the marriage and it should be characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity –
that is unbroken. In the case at bar Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
time he cohabited with another.

It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it


never existed. Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.

MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ


A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001

FACTS:
Herminia Borja Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966. They had 4
children. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before Judge Sanchez. The Judge
knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated.”

In his comment, at the time he officiated the marriage the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. Had he known
that Manzano was married he would have refused to solemnize the
marriage

David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were
married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since
their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had
both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with
their spouses anymore”

ISSUE:
Is the judge guilty of solemnizing a bigamous marriage?

HELD:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a legal impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time is immaterial. Legal separation does not
dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This
holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the
case at bar.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when


he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the


MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent
Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20, 000.

MARIATEGUI Vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3
marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he
was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia
Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario,
Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina.
Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto.

Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter


named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with
Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and
were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of


extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of
the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration
proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued.
The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of
the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid and entitles their
children of heirship for the properties left by Lupo.

HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s
marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken


place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things
have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life. Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have
successional rights

CHI MING TSOI vs. CA


256 SCRA 324

FACTS:

GINA LAO-TSOI and Chi Ming Tsoi got married on May 22, 1988.
Distraught, Gina filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity premised on the following reasons:

 There was no sexual intercourse between them on the first night or on the
succeeding nights until they separated in March of 1989;
 That the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual;
 Results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband’s examination was kept confidential
up to this time.
 Chi Ming Tsoi married her, to maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
Chi Ming Tsoi does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons:

 That there is no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically


capable;
 If there are any differences between them, it can still be reconciled and that
if either has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be
cured.
 He admitted that since their marriage until their separation they had no
sexual contact between them. He reasoned was that every time he wants to
have sexual intercourse, his wife always avoided him. He forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was
shaking and she did not like it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation.

HELD:
 Both defendant and appellant admitted that they did not have sexual
relations after almost ten months of cohabitation, when both are not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder.
 “To procreate is based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation destroys the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity, since
he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse
during the entire time.
DOMINGO vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled “Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property” against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. They were married on November 29, 1976 unknown to her, he
had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969
which marriage is valid and still existing. She came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlinda sued for bigamy.

Since January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi
Arabia while he has been unemployed and dependent. Out of her personal
earnings, she purchased properties amounting to P350k, which are under
the possession and administration of Roberto. In June 1989, she discovered
that he was cohabiting with another woman and he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent.

The petition prayed that 1. temporary restraining order or a writ of


preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act
of administration and ownership over said properties; 2. their marriage be
declared null and void and of no force and effect; and 3. Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time
of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact—Moises Avera, her
brother

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for
purposes of remarriage.

HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is required for the purpose of
remarriage. It is necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who
believed in good faith that his partner was not lawfully married thus free
from being charged with bigamy.

The marriage of Soledad and Roberto was celebrated while the former’s
previous marriage was still subsisting, thus, bigamous and void ab initio.
Law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes.
There is no need for a separate action of partition of property because it will
simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. MOLINA


G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997

FACTS:
Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed of a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. They were married on April 14, 1985 and
begot a son, Andre O. Molina was born. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend
time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money. He
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with
his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels.

Reynaldo was relieved of his job and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner. In October 1986 the couple had a very intense fight, which
resulted to their estrangement until Reynaldo finally abandoned them.
Roridel desires to have the marriage declared null and void in order to free
them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as


husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to Roridel’s strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage, Roridel’s refusal
to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and Roridel’s
failure to run the household and handle their finances.

The parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years. The petitioner
is not asking support or for damages. Their common child is in the custody
of the petitioner.

ISSUES:
Are opposing and conflicting personalities equivalent to psychological
incapacity?

HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. Psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.

The present case, does not show that the psychological defect spoken of is
an incapacity. It appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

Here is the guideline for psychological incapacity to be established:

(The Molina Doctrine)

1. Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the


2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration”
of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
LEOUEL vs CA
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995
FACTS:
Leouel Santos 1LT of the Philippine Army met Julia in Iloilo. The two got
married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter,
by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth
to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr.

Occasionally, the couple would fight over a number of things aside from the
interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs. Julia left in 1988 to
work in the U.S. as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. She only
called her husband after 7 months; promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did.

Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program


under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. He filed a complaint to have their
marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. He
argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for
more than 5 years show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter
into married life.

Julia opposed the complaint and denied the allegations, claiming that it
was the petitioner who had been irresponsible and incompetent.

ISSUE:
Does Julia’s behavior of refusing to come home in spite of the pleas of her
husband constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity- a true
inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage (b) juridical
antecedence-inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love,
the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring,
and (c) incurability- inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage;
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO


G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004

FACTS:
Lolita Quintero and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship in
Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Toshio went back to
Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. They had a child and in January 14,
1988, she and Toshio were married

Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to


assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only
after the marriage. One month after they Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but he never responded. She learned from her
friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her
and their child. June 1996 Lolita filed for annulment.

Exhaustive efforts were done to contact Toshio to no avail so she was


allowed by the court to submit evidence ex parte. She testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family. She offered documentary evidence to support
her testimony.
Court found that respondent failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of
the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained
irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family.
Such indifference is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect
for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person.
Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity
and disability of entering into marital life. Court granted her petition of
nullity.

ISSUES:
Can a mixed marriage be embraced in psychological incapacity?

Is failing to meet a duty to live with, care for and support a family and
abandonment constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD:
In proving psychological incapacity, court finds no distinction between an
alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. Court cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. However,
the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated.

Abandonment is a ground for legal separation. Psychological defect cannot


be presumed from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family.

CHOA vs. CHOA


G.R. No. 1473376, 26 November 2002

FACTS:
A demurrer to evidence is defined as “an objection or exception by one of
the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to
make out his case or sustain the issue.” The demurrer challenges the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict.

The petitioner Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa, respondent were married on
March 15, 1981. Two children were born. The respondent filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged
psychological incapacity.

The testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of


petitioner’s personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their
children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an “intention of procreative
sexuality.” The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence.
Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
(Demurrer to Evidence). The lower court then allowed a number of
pleadings to be filed thereafter. The RTC issued an order denying
petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. It held that respondent established a
quantum of evidence that the petitioner must controvert.”

ISSUES:
WON (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of
an “intention of procreative sexuality constitute psychological incapacity

HELD:
None of the causes complained of against the petitioner separately or
collectively constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity
must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal” or a “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological
incapacity.

Mild character peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional


outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

Respondent’s contention that petitioner “lacked the intention of procreative


sexuality” is easily belied by the fact that two children were born during
their union.

DEDEL vs. CA
G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner David B. Dedel married respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel
wedding on May 20, 1967. The union produced four children. The conjugal
partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother
and had extra-marital affairs with several men. Sharon once underwent
treatment with a clinical psychologist but it did not stop Sharon in her illicit
affairs where she even had two children out of wedlock.

Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children. Petitioner


accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his
own. December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in
Jordan with their two children.

Petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage


on the ground of psychological incapacity. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon
was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity and had no capacity for remorse. Her repeated
acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-
Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUES:
Does the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated?

Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner


fall within the term “psychological incapacity?”

HELD:
Respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming. Neither could her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and abandonment constitute psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential marital obligations. The manifestations presented refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

The grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present


situation cannot be denied. While sympathy is warranted in the petitioner’s
marital predicament, the law must be applied no matter how harsh it may
be.

MORIGO vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004

FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for 4 years,
after which they lost contact with each other. They reconnected again in
1984 and became sweethearts when Lucia was in Singapore until she went
to Canada in 1986.

They got married in Aug.1990, the following month Lucia went back to
Canada leaving Lucio behind. Lucia filed for divorce in Canada which was
granted by the court to take effect on Feb 17, 1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio
Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place. Lucio was charged with Bigamy in information filed by
the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol.

Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking a reversal of his conviction. He


should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of
the Ontario court. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he
was in good faith in relying on the divorce decree is negated by his act of
filing a petition for a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense
of good faith is valid.

HELD:
The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent
marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

The trial court held that the marriage of Lucio and Lucia is void ab initio, in
accordance with the Family Code. What transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete.

Petitioner has not committed bigamy. His defense of good faith or lack of
criminal intent is now moot and academic.

WEIGEL vs. SEMPIO-DY


143 SCRA 449

FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
celebrated on July, 1978 with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Weigel on the g
round that Lilia has previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion
performed on June 25, 1972

Lilia admitted the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that
said marriage was null and void. She asked the respondent court for an
opportunity to present evidence that:

 The first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and
 The first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to
someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the
existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already
been agreed upon.

Lilia assailed the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were
compelled to submit the case for resolution based on “agreed facts;” and the
Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner’s motion to allow her to
present evidence in her favor.

ISSUE:
Could the resolution of the facts of the first marriage change the result of
the annulment case filed by Weigel?

HELD:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated
by force committed against both parties because assuming as such, the
marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married the respondent she was still validly married to
her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art.
80, Civil Code).

A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact and for
all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel. The marriage of Lilia and Karl would be regarded VOID under the
law.

VALDES vs. RTC


260 SCRA 221

FACTS:
The petition for review is purely on a question of law. Petitioner avers that
the court has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the
disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared
void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or
both of the parties to the contract.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971 and
had five children. In 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity
of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. In 29 July 1994,
the court granted the petition. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
 The marriage declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations;
 The three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay
with. The 2 younger ones shall be in the custody of their mother, herein
respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
 The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children
who are in the custody of the other.
 Petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation
of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code,
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same
code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.

ISSUE:
What will govern the partition of property for annulled marriages on the
ground of psychological incapacity?

HELD:
The Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio. The property regime shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
The properties acquired during their union are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts and will be owned by them in equal
shares. They own their ‘family home’ and all their other properties for that
matter in equal shares.

A court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be


deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters such as property partition.

PEOPLE vs. ARAGON


100 Phil 1033

FACTS:
On September 28, 1925, Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a
certain Maria Gorrea in Cebu. While marriage with Maria Gorrea was
subsisting, Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on
August 27, 1934. Accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo
while he maintained his first wife in Cebu.

Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 and the accused brought
Maria Faicol to Cebu in 1940. Proceso and Maria Faicol did not live a happy
marital life. Faicol suffered injuries because of physical maltreatment in
the hands of the accused. Proceso sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo to undergo
treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, he contracted another
marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953.

CFI Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No.
3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a
marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with
Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria
Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the
nullity of such marriag.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage to Jesusa Maglasang was bigamous.

HELD:
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613)
plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annullable marriages.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second
wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of
the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence,
marriage with Maglasang was a valid one and appellant’s prosecution for
contracting this marriage cannot prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby


reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio,
without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second
bigamous marriage.
MERCADO vs. MERCADO
337 SCRA 122
FACTS:
In June 27, 1991 Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan
got married with which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed
by the parties. The status indicated by the accused was ‘single’.

At the time of the celebration of the wedding with Tan, accused was actually
a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976

Both marriages were consummated: Ma. Thelma Oliva had two children
and Tan had one. On October 5, 1992, bigamy was filed by Tan; where he
was convicted by the lower court.

Dr. Vincent G. Mercado assailed the decision the ground that on November
13, 1992 accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva and was granted by the court. While
acknowledging the existence of the two marriages, accused posited the
defense that his previous marriage had been judicially declared null and
void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage
of accused.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy negates the guilt of petitioner.
Is the petitioner entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt?

HELD:
The elements of BIGAMY are as follows: (1)That the offender has been
legally married; (2)That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) That he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; (4)That the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required


either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. In the instant case,
petitioner contracted a second marriage without judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage. That he subsequently obtained a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because the
crime had already been consummated.

Justice VITUG dissenting opinion:

 No judicial declaration of nullity should be deemed essential when the


“marriage,” is 1.) between persons of the same sex or 2.) when either or both
parties had not at all given consent to the “marriage.”
 Complete nullity of a previously contracted marriage, being a total nullity
and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a
defense in a criminal case for bigamy. No incongruence bet this rule in
criminal law and that of the Family Code, and each may be applied within
the respective spheres of governance.
REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
220 SCRA 20

FACTS:
Nolasco was a seaman and met Janet Monica Parker, a British in a bar in
England. 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San
Jose, Antique. After marriage celebration, he obtained another contract and
left his wife with his parents.

In January 1983 his mother informed him that Janet Monica had given
birth to his son and that Janet Monica had left Antique. He then
immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived
in Antique in November 1983 (after 11 mos)

His efforts to look for her proved fruitless, respondent stated that he had
lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker not knowing her
background. He did not report the matter of Janet Monica’s disappearance
to the Philippine government authorities.

5 August 1988, Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive


death of his wife Janet Monica Parker or that the marriage be declared null
and void.

ISSUE:
Does the circumstances of Jessica’s disappearance constitute a presumptive
death?

HELD:
There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code: (1) That the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391, Civil Code; (2)That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(3)That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and (4) That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

Respondent failed to prove a “well-founded belief” that the absent spouse is


already dead by failing to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief”

Inquiring from friends instead of reporting to the proper authorities among


the other superficial testimonies given by the respondent does not
constitute a diligent search

LUKBAN vs REPUBLIC
L-8492, 29 February 1956

FACTS:
In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of LOURDES G.
LUKBAN. Petitioner is a widow of Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to
be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.

Lourdes G. Lukban, married with Francisco Chuidian on December 10,


1933. After 17 days Francisco left after a violent quarrel then he has not
been heard from despite diligent search. She inquired from his parents and
friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She believes that
he is dead because he had been absent for more than 20 years.

She intends to marry again and she desires that her civil status be defined
in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.
Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not
authorized by law.

ISSUE:
Can death be presumed by the nature of Francisco Chuidan’s
disappearance?

HELD:
Judicial declaration that Petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead
cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law. The court cannot
declare the status of Petitioner as a widow since this matter depend upon
the fact of death of the husband which the court can declare upon proper
evidence, not because he is merely presumed to be dead.

CIVIL CODE Section III Paragraph 2, General Orders No. 68) requires that:

 The former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage. The spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living.
 that former spouse is generally reputed to be dead;
 the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage
ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO
G.R.No. 138467, 6 April 2000

FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein
respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of
Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds who
disappeared without a trace on 11 Feb 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years later, without Marietta having secured a court
declaration that James was presumptively dead.

Antonia Armas, a sister of Teodorico, filed a petition claiming to be the sole


surviving heir. She alleged marriage between Teodorico and Marietta being
is bigamous and thereby null and void. She asked the court to have her son
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator.
Marietta opposed, stating that her marriage with James Bounds had been
dissolved due to the latter’s absence for more than 11 years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Being the surviving spous,
she sought priority in the administration of the estate.

Trial Court handed a judgment that Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared


as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos.

ISSUE:
Is the marriage contracted by Teodorico and Marietta valid?

HELD:
The law in force at that time was the Civil Code: Art. 83 which states that:

Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of


the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

 The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or


 The first spouse had been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive; or
 If the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.”

 It remained undisputed that Marietta’s first husband, James William Bounds,


had been absent for more than 11 years before she entered into a second
marriage. This second marriage, under the Civil Code, should thus be
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of James Bounds. A judicial declaration of absence of the
absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence
is met.
 The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, without other evidence
having been adduced to indicate another property regime between the
spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions. One
portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of
the deceased spouse.
 The dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise
entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance the other one-half
share of the decedent’s estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of
her own children.
ANAYA vs. PALAROAN
35 SCRA 97

FACTS:
Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953.
Defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7
January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force
and intimidation.

Judgment was rendered dismissing Fernando’s petition, upholding the


validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim. Accordingly
Fernando had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his prior to
their marriage. The non-divulgement to her of the pre-marital secret
constituted ‘FRAUD’, in obtaining her consent. Aurora further alleged that
Fernando sought to marry her so he could evade marrying the close relative
and he intended from the beginning not to perform the marital duties and
obligations in order to appease the immediate members of the family of the
first girl.

Fernando in his answer, denied the allegation of having had pre-marital


relationship with a close relative, thus having committed no fraud against
her. He courted a third girl with whom he cohabited and had several
children during the whole range of nine years that the Civil Case had been
litigated between them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-
marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
HELD:
Fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its
annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides
that a marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:

 Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;


 Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for
two years or more;
 Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.
Any secret intention on the husband’s part not to perform his marital duties
must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her
action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within
four years after the marriage. Since appellant’s wedding was celebrated in
December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be
declared already barred.

BUCCAT vs. BUCCAT


72 Phil 19

FACTS:
This issue has been raised to this superiority by the Court of First Instance
of Baguio, as only raises a question purely of law.

The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938, committed on Sept and got
married on 26 November the same year. After living together for 99 days
,Luisa gave birth to a child of nine months, in February 23, 1939. Godofredo
abandoned Luisa and did not return.

In March 29, 1939 GODOFREDO requests the annulment of marriage with


Luisa Buccat Mangonon on the ground that he was defrauded in consenting
to the marriage with Luisa. She had assured him that she was virgin but the
circumstances of the birth of the child after only 99 days of cohabitation
speaks otherwise.
Luisa failed to appear despite having been summoned which allowed
Godofredo to present evidence. The lower court decided in favor of Luisa in
upholding the marriage. Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Godofredo’s ground is valid to be granted an annulment.

HELD:
The plaintiff’s allegation of fraud is impossible after it has been proven that
Luisa is in advanced pregnant condition by the time they were married. It
seems childish considering that the applicant was a freshman in law.

Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation on which society


rests. In this case no evidence has satisfied the court to merit an
annulment. All the intendment of the law leans towards the validity of
marriage.

AQUINO vs. DELIZO


109 Phil 21

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the dismissed complaint for annulment of Fernando Aquino’s
marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo. Complaint which was filed on
September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud.

Conchita Delizo, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man.
Sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, she
gave birth to a child. She claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful
wedlock between her and the plaintiff.

On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate was
presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the
marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy
as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud as would annul a
marriage dismissed the complaint.
Fernando appealed the case with the following information:

 At the time he courted Conchita she was living with his own brother Cesar
Aquino who admitted that he was the father of Conchita’s first-born. Cesar
and Conchita hid her pregnancy from Fernando.
 Conchita is presently living with Cesar and had 2 more children; he
submitted the birth certificates
Stating that it “does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion
and its annexes”, the Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the
motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contentions alleged sufficient to seek for annulment.

HELD:
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the
time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. 4)

The evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with
what has already been adduced would be sufficient to sustain the fraud
alleged by plaintiff. The Supreme Court found the appeal meritorious and
ordered a new trial for the annulment case.

MENCIANO vs. SAN JOSE


89 Phil 63

FACTS:
Matilde Menciano filed a motion for declaration of heirs, alleging that she is
the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was
married on September 28, 1944. Before the marriage they lived together as
husband and wife, there having been no impediment to their marriage. As a
result of their cohabitation the child Carlo Magno Neri was born, baptized
and was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his parents. The
second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 24, 1945 is a legitimate
child.
Paz Neri San Jose, then executrix of the estate of the deceased Faustino
Neri San Jose, and Rodolfo Pelaez, designated universal heir in the will of
the deceased filed a motion to question the declaration of heirs.

They alleged that marriage between said deceased and Matilde Menciano
was in violation of the legal provisions and requisites, because he was
deprived of free will due to his age and sickness. Accordingly, Matilde
Menciano took advantage of his condition, by intrigue, deceit and threat of
abandoning him, forced Neri to marry her. The deceased was impotent and
congenitally sterile, the same as his brothers and sister Conchita, who had
no children therefore it would have been impossible for him to have
fathered the children

Defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of P286, 000 in cash, and
for jewels and certain properties, which, as alleged, were retained and
illegally disposed of by Matilde Menciano.

ISSUE:
1. Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde
Menciano valid?
2. Are, the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate
children of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano?
3. Did Matilde Menciano have illegally disposed of the cash, jewels, and
certain properties above mentioned?
HELD:
The marriage of Matilde and Faustino was evidenced by a valid Marriage
License and Marriage Certificate both of which were signed by the parties
and properly recorded at the Office of the Civil Registrar. Being official and
public documents, their validity can be successfully assailed only by strong,
clear, and convincing oral testimony.

Faustino’s meticulous signature cannot be signed by one who is not of


sound mind and of fair physical condition. He may have been sick at that
time, but not to such a degree as to render him unconscious of what he was
doing.

Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. The


presumption is in favor of potency. The fact that the deceased was able to
produce the specimen as what was instructed by his doctor shows that he
was potent. The necessary conclusion is that the child Faustino Neri, Jr., is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased Faustino
Neri with Matilde Menciano in lawful wedlock.

The trial court, after a careful and exhaustive review of the evidence,
correctly reached the conclusion that allegation of illegally disposing money
and jewelry has not been substantiated.

JIMENEZ vs. CANIZARES


L-12790, 31 August 1960

FACTS:
Joel Jimenez filed a petition for a decree annulling his marriage to the
defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 upon the
ground that the condition of her genitals is incapable of copulation and it
existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. For that reason he
left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.

On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the
complaint. She did not file an answer so the court directed the city attorney
of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was collusion.

On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant


to submit to a physical exam to determine her physical capacity for
copulation and to submit, in ten days a medical certificate on the result
which she did not comply with. The Court entered a decree annulling the
marriage which prompted the city attorney to file a motion for
reconsideration upon the ground that the defendant’s impotency has not
been satisfactorily established as required by law; because the wife refused
to be examined.

Instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for
contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination
and submit a medical certificate. The decree sought to be reconsidered
would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to
collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of
them.

ISSUE:
May the marriage in question be annulled on the strength of the lone
testimony of thhusband?

HELD:
The annulment cannot be decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband
who was expected to give testimony which is aimed at securing the
annulment he seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed
to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of
the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking
part therein. Her refusal to be examined and failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not be inferred because women of this country are by nature
coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless
compelled to by competent authority.

Impotency should not be presumed. The presumption is always in favor of


potency.

SIN vs. SIN


G.R. No. 137590, 26 March 2001

FACTS:
An appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner
Florence Malcampo-Sin’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due
to psychological incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.

January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and


respondent Philipp T. Sin, a Portugese citizen, were married. On September
20, 1994, Florence filed for annulment which was dismissed June of the
following year. She appealed and again dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Florence was given a fair trial.
HELD:
Throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson filed with the trial court a
manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that he found no collusion
between the parties, he did not actively participate therein. The Article 48
of the Family Code mandates:

In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the


Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires


vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense
of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.

Decision of the trial court as “prematurely rendered” since the investigating


prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
before the judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the
participation of the State.

Supreme Court declined to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this
being within the province of the trial court upon proper re-trial.

OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO


107 Phil 35

FACTS:
On July 5, 1955, petition for legal separation was filed by Jose De Ocampo.
It described their marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of
adultery by Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955
with Nelson Orzame.

The defendant made no answer so the court defaulted her, and directed the
provincial fiscal to investigate whether or not collusion existed between the
parties. There was none. The plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of
several testimonies which established that they were married in April 5,
1938 and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several
children who are now living with plaintiff.

Plaintiff discovered on several occasions illicit relations with one Jose


Arcalas. He sent Serafina to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture,
where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the
said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose
Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952 she left plaintiff and since then they
had lived separately.

The night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discovering the illicit
connection with Nelson Orzame, expressed his wish to file a petition for
legal separation and defendant readily agreed. Her conformity to the legal
separation was treated a confession of judgment by the Appellate Court and
declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.

ISSUE:
DOes the defendant’s conformity to the legal separation constitute a
confession of judgment that proves collision?

HELD:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between
husband and wife as having committed, a matrimonial offense or to
suppress evidence of a valid defense for the purpose of enabling the other to
obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the
acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce. Collusion may not
be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense
and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it

What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on


defendant’s confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any
defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment,
purposely to prevent it. Collusion implies more than consent or lack of
opposition.
LAPUZ vs. EUFEMIO
43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio and he should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits. They were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on
30 September 1934. They lived together as husband until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They had no child; that they acquired properties
during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with
a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949.

Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along


with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-
claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated
according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok

Before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in


a vehicular accident on. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her
death and moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz.

ISSUES:
What is the effect of death of either party to a legal separation case?

HELD:

The Article 100 of Civil Code allows only the innocent spouse to claim legal
separation; and in Article 108, provides that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of
legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows
that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
— actio personalis moritur cum persona.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.
Property rights acquired by either party could be resolved and determined
in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.

As to the petition of Eufemio for a declaration of nullity of his marriage to


Carmen Lapuz, such action became moot and academic upon the death of
the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union.

GANDIONCO vs. PENARANDA


G.R. No. 72984, 27 November 1987

FACTS:
Teresita Gandionco respondent and legal wife of the petitioner, filed a
complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages presided
over by respondent Judge. The wife also filed a separate concubinage case.
On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of
support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation,
was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The
respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered
payment of support pendente lite.
Petitioner Froilan Gandionco contends that the civil action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for
support pendente lite should be suspended in view of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him the private respondent. He also argues that
his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action
for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for
legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordered support arising from a legal separation case
should be suspended until the pending criminal case of concubinage is
decided upon.

HELD:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a
civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead
of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said
civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense”
even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of off springs, support, and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued


upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation.
No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal


separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the
amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a
motion to modify or reduce the same.
BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033, 28 December 1956

FACTS
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan wherein on motion of the defendant, the case was dismissed.
The order of dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but said
Tribunal certified the case to the Court on the ground that there is
absolutely no question of fact involved.

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the U.S. Navy, was married to


defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949 while on furlough leave.
Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with his sisters in
Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left
the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that
she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which
place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local college there.

Benjamin received several information from different people about his


wife’s infidelity. This prompted him to go home and confront his wife. They
stayed together in his cousin’s house as husband and wife for a few days.
Instead of answering his questions, she left which made him assume that it
was an admission of guilt. He filed for legal separation on the ground of
adultery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his assumption of his wife’s guilt is enough basis for a legal
separation to be granted.

HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground
for legal separation or “conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband
or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed”.

The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact
that she went with him to the house of his cousin and slept as husband and
wife for one day and two nights; these facts show reconciliation between
them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the
husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to
know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.

Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, the
conduct of the husband despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful,
deprives him of the right of any action for legal separation against the
offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of
Article 100 of the Civil Code.

PACETE vs. CARIAGA


231 SCRA 321

FACTS:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the CFI of
Cotabato, Branch I, gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners’
motion for extension of time to file their answer and in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of which, among other
things, decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and
private respondent Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void ab initio
the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion.

Concepcion Alanis filed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage


between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation and accounting and separation
of property. She averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938
and they had a child named Consuelo. She learned that Pacete subsequently
contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion. She and Pacete
acquired vast property that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with
Clarita and other “dummies;”

After having been summoned, the defendants repeatedly asked the court
for extension of filing for an answer which eventually resulted to being
declared in default. Five months after the petition was filed the court
granted the issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation and declared the
properties in question as conjugal properties of Alanis and Pacete which
were ordered forfeited in favor of Alanis. The court also nullified his
marriage to Clarita.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court gravely abused its discretion in deciding the case.

HELD:
No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. If
the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,”
obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The decision of the lower court was nullified.

MACADANGDANG vs. CA
108 SCRA 314

FACTS:
Filomena and Antonio contracted marriage in 1946. From humble
beginnings they slowly expanded their business and wealth. They had six
children. After several setbacks in their relationship, each accusing the
other of infidelity, they separated in 1965.

Filomena left and resided in Cebu. When she returned, she learned of the
illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She initiated a legal separation
against Antonio and later filed for a petition for the appointment of an
administrator for their properties. Antonio opposed the appointment of an
administrator.

No action was made on Antonio’s petition. In spite of that, the court


granted the legal separation with all its legal effects particularly the
dissolution and liquidation of the community property. Pending the
inventory and dissolution of property, Antonio was ordered to pay support
to Filomena.

Filomena filed for another motion for administration to impede unlawful


sequestration of some conjugal assets and clandestine transfers by Antonio.
Antonio opposed the move and filed a motion to stop the court from
executing orders for administration and to null the legal separation. CA
upheld the decision of the lower court. Antonio appealed but he unexpected
died on November 30, 1979.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of Antonio’s death to the legal separation case and the
dissolution of conjugal properties?

HELD:
Upon finality, legal separation shall have the following effects: 1.) Spouses
shall be entitled to live separately, but the marriage bond shall be severed;
2.) Conjugal properties shall be liquidated and dissolved but the offending
spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community.

The decision of the trial court on Jan 4, 1973 finding Antonio guilty of
concubinage and granting the legal separation and all its legal effects along
with the division of conjugal property had long been final and executory.
Upon the death of the guilty party, the liquidation of the conjugal property
can be resolved by the application of the rules on intestate succession with
respect to the exclusive property of the deceased petitioner. Thus, the
process be:

1. Liquidation and distribution governing the effects of the final decree of legal
separation;
2. Whatever remaining properties allocated to the deceased petitioner shall be
governed by intestate succession.