Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 76532 January 26, 1987

DR. FLOR J. LACANILAO, petitioner,

vs.
CAPT. JUAN DE LEON (P.N.), respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:

In this special civil action of quo warranto, petitioner Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao asserts that he is the lawful
holder of the position of Chief of the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center — Aquaculture
Department, and seeks to prevent Juan de Leon, a retired navy captain, from usurping and taking
over or occupying the said office and from exercising the functions and responsibilities of such office.

The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) was established by an Agreement
that was signed in Bangkok on 28 December 1967 by the Governments of the following countries:
Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and
Vietnam. 1 The general purpose of the SEAFDEC is "to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast
Asia," 2 which purpose is to be realized by carrying out the following functions:

(i) to train fisheries technicians of the Southeast Asian countries;

(ii) to study such fisheries techniques as are suited to the fisheries in Southeast Asia;

(iii) to develop fishing grounds and to conduct investigation of fisheries resources and
research in fisheries oceanography in Southeast Asia;

(iv) to collect and analyze information related to the fisheries in Southeast Asia;

(v) to provide the Members with the results of studies and researches by the Center
and other information; and

(vi) to handle other matters related to the functions referred to in (i) to (v) of this
Article. 3

The SEAFDEC has the following principal organs: the Council, where each member government is
represented by one Director and an Alternate Director; the Secretariat, which consists of a
Secretary-General a Deputy Secretary-General and the Secretariat staff; and such Departments as
may be created by the Council. 4 Each Department consists of a Department-Chief, a Deputy
Department-Chief and Department staff. In July 3-7, 1973, the SEAFDEC Council at its sixth meeting held
in Kuala Lumpur, approved the establishment of an Aquaculture Department in the province of Iloilo,
Philippines. The Government of the Philippines has granted certain tax exemption privileges to the
Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC as well as to foreign (non Philippine) citizens serving on the
technical and scientific staff of the Aquaculture Department. 5
Under Article 6 (2) (vi) of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, the power to appoint
Department-Chiefs rests in the Council of the SEAFDEC. Article 10 of the Agreement further
provides:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The Department-Chief shall be appointed by the Council upon the

recommendation of the government of the member country in whose territory the
Department is located and the Deputy Department-Chief shall be appointed by the
Council upon the recommendation of the government of Japan.

3. The term of office of the Department-Chief and the Deputy Department-Chief shall
be two years and they may be re-appointed.

4. The Department staff shall be appointed by the Department-Chief.

... (Emphasis supplied)

Just before and immediately after the February 1986 revolution in the country, the position of
Department-Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, was held by Dr. Alfredo C. Santiago,
Jr. Dr. Santiago was prevailed upon to withdraw as Chief of the Aquaculture Department and to
surrender his office to the petitioner. By a letter dated 8 April 1986, the Minister of Agriculture and
Food, acting "by authority of the President," nominated the petitioner as Chief of the Aquaculture
Department of SEAFDEC. 6 This recommendation was immediately transmitted to the Secretary-
General of SEAFDEC, who holds office in Bangkok, Thailand.

By an urgent telex dated 8 April 1986 addressed to the petitioner, the Secretary-General of
SEAFDEC acknowledged receipt of the petitioner's "nomination by the President of the Philippines
as new Chief for the SEAFDEC AQD." 7 The Secretary General advised the petitioner, in the same telex
that pending Council approval of his nomination, the petitioner was requested "to serve as [Officer-in-
charge] for AQD effective today" and was authorized "to take necessary actions to ensure orderly transfer
of power in both administration and finance."

By another telex dated 11 April 1986, the Secretary General advised the petitioner that the
Secretariat had received the favorable vote of a majority of the members of the Council, and that,
consequently, under Article 7 (2) of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, "the appointment of
Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao as AQD Chief [had been] approved by SEAFDEC Council." 8 It appears that the
Council was not then in session and we assume that the members were canvassed by telephone, telex or
other comparable means and their votes obtained or transmitted by the same means. 9

By a letter dated 13 June 1986, the Secretary General formally advised the SEAFDEC Council
Director for Japan (and presumably the Council Directors for the other member countries) that "the
Secretariat has received a unanimous vote for the appointment of Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao as Chief of
the SEAFDEC Aquaculture Department effective 8 April 1986, for a period of two years, as
recommended by the government of the Republic of the Philippines. 10

Accordingly, the petitioner entered upon the discharge of the functions and duties of Chief of the
Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC and continued to do so from early April 1986. until about 21
November 1986.

On or about 21 November 1986, while Dr. Lacanilao was in Tokyo, Japan attending the annual
SEAFDEC Council meeting, the respondent, attended by groups of retainers and assistants, entered
and took physical possession of the different offices of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, i.e.,
its Manila Liaison Office, its Research Stations in Binangonan, Naujan Tigbauan and Leganes, as
well as its Iloilo Liaison Office. Having physically. occupied the office of the Aquaculture Department,
the respondent instantly undertook to exercise the functions of the Department-Chief, and in the
process took immediate control of all purchases and payments, stopped the issuance of checks,
recalled all motor vehicles assigned to various officers and agencies of the Department, immediately
terminated the services of all consultants of the Department and put his own followers in charge of
the various sections and agencies of the Department.

The petitioners and other previously appointed or designated Aquaculture Department Officers and
employees protested and have opposed and resisted the respondent's assertion of power and
physical occupation of the Aquaculture Department by the respondent and his followers who have
refused to vacate the offices and stations they have physically occupied.

On 25 November 1986, immediately upon his return from Tokyo, Dr. Lacanilao filed in this Court a
sworn Petition for Quo Warranto with prayer for preliminary injunction dated 24 November 1986. In
the afternoon of 26 November 1986, the petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for a temporary
restraining order, stating that morning, he had been served with summons issued by Judge Eutropio
Migrinio of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, in Civil Case No. 54091 entitled
"Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center — Aquaculture Department, et al. vs. Flor J.
Lacanilao," together with are strainin order issued by the same judge purporting to restrain the
petitioner from discharging the functions and exercising the privileges pertaining to the office of the
Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, disbursing funds of the Aquaculture Department,
using any of its facilities and vehicles and otherwise acting in his capacity of Chief of the Aquaculture
Department.

On 27 November 1986, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Migrinio from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 54091 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, and from
implementing and enforcing his restraining order issued in the said civil case, and further restraining
the respondent Capt. Juan de Leon from assuming and/or continuing to exercise the functions of the
office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, from intimidating the officers and
personnel of the SEAFDEC, in particular the use of armed men in such intimidation, and from
occupying and otherwise intervening in the functions and activities of the Aquaculture Department.

In his Comment filed on 18 December 1986 on the Petition for Quo Warranto in accordance with the
resolution of this Court, the respondent claims that he is entitled to the office of Chief of the
Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, by reason of a recommendation in his favor embodied in a
letter dated 12 November 1986 signed by the Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs and
addressed to the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC. This letter reads as follows:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines is pleased to submit the

nomination of Juan A. de Leon as Chief of the Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC
for a two-year term vice Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao. This nomination is being submitted for
consideration in the annual meeting of the SEAFDEC Council of Directors scheduled
in Tokyo next week in accordance with Article 10 of the SEAFDEC Agreement.

The term of Mr. de Leon shall take effect on November 21, 1986. ...

Copies of this letter were apparently sent to the SEAFDEC Council Directors for Japan, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
In another letter also dated 12 November 1986, addressed to the respondent, the Vice President
and Minister for Foreign Affairs advised him that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

has approved your nomination as Chief of the Aquaculture Department of the

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) for a term of two years
starting November 21, 1986.

In accordance with established procedure of the SEAFDEC nomination, this Ministry

has advised the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC regarding your nomination.

You are, therefore, directed to assume the foregoing position effective November 21,
1986, and to request, for this purpose, the assistance of government offices and
agencies concerned.

It was under cover of this letter that the respondent, about nine days later, launched his physical
occupation of the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department, with all the planning and
dispatch of a military campaign.

The receipt of the 12 November 1986 nomination of the respondent as Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, caused consternation in the SEAFDEC Council meeting in Tokyo, where
Dr. lacanilao was present. Objections were raised and the Courcil refrained from acting on the
respondent's nomination The formal response of the SEAFDEC Council is embodied in a letter dated
21 November 1986 addressed by Mr. K. Kimura, Chairman of the SEAFDEC Council of Directors, to
Mr. Juanito B. Malig, Council Director for the Philippines:

I have the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's letter of 18 November 1986

informing the Council Directors that the Vice President and Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Government of the Philippines has officially submitted, by his letter of
12 November 1986, the nomination of Mr. Juan A. De Leon as Chief of the 9
Aquaculture Department, effective 21 November 1986.

In this connection, you have mentioned to the Council Members that neither the
President of the Philippines nor the Minister of Agriculture and Food have withdrawn
support for Dr. F.J. Lacanilao, appointed by the Council for a two-year term effective
8 April 1986, as Chief of AQD.

I therefore would like to convey to you the unanimous agreement of the Council
Members asking you to seek further clarification on this matter and inform SEAFDEC
Council accordingly. 11

We note from this letter that the SEAFDEC Council of Directors has not approved the nomination of
respondent as chief of the Aquaculture Department. So far as the records of this case in this Court
show, the SEAFDEC Council has not taken any further action on such nomination.

The recommendation in favor of the respondent must be regarded as legally ineffective for the
fundamental reason that there existed no vacancy to which the respondent could be nominated by
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to which the respondent could be appointed
by the SEAFDEC Council. Notwithstanding the insinuations of the respondent, we have no doubt
that Dr. Lacanilao was lawfully entitled to hold the position of the Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, as of 21 November 1986 when the respondent and his assistants and
retainers introjected themselves in the offices of the Aquaculture Department. Until the tenure of the
petitioner is lawfully terminated in accordance with the laws and regulations governing such tenure,
no nomination for the same position can be approved and given effect It is clear that the nomination
of the respondent for a position then lawfully filled in accordance with the provisions of the
Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, did not have the effect of removing or otherwise terminating
the two-year term of the petitioner. The power to appoint having been vested by Article 6 of the
SEAFDEC Agreement in the Council, the, power to remove must likewise be deemed lodged in the
Council, and not in the nominating member-government. It is worth noting that under Article 6 (2) of
the Agreement, the power to appoint the Department-Chiefs and the Deputy Department-
Chiefs cannot be delegated by the Council to the Secretary-General. It follows, under the present
terms of the SEAFDEC Agreement, that the power to remove cannot similarly be delegated to the
Secretary-General.

It has been suggested by the respondent that a nomination by the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines to the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department should be regarded as
equivalent to an appointment to such position, upon the ground that "by established diplomatic
procedure (sic), the appointment to be made by the SFAFDEC Council based on such nomination or
recommendation would be merely ministerial as the Council, again by force of international
procedure (sic) could not override or reject such nomination." 12 This suggestion of the respondent is bereft of any
basis in the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC and indeed flies in the face of Article 10 (2) of that Agreement. Under Article 10 (2) of the
Agreement, two distinct acts are essential for a Department-Chief to be lawfully entitled to his position as such: the recommendation of the
government of the member country in whose territory the department is located; and the appointment to such position be the SEAFDEC
Council. The recommendation by the government of the member country must be accepted by the Council; a Department-Chief must be
acceptable to both the host government and the Council of the SEAFDEC. If it be assumed that the SEAFDEC Council has in the past
uniformly accepted the recommendations of the government of the host member country, that circumstance assuredly does not mean that
the SEAFDEC Council cannot, under its constitutional document, reject such a recommendation. Neither can it be supposed that the
recommendation by the government of the host member country, by itself and without more, would be sufficient to vest lawful title to the
office concerned. It follows that the recommendation dated 12 November 1986 in favor of the respondent cannot, in and of itself, be regarded
as lawfully authorizing him to assume the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, and to exclude the petitioner from
that same office.

We hold, accordingly, that the petitioner is entitled to the position of Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, for the duration of his term or until that term is otherwise ended
conformably with applicable law, including applicable regulations of the SEAFDEC.

The respondent also argues that the position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, is
not a "public office" and therefore not a proper subject of inquiry in a quo warranto proceeding. The
respondent further asserts that the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, is not a corporation and
that the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department is not therefore a corporate position.
These arguments need not detain us for long. It is not necessary for us here to determine the
precise nature of the position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC. The SEAFDEC
exhibits some of the features of an intergovernmental organization, albeit of a fairly rudimentary
type. Thus, the position of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department may be assimilated to a position
within an intergovernmental organization. There appears nothing to prevent the petitioner, as the
lawful holder of an office within an international organization having offices within the territory of the
Philippines, from seeking the assistance of the courts of the Philippines in protecting his right to such
office against the pretensions of the respondent. The respondent himself sought the assistance of
the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 151, by filing a complaint for injunction and damages, in
attempting to prevent the petitioner from continuing to exercise the rights and responsibilities
attaching to the position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department. In his complaint for injunction, the
respondent made allegations entirely analogous to those made in petitioner's Quo Warranto petition:
his own right to the office, and the defendant's (petitioner herein) lack of right to the same office.

We would note, finally, that the present petition relates to a controversy between two claimants to
the same position; this is not a controversy between the SEAFDEC on the one hand, and an officer
or employee, or a person claiming to be an officer or employee, of the SEAFDEC, on the other hand.
There is before us no question involving immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court, there being no
plea for such immunity whether by or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of SEAFDEC with the
consent of SEAFDEC.

The present controversy has created considerable confusion and anxiety among the officers and
employees of the Aquaculture Department and threatens the paralization of the important activities,
and dissipation of funds and assets, of that Department. This controversy should be resolved
forthwith. In the exercise of the broad jurisdiction of this Court and in the interest of prompt and
substantial justice, we treat the petition in this case as a petition for injunction, the respondent's
comment as his answer thereto and dispose of the case accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby enjoined from assuming the position and from discharging,
or continuing to discharge, directly or indirectly, the powers and functions of the Chief of the
Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC. All acts, contracts and directives done or issued by the
respondent, or by persons appointed or designated by him, are invalid and ineffective unless
adopted or ratified by the petitioner or other competent authority of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC. The Temporary Restraining Order we issued on 27 November 1986 is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER

FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, respondents.

Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three
(3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

But first the facts.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of
Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many
times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the
aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom
and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the
NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition
filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of
1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged
order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had
been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police
power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized
to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in
the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation
of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the
student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission
to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development,
are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests
in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or
inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold
that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation
and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those
who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her
reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-
called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue
raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least
initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter
cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary
to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 5

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated
by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link,
the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants
to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he
may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By
the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to
take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution
also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. 6

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared.
Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded
medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found
wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law
does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other
students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession
directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require
more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable
profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not
be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and
others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection
requires is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of
the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The
private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the
least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who
does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The
only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling
that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed
and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education
for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even
be a brilliant future.

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the
farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not
because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13,
1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,

vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET,
respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

PADILLA, J.:

Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for
prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.

Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the
Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural
questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this
suit.

By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on Appointments
to intervene and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said
petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard
in oral argument on 8 December 1987.

This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two (2)
great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in
the life of the 1987 Constitution.

The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the
Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief
Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent

of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which
 force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional
provisions themselves.

The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they
say and provide.

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; 3

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5

The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be
appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the
President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad
Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:

In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must
be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of
prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume
that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing
laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express
their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W.,
769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6

It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that —

xxx xxx xxx

(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.

(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

xxx xxx xxx

(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...

Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-

Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or
Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister,
members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies,
Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective
offices.

Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that
the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution,
transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the
President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.

Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973
Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the
people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President,
without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third
groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text of
Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, read as follows:

Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on
Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].

The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution. When
the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a
feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on Appointments over
presidential appointments more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution.
Thus-

Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized

The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.

Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few
minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments that
I would like to propose to the Committee this morning.

xxx xxx xxx

On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on
Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on
but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.

xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed
and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of
bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the
exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same
requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following:
 MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized

MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7,

Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and
on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval
captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last
amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to
put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same
page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et
cetera.

MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The

first proposed amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on
line 26.

MR. FOZ: That is correct.

MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what

would be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion?

MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the
executive department, and to require further confirmation of
presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to
political influence.

MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by

deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from merely
staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a plenitude
of powers within the regions as distinguished from staff directors who
only stay in the office.

MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn
of the staff bureau directors.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz?

The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus
on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not
the President?

MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their
appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer

of Commissioner de Castro?

MR. FOZ: Yes.

 MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the

Committee?

xxx xxx xxx

MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this

matter should be submitted to the body for a vote.

MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.

MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will

first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such
that appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation by
the Commission on Appointment.

Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the
consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and

bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendments is approved.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. ROMULO: Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized

MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment

on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on
line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO
APPOINT ANY.

MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the

proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other
officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.

xxx xxx xxx

 MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his
amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the following words:
AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED
IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION?

FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.

MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the
Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a
matter of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions.

FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16

is not an exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally
require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,

MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words
I proposed.

FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed

amendment?

MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER

OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION.

FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE

APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?

MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the

Committee.

FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?

MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those
officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and
the Ombudsman.

MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification
made by Commissioner Bernas.

THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of

Commissioners Foz and Davide.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed

amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the
 Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as
amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).

It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can
be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second

sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-

He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint
the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the
officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned
in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of
the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in
addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which
meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the
President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent
(confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence-

Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the
context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the
first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to
each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line with
Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more so,
because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly
justify such differences.

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are
officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if
such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art.
VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.

But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and
deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose
appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the
first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to
presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they
were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.

Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on

or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on
Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied].

and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this
is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the
President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII,
abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word
"alone" in said third sentence.

The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study
of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the
word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip
or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision
appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof —

...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied].

The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes
practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
thus-

3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint; ...

In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an
exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,

In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its
framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the
word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment
of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint
is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.

Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of
lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the
courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the
third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of
par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the
second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and
positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of
fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987
Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22
June 1957, reads as follows:

601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and
one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter
known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall
each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by
existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the
proper department head.

Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No.
34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now
reads as follows:

Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall
have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the
Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the
rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner
 of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis
supplied.)

Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs.

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be
read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment
he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.

Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority
and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus
entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.

WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.
Without costs.

SO ORDERED.