Criminal Law

Section 299: Culpable Homicide (Not Amounting to Murder)

Contain 3 Limbs:
1. Intention of causing death (S.300a)
OR
2. Intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death (S.300b & c)
OR
3. Knowledge that he is likely to by such act to cause death. (S.300d)

Section 300: Murder

(a) Intention of causing death.

(b) Intention of causing such bodily injury and KNOWS to be likely to cause death.

 Combine subjective elements in the second (intention to inflict a bodily injury)

and third (knowledge that death was likely) limbs of s.299.

 Rarely invoked in practice because such a high degree of culpability always

inferred an intention to kill under (a) or an inference of knowledge under (d).

 R v Govinda: ‘Pin prick murder’ where ‘the offender knows that the particular
person injured is likely, either from peculiarity of constitution, or immature age,
or other special circumstance, to be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily
cause death.’

 Accused was sufficiently aware of the victim’s disorder to know death was likely
outcome without intention to kill.

 Encompassed the Egg-shell-skull rule of causation.

(c) Intention of causing bodily injury AND such bodily injury is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.

 State v Ghana Padhan: It is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause

death if ‘in the usual course, if left alone, it would do so.’

 Ike Mohamed Yasin bin Hussin v PP: The words ‘sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature’ mean that the probability of death occurring should be assessed
by reference to the inherent nature of the injuries and not by reference to the
possible effects of medical intervention.

 S.299 second limb used the word ‘likely’ which indicates a lower threshold
compared to s.300(c).
 The question to ask would be: Whether the particular victim, with his or her
susceptibilities, was likely to die (s.299) and, if so, whether s.300(c) was also
satisfied.

 S.300(c) would only be satisfied if the injuries were likely to cause the death of a
victim of ordinary strength and capacity, taking account of the size, age and sex of
the deceased. (Rationale: Give effect to the rejection of felony murder rule where
it would be unduly draconian and at odds to impose liability for murder where the
accused committed a relatively minor assault but the victim’s peculiar sensitivities
led to death, and otherwise it will be identical to S.300(b).)

 Bharat Singh v Emperor: Despite the victim was an old man, there is no
evidence showing that the accused knew of his infirmity and peculiar
susceptibility which lead to the victim death. The accused was merely convicted
with voluntarily causing grievous hurt.

 This subsection is partly subjective (the accused intended to cause a bodily injury)
and partly objective (such injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death).

 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab [1958] (Consistently Approved):

 First, establish the existing bodily injury and the nature of such injury.
(Objective)
 Second, establish the intention to cause such bodily injury which is not
accidental or unintentional. (Subjective)
 Third, establish the bodily injury mentioned cause death in the ordinary course
of nature.

 Tsang Yuk Chung v PP [1990]: Accused was convicted of murder under

S.300(c) even though “only a moderate force” had required to cause such injuries
leading to death.

 Tan Chee Hwee v PP [1993]: Accused were committing a burglary when the
maid returned home unexpectedly. She died after the cord of an electric iron was
pulled around her neck. The court substituted the conviction with culpable
homicide not amounting to murder because if the accused had really intended to
‘silence her forever’, he would have hit her with the iron rather than trying to tie
up a ‘violently struggling maid or even to strangle her’. The injury inflicted was
therefore not intentionally.

 PP v Lim Poh Lye [2005]: Attention must focus on whether the accused intended
the injury that cause death. If the accused only intended to cause a particular
‘minor injury’ which is not fatal in the ordinary course of nature but that minor
injury caused a different injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, S.300(c) is not applicable. However, if the intended ‘minor injury’ turned
out to be a fatal cause then the accused will be liable.
 What is meant by saying that a person can intend a ‘particular’ injury even if he
or she does not intend the ‘precise’ injury?
Explanation:
(1) ‘Particular’ connotes something less specific than ‘precise’. In Lim Poh Lye, it is
sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the accused intended to stab in the region
of the upper leg, no need to prove the accused intended to stab the specific part of the
thigh that is actually stabbed.

(2) Prosecution need to prove more specifically that the accused intended the
particular injury of stabbing V in the part of the thigh where he was stabbed, but that
it is not necessary to prove that the accused knew of the effects of such an injury,
namely severing of the artery. The accused need not know the consequences of the
intended injury to be inflicted.

(d) (KNOWS the act is so imminently dangerous) (that it must in all probability cause
death OR bodily injury as is likely to cause death) AND commits (without any
excuse.)

 PP v Mahfar bin Sairan [2000]: “The act is so imminently dangerous” contemplates

the doing of an imminently dangerous act to people in general and not the doing of
any act to any particular individual.

 Seah Kok Meng v PP [2001]: An act which falls within S.300(d) is essentially the
doing of a dangerous act and that act need not necessarily be of an extreme degree.

 Tan Cheng Eng William v PP [1970]:

Facts: The appellant drive his car when he saw his girlfriend sitting in another man’s
car. He gave chase, the cars touched and he lost control. A motorcyclist coming in the
opposite direction was killed.
Held: Court set aside the conviction, the prosecution had to prove that the accused
knew his act of doing is imminently dangerous, it is insufficient only to prove that the
act is imminently dangerous which the accused don’t know.

 Yeap Boon Hai v PP [2010]:

Facts: The accused was asked for a divorce from his wife. The accused set fire to his
shop house, killing 6 people including his wife, son, maternal uncle, niece.
Held: The accused was convicted of murder and his appeal was dismissed by the
Federal Court. In starting the fire by means of petrol clearly brought about enormous
degree of risk to the lives of the occupants so the court ruled that the death caused
thereby is not just a likely result. It is certainly the most probable result. It is therefore
murder. The appellant started the fire to the shop house in the early hours of the
morning knowing full well that the shop house was occupied by so many people
including his own wife and children. His act had put the lives of so many innocent
people in grave danger. It cannot be denied that his act was so imminently dangerous
and that in all probability it will cause death. It is our finding, therefore, that his act
falls squarely within the definition of murder under s. 300 the Penal Code.
 PP v Selvraj Subramaniam [1984]:
Facts: The accused had suffocated his wife and was found guilty of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder based on the third limb S.299.
Held: I am in all the circumstances convinced that the smothering was not at all
accidental. I was invited by Counsel for the defence to find that if the accused had
smothered his wife to death, the act of smothering was a rash act punishable under
section 304A of the Penal Code. Clearly, this submission must fail. It was culpable
homicide. I have no doubt that the accused knew that his act of smothering was likely
to cause death. It was done in such a way and with such force that the deceased was
totally deprived of any air so that death ensued within ten minutes or so. The evidence
also suggests that the accused had effectively immobilised the deceased with the
result that she could not put up any struggle. I accordingly convict the accused as
charged.

 PP v Kenneth Fook Mun Lee

“Without Excuse”

 Emperor v Dhirajia [1940]:

Facts: The appellant was frequently ill-treated by her husband. One night after a
quarrel, she slipped from the house. She heard footsteps behind her and got panicked
which she jumped down a well with her baby in her arms. The baby died.
Held: The appellant was dismissed with the conviction of murder. She had an
‘excuse’ for jumping into the well. The court shall consider in assessing what is
excuse or is not excuse the state of mind she was in. That excuse in this case was
panic or fright against her husband.

 This limb is not used widely because S.300(c) has been interpreted in such a way that
it will cover most of the cases where there is no intent to kill and that S.304A or the
offences under the road traffic legislation will be used in cases involving lower levels
of risk taking.