I
Hilario Moncado v. People’s Court
FACTS: In an ejectment case filed before the justice of the peace court of Guijulngan, Negros Oriental,
after trial in the absence of the defendants, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. The Court of First
Instance then sent notice by registered mail posted on September 8, 1939 the notice of receipt of
appealed case and the period for pleading. Defendants were informed of such mail by the postmaster but
the same was not claimed, CFI of Negros Oriental, upon motion of plaintiff, ordered defendants to vacate
the land and to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of PHP 18 as damages, plus costs.
Defendant’s appealed the decision claiming that their failure to get notice from post office was due to
ignorance and that they were not served with copy of plaintiff’s motion for default.
CFI denied defendant’s motion on June 19, 1940.
ISSUE: Was defendant’s failure to get notice valid and excusable?
RULING: No, the Court ruled that in the first place, defendant’s are not entitled to a service of copy of the
motion that they are in default except when they file a motion to set aside the order of default, in which
event they are entitled to notice of all further proceedings (Rule 27, Section 9, Rules of Court). Second,
failure to get notice was not excusable neglect as claimed by defendants. Indeed, a notice, is deemed
served if delivered by registered mail and claimed within 5 days from first notice of postmaster (Rule 27,
Section 8, Rules of Court).
Appealed order affirmed.
Stonehill vs. Diokno
Facts:
Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued on different dates a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were
officers to search the persons of the petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or
residences and to seize and take possession of the personal property which is the subject of the offense,
stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or the means
of committing the offense, which is described in the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and
injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
against the prosecutors, their agents and representatives from using the effect seized or any copies
thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the contested
search warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being violative of the constitution and the
Rules of court by: (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2)
money not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for
deportation cases filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for
disposal in accordance with law.
In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and issued in
accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) in any event
the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However by a resolution, the
writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search warrants issued
against the corporation of which they were officers.
2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general search warrants.
3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality of its
seizure.
Held:
Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by means of
search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
II
The Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probablecause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws.
General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.
To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied
with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."
Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that
the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the
elimination of general warrants.
III
Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant
has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party
against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with
the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence,
then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the
absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that
the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of
June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences
are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Alih vs Castro
This case was in explaining Sec 3 of Art 2 of the 1987 Constitution regarding the supremacy of the
civilians.
Facts;
Zona was conducted by the men of Maj. Gen Castro in a compoud where petioners reside and conducted
illegal search and thereafter seized guns from them. The order was carried on by his Castro's men with
the contention that the petitioners are involved in the latest killing of the town's mayor Cesar Climaco.
Issue;
Is the warrantless search and seizure legal?
Held;
The Supreme Court declared those seized in custodia legis and declared that the operation conducted by
Maj. Gen. Castro was ILLEGAL. The respondents have all the time to obtain a search warrant granted
that they have about 10 trial courts. The SC also held the protection of the petitioner's human rights as
stated in Art IV Sec 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution regarding illegal search and seizure. The
presumption of innocence of the petitioners should be observed and that they cannot be subjected to self-
incriminating instances like paraffin tests, photographing and finger printing.
As penned by J. Cruz in this case, "The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
The warrantless wiretapping of a public pay phone violates the unreasonable search and seizure
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
FACTS
The petitioner, Charles Katz, was charged with conducting illegal gambling operations across state lines
in violation of federal law. In order to collect evidence against Katz, federal agents placed a warrantless
wiretap on the public phone booth that he used to conduct these operations. The agents listened only to
Katz's conversations, and only to the parts of his conversations dealing with illegal gambling transactions.
In the case of Olmstead v. United States (1928), the Supreme Court held that the warrantless wiretapping
of phone lines did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. According to the
Court, physical intrusion (a trespass) into a given area, and not mere voice amplification (the normal
result of a wiretap), is required for an action to constitute a Fourth Amendment search. This is known as
the "trespass doctrine." Partly in response to this decision, Congress passed the Federal
Communications Act of 1933. This Act required, among other things, federal authorities to obtain a
warrant before wiretapping private phone lines. In the case of Silverman v. United States (1961), the
Supreme Court refined the Olmsteadtrespass doctrine by holding that an unreasonable search occurs
only if a "constitutionally protected area" has been intruded upon.
At his trial, Katz sought to exclude any evidence connected with these wiretaps, arguing that the
warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search of a "constitutionally
protected area" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The federal agents countered by saying that a
public phone booth was not a "constitutionally protected area," therefore, they could place a wiretap on it
without a warrant.
ISSUE
Does the warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth violate the unreasonable search and seizure
clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
RULING: Yes
REASONING:
By a 7-1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Katz and held that placing of a warrantless wiretap on
a public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Potter Stewart, however, did not address the case from the
perspective of a "constitutionally protected area." In essence, the majority argued that both sides in the
case were wrong to think that the permissibility of a warrantless wiretap depended upon the area being
placed under surveillance. "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected," the Court stated.
Building upon this reasoning, the Court held that it was the duty of the Judiciary to review petitions for
warrants in instances in which persons may be engaging in conduct that they wish to keep secret, even if
it were done in a public place. The Court held that, in the absence of a judicially authorized search
warrant, the wiretaps of the public phone booth used by Katz were illegal. Therefore, the evidence against
him gathered from his conversations should be suppressed.
CONCURRENCE
Justice John Marshall Harlan's Concurrence: Test for Constitutionally Protected Searches
Although he agreed with the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Harlan went further to provide a test for
what is a constitutionally protected search. He said it was necessary to clarify when private actions,
conducted in a public place, may be constitutionally protected. Expanding upon the general principles
enunciated by the majority opinion, Justice Harlan proposed the following two-pronged test to address
this issue: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior judicial decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have looked to this two-pronged test, and not the
majority holding per se, to determine when private actions in public places may be constitutionally
protected. In essence, this concurrence has come to be seen as the main point of the Katz decision, and
it is the test that, typically, has been used when deciding upon the constitutionality of warrantless
wiretaps.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return
of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued
indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched
set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the
issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case
of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized
when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted
to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State
of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not
indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.
ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner
v RULING:
HON. JOSE HERRERA, respondent
Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court
of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and
records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta,
Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection
with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the
Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI
entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty.
Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the
board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of
documents, papers and receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2)
falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section
3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is
nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents,
papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.
CASTRO VS PABALAN
Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of
Lumang or the warrant itself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on
the part of the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. Judge never refuted the assertions when required to answer. Application alleged that applicants
wee informed and claimed that they verified the report that Maria Castro and Co Ling are in possession of
narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union without specifying the particular place
in the Barrio. No complete description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned
out that it was in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is validly issued.
Held: Search warrant issued illegal for violation of the 1935 Constitution and the Rules of Court because
the two basic requirements are not complied with: (a) no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, (b)
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized, thus, a general warrant. However, things
seized cannot be returned and shall be destroyed, except the liquors, playing cards, distilled water and
five bottles of Streptomycin.
PP VS SALANGUIT
G.R. No. 133254-55,
FACTS:
On December 26, 1995, around 10:30 p.m., a group of about ten (10) policemen, along with one civilian
informer, went to the residence of the accused-appellant, Roberto Salanguit y Ko, a search warrant was
shown, and the police operatives started searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent plastic
bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized
was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for
violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-
64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court convicted him in
Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.
The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was inadmissible because the warrant
used in obtaining it was invalid.
ISSUES:
1. Was the warrant find invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of “drug
paraphernalia?
2. Whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.”
Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.”
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the
search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the
seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant
being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the
deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With
respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana
was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it
was recovered on Salanguit’s person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as
attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to
Criminal Case Q-95-64357, accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal
drugs S16 of R.A.No. 6425.
PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463; G.R. NOS. L-60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]
Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said
informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of
warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the
court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations
to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They
contended that the fiscal’s certification in the informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes
sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel
the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation.
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the
warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge
must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of
the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of
probable cause.
Petition dismissed.
Maximo Soliven vs Ramon Makasiar
167 SCRA 393 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked
by the President
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the
then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavitagainst him and others. Makasiar
averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavitbecause this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would
sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she
would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may
not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if
so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
HO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (full text)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the report and recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor, without personally determining probable cause by independently examining
sufficient evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation?
The Case
This is the main question raised in these two consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court challenging the Sandiganbayan’s August 25, 1992 Resolution[1] which answered the said
query in the affirmative.
The Facts
Both petitions have the same factual backdrop. On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor and investigator, Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint[2] against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678, respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo
Odoño. The complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019[3] prohibiting a
public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
After due notice, all respondents therein filed their respective counter-affidavits with supporting
documents. On January 8, 1992, Graft Investigation Officer Titus P. Labrador (hereafter, “GIO Labrador”)
submitted his resolution[4] with the following recommendations:
“WHEREFORE, all premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that an information for violation
of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 as amended be filed against respondent Rolando S. Narciso before the
Sandiganbayan.
It is likewise recommending that the case against the other respondents be DISMISSED for insufficiency
of evidence.”
However, after a review of the above resolution, Special Prosecution Officer Leonardo P. Tamayo
(hereafter, “SPO Tamayo”) recommended that both Rolando Narciso and Doris Teresa Ho be charged
with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The resolution of GIO Labrador, as modified by the
memorandum[5] of SPO Tamayo, was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on May 5, 1992.
Thus, herein petitioners were charged accordingly before the Sandiganbayan in an information[6] filed on
May 18, 1992. Attached to the information were the resolution of GIO Labrador and the memorandum of
SPO Tamayo. The said information reads:
“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
ROLANDO NARCISO and DORIS TERESA HO, President of National Marine Corporation, of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about April 4, 1989, and for sometime prior and/or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO
NARCISO, a public officer, being then the Vice-President of the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a
government-owned or controlled corporation organized and operating under the Philippine laws, and
DORIS TERESA HO, a private individual and then the President of National Marine Corporation (NMC), a
private corporation organized and operating under our Corporation law, conspiring and confederating with
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, with evident bad faith and through
manifest partiality, cause undue injury to the National Steel Corporation (NSC), by entering without legal
justification into a negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its
products at the rate of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila, despite their full knowledge that the rate
they have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc.
(LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of P109.56 and P123.00 per Metric Ton,
respectively, in the public bidding held on June 30, 1988, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the
National Marine Corporation, in the total sum of One Million One Hundred Sixteen Thousand Fifty Two
Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos (P1,116,052.75), Philippine Currency, to the pecuniary damage and
prejudice of the NSC in the aforestated sum. The said offense was committed by Rolando S. Narciso in
the performance of his official functions as Vice-President of the National Steel Corporation.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Acting on the foregoing information, the Sandiganbayan issued the now questioned warrant of arrest
against Petitioners Ho and Narciso. Petitioner Ho initially questioned the issuance thereof in an “Urgent
Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest/Motion for Reconsideration” which was adopted by Petitioner Narciso.
They alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for
their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman
without other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, and settled jurisprudence. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied said motion in the challenged
Resolution. It ratiocinated in this wise:
“Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the information
in this case in the determination of whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of
arrest but also on the basis predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the
resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest,
or the reconsideration sought for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly
shows that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties
during the preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the entire record of the preliminary
investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence submitted by the complainant and the
accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in futility.”
Thus, these petitions.
The Issue
Petitioner Ho raises this sole issue:
“May a judge determine probable cause and issue [a] warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the
resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman)
who conducted the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such as
complainant’s affidavit, respondent’s counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted at
the preliminary investigation?”[7]

In his separate petition, Rolando S. Narciso adopts the foregoing and raises no other distinct issue.
Petitioners Ho and Narciso similarly contend that a judge, in personally determining the existence of
probable cause, must have before him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the
information filed by the investigating prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an
arrest warrant. Such evidence should not be “merely described in a prosecutor’s resolution.” Citing
People vs. Inting,[8] petitioners insist that the judge “must have before him ‘the report, the affidavits, the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents which are material in
assisting the judge to make his determination.’”
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
“Section 2 [, Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.” (Underscoring supplied.)
In explaining the object and import of the aforequoted constitutional mandate, particularly the power and
the authority of judges to issue warrants of arrest, the Court elucidated in Soliven vs. Makasiar[9]:
“What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.”[10]
[underscoring supplied]
We should stress that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause “personally.”
The word “personally” does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous Constitutions.
This emphasis shows the present Constitution’s intent to place a greater degree of responsibility upon
trial judges than that imposed under the previous Charters.
While affirming Soliven, People vs. Inting[11] elaborated on what “determination of probable cause”
entails, differentiating the judge’s object or goal from that of the prosecutor’s.
“First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination.
“Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to
make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor
presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report,
the affidavits the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
“And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are
conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the
objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper -- whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused
is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial -- is the function of the Prosecutor.”[12]
And clarifying the statement in People vs. Delgado[13] -- that the “trial court may rely on the resolution of
the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest” -- this
Court underscored in Lim Sr. vs. Felix[14] that “[r]eliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor’s
certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted
to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation
sustain the recommendation.” We added, “The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification
standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.” Summing up, the Court said:
“We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for
the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal’s bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
”The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s
examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor’s certification
and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for [the] complainant and [the] witnesses
themselves to answer the court’s probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.”[15]
[underscoring supplied]
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim Sr. were iterated in Allado vs. Diokno[16] where we explained
again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.[17] Hence, the judge,
before issuing a warrant of arrest, “must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
thereof.”[18] At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the
evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such
evidence in determining probable cause.[19] In Webb vs. De Leon,[20] we stressed that the judge merely
determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct
a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutor’s initial determination finding probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
In the recent case of Roberts Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,[21] this Court’s application of the dictum laid down
in Soliven -- affirmed and fortified in Inting, Lim Sr., Allado and Webb -- should lay to rest the issue raised
in the instant petitions. In Roberts Jr., this Court, through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., set aside the
order of the respondent judge directing inter alia the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused,
reasoning that said judge did not personally determine the existence of probable cause, since he had
“only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the
records or evidence supporting the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause.”
In like manner, herein Respondent Sandiganbayan had only the information filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman, the thirteen-page resolution of the investigating officer and the three-page memorandum of
the prosecution officer, when it issued the warrant of arrest against the petitioners. The latter two
documents/reports even had dissimilar recommendations -- the first indicting only Petitioner Narciso, the
second including Petitioner Ho. This alone should have prompted the public respondent to verify, in the
records and other documents submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation, whether there
was sufficient evidence to sustain the Ombudsman’s action charging both petitioners with violation of Sec.
3(e) of Anti-Graft law. But in its initial justification of the issuance of the warrant, the Sandiganbayan
simply said:
“JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
xxx xxx xxx
But in this particular case we believe there is a prima facie case based on our examination of the
resolution because we believe, we think the Ombudsman will not approve a resolution just like that,
without evidence to back it up.”[22]
In attempting to further justify its challenged action, the public respondent explained in its assailed
Resolution:

“In the instant case, there are attached to the information, two (2) Memorandum/Resolution (sic)
emanating from the Offices of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor (Pp. 4-6, 7-19, respectively,
Record) which clearly and indubitably established, firstly, the conduct of a due and proper preliminary
investigation, secondly, the approval by proper officials clothed with statutory authority; and thirdly, the
determination and ascertainment of probable cause based on the documentary evidence submitted by
the complainant (Anti-Graft League of the Philippines), foremost among which is the Contract of
Affreightment entered into between National Steel Corporation (NSC), and National Marine Corporation
(NMC) and the COA-NSC audit report, together with the counter-affidavits of accused Rolando Narciso
and NMC officials, among whom is accused-movant. Outlined in detail in the aforesaid Resolution of
Titus P. Labrador, Graft Investigation Officer II, which was reviewed by Attys. Romeo I. Tan and Arturo
Mojica, Director, Community Coordination Bureau and Assistant Ombudsman, PACPO, [respectively,] are
the facts leading to the questioned transaction between NSC and NMC, together with an evaluation of the
propriety and legality of the bidding process involved therein and which revealed that there were
supposed non-compliance with proper bidding procedures. GIO Labrador’s findings and
recommendations, extensively set out in his thirteen-page resolution, is complemented by the three-page
Memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer II Leonardo P. Tamayo, both of which meticulously delved
into the merits and demerits of the evidence presented by the complainant and accused-respondents and
which resulted in their respective recommendation which led the Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez to
approve the recommendations of Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de G. Ferrer and Special Prosecutor
Aniano A. Desierto for the filing of the information in the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
“Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the information
in this case in the determination of whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of
arrest but also on the basis predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the
resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest,
or the reconsideration sought for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly
shows that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties
during the preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the entire record of the preliminary
investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence submitted by the complainant and the
accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in futility.”[23]
In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be upheld. Lest we be too
repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made
by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e. whether there is a
necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.[24] Thus,
even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no
confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in
finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the
contents of the prosecutor’s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the
accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he
must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his
own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This
responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable
cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor
could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only
the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the
evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether
to issue a warrant of arrest.[25]
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation
be submitted to and examined by the judge.[26] We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging
them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the
arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very
least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point
is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, as Respondent Court did in
this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution,
we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of
arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the
certification or the report of the investigating officer.
True, in Webb vs. De Leon, we found that “the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties’ evidence
made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there [was] probable cause to issue warrants of
arrest against petitioners.” This statement may have been wrongly construed by the public respondent to
mean that the narration or description of portions of the evidence in the prosecutor’s report may serve as
sufficient basis to make its own independent judgment. What it should bear in mind, however, is that,
aside from the 26-page report of the DOJ panel, the sworn statements of three witnesses and counter-
affidavits of the petitioners in Webb were also submitted to the trial court, and the latter is presumed to
have reviewed these documents as well, prior to its issuance of the warrants of arrest.
In the instant case, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the graft
investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information filed
before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have approved their recommendation without
supporting evidence. It had no other documents from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines) or the People from which to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists. Clearly
and ineluctably, Respondent Court’s findings of “the conduct of a due and proper preliminary
investigation” and “the approval by proper officials clothed with statutory authority” are not equivalent to
the independent and personal responsibility required by the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. At
least some of the documentary evidence mentioned (Contract of Affreightment between National Steel
Corporation and National Marine Corporation, the COA-NSC audit report, and counter-affidavits of
Rolando Narciso and NMC officials), upon which the investigating officials of the Ombudsman reportedly
ascertained the existence of probable cause, should have been physically present before the public
respondent for its examination, to enable it to determine on its own whether there is substantial evidence
to support the finding of probable cause. But it stubbornly stood pat on its position that it had essentially
complied with its responsibility. Indisputably, however, the procedure it undertook contravenes the
Constitution and settled jurisprudence. Respondent Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion
in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor’s findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence
other than such bare findings and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED and the assailed Resolution is SET ASIDE. The warrant
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) on May 20, 1992 in Case No. 17674 for the arrest of
Petitioners Doris Teresa Ho and Rolando Narciso is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
Webb v De Leon (Criminal Procedure)
Webb v De Leon
GR No. 121234
August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of
Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne
Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June
30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R.
Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as
inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22,
1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners:
charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of
arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. 
 Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an
impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation. 
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge
accused with crime of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to
conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary
investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in
the information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed
and that the person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that – “upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the
accused.”
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted
“searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be
heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel
to study the evidence submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute
is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to
prosecute their violators.
ROBERTS VS CA
Paul G. Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. were
prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi “Number Fever” promotion by handlers of the supposedly
winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by
the investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything accompanying it. A copy of
the investigating prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22
April 1993. However, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the
records of the case as of 19 May 1993.
On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of Justice seeking
the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the
suspension of the proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants
pending the final disposition of the appeal to the Department of Justice.
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying, on the basis of
Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners and the public prosecutor,
and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest “after June 1993” and setting the arraignment on 28
June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this
Court for trial, following whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would
undermine the independence and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge had not the slightest
basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. After
finding that a copy of the public prosecutor’s Joint Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received
by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied petitioners’ application for writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution “was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent
Judge in convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest” and that the “mere silence of the records or the absence of any express
declaration” in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to an adverse
inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of
his official duty. Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of
probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul,
the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved?
2. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest
without examining the records of the preliminary investigation?
3. May the Supreme Court determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of probable cause either for
the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa?
III. THE RULING
[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the decision and resolution of the CA,
the resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee, and the order of respondent judge.]
1. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs.
Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and
to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of
a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating
prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, “as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court.”

Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a matter of guesswork.
Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend
proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice
may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is still
capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the
aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis
of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor.
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it,
not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
2. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of
arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the investigating
prosecutor’s certification in an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the
information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the respondent Judges had before them not
only the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses
and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the
evidence attached to the records of the case.
In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with the trial court. A
copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And
as revealed by the certification of respondent judge’s clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses,
transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other
documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of this case as of 19 May 1993.
Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among
other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and
Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's
finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he
merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest “after June 21, 1993.” It may, however, be argued that
the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional
requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even
convincing logic.
3. NO, the Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of probable
cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the
crime of estafa.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate
case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused to reevaluate the evidence to
determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest in this case. For the
respondent judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists, and if he did he did not have the basis
therefor. Moreover, the records of the preliminary investigation in this case are not with the Court. They
were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the
latter's 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court and the DOJ must be required to perform their
duty.
Morano v. Vivo
Facts: Petitioners are Chinese nationals (Chan Sau Wah from Fukein, with a minor child from prior
marriage, Fu Yan Fun) who were granted a temporary visitor’s visa as mom-immigrant for 2 months upon
posting P4k cash bond to visit a cousin in the Philippines. She soon married to Esteban Morano, a
Filipino Citizen, on January 24, 1962 and gave birth to a child, Esteban Morano, Jr. After several
extensions to prolong stay in Philippines, their visas expired on Sept. 10, 1962 and were ordered by
Commissioner of Immigration (COI) on Aug. 31, 1962 thru a letter, to leave the country on or before Sept.
10, 1962 with warning of issuance of warrant of arrest for failure to leave and confiscation of bond.
Petitioners then filed with the CFI of Manila for Mandamus to compel COI to cancel their ACR, to stop
issuing arrest warrant, and preliminary injunction from confiscating their bond. They argue that Chan Sau
Wah became a Filipino Citizen upon marriage to Esteban Morano by virtue of Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Act). Likewise, it argues that Section 37 of the
Naturalization Law is unconstitutional for allowing the COI to issue warrant of arrest and effecting
deportation without judicial intervention enshrined in the Constitution. CFI decided partly against
petitioners, thus, COI and petitioners both appealed to SC.
Issues:
Whether or not the marriage of Chan Sau Wah to Esteban Morano makes her a Filipino citizen.
Whether or not Section 37 of the Naturalization Law empowering the COI to issue a warrant of arrest, and
deport upon a warrant on deportation cases is unconstitutional for are covered by the Constitutional
mandate on searches and seizures without judicial intervention required under the Constitution on
searches and seizures.
Ruling:
Citizenship. Marriage to a Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must show
that she possess all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications required by the Naturalization
Law requiring as follows:
Valid marriage; and
Alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized
In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed
of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law. Thus, she did not become a Filipino citizen.
Searches and seizures. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty planted on the accepted
maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions. Section 1 (3),
Article III of the Constitution, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of
deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in
the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceeding for a given
offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a
competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in
pursuance of a valid legislation.
Petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioners Chan Sau Wah is hereby denied; and
judgment declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, directing COI to cancel her Alien Certificate of
Registration and other immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her
permanent, are all hereby set aside; and in all other respects, the decision appealed is hereby affirmed.
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew
Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan
Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission
of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation
Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found
with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two
children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime
now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters
and other literature advertisingthe child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988
after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for
self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with
NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to facedeportation proceedings. On 4
March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under
Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of
Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petitionfor Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court
heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
 Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas EmploymentAdministration (or the Secretary of Labor) can
validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code
Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending Held: Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
determination of existence of probable cause. probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CIDagents. and the persons or things to be seized”. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure
or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners. held, “We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect… The power of the
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the President to order the arrest of aliens fordeportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole
petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The domain of the courts.” Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant.
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, seized.
Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized
There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was
incidental to the arrest. ALVAREZ vs CFI

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and
estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas
corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was
illegal at the beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section
37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a
ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never
construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with
assistance of a counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign
power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with
illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to
appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner
had no license to operate a recruitment agency, publicrespondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued
a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents
and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it
having verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of
Labor andEmployment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are
committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same
code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and
Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioner’s residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a
Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter
requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing.
The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the
properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that
a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money
lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say
that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable
source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4,
1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks,
stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought
immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board
be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW
issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain
custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion.
Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the
judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent
Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to
serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information
secured from a person whom he considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58
require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search
warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he
is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an
outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate
sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince
the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused . The affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in
which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit
of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the
search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did
not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an
imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of
other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the
facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause;
when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses
having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because
it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts
Mata v. Bayona
FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game
by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that during the
hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the
search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to
inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding
Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then handed the records to the
Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search
warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the
court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo
T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the
court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant
were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the
rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the
petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the
articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on
the matter.
ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?
HELD:YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and
detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must
before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
PONSICA VS IGNALAGA (full text)
NARVASA, J.:
The chief issue raised by the petitioners in this case is whether or not Section 143 of the Local
Government Code1 granting power to the municipal mayor to conduct preliminary investigations and
order the arrest of the accused, was repealed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated by
this Court; and is, in addition, unconstitutional as vesting the power to conduct preliminary investigations
in an official who cannot be deemed a "neutral and detached magistrate" within the contemplation of
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. The issue is hereby resolved adversely to the petitioners,
with the stressed qualification that the mayor's power to order arrest ceased to exist as of February 2,
1987 when the new Constitution was ratified by the Filipino people, and that, in any event, the
investigation actually conducted by respondent mayor in the case at bar was fatally defective.
Shortly after noon on September 20, 1985, an attempt was made by firemen and soldiers to disperse a
crowd of demonstrators massed in front of the Municipal Building of Escalante, Negros Occidental, with
the use first, of water spewed from fire hoses, and later, tear gas. Eventually there was gunfire. Within
moments, rallyists lay dead on and by the National Road. The fatalities numbered fifteen (15), according
to the military officers; twenty-nine (29), according to the demonstrators.
In the afternoon of that day, Escalante Town Mayor Braulio Lumayno, in view of the absence of the
Municipal Circuit Court Judge (Emilio Ignalaga), took cognizance of a complaint filed by the Military
Station Commander charging some of the rallyists with the felony of inciting to sedition, and after
avowedly conducting an investigation of the witnesses presented by the complainant, issued an order for
the arrest of certain of the demonstrators. His order reads as follows:
It appearing that the Presiding Municipal Circuit Court Judge, Hon. Emilio M. Ignalaga, is on official leave
of absence and, in the interest of justice, the undersigned has to urgently act on the complaint filed by the
Station Commander, against the above-named accused for "INCITING TO SEDITION" and, on the basis
of the evidence submitted after a searching question and answer were conducted and, being satisfied
that said crime has been committed, in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, it is necessary that the
above-named accused be placed under custody. Let therefore, a warrant of arrest be issued for said
above-named accused.
Bail recommended: P12,000.00. 2
In the record of the Court a quo appear the following inter alia:
1) Complaint for "Inciting to Sedition" (RPC 142, as and by PD 183 and PD 1974), signed by a Capt.
Jugan, and sworn to before Mayor Lumayno on Sept. 20, 1985, bearing the stamped notation of filing with
the MTC: "9/24/85, 4:00 PM:" 3
2) 2-page Affidavit of Capt. Sanson, dated, and sworn to before Actg.. City Fiscal Abros (Cadiz City) on
Sept. 20, 1985; 4
3) 3-page document, "Searching Questions and Answers" signed by Capt. Sanson, dated. and sworn to
before Mayor Lumayno on, September 20, 1985; 5
4) 3-page sworn statement of Godofredo Hoyo-A y Jayme, General Manager of the Balintawak-Escalante
Water District; 6
5) Affidavit of Leopoldo Villalon; 7
6) Affidavit of Elpidio Carbajosa; 8 and
7) Affidavit of Eduardo Flores. 9
The gist of the testimony of Capt. Sanson and the other affiants is that on September 20, 1985, the
demonstrators, numbering "about 1,000, " had blockaded the main highway in front of the Escalante
Municipal Building, by massing themselves on the road as well as by piling stones, coconut trunks and
pieces of wood in the middle of the highway. They were also "shouting invectives, seditious and scurrilous
words against the government." Negotiations with Ponsica, Chairman of the Escalante Chapter of
"BAYAN" (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), to have the road cleared having been unavailing, firemen on
firetrucks began to train a "torrent of water" from their fire hoses on the demonstrators. The rallyists
retaliated by hurling stones at the firemen. One of them "approached the security of the firetruck and
stabbed him." Others climbed aboard the trucks and tried to grab the firehoses and firearms of the
officers. At this point, on Capt. Sanson's orders, his "back-up teams" of soldiers commenced to throw tear
gas at the crowd. One of the demonstrators picked up a tear gas canister and hurled it back at the
soldiers. At the same time gunfire from "different assorted firearms" emanated from the rallyists; and
some of the shots hit the blinker of a firetruck and the headlight of another. The soldiers shot back. This
exchange of gunfire resulted in "fourteen (14) demonstrators killed on the spot. " Recovered at the scene
were a rifle; a U.S. 45 cal. pistol; 2 "homemade" pistols; 14 steel arrows and 4 assorted slings; 30
assorted knives; a "pogakhang" with 2 live cartridges; 2 grenades; and several empty shells of different
caliber. Hours later, another corpse, Identified as that of a demonstrator, too, was brought to the PC
Headquarters.
The petitioners however give a different version of the facts. What happened, according to them, was that
at 9 o'clock in the morning on that day, a group of demonstrators, "composed mostly of laid-off sugar field
workers," gathered in front of Escalante Municipal Hall "in the exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed
right to freedom of expression and to assemble peacefully to petition the government for redress of
grievances."10 About an hour afterwards, fire trucks arrived one after another, as well as jeeploads of
soldiers and CHDF members, in full combat gear, Shortly after noon, after "going thru the motions of
negotiating with the demonstrators," the military officers ordered the crowd to disperse; but without
warning, fire hoses were trained on and sprayed water at the demonstrators. When the rallyists did not
budge, tear gas canisters were thrown at them. A demonstrator picked up a canister and threw it at an
"empty space in the plaza" The soldier and CHDF members thereupon fired indiscriminately at the crowd,
killing 29 and injuring at least 30 persons.11
After the Mayor had referred the case to Municipal Trial Court Judge Ignalaga on September 24, 1985,12
an "URGENT MOTION TO QUASH WARRANT OF ARREST" was filed on September 26, 1985 by
petitioners' counsel on the ground that a mayor no longer has authority to conduct preliminary
investigations or issue warrants of arrest that authority having been "withheld in the 1985 New Rules on
Criminal Procedure."13 This was opposed by the Station Commander14 who invoked Section 143 of the
Local Government Code providing that "(i)n case of temporary absence of the Judge assigned to the
municipality, the mayor may conduct the preliminary examination in criminal cases when, in his opinion
the investigation cannot be delayed without prejudice to the interest of justice." A reply was filed by the
petitioners after their receipt of the opposition "only last October 8, 1985."15 They contended that the
"power of the municipal mayor to conduct preliminary investigation and issue a warrant of arrest under the
1964 Revised Rules of Court** (had been) impliedly repealed by the 1985 New Rules on Criminal
Procedure;" that "the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure being a special law, controls over
provisions of the Local Government Code (BP 337, 1983), which is a general law;" and in any case,
"subject t warrants of arrest should be reviewed and revoked as done without observance of legal
requisites."
By Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1985,16 the Judge confirmed the mayor's arrest order. He opined that in the
absence of the judge, the mayor still has authority to conduct preliminary investigations and issue arrest
warrants, since Rule 112, Sec. 2 (d), of the 1985 Rules, includes as among those authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations, "Such other officers as may be authorized by law;" and the Local G
government Code of 1983, Section 143, grants a town mayor authority to conduct preliminary
examinations in case of the temporary absence of the judge when such investigation cannot be delayed
without prejudice to the interest of justice. The Judge declared that in the case at bar, the mayor had
conducted the examination personally, and having in the exercise of his discretion found probable cause,
issued the warrants of arrest in question; and conceding arguendo irregularity in that the preliminary
examination was conducted without according the parties the assistance of lawyers (contrary to par. 2,
Sec. 143, Chap. 3, Title 2, Book 11, Local Government Code), this does not render the proceedings void
because at any rate, the mayor had duly observed the uniform procedure under PD 91 (citing: People v.
Paran, 52 Phil. 712; Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216; Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 933).
It is Mayor Lumayno's order for the petitioners' arrest of September 20, 1985, and Jude Ignalaga's Order
of October 11, 1985 "validating that order of arrest" that the petitioners would have this Court nullify and
perpetually enjoin.17
In their petition for certiorari and prohibition filed on October 15, 1985, and their Memorandum of January
21, 1986,18 they assert that:
1) while Section 3,Rule 112 of the l964 Rules of Court,empowers the municipal mayor, "in case of
temporary absence of both the municipal and the auxiliary municipal judges from the municipality, town or
place wherein they exercise their jurisdiction, to make the preliminary examination in criminal cases when
such examination cannot be delayed without prejudice to the interest of justice," that power has been
removed from him by the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure which "do not mention the Municipal
Mayor as among the officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation (Section 2, Rule 112), much
less to issue an order of arrest (Section 6, Ibid.)19
2) Section 143 of BP Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) — under which the order of arrest in question is
presumably made to rest-cannot withstand the "constitutional test" of Section 3, Article IV,20 which
safeguards the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requires the interposition of a
"judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law," meaning "a neutral and detached
magistrate competent to determine probable cause (Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 40 LW 4758; Castillo v.
Jias, 62 SCRA 124; Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635; Zambales Chromite, etc. v. C.A., 934 SCRA 2617);"
and since a mayor is obviously not such a magistrate (U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 197), the orders of
arrest at bar are constitutionally infirm;21 moreover, said Section 143 of the Local Government Code is
"merely a rule of procedure** (and is thus) deemed to have been superseded by the New Rules of
Criminal Procedure;22
3) the Mayor's examination "falls short of the requirements of "searching questions and answers;" the
statements of the witnesses supposedly interrogated by the mayor, are either merely conclusions of law
or sterile as regards seditious utterances, hence, probable cause was non-existent23 and
4) Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended-under which the petitioners are charged is based
on the US Sedition Act of 1978, which has been declared by the US Supreme Court as "repugnant to the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254);" hence, said Article 142 is also fatally flawed and therefore, the warrant. of arrest in question was in
effect issued for a "crime which in the context of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and
expression does not exist."24
In his comment filed with this Court,25 Judge Ignalaga argues that —
1) The validity of the preliminary examination on the basis of which the arrest warrants were issued, may
not be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, but should first be ventilated before the RTC having
cognizance of the crime.26 In any case, upon the considerations set out in his resolution of October 11,
1985, the preliminary examination in question is valid.27
2) The petitioners raise factual issues which are best left for determination by the RTC, the Supreme
Court not being a trier of facts.28
3) The Mayor in fact followed the procedure in the constitution prior to issuing the arrest warrants.29
4) The constitutionality of PD 1974 should be assailed by separate petition.30
The Solicitor General at the time, Estelito Mendoza, also filed a comment on December 6, 1985.31 The
comment addressed itself only to the issue of "the validity of the law authorizing municipal mayors to
issue warrants of arrest and the law punishing inciting to sedition," in view of the fact that the respondents
had presented their own separate comments on the petition.32 The comment points out that:
1) Section 3, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which mentions a "judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law" as vested with competence to conduct preliminary investigations, is
an innovation. In implementation thereof, BP Blg. 337 was enacted on February 10, 1983, empowering
mayors to conduct preliminary investigations (Sec. 143). This is a recognition of the truism that the
determination of probable cause is but a quasi judicial function Ocampo v. US, 58 LED 1231).33
Petitioners' American authorities are not applicable: the mayor is the highest official in the municipality; he
exercises only general supervision over the police but is not directly involved in police work; the old rules
precisely expressed a recognition of the capability of i mayors to determine probable cause, and the
omission of mayors in the 1985 Rules simply means that the determination of officers who may be
authorized to conduct preliminary investigations was deemed best left to legislation.34
2) The Philippine sedition law is not akin to the US Sedition Law; in any event our own sedition law has
passed the test of constitutionality (Espuelas v. People, 90 Phil. 524).35
Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez subsequently declared that he "stands by the constitutionality of the
statutes the petitioners question and, therefore, sustains the position taken by his predecessor in
office;"36 this, in response to this Court's resolution dated May 15, 1986, requiring the parties to state
whether supervening events had transpired materially affecting the case.37
It is clear from the outset that the issue before this Court does not involved the adjudgment of the guilt or
innocence of the soldiers in the tragic and regrettable killings in front of the Escalante Town Hall in the
early afternoon of that day, the twentieth of September, 1985, an event that caused a great outcry of
lamentation and condemnation throughout the land. This is a matter that should be and is in fact now
subject of a separate criminal proceeding. Neither is the propriety of the victims' exercise of their
constitutional rights of free speech and free assembly for redress of grievances in the premises at issue
here. The basic question before the Court is divorced of the drama and the passion of those issues; it
deals mainly with the dry, unexciting, but nonetheless important matter of whether or not the municipal
mayor has the power to conduct preliminary investigations in the light of the 1985 amendments of the
rules governing criminal procedure in the Rules of Court. The answer to the question entails a re-
examination and analysis of the relevant legal provisions.
The 1964 Rules of Court explicitly gave the mayor authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
SEC. 3. Preliminary examination by the municipal mayor. — In case of temporary absence of both the
municipal and the auxiliary municipal judges from the municipality, town, or place wherein they exercise
their jurisdiction, the municipal mayor shall make the preliminary examination in criminal cases when such
examination cannot be delayed without prejudice to the interest of justice. He shall make a report of any
preliminary examination so made to the municipal or to the auxiliary municipal judge immediately upon
the return of one or the other. He shall have authority in such cases to order the arrest of the defendant
and to grant him bail in the manner and cases provided for in Rule 114. 38
The Rules of 1940 contained an Identical provision, in Section 3, Rule 108.
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure did not reproduce this provision, and did not include the mayor in
the enumeration of the officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations, those listed being judges
of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts; city or provincial fiscals and their assistants;
national and regional state prosecutors; and "such other officers as may be authorized by law." 39
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. —
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Upon the filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is
satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest. (n). 40
It is of course the deletion in the 1985 rules of reference to the municipal mayor as among those
authorized to conduct preliminary investigations and order arrests upon which the petitioners chiefly rely
as basis for their impugnation of Mayor Lumayno's preliminary investigation and order of arrest based
thereon.
The matter is however treated of not solely by the Rules of Court but also by the 1973 Constitution,
Section 3, Article IV whereof reads:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 41
Parenthetically, it may be noted that Section 3, Rule III of the 1935 Constitution mentioned only "the
judge" as having power to determine probable cause and issue search and arrest warrants.
The matter is further dealt with in Section 143 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, which took effect on February 10, 1983. This section evidently deems the mayor
a "responsible officer" in contemplation of the cited constitutional provision, and explicitly authorizes him
to conduct preliminary examination in criminal cases and order the arrest of the accused upon probable
cause.
SEC. 143. Authority of the Mayor to Conduct Preliminary Examination.
(1) In case of temporary absence of the judge assigned to the municipalities the mayor may conduct the
preliminary examination in criminal cases when, in his opinion the investigation cannot be delayed without
prejudice to the interest of justice.
(2) No examination shall be conducted unless the parties are assisted by lawyers.
(3) In cases where he may conduct preliminary examination, the mayor shall upon probable cause after
examination of witnesses, have authority order the arrest of the accused and to grant him bail in the
manner and cases provided in the Revised Rules of Court and order his provisional release.
(4) The mayor shall make a report of any preliminary examination so made immediately after the return of
the judge assigned in the area, or upon the designation of his replacement. 42
The 1973 Constitution plainly and unmistakably grants to the legislature the power to determine which "
responsible officers, " aside from judges, may issue warrants of arrest after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. And as plainly and unmistakably, the
legislature, the Batas Pambansa, has in the Local Government Code made the determination that the
mayor is such a "responsible officer "and has in consequence authorized him to conduct preliminary
investigations in criminal cases and order the arrest of the accused upon a finding of probable cause.
The first issue raised by the petitioners — that in September ,1985 the mayor no longer had power to
conduct preliminary investigations and issue arrest warrants43 — must therefore be resolved against
them. The argument that Section 143 of the Local Government Code is just "a rule of procedure merely
having incorporated Rule 112, Section 2 of the old rules of Criminal Procedure," and should therefore be
deemed "superseded by the New Rules of Criminal Procedure pursuant to the power of this ** Court to
promulgate rules of procedure (Article X, Section 5 151, Constitution **)"44 cannot be sustained. However
superior the Supreme Court may be to the other branches of government in the realm of adjudication, its
power to ordain rules of court was at the time inferior to the lawmaking power of the legislature.45 It is
true that the 1935 Constitution repealed all procedural laws then in force "as statutes" and declared them
to be "rules of court;" but this was only so that they could be subject to repeal or modification by the
Supreme Court, which was given the power to promulgate rules of procedure,46 and has since been
exercising such power by promulgating the Rules of Court of 1940 and of 1964, and the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, etc. But the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions explicitly conferred on the legislature the
power to repeal, alter or supplement those rules of court, although it would appear that that power is no
longer granted to it by the 1987 Charter.47
Now, the conditions under which the mayor could conduct preliminary investigations are also clearly
indicated by the law, to wit:
1) in case of the temporary absence of the judge assigned to the municipality; and
2) in his (the mayor's) opinion, the investigation cannot be delayed without prejudice to the interests of
justice.
On these occasions, the mayor may order the arrest of the accused upon a finding of probable cause
after searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses the latter may present.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that these conditions have not been met. Indeed, quite apart from
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.48 and the affirmative statements of
respondent official that on that fateful 20th day of September, 1985, Judge Ignalaga was in Manila"49 on
official leave or absence,"50 the petitioners have not put the fulfillment of those conditions at issue at all,
or the matter of whether or not the accused were "assisted by lawyers" in the course of the
investigation.51
The petitioners also challenge the constitutionality of Section 143 of the Local Government Code, it being
claimed that the mayor has been thereby authorized to conduct pre investigations and issue warrants of
arrest, although he can not be deemed a "neutral and detached magistrate" within the contemplation of
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.52
The competence of the Batasang Pambansa to decide and declare by statute which "responsible
officers," aside from judges, should be entrusted with the authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and issue arrest warrants cannot be doubted in view of the clear language of the Constitution.53 And the
determination by the Batasan that a municipal mayor is one such "responsible officer" who may properly
be entrusted with the function of conducting preliminary investigations and ordering arrests of suspects
upon probable cause, can not be subject of judicial review, absent any indication that the legislative
proceedings leading to that statutory determination are void on account of some grave cause. Certainly,
the wisdom of the statute, or the validity of the reasons underlying it, or the adequacy of the statistics,
facts and circumstances considered by the legislature in its enactment, are beyond the sphere of inquiry
of the courts54 The Batasan was apparently of the belief that a municipal mayor could be sufficiently
objective and impartial as to be relied upon to conduct preliminary investigations and issue orders of
arrest in the exceptional situation when the judge assigned in the municipality was absent. The petitioners
disagree. They contend that the mayor cannot in the very nature of things be "neutral and detached." The
disagreement, and the fact that plausible reasons may be adduced by one side or the other on the
proposition does not make the question a justiciable one. The theory advocated by the petitioners that the
mayor's "deep involvement in law enforcement functions is likely to color his judgment as a trier of
probable cause,"55 does not induce persuasion. In the first place the premise cannot be conceded. While
it is true that the mayors do "exercise general supervision over units and elements of the INP stationed or
assigned in their respective jurisdictions," they are not themselves directly involved in police work and
cannot in any sense be described, as the petitioners do, as being deeply involved in law enforcement
functions. And even if that "deep involvement" be conceded, it does not follow that this would necessarily
preclude their assuming "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" in conducting preliminary investigations
of persons suspected of crimes.
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it
was in September, 1985. The law has since been alter. No longer does the mayor have at this time the
power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local
Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by
the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino
people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. " The constitutional
proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause
and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by
judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973
Constitution,56 — who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of
arrest or search warrants.
As the law now stands, the mayor may no longer conduct preliminary investigation, the authority to do so
being limited under Section 2, Rule 1 1 2 of the Rules of Court to (1) provincial or city fiscals and their
assistants; (2) judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (3) national and
regional state prosecutors; and (d) such other officers as may be authorized by law.57 But only "the
judge" may issue search and arrest warrants after due determination of probable cause.58
The petitioners' assault, on the other hand, upon the constitutionality of Article 141 of the Revised Penal
Code, defining and penalizing the felony of inciting to sedition, upon the claim that it was "borrowed" from
the U.S. Sedition Act of 1798 which in turn has been struck down as inconsistent with the First
Amendment of the American Constitution,59 is repelled by the Solicitor General's arguments.60
In the first place, ** our law on inciting to sedition is not akin to the US Sedition Act of 1798 which was
imposed on the American colonies by their British ruler. With the success of the American revolution, the
1798 Sedition Act naturally ceased to have effect as it would be utterly incongrous to punish those who
sought the overthrow of the British government in America.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
To annul our law on sedition is to give license to those who seek the application of lawless methods in the
advancement of their political views. Our constitution surely does not contemplate this.
Finally, the petitioners postulate that in the determination of the existence of probable cause from the
constitutional aspect, it is required that: "(1) The judge (or) officer must examine the ** witnesses
personally; (2) The examination must be under oath; and (3) The examination must be reduced to writing
in the form of searching questions and answers. (Marinas v. Siochio, 104 SCRA 403)."
In the light of these principles they contend: firstly, that the mayor's questioning of the witnesses was not
"searching" enough; and secondly, that the witnesses' testimony does not establish prima facie the
commission of the felony of inciting to sedition.
The fact is that is shown by the record, questions about the material events were in truth propounded by
Mayor Lumayno to the chief witness. Capt. Sanson;61 and no proof to the contrary has been submitted.
The circumstance that the answers given by Capt. Sanson to the mayor's questions are closely reflective
of the contends of his affidavit should not come as a surprise and cannot, without more, be taken as
debilitating or nullifying the interrogation.
The petitioner's second point is much more substantial and is decisive of the controversy. The petitioners
are correct in their claim that Capt. Sanson's testimony62 does not in truth contain any facts
demonstrating the actuality of the crime of inciting to sedition, which is the crime for which arrest warrants
were issued by Mayor Lumayno. The facts recited by Capt. Sanson may perhaps warrant a charge of
traffic obstruction, or grave coercion, or malicious mischief, or illegal possession of firearms or deadly
weapons, or maybe, attempted murder or homicide. But it is barren of facts to support an accusation of
inciting to sedition.
The other evidence on record exhibits the same barreness.
Two witnesses, Godofredo Hoyo-A and Elpidio Carbajosa, advert in their affidavits63 to the shouting of
"seditious words," etc. Hoyo-A is quoted as deposing that "the demonstrators were already unruly ** (and
kept) on shouting anti-government slogans, ** invectiues and seditious words against the government,"64
that certain of the petitioners were Identified as being "against the government, ** and using the (Mt.
Carmel) School in doctrining (sic) the students against the government,"65 that petitioner Rogelio Arnaiz
had delivered a speech in which he had said, "Rumpagon ang dictatorial na regimen ni Pres. Marcos,
pamatukan ang NSL, ibagsak ang military kagwalaon ang CHDF, suklan nato ang gobyerno," a woman
speaker had said the same thing, and a third speaker, petitioner Daniel Gempesala, also stated:
Lumpagon and dictatorial na regimen ni Marcos, kag ibagsak ang Gobyerno;"66 and they had elicited a
response from the people there who had raised their right hands and repeated the shouted "slogan."67
Carbajosa in his turn declared that the demonstrators ** were shouting for trouble and ready to make
revolution with the use of arms."68
Another affiant, Eduardo Flores, stated that the demonstrators were unruly, "tumultuously shouting
seditious words against the government and shouting for revolution."69
The sworn statement of the only other witness, Leopoldo Villalon,70 is totally innocuous as far as proving
the elements of inciting to sedition is concerned.
The evidence can not justify the action taken by the respondent Mayor and Judge. The Court thus
declares as sorely inadequate and mortally defective the avowed evidentiary foundation for Mayor
Lumayno's finding of probable cause respecting the commission by the petitioners of the crime of inciting
to sedition. The affiants declarations in their sworn statements which might otherwise be pertinent to the
offense, are generalities, mere conclusions of their, not positive averments of particular facts within their
personal knowledge. 'They do not Identify the specific persons supposed to have perpetrated the crime
charged, except two. But even the Identification of these two is of no moment. For except as regards
Capt. Sanson, whose testimony, to repeat, is in any case ineffectual to prove the precise offense ascribed
to the petitioners, there had been no searching interrogation by Mayor Lumayno of the witnesses as
required by the Constitution. Hence, whatever credit could possibly have been accorded to the affidavit of
Hoyo-A — which ventures to quote the exact words allegedly shouted by petitioners Arnaiz and
Gempesala, and an unidentified woman — was thereby effectively foreclosed.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted. The order of respondent Mayor
Lumayno issued on September 20, 1985 and the resolution promulgated by respondent Judge Ignalaga
on October 11, 1985 are annulled and set aside, and the respondents are perpetually forbidden to
enforce or in any way implement the orders for the arrest of any of the petitioners. No costs.
Cynthia P. Nolasco vs Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano
FACTS: Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the
intersection of Mayon Street, Quezon City On the same day, a searched was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio
Saldajeno; applied for search warrant from the respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, after a month of
“round the clock” surveillance of the premises as a “suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA”,
particularly connected to MV Karagatan / Pena Andrea cases. The searching party seized 428 documents
and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. The City Fiscal
information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents
Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
sufficiently describe with particularly the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable cause
had not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.
Disputed Search Warrant: Documents, papers and other records of the communist party of the
Philippines / New People’s Army and or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party
Philippines..
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued was of general warrant and illegal?
HELD: The search warrant is of General, thus, it was hereby annulled by set aside.
RATIONALE: The Search Warrant does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what II. THE ISSUE
are the manuals not otherwise available to the public certain to make them subversive or to enable them
to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they
should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter. III. THE RULING
Mere generalization will not suffice and odes not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a
warrant may issue. [The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.]

Nolasco, et al vs. Paño
G.R. No. L-69803
October 8, 1985
Facts:
The present case was subject for resolution.
Supreme Court held in a criminal case that the arrest of the petitioners was illegal, annulling the decision
of respondent Judge Paño, and that the seizure of the items by virtue of the warrant by the same
respondent judge are inadmissible as evidence in the Subversive Documents case. However the Court
held that the items were to be retained in case it would be used as evidence in a separate criminal case
pending before the Special Military Commission No.1, returning the rest which are determined irrelevant
by petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the portion of the decision regarding the retention of the properties seized. One of
the petitioners also assailed the respondent’s claim that the search was incidental to her arrest for the
crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or not some of the properties seized may be introduced as evidence in a separate criminal case.
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the
private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application for
search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony, which was the
alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who
was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated
tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the
petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioner’s counsel did not
have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court
during the application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were allegedly
copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the
pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time
of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative
of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not
meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from
master tapes that it owns.

Held: The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported
pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted
The Court ruled the propriety of the declaration of the arrest and search as null and void. It was held that films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine
the warrant was one of a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate against whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Bill of rights also orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as
obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]).
All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used Columbia Pictures v CA 261 SCRA 144 (1996)
against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs.
Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). Nature
Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void general warrant, the : Petitions for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA.
seizure of documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrest. Ponente
: J. Vitug
20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988 Facts:
•
DECISION 07 April 1998: NBI filed with the RTC of Pasig 3 applications for SW
(3rd Division) againstprivate respondent (Tube Video Enterprises – Edward C. Cham; BloomingRose Tape Center –
Ma. Jajorie T. Uy; Video Channel – Lydia Nabong)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: chargingthem with violations of Sec. 56 of PD 49 (Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property) as
amended by PD 1988.
I. THE FACTS •
RTC Judge Austria consolidated the 3 applications and conducted a jointhearing where she made a
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and personal examination of the applicant (NBI AgentReyes) and his witnesses.
seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape •
outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in Finding just and probable cause, Judge Austria issued the search warrants.
violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). •
Private Respondents filed their “Motion to Quash” the SW citing as groundsthat there was no probable
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and cause; the films in question are not protected byPD 1988 in that they were never registered in the
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the National Library as acondition precedent to the availment of the protection; the Motion PictureAssociation
private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the of America have not proven nor established their ownership overthe films; etc.
petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants. •
Judge Austria reversed her former stand initially finding probable cause forthe issuance of the search
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized properties, warrants and ordered their quashal:
which was granted by the lower court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower o
court. The CA affirmed the trial court. Private complainants uncertain of their ownership over the titles;
o
Complainants did not comply with the requirement that master tapesshould be presented during
the application for search warrants;
o evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of
Complainants failed to comply with the deposit and registrationrequirements of PD 49 as amended by PD
1988.
• goods is not in his name.
Judge Austria also ordered the return of the items seized by virtue of thewarrants.
• Prudente vs Dayrit Case
CA affirmed the quashal of the SWs.
Issue
: WON the SWs were issued with probable cause.
NORatio
:BASIC REQUIREMENT for the validity of search warrants (in cases of this nature) is
the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from whichthe pirated films are supposed to
have been copied
(20
th
Century Fox FilmCorp. vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655). The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity
or at least
substantialsimilarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, theapplicant must
present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with thepurchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether thelatter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This
linkage of the
copyrightedfilms to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannotserve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant.According to the CA, in which the SC concurs:
It is not correct to say that "the basic fact" to be proven to establishprobable cause in the instant cases is
not the "unauthorized transfer"of a motion picture that has been recorded but the "sale, lease,
ordistribution of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films."In applying for the search warrants the NBI
charged violation of theentire provisions of Section 56 of P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D.No.1988. This
included not only the sale, lease or distribution of piratedtapes but also the transfer or causing to be
transferred of any soundrecording or motion picture or other audio visual work.But even assuming, as
appellants argue, that only the sale, lease, ordistribution of pirated video tapes is involved, the fact
remains thatthere is need to establish probable cause that the tapes being sold,leased or distributed are
pirated tapes, hence the issue reverts back tothe question of whether there was unauthorized transfer,
directly orindirectly, of a sound recording or motion picture or other audio visualwork that has been
recorded.
Petitions denied.
MICROSOFT VS MAXICORP
438 SCRA 224 – Mercantile Law – Intellectual Property – Law on Copyright – Probable Cause in Issuing
Search Warrant
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a
surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating Systems)
were being produced and packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian
witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed
with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was
in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz”. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC.
He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as evidence as
well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer technician, who
showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated.
The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair
competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of
the warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its
decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or Sacriz’ name hence the
proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they
presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed,
there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the
prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit
software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced,
packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in Sacriz’ name does not render the
issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of
conditions obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the
RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit
FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made
mentioned of “result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information
from verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t
licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of
these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions
which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office
of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and answers
Search warrant was a general warrant
Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that
the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the
Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing
Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing and under
oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach
to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
- This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant and
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree punishes several
offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase illegal possession of firearms etc.
– – Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the
specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant
to mention the particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the
invalidation of this case.
Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board
570 SCRA 410 – Political Law – Qualifications of a Senator or a Congress Representative
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented.
Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on
the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election
in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic
that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void
and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if
it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits
it imposes must be observed.
The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergonemandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the
guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36, validly imposequalifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of
election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.
PP VS MARCOS
FACTS:
ON 18 MARCH 1986, ATTY. RAMIREZ AND ATTY. ABELLA, PCGG AGENTS, ISSUED A
SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST THE RESTHOUS THE SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IS WHETHER
OR NOT THE MARCH 18, 1986 SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST PROPERTIES OF IMELDA IN
LEYTE INCLUDING THE RESTHOUSE AT OLOT. THEIR ORDER WAS NOT SIGNED BY ANY PCGG
COMMISSIONERS.
ISSUE:
IS THEIR ORDER VALID?
RULING:
NO. JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT BE DELEGATED. IN PCGG V. JUDGE PEÑA,
[1][17] THE COURT HELD THAT THE POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE PCGG AMOUNT
TO THE EXERCISE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS, AND THE EXERCISE OF SUCH FUNCTIONS
CANNOT BE DELEGATED BY THE COMMISSION TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES OR SUBORDINATES
OR TASK FORCES BECAUSE OF THE WELL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT JUDICIAL OR QUASI-
JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT BE DELEGATED.
PETITIONER REPUBLIC ARGUES THAT MRS. MARCOS SHOULD BE DEEMED ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE SEQUESTRATION OF HER OLOT RESTHOUSE BY HER ACTIONS IN REGARD
TO THE SAME. BUT A VOID ORDER PRODUCES NO EFFECT AND CANNOT BE VALIDATED
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL. FOR THE SAME REASON, THE COURT CANNOT ACCEPT
PETITIONER’S VIEW THAT MRS. MARCOS SHOULD HAVE FIRST SOUGHT THE LIFTING OF THE
SEQUESTRATION ORDER THROUGH A MOTION TO QUASH FILED WITH THE PCGG. BEING VOID,
THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS THE POWER TO STRIKE IT DOWN ON SIGHT.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
RULING OF THE COURT:
The Court’s Ruling
Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, an order of sequestration may only issue upon a
showing “of a prima facie case” that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under Executive Orders 1 and 2.
[2][11] When a court nullifies an order of sequestration for having been issued without a prima facie case,
the Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG but simply applies the law.[3][12]
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co, Inc. v. PCGG,[4][13] the Court held that a prima facie factual
foundation that the properties sequestered are “ill-gotten wealth” is required. The power to determine the
existence of a prima facie case has been vested in the PCGG as an incident to its investigatory powers.
The two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a collegial determination of such fact.[5][14]
Here, it is clear that the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of a prima facie case
that would warrant the sequestration of the Olot Resthouse. The Republic presented no evidence before
the Sandiganbayan that shows differently. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the two PCGG
representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would
warrant such a prima facie finding.
Parenthetically, the Republic’s supposed evidence does not show how the Marcoses acquired the
sequestered property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth,” and how former President Marcos intervened in
its acquisition. Taking the foregoing view, the resolution of the issue surrounding the character of the
property sequestered – whether or not it could prima facie be considered ill-gotten – should be necessary.
The issue in this case is not new. The facts are substantially identical to those in the case of
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Dio Island Resort, Inc.).[6][15] There, the same Atty. Ramirez issued a
sequestration order on April 14, 1986 against Dio Island Resort, Inc. and all its assets and properties
which were thought to be part of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. Alerted by a challenge to his action, the
PCGG passed a resolution “to confirm, ratify and adopt as its own all the Writs of Sequestration” that
Attys. Ramirez and Abella issued “to remove any doubt as to the validity and enforceability” of their writs.
Still, the Court struck them down as void:
x x x It is indubitable that under no circumstances can a sequestration or freeze order be validly issued
by one not a Commissioner of the PCGG.
The invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty. Ramirez did not
even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at the time he issued the said
sequestration order. x x x
xxxx
Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramirez had been given prior authority by the PCGG to place Dio
Island Resort under sequestration, nevertheless, the sequestration order he issued is still void since
PCGG may not delegate its authority to sequester to its representatives and subordinates, and any such
delegation is invalid and ineffective.
Under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2, PCGG is the sole entity primarily charged with the responsibility of
recovering ill-gotten wealth. x x x The power to sequester, therefore, carries with it the corollary duty to
make a preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable basis for sequestering a property
alleged to be ill-gotten. After a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced, the PCGG clearly has to use
its own judgment in determining the existence of a prima facie case.
xxxx
The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the sequestration order is,
unavoidably, a fatal defect which rendered the sequestration of respondent corporation and its properties
void ab initio. Being void ab initio, it is deemed non-existent, as though it had never been issued, x x x.[7]
[16]
The Court is maintaining its above ruling in this case.
Although the two PCGG lawyers issued the sequestration order in this case on March 18, 1986, before
the passage of Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules, such consideration is immaterial following our above ruling.
In PCGG v. Judge Peña,[8][17] the Court held that the powers, functions and duties of the PCGG
amount to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, and the exercise of such functions cannot be delegated
by the Commission to its representatives or subordinates or task forces because of the well established
principle that judicial or quasi-judicial powers may not be delegated.
It is the Republic’s theory of course that Commissioner Daza’s letter, directing Attys. Ramirez and Abella
to search and sequester all properties, documents, money and other assets of respondents, should be
considered as the writ of sequestration while the order issued by Attys. Ramirez and Abella should be
treated merely as an implementing order.
But the letter did not have the tenor of a sequestration order covering specific properties that the lawyers
were ordered to seize and hold for the PCGG. Actually, that letter is of the same kind issued to Attys.
Ramirez and Abella in Dio Island Resort. Consequently, there is no reason to depart from the Court’s
ruling in the latter case where it said:
The invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty. Ramirez did not
even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at the time he issued the said
sequestration order. Thus, the respondent Court noted:
“Contrary to plaintiff’s representation, nothing exists to support its contention that the Task Force had
been given prior authority to place DIO under PCGG control. On the contrary, as the text of the above
letters clearly show, Attys. Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben Abella, had acted on broad and non-specific
powers: ‘By authority of the commission and the powers vested in it. x x x.’”[9][18]
Petitioner Republic argues that Mrs. Marcos should be deemed estopped from questioning the
sequestration of her Olot Resthouse by her actions in regard to the same. But a void order produces no
effect and cannot be validated under the doctrine of estoppel. For the same reason, the Court cannot
accept petitioner’s view that Mrs. Marcos should have first sought the lifting of the sequestration order
through a motion to quash filed with the PCGG. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it
down on sight.
Besides, the lifting of the sequestration order will not necessarily be fatal to the main case since it does
not follow from such lifting that the sequestered properties are not ill-gotten wealth. Such lifting simply
means that the government may not act as conservator or may not exercise administrative or
housekeeping powers over the property.[10][19] Indeed, the Republic can be protected by a notice of lis
pendens.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRMS the challenged
resolutions of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan dated February 28, 2002 and August 28, 2002 in
Civil Case 0002, which granted respondent Imelda R. Marcos’ Motion to Quash the March 18, 1986
Sequestration Order covering the Olot Resthouse.
Further, the Court DIRECTS the Register of Deeds of Leyte to immediately annotate a notice of lis
pendens on the certificate of title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the Republic of the Philippines’
claim over the same in Civil Case 0002 of the Sandiganbayan.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. , 117 SCRA 999
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
September 30, 1982
G.R. No. , ,
vs.
,.
, J.:
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, filed this petition to review on certiorari the order dated
October 13, 1969 of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet
Province, declaring the issuance by the City Court of Search Warrant No. 459, as contrary to law
and ordering the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents and any person in possession of
the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant to deliver and return the same to Yu Cua Sio,
owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery.
On June 15, 1969, NBI Supervising Agent Jose Vicente filed an application for the issuance of a
search warrant with the City Court of Baguio City which provides, among others, the following:
That he has been reliably informed and verily believes that the owner and/or manager of the
Suntory Grocery, of 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City has in his possession and control stocks of
San Miguel Gin, product of the La Tonde?a, Inc., Manila, which is adulterated, bearing fake
auxiliary stamps, and using crown caps not produced by the company, which is in violation of the
provisions of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
... and therefore has reason enough to believe that a search warrant should be issued to enable
the undersigned to take possession and control and bring it to this Court said stock, as evidence in
the above case under investigation.
City Judge Patricio Perez of Baguio City, acting on the aforesaid application issued on June 15,
1967, Search Warrant No. 459, under the following terms:
Whereas, after examination under oath of Supervising Agent, NBI Jose Vicente and Cesar de
Leon, both of the NBI Regional Office, at Dagupan City, this Court finds that there is probable
cause to believe that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery, located at No. 36 Rajah
Soliman St., Baguio City, is in possession such stock of La Tondena product, San Miguel Gin,
which is adulterated, bearing auxiliary stamps which is tampered and possession of falsified or fake
crown caps, which is now under investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation, in this City.
Therefore, you are hereby commanded during the day only to make an immediate search on the
premises of the store and/or grocery owned by the Manager and/or proprietor of the Suntory
Grocery which is located in No. 36 Rajah Soliman, of this City and if you should find the same to
bring it forthwith before me in the City Court of Baguio to be dealt with as the law directs.
Armed with said search warrant, the NBI agents, on June 19, 1967, searched the premises of the
Suntory Grocery located at 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City, owned and managed by private
respondent Yu Cua Sio. During the search conducted in the presence of private respondent and
his wife, the NBI agents seized the following articles which were properly inventoried and
receipted:
(1) One (1) bundle consisting of rubber siphon, trainer and funnel;
(2) One (1) galvanized tank, 15" in diameter, 2 feet in height;
(3) One (1) mounted crown cap sealer with accessories;
(4) Six (6) cases of San Miguel Gin, round bottles, fined with suspected adulterated Gin and
bearing BIR stamps dated 6 April 1967;
(5) Two(2)cases of San Miguel Gin empty bottles;
(6) One (1) case containing ten (10) San Miguel Gin (adulterated) and 14 empty bottles, without
stamps;
(7) One (1) bundle consisting of two (2) bottles believed to be containing genuine San Miguel Gin
which was marked as standard; and
(8) One (1) paper bag containing 122 auxiliary stamps dated 6 April 1967, without perforation and
bearing successive serial numbers starting from 43,000,000.
Private respondent Yu Cua Sio filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 459 with the City Court
of Baguio. In an Order dated February 3, 1969, the inferior court ordered the NBI agents who
seized and confiscated the various articles from the store of Yu Cua Sio to return the same
immediately to him.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, reversed the decision of the City Court and
sustained the validity of the questioned search warrant. However, upon motion for reconsideration
filed by private respondent Yu Cua Sio, respondent Judge, on October 13, 1969, reconsidered his
decision and declared the issuance of Search Warrant No. 459 as contrary to law and, forthwith,
ordered the NBI agents to deliver and return the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant to
private respondent Yu Cua Sio.
The only legal issue posed for resolution in this case is the validity of Search Warrant No. 459
issued by City Judge Patricio Perez of Baguio City which respondent Judge declared as null and
void in his order dated October 13, 1969 on the grounds that (1) the same was issued "for more
than one specific offense in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court which states
'no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense' "; and, (2) that the search warrant
was issued to fish for evidence.
Petitioner claims that the lower court erred (1) when it held that the questioned search warrant
violates the provisions of Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court; (2) in holding that the
search warrant in question was issued to fish for evidence; and (3) in declaring Search Warrant No.
459 as contrary to law and in ordering the return of the articles seized by virtue of said search
warrant to respondent Yu Cua Sio.
We find merit in the petition. The search warrant issued by the City Court did not mention any
specific offense deemed to have been violated by respondent Yu Cua Sio. It is in the application
filed by the NBI agents which states that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery has in
his possession and control stocks of San Miguel Gin which are adulterated and therefore, violative
of the provisions of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code. These articles of the Revised
Penal Code are entitled: "Substituting and Altering Trademarks, Tradenames, or Service marks"
and "Unfair Competition and Fraudulent Registration of Trademark and Tradename," respectively.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "the specific acts defining said offenses and mentioned in
said articles are closely allied to each other that in a sense, the punishable acts defined in one of
them can be considered as including, or necessarily included in the other."
There is no merit also in the pronouncement by respondent Judge that the search warrant was
issued to fish for evidence just because the application for search warrant states that its purpose is
"to take possession and control of the articles to be used as evidence in the above case under
investigation."
The search warrant as issued mentions that respondent has in his possession and control stocks
of La Tonde?a product which are adulterated, with fake auxiliary stamps, and are using crown caps
which are not produced by the company. The articles seized in the premises of respondent Yu Cua
Sio show that he was in possession of these articles mentioned in the application for search
warrant and in the search warrant itself. Possession of said fake stamps is illegal and the same
should not be returned to respondent Yu Cua Sio.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent Judge, dated October 13, 1969, is SET ASIDE, and
private respondent Yu Cua Sio is hereby ordered to return the articles seized if they had been
delivered to him by the NBI agents.
SO ORDERED.
UY KHEYTIN VS VILLAREAL
Facts:
-On April 30, 1919, one Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant, the said Ramon Gayanilo stating
in hisapplication; "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing
desk inhis store, there is kept a certain amount of opium."- Armed with that search warrant, the
respondent M. S. Torralba, on the same day (April 30th) searchedthe house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin
and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to searchalso the bodega on the ground-floor of
the house, but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or thathe rented it. Lt. Torralba wanted to
be sure, and for this reason, he placed a guard in the premises to seethat nothing was removed
therefrom, and then went away to find out who the owner of the bodega was. The next morning he
learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia, of the town of Molo, that theChinaman Uy Kheytin
was the one who was renting the bodega. Thereupon Lt. Torralba and hissubordinates resumed
the search and then and there found and seized articles which were all withconnection to the using
of opium.- A criminal complaint was filed in the court of the justice of the peace of Iloilo against all the
petitionersherein, charging them with a violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested.
-Defendants urged: (1) that the search warrant of April 30 was illegal because the requisites prescribed
bythe General Orders No. 58 had not been complied with in its issuance
(specifically (a) because it was not issued upon either of the grounds mentioned in section 96 of General
Orders No. 58, and (b) because the judge who issued it did not determine the probable cause by
examining witnesses under oath)
; A private jeep driven by accused-appellant Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for
(2) that thesearches and seizures made on May 1st had been made without any semblance of authority
and henceillegal; and (3) that the seizure of the defendants' books and letters was a violation of the
provisions of the Jones Law providing that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself, and
protecting himagainst unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue:
WON the defendants’ positions are with merit.
Ruling (s):
1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with
therequirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of
theopium and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are
theyentitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.2. That the search made on May 1st
was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day, and,therefore, did not require another search
warrant.3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no
inherentrelation with opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in
violation of thepetitioners' constitutional rights.
RD:
(Contention # 1)-SEC. 96. of General Orders No. 58 provide: “ It (a search warrant) may be issued upon
either of thefollowing grounds: 1. When the property was stolen or embezzled. ; 2. When it was used or
when the intentexists to use it as the means of committing a felony.”-Suffice it to say that, whatever may
be the technical common-law meaning of the word "felony", which isused in paragraph 2 of sec. 96 above
quoted, the Court believes it would be the height of absurdity tohold, upon technical grounds, that a
search warrant is illegal which is issued to search for and seizeproperty the very possession of which is
forbidden by law and constitutes a crime. Opium is such property.- Search-warrants have heretofore
been allowed to search for… material so kept as to endanger the publicsafety.- A search warrant may be
likened to a warrant of arrest. The issuance of both is restricted by the sameprovision of the Jones Law
(sec. 3) which is as follows:
“That no warrant shall issue but upon probablecause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.”
- In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in
that the judge did not first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property sought
to besearched for and seized having been actually found in the place described by the complainant,
reasoningby analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we are of the opinion that that irregularity is
not sufficientcause for ordering the return of the opium found and seized under said warrant, to the
petitioners, andexonerating the latter.
While it is true that a warrant is good for 10 days after the date of issuance, this cannot be interpreted
tomean that a search warrant can be used every day for 10 days, and for a different purpose each day.
Thiswould be absurd.-It appears from the oral evidence adduced during the hearing of the petitioners'
motion in the court belowthat the search for opium, the property mentioned in the warrant, was not
completed on April 30th; it wasinterrupted by the necessity to ascertain who the owner of the bodega on
the ground-floor was, becausethe petitioner Uy Kheytin falsely disclaimed ownership thereof. In other
words, the search of May 1st wasnot made "for a different purpose," nor could it be considered "another
search," but was really acontinuation of the search begun on April 30th. This is shown by the fact that
during the interval betweenthe two searches the premises in question were guarded by Constabulary
soldiers, and the petitionerswere made to understand on April 30th that the authorities were not yet
through with the search andwould continue the same as soon as they found out that the bodega was also
occupied by the petitionerUy Kheytin.(Contention # 3)- In order to comply with the constitutional
provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, theproperty to be seized under a warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property can betaken thereunder.- That the officers of the law
believed that the books, papers, etc., which they seized might be used asevidence against the petitioners
herein a criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium Law, isno reason or justification under
the law for the seizure: First, because they were not "particularlydescribed" or even mentioned in the
search warrant; second, because, even if they had been mentioned inthe search warrant, they could not
be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the purposeof obtaining evidence; and third,
because to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used inevidence against him would be
equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EXALA
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
routine inspection. With Bocalan were his co-accused Fernandez and Exala. Pfc. Galang, a member of
the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside. They
answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He
then noticed a black leather bag measuring about 1 foot wide and 2 feet long with its sides bulging. When
he asked what it contained, there was deadening silence from the 3 accused. Nobody answered. Instead,
they suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened, which was found out to
contain marijuana. The 3 accused were thereafter prosecuted and convicted of illegal transportation of
marijuana. Accused Bocalan appealed and questioned the legality of the admission of the marijuana as
evidence against him since it was seized without a valid search warrant.
II. THE ISSUE
Was the marijuana seized without warrant during the checkpoint admissible in evidence against the
accused?
III. THE RULING
[The 1st Division voted 3-1 to AFFIRM the conviction of the accused. JusticesGriño-Aquino and
Quiason concurred with Justice Bellosillo’s ponencia. Justice Cruz, by his lonesome, dissented from the
majority.]
 The Court held that Bocalan is deemed to have waived his objection to the admission of the seized
marijuana because he neither raised this issue before the trial court nor objected to the admissibility of
the marijuana when it was offered in evidence.
And even assuming that there was no such waiver, the Court held that still Bocalan’s contention deserves
scant consideration because there are instances where search and seizure can be made without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the “stop-and-search” without a warrant
at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this
Court [inValmonte vs. De Villa]. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after
a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is
because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law-offender or thecontents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the
commission of an offense.
According to the Court, lest it be misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not intended to do away with
the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and
belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful
arrest. This case, however, is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful “stop-and-search” at a military or
police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with “Operational Bakal,” the main object of
which was to search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized
persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was
flagged down and the occupants were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed
a black leather bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of
the accused answered. At that moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became
suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused
clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not
restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a
more extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff.
[NOTE: Incidentally, one of the co-counsels for accused-appellant Bocalan in his appeal to the Supreme
Court was then-Atty. and now Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr.]
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Justice Cruz maintained the proposition in his dissent in Valmonte vs. De Villathat checkpoints and the
searches and seizures incident thereto are unconstitutional. InPeople vs. Exala, he expounded on this
thesis:
I am opposed to checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at reducing criminality in general. I do not
agree that in the interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the
authorities and searched without warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That
possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of Rights.
In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the search. The search is
made as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a crime is about
to be committed, is actually being committed, or has just been committed and the searching officer has
personal knowledge that the person being searched or arrested is the culprit.
I will concede that checkpoints may be established at borders of states or at ‘constructive borders’ near
the boundary for the purpose of preventing violations of immigration and customs laws. But in the interior
of the territory, the requirements of a valid search and seizure must be strictly observed. The only
permissible exemption is where a crime like a bank robbery has just been committed or a jailbreak has
just occurred, and the authorities have to seal off all possible avenues of escape in the area. In all other
cases, I submit that the checkpoint should not be allowed.
xxx. [W]e cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all, the
articles seized are illegal. That is putting the cart before the horse. I would rather see some
criminals go unpunished now and then than agree to the Bill of Rights being systematically
ignored in the oppressive checkpoint. Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a
conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pp vs. ZaspaFacts:
On April 29, 1994, Zaspa and a companion were caught by the policemen carrying dried marijuana
leavesinside a bag. They were arrested thereafter without a warrant and brought to the police station for
investigation.
Issue:
W/N the warrantless arrest is valid?
Held:
Yes. Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court authorizes an arrest without a warrant when the person to be
arrestedhas committed a crime, is actually committing or about to commit a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Asthe appellants were found to be in possession of the prohibited drug at the time of their
arrest, the same isadmissible in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO ZASPA and JULIUS GALVAN, accused-appellants.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Elevated and certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court for review is the decision, dated 08 January
1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental, Branch 5, penned by Judge Ricardo M. Berba.
The case, docketed Criminal Case No. 2621 before the trial court, has charged Rolando Zaspa, a.k.a.
"Tata," and Julius Galvan with violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
The case originated from an Information, dated 13 October 1994, which read:
"That on or about April 29, 1994, in the Municipality of Tarragona, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to use did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously own and possess five point six (5.6) kilos of marijuana dried
leaves with stalks, a prohibited dangerous drugs, without proper license or permit from the authorities." 1
Upon arraignment, both accused pled "not guilty" to the charge.
Culled from the findings of the trial judge, as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals, 2 promulgated on
09 November 1998 and penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, the facts could be
gathered, thusly:
At about two o'clock in the morning of 29 April 1994, Chief of Police Rosauro Francisco of Tarragona,
Davao Oriental, received a tip from a police informer that Rolando Zaspa and a companion were bringing
dried marijuana leaves bound for Mati, somewhere at Crossing Banhawan, Tarragona, Davao Oriental.
The police chief promptly organized and dispatched to the area a team composed of SPO2 Honorio
Carasca (the team leader), PO1 Letecio Rafael and SPO1 Cesar Travelegio. The group immediately
proceeded to Crossing Banhawan, arriving thereat at about five o'clock in the morning. There, the team
saw Zaspa and his companion standing by the side of the road with a big black "loalde" bag in front of
them. Just as SPO2 Carasca and PO1 Rafael, who were both in uniform, proceeded to approach the two
men, Zaspa tried to flee. He was intercepted by the policemen. Zaspa claimed that the contents of the
bag did not belong to them. When the bag was opened, Zaspa told the policemen that the dried
marijuana leaves were owned by one Bito Mangandan. Zaspa and his companion, who turned out to be
Julius Galvan, were arrested and brought to the Tarragona police station for investigation. Samples of the
leaves taken from the bag were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Ecoland, Davao City, where the
specimen were tested and confirmed to be marijuana leaves. Chemistry Report No. 035-94, submitted by
Police Senior Inspector Noem; Austero, a forensic expert, contained the following findings:
"Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave positive result to the tests for
marijuana, a prohibited drug."3
Zaspa, taking the witness stand in his defense, testified that sometime in January 1994 he was hired by
Maturino Masanguid to cut an Antipolo round timber for the amount of P5,000.00. He was paid P3,500.00
and was about to get the balance of P1,500.00 on 29 April 1994 when the incident transpired. He stated
that he was walking towards Barrio Sambarangay when an armed man in civilian outfit pointed a gun at
him and proceeded to examine the brown bag he was holding. He was thereafter dragged to the side of
the road and questioned whether a black bag also belonged to him. He denied either ownership or
possession of the bag. He was brought to the police station in Tarragona with another man whom he later
learned to be Julius Galvan. At the police station, a certain Francisco slapped him and made him and
Galvan crawl on the floor. The man also tried to smash the face of Galvan. He was detained in Tarragona
Municipal jail from 29 April until he was brought, on 02 May 1994, to the PC Barracks at Menzi, Mati,
Davao Oriental.
Galvan corroborated the testimony of Zaspa. He asserted that on 12 April 1994, he was contracted by
Algin Divinagracia to spray their mango trees in Banhawan. The first spray was made on 15 April; he
returned to Mati on the same day. The second spray was made on 28 April but, unable to finish the work
that day, he stayed overnight with Divinagracia. At about four o'clock in the morning, he was on his way to
Banhawan crossing when he was stopped by a man holding a gun. He was brought to a place where
some police officers were questioning a man about the ownership of a black bag. The two were brought
to the police station where they were investigated and detained until they were brought the following day
to the P.C. Barracks at Mati.
After trial, the court a quo found the two accused guilty of the crime with which they were charged; the
trial court held:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rolando Zaspa alias `Tata' and Julius Galvan both GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8 in relation to Section 20 of the Republic Act 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and hereby imposes upon each of them the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs of
the proceedings.
"The marijuana leaves subject hereof (Exhs. `D,' `D-1' and `D-2') are hereby ordered turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board, thru the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), for disposition in accordance
with law.
"SO ORDERED."4
Zaspa and Galvan appealed their conviction, albeit the penalty imposed, to the Court of Appeals for
review. The appellate court upheld the conviction; it said:
"Regarding the first issue, the appellee asseverates that there is entirely no merit in appellants' claim that
they were not in possession of marijuana when the police authorities apprehended them at Banhawan
Crossing. The testimonial evidence submitted by the prosecution clearly pointed out that the two
appellants were standing by the side of the road, with the black bag containing the prohibited marijuana
just 1/2 foot away. The absence of any other person within the vicinity indicates that the contraband
belonged to the appellants and to no one else. Now, the appellants could not sufficiently explain the
presence of the bag in their possession. Neither could they explain why the police would `plant' the same
as evidence. Likewise, they did not substantiate the alleged `maltreatment' suffered in the hands of the
law enforcers. Moreover, no improper motive was attributed to the police as to why they would testify
falsely against the appellants -- if such was the fact.
"With respect to the alleged unlawful and warrantless arrest, the People manifests that Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes an arrest without a warrant when the person to be arrested
has committed a crime, is actually committing or about to commit a crime in the presence of the police
officers. As the appellants were found to be in possession of the prohibited drug at the time of their arrest,
the same is admissible as evidence.
"We agree with the appellee. Well-settled is the rule that peace officers may pursue and arrest without a
warrant any person under circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed or
is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace ( People vs. Bautista, 227 SCRA 152). In the case at
bench, the facts and circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused at dawn of April 29, 1994 would
show that the arresting officers have proper and justifiable reasons to arrest the two (2) suspects. First,
they received a confidential information from a police informer that a certain Rolando Zaspa with a
companion were bringing dried marijuana leaves bound for Mati. Second, when the police arrived at the
crime scene, the two (2) suspects were suspiciously at the side of the road with a big black bag in front of
them. Third, there were no other people in sight and it is therefore safe to conclude that the bag
containing the contraband belonged to no one else but the suspects.Lastly, when the police officers were
approaching, the appellant Zaspa attempted to escape.
"A warrantless arrest and seizure was valid where it was done by the police team dispatched to look for
persons responsible for the crime (People vs. Acol, 232 SCRA 406). In any case, in accordance with
settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402). Thus, any irregularity attendant to
the arrest of the accused was cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial (People vs. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93).
"As to the seized marijuana, the same is admissible in evidence, for trite is the jurisprudence that the
search of the appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana in his possession were valid because
they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756). As the appellant
Zaspa opened the black bag containing the prohibited drug, then it is a consented search. Settled is the
rule that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence ( People vs.
Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325).
"In the case at bench, it is clear that the appellants were really in possession of the seized marijuana.
Prosecution witness SPO2 Honorio Carasca's testimony that the black bag containing the contraband
was just 1/2 foot from infront of the appellants (TSN, 4/25/95, p. 10), apart from the fact that there were
no other people in the vicinity, would clearly show that the two (2) appellants were the possessors of the
prohibited item. The appellants' respective defenses denying the ownership and possession of the
marijuana cannot topple the evidence proffered by the prosecution. In the first place, denial, like an alibi,
is a weak defense which becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by
prosecution witnesses (People vs. Ompad, 233 SCRA 62). Second, the appellants failed to present any
receipts proving that on different occasions, they were at the crime scene merely by chance. It must be
noted that the appellant Zaspa failed to present any evidence to show that he collected the sum of
P3,500.00, or that he was to collect the balance of P1,500.00 from the witness, Mr. Maturino Masanguid.
In the same manner, the appellant Galvan failed to present the receipts for the medicine he purportedly
bought for the spraying of the mango trees (TSN, 7/19/95, p. 22). Third, if the appellants were really
maltreated in order to confess to the crime charged, then why is it that they failed to submit to a medical
examination or treatment? (TSN, 6/8/95, p. 48 and TSN, 7/19/95, p. 36). Why is it that the appellants filed
a case before the Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights only after almost a year from the
time of the incident (Exhibit `1' and `2')? In any case, there is nothing on record which indicates that the
police operatives were actuated by improper motive against the appellants. Credence can be given to the
narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, who as police officers are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of proof to the contrary ( People vs. Bautista,
227 SCRA 152). Lastly, as the seized items were positive for marijuana, then, the corpus delicti of the
crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness (People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555).
"In sum, the guilt of the accused-appellants has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt;
hence, the affirmance of the appealed judgment is in order. However, considering that the applicable
penalty is reclusion perpetua, the second paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court shall
apply.
"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. Let this case
be CERTIFIED and ELEVATEDto the Honorable Supreme Court for review.
5
"SO ORDERED."
Although the appeal from the decision of the trial court imposing reclusion perpetua should have been
directly appealed to this Court, considering the penalty involved, the Court has decided to ignore this
breach of technicality and to nevertheless consider the appeal and evaluate the case.
The testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution and that of the defense are diametrically
opposed to each other on almost every point. In resolving such a conflict, so dealing as it does on the
credibility of the witnesses, the Court relies heavily on findings of the trial court being in the best position,
certainly more than the appellate court, in making that judgment. Thus, often repeated, is the standing
rule that absent any showing that the trial judge has overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated any
evidence that could otherwise alter the result of the case, the Court would adhere to the assessment
made by the trial court on the question. Parenthetically, the Court of Appeals has basically done likewise
in finding no reason to alter the conclusion of the trial judge.
In almost every case involving a buy-bust operation, the accused would put up the defense of frame-
up.1âwphi1 The Court views such a claim with disfavor for, like alibi, the frame-up theory can easily be
concocted.6 In the instant case, the police informer has particularly mentioned the name of Rolando
Zaspa as being one of those who would be bringing the bag containing the marijuana, 7 thus paving the
way for the authorities to conduct their operation. When Zaspa, indeed, has made an attempt to run away
upon seeing the police officers, he inadvertently has also confirmed the information given to the police. It
bears to repeat that absent any convincing proof of an intent on the part of police authorities to falsely
impute a serious crime against an accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty will ordinarily have to prevail.8
On the validity of the warrantless arrest, along with the corresponding search and seizure, suffice it to say
that any objection regarding the regularity of an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea;9 otherwise, the defect shall be deemed cured by the voluntary submission by the accused to the
jurisdiction of the trial court.10
No significant value could be given to the allegations of accused-appellants that they were maltreated.
Zaspa only decided to file charges against the apprehending police officers after almost a year following
the incident. For his part, Galvan chose to remain silent. Neither one of the two accused-appellants
submitted himself to medical examination. The attendant circumstances scarcely augur well to support
the asseveration of maltreatment allegedly suffered by accused-appellants from the police authorities.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Malacat v CA 283 SCRA 159 (December 12, 1997)
Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days
earlier, Rodolfo Yu ofthe Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National
Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo,Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them
in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo,Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with eachgroup, comprised of three to four men,
posted at opposite sides of the corner of
“stop and frisk,” where a “warrant andseizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest” and “whose object is either to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information
”; and that the seizure of the grenade from
Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal
possession ofexplosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less
than 17 years, 4 months and 1day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that
he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, therecord of the case was forwarded to the Court of
Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, theCourt of Appeals affirmed the trial
court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Quezon Boulevard -
near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with “their eyes moving very fast.” Yu
and his
companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes.
The police officers thenapproached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehendedSammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu
recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at PlazaMiranda, Yu
saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade
tucked inside the latter’s “front waist line.” Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended
Abdul Casan from
whom a.
38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu
placed an “X” mark at the
bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the
grenade he allegedly recoveredfrom Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating
Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel
de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that heonly recently
arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns.
Petitioner wasonce again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court
when it was presented. In its decision dated 10February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the
trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akinto a
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk.”
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly
effect the same.The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers
to those effected without avalidly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A
warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)has been deno
minated as one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
“hotpursuit” arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a
search incidental to a
lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.”
The concepts of a “stop
-and-
frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest
must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof beforethey may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful
arrest, as the precedent arrestdetermines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have
been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuitarrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overtphysical act, on the part of Malacat,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going tobe committed.
Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the
other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it neverthe
less holds that mere suspicion or
a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him. Finally, a “stop
-and-
frisk” serves a two
-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underliesthe
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach aperson for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressinginterest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person withwhom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the “stop
-and-
frisk” was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu’s claim
that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This
claim is neithersupported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who
allegedly chased that group.Second, there was nothing in Malaca
t’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicionother than that his eyes
were “moving very fast” —
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and histeammates were nowhere near Malacat and
it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companionswere merely standing at the
corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground,probable or
otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he
admitted, the alleged grenade was “discovered” “inside the front waistline” of Malacat, and from all
indications as to the
distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat’s rights solemnly
guaranteed in Sections 2
and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
Pp v. Figueroa
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Bernabe Silva FIGUEROA, Defendant and Appellant.
E041876. No.
Decided: April 22, 2008
Mark A. Hart, Northridge, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W.
Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
269, subd. (a)(1)), A jury convicted defendant of two counts each of aggravated sexual assault of a minor
(Pen.Code, §1 We disagree and affirm the judgment, while directing the trial court to correct errors in the
abstract of judgment.  Defendant appeals, contending that the sentencing court erred in concluding that
his terms for the aggravated sexual assaults must be run consecutively to each other under the
provisions of section 667.6, subdivision (d).   He was sentenced to prison for two consecutive terms of 15
years to life plus 15 years four months.  286, subd. (c)(2)).  288, subd. (c)) and one count of forcible
sodomy (§ 288, subd. (a)), committing lewd and lascivious acts on a person under the age of 16 (§ 288,
subd.(b)(1)), committing lewd and lascivious acts on a minor (§ forcibly committing lewd and lascivious
acts on a minor (§
We need not recite the facts surrounding this case, as they are unnecessary to our discussion of the
issue raised by the defendant.
Applicability of Section 667.6, Subdivision (d) to the Terms for Counts 1 and 3 1.
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the court announced that its tentative sentence would include
a 15-year-to-life term each for counts 1 and 3, to run concurrently with each other and full consecutive
terms for counts 2 and 4. However, after the prosecutor argued that the terms for counts 2 and 4 would
have to be stayed pursuant to section 654, because they were the same acts as were involved in counts
1 and 3, and the terms for counts 1 and 3 would have to be run consecutively under the provisions of
section 667.6, subdivision (d), the court imposed consecutive 15-year-to-life terms for counts 1 and 3.
The jury was instructed that it had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant raped the victim,
“in violation of Penal Code section 261 subdivision (a), subsection (2)” in order to return verdicts of guilt
as to counts 1 and 3. In convicting defendant of these counts, the jury necessarily found that he
committed violations of section 261, subdivision (a)(2), for which section 667.6, subdivision (d) imposes
mandatory consecutive sentences.  At the time defendant committed them, section 667.6, subdivision (d)
provided, in pertinent part, “A full, separate and consecutive term shall be served for each violation of ․
paragraph (2) ․ of subdivision (a) of Section 261․” As to counts 1 and 3, the Information charged
defendant with “a violation of Penal Code section 269, subdivision (a), subsection (1) ․ in that ․ he did ․
commit a violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a), subsection (2), ․ upon [the victim], a child
who was under 14 years of age and 10 or more years younger than the defendant.”  Defendant first
contends that at the time he committed the aggravated sexual assaults of the minor victim, section 667.6,
subdivision (d) did not provide for mandatory consecutive sentences for those offenses.   Committee on Public Safety in 1994 that multiple convictions under section 269 were to be punished
Defendant contends that because section 269 was not amended until after he committed his crimes to
also include the mandatory consecutive term provision of section 667.6, subdivision (d),  2 that provision
does not apply to him.
He fails to account for the fact that characterization of section 269 as such would work to the advantage
of pedophiles by exempting them from the additional penalties that would ordinarily result when they
commit multiple offenses․” (Id. at pp. 291-292, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 884.)  Defendant does not proffer any
decisional or historical support for his assertion that by enacting section 269 the Legislature created a
separate sentencing scheme for violent sexual offenders who prey on a particular class of victims.  [¶] It
would be irrational to suppose the Legislature intended that criminals who commit multiple violent sexual
offenses would be exempt from the aggravated punishment prescribed by section 667.6 merely because
their victims happened to be children under age 14 who were 10 or more years younger than they.   2Section 269 states, in pertinent part, “(c) The court shall impose a consecutive sentence for each
When the jury found defendant had violated section 269 under the circumstances presented here, it
necessarily found he had violated [the] section [prohibiting forcible sodomy] ․ Thus, the factual predicate
necessary to apply section 667.6, subdivision (d) was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.   However, he
makes too much of this omission, ignoring the fact that violation of [the] section [prohibiting forcible
sodomy] is one of the predicate offenses of section 269;  one committing a forcible sodomy offense with
the prescribed age disparity violates section 269.  [¶] Defendant correctly points out that section 667.6,
subdivision (d) does not explicitly provide that it applies to violations of section 269.  ․ [T]he Legislature
intended [in Section 269] to aggravate punishment for forcible sexual offenses where the defendant's
culpability is increased by a substantial age disparity.   [Citation.]  Subdivision (d) of section 667.6 ․ was
intended by the Legislature to provide increased punishment for cases where defendant's culpability is
increased by the ‘number and violence of his crimes.’  [¶] Section 667.6 and section 269 serve two
different objectives.   [Citation.]   In enacting subsequent statutes, the Legislature is presumed to be
aware of existing statutes and judicial decisions.  He notes that before section 269 was amended in
2006, in People v. Jimenez (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 286, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 884 (Jimenez ), the Fifth District
disposed of an argument similar to his as follows, “Section 667.6 was enacted in 1979 [citation];  section
269 followed in 1994 [citation].
(Id. at p. 1037, fn. 10, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 417.)  [Citation.]”  ․ Under [section 269], as it might interact with
Penal Code section 667.6, a person convicted of six counts of child molestation, could receive ․ six
consecutive life sentences.'  (Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (d).)   The court is required to
sentence such a defendant to full-term consecutive sentences.   They further observed in a footnote,
“Under current law, a person who is convicted of forcible sex offenses against ․ the same victim on
different occasions, is subject to special rules of sentencing.  (Id. at p. 1037, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 417.)   Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
[Citation.]”  Four years after Jimenez was decided, in People v. Glass (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1032, 8
Cal.Rptr.3d 417 (Glass ), the Fifth District observed, “[T]he bill analysis for section 269 from the Assembly
Committee on Public Safety specifically refers to the applicability of section 667.6 to section 269 crimes.
However, in so doing, he ignores the language quoted in Glass.  Thus, he suggests, the Legislature has
already imposed increased punishment for sex crimes against minors, and further punishment under
section 667.6, subdivision (d) is neither appropriate nor intended by the Legislature.   He points out that
the terms addressed in section 667.6, subdivision (d) are determinate, while the ones provided in section
269, for the same crimes against children, are 15 years to life.  Defendant contends that Jimenez was
wrongly decided.
It certainly does not apply to sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (d).  However, section 669
makes no reference whatsoever to section 269.   He appears to suggest that section 669 precludes
mandatory consecutive sentences for violations of section 269.   Life sentences ․ may be imposed to run
consecutively with one another, with any term imposed for applicable enhancements, or with any other
term of imprisonment for a felony conviction.”   That section states, “When any person is convicted of two
or more crimes, whether in the same proceeding ․ or in different proceedings ․ the second or other
subsequent judgment upon which sentence is ordered to be executed shall direct whether the terms of
imprisonment ․ shall run concurrently or consecutively.  He also asserts that section 669 provides the
sentencing court with discretion to run terms for violations of section 269 either consecutively or
concurrently.   With the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
He also cites the Legislative Counsel's Digest for the 2006 amendment to section 269 which states,
“ ‘The [amendment] would require the court to impose a consecutive sentence for Finally, defendant
asserts that the amendment of section 269 in September 2006, to expressly apply the mandatory
consecutive provision of section 667.6, subdivision (d) signals that the applicability of section 667.6,
subdivision (d) to section 269 was ambiguous before that date. Section 667.6, subdivision (d) was crystal
clear, at the time defendant committed his crimes, in its application to the rapes that the jury in this case
found beyond a reasonable doubt to have been committed.  Rather than attempt to sort out these
legislative tea leaves, we prefer to adopt the reasoned analysis of our colleagues at District Five in
Jimenez.   What we are left then, at best for defendant, are dueling legislative analyses and an
interpretation of inaction on the part of the Legislature.  Additionally, section 667.6, subdivision (d) has
not, since 2006, been amended to add section 269.  Not to be ignored is the analysis of the Assembly
consecutively under section 667.6, subdivision (d).   However, the digest did not state that that
requirement did not already exist under section 667.6, subdivision (d).   No doubt, the amendment does,
indeed, require a consecutive sentence for each offense.  each offense that results in a conviction under
this provision.’ ” 3 Therefore, consecutive sentencing was mandatory under that subdivision.  4
Disposition
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of
judgment to show that the sentences imposed for counts 6, 7 and 8 are consecutive terms of one-third of
the midterm, and not full consecutive terms as the abstract currently states.
FOOTNOTES
1All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. .
offense that results in a conviction under this section if the crimes involve ․ the same victim on separate
occasions, as defined in subdivision (d) of section 667.6.” .
3 Therefore, there was no ex post facto application of the 2006 amendment of section 269 to defendant. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court did not rely on, and did not have to rely on, the post-offense
amendment of section 269, which added its reiteration of section 667.6, subdivision (d)'s mandatory
consecutive sentencing provision.  .
4Because we address defendant's arguments on the merits, and do not conclude that his trial counsel
waived the matter below by failing to object to the imposition of consecutive terms for counts 1 and 3, we
need not address his contention that his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to make such an
objection. .
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO SALAZAR alias DARQUEZ, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bermudo for appellee.
Juan T. David for appellant.
PER CURIAM:
A complaint for multiple murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder was filed against the accused
before the Justice of the Peace court of Roxas, Palawan. Having waived his right to preliminary
investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of the province where the Fiscal filed
an information for the same crime against him of the following tenor:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1956, in the municipality of Roxas, province of Palawan,
evident premeditation, treachery and with the use of deadly weapon, to wit: a spear and big bolo, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound one after another, in one
continuous act and in and around their dwelling houses, the following persons, namely: Maxima Pacho,
37 years old and Romana Pacho, 34 years old, both pregnant; Fortunato Nares Jr., 5 years old; Aurelia
Paz, 7 years old; Lilia Paz, 5 years old; Herminia Paz, 6 months old; Nenita Sausa, 5 years old; and
Henry Pacaldo, 5 years old, all minors; and Felomina Baaco, 48 years old; Salome Baaco, 23 years old;
Baudelio Pacho, 18 years old; Leonila Llavan, 25 years old; Urbana Abique, 50 years old; Felisa Adion,
37 years old; Lolita Yayen, 17 years old and Manuela Llavan, 39 years old and as a result thereof, the
said victims died instantly; and in furtherance, of his criminal and heinous act, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and wound one Manuel Adion with the same spear, who, as a
result thereof, suffered a spear wound at the back, hitting the left lower lobe of the lung, which ordinarily
would cause the death of said Manuel Adion, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes of independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said
Manuel Adion which prevented his death; and, finally, not satisfied with his heinous acts and to show
further his criminal propensity, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate to
intent to kill Pablo Paz and Severino Adion, by overt acts, but fortunately missed the said Pablo Paz and
Severino Adion.
strength,alevosia, that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victims and that the wrong done in
the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its
commission. (pp. 2-3, appellee's brief.)
On October 24, 1956, a physical and mental examination of the accused was conducted by the Chief of
the Puerto Princesa Hospital and he was found to be normal and sane. He even narrated how he killed
his common-law wife and his other victims. Two local lawyers were appointed counsel de oficio to defend
him. Upon arraignment, interpreted in the local dialect, he pleaded guilty. This notwithstanding,
considering the gravity of the offense charged, the Court asked him to take the witness stand and narrate
the circumstances surrounding their commission, but he refused stating that he had already made a
confession. Thereupon, the Court asked the prosecution to present its evidence, and the Fiscal presented
among his exhibits the murder weapon, the confession of the accused, the sketches of the scene of the
crime, the sixteen certificates of death, the affidavits of some witnesses, and the ante mortem declaration
of Manuel Adion.
The Provincial Commander of Puerto Princesa who investigated the accused testified that he propounded
the questions to him in Tagalog, which is the dialect known to him, while Justice of the Peace Oscar Siat,
before whom the confession was subscribed and sworn to, testified that he read the document and
translated it into Tagalog for the benefit of the accused, and when he asked him if he was coerced into
making the statement, he acknowledged that it was voluntarily given by him. His statement is embodied in
Exhibit "C".
After hearing, the lower court rendered decision the dispositive part of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment finding DOMINGO
SALAZAR, aliasDARQUEZ, guilty of the crime of Multiple Murder with Frustrated Murder as charged, and
sentences him to suffer the penalty, as provided for in the Revised Penal Code, of sixteen (16) death
penalties corresponding to the murder of each of the sixteen (16) victims, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P3,000.00 each; also to suffer the penalty for the crime of Frustrated Murder
of imprisonment the minimum of which shall not be less than EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor and the maximum of which shall not be less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal for the two crimes of Attempted Murder to suffer
imprisonment for each crime, the minimum of which shall not be less than TWO (2) YEARS, Four (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccionaland the maximum of which shall not be more than
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayorand to pay the costs. (pp. 10-11, appellee's brief)
The case was elevated to this Court for review.
The accused is a moro native of Zamboanga. For many years before the occurrence of the tragedy, he
went to barrio San Nicolas, Roxas, Palawan, where he established his home with his common-law wife
Maxima Pacho. In the morning of October 11, 1956, he invited his wife to go with him to gather nipa for
the repair of their house. Romana then arrived and invited Maxima to accompany her to her house to get
palay. Because of the invitation of Romana, Maxima refused to go with her husband, which aroused his
anger. At that time, the accused already entertained the suspicion that his wife was having illicit relation
with Fortunato Nares, husband of Romana, to the extent that he believed that the child his wife was
bearing was the result of such illicit relation. This incident started the accused on a killing rampage
leaving in its wake sixteen dead and some wounded. The following is what happened as related by the
trial court: "He started by killing his own sister-in-law. Then he turned to kill his own wife and his nephew.
He then walked for about 800 meters to another house where he killed and massacred all the inmates he
found therein. He went to three other houses and repeated the same performance leaving behind him
several household filled with tragedy and bloody deaths, the like of which have never been seen or known
in this province. Then he went into the school premises of that sitio and attacked one man from behind
who was able to run away and is the lone survivor of this bloody incident. After that he chased and
actually did throw his spear to two other men but whom he did not hit. And then he went to the school
house and tried to force open the door, also with dark criminal intention. Fortunately due to the presence
of mind of the lady teacher the door and windows were locked and barricaded while the accused went
around trying to force upon the entrance and the windows of the school house. The imagination of this
Court shudders of the thought of what might have happened if this accused succeeded in going into the
school room filled with young school children. And the accused went up to the bell tower of the Chapel,
sounded the alarm calling for everybody to come. He asked that he be killed but no one dared to come
and obey his request. Finally, when two armed guards arrived accompanied by a barrio officer, the
accused was persuaded to surrender but on condition that he be shot and killed immediately. The guards
and barrio officer cleverly made a ruse by asking the accused to go with them to the wharf where he will
be shot, and by asking him to sign a piece of paper to serve as their protection for the killing the accused
which would be presented to the authorities later on. The accused in the meantime had put down his
arms and as he was about to affix his thumbmark on the piece of paper he was suddenly grabbed and
was subdued and put under custody."
Let us now come to the arguments advanced by counsel for the accused in an effort to mitigate his
liability. These arguments in a nutshell may be boiled down into three, to wit:
1. That the accused's plea of guilty did not extend to the admission of the correctness of the qualification
of his acts as expressed by the prosecution in its information, particularly the allegation that the acts of
the accused were committed with evident premeditation and with treachery,
2. That running amuck, or becoming a "juramentado" is a cult among the Moros that forms part of their
religion. It is age-old and deeply rooted in their psychology. The Moros do not discourage its observance.
They do not view the observance of this cult as a heinous crime. The calculated risk they take when a
Moro becomes "juramentado" is taken graciously. They are always alert to kill a "juramentado" before his
victims multiply. And
3. Consequently, because the acts committed by the accused were parts and parcel of his observance of
the Moro cult of being a "juramentado", which should be distinguished from the acts of a common
murdered under our laws, counsel believes that the accused should only be considered as having
committed the crimes of homicide, or something lesser than murder.
There is no merit in the first argument. It should be noted that, in spite of the plea of guilty entered by the
accused, the Court asked him to take the witness stand and narrate the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the acts imputed to him, but he refused stating that he had already made a confession.
When he was arraigned, he was assisted by two lawyers who were appointed by the Court to defend him.
And when the information was read to him, its contents were interpreted into a dialect known to him, and
when asked about his answer, his plea was of guilty. If he did not understand the clear import of what is
embodied in the information, or of what was stated in his written confession, he could have so explained
when called by the trial court to take the witness stand. His refusal to do so gives rise to no other
implication than that he was well aware of the seriousness of the occasion and of the import of the
proceedings against him. He cannot, therefore, complain of the consequences.
A plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information (U.S. vs. Burlado, 42
Phil., 72; People vs. Acosta, 98 Phil., 642; 52 Off. Gaz., 1930-1933, March 23, 1956). A plea of guilty
when formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain conviction of the offense charged without
introduction of further evidence, upon the theory that the defendant himself has supplied the necessary
proof by his plea of guilty (U.S. vs. Jawad, 37 Phil., 305). But in this case, despite the accused's plea of
guilty, the prosecution offered evidence considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding the
commission of the acts charged. And the evidence presented substantially supports the material
allegations of the information . In other words, by his plea, the accused is deemed to have admitted not
only the commission of the offense charged, but the circumstances surrounding their commission, such
as evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, alevosia,and dwelling.
The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising from jealousy cannot be invoked in favor of the
accused considering that his relationship with his common-law wife was illegitimate. (U.S. vs. Hicks, 14
Phil., 217; People vs. Olgado, et al., G.R. No. L-4406, March 31, 1952). In addition, many days had
already passed from the discovery of the alleged infidelity of his common-law wife before he committed
the crime allegedly in vindication of his honor. As a matter of fact he admitted having planned his
vengeance long before the opportune moment came to carry it out.
Regarding the contention that running amuck is a cult among the Moros that is age-old and deeply rooted
and should be distinguished from murders where the murderer is not resigned to expiate his offense by
being killed unlike the amuck, the claim is likewise unmeritorious. Our penal laws enumerate the
circumstances which mitigate criminal liability, and the condition of running amuck is not one of them. In
so far as they are applicable they must be applied alike to all criminals be they Christians, Moros or
Pagans. More so in the case of the accused who though Moro by blood, has however settled for many
years before the occurrence of the tragedy in christian community and lived there with a Christian
common-law wife and relatives. Under such atmosphere, he must have been indoctrinated into the
Christian way of life to such extent that he should have known that running amuck is abhorred in our
society and punished by our law. He cannot even invoke in his favor what Section 106 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu accords to a Moro who commits a crime and is convicted, for
even then said section gives to the Court ample discretion to determine the penalty to be imposed
considering the circumstances of the case, the degree of his instruction, and nature of the crime
committed, the Court being justified in imposing the penalty which would best serve the interest of justice.
This is a case where the degree of perversity of the criminal warrants not mercy but the enforcement of
the law to its full extent.
We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
multiple murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder, all qualified by evident premeditation as
charged in the information.
The murder of Filomena Baaco, Baudilla, Pacho, Salome Baaco, Leonila Llavan, Urbana Abique, Lilia
Paz, Aurelia Paz, Herminia Paz, Lolita Yayen, Felisa Adion, Nenita Sausa, Henry Pacaldo and Manuela
Llavan, was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and dwelling. The murder of Maxima
Pacho, Romana Pacho, and Fortunata Nares, the frustrated murder of Manuel Adion and the attempted
murder of Pablo Paz and Severino Adion were committed with the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery in the sixteen murders, one frustrated murder and two
attempted murders, is however offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea guilty.
With respect to the murder of the accused common-law wife, Maxima Pacho, his sister-in-law, Romana
Pacho, and the latter's nephew, Fortunato Nares, the frustrated murder of Manuel Adion and attempted
murder of Pablo Paz and Severino Adion, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. In the
murder of Maxima Pacho, Romana Pacho and Fortunato Nares, the penalty should be reclusion
perpetua, in the frustrated murder of Manuel Adion, the defendant should be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 12 years and
1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
For each of the two crimes of attempted murder, the defendant should be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as maximum.
The indemnity to the heirs of each of the deceased should be P6,000.
Wherefore, modified as above indicated, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other
respects, with costs.
RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated
January 16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1,
convincing petitioner Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized
by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing
crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law. 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July
14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio
Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling
"something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified
themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner
was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On
July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991. 4
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the
articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for
examination tested positive for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house and was
awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his
brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station
for investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his
story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's, defense as a "mere afterthought" and found the version of the
prosecution "more credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting petitioner of the crime charged,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the accused Rodolfo Espano y
Valeria guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic
Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned over to the Dangerous
Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the basis of the following:
(a) the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity, (c) he was denied the constitutional
right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d) his conviction was based on evidence which
was irrelevant and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no compelling reason sufficient to
reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a
better position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the
appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of
the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was
motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him
such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty which provides:
. . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust team are
policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were motivated either by the desire
to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice, when they entrapped her.
And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a
serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, . . . , must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been
framed. 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply contended
that he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has consistently held that alibi is
the weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be
there. Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the
Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and
standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." 9 No
clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to present the alleged informant in court cast a
reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since failure of the prosecution
to produce the informant in court is of no moment especially when he is not even the best witness to
establish the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one
of the policemen who apprehended petitioner, testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and
identified him as the one they caught in possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. There is no compelling
reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness
for the prosecution, was straightforward spontaneous and convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if
credible and positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. 10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner indeed
committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-
bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade
of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner
handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two
cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana
seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III,
Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this
case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and
Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court correctly ignored it
apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the
warrantless search made inside the appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives were
not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a lawful
arrest," the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person
arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case
at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said
that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made
incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten
cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search
warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II,
Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Under the said
provision, the penalty imposed is six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on
December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on the quantity of drugs recovered. Under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 7629, Section 20, and as interpreted in People v. Simon 13 and People
v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty ranges
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into consideration that petitioner is not a habitual
delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable to him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less
than 750 grams, the penalty imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which
is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo
Espano is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Chua Ho San
G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CHUA HO SAN @
TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.FACTS OF THE
CASE:In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and othercontraband, Chief of Police Jim
Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station,
LaUnion began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. Whilemonitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call
ataround 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police
assistance regarding an unfamiliarspeedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel
lookeddifferent from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and waspoised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by
SPO1Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and thereconferred with Almoite.
Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lonemale passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho
San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored
strawbag,and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the manchanged direction.
Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police
officers; however, Chua did notunderstand what they’re saying. And by resorting of “sign language”,
Cidmotioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded tothe request. The said bag
was found to contain several transparent plasticscontaining yellowish crystalline substances, which was
later identified to bemethamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought toBacnotan Police
Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to informhim of his constitutional rights.ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure
conductedby the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrantrequirement.RULING: The
Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a
person'sbody, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid
of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However,warrantless searches may be
permitted in the following cases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles,(2)seizure in plain view,
(3)customs searches,(4)waiver or consent searches,
(5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and(6)search incidental to a lawful arrest.It is required in cases
of
in flagrante delicto
that the arresting officer
musthave personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincinglyindicative or constitutive of pro
bable cause. Probable cause means areasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficientlystrong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the personaccused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. In the case atbar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrativeof CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could havespurred police
officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA wasnot identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact thatthe vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the
fishingboats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With
these, the Court held that there was noprobable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the
Prosecutionthat there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could notunderstand what was orally
articulated to him, how could he
understandthe police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically beinferred from his alleged c
ognizance of the "sign language" that hedeliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against
suchan intrusive search.Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was heldto be
inadmissible in evidence.Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient toestablish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Terry v. Ohio
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the “Petitioner”), was stopped and searched by an
officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer
approached the Petitioner for questioning and decided to search him first.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without
probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly
walking up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk
some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer
believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a store for a potential robbery. The officer
decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to
perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a
concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (”Constitution”)?
Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (”Supreme Court”) held that it is a reasonable search when
an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer
reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited
from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.
Dissent. Justice William Douglas (”J. Douglas”) dissented, reasoning that the majority’s holding would
grant powers to officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate would not possess.
Concurrence.
Justice John Harlan (”J. Harlan”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an additional necessity of
the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (”J. White”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized that the particular facts of
the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.
Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow
the search. The suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the officer’s suspicions were
correct then he would be in a dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without searching
them. The officer also did not detain the men for a long period of time to constitute an arrest without
probable cause.
PP VS TABAR
FACTS:
- Carmelina Tabar y Carmilotes and her nephew, Rommel Arriesgado y Tabar, were charged with
theviolation of Dangerous Drug Act, for selling and delivering, without authority of law, 3 sticks of
marijuanacigarettes.- Pfc. Josephus Trangia On February 8, 1989, Pfc. Josephus Trangia he was with
Pfc. Romeo Cortes andGualberto Gabales on a buy-bust operation for marijuana after receipt of
information about marijuanapushers in Punta Princesa, Cebu City and that they had their informant go
ahead of them after giving theP5.00 bill for him to purchase marijuana. He continued saying that their
informant stood in front of ashanty while they posted themselves at a distance of about 50 meters from
the place where theirinformant was standing. And that they saw a young boy approached their informant
and handedcigarettes to him who in turn handed the marked money to the young boy. Then, their
informant gavethem the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head with his right hand; that after the
signal, he and hiscompanions immediately approached the young boy and the informant introduced them
as policeofficers. This young boy was about 16-17 years old, by the name of Rommel Arriesgado y Tabar.
He hadearlier pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of mere possession of marijuana He explained the
initials GDGwhich stands for Gualberto G. Gabales, his team member. He further declared that after the
pre-arranged signal from their informant, they immediately proceeded to the scene and were given
threesticks of marijuana by their informant after buying the same from the boy, Rommel Arriesgado and
thatthey proceeded to confiscate the P5.00 bill from the boy. At this juncture, he claimed that he
observedthat after the transaction, the boy went inside the shanty and the moment he got out, he handed
thethree sticks of marijuana to the informant. In fact, he claimed that after the proceeding to the
shanty,they met Carmelina Tabar, accused herein, and that Carmelina Tabar was holding white pants
fromwhere they found other marijuana sticks in cigarette packs which they confiscated; that they
broughtCarmelina Tabar to Fuente Police Station for investigation. He claimed that there were 75 sticks of
marijuana in the Hope Cigarette pack; 22 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in the Philip Morris pack and
99sticks of marijuana in the Mark cigarette pack.
ISSUE
: WON the marijuana cigarettes seized from her are inadmissible in evidence because they wereobtained
in violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD:
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that the appellant placed the packs of marijuana sticksunder
the rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time she hurriedly left her shanty afternoticing
the arrest of Rommel. When she was asked to spread it out, which she voluntary did, thepackage
containing the packs of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the member of theteam. A
crime was thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 andSection
12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
she could lawfully be arrested and searched foranything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense without thecorresponding arrest and search warrants.
PP VS ARUTA
Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be
arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the
Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out
who “Aling Rosa” was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When
Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found
dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the
search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from
Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to cross the road an old woman asked
her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no
knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search
warrant was presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972
Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.
Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not
acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no
legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no probable cause and the
accused was not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized
marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
RULE 126, RULES OF COURT
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search warrant
shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together
with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has
been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to
explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section
11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him.
The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search
warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
Roldan vs. Arca [GR L-25434, 25 July 1975]
First Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 62 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero)
Facts:
On 3 April 1964, Morabe, De Guzman & Company filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a
civil case (56701) against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing
vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by the Fisheries Commissioner through the
Philippine Navy. On 10 April 1964, the company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with
the CFI, but said prayer was denied. On 28 April 1964, the CFI set aside its order of 10 April 1964 and
granted the company's motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, the
company took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from the Philippine Fisheries Commission and the
Philippine Navy by virtue of the said writ. On 10 December 1964, the CFI dismissed Civil Case 56701 for
failure of the company to prosecute as well as for failure of the Commission and the Navy to appear on
the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however, remained in the
possession of the company. On 20 July 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy
to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes,
for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with
dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels. On
18 August 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal
charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels. On 30 September 1965, there were filed in the
CFI of Palawan a couple of informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another
against the crew members of Tony Lex VI
— under the provisions of the Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk,
both for violations of Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal
fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in
custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to
detain the vessels. On October 2 and 4, likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take
the boats in custody. On 2 October 1965, the company filed a complaint with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction (Civil Case 62799) with the CFI of Manila against the Commission and the Navy.
Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were
engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise
dated 13 September 1965 by the company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled. On 18
October 1965, Judge Francisco Arca issued an order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by the company of a bond of
P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels. On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the Navy filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ on 18 October 1965 on the ground,
among others, that on 18 October 1965 the Philippine Navy received from the Palawan CFI two orders
dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and
directing that the said vessels should not be released until further orders from the Court, and that the
bond of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two vessels, which
are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture
as instruments of the crime. On 23 November 1965, Judge Arca denied the said motion for
reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued.
Issue:
Whether the Fisheries Commissioner and the Navy can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the
vessels of the company for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.
Held:
Section 4 of Republic Act 3512 approved on 20 March 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to
carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives in
accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as dynamites and the like; including fishery
products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are subject to seizure under existing fishery
laws"; and "to effectively implement the enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing." Paragraph
5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine
Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of
Customs, Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters." Section
12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with
dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than
P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6)
months nor more than five (5) years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats,
tackles, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act."
Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together
with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government." The second paragraph
of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting caps and other
explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption that the said dynamite and/or blasting caps
and explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and that the possession or
discover in any fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives, under
expert testimony, shall constitute a presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the fishing
crew have been fishing with dynamite or other explosives." Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as
amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without the corresponding
license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or regulation
deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more than
P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided,
That in case of an association or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly responsible for
the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his knowledge; otherwise the
responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided, further, That in the absence of a
known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person in charge of such vessel shall be responsible for
any violation of this Act: and Provided, further, That in case of a second offense, the vessel together with
its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government." Under Section 13 of
Executive Order 389 of 23 December 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Philippine Navy has the function, among others, "to assist the proper governmental agencies in the
enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to Fishing. Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
as amended by PD 34 of 27 October 1972, authorized any official or person exercising police authority
package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person on board for any breach or violation of the
customs and tariff laws. Herein, when the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner,
apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known
respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels were found to be without the necessary
license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under
Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license required
by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and
aircrafts for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is
not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws: They are
usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or
Coast Guard.
PAPA v. MAGO
G.R. No. L-27360/February 28, 1968/EN BANCOriginal action in the SC for prohibition and
certiorari
, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent judgeParties:Petitioners:Ricardo G. Papa
(Chief of Police of Manila), Juan Ponce Enrile (Commissioner of Customs), Pedro Pacis(Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila), Martin Alagao (Patrolman, head of counter-intelligence of theManila
Police Department)Respondents:Remedios MagoHilarion Jarencio (Presiding Judge of Br. 23, CFI of
Manila)J. ZaldivarNovember 4, 1966 – having received information the day before that a certain shipment
of misdeclared andundervalued personal effects would be released from the customs zone of the port of
Manila, Alagao and aduly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs conducted surveillance of two trucks
allegedly carrying thegoods. When the trucks left the customs zone, elements of the counter-intelligence
unit intercepted them inErmita. The trucks and the nine bales of goods they carried were seized on
instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation those claiming ownership showed the policemen a
“Statement of Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501” issued by the Bureau of
Customs in the name of oneBienvenido Naguit.Mago filed with the CFI of Manila a Petition for
Mandamus
with restraining order or preliminary injunction, alleging that she was the owner of the goods seized,
which were purchased from Sta. MonicaGrocery in San Fernando, Pampanga. She hired the trucks
owned by Lanopa (who filed with her) to bringthe goods to her residence in Sampaloc, Manila. She
complained that the goods were seized without a warrant, and that they were not subject to seizure under
Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code even if they were misdeclared and undervalued because
she had bought them without knowing they had beenimported illegally. They asked that the police not
open the bales, the goods be returned, and for moral andexemplary damages.November 10, 1966 –
Judge issued an order restraining the police from opening the nine bales in question, but by then some
had already been opened. Five days later Mago filed an amended petition including asparty defendants
Pedro Pacis and Martin Alagao.December 23, 1966 – Mago filed a motion to release the goods, alleging
that since the inventory ordered by the court of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited
importation, the same should be releasedupon her posting of the appropriate bond. The petitioners in the
instant case filed their opposition, allegingthat the court had no jurisdiction over the case and thus no
jurisdiction to order the release (case under jurisdiction of CTA), and as the goods were not declared they
were subject to forfeiture.
March 7, 1967 – assailed Order issued by Jarencio, authorized release under bond of goods seized and
held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code. The bond of
P40,000.00 was filed five days later. On the same day, Papa filed on his own behalf a motion for
reconsideration on theground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of
Customs to hold the goodspending termination of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court’s
action on the MR, petitioners filed the present action. Arguments of Petitioners (that seem important)(1)
CFI had no jurisdiction over the case(2) Mago had no cause of action in the civil case filed with the CFI
due to her failure to exhaust alladministrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention Arguments of
Respondents(1) It was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and
decide CivilCase No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case
No. 67496 wasinstituted long before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine bales of
goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs(2) Petitioners could no longer go after the
goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the
customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureauof Customs
IMPORANT ISSUE
(there’s another involving illegal search and seizure)
: even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
WON the judge acted with jurisdiction in issuing the Order releasing the goods in question
HELD: NO.
Petition granted, case filed by Mago dismissed.The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and
jurisdiction, among others, to(1) assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all
other dues, fees, charges, fines andpenalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws(2) prevent and
suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.The
goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of
DutiesCollected on Informal Entry".
As long as the importation has not been terminated the importedgoods remain under the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemedterminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and
other charges upon the articles,or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have beengranted. The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in
full.The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statementand
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other chargeson the goods subject of this
case amounted to P95,772.00
as evidenced by the report of theappraiser of the Bureau of Customs,
that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid infull. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods
on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articlesfound in the bales upon examination and
inventory, shows that
the quantity of the goods wasunderdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon.
(e.g. 40 pieces of ladies’sweaters assessed in the Statement when there actually
42 dozen
; 100 watch bands were assessed but
2,209dozen, etc.)
The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture
under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The Court had
held before (and did again in this case) that
merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture,
and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizureand forfeiture.
Even if it be granted,
arguendo
, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs areathe Bureau of Customs had
lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were interceptedat the Agrifina Circle on
November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting underdirections and orders of
their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by theCommissioner of Customs,
the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods.
Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold
possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges havenot been paid or
secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goodsin question, therefore, were
under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customsat the time the petition for
mandamus
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila onNovember 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for thepurposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued
by the Collectorof Customs.
The Court reiterated its ruling in
De Joya v. Lantin:
The owner of seized goods may set up defenses beforethe Commissioner of Customs during the
proceedings following seizure. From his decision appeal may bemade to the Court of Tax Appeals. To
permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render
ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff andCustoms Code and deprive the Court
of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions.
Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively uponthe
Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, whilethe Judiciary Act
defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation,not to mention that the former
are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yieldto the jurisdiction of the Customs
authorities.The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for thepurposes
of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in itspossession or control,
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In thepresent case, the Bureau of Customs actually
seized the goods in question on November 4,1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs
acquired jurisdiction over the goods forthe purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to
the exclusion of theregular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have
jurisdictionover the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizureand
detention on January 12, 1967.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, itfollows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction to issue the questionedorder of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
People vs Malmstedt
Facts:Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was found, via a routine NARCOMinspection at Kilometer
14, Acop, Tublay Mountain Province, carrying Hashish, aderivative of Marijuana. RTC La Trinidad found
him guilty for violation of theDangerous Drugs Act. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for
the reversalof the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal because there wasno
search warrant.
Issue:Whether or not the decision of the trial court should be reversed (or affirmed) because the accused
argues that the search and arrest was made without a warrant
Held:The RTC decision is affirmed.
Ratio:The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a personwithout a
warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, isactually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The offense was recognizedwith the warrantless search conducted by
NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1) thereceipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately
presenthis passport.
PEOPLE VS ARUTA
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant
named “Benjie” that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be
back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the
evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the
informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her
travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana
leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to
technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor
had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner
that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the
carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor
tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.
Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and
warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of Aruta’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having
been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant.
As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits
of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
NOTES:
When is a warrantless search allowed?
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Valmonte vs. De Villa
Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) wasactivated pursuant to
Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility andperipheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintainingpeace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic andpolitical development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peaceand order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela
are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, consideringthat their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especiallyat night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order. Their allegedfear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July
1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supplyofficer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down
allegedly in cold bloodby the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway
at Malinta,Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and forcontinuing to
speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Issue:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people againstunreasonable searches and
seizures
Held:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by themilitary manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se
, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of theirroutine checks,
the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rightsagainst unlawful search and seizure
of other rights. The constitutional right againstunreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rightshave been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches
and seizures areprohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the
questionedcheckpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue
itsmission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for thebenefit of
the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots todestabilize the govt, in
the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of thestate to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individuals right against awarrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail. True,the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the military in thesame manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpointsduring
these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the pricewe pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.
Pp. vs. Salvatierra
‘Facts:
While Charlie Fernandez was walking towards Quiapo, appellant and the 2 accused lunged a
pointedinstrument at Charlie, hitting the latter at the left breast. This resulted to his death.On Nov. 15,
1990 the police received a complaint that appellant was creating a commotion. He wasthereafter taken in
custody.Appellant put up the defense of alibi alleging that he was having merienda with his wife and
children whenthe incident occurred. He also alleged that he had an altercation with a woman on that day
who caused his arrestfor the crime of malicious mischief, wherein he was detained after. Then, when
police arrived, they brought him tothe Homicide Section where he was investigated for the stabbing of
Fernandez.Appellant claimed that the arrest was made almost 3 months after the commission of the
crime and nowarrant had been obtained during the 3-month intervening period between the commission
of the crime and hisapprehension, thus making the arrest illegal.
Issue:
W/N the arrest is violative of his constitutional rights?
Held:
No. Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised
itbefore entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the
objection isdeemed waived.
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 (1991)

Facts:
Separate motions before the Court, seeking reconsideration.
In the Umil case, the arresting officers had good reason to believe that an NPA member (Rolando Dural,
although using a fictitious name) was indeed being treated at St. Agnes Hospital, QC for gunshot wounds.
The information was from the attending doctor and hospital management, and therefore came from
reliable sources.
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the same admitted that he was an NPA courier.
In the case of Amelia Roque, subversive documents and live ammunition were found at the time of her
arrest, and she admitted to owning such documents.
As regards Domingo Anonuevo & Ramon Casiple, agents frisked them and found subversive documents
& loaded guns without permits.
With regard toVicky Ocaya, she arrived at a house subject to a search warrant. Ammunition & subversive
documents were found in her car.
In the Nazareno case, Narciso Nazareno was identified by Ramil Regala as the latter’s
companion in killing Romulo Bunye II.
Issue:
Whether or not Rolando Dural (and other petitioners in the other consolidated cases) was lawfully
arrested
Ruling:
Dural and the other petitioners were lawfully arrested for being members of the New People’s
Army (mere membership is penalized), and for subversion (a continuing offense).
Subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same
acts of lawlessness & violence until the objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Likewise, the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
is the one who committed the offense (based on actual facts), coupled with good faith in making the
arrest.
The Court reiterates that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is
absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of
the arrests on the compliance with the requirements of a long existing law; probable cause and good faith
of the arresting peace officers; and that the arrest be on the basis of
actual facts and circumstances.
David vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
Facts of the case:
During the celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP
1017 for brevity) declaring a state of national emergency. The President also issued General Order
(G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
The President stated that over the past months, elements in political opposition have conspired with
extreme left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and military adventurists, which caused her to declare such
order. The President considered aims to oust the President and take- over reigns of government as clear
and present danger.
On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017.
Solicitor General argued that the basis of declaring PP 1017 was that the intent of the Constitution is to
give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the AFP.
However despite the contentions of the Solicitor General, the Magdalo group indicted the Oakwood
mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left arms to show disgust.
At the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered, which constitutes plans of bombings and attacks on
PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event where the President was invited. The next morning
after the alumni homecoming celebration, a bomb was found inside the campus.
PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao also intercepted information that PNP- SAF members are planning to defect
from the administration, while on the same view Congressman Peping Cojuanco plotted moves to bring
down the Arroyo Administration.
Huge number of soldiers joined the rallies to provide critical mass and armed component to Anti- Arroyo
protests.
Bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacaan and Bataan was also considered
as an additional factual basis after the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5.
Because of these incidental series of events which clearly presents a critical situation, President Arroyo
cancelled all activities related to EDSA People Power I. Mike Arroyo, then Executive Secretary,
announced that warrantless arrest and takeover of facilities can be implemented.
Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of Randy David, a Filipino journalist and UP professor due
to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in the street rallies. Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya
and Abante-- all local news publication, took place which, according to the PNP, was meant to show a
strong presence to tell the media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help rebels in bringing
down the government. Police also arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, who then represented the
Anakpawis Party.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of Presidential Proclamation PP 1017 is unconstitutional? Whether or not the
arrest of Randy David and the seizure of Daily Tribune et. al., is unconstitutional?
Ruling of the court:
Respondents claim that such petition is moot and academic based on the issuance of PP 1017, but the
Court rejects such contention. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy. In this case, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 which
calls for military aid.
Most people then equate it to martial law, but such case is different wherein the basis then was the 1973
Constitution. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the President may summon armed forces to aid him in
supporting lawless violence.
The President's declaration of state rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or conduction of a
public moment of interest. State of national emergency, however, is the prerogative of the President. Her
exercise of emergency powers such as the taking over of privately owned utility requires delegation from
the Congress, which is entirely different from the martial law.
As to the seizure of the Daily Tribune and the arrest of Randy David, the Court considers those actions
unlawful based on the fact that it violates the constitutional mandate of freedom of expression.
Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011
Facts
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an
anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued
a memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions.”
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers
were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office
for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from
the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the
basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had
gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing
expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to
Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal
search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In
view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was
deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter
on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion
for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search
and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not
violate his constitutional right.
Ratio Decidendi
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the
petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated
his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that
the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person
has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”
O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer.” In
O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government
interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293
SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the
workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the
CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its
inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales,
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19,
2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner
were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC
has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
O'CONNOR v. ORTEGA, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)
Facts of the Case
In 1981, officials at a hospital, including Executive Director Dr. Dennis O'Connor, suspected improprieties
in Dr. Ortega's management of a residency program. The officials conducted an investigation of Ortega,
which included multiple searches of his office and seizure of a number of items. The items were later
used in proceedings before the California State Personnel Board to impeach the credibility of witnesses
that testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf.
Question
Did the supervisor's search of the office violate Dr. Ortega's "reasonable expectation of privacy"
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment?
Conclusion
Decision: 5 votes for O'Connor, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held
that "the realities of the workplace" made some expectations of privacy among public employees
unreasonable when the intrusion was by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Work- related
searches, the Court found, were "merely incident to the primary business of the agency," and a warrant
requirement would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business." The Court thus held that a
standard of "reasonableness" was sufficient for work-related intrusions by public employers.
Griswold v. Connecticut
Brief Fact Summary. Appellants were charged with violating a statute preventing the distribution of advice
to married couples regarding the prevention of conception. Appellants claimed that the statute violated the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right of a married couple to privacy is protected by the Constitution.
Facts. Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and
Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in
New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving information, instruction, and medical advice to
married persons on means of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories and
fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on their
professional relationship with the married people they advised.
Issue. Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples?
Held. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion,
which although not expressly included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees
meaningful. The association of marriage is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the State’s
effort to control marital activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on protected
Constitutional freedoms.
Dissent. Justice Stewart and Justice Black. Although the law is silly, it is not unconstitutional. The citizens
of Connecticut should use their rights under the 9th and 10th Amendment to convince their elected
representatives to repeal it if the law does not conform to their community standards.
Concurrence. Justice Goldberg, the Chief Justice, and Justice Brennan. The right to privacy in marriage is
so basic and fundamental that to allow it to be infringed because it is not specifically addressed in the first
eight amendments is to give the 9th Amendment no effect.
Justice Harlan. The relevant statute violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment because if
violates the basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Discussion. The right to privacy in marriage is not specifically protected in either the Bill of Rights or the
Constitution. Nonetheless, it is a right so firmly rooted in tradition that its protection is mandated by
various Constitutional Amendments, including the 1st, 9th and 14th Amendments.
MORFE V MUTUC
Facts:
The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of office “and within the month
of January of every year thereafter”, as well as upon termination of his position, shall prepare and file with
the head of the office to which he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year”.
Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within the month of January of
every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due
process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right
to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination.
Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of obligation
Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of general welfare in honest and
clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of police power.
CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus
offensive to the due process clause
Issue/s:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An oppressive exercise of police power;
2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An
insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.
Ruling: Decision reversed.
Ratio:
Presumption of validity
Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement for employment so a public
officer can make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present
evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.
“If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of
Manila)
Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause
“inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)
The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain (Justice
Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)
Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action affecting
persons in public or private life can invoke the protection of due process.
It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure
which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down
what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.
Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed.
The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression.
“It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public
service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and
oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office…There was
therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.”
Right to privacy
Right to be let alone
“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes
on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement
possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such
character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of constitutional
protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his
assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion
into what otherwise would be a private sphere.”
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom from
testimonial compulsion.
Right against self-incrimination
We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s conduct from judicial inquiry,
or aid him in fleeing from justice.
Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid.
OPLE VS TORRES
[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]293 SCRA 141FACTS: Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the
constitutionality of the
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of Computerized IdentificationReference System” on the
following grounds:
1.) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and not amere administrative
order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress tomake laws, and
2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizen‟s constitutional right of privacy.
ISSUE: Does the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right toprivacy?HELD: Yes, the
Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because
its scope is too broad and vague that will put people‟s right to privacy in clear and
present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the
information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and
other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual‟s liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enableunscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the rightagainst self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assaultthey filed
against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a
telephone extensionas requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested inan entrapment operation upon receipt of the money.
Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''sconsent, complainant
charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts
use to overhear a privateconversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication
between 2 parties using a telephone line.
HELD: NO An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or
other devices enumerated in Sec. 1of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. This section refers to instrumentswhose installation or presence cannot
be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are notof
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation.
The tel. extension in this casewas not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary
office use. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penalstatutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension tel. isincluded in the phrase
"device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. A perusal
of theSenate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through
punishment, persons such as governmentauthorities or representatives of organized groups from
installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate,blackmail or gain some
unwarranted advantage over the tel. users. Consequently, the mere act of listening , in order to
be punishablemust strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar
nature.
Olmstead v. United States
Brief Fact Summary. The conversations of various individuals involved in illegal liquor sales were tapped.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. “A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if obtained by other
than nice ethical conduct by government officials, would make society suffer and give criminals greater
immunity than has been known heretofore. In the absence of controlling legislation by Congress, those
who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well deem it wise that the exclusion of
evidence should be confined to cases where rights under the Constitution would be violated by admitting
it.”
Facts. Various individuals were convicted of liquor related crimes, including conspiracy. The operation
grossed a substantial amount of money. The leading conspirator and the general manager of the
business was one of the Petitioners, Olmstead (the “Petitioner”). The main office of the business was in
Seattle and there were three telephones in the office, each on a different line. There were also telephones
in an office the Petitioner had in his own home, at the home of his associates and various other places in
Seattle. A lot of communication occurred between Seattle and Vancouver, British Columbia.
“The information which led to the discovery of the conspiracy and its nature and extent was largely
obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones of the conspirators by four federal prohibition
officers. Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the residences of four of the
[suspects] and those leading from the chief office. The insertions were made without trespass upon any
property of the defendants. They were made in the basement of the large office building. The taps from
house lines were made in the streets near the houses.”
Various conversations were taped and testified to by government witnesses.
Issue. “[W]hether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and
others, intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments[?]”
Held. “The [Fourth] amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was
no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants. By the invention of the telephone 50 years ago, and its
application for the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with another at a far distant place.
The language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching
to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or
office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”
“Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when
intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from
the common law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a policy by attributing an enlarged and
unusual meaning to the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a
telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that
the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are not within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. Here those who intercepted the projected voices were not in the house of either party
to the conversation.”
“Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our attention hold the
Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant, unless there has been an official
search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an
actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure. [The court
thought], therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”
Additionally, “[t]he common-law rule is that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of
the means by which it was obtained.”
“A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by
government officials, would make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known
heretofore. In the absence of controlling legislation by Congress, those who realize the difficulties in
bringing offenders to justice may well deem it wise that the exclusion of evidence should be confined to
cases where rights under the Constitution would be violated by admitting it.”
Dissent. Justice Holmes filed a dissenting opinion and argued “that apart from the Constitution the
government ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act. There is no body of
precedents by which we are bound, and which confines us to logical deduction from established rules.
Therefore [the Court] must consider the two objects of desire both of which [the Court] cannot have and
make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that
all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and
pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its
officers for having got evidence by crime I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the
same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays
and announces that in future it will pay for the fruits
. [The Court has] to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part.”
Dissent. Justice Brandeis filed a dissenting opinion and argued “[a]pplying to the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments the established rule of construction, the defendants’ objections to the evidence obtained by
wire tapping must, in my opinion, be sustained. It is, of course, immaterial where the physical connection
with the telephone wires leading into the defendants’ premises was made. And it is also immaterial that
the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to
repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
“When the government, having full knowledge, sought, through the Department of Justice, to avail itself of
the fruits of these acts in order to accomplish its own ends, it assumed moral responsibility for the officers’
crimes and if this court should permit the government, by means of its officers’ crimes, to effect its
purpose of punishing the defendants, there would seem to be present all the elements of a ratification. If
so, the government itself would become a lawbreaker.”
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
No. 962
Argued February 5, 6, 1942
Decided April 27, 1942
316 U.S. 129
Syllabus
1. Refusal of the judge in the trial of a criminal case in the federal court to allow defendant to inspect the
memoranda of Government witnesses -- where the memoranda were not used by the witnesses in court,
but only to refresh their recollection prior to testifying, and were also part of the Government's files -- held
not an abuse of discretion. P. 316 U. S. 132.
2. Divulgence of a person's telephone conversation, overheard as it was spoken into the telephone
receiver, does not violate § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, as in such case there is neither a
"communication" nor an "interception" within the meaning of the Act. P. 316 U. S. 133.
3. Evidence obtained by federal agents by use of a detectaphone, applied to the wall of a room adjoining
the office of the defendant, held not unlawfully obtained as a consequence of a prior trespass committed
by the agents in the defendant's office where such trespass, as found by the courts below, did not aid
materially in the use of the detectaphone. P. 316 U. S. 134.
4. The use by federal agents of a detectaphone, whereby conversations in the office of a defendant were
overheard through contact on the
Page 316 U. S. 130
wall of an adjoining room, did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and evidence thus obtained was
admissible in a federal court. P. 316 U. S. 135.
118 F.2d 310 affirmed.
Certiorari, 314 U.S. 701, to review the affirmance of convictions of conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy
Act.
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Katz v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Katz (the “petitioner”), was convicted of transmitting wagering
information over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had entered into evidence the
petitioner’s end of telephone conversations that the government had obtained by placing a listening
device to the phone booth that the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner’s
contention that the evidence should be suppressed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(”Constitution”), against unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not the place.

Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to
Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening
device to the top of the telephone booth and recorded the petitioner’s end of the telephone conversations
which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the evidence
suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of
Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.

Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in
a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person?
Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone
booth was a constitutionally protected area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not
places from unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when he
entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to
do so simply because he went to a place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a telephone
booth may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the
words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is
clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Government’s activities in electron
ically listening to and recording the petitioner’s telephone conversations constituted a search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all
evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (”J. Black”) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping
was an ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United States
Constitution (”Constitution”). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution they would have added such language that would have effectively done so. By clever
wording, the Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and
seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped
evidence of conversations.
Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (”J. Harlan”) filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to
those people. First, that a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is
that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled
to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in the
open public would not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of privacy would not be
reasonable.

Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to individuals
and not to particular places. The two-part test for this protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the
person must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be
reasonable.