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CASE NO. 1
SPS. CARLOS MUNSALUD and G.R. No. 167181
WINNIE MUNSALUD,
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
should not be based on the title or caption, especially when the allegations of the
In pursuit of a reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the order
1
The Facts
Petitioner Winnie Munsalud is the daughter and one of the compulsory heirs of the late
Lourdes Bulado (Bulado) who died on December 8, 1985. During the lifetime of Bulado,
respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded her a lot located at 942 R.
Higgins St., CAA Compound, Bgy. 185, Pasay City. The award was made pursuant to
the Land for the Landless program of respondent. She resided at the said property until
her death.
When Bulado died, petitioner Winnie assumed the obligation to pay the monthly
obligations as their names were reflected in the receipts. They were allowed to occupy
the lot up to the present. To prove their occupancy over the lot, petitioners offered as
1. Tag Card No. 77-02830-03 issued by then Pasay City Mayor Pablo
Cuneta and then NHA General Manager Gaudencio Tobias;
2. Application and Contract for Water Services No. 295319 in the name of
Bulado but the same was signed by petitioner Winnie;
2
5. Pagpapatunay dated September 5, 1989 signed by neighbors and
acquaintances of petitioners attesting to their long time residence in
the property;
6. Deposit Receipt No. 286444 dated September 27, 1989 issued by the
Manila Electric Company attesting to the installation of electric service
in the name of petitioner Winnie on the property. [4]
On September 14, 1989, petitioners completed the payments of the amortizations due
on the property. Reflected on the left side portion of the official receipt evidencing full
respondent NHA issue in their favor a deed of sale and a title over the
On January 28, 2003, petitioners, by counsel, sent respondent a letter to issue a deed
of sale and title. Despite receipt, respondent did not issue the requested
petitioner Winnies name does not appear as beneficiary. Petitioners replied that Winnie
was representing her mother, the late Lourdes Bulado. Respondent did not respond to
the reply.
Left with no recourse, petitioners instituted a complaint for mandamus before the
court a quo.
RTC Order
On April 22, 2003, the RTC dismissed the complaint for mandamus, disposing thus:
Considering that the petition is insufficient in form and substance,
there being no reference to any law which the respondent by reason of its
office, trust or station is especially enjoined as a duty to perform or any
allegation that respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using or
enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to, the
above-entitled petition is hereby DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 3 Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but they did not succeed. Thus, petitioners
CA Disposition
On August 23, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTC dismissal of the mandamus petition.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In agreeing with the court a quo, the appellate court rationalized as follows:
4
On September 20, 2004, petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied
Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE ORDERS OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY DATED APRIL 22, 2003 AND SEPTEMBER
25, 2003 WHERE THE LATTER COURT RELYING UPON THE
APPELLATION AND/OR LABEL THAT PETITIONERS GAVE THEIR
COMPLAINT (I.E., MANDAMUS) IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-03-
492 DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT THEREIN PURPORTEDLY
BECAUSE THE SAID COMPLAINT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 3, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS
DECISION DATED AUGUST 23, 2004.[7] (Underscoring supplied)
Poring over the arguments presented, the focal issue is whether in giving due course to
an action, the court is fenced within the parameters of the title given by plaintiff to the
Elsewise stated, does the trial court have absolute discretion to dismiss an action on
the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance based alone on its designation
when, from the body and the relief prayed for, it could stand as an action sufficient in
5
Our Ruling
Petitioners action designated as mandamus was dismissed by the trial court on the
ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. This begs the question: when is an
To begin with, form is the methodology used to express rules of practice and
1. A Caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action
indicating the names of the parties, and the docket number which is
usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet a docket
number;
6
Likewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in nature, there must be:
In the case at bench, a naked perusal of the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-
form. It has the caption with the name of the court, the name of the parties, and the
docket number. The complaint contains allegations of petitioners claims. It has a prayer
and the date when it was prepared. The signature page shows the signature and name
of petitioners counsel, the counsels IBP, PTR and Roll of Attorneys Numbers. The
and signed by petitioners as plaintiffs. It was filed personally with the office of the clerk
of court.
7
Now, is the petition insufficient in substance?
Substance is that which is essential and is used in opposition to form. [20] It is the most
anything, the main part, the essential import, and the purport.[21] It means not merely
subject of act, but an intelligible abstract or synopsis of its material and substantial
elements, though it may be stated without recital of any details. [22] It goes into matters
which do not sufficiently appear or prejudicially affect the substantial rights of parties
determinative of whether or not a cause of action exists. It is the central piece, the core,
and the heart constituting the controversy addressed to the court for its consideration. It
is the embodiment of the essential facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
8
The court a quo anchored the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of Rule 65,
Section 3[25] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It found that there was no
reference to any law which respondent NHA, by reason of its office, trust or station, is
specifically enjoined as a duty to perform. It declared that there was no allegation in the
petition below that respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using or enjoying
well as the relief sought, called for an action for specific performance. Pertinent portions
xxxx
xxxx
9
10. On September 14, 1989, Plaintiffs completed the payment
of the amortizations due over the property in question, and this is
evidenced by an official receipt, numbered 19492, which Defendants
cashier, Yasmin D. Aquino, issued to the Plaintiffs themselves,
although the official name of the payor indicated therein was still that
of the deceased Lourdes Bulado;
xxxx
12. Significantly, that receipt contained the annotation
appearing on the left side thereof, that the amount paid thereon
constituted full payment;
xxxx
20. At this point that the lot in question had already been fully
paid for by the Plaintiffs, there is now a need to compel the
Defendant to comply with its duty to issue a deed of sale in favor of
the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs
Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, as well to issue a title over the same
property in favor of the same heirs.
A plain reading of the allegations of the complaint reveals that petitioner Winnie
Munsalud assumed the obligations of her deceased mother, the original awardee of
10
respondents Land for the Landless Program. One of the obligations of an
awardee is to pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioners complied with said obligation
and religiously paid the amortizations until these were fully paid.
Indeed, petitioners have complied with what is incumbent upon them under the
program. Hence, it is now the turn of respondent to comply with what is incumbent upon
it.
In a letter dated February 21, 2003,[27] respondent informed petitioners counsel that per
its records, the name of petitioner Winnie Munsalud does not appear as a
mother. This fact was made known to respondent when another letter dated March 6,
2003[28] was sent by the counsel of the heirs of Lourdes Bulado. In the same letter,
respondent was informed that petitioner Winnie is representing her deceased mother,
In view of the contents of that letter, we would like to notify you that
Ms. Munsalud is actually representing her deceased mother,Lourdes
Bulado, who, on September 14, 1989 completed her payment for Lot 12,
Block 79 of the Maricaban Estate. A copy of the receipt evidencing that
completed is attached hereto as Annex B for your easy reference.
11
In view thereof, may we reiterate our request for the issuance of the
title over the aforesaid property in the name
of Lourdes Bulado.[29] (Underscoring supplied)
The letter was received by respondent on March 12, 2003. On account of this second
letter, respondent could have easily verified if the name of Lourdes Bulado appears as a
beneficiary and awardee of its Land for the Landless Program. However, respondent
never responded to the second letter. This left petitioners with no recourse but to bring
Evidently, the action commenced by petitioners before the trial court, although
averments of the complaint are clear. The essential facts are sufficiently alleged as to
apprise the court of the nature of the case. The relief sought to be obtained aims to
compel respondent to issue a deed of sale and the corresponding title over the property
awarded to Bulado. Thus, the Court finds the complaint sufficient in substance.
The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the
Instead of focusing on what an action for mandamus should contain, the court a
in petitioners complaint. For what determines the nature of the action and which court
12
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.[30]
the parties. The allegations in the body of the complaint define or describe it. The
designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint. It is
There is no need to make reference to any law which respondent by reason of its office
is enjoined as a duty to perform. Respondents duty arose from its contractual obligation
The trial court is reminded that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the
nature of the action.[32] The caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor,
but rather the allegations in it should determine the nature of the action,
because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless
grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and the
evidence introduced.[33]
All told, whether or not petitioner Winnie, in her capacity as a compulsory heir of the
awardee, becomes a beneficiary of the program is a question best ventilated during trial
on the merits. The conditions, terms, and provisions of the program in case an awardee
dies are evidentiary and should be presented for determination of the court. Even the
effect and the consequence of the assumption of obligation of the awardee as well as
13
the presence of other compulsory heirs are issues that should be addressed for the
courts evaluation on the basis of the evidence to be laid down before its eyes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court which is ORDERED to reinstate the case
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
14
CASE NO. 2
KENRICK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 8, 2006
x------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision[1] and August 20,
2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for
Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind
the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a
result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land.
Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name
and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one
Alfonso Concepcion.
15
ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title
Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of
Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The
land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be within Villamor Air
By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3,
1996, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against
respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the
trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and
the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation
looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent was able to
acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.
16
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those
president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He
authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on
December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in default, [2] predicated on its failure to file a
valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer was
neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was effectively
an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, [3] it was a
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republics
motion.[4] It found respondents answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the
purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records,
declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex
parte.
The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari[5] seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court.
Respondent contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for failure to file
17
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found
Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not
subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts
after the filing of the answer[6] and concluded that he assented to the signing of the
answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer
may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari. It
directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court
to proceed to trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which declared
respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.
becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but
ignores further points which he or she has heard the other make[13] or
18
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. [14]
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its
case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels
statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its
implications, as follows:
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer
was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be considered invalid for being
an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was neither
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party
authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what Atty.
Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of no
such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not known
beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its
19
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition
it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment [15] and memorandum it
on it.
by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires
that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates
to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the
pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. [16] Under the Rules of Court,
it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice
of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel
20
Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just
anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was
no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that
Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another as long as it conformed
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just
anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondents answer was
invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly
declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were
true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere
To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. [19]
21
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication
of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by
the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in
the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure.[21] In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in
violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for
and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his
22
CASE NO. 3 G.R. No. 162924
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition are the two (2) Resolutions[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated November 20, 2003 and March 22, 2004, dismissing the petition
for certiorari before it on technical grounds and denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
bounded by Meralco Avenue, Ortigas Avenue, Doa Julia Vargas Avenue, and Valle
23
President, Ronaldo Salonga, and ECRM Enterprises, represented by its proprietor,
Mario P. Tablante, executed an agreement whereby the former would lease to the latter
an area, approximately one (1) hectare, of the aforesaid land, for a period of three (3)
months, to be used as the staging area for the Home and Garden Exhibition Fair. On
March 6, 2000, the date of the expiration of the Lease Agreement, Tablante assigned
all his rights and interests under the said agreement to respondents Laurie M. Litam
of the same date. Petitioner eventually learned that respondent Tablante had executed
a Contract of Lease with respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. on November 26, 1999 over
the same parcel of land. Thereafter, respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. constructed
improvements on the land and subdivided the area into fifty-nine (59) commercial stalls,
which it leased to various entities. Upon the expiration of the lease on March 6, 2000,
petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the land. A final demand was made in a
In order to forestall ejectment from the premises, respondent Rockland filed a case
for Specific Performance with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 266, Pasig City,
on January 11, 2001, compelling petitioner to execute a new lease contract for another
three (3) years, commencing in July 2000. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
68213. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was anticipatory
in nature.
24
Consequently, on August 22, 2001, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 8788 for
unlawful detainer against herein respondents, raffled to the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Pasig City, Branch 70. Simultaneously, petitioner filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 68213, on the ground of litis pendentia. Petitioners motion to
dismiss was denied. The denial was questioned and eventually elevated to the
Supreme Court.[3]
Meantime, on April 29, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in the unlawful
detainer (ejectment) case. In the main, the trial court ruled that the issue did not involve
material or physical possession, but rather, whether or not ECRM had the right to
exercise an option to renew its lease contract. The MTC stated that, considering that
this issue was incapable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction over the case was vested
On appeal, the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 160, affirmed in toto. In its
25
established under the facts obtaining that the contract of lease has been
renewed before the expiration of the lease period, and the appellant has
consented to the renewal and assignment of the lease, it necessarily
follows that the issue on whether the lower court erred in finding that it did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter raised by the appellant,
deserves scant consideration and this court need not delve into it
anymore.[5]
In the assailed resolution dated November 20, 2003, the CA resolved to dismiss
The motion for reconsideration was denied;[7] hence, the instant petition assigning
26
PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING SUCH UNILATERAL
RENEWAL; (b) THAT RESPONDENTS TABLANTE/ECRM, ROCKLAND
AND MC HOME DEPOT COULD VALIDLY OCCUPY THE PROPERTY
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY VALID LEASE AGREEMENT CONSENTED
TO BY PETITIONER; (c) PETITIONER [IS] LIABLE FOR ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT.[8]
27
corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping,
being in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition.[10]
From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the failure to attach the Secretarys
the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the requisite board resolution was subsequently
submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent documents. [11] Considering that
petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of the petition was,
unfairness. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. For
this reason, courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory
appeal; rather, they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of
technicalities.[12]
After a finding that the CA erred in dismissing the petition before it, a remand of the case
Petitioner, in its Memorandum dated October 28, 2005, alleged that respondents
possessory claims had lapsed and, therefore, had become moot and academic.
28
Respondent Rockland prayed that a three-year lease period be granted to it in order
that it would be able to plan its activities more efficiently. Since the claimed lease
contract had already expired as of July or August 2003, there appears no reason why
respondents should continue to have any claim to further possession of the property. [13]
Respondent Rockland also stated in its Memorandum dated March 16, 2006 that
Comment/Memorandum dated May 22, 2007 submitted to the Court. It stated therein
that the passage of time has rendered the issue of possession moot and academic with
respect to respondent Rockland, as the three-year period has long been expired in
29
possession of the land on the strength of a Memorandum of Agreement dated
November 22, 2004 between the latter and Pasig Printing Corporation. By petitioners
admission that while it remains the registered owner of the land, possession of the
same had been adjudicated in favor of Pasig Printing Corporation, another entity without
any contractual relationship with petitioner, on the strength of an Order from the RTC of
Pasig City. Considering that Pasig Printing Corporation has the jus possessionis over
the subject property, it granted the MC Home Depot, Inc. actual occupation and
possession of the subject property for a period of four (4) years, renewable for another
of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. However, in view of the developments
which have rendered the issue of the right of possession over the subject property moot
and academic, the main case is hereby considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
30