Montano vs.

Verceles

FACTS:

Atty. Montaño worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center on October 1, 1994.

Subsequently, he joined the union of rank‐ and‐ file employees, the FFW Staff
Association, and eventually became the employees' union president in July 1997. In
November 1998, he was likewise designated officer‐ in‐ charge of FFW Legal Center.

During the 21st National Convention and Election of National Officers of FFW, Atty.
Montaño was nominated and elected for the position of National Vice‐ President despite
the finding of FFW COMELEC that Atty. Montaño is not qualified to run for the position
because Section 76 of Article XIX of the FFW Constitution and By‐ Laws prohibits
federation employees from sitting in its Governing Board

There was a strong opposition and protest of respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Verceles
(Atty. Verceles), a delegate to the convention and president of University of the East
Employees' Association (UEEA‐ FFW) which is an affiliate union of FFW.

Through a letter to the Chairman of FFW COMELEC, Atty. Verceles reiterated his
protest over Atty. Montaño's candidacy which he manifested during the plenary session
before the holding of the election in the Convention.

Thereinafter, Atty. Verceles sent a follow‐ up letter to the President of FFW requesting
for immediate action on his protest.

BLR(petition for the nullification of the election by VERCELES )

Atty. Verceles, as President of UEEA‐ FFW and officer of the Governing Board of FFW,
filed before the BLR a petition for the nullification of the election of Atty. Montaño as
FFW National Vice‐ President.

MONTANO filed his Comment with Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and not
the BLR has jurisdiction over the case.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

 FFW COMELEC: Montano NOT qualified

 Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR): Montano qualified.

-BLR upheld its jurisdiction over the intra‐ union dispute case and affirmed
election,
-BLR ruled that there were no grounds to hold Atty. Montaño unqualified to
run for National Vice‐ President of FFW.
 Verceles filed for an MOR in BLR
BLR denied MOR

COURT OF APPEALS
Reversed BLR decision
- According to CA Montano is NOT qualified.
-Atty. Montaño did not possess the qualification requirement under paragraph (d) of
Section 26 that candidates must be an officer or member of a legitimate labor
organization.
-According to the CA, since Atty. Montaño, as legal assistant employed by FFW, is
considered as confidential employee, consequently, he is ineligible to join FFW Staff
Association, the rank‐ and‐ file union of FFW.

ISSUES :
1. WON the CA was correct in upholding the jurisdiction of the BLR;
2. WON the CA was correct in not declaring as premature the petition in view of
the pending protest before FFW COMELEC;
3. WON the CA was correct in not finding that the petition violated the rule on non‐
forum shopping;
4. WON the CA was correct in not dismissing the case for being moot in view of the
appointment of Atty. Verceles as NLRC Commissioner;
5. WON Montano is qualified to run as National Vice ‐ President

RULING:

1. WON the CA was correct in upholding the jurisdiction of the BLR;

YES. The BLR has jurisdiction over intra‐ union disputes involving a federation.

Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional
Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter‐ union and intra‐ union
disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union and
workers’ association officers.

There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLR’s jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving
member‐ unions of a federation arising from disagreement over the provisions of
the federation’s constitution and by‐ laws.

Rule XVI lays down the decentralized intra‐ union dispute settlement mechanism.
Section 1 states that any complaint in this regard ‘shall be filed in the Regional Office
where the union is domiciled.’ The concept of domicile in labor relations regulation is
equivalent to the place where the union seeks to operate or has established a geographical
presence for purposes of collective bargaining or for dealing with employers concerning
terms and conditions of employment.

The matter of venue becomes problematic when the intra‐ union dispute involves a
federation, because the geographical presence of a federation may encompass more than
one administrative region. Pursuant to its authority under Article 226, this Bureau
exercises original jurisdiction over intra‐ union disputes involving federations. It is well‐
settled that FFW, having local unions all over the country, operates in more than one
administrative region. Therefore, this Bureau maintains original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from any violation of or disagreement over any
provision of its constitution and by‐ laws.

2. WON the CA was correct in not declaring as premature the petition in view of the
pending protest before FFW COMELEC;

YES. The petition to annul Atty. Montaño’s election as VP was not prematurely filed.

It is true that under the Implementing Rules, redress must first be sought within the
organization itself in accordance with its constitution and by‐ laws. However, this
requirement is not absolute but yields to exception under varying circumstances. The
FFW COMELEC failed to timely act thereon. Thus, Atty. Verceles had no other recourse
but to take the next available remedy to protect the interest of the union he represents as
well as the whole federation, especially so that Atty. Montaño, immediately after being
proclaimed, already assumed and started to perform the duties of the position.
Consequently, Atty. Verceles properly sought redress from the BLR so that the right to
due process will not be violated.

3. WON the CA was correct in not finding that the petition violated the rule on
non‐ forum shopping;

Montano is estopped from raising this issue since he only raised this during this motion
for reconsideration with the CA. The allegation regarding certification against forum
shopping was belatedly raised. It is settled that new issues cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal or on motion for reconsideration.

4. WON the CA was correct in not dismissing the case for being moot in view of the
appointment of Atty. Verceles as NLRC Commissioner;

The CA is correct. There is necessity to resolve the case despite the issues having become
moot. As manifested by Atty. Verceles, Atty. Montaño ran and won as FFW National
President after his challenged term as FFW National Vice‐ President had expired. It must
be stated at this juncture that the legitimacy of Atty. Montaño’s leadership as National
President is beyond our jurisdiction and is not in issue in the instant case. The only issue
for our resolution is petitioner’s qualification to run as FFW National Vice‐ President
during the May 26‐ 27, 2001 elections. We find it necessary and imperative to resolve
this issue not only to prevent further repetition but also to clear any doubtful
interpretation and application of the provisions of FFW Constitution & By‐ laws in order
to ensure credible future elections in the interest and welfare of affiliate unions of FFW.

5. WON Montano is qualified to run as National Vice ‐ President

-No, The FFW Constitution and By‐ laws are clear that no member of the Governing
Board shall at the same time perform functions of the rank‐ and‐ file staff.
-FFW COMELEC, undeniably, has sufficient authority to adopt its own
interpretation of the explicit provisions of the federation's constitution and by‐ laws
and unless it is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion, its decision and
ruling will not be interfered with.
-The BLR erred in disregarding this clear provision. The FFW COMELEC's ruling which
considered Atty. Montaño's candidacy in violation of the FFW Constitution is therefore
correct.
- Atty. Montao is not qualified to run for the position but not for failure to meet the requirement
specified under Section 26 (d) of Article VIII of FFW Constitution and By-Laws. He is
disqualified to run for the position of National Vice-President in view of the proscription in the
FFW Constitution and By-Laws on federation employees from sitting in its Governing Board.
Accordingly, the election of Atty. Montao as FFW Vice-President is null and void.

6. WON the CA was correct in granting the petition to annul Montano's election as
FFW National Vice‐ President on the ground that FFW Staff Association is not a
legitimate labor organization.

- NO. the CA's declaration of the illegitimate status of FFW Staff Association is
proscribed by law, owing to the preclusion of collateral attack.
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs.MICHAEL MAXIMO R.
AMURAO

FACTS:

(RMN) hired respondent Michael Maximo R. Amurao III (Michael) as a radio

broadcaster and production manager

RMN decided to reformat and restructure the programming

The president of RMN met with Michael and other personnel of the station to inform
them of the management's decision, advising them that the reformatting and restructuring
of the station's programs would necessarily affect their employment

Assuring that they would be paid their retirement pay and other benefits.2 To formalize
the discussions had in their meeting, RMN furnished Michael and other personnel
separate letters

Michael and the other personnel refused to sign in receipt when the letters were served on
them. Not long after, however, they accepted the offer of RMN and executed affidavits
relinquishing all their claims against the employer

5 months after receiving his benefits and his execution of the quitclaim, Michael filed a
complaint against RMN for illegal dismissal with money claims in the National Labor
Relations Commission

LA DECISION

Declaring the dismissal of Michael as illegal on the ground that the reformatting and
restructuring of RMN’s radio programming did not fall under any of the just or
authorized causes specified under Article 282, Article 283 and Article 284 of the Labor
Codethat would make the termination of his employment valid; and holding the quitclaim
Michael signed as void because it was not voluntarily executed and ordered:
(1) reinstate the complainant
(2) pay the complainant backwages

APPEAL TO NLRC

RMN’s contention:

(1) Decision of the Labor Arbiter was premature for being rendered without first issuing
an order either setting the case for hearing or declaring the same submitted for decision in
violation of Rule V, Section II of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended;8 that
the
(2) quitclaim signed in its favor was valid and binding because it represented a voluntary
and reasonable settlement of Michael’s claims; and that

(3) Michael was estopped from filing the illegal dismissal case against it

NLRC DECISION

NLRC found no merit in the contention of RMN that the appealed decision was
prematurely rendered

It held that the quitclaim was null and void for not being voluntarily executed; modified
the decision of the Labor Arbiter in that the amount already received by Michael was to
be deducted from the monetary benefits awarded to him;

Decision of CA

The CA denied due course to the petition and dismissed it for lack of merit

ISSUE:

3. Whether or not the Affidavit of Release/Quitclaim executed by Michael was valid and
binding (YES)

RULING:

According to SC, Michael was indeed ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. The remaining

question to resolve is whether the quitclaim was valid and binding?

The Court finds and considers the CA’s ruling unfounded.

Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy. A quitclaim is invalid or
contrary to public policy only:

(1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wrangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, which is unavailing in this case

- Michael acknowledged in his quitclaim that he had read and thoroughly

understood the terms of his quitclaim and signed it of his own volition
- Being a radio broadcaster and production manager, he occupied a highly
responsible position in the compan. It would be implausible to hold, therefore,
that he could be easily duped into simply signing away his rights
- That he was required to sign the quitclaim as a condition to the release of the
settlement pay did not prove that its execution was coerced. Having agreed to
part with a substantial amount of money, RMN took steps to protect its
 interest and obtain its release from all obligations once it paid Michael his
settlement pay, which it did in this case

(2) Where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face.

- settlement pay of ₱311,922.00 was credible and reasonable considering that

Michael did not even assail such amount as unconscionably low, or even state
that he was entitled to a higher amount

(3) Where signing is out of dire necessity

- Michael’s claim that he signed the quitclaim out of fear of not being able to
provide for the needs of his family and for the schooling of his children did
not immediately indicate that he had been forced to sign the same.
- Dire necessity should not necessarily be an acceptable ground for annulling
the quitclaim, especially because it was not at all shown that he had been
forced to execute it. Nor was it even proven that the consideration for the
quitclaim was unconscionably low, and that he had been tricked into accepting
the consideration.
J-PHIL MARINE, INC. and/or JESUS CANDAVA and NORMAN SHIPPING
SERVICES,

FACTS:

Dumalaog served as cook aboard vessels plying overseas

He filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a pro-forma

complaint1[1] against petitioners ─ manning agency J-Phil Marine, Inc. (J-Phil for
unpaid money claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees

Respondent thereafter filed two amended pro forma complaints: award of overtime pay,
vacation leave pay, sick leave pay, and disability/medical benefits, he having, by his
claim, contracted enlargement of the heart and severe thyroid enlargement in the
discharge of his duties

LA

Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents complaint for lack of merit.

NLRC

NLRC, reversed the Labor Arbiters decision and awarded: disability benefit to
respondent and dismissed other claims for lack of basis or jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals

Dismissed petitioners petition for, inter alia, failure to attach to the petition all material
documents, and for defective verification and certification

MOR- denied

While case was pending in SC, respondent Dumalaog, against the advice of his counsel,
entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. He thereupon signed a Quitclaim
and Release before the LA.

Petitioners, JPHIL filed before this Court a Manifestation informing that, inter alia, they
and respondent had forged an amicable settlement.
But counsel of Dumalog filed before this Court a Comment and Opposition to the
manifestation interposing no objection to the dismissal of the petition but objecting to the
absolution of petitioners from paying respondent the total amount of Fifty Thousand US
Dollars (US$50,000.00) or approximately P2,300,000.00, the amount awarded by the
NLRC

ISSUE:

WON the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement without the
assistance of a counsel is proper

RULING:

Yes, the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement without a lawyer is
proper.

The Supreme Court held that the relation of attorney and client is in many respects one
of agency, and the general rules of agency apply to such relation. The acts of an agent are
deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
The circumstances of this case indicate that respondent's counsel is acting beyond the
scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement.

Dumalaog has undoubtedly the right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his
lawyer cannot be gainsaid, the only qualification being that if such compromise is entered
into with the intent of defrauding the lawyer of the fees justly due him, the compromise
must be subject to the said fees.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent intended to defraud his counsel of
his fees.

A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the

employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was
entering into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered
into is personal and specific individual consent. Thus, contrary to respondents contention,
the employees counsel need not be present at the time of the signing of the compromise
agreement

The relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency, and the general
rules of agency apply to such relation.2[22] The acts of an agent are deemed the acts of
the principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority.3[23] The
circumstances of this case indicate that respondents counsel is acting beyond the scope of
his authority in questioning the compromise agreement

A client has undoubtedly the right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his
lawyer4[24] cannot be gainsaid, the only qualification being that if such compromise is
entered into with the intent of defrauding the lawyer of the fees justly due him, the
compromise must be subject to the said fees.5[25] In the case at bar, there is no showing
that respondent intended to defraud his counsel of his fees. In fact, the Quitclaim and
Release, the execution of which was witnessed by petitioner J-Phils president Eulalio C.
Candava and one Antonio C. Casim, notes that the 20% attorneys fees would be paid 12
April 2007 P90,000.