More, not less, democracy :)

The masses, on average, are conceptually obscure on the origination, evolution, meaning and
utility of democracy in the post-colonial states from Africa to Asia. There are multiple factors
and forces at play behind such ambiguity. The authoritarian state structure, for instance, in the
post-colonial state of Pakistan, dominated popular aspirations for freedom, justice and
democracy and on the other hand, the collusion between state and clergy compounded the puzzle
by presenting a singular nationalistic and ideological narrative through structured curriculum and
controlled media.

Consequently, concepts of constitutional rule, equity, justice and democracy were branded as
“corrupt” ideas of the Christian and colonialist west. In addition, the pan-Islamist (post-) colonial
movements and their ideologues vowed to return to the “pure” and thus, decreed democracy,
among others, to be un-Islamic. Unsurprisingly, the pro-religion political parties in Malaysia,
Indonesia, Egypt and, of course, Pakistan view democracy as un-Islamic and the electoral
exercise, as a lesser evil, which they have accepted as means to gain power to establish Islamic
state in its purest form and frame.

Interestingly, the religious political parties such as JUI-F remained unable to outdo its rival
parties, i.e. Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), at the national level throughout the country’s electoral
history. Since such parties and forces found it hard to gain state power, they supported coups and
martial laws. The military dictators, always in need of political and electoral legitimacy,
embraced these elements who, in ideological unity with the regime runners, presented democracy
in derogatory terms. Moreover, the dictator-cleric nexus demoted mainstream politicians and
political parties for being corrupt and incompetent.

PML-N won the 2013 general election massively and formed government in the centre.
However, the PML-N’s arch rival, Imran Khan and his party refused to accept the electoral
results because PTI failed to win enough seats to form government on its own. It instead alleged
the elections to have been rigged by Nawaz Sharif and his party. In order to pressure the Prime
Minister to leave office, Khan staged a long sit-in in Islamabad in 2014. He along with a cleric,
who heads a small pro-religion political party (PAT), urged the then army top brass to topple the
government.

Since religious parties and forces found it hard to gain state power, they supported coups and
martial laws

The vast majority of the pseudo TV-based political analysts, whose majority is pro-PTI and anti-
democracy, made false arguments to discredit democracy and the civil government. The anti-
democracy televangelists and the their social media cohorts, in summary, argued: 1) democracy
is not the solution to problems Pakistan is mired in, 2) our democratic system is controlled by the
corrupt, incompetent and cruel politicians such as Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari, 3) democracy
is a western concept and thus unsuitable to Pakistani culture, 4) democracy is against the spirit of
Islam, 5) Pakistan comes first and the constitution and democracy come later and 6) there is no
harm in removing the government through unconstitutional means since corrupt and cruel
politicians have ruined the country and make it vulnerable to (external) threats.
Since the majority of our populace prefers TV to newspapers and books, such attacks on
constitutional rule, fundamental human rights and democracy do influence them, and indeed our
youth seems to have accepted this otherwise unconstitutional and illogical rhetoric.

Pakistan came into being as a result of a democratic struggle pioneered by constitutionalist

Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Indeed, the 1945-46 elections and subsequent referenda in various places
mark the democratic and constitutional foundations of Pakistan. The 1956 and 1973 constitutions
strengthened parliamentary form of government. It was the Ayub, Yahya and Zia dictatorship,
the 1990s subjugation of democracy by the non-elective institutions and ultimately the Musharraf
martial laws (1999 and 2007) that further de-shaped democracy in the country. Secondly,
corruption is a relative term and to prove someone to be financially corrupt, one has to
empirically prove so in a constitutionally constituted court of law, where law is applied fairly and
squarely.

Thirdly, what we call Pakistan becomes Pakistan through the 1973 constitution. In the
constitution, no person, group or any entity has the right to abrogate or suspend the constitution
and remove/topple the government. Indeed, such an act amounts to “high treason” and this is
why the “doctrine of necessity” was coined by the Dogar courts and the illegal and
unconstitutional acts of martial law regimes were provided with “indemnity” by the controlled
parliaments and compromised political parties, i.e. PML-Q and MMA.

An arbitrary rule of any kind is exploitation of human rights. It is also immoral to rule over a
person or a nation without their willingness. Finally, democracy has been arbitrarily projected as
un-Islamic by various Muslim monarchs, colonial-era Muslim liberationists and modern-day
mullah, military and bureaucratic mindset.

But in fact the Qur’an says, “Their affairs [political order] are based on their mutual
consultation” (42:38) and “there is no compulsion in faith” (2:256). Thus, in Islam, it is a big sin
(gunah-e-kabira) to violate the will of the people, which is summarised in our constitution, by
either toppling a government through unconstitutional means or imposing a system on them
without their genuinely ensured consent.

Lastly, to survive as a viable state and society, the panacea for all post-colonial authoritarian
states lies in more, not less, democracy – and Pakistan needs it in large quantity now than ever.

Published in Daily Times, July 1st , 2017.

Pakistan: A Catch-22 in the India-US

‘Special’ Relationship
How far can Trump push with Modi’s agenda of changing Pakistan’s security policy?
By Umair Jamal June 29, 2017
 The meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump
has put to rest New Delhi’s fears that the latter’s erratic approach to politics and diplomacy
might disrupt the continuation of steady partnership between the two countries.

Clearly, Modi has been successful in enlisting Trump’s support for a number of security and
economic issues that are central to his country’s foreign policy priorities. At the symbolic level,
Modi’s first meeting with Trump has squeezed out all major strategic gains which India has been
pursuing in South Asia.

Chief among them remains India’s long-desired approach to push Washington to put effective
and sustained pressure on Pakistan to take action against various militant organizations that have,
for a long time, carried out cross border terrorism that New Delhi believes emanates from
Pakistan’s soil.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

For India, the Trump administration’s declaration of Hizbul Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin
as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” reflects a significant diplomatic triumph. The
timing of this announcement could not have been better, for the recent violence in India-
administered Kashmir brought attention to the question of legitimacy in New Delhi’s growing
reliance on military force to stifle protests in the valley.

Moreover, Trump also lent support to India’s stance of rejecting China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’
initiative because part of it runs through Pakistani controlled regions that remain a matter of
dispute between Islamabad and New Delhi. Arguably, by securing Trump’s endorsement against
China’s economic vision, Modi was able to send a strong signal that the United States and India
remain committed to a partnership that is not just looking to check Beijing’s prolific rise, but
also its world view, economically and militarily.

While Modi may have achieved some quick diplomatic points to showcase his country’s image
as an emerging player in global politics, it remains to be seen to what extent he can actually turn
this warm rhetoric into action, particularly in terms of his country’s anxieties with Islamabad and
Beijing.

It’s fair to argue that in the first Modi-Trump meeting, it was not just the former that sought to
court the latter but rather it was a shared objective that both leaders eagerly sought in their haste
to score political points. But the question remains: how does India profit from this mutual
courtship when it comes to forcing Pakistan to give up its alleged policy of supporting insurgent
groups or getting China to stop its economic projects in regions that New Delhi considers
disputed?

It’s clear that while India and United States may share host of common interests in the Asia-
Pacific region, the latter has no desire to push forward strongly with India’s anti-Pakistan or anti-
China policies. In essence, the naming of Salahuddin as a global terrorist doesn’t help in any way
in easing India’s challenges in Kashmir, or its aims to discredit Pakistan by exposing its alleged
ties with militant groups.
The Trump administration’s developing policy toward Pakistan aims to employ a toughen
approach in a bid to end the country’s alleged links with militant groups. However, this approach
is hardly driven by India’s concerns: the new administration in Washington is desperate to spot a
change in Pakistan’s behavior as far as the latter’s policy toward Afghanistan is concerned. For
Trump, it’s a risky path to take, for Pakistan has experienced and lived through such tough
phases before albeit without making any changes to its security policies. In fact, now With
China’s active support, Pakistan is better positioned now to overcome any economic or military
obstacles that the U.S. may be planning to unveil.

Hussain Nadim, the Director of South Asia Study Group at the University of Sydney, recently
wrote an op-ed for War on The Rocks in which he discussed Washington’s growing limitations
when it comes to employing an overarching “stick” approach toward Pakistan. Nadim argued
that “the increasingly large presence of China in Pakistan due to the China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) project, threats of economic or military sanctions on Pakistan don’t appear
credible, nor does it appear the United States has the capacity to pursue that course of action.”

“Pakistani officials truly believe the United States does not have the capacity or credibility to
provide a long-term solution in Afghanistan. If anything, the Pakistani security establishment
sees China as playing a major role in the Afghan peace process – something that Pakistan is a lot
more comfortable with,” added Nadim.

Arguably, pushing Pakistan into isolation may not be in the interests of either New Delhi or
Washington. An isolated Pakistan with nothing to lose can further increase its support for various
insurgent groups while undermining Washington’s efforts in Afghanistan, which will surely
increase violence in the country.

Other prominent scholars have also warned of similar challenges when it comes to pushing
Pakistan into a corner. Joshua T. White, an associate professor of the Practice of South Asia
Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes:

The United States still has numerous equities with Pakistan, and can little afford to alienate
Pakistani leaders precisely when it is considering reinvesting in an Afghan peace process. New
Delhi may continue to hear a tougher rhetorical line on Pakistan, but so far there are few
indications that Trump would be willing to use America’s limited leverage with Pakistan to press
for action against India-focused groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, rather
than groups like the Haqqani Taliban network that directly target US forces in Afghanistan.

While Modi may like to see Trump move swiftly and comprehensively to undercut Pakistan and
China’s position, Washington’s hands are tied with numerous political, diplomatic, and security
limitations rearing their heads.
The warnings of containing China’s political and economic clout and Pakistan’s audacious
polices in the region are going to draw Islamabad and Beijing closer. Both countries have already
condemned India and U.S.’s joint mapping of China and Pakistan as the states that are triggering
tensions in the region.
From here onwards, it will be the above-mentioned challenges that will test the resolve and
commitment of special relation between India and America.
Is Education a Priority? By Faisal Bari
EVERY year we celebrate the fact that the allocation for education by federal as well as provincial
governments goes up by 10 to 15 per cent. This has been happening for quite a few years now. All
provinces feel the pressure to raise their education budgets, and they do.

Indeed, some of the increases are substantial — this year, the Higher Education Commission is
going to get about Rs5 billion more, while for Punjab the 10pc to 15pc increase means an additional
Rs30bn for the education sector.

Even allowing for the fact that the increases mentioned above are in nominal terms, the educational
budgets of the provinces have increased by 50pc to 80pc over the last five to seven years. Though
we are still only spending about 2.3pc of GDP on education, it is a significant percentage of the
provincial budgets.

Will the increase in the education budgets be able to address the inequities in our learning
systems?

The government’s own statistics acknowledge that some 21 million-plus five- to 16-year-olds are
still out of school.

We have not achieved universal enrolment even at the primary level. In fact, if it were not for the
increase in enrolment of children in private-sector schools, the overall enrolment rates would be
showing a declining trend. Our high dropout rates mean that out of 100 children enrolling in grade
1 in Pakistan, only five to six make it to college level. Our transition rates, from primary to middle
and high school are pathetic.

But, despite these increases in the private sector, there are too many two-room primary schools
where basic infrastructure facilities are missing, and we do not have enough middle and high
schools to offer a higher transition rate from primary to middle schools.

We do not have enough teachers to ensure that every primary school has as many teachers as
classes: multi-grade teaching is quite common. Punjab is promising to recruit some 77,000 teachers
this year to ensure that there are at least four in every school. The situation in other provinces is
no better.

Meanwhile, examination results at all levels — grade 5 or the civil service exams — show that the
quality of education that most of our children, barring the minority that go to high-fee private or
elite government schools or universities, receive is quite poor.

Grade 5 children, on average, are one or two grades behind where they should be, and only 2pc or
so of the candidates who take the civil service examinations even pass the written test.
Given this situation, what will an increase of 10pc to 15pc in the budgets achieve on the education
front? What is there to celebrate in such increases? Will these increases allow us to fulfil our
constitutional obligation of providing every child in Pakistan with 10 years of quality education?

Will these allow us to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals that we are a signatory to? Will
these increases be able to address the tremendous inequities in our education system and allow
every child to explore his or her potential fully?

It is not just about the money. All provinces have, consistently, shown a low use of development
funds within the education sector: of the money that is budgeted for the sector at the beginning of
the year, only 50pc to 70pc is actually spent. The rest of it lapses.

Non-development expenditures are usually utilised well: these are mostly spent on salary budgets.
Teachers’ salaries are indeed the main expense in the education sector so it is not a surprise that
most of the money is spent on these. But the poor utilisation of funds for non-salary heads tells us
about the kind of priority we attach to development or quality-enhancing expenditures.

It is also about how the money that we actually spend is utilised.

In Punjab, laptop distributions come out of the education budget. Where is the evidence that giving
laptops will improve the quality of education in the country? It might be a popular move and an
attempt to get votes, but how is it about educational quality or outcomes? Daanish school
expenditures are also educational expenses. The spending of billions on a few schools when
50,000-plus schools are still lacking teachers as well as some basic infrastructure facilities needs
to be justified.

We have never seen any sound evaluation of the contribution that the Daanish schools are making.
All provinces are moving towards distributing laptops, tablets and LED televisions to teachers and
schools: do we have any evidence that these are going to enhance quality and improve learning
among children?

Do provincial governments see public education as a priority? If we go by the increases in the

provincial budgets, we might say yes and this is how many have been interpreting the increases
over the last few years.

But there is another way of thinking. The increased expenditures are definitely not going to address
the issues in education as a) the increases are small and the problems very large, b) a significant
portion of the increased budget is not going to be spent, c) and even if it is, spending priorities
have not been thought through and are not going to address the access or quality issues that we
face.

Clearly, governments are according low priority to education issues: the increased funding is just
for the political appeasement of concerned lobbies. If education was indeed an area of high priority
and governments wanted to accomplish something, there would be a lot more debate on
educational issues in political parties and government circles — the best of political leaders would
be made education ministers, there would be a lot more innovative thinking on how to achieve our
educational goals and there would be political consequences for not delivering. We do not see any
of the above.

The writer is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives
and an associate professor of economics at Lums, Lahore.

Published in Dawn, June 16th, 2017

The strangest plot

Cyril Almeida

ASSUME they’re right. The JIT isn’t about corruption. The investigation is just a vehicle to oust Nawaz.
Old tricks adapted for new times.

Fine.

We can go further. They — the permanent establishment, the boys, whomever — want to oust Nawaz
because of what Nawaz represents and because of what Nawaz wants to do.

What he represents is danger, a popular politician from Punjab who dislikes and is disliked by the boys.
What he wants to do is dangerous: rid us of proxies and focus on regional connectivity and trade.

The timing is convenient, just ahead of an election which Nawaz looks like he can win. Get him now and
you’ve got him for good — shut out from the next election and then on for the next five years at least.

For all its weaknesses, the mere existence of an independent prime minister’s office is a potential threat
because it’s impossible to fully control.

By then Nawaz would be an old man and the next generation ready to take over.

If that’s the game, the rest of us are all just passengers along for the ride. The boys will do what the boys
think they need to do. Nawaz and co will fight until they can or up to the point they think it’s worth it.

But while they fight their wars and decide our fate, at least we can ask: has Nawaz really posed a threat?

Because all of it — why they’ve wanted to oust him and why they still need to oust him— rests on the
premise that Nawaz is a danger and his agenda dangerous.

And that twin belief could just be megalomania on one side — Nawaz’s — and miscalculation on the
other, the boys’.

Start with the danger that Nawaz the Punjabi politician is supposed to embody. When he calls, Punjab
responds. But winning elections doesn’t necessarily filter down to policy fights.
When it comes to picking sides between Nawaz and the boys, most of Punjab is probably where it has
mostly been: wanting the two to just get along.

Sure, Punjab will vote for Nawaz, but will Punjab fight for Nawaz? Especially if the opponent is the boys?
Probably not.

There’re many reasons historical and particular to Punjab for that, but there’s one specific to Nawaz too:
for all his electoral success, he hasn’t built a formidable party machine dedicated to serving his agenda.

The name Nawaz may mean votes in the bank, but there is no awe, great love or terrible fear. Nothing
that approaches what the other side has.

Real as Nawaz’s electoral support may be, it can’t be weaponised because its core is soft. It’s good
enough to win elections, not enough to stand on and challenge the gods.

What winning elections does though is win you a seat at the table. From there, even if your electoral
base is soft, you can try and ram through policy changes.

That’s the second part: the dangerous Nawaz agenda.

For all its weaknesses, the mere existence of an independent prime minister’s office is a potential threat
because it’s impossible to fully control.

You can’t stop a prime minister from dreaming; you can’t stop his office from plotting; and because of
the constraints of nominal democracy, you can’t immediately swat away all prime ministerial ideas and
initiatives.

But then just have a look at Nawaz’s record this term.

Forget the bits where he’s been cut down, shut down or shoved aside. That was inevitable. It’s not like
the other side was ever going to just surrender policy control.

The third term was the biggest opening Nawaz has ever had or arguably ever will — and it’s littered with
rookie mistakes and unforced errors.

He refused to instal a foreign minister and only reluctantly installed a part-time defence minister. He
chose to put Musharraf on trial instead of signing a trade deal with Congress ahead of the Indian
election.

He insisted on talking to the Taliban for too long, allowing the boys to switch the militancy narrative
themselves. He tried to talk to Modi but wasn’t able to terror-proof dialogue.

After Kashmir erupted, he’s remained stuck in the same incongruous gear. On Afghanistan, there is not a
single idea or initiative that has emerged — not even at the level of theory.
CPEC is the great new arrival, but it was dreamt up by the Chinese and presented to us. The more
damning thing is the lopsidedness of the loans and investments — 75 per cent dedicated to addressing
the electricity deficit, a waste of a historic opportunity.

Round and round you can go, and even adjusting for all that Nawaz has been thwarted in doing and all
that he’s been shut down on, there’s just no sign of the great big policy threat that he is supposed to be.

More obvious is the opposite: keeping him in place may be better than chucking him out. The fillip he’ll
get from another election win won’t exceed the political capital he got after 2013.

Next time round, with a new US approach in Afghanistan and a confident Modi striding towards re-
election, there’ll be even less space for a Nawaz doctrine regionally.

Economic take-off is certainly not imminent, meaning he won’t suddenly surge to massive popularity
around 2020 or so. And most of all, the boys have figured out how to contain him — something they’d
have to learn anew with Imran.

And yet the PML-N remains convinced: the aim is to oust Nawaz because of the threat he is and the
threat his agenda is.

They may be right. Or between megalomania and miscalculation may lie our fate yet again.

The writer is a member of staff. Published in Dawn, July 2nd, 2017

Martial Laws in Pakistan :)

Since achieving independence from the British yoke on August 14, 1947, Pakistan had been
under army rule for almost a half of the period of its life. Martial law was declared in this period
for three times. These coups happened because initial years of Pakistan's life were tumultuous to
such an extent that country's first premier, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in
Rawalpindi on October 16, 1951, and after him no government was allowed to work freely. Here
is a brief overview of the military rule in Pakistan:

1. First Martial Law (1958):

After Governor General Ghulam Muhammad was compelled to go on a two-month leave to the
United Kingdom, Major General Iskander Mirza entered the office of the Governor General on
August 7, 1955. President Iskander Mirza could not develop proper working relations with all the
coming premiers. Muhammad Ali Bogra (April 17, 1953 to August 11, 1955) was the first prime
minister under Mirza but he soon resigned and was replaced by Chaudhry Muhammad Ali
(August 11, 1955 to September 12, 1956), Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy (September 12, 1956 to
October 18, 1957), I. I.Chundrigar (October, 18, 1957 to December 16, 1957) and Malik Feroze
Khan Noon (December 18, 1957 to October 7, 1958).
During Mirza's rule, the new Constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly on
February 29, 1956, and was promulgated on March 23, 1956. The Constitution was based on the
Objectives Resolution, which was adopted on March 12, 1949. This constitution proclaimed the
Dominion of Pakistan as Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Iskander Mirza was sworn in as its
first president.

Then came the fateful day of October 7, 1958 when Iskander Mirza proclaimed martial law
throughout the country and appointed the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, as
Chief Martial Law Administrator. The constitution was abrogated, central and provincial
governments were dismissed, National and provincial assemblies stood dissolved, and all
political parties were abolished. Next day, the president appointed an Advisory Council,
consisting of secretary-general and seven secretaries of ministries. However, on October 10, the
president promulgated an Order stating that notwithstanding abrogation of 1956 Constitution,
Pakistan shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the late Constitution.

On October 24, 1958, President Mirza constituted a 12-man Central Cabinet, including General
Azam Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Manzoor Qadir. General Ayub Khan was appointed prime
minster. Iskander Mirza relinquished his office of president on October 27, 1958, and handed
over all powers to CMLA Ayub Khan, who promulgated the Presidential Cabinet Order next day
according to which the Cabinet would have no prime minister and it would work directly under
the president.

Exactly one year after taking power (October 27, 1959), General Ayub became Field Marshal
and promulgated Basic Democracies Order, providing for constitution of Basic Democratic
institutions ranging from the Union Councils to Provincial Development Advisory Councils. He
held the elections for Basic Democracy Units on January 2, 1960, electing their 80,000 members
by adult franchise. These BD members went to the polls on January 14, to express, through
secret ballot, their confidence or lack of it, in President Ayub Khan.

Ayub Khan was sworn in as elected President on February 17, 1960. On June 8, 1962, he
announced to lift martial law after nearly four years, and also took oath of the office of the
President under the new Constitution, enacted by him on March 1, 1962, providing presidential
form of government.

On January 2, 1965, he was re-elected president in presidential election against MS Fatima

Jinnah, sister of Father of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and a candidate of
Combined Opposition Parties. However, the COP had refused to accept the election results.

Declaration of martial law in 1958 was solely due to unpleasant and uncertain situation as well as
political instability because of fast political manoeuvres and changes that took place in the
country.

2. Second Martial Law (1969):

The second instance was when the then Army Chief, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan,
declared Martial law, dissolved the assemblies and assumed the office of the president after
Ayub Khan stepped down as President on March 25, 1969, and handed over powers to him. On
April 3, he formed a three-member Council of Administration with himself as its Chairman, and
next day issued Provisional Constitution Order, providing basis for governance of country. On
April 8, he ordered that Martial Law Administrators of East and West Pakistan will also perform
duties of the governors.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Chairman Pakistan People's Party, took over as president and the first
civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator on December 20, 1971.

3. Third Martial Law (1977):

The army staged third coup when General Ziaul Haq overthrew the Bhutto government and took
over as CMLA on July 5, 1977. The federal and provincial governments were dismissed;
political parties were banned; National and provincial assemblies were dissolved; the
constitution was put in abeyance; civil courts continued to function as usual but fundamental
rights were suspended.

On July 15, 1977, Justice Mushtaq Hussein of the Lahore High Court was appointed chairman of
a committee to formulate election procedures and laws. Two days later, Justice Mushtaq Hussein
also took over as the Chief Election Commissioner and announced that elections would be held
in the first fortnight of October 1977 under the supervision of the armed forces and the judiciary.
October 18 was fixed for the general elections and nomination papers were invited between
August 7 and 18, 1977.

On September 21, 1977, General Zia issued a 15-point code of ethics to regulate the election
campaign which started from September 18. The code prohibited all actions and deeds, including
words, symbolic representations, which were likely to prejudice the solidarity of Pakistan and its
Islamic foundations.

On October 1, the elections were postponed indefinitely. On November 10, 1977 the Supreme
Court unanimously validated the imposition of martial law, under the doctrine of necessity.

In its judgement dismissing Begum Nusrat Bhutto's petition challenging detention under martial
law of former Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto and 10 others, the nine-member court headed by Chief
Justice Anwarul Haq observed that after massive rigging of elections followed by complete
breakdown of law and order situation bringing the country on the brink of disaster, the
imposition of martial law had become inevitable.

Zia's martial law came to an end on December 30, 1985.

4. 1999 Coup:

Pakistan came under military rule again on October 12, 1999, when General Pervez Musharraf
seized power in a bloodless coup and dissolved elected government of Nawaz Sharif. However,
no Martial law was imposed. As announced by him on July 11, 2002, general elections were held
on October 10, 2002. But before the elections, a referendum was held on April 30, 2002 for him
to be elected as the president for another five years. On November 3, 2007, he declared the state
of emergency in the country which is claimed to be equivalent to the state of martial law as the
constitution was suspended. On November 12, 2007, Musharraf issued some amendments to the
Military Act, which gave the armed forces some additional powers.

Pervez Musharraf, who ruled Pakistan as Chief Executive from 1999-2002 and as president from
2001-08, resigned on August18, 2008 in the face of impeachment. Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali,
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Shaukat Aziz served as elected prime ministers during his era.

Politics in Pakistan has been tarnished by corruption, inefficiency, domestic political upheavals
and wrong policies of the ruling elite; and alternating periods of civilian and military rule have,
so far, not been able to establish stability. Due to their unrealistic policies, supplemented by anti-
Pakistan elements, we could not maintain its integrity and their actions resulted into the
unfortunate break-up of the hard-earned country in 1971.

Five myths that need to be buried for good :)

Popular narratives in Pakistan regurgitated by civil and military leadership with the support of
mainstream media suggest that certain things have changed over the past few years. Be it our
domestic politics, the conduct of elected and non-elected institutions of the state, we like to
create make-believe stories to delude ourselves. Nation states like to peddle national myths often
at the expense of history, facts and diversity. Pakistan is no exception. The list of delusions is
long but let’s name a few here.

Since the ‘historic’ lawyers’ and judges’ movement, we have been hearing that doctrine of
necessity has been buried. Proud pronouncements from the Supreme Court of Pakistan often
repeated by analysts and politicians do their rounds. While the courts certainly are far freer than
they were before, the doctrine of necessity is very much alive and kicking. Take the example of
military courts. The apex court ratified military courts established after the 2014 terror attack in
Peshawar that killed children and teachers in an army school. The court upheld them and many
outspoken lawyers and ostensibly independent analysts also supported these courts. In March of
this year, the National Assembly passed 28th Constitutional Amendment Bill that revived the
military courts after the initial two-year period was over. It requires no rocket science to note that
that such courts are violative of citizens’ rights to fair trial, legal counsel, etc. as guaranteed by
the Constitution. There are countless instances where the courts have passed verdicts that fall
into the ambit of doctrine of necessity -initially used in 1950s to uphold a constitutional
subversion - without naming it. Sixty years later, it remains pretty much a convenient ploy to
justify the power arrangements in the country.

One wonders if there is an Ummah then why is it so divided and why are we even imagining
ourselves as its leader when we have clearly sided with one sectarian, albeit majoritarian, bloc.

Another myth pertains to the burial of the ‘strategic depth’ doctrine famously propounded by
former Army Chief Mirza Aslam Beg. The gist of this doctrine was that Pakistan sought to exert
influence in Kabul through a friendly government, which in times of hostilities with India would
provide Pakistan a safe fallback option. It is a separate matter that after three decades the
doctrine has reversed and we have turned into the ‘depth’ for others and a target of groups that
call themselves the Pakistani Taliban. Now they have found sanctuaries in the badlands of
Afghanistan and we keep on complaining about that to the world. Who would have thought that
this day would arrive and why have we not learnt from the misfire of this flawed doctrine. But
has it been given up? Not really.

Assuming that India, with the support of United States, is playing an anti-Pakistan game in
Afghanistan — can we not find other allies in the wide range of political spectrum in our
neighbouring countries? Even if the Taliban succeed with the support of Pakistan, China and
Russia to gain full or partial power have we forgotten that they allowed the sectarian militias to
operate from their soil when the state of Pakistan launched a crackdown in 1990s? Our view of
Afghanistan has not changed, as it remains an extension of battle with India.

Another idea that has been conveniently drummed into the public mind is that all states use
proxies to achieve their strategic goals. The United States and its spy agency Central Intelligence
Agency are mentioned as the key examples. India’s role in 1971 and its alleged support to
Baloch separatists and Pakistani Taliban are oft-cited examples. In short, Pakistan only follows
what others do in warfare, say the pundits. There is a little but significant difference. Few, almost
none, of these cases actually allow non-state militias to operate and prosper on their soil. But that
is not even the issue here. Which state allows its proxies to influence public minds and build
popular support? Whether it is anti-Shia hate speech by militant groups and calls for violent
jihad, young Pakistanis have been influenced by such faux narratives. Pick up a random copy of
any Urdu newspaper from 1980s onwards and glorification of Taliban, the necessity to counter
India through jihad has been recurrent theme. I doubt if other countries have allowed that. Let’s
be clear about it.

Since we were young, we were told that there was an Ummah that we cherish and belong to. We
heard Bhutto wanted to be the leader of the Ummah and he was killed so that the dream could
not be fulfilled. Now with nuclear prowess and our professional armed forces, we are the leader
of Islamic world. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Last month when our PM went to
Saudi Arabia to attend a moot of other Muslim countries he was not even asked to speak. Our
former Army Chief heads a Saudi alliance which is clearly sectarian in nature and one wonders if
there is an Ummah then why is it so divided and why are we even imagining ourselves as its
leader when we have clearly sided with one sectarian, albeit majoritarian, bloc. In the recent
Saudi-Qatar spat, Pakistan’s leverage was seriously exposed as any hint of Pakistani mediation
was denied by concerned parties. Power in this day and age is not just a function of how many
tanks and nukes you possess but what your economic worth is. Can Pakistan ever bridge Saudi-
Iran differences? The answer is in the negative.

Finally, a new truth has emerged. China and its $53 billion economic corridor is a panacea for
everything that afflicts us. Our energy crisis will be solved because the Chinese are setting up
power plants. Our regional isolation will be tackled as China backs us and we let Iran,
Afghanistan and India continue to resent us. And who cares for the relationship with the United
States, as China will do all that the US assistance has been doing for the military and our chronic
balance of payments deficits. CPEC is a welcome development and certainly a game changer but
how would the Chinese make Pakistanis pay more direct taxes? How is the domestic investment
going to increase when most of the contracts may be awarded to Chinese companies? And the
increased indebtedness is already a reality. Future projections are even scarier. Most importantly,
without a stable Afghanistan how are we going to reap the benefits of our much-touted ‘geo-
strategic location'? The US is a major destination for Pakistani exports. It is also a key source for
remittances from the Diaspora. What would happen when the relations with US take a nosedive?
These are mind-boggling questions, which no one bothers to answer.

It is time that we infuse a bit of realism in our collective thinking and policymaking processes.
Peddling and employing myths as cornerstones of policy and national pride leads nowhere.

Published in Daily Times, July 2nd , 2017.

Of unjust taxes and inequalities :)

One of many factors for increased income and wealth inequalities in Pakistanis regressive and
unjust taxation benefitting the rich and hurting the less-privileged segments. Incidence of taxes
on the poor after presumptive taxes, imposed and enhanced perpetually since 1991, has increased
substantively (38 percent in 15 years), while on the rich it has decreased by 21 percent for the
same period. Since the coup d’état of July 5, 1977, regressive taxes have gradually replaced
progressive ones, even under so-called civil dispensations.

The real brunt came in 1991 under first premiership of Nawaz Sharif when for the first time,
presumptive taxes, indirect in nature, were made part of income taxation, facilitating the
businessmen to pass the burden onto the end consumers. In addition, the criminal, tax evaders
and looter of national wealth got Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 to whiten the dirty
money. This not only eroded the tax base but also helped many, including the house of Sharif, to
shift untaxed money abroad, and the rich and mighty till date enjoy the unprecedented
opportunity to decriminalise their untaxed money under this obnoxious law.

The final nail in the coffin of progressive taxation came during Musharraf-Shaukat era when
wealth taxation was abolished and personal income tax rates were slashed for the rich. After the
18th constitutional amendment, the right to levy progressive taxes like gain on immovable
property, estate duty, wealth tax on immovable assets and gift tax was transferred to the
provinces and since 2010, not a single province has availed the same to increase their resources
and spend the money for public welfare, wealth redistribution and alleviating poverty.
Shockingly, the capital gains on disposal of immovable property, though provincial subject is
encroached upon by the federal government and none protested.

The rich-poor divide in Pakistan, among many other factors has its roots in regressive taxation. A
study conducted by Talat Anwar provides estimates of various inequality indices in Pakistan
wherein the Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficients have been most commonly used. This study
confirms that income inequality in 2000-2007 had been the maximum compared to any time
period in the history of Pakistan. The poorest 30 percent lost their share while the richest 20
percent gained in both the urban and rural areas. This study also notes that good policies without
good governance can never benefit the poor. “In Pakistan the periods of highest levels of
resource allocations did not result in improvement in social indicators underlining the fact that
spending money without addressing the underlying structural causes of poverty will not reduce
poverty”, the study says.

Transparency of public sector expenditure and accountability in resource allocation therefore

was of foremost importance. Political accountability was also essential to eradicate bad
governance practices. Secondly, regressive tax structures followed by poorly constructed
subsidies made for an inefficient system. There is a need for correct and efficient targeting of
subsidies. Poor governance structures exacerbated leakages and missed targets, completely
sidelining the poor even from accidental benefits, the study suggests.

The state needs to end inequalities and ensure fair and equitable allocation of resources as part of
tax reforms agenda. The foremost objective of rational and just tax system should be collecting
funds for public spending and providing basic facilities of health, education, transport, housing
and recreation to all citizens. Taxation should not be meant for favouring somebody or
penalising a segment of society. It should be for the common good, for welfare of all, for
establishing an egalitarian state.

The final nail in the coffin of progressive taxation came during the Musharraf-Shaukat era when
wealth taxation was abolished and personal income tax rates were slashed for the rich

It is highly lamentable that millions of Pakistanis are living below the poverty line but huge
amounts are spent on personal comforts and luxuries of the president, prime minister, governors,
chief ministers, ministers, state ministers and high-ranking civil-military officials. Unfair tax
system, like the one prevailing in Pakistan, promotes inequalities. Wealthy individuals escape
taxes, and burden is shifted to ordinary citizens through taxes on labour and consumption. As a
result, wealth and power are being increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few — even less
than one per cent of the population of Pakistan.

The main factors that govern personal income distribution include distribution of assets;
functional income distribution; transfers from other households, government and rest of the
world; and tax/expenditure structure of the government. In Pakistan, on the contrary, the single
most devastating factor for increased income and wealth inequalities remains the regressive
taxation. Study of Pakistan from this political economy perspective is very crucial as society is
fast moving towards dehumanising characteristics due to income/wealth disparities and rising
poverty.

The great divide in today’s Pakistan between the rich and the poor is assuming alarming
proportions and one of the main factors for this is lack of political will to tax the people
according to their ability to pay. The way forward is implementation of Article 3 in letter and
spirit. Taxation system should conform to the principles enshrined in this and other related
articles of the constitution to ensure fair and just socio-economic order. Fair taxation alone can
ensure growth, employment and equity.

Published in Daily Times, July 2nd, 2017.