Why should the appointing authority accept the tender of resignation in case of

silence of the law?

The 1880 US Supreme Court Case of Edwards v. United States (103 U.S. 471)
discussed the origin of the rule requiring acceptance as a prerequisite for an
effective resignation. The US Supreme Court in the case explained that “in England,
a person elected to a municipal office was obliged to accept it and perform its
duties, and he subjected himself to a penalty by refusal. An office was regarded as
a burden which the appointee was bound, in the interest of the community and of
good government, to bear.”
Governmental offices under the English rule is considered obligatory and therefore
a recognition of an absolute right of the officer to resign regardless of the wish of
his superiors would result in the destruction of the obligation of his office.1 As the
US Supreme Court in Edwards v. US puts it:
“[A] political organization would seem to be imperfect
which should allow the depositaries of its power to throw
off their responsibilities at their own pleasure.”
From this flowed the common law rule that “after an office was conferred and
assumed, it could not be laid down without the consent of the appointing power.
This was required in order that the public interests might suffer no inconvenience
for the want of public servants to execute the laws.”
This rule has been adopted by the Philippine Supreme Court. In the case of
Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres Catanduanes v. Court of Appeals,2 the Supreme
Court held that “resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to whom
they should be submitted, should be tendered to the appointing person or body.”
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the common law rule requiring the
acceptance of the appointing power is for the purpose of avoiding an interval

1
Goodnow, Frank J., Comparative Administrative Law, 2000 Edition, p. 92-93 citing Van Orsdell v. Hazard, 3 Hill N.
Y., 243.
2
G.R. No. 118883, January 16, 1998.
during which no one is available to exercise the duties or responsibilities of the
office.
It should therefore follow that the rationale of the rule designating the appointing
authority as the one to whom the resignation is to be tendered when the law is
silent on the matter is to ensure the continuity of the functions of the public office
involved since the appointing authority has the power to fill the vacancy.
This can also be gleaned from Justice Nachura’s Outline Reviewer in Political Law
wherein the author stated that when the law is silent on who shall accept the
resignation, it shall be the appointing authority to whom appointive officers shall
tender their resignation while in case of elective officers the ones “it shall be the
officers authorized by law to call an election, in order to fill the vacancy.”3

3
Nachura, Antonio E.B., Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2015 Edition, p. 588.