Ballesteros vs.

Rural Bank of Canaman

G.R. No. 176260

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing
the August 15, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 82711, modifying the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 (RTC-Iriga), in Civil Case No. IR-3128, by ordering the
consolidation of the said civil case with Special Proceeding Case No. M-5290 (liquidation case) before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59 (RTC-Makati).

It appears from the records that on March 17, 2000, petitioner Lucia Barrameda Vda. De
Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and
Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against her children, Roy, Rito, Amy, Arabel, Rico, Abe, Ponce
Rex and Adden, all surnamed Ballesteros, and the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the
RTC-Iriga. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. IR-3128.

In her complaint, Lucia alleged that her deceased husband, Eugenio, left two (2) parcels of land located in San
Nicolas, Baao, Camarines Sur, each with an area of 357 square meters; that on March 6, 1995, without her
knowledge and consent, her children executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver of the estate of her
husband wherein all the heirs, including Lucia, agreed to allot the two parcels to Rico Ballesteros (Rico); that, still,
without her knowledge and consent, Rico mortgaged Parcel B of the estate in favor of RBCI which mortgage was
being foreclosed for failure to settle the loan secured by the lot; and that Lucia was occupying Parcel B and had no
other place to live. She prayed that the deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver, and the subsequent mortgage in
favor of RBCI be declared null and void having been executed without her knowledge and consent.She also prayed
for damages.

In its Answer, RBCI claimed that in 1979, Lucia sold one of the two parcels to Rico which represented her share in
the estate of her husband. The extrajudicial partition, waiver and mortgage were all executed with the knowledge
and consent of Lucia although she was not able to sign the document. RBCI further claimed that Parcel B had
already been foreclosed way back in 1999 which fact was known to Lucia through the auctioning notary
public. Attorneys fees were pleaded as counterclaim.

The case was then set for pre-trial conference. During the pre-trial, RBCIs counsel filed a motion to withdraw after
being informed that Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) would handle the case as RBCI had already
been closed and placed under the receivership of the PDIC. Consequently, on February 4, 2002, the lawyers of
PDIC took over the case of RBCI.

On May 9, 2003, RBCI, through PDIC, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC-Iriga has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. RBCI stated that pursuant to Section 30, Republic Act No.
7653 (RA No. 7653), otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act, the RTC-Makati, already constituted itself,
per its Order dated August 10, 2001, as the liquidation court to assist PDIC in undertaking the liquidation of
RBCI. Thus, the subject matter of Civil Case No. IR-3128 fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of such liquidation
court. Lucia opposed the motion.

On July 29, 2003, the RTC-Iriga issued an order[2] granting the Motion to Dismiss, to wit:

This resolves the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc.,
premised on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. This
issue of jurisdiction was raised in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ong v. C.A.
253 SCRA 105 and in the case of Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., G.R. No. L-29791
dated January 10, 1978, wherein it was held that the liquidation court shall have jurisdiction to
adjudicate all claims against the bank whether they be against assets of the insolvent bank, for
Specific Performance, Breach of Contract, Damages or whatever.

It is in view of this jurisprudential pronouncement made by no less than the Supreme Court,
that this case is, as far as defendant Rural Bank of Canaman Inc., is concerned, hereby ordered
DISMISSED without prejudice on the part of the plaintiff to ventilate their claim before
the Liquidation Court now, RTC Branch 59, Makati City.

SO ORDERED.
Not in conformity, Lucia appealed the RTC ruling to the CA on the ground that the RTC-Iriga erred in dismissing
the case because it had jurisdiction over Civil Case No. IR-3128 under the rule on adherence of jurisdiction.

On August 15, 2006, the CA rendered the questioned decision ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. IR-
3128 and the liquidation case pending before RTC-Makati. The appellate court ratiocinated thus:

The consolidation is desirable in order to prevent confusion, to avoid multiplicity of suits and to
save unnecessary cost and expense. Needless to add, this procedure is well in accord with the
principle that the rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and
to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding (Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Yap, 126 SCRA 500 [1983]; Suntay v. Aguiluz, 209 SCRA 500
[1992] citing Ramos v. Ebarle, 182 SCRA 245 [1990]). It would be more in keeping with the
demands of equity if the cases are simply ordered consolidated. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1,
Revised Rules of Court, the rules on consolidation should be liberally construed to achieve the
object of the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases (Allied
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 371 [1996]).

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED, in

such a way that the dismissal of this case (Civil Case No. IR-3128) is set aside and in lieu thereof
another one is entered ordering the consolidation of said case with the liquidation case docketed as
Special Proceeding No. M-5290 before Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
entitled In Re: Assistance in the Judicial Liquidation of Rural Bank of Canaman, Camarines Sur,
Inc., Philippine Deposit Corporation, Petitioner. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Lucia filed a motion for reconsideration[4] but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 14,
[5]
2006.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following

GROUNDS

(I) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF IRIGA CITY, BRANCH 36 IS VESTED WITH
JURISDICTION TO CONTINUE TRYING AND ULTIMATELY DECIDE CIVIL CASE NO. IR-
3128.

(II) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING THE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. IR-3128 WITH THE
LIQUIDATION CASE DOCKETED AS SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. M-5290 BEFORE
BRANCH 59 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY.[6]

Given the foregoing arguments, the Court finds that the core issue to be resolved in this petition involves a
determination of whether a liquidation court can take cognizance of a case wherein the main cause of action is not
a simple money claim against a bank ordered closed, placed under receivership of the PDIC, and undergoing a
liquidation proceeding.

Lucia contends that the RTC-Iriga is vested with jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3128, the constitution of
the liquidation court notwithstanding. According to her, the case was filed before the RTC-Iriga on March 17,
2000 at the time RBCI was still doing business or before the defendant bank was placed under receivership of
PDIC in January 2001.

She further argues that the consolidation of the two cases is improper. Her case, which is for annulment of
deed of partition and waiver, deed of mortgage and damages, cannot be legally brought before the RTC-Makati
with the liquidation case considering that her cause of action against RBCI is not a simple claim arising out of a
creditor-debtor relationship, but one which involves her rights and interest over a certain property irregularly
acquired by RBCI. Neither is she a creditor of the bank, as only the creditors of the insolvent bank are allowed to
file and ventilate claims before the liquidator, pursuant to the August 10, 2001 Order of the RTC-Makati which
granted the petition for assistance in the liquidation of RBCI.
 In its Comment,[7] PDIC, as liquidator of RBCI, counters that the consolidation of Civil Case No. 3128 with
the liquidation proceeding is proper. It posits that the liquidation court of RBCI, having been established, shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all claims against the said bank.

After due consideration, the Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Lucias argument, that the RTC-Iriga is vested with jurisdiction to continue trying Civil Case No. IR-3128
until its final disposition, evidently falls out from a strained interpretation of the law and jurisprudence. She
contends that:

Since the RTC-Iriga has already obtained jurisdiction over the case it should continue
exercising such jurisdiction until the final termination of the case. The jurisdiction of a court once
attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction
until it finally disposes of the case (Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711).

When a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the case is not affected by a new legislation
transferring jurisdiction over such proceedings to another tribunal. (Alindao v. Joson, 264 SCRA
211). Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation (Bernate v.
Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 323).[8]

The afore-quoted cases, cited by Lucia to bolster the plea for the continuance of her case, find no
application in the case at bench.

Indeed, the Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be reminded
that such principle is not without exceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the CA on this matter, thus:
This Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of
jurisdiction. However, the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One
of the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character (Garcia v. Martinez,
90 SCRA 331 [1979]; Calderon, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 459 [1980]; Atlas Fertilizer
Corporation v. Navarro, 149 SCRA 432 [1987]; Abad v. RTC of Manila, Br. Lll, 154 SCRA 664
[1987]).

For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation
court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed
claims against the Bank. The interpretation of this Section (formerly Section 29, R.A. 265) becomes
more obvious in the light of its intent. In Manalo v. Court of Appeals (366 SCRA 752, [2001]), the
Supreme Court says:

xxx The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the
liquidation proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity
of actions against the insolvent bank and designed to establish due process and
orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations
and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness (citing Ong v. CA, 253 SCRA 105
[1996]). The lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if
possible, should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the
liquidation court should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his
operations (citing Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA 482
[1988]).[9]

As regards Lucias contention that jurisdiction already attached when Civil Case No. IR-3128 was filed with, and
jurisdiction obtained by, the RTC-Iriga prior to the filing of the liquidation case before the RTC-Makati, her stance
fails to persuade this Court. In refuting this assertion, respondent PDIC cited the case of Lipana v. Development
Bank of Rizal[10] where it was held that the time of the filing of the complaint is immaterial, viz:
It is the contention of petitioners, however, that the placing under receivership of
Respondent Bank long after the filing of the complaint removed it from the doctrine in the said
Morfe Case.

This contention is untenable. The time of the filing of the complaint is immaterial. It is the
execution that will obviously prejudice the other depositors and creditors.Moreover, as stated in the
 said Morfe case, the effect of the judgment is only to fix the amount of the debt, and not to give
priority over other depositors and creditors.

The cited Morfe case[11] held that after the Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent and has
ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors,
including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution are held in trust for the equal benefit of all
creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or a preference over another by an attachment,
execution or otherwise.

Thus, to allow Lucias case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a possibility of favorable
judgment and execution thereof against the assets of RBCI would not only prejudice the other creditors and
depositors but would defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted as well.

Anent the second issue, Lucia faults the CA in directing the consolidation of Civil Case No. IR-3128 with
Special Proceedings No. M-5290. The CA committed no error. Lucias complaint involving annulment of deed of
mortgage and damages falls within the purview of a disputed claim in contemplation of Section 30 of R.A. 7653
(The New Central Bank Act). The jurisdiction should be lodged with the liquidation court. Section 30 provides:
Sec. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. - Whenever, upon report of the head
of the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:
(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business:
Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by
financial panic in the banking community;
(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its
liabilities; or
(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or
creditors; or
(d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final,
involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution;
in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the
institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.

For a quasi-bank, any person of recognized competence in banking or finance may be

designated as receiver.

The receiver shall immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the
institution, administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercise the general powers of a
receiver under the Revised Rules of Court but shall not, with the exception of administrative
expenditures, pay or commit any act that will involve the transfer or disposition of any asset of the
institution: Provided, That the receiver may deposit or place the funds of the institution in non-
speculative investments. The receiver shall determine as soon as possible, but not later than ninety
(90) days from take over, whether the institution may be rehabilitated or otherwise placed in such a
condition that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and
the general public: Provided, That any determination for the resumption of business of the
institution shall be subject to prior approval of the Monetary Board.

If the receiver determines that the institution cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume
business in accordance with the next preceding paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in
writing the board of directors of its findings and direct the receiver to proceed with the liquidation
of the institution. The receiver shall:

(1) file ex parte with the proper regional trial court, and without requirement of prior notice
or any other action, a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the institution pursuant to a
liquidation plan adopted by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation for general application to
all closed banks. In case of quasi-banks, the liquidation plan shall be adopted by the Monetary
Board. Upon acquiring jurisdiction, the court shall, upon motion by the receiver after due notice,
adjudicate disputed claims against the institution, assist the enforcement of individual liabilities of
the stockholders, directors and officers, and decide on other issues as may be material to implement
the liquidation plan adopted. The receiver shall pay the cost of the proceedings from the assets of
the institution.

(2) convert the assets of the institution to money, dispose of the same to creditors and other
parties, for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution in accordance with the rules on
 concurrence and preference of credit under the Civil Code of the Philippines and he may, in the
name of the institution, and with the assistance of counsel as he may retain, institute such actions as
may be necessary to collect and recover accounts and assets of, or defend any action against, the
institution. The assets of an institution under receivership or liquidation shall be deemed in custodia
legis in the hands of the receiver and shall, from the moment the institution was placed under such
receivership or liquidation, be exempt from any order of garnishment, levy, attachment, or
execution. [Emphasis supplied]
xxx

Disputed claims refers to all claims, whether they be against the assets of the insolvent bank, for specific
performance, breach of contract, damages, or whatever. [12]Lucias action being a claim against RBCI can properly
be consolidated with the liquidation proceedings before the RTC-Makati. A liquidation proceeding has been
explained in the case of In Re: Petition For Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of BOKOD (Benguet),
Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue[13] as follows:

A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases

properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first phase is
concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking
the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a closed entity, all money claims against the
bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end with the declaration by
the liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also
end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified
whether it is ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the party
aggrieved thereby.

The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan prepared by
the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the total amount available for
distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue
of how much property is available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the
liquidation proceeding - payment of all allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal
priority and the approved distribution plan.

xxx

A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the Solicitor

General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation
of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with
the liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is
individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim
applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered separate
and distinct from the others. x x x [Emphasis supplied.]

It is clear, therefore, that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over all claims, including that of Lucia
against the insolvent bank. As declared in Miranda v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation,[14] regular courts
do not have jurisdiction over actions filed by claimants against an insolvent bank, unless there is a clear showing
that the action taken by the BSP, through the Monetary Board, in the closure of financial institutions was in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. The same is not obtaining in this present case.

The power and authority of the Monetary Board to close banks and liquidate them thereafter when public
interest so requires is an exercise of the police power of the State.Police power, however, is subject to judicial
inquiry. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably and could be set aside if it is either capricious,
discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust, or is tantamount to a denial of due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution.[15]

In sum, this Court holds that the consolidation is proper considering that the liquidation court has
jurisdiction over Lucias action. It would be more in keeping with law and equity if Lucias case is consolidated with
the liquidation case in order to expeditiously determine whether she is entitled to recover the property subject of
mortgage from RBCI and, if so, how much she is entitled to receive from the remaining assets of the bank.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
GARCIA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other
duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of five
percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including
crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently increased
from five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of Executive Order No.
443, dated 3 January 1991.

On 24 July 1991, the Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to initiate the process required by the
Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy on crude oil and other petroleum products, covered
by HS Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended.
Accordingly, the Tariff Commission, following the procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in
support of their respective positions.

Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, on 15 August 1991 reducing the rate of additional
duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude
oil and other oil products which continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the President a "Report on Special
Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products" dated 16 August 1991, for consideration and appropriate action. Seven (7)
days later, the President issued Executive Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in addition to the
aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special
duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the validity of Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides as follows:

Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President
may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of
revenue-generating measures.

Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders No. 475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, which Section authorizes the President, according to petitioner, to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or
to impose additional duties only when necessary to protect local industries or products but not for the purpose of
raising additional revenue for the government.
Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and second the legality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
and asks us to restrain the implementation of those Executive Orders. We will examine these questions in that
order.
Before doing so, however, the Court notes that the recent promulgation of Executive Order No. 507 did not render
the instant Petition moot and academic. Executive Order No. 517 which is dated 30 April 1992 provides as follows:

Sec. 1. Lifting of the Additional Duty. — The additional duty in the nature of ad valorem imposed
on all imported articles prescribed by the provisions of Executive Order No. 443, as amended, is
hereby lifted; Provided, however, that the selected articles covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09 and
 27.10 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, subject of Annex "A" hereof,
shall continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine (9%) percent ad valorem.

Under the above quoted provision, crude oil and other oil products continue to be subject to the additional
duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem under Executive Order No. 475 and to the special duty of P0.95 per
liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products under Executive Order No. 478.
Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather
than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted
instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations
and restrictions is [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . ."
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the
pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in relevant part:
Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of import duty under
Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued under Executive
Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby adopted and form part of this Code.
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of duty indicated in the
Section under this section except as otherwise specifically provided for in this Code: Provided, that,
the maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad valorem.
The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four Hundred One of
this Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by
the President upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:

Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject to the
limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase,
reduce or remove existing protective rates of import duty (including any necessary change in
classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in no case shall the reduced rate
of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased
rate of import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to
establish import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose
an additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, whenever necessary;
Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the
NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section One
hundred and four of this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.
b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA pursuant to the provisions
of this section, except in the imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad
valorem, the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the course of which they shall hold
public hearings wherein interested parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present,
produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the views and recommendations
of any government office, agency or instrumentality concerned. The Commission shall submit their
findings and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the termination of the
public hearings.
c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within the limits fixed in
subsection "a" shall include the authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the form of duty,
the corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty with respect to imports from the
principal competing foreign country for the most recent representative period shall be used as bases.
d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a copy of all customs
import entries as filed in the Bureau of Customs. The Commission or its duly authorized
 representatives shall have access to, and the right to copy all liquidated customs import entries and
other documents appended thereto as finally filed in the Commission on Audit.
e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this
section.
f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section shall take effect thirty
(30) days after promulgation, except in the imposition of additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per
cent ad valorem which shall take effect at the discretion of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated authorizations found in Sections 104 and 401 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, by contending that the President is authorized to act under the Tariff and Customs
Code only "to protect local industries and products for the sake of the national economy, general welfare and/or
national security." 2 He goes on to claim that:
E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having nothing to do whatsoever with the protection of local industries and
products for the sake of national economy, general welfare and/or national security. On the
contrary, they work in reverse, especially as to crude oil, an essential product which we do not have
to protect, since we produce only minimal quantities and have to import the rest of what we need.
These Executive Orders are avowedly solely to enable the government to raise government
finances, contrary to Sections 24 and 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution, as well as to Section
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. 3 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the language of either Section 104 or of 401 of the
Tariff and Customs Code that suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The entire contention of
petitioner is anchored on just two (2) words, one found in Section 401 (a)(1): "existing protective rates of import
duty," and the second in the proviso found at the end of Section 401 (a): "protection levels granted in Section 104
of this Code . . . . " We believe that the words "protective" and ''protection" are simply not enough to support the
very broad and encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.
In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which this Court may take
judicial notice — that the Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two (2)
principal traditional generators or producers of governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that generates lower but still comparable levels of
revenue for the government — The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].)

In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which
are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. 4 Thus, it has been held that "customs
duties" is "the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed
upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country." 5 The levying of customs duties on imported
goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries — where such local industries actually
exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties inevitably have
the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever,
designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense
of exactions the proceeds of which become public funds 6 — have either or both the generation of revenue and the
regulation of economic or social activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which,
in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the Philippines in fact
produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates
and a special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have some "protective" impact
upon indigenous oil production. For the effective, price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the
same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are raised by the imposition of such
increased tariff rates or special duty.

In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our constitutional and customs law, is a
stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the
exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be
exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists
that the "protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of that
delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the alpha and the omega of
"the national economy, general welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously
such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe,
for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at
the very least as important a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and national security" as the
protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of
protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and
subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.
It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly established and the corresponding customs duties
levied and collected upon articles and goods which are not found at all and not produced in the Philippines. The
Tariff and Customs Code is replete with such articles and commodities: among the more interesting examples
are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); castoreum or musk taken from the beaver (Chapter 5, 5.14); Olives (Chapter 7,
Notes); truffles or European fungi growing under the soil on tree roots (Chapter 7, Notes); dates (Chapter 8,
8.01); figs (Chapter 8, 8.03); caviar (Chapter 16, 16.01); aircraft (Chapter 88, 88.0l); special diagnostic
instruments and apparatus for human medicine and surgery (Chapter 90, Notes); X-ray generators; X-ray tubes;
X-ray screens, etc. (Chapter 90, 90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties may be seen to be imposed either for
revenue purposes purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage any importation of the items involved. In either
case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any
competing local industries to protect.

Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may be conceded to be
substantially moved by the desire to generate additional public revenues, are not, for that reason alone, either
constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner has not
successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and legality to which those Executive Orders are
entitled. 7

The conclusion we have reached above renders it unnecessary to deal with petitioner's additional contention that,
should Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 be declared unconstitutional and illegal, there should be a roll back of
prices of petroleum products equivalent to the "resulting excess money not be needed to adequately maintain the
Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)." 8

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 120011. September 7, 1999]

LT. COL. LINO A. SANCHEZ and MAJOR VICENTE S. MANAGAY, petitioners, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, THE OMBUDSMAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction assailing the resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division,[1] that denied petitioners' joint motion to dismiss Criminal Case No.
20461 against petitioners and Gaudencio Romualdez, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, as they were previously charged before the court martial with violation of Article 95, Com. Act No. 408,
as amended (Articles of War) involving the same facts as the charge of violation of R. A. No. 3019, Section 3 (e)
before the Sandiganbayan.

We grant the petition.

The facts may be related as follows:

Petitioners are officers of the Philippine Army (PA). Lt. Col. Lino A. Sanchez at times material hereto was
Commanding Officer, 9th Post Engineer Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Support Group (HHSG),
Philippine Army. Major Vicente S. Managay was G-4, HHSG, Philippine Army.

On February 4, 1993, Col. Celedonio Ancheta, pre-trial investigating officer, submitted a report to the
Commanding General, Philippine Army, stating that there was a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of
Article 95 of the Articles of War for causing the wrongful release of P599,547.00 for payment of repair/renovation
of G-10 Office, Philippine Army, equivalent to 88.55% completion of the work when in truth and in fact, only 25%
of the work had been completed, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

On the basis of the report, on June 16, 1993, the Judge Advocate, Philippine Army, initiated court martial
proceedings against petitioners before the Philippine Army Permanent General Court Martial No. 2. In addition, he
referred the findings to the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, recommending the filing of an information with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioners and Gaudencio Romualdez for violation of R. A. No. 3019.
On December 15, 1993, the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal endorsed the records to the Ombudsman.

Meantime, on April 8, 1994, petitioner Sanchez was arraigned before General Court Martial No. 2, Philippine
Army, and on July 1, 1994, petitioner Managay was arraigned before the same court martial. They pleaded not
guilty.

On April 18, 1994, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an information against petitioners Lino A.
Sanchez and Vicente S. Managay and Gaudencio Romualdez, for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Section 3 (e).[2]

On September 1, 1994, petitioners filed a joint motion to dismiss the case before the respondent Sandiganbayan on
the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the case.

On September 13, 1994, the Special Prosecutor filed an opposition/comment to the motion to dismiss.

On March 14, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, issued a resolution denying the motion to dismiss, for
lack of merit, ruling that the offenses charged in the court martial and the information before the Sandiganbayan
are distinct and separate from each other.

On March 15, 1995, petitioners were arraigned before the Sandiganbayan. They pleaded not guilty.

On March 27, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial reiterating that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the case as the court martial had acquired original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case,
pursuant to R. A. No. 7055, and that the acts complained of in the charge sheet in the court martial and the
Information before the Sandiganbayan were the same or identical.

On April 19, 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

On June 5, 1995, the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on the petition, not to file a motion to
dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice.[3]

On July 25, 1995, respondent Ombudsman filed his comment.[4]

In his comment, the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, acknowledged the recent enactment of
Republic Act No. 7975, approved on March 30, 1995, under which the Sandiganbayan "lost" its jurisdiction over
the case primarily because the public officials charged, petitioners herein, were officers of the Philippine Army
below the rank of full colonel. Hence, in the words of the Special Prosecutor, "necessarily the herein criminal case
No. 20461 against petitioners should be referred to the proper court as trial has not begun in the public respondent
Sandiganbayan."[5] Regrettably, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration even when at
the time it was resolved Republic Act No. 7975 was in effect, and its enactment was precisely to declog its docket
of "small fry" cases.

Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction at the time the charge was filed on April 18, 1994, it no longer has
jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act No. 7976, enacted on March 30, 1995, or even under Republic Act
No. 8249, enacted on February 5, 1997.

In thus denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration seeking to dismiss the information against them, the
Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan, dated March 14, 1995, and April 19, 1995, in Criminal Case No. 20461.

The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to forthwith refer Criminal Case No. 20461 to the proper court and to inform
this Court of the action taken hereon within fifteen (15) days from notice.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated
January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:

The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority
of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive
authority;
The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to
litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be
raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable
Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past,
. . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of
the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving
heinous crimes.
The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and
duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of
its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters
involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction;
and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress
convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No.
117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court.
The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal
Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in
its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated
January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing
to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor
General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction
over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents
are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as
important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the
Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and
bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry
of Judgment in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this Office,
the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No.
8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17
contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b)
Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and
unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict
and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the
aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately
amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.
Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP

Acting Chief

Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas,
filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations
as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and
unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented
until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight
clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General,
the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same
judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2

xxx xxx xxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the
judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the
jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter
terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.5

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First
Instance, 6 viz:

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject,
that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change
or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in
issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with
reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ
of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no
power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it
must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this
point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on
the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion
(arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to
render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court
can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by
direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . .
. and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative
duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the
application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and
so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal,
is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and
compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control
of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135
provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It
bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable
time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to
popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.1âwphi1.nêt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to
restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of
republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord
with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the
assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of
execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule
120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words
of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to
this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII
provides:

Sec.13.The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10
Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of
law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation;
it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on
the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12
The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice
of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified
the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More
completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to
it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the
rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted
for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the
1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do,
that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and
which it has exercised since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and
supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and
executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less
than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion
to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a
certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of
death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution
date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting
the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution
deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as
renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern,
and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for
the exercise of his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter
8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code,
insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative
to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits
the exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which
provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone
the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise
date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the
convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date at execution set by
the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to herein respondent and
the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and
State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary
act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot
be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art.
III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the
Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by
his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's
right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on
the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted
the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December
15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from
contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend
on the convenience of litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final
and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting
the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents
cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The
provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth,
an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot
be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process
of law will prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No.
7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to
amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the
United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts
and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to
grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life
of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper
perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner
filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several
grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of
Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital
punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and
that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President
Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death
penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman
Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume
session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on
January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours
to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of
resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law
are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's
allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was
also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new
members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different
from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No.
8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly
a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment
but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was
temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of
Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The
extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not
stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life
was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority
felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law
and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue
whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite
posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law.
He names these supervening events as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving
heinous crimes.
The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution
No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty,
notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on
this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty
law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session
yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of
Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House
Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act
7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review
of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be
lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been
the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In
our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of
capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and
anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more
than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the
overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of
this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds
us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of
justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be
blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the
mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass
their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of
law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.

Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.

Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court,
who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences
imposed by Regional Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that Congress
would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the
government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after
deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused
or recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further
done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations
The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing
before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches
that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court
may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice or when supervening events warrant it.1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man,
whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs.
Judge of First Instance of Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus —

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject,
that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed,
the court can not change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according
to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the
event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not
follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the execution
itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely
under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except
to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it
must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this
point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on
the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion
(arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to
render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court
can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by
direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering
the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the
execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement . . ..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to
grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could
benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and
may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court
would not prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure
that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with
the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification
of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that
the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to
yet expect any chance for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate
why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and
dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second
look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People
vs. Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty
law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making authority,
the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That
there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense
must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of
the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of
it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from
that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at
the enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively
inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that would
characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty
must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its
power of judicial review given the circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would
become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a
painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is callously humiliated or even
brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts
to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what
might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders to the great
prejudice of victims and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so
hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue
to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is
fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant
petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else, however,
must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain
my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current
session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or amendment,
the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death
penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof
prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons"
prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in
various death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January 4,
1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of law
(or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally
nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to
implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both
RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by
means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the
accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law
reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his
previous counsel,3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its
Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death.4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even
in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to
reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a
retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the
death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction
to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that,
while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws
and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas
ex-claimed,6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-
imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of
the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the provision and
made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to
a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of
constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes
but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on
condition that it (Congress)9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the
Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute.
Rather, it is strictly limited:

by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling
reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore
the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain
crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty)
(1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13
and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special
laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast
in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or
individually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and
(2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating
circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the
Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in
excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully
submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous"
crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA
7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not
give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I
concede that Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it
included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a
heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying
its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of
heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an
objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as
rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this
case, it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable
penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery,17 no new
crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already to punishable by
the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of
Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws which, before
abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior
to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the
Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it
would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the
intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and
subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter
debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by
Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez
agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did
not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates
were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on
"heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing and already
penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:

the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of
perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to
show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of
extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in
the same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier
penalty is prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and
inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never
be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization
of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the
future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation
(during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the
return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer
to questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as
an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order
situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that
answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the
death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized society
governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the
offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the compelling
reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would supervene or come after the
approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for
the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people
ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of the
seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be
meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice".
With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed
deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police
show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in
fact declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was
enacted. Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the volume of
murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime
rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that
correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we
know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman
tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery
cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The
volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not want to say
that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested
in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in
1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure
continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition
"would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof,
empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the
prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a
theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to
crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk,
expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate
can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed
burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As
such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception
thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right
pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life
— life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by
its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is
arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the
mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced
ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for life
more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of
death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even religion. But the most
basic and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment,
utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against
the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free
Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there
were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per
month; double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the
number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly
average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while
approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000
monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between
P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000
comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen
percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five
percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a
month.
Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated
minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by government.
Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only
one (1) earns P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance
basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn
nothing at all.
In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal
husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the
transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry,
painting, welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck
helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with
fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers
(butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and
four (4) clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk) About four percent (4%) are government workers, with
six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative
employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less
than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand
Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One
(1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying
levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent
(35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating
from high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA
7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the legal services
necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required. The
best example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of
constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free
legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible
language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of
having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the
latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of
justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are
in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law
reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the
underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex
and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating,
whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that,
whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people in our
society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are
consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel
neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither
improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be said to help improve
their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the
non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of
protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of
themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a
position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves
individually to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor
provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the
ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which
penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better.
This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or
prohibit its imposition.

(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty, which is really
a species of the right to life.

(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused because such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal
justice to the underprivileged.

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside.

(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances
define or characterize the crime as "heinous".

Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the
Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They
must both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each
and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino
people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people
belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such
prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must
be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in
cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which
is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both
are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which
man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment
only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of
"absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its
constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined
"heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words
"DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes
mentioned in its text.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court,
who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences
imposed by Regional Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that Congress
would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the
government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after
deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused
or recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further
done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations
The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing
before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches
that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court
may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice or when supervening events warrant it.1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man,
whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs.
Judge of First Instance of Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus —

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject,
that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed,
the court can not change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according
to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the
event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not
follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the execution
itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely
under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except
to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it
must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this
point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on
the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion
(arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to
render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court
can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by
direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering
the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the
execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement . . ..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to
grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could
benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and
may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court
would not prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure
that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with
the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification
of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that
the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to
yet expect any chance for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate
why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and
dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second
look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People
vs. Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty
law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making authority,
the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That
there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense
must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of
the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of
it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from
that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at
the enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively
inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that would
characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty
must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its
power of judicial review given the circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would
become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a
painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is callously humiliated or even
brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts
to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what
might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders to the great
prejudice of victims and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so
hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue
to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is
fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant
petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else, however,
must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain
my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current
session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or amendment,
the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death
penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof
prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons"
prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in
various death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January 4,
1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of law
(or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally
nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to
implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both
RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by
means of lethal injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the
accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law
reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his
previous counsel,3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its
Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death.4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even
in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to
reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a
retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the
death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction
to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that,
while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws
and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas
ex-claimed,6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-
imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of
the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the provision and
made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to
a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of
constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes
but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on
condition that it (Congress)9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the
Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute.
Rather, it is strictly limited:

by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling
reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore
the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain
crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA

7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12
(2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special
laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast
in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or
individually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and
(2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating
circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the
Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in
excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully
submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous"
crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA
7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not
give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I
concede that Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it
included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a
heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying
its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of
heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an
objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as
rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this
case, it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable
penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery,17 no new
crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already to punishable by
the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of
Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws which, before
abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior
to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the
Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it
would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the
intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and
subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter
debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by
Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez
agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did
not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates
were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on
"heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing and already
penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:

the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of
perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to
show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude
of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in
the same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier
penalty is prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and
inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never
be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization
of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the
future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation
(during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the
return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer
to questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as
an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order
situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that
answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the
death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized society
governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the
offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the compelling
reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would supervene or come after the
approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for
the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people
ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of the
seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be
meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice".
With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed
deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police
show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in
fact declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was
enacted. Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the volume of
murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime
rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that
correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we
know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman
tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery
cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from the same document.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The
volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not want to say
that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested
in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases
were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in
1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure
continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition
"would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof,
empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the
prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a
theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to
crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk,
expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate
can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed
burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As
such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception
thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right
pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life
— life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by
its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is
arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the
mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced
ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for life
more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of
death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even religion. But the most
basic and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment,
utility and expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against
the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free
Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there
were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per
month; double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the
number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly
average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while
approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000
monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between
P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000
comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen
percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five
percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a
month.
Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated
minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by government.
Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only
one (1) earns P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance
basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn
nothing at all.
In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal
husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the
transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry,
painting, welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck
helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with
fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers
(butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and
four (4) clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk) About four percent (4%) are government workers, with
six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative
employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less
than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand
Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One
(1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying
levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent
(35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating
from high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA
7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the legal services
necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required. The
best example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of
constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free
legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible
language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of
having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the
latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of
justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are
in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law
reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the
underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex
and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating,
whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that,
whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people in our
society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are
consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel
neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither
improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be said to help improve
their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the
non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of
protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of
themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a
position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves
individually to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor
provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the
ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which
penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better.
This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its
imposition.
The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty, which is really a
species of the right to life.
Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused because such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal
justice to the underprivileged.
Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances
define or characterize the crime as "heinous".
Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the
Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They
must both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.
In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and
every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino
people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people
belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such
prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must
be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in
cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which
is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both
are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which
man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment
only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of
"absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its
constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined
"heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words
"DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes
mentioned in its text.

G.R. No. 204689, January 21, 2015

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES RUNE AND LEA STROEM,
Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

For resolution is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated
November 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96017. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 in Civil Case No. 02-1108 for collection of a sum of
money.

This case involves the proper invocation of the Construction Industry Arbitration Committee’s (CIAC) jurisdiction
through an arbitration clause in a construction contract. The main issue here is whether the dispute — liability of a
surety under a performance bond — is connected to a construction contract and, therefore, falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CIAC.

Spouses Rune and Lea Stroem (Spouses Stroem) entered into an Owners-Contractor Agreement4 with Asis-Leif &
Company, Inc. (Asis-Leif) for the construction of a two-storey house on the lot owned by Spouses Stroem. The lot
was located at Lot 4A, Block 24, Don Celso Tuason Street, Valley Golf Subdivision, Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo,
Rizal.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On November 15, 1999, pursuant to the agreement, Asis-Leif secured Performance Bond No. LP/G(13)83056 in
the amount of P4,500,000.00 from Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronghold).6 Stronghold and Asis-Leif,
through Ms. Ma. Cynthia Asis-Leif, bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the Spouses Stroem the agreed
amount in the event that the construction project is not completed.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Asis-Leif failed to finish the project on time despite repeated demands of the Spouses
Stroem.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Spouses Stroem subsequently rescinded the agreement.9 They then hired an independent appraiser to evaluate the
progress of the construction project.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Appraiser Asian Appraisal Company, Inc.’s evaluation resulted in the following percentage of completion: 47.53%
of the residential building, 65.62% of the garage, and 13.32% of the swimming pool, fence, gate, and land
development.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On April 5, 2001, Stronghold sent a letter to Asis-Leif requesting that the company settle its obligations with the
Spouses Stroem. No response was received from Asis-Leif.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On September 12, 2002, the Spouses Stroem filed a Complaint (with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment)13 for
breach of contract and for sum of money with a claim for damages against Asis-Leif, Ms. Cynthia Asis-Leif, and
Stronghold.14 Only Stronghold was served summons. Ms. Cynthia Asis-Leif allegedly absconded and moved out
of the country.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On July 13, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment in favor of the Spouses Stroem. The trial court
ordered Stronghold to pay the Spouses Stroem ?4,500,000.00 with 6% legal interest from the time of first
demand.16 The dispositive portion of the trial court Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs’ cause of action to be sufficiently established being supported by evidence on
records, judgement is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff spouses Rune and Lea Stroem and against the
defendant Stronghold Insurance Company Incorporated ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff the sums
of:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1) Php4,500,000.00 with six (6%) percent legal interest from the time of first demand and interest due shall earn
legal interest from the time of judicial demand until fully paid.

2) Php35,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses.

Defendant is further ordered to pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.17

Both Stronghold and the Spouses Stroem appealed to the Court of Appeals.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court’s Decision. It increased the amount of attorney’s
fees to ?50,000.00.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Stronghold Company, Inc[.] is DISMISSED, while the appeal of spouses Rune and
Lea Stroem is PARTLY GRANTED. The November 27, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s fees is increased to P50,000.00

SO ORDERED.20

On March 20, 2013, this court required the Spouses Stroem to submit their Comment on the
Petition.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We noted the Spouses Stroem’s Comment on July 31, 2013.22 We also required Stronghold to file its Reply to the
Comment,23 which was noted on December 9, 2013.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Stronghold argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error when it upheld the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.25 The lower courts should
have dismissed the case in view of the arbitration clause in the agreement and considering that “[Republic Act No.
876] explicitly confines the court’s authority only to pass upon the issue of whether there is [an] agreement . . .
providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute ordains that the court shall issue an order ‘summarily
directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms
thereof.’”26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Moreover, “the stipulations in said Agreement are part and parcel of the conditions in the bond. Were it not for
such stipulations in said agreement, [Stronghold] would not have agreed to issue a bond in favor of the Spouses
Stroem. The parties to the bond are ALB/Ms. Asis-[L]eif, Spouses Stroem and [Stronghold] such that ALB/Ms.
Asis-[L]eif never ceased to be a party to the surety agreement.”27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In any case, Stronghold’s liability under the performance bond is limited only to additional costs for the completion
of the project.28 In addition, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Stronghold changed its theory with regard
to the notice requirement29 and in modifying the trial court’s award of attorney’s
fees.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, the Spouses Stroem argue that Stronghold committed forum shopping warranting dismissal of
the case.31 According to the Spouses Stroem, Stronghold deliberately committed forum shopping when it filed the
present petition despite the pendency of the Spouses Stroem’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals Decision dated November 20, 2012.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

More importantly, the Owners-Contractor Agreement is “separate and distinct from the Bond. The parties to the
Agreement are ALB/Ms. Asis-Leif and Spouses Stroem, while the parties to the Bond are Spouses Stroem and
Stronghold. The considerations for the two contracts are likewise distinct. Thus, the arbitration clause in the
Agreement is binding only on the parties thereto, specifically ALB/Ms. Asis-Leif and Spouses
Stroem[.]”33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Contrary to Stronghold’s argument, Spouses Stroem argues that stronghold is liable for the full amount of the
performance bond. The terms of the bond clearly show that Stronghold is liable as surety.34 Verily, notice to
Stronghold is not required for its liability to attach.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The issues for consideration are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1)
Whether the dispute involves a construction contract;
(2)
Whether the CIAC has exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties;
(3)
Whether the Regional Trial Court should have dismissed the petition outright as required by law and jurisprudence
and referred the matter to the CIAC; and
(4)
Whether petitioner Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. is liable under Performance Bond No. LP/G(13)83056.
(a)
Whether petitioner Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. is only liable as to the extent of any additional cost for the
completion of the project due to any increase in prices for labor and materials.
(b)
Whether the case involves ordinary suretyship or corporate suretyship.

After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case, this court resolves to deny the Petition.

On forum-shopping

Respondents argue that petitioner committed forum shopping; hence, the case should have been dismissed outright.

Records show that petitioner received a copy of the Decision of the Court of Appeals on December 5, 2012.36
Petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision. It filed before this court a Motion for
Extension of Time To File Petition for Review requesting an additional period of 30 days from December 20, 2012
or until January 19, 2013 to file the Petition.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondents filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision on December 11,
2012.38 They sought the modification of the Decision as to the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondents alleged in their Comment that as early as January 9, 2013, petitioner received a copy of the Court of
Appeals’ Resolution requiring Comment on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration.40 Still, petitioner did not
disclose in its Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping the pendency of respondents’ Motion for
Partial Reconsideration.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For its part, petitioner claims that it did not commit forum shopping. It fully disclosed in its Petition that what it
sought to be reviewed was the Decision dated November 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals. “Petitioner merely
exercised its available remedy with respect to the Decision of the Court of Appeals by filing [the] Petition.”42
What the rules mandate to be stated in the Certification Against Forum Shopping is the status of “any other action.”
This other action involves the same issues and parties but is an entirely different case.

Indeed, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

There is forum shopping when:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari)
in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with
litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending[.]43 (Citation omitted)

This court has enumerated the elements of forum-shopping: “(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such
that any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the other case.”44chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Rule 42, Section 245 in relation to Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court mandates petitioner to submit a
Certification Against Forum Shopping and promptly inform this court about the pendency of any similar action or
proceeding before other courts or tribunals. The rule’s purpose is to deter the unethical practice of pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different forums, which “wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure.”46 Failure to
comply with the rule is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.47chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Records show that petitioner’s duly authorized officer certified the following on January 21,
2013:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4. I further certify that: (a) I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of my knowledge, no such action
or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any tribunal
or agency; (c) if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and such tribunal or agency of the fact within five (5) days therefrom.48

Petitioner failed to carry out its duty of promptly informing this court of any pending action or proceeding before
this court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency. This court cannot countenance petitioner’s
disregard of the rules.

This court has held before that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[u]ltimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies
to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.49
(Emphasis supplied)

On this basis, this case should be dismissed.

On arbitration and the CIAC’s jurisdiction

Petitioner changed the theory of its case since its participation in the trial court proceedings. It raised the issue of
lack of jurisdiction in view of an arbitration agreement for the first time.

Generally, parties may not raise issues for the first time on appeal.50 Such practice is violative of the rules and due
process and is frowned upon by the courts. However, it is also well-settled that jurisdiction can never be waived or
acquired by estoppel.51 Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law.52 “Lack of jurisdiction of the
court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, by acquiescence, or even by
express consent of the parties.”53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 4 of Executive Order No. 100854 is clear in defining the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CIAC:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 4. Jurisdiction – The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or
connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute
arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes
may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must
agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.

The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and
workmanship; violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual time and delays;
maintenance and defects; payment, default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost.

Excluded from the coverage of this law are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which shall
continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 35 of Republic Act No. 9285 or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 35. Coverage of the Law. - Construction disputes which fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (the “Commission”) shall include those between or among
parties to, or who are otherwise bound by, an arbitration agreement, directly or by reference whether such parties
are project owner, contractor, subcontractor, quantity surveyor, bondsman or issuer of an insurance policy in a
construction project.

The Commission shall continue to exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over construction disputes although
the arbitration is “commercial” pursuant to Section 21 of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)

In Heunghwa Industry Co., Ltd., v. DJ Builders Corporation,55 this court held that “there are two acts which may
vest the CIAC with jurisdiction over a construction dispute. One is the presence of an arbitration clause in a
construction contract, and the other is the agreement by the parties to submit the dispute to the
CIAC.”56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This court has ruled that when a dispute arises from a construction contract, the CIAC has exclusive and original
jurisdiction.57 Construction has been defined as referring to “all on-site works on buildings or altering structures,
from land clearance through completion including excavation, erection and assembly and installation of
components and equipment.”58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this case, there is no dispute as to whether the Owners-Contractor Agreement between Asis-Leif and respondents
is a construction contract. Petitioner and respondents recognize that CIAC has jurisdiction over disputes arising
from the agreement.

What is at issue in this case is the parties’ agreement, or lack thereof, to submit the case to arbitration.
Respondents argue that petitioner is not a party to the arbitration agreement. Petitioner did not consent to
arbitration. It is only respondent and Asis-Leif that may invoke the arbitration clause in the contract.

This court has previously held that a performance bond, which is meant “to guarantee the supply of labor,
materials, tools, equipment, and necessary supervision to complete the project[,]”59 is significantly and
substantially connected to the construction contract and, therefore, falls under the jurisdiction of the
CIAC.60chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc. v. Anscor Land, Inc.61 involved circumstances similar to the present case.
In Prudential, property owner Anscor Land, Inc. (ALI) entered into a contract for the construction of an eight-unit
townhouse located in Capitol Hills, Quezon City with contractor Kraft Realty and Development Corporation
(KRDC).62 KRDC secured the completion of the construction project through a surety and performance bond
issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc. (PGAI).63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The delay in the construction project resulted in ALI’s termination of the contract and claim against the
performance bond.64 “ALI [subsequently] commenced arbitration proceedings against KRDC and PGAI in the
CIAC.”65 PGAI, however, argued that it was not a party to the construction
contract.66chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CIAC ruled that PGAI was not liable under the performance bond.67 Upon review, the Court of Appeals held
that PGAI was jointly and severally liable with KRDC under the performance bond.68chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

PGAI appealed the Court of Appeals Decision and claimed that CIAC did not have jurisdiction over the
performance bond.69 This court ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A guarantee or a surety contract under Article 2047 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is an accessory contract
because it is dependent for its existence upon the principal obligation guaranteed by it.

In fact, the primary and only reason behind the acquisition of the performance bond by KRDC was to guarantee to
ALI that the construction project would proceed in accordance with the contract terms and conditions. In effect,
the performance bond becomes liable for the completion of the construction project in the event KRDC fails in its
contractual undertaking.

Because of the performance bond, the construction contract between ALI and KRDC is guaranteed to be performed
even if KRDC fails in its obligation. In practice, a performance bond is usually a condition or a necessary
component of construction contracts. In the case at bar, the performance bond was so connected with the
construction contract that the former was agreed by the parties to be a condition for the latter to push through and
at the same time, the former is reliant on the latter for its existence as an accessory contract.

Although not the construction contract itself, the performance bond is deemed as an associate of the main
construction contract that it cannot be separated or severed from its principal. The Performance Bond is
significantly and substantially connected to the construction contract that there can be no doubt it is the CIAC,
under Section 4 of EO No. 1008, which has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from or connected with it.70
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

At first look, the Owners-Contractor Agreement and the performance bond reference each other; the performance
bond was issued pursuant to the construction agreement.

A performance bond is a kind of suretyship agreement. A suretyship agreement is an agreement “whereby a party,
called the surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or
undertaking in favor of another party, called the obligee.”71 In the same vein, a performance bond is “designed to
afford the project owner security that the . . . contractor, will faithfully comply with the requirements of the
contract . . . and make good [on the] damages sustained by the project owner in case of the contractor’s failure to so
perform.”72chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is settled that the surety’s solidary obligation for the performance of the principal debtor’s obligation is indirect
and merely secondary.73 Nevertheless, the surety’s liability to the “creditor or promisee of the principal is said to
be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is directly and equally bound with the
principal.”74chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Verily, “[i]n enforcing a surety contract, the ‘complementary-contracts-construed-together’ doctrine finds

application. According to this principle, an accessory contract must be read in its entirety and together with the
principal agreement.”75 Article 1374 of the Civil Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that
sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.

Applying the “complementary-contracts-construed-together” doctrine, this court in Prudential held that the surety
willingly acceded to the terms of the construction contract despite the silence of the performance bond as to
arbitration:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the case at bar, the performance bond was silent with regard to arbitration. On the other hand, the construction
contract was clear as to arbitration in the event of disputes. Applying the said doctrine, we rule that the silence of
the accessory contract in this case could only be construed as acquiescence to the main contract. The construction
contract breathes life into the performance bond. We are not ready to assume that the performance bond contains
reservations with regard to some of the terms and conditions in the construction contract where in fact it is silent.
On the other hand, it is more reasonable to assume that the party who issued the performance bond carefully and
meticulously studied the construction contract that it guaranteed, and if it had reservations, it would have and
should have mentioned them in the surety contract.76 (Emphasis supplied)

This court, however, cannot apply the ruling in Prudential to the present case. Several factors militate against
petitioner’s claim.

The contractual stipulations in this case and in Prudential are different. The relevant provisions of the Owners-
Contractor Agreement in this case state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE 5. THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS

The following documents prepared by the CONTRACTOR shall constitute an integral part of this contract as fully
as if hereto attached or herein stated, except as otherwise modified by mutual agreement of parties, and attached to
this agreement.

Attachment 5.1
Working Drawings
Attachment 5.2
Outline Specifications
Attachment 5.3
Bill of Quantities
Attachment 5.4
CONTRACTOR Business License

. . . .cralawred

ARTICLE 7. PERFORMANCE (SURETY) BOND

7.1 Within 30 days of the signing of this agreement, CONTRACTOR shall provide to OWNERS a performance
bond, issued by a duly licensed authority acceptable to the OWNERS, and equal to the amount of PHP
4,500,000.00 (Four Million and Five Hundred Thousand Philippine Pesos), with the OWNERS as beneficiary.

7.2 The performance bond will guarantee the satisfactory and faithful performance by the CONTRACTOR of all
provisions stated within this contract.

ARTICLE 8. ARBITRATION

8.1 Any dispute between the parties hereto which cannot be amicably settled shall be finally settled by arbitration
in accordance with the provision of Republic Act 876, of The Philippines, as amended by the Executive Order 1008
dated February 4, 1985.77 (Emphasis in the original)

In contrast, the provisions of the construction contract in Prudential provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 1
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS

1.1 The following shall form part of this Contract and together with this Contract, are known as the “Contract
Documents”:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a. Bid Proposal

....

d. Notice to proceed

....

j. Appendices A & B (respectively, Surety Bond for Performance and, Supply of Materials by the Developer)78
(Emphasis supplied)

This court in Prudential held that the construction contract expressly incorporated the performance bond into the
contract.79 In the present case, Article 7 of the Owners-Contractor Agreement merely stated that a performance
bond shall be issued in favor of respondents, in which case petitioner and Asis-Leif Builders and/or Ms. Ma.
Cynthia Asis-Leif shall pay P4,500,000.00 in the event that Asis-Leif fails to perform its duty under the Owners-
Contractor Agreement.80 Consequently, the performance bond merely referenced the contract entered into by
respondents and Asis-Leif, which pertained to Asis-Leif’s duty to construct a two-storey residence building with
attic, pool, and landscaping over respondents’ property.81chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To be clear, it is in the Owners-Contractor Agreement that the arbitration clause is found. The construction
agreement was signed only by respondents and the contractor, Asis-Leif, as represented by Ms. Ma. Cynthia Asis-
Leif. It is basic that “[c]ontracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs[.]”82 Not being a
party to the construction agreement, petitioner cannot invoke the arbitration clause. Petitioner, thus, cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
Moreover, petitioner’s invocation of the arbitration clause defeats the purpose of arbitration in relation to the
construction business. The state has continuously encouraged the use of dispute resolution mechanisms to promote
party autonomy.83 In LICOMCEN, Incorporated v. Foundation Specialists, Inc.,84 this court upheld the CIAC’s
jurisdiction in line with the state’s policy to promote arbitration:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The CIAC was created through Executive Order No. 1008 (E.O. 1008), in recognition of the need to establish an
arbitral machinery that would expeditiously settle construction industry disputes. The prompt resolution of
problems arising from or connected with the construction industry was considered of necessary and vital for the
fulfillment of national development goals, as the construction industry provides employment to a large segment of
the national labor force and is a leading contributor to the gross national product.85 (Citation omitted)

However, where a surety in a construction contract actively participates in a collection suit, it is estopped from
raising jurisdiction later. Assuming that petitioner is privy to the construction agreement, we cannot allow
petitioner to invoke arbitration at this late stage of the proceedings since to do so would go against the law’s goal of
prompt resolution of cases in the construction industry.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The case is DISMISSED. Petitioner’s counsel is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition or similar violation of the rule on Certification Against Forum Shopping will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 193253, September 08, 2015

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE AGNES VST DEVANADERA, ACTING

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; HONORABLE JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, PEDRITO L.
RANCES, ARMAN A. DE ANDRES, PAUL CHI TING CO, KENNETH PUNDANERA, MANUEL T. CO,
SALLY L. CO, STANLEY L. TAN, ROCHELLE E. VICENCIO, LIZA R. MAGAWAY, JANICE L. CO,
VIVENCIO ABAÑO, GREG YU, EDWIN AGUSTIN, VICTOR D. PIAMONTE, UNIOIL PETROLEUM
PHILIPPINES, INC., AND OILINK, INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and
set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated March 26, 20101 and August 4, 2010,2 and to reinstate the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 113069, or in the alternative, to issue a decision finding probable cause to
prosecute the private respondents for violation of Sections 3601 and 3602, in relation to Sections 2503 and 2530,
paragraphs f and 1 (3), (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), as amended.

The antecedents are as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in marketing, distribution, and sale of
petroleum, oil and other products, while its co-respondent OILINK International, Inc. is engaged in manufacturing,
importing, exporting, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in at wholesale and retails of petroleum, oil, gas and of
any and all refinements and byproducts thereof. Except for respondent Victor D. Piamonte who is a Licensed
Customs Broker, the following private respondents are either officers or directors of UNIOIL or
OILINK:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Paul Chi Ting Co - Chairman of UNIOIL and OILINK

2. Kenneth Pundanera - President/Director of UNIOIL
3. Manuel T. Co - Officer/Director of UNIOIL
4. Sally L. Co - Officer/Director of UNIOIL
5. Stanley L. Tan - Officer/Director of UNIOIL
6. Rochelle E. Vicencio - Corporate Administrative Supervisor of UNIOIL
7. Liza R. Magaway - President of OILINK
8. Janice L. Co - Director of OILINK
9. Vivencio Abaño - Director of OILINK
10. Greg Yu - Director of OILINK
11. Edwin Agustin - Corporate Secretary of OILINK

On January 30, 2007, Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales of petitioner Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Audit
Notification Letter (ANL) No. 0701246,3 informing the President of OILINK that the Post Entry Audit Group
(PEAG) of the BOC will be conducting a compliance audit, including the examination, inspection, verification
and/or investigation of all pertinent records of OILINK's import transactions for the past three (3)-year period
counted from the said date.

On March 2, 2007, a pre-audit conference was held between the BOC Audit Team4 and the representatives of
OILINK.5 During the conference, the Audit Team explained to OILINK representatives the purpose of the post-
entry audit and the manner by which it would be conducted, and advised it as to the import documents required for
such audit.

On March 14, 2007, OILINK submitted to the Audit Team the following documents: Post-Entry Audit Group
General Customs Questionnaire, General Information Sheet for the year 2006, SEC Registration, Articles of
Incorporation, Company By-laws, and Audited Financial Report for the year 2005.

On April 20, 2007, the Audit Team requested OILINK to submit the other documents stated in the List of Initial
Requirements for Submission, namely: 2004 Audited Financial Report, 2004-2006 Quarterly VAT Returns with the
accompanying schedule of importations, Organizational chart/structure, and List of foreign suppliers with details
on the products imported and the total amount, on a yearly basis.

On May 7, 2007, OILINK expressed its willingness to comply with the request for the production of the said
documents, but claimed that it was hampered by the resignation of its employees from the Accounting and Supply
Department. OILINK also averred that it would refer the matter to the Commissioner of Customs in view of the
independent investigation being conducted by the latter.

On June 4, 2007, OILINK sent a letter stating that the documents which the Audit Team previously requested were
available with the Special Committee of the BOC, and that it could not open in the meantime its Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) - registered books of accounts for validation and review purposes.

In a letter dated July 11, 2007, the Audit Team informed OILINK of the adverse effects of its request for the
postponement of the exit conference and its continuous refusal to furnish it the required documents. It advised
OILINK that such acts constitute as waiver on its part to be informed of the audit findings and an administrative
case would be filed against it, without prejudice to the filing of a criminal action.

On July 24, 2007, Commissioner Morales approved the filing of an administrative case against OILINK for failure
to comply with the requirements of Customs Administrative Order (CAO) No. 4-2004.6 Such case was filed on
July 30, 2007.

On September 20, 2007, an Order was issued by the Legal Service of the BOC, submitting the case for resolution
in view of OILINK's failure to file its Answer within the prescribed period.

On December 14, 2007, the Legal Service of the BOC rendered a Decision finding that OILINK violated Section
IV.A.2(c) and (e) of CAO 4-20047 when it refused to furnish the Audit Team copies of the required documents,
despite repeated demands. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds herein respondent liable for violating Sections IV.A.2 (c)
and (e) of Customs Administrative Order No. 4-2004, and a DECISION is hereby rendered:cralawlawlibrary
1. Ordering OILINK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION to pay the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) ad
valorem on the article/s subject of the Importation for which no records were kept and maintained as prescribed in
Section 2504 of the Customs Code in the amount of Pesos: Two Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million Eight
Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Three Hundred Four and 80/100 (Php 2,764,859,304.80);

2. Ordering the Bureau of Customs to hold the delivery or release of subsequent imported articles to answer for the
fine, any revised assessment, and/or as a penalty for failure to keep records.
This is without prejudice to the filing of a criminal case or any appropriate legal action against the importer in
order to protect the interest of the government and deter other importers from committing the same offense.
SO ORDERED8

Pursuant to the Decision dated December 14, 2007, Commissioner Morales, in a letter9 of even date, directed the
President of OILINK to pay the BOC the administrative fine of P2,764,859,304.80 for violation of CAO No. 4-
2004, in relation to Section 2504 of the TCCP. Copy of the said Decision and letter were served to OILINK
through personal service on December 28, 2007.10cralawrednad

On March 13, 2008, Atty. Noemi B. Alcala, Officer-in-Charge, Collection Service, Revenue and Monitoring
Group, sent a final demand letter for OILINK to settle the administrative fine, otherwise, the BOC will be
compelled to file the necessary legal action and put in force Section 150811 of the TCCP against its succeeding
shipments to protect the government's interest.12cralawrednad

On April 23, 2008, a Hold Order13 was issued by Horacio P. Suansing, Jr., District Collector, Port of Manila,
against all shipments of OILINK for failure to settle its outstanding account with the BOC and to protect the
interest of the government pursuant to Section 1508 of the TCCP.

On May 2, 2008, Rochelle E. Vicencio, Corporate Administrative Supervisor of UNIOIL, citing the existing
Terminalling Agreement dated January 2, 2008 with OILINK for the Storage of UNIOIL's aromatic process oil and
industrial lubricating oils (collectively, "base oils"), requested District Collector Suansing Jr. to allow it to
withdraw base oils from OILINK's temporarily closed Terminal.

On May 6, 2008, Commissioner Morales granted the request of UNIOIL to withdraw its base oils stored at
OILINK's terminal/depot based on the Terminalling Agreement between the two companies, subject to the
following conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper inventory by the BIR and BOC.
2. Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn are fully paid or settled.
3. The company should allow the operation/withdrawal to be closely monitored and continuously underguarded by
assigned Customs personnel.14

On May 9, 2008, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD), docketed as Seizure Identification (S.I.) No. 2008-
082, was issued by District Collector Suansing Jr., directing the BOC officials to seal and padlock the oil
tanks/depots of OILINK located in Bataan.

On May 12, 2008, Kenneth C. Pundanera, Operations Manager of UNIOIL, requested Zaldy E. Almoradie, District
Collector of Mariveles, Bataan, for permission to release UNIOIL-owned products from OILINK's storage
terminal. Pertinent portion of the request letter reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Unioil is a licensed importer of various Petroleum Products by virtue of its import license LTAD-0-021-2002
issued on March 26, 2002 which was revised to include all other petroleum products in 2007 through LTAMII (P)
001-10-07-13639. To pursue its line of business, Unioil has an existing Terminalling Agreement with Oilink for the
storage of various Unioil products at the Oilink terminal located at Lucanin Pt, Mariveles, Bataan.

In view of the said temporary closure of Oilink's terminal, Unioil is currently unable to fully utilize its leased tanks
as well as make use of the products contained therein. We understand that there is still an unresolved issue between
Oilink and the Bureau of Customs. However, with all due respect, said issue should not affect Unioil because it is
not a party to the same, furthermore there is a legal and binding terminalling agreement between Oilink and Unioil
which should be honored.

Last May 8, 2008, an asphalt importation for Unioil Petroleum Philippines, Inc. arrived in Mariveles, Bataan. This
was issued the corresponding discharging permit by the Bureau of Customs. All duties, excise taxes and value
added taxes for this product have already been settled. However, we are still unable to withdraw these products in
order to serve our customers who are using the product to supply major government infrastructure projects in the
country.

In line with the endorsement coming from the Bureau of Customs Commissioner Napoleon D. Morales issued last
May 6, 2008, Unioil has complied with the conditions stipulated therein which are:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper inventory by the BIR and BOC.

2. Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn are fully paid or settled.
3. The company (Unioil) should allow the operation/withdrawal to be closely monitored and continuously
underguarded by assigned Customs personnel.

In this regard, may we respectfully request your good office to please allow Unioil to withdraw from Oilink's
terminal its products which are stored in the following tanks[:]15cralawrednad

TANK PROD CONTENTS (Liters)

2 diesel 2,171,670.00
6 rexo 1,862,846.00
10 asphalt 4,573.14
13 gasoline 809,345.00
14 gasoline 746,629.00
17 diesel 360,097.00
19 sn500 203,659.00
20 sn500 643,236.00

In the same request letter, District Collector Almoradie approved the release of the above petroleum products
through a handwritten note dated May 12, 2008: "All concerned: Pls. allow the release of the Unioil-owned
products from the Oilink Storage Terminal per this request. Thanks."16cralawrednad

On May 15, 2008, Pundanera wrote a clarificatory letter pursuant to the verbal instruction of District Collector
Almoradie to explain the withdrawal of products from the Terminal of OILINK, to
wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As far as Unioil is concerned, we affirm to your good office that the products withdrawn/loaded at the Terminal are
entirely Unioil products. Unioil owns these products pursuant to its supply and terminalling agreements with
Oilink. (We shall be submitting to you copies of these documents as soon as they arrive from our office in Manila.)
In addition, due to the issue involving Oilink and the Bureau of Customs, Unioil was forced to secure its petroleum
products from local sources in order to comply with its valid contractual commitments.

Unioil intended to withdraw these products because it believed in good faith and based on documents in its
possession that it is allowed to do so. Unioil based its intention pursuant to the Indorsements of the Collector of the
Port of Manila as well as the Office of the Commissioner that allowed the withdrawal of Unioil products subject to
compliance with the three (3) conditions specified in the abovementioned Indorsements.

This being the precedent, we believe in good faith that, since Unioil owns the products, and it is considered a
stranger to the issue between Oilink and the Bureau, then Unioil is allowed to withdraw the products it owns
subject to the compliance with the three (3) stated conditions. Besides, any withdrawal is covered by an appropriate
delivery receipt, which would clearly indicate that Unioil owns the products being withdrawn.17

In a complaint-affidavit dated December 15, 2008, Atty. Balmyrson M. Valdez, a member of the petitioner BOC's
Anti-Oil Smuggling Coordinating Committee that investigated the illegal withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products
consigned to OILINK, valued at P181,988,627.00 with corresponding duties and taxes in the amount of
P35,507,597.00, accused the private respondents of violation of Sections 360118 and 3602,19 in relation to
Sections 250320 and 2530,21 paragraphs f and 1 (3), (4) and (5), of the TCCP.

In a letter22 dated December 15, 2008, Commissioner Morales referred to the Office of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuno the said complaint-affidavit, together with its annexes, for preliminary investigation. During the
said investigation, BOC's counsel appeared and all of the private respondents submitted their respective counter-
affidavits.

In a Resolution23 dated May 29, 2009, public respondent Arman A. De Andres, State Prosecutor of the Department
of Justice (DOJ), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. The Resolution
was approved by public respondents Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Pedrito L. Ranees and Chief State Prosecutor
Zuflo. On automatic review, the Resolution was affirmed by then Secretary of Justice Raul M.
Gonzales.24cralawrednad

Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent, the Acting
Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera, in a Resolution25cralawred dated December 28, 2009.

On March 11, 2010, the BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
In the Resolution dated March 26, 2010, the CA dismissed outright the petition due to procedural
defects:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The instant petition (i) contains no explanation why service thereof was not done personally (Sec. 11, Rule 13,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure); (ii) shows that it has no proper verification and certification against forum
shopping and (iii) the docket and other lawful fees payment is short by P1,530.0026

In the Resolution dated August 4, 2010, the CA denied the private respondents' motion for reconsideration of the
March 26, 2010 Resolution, as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We made a cursory examination of the petition filed in this case as well as the whole rollo of the case. It is our
finding that, up to the date hereof, the petitioner has not duly submitted to this Court another set of petition with a
certification against forum shopping embodied therein or appended thereto. Thus, the petition really suffers from a
fatal defect until now, and so, the petitioner has to bear the consequence thereof.27

The CA stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only
when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that Rules of Court may be ignored
at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution.

Aggrieved, the BOC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT, ALLEGEDLY, IT
DID NOT RECEIVE THE SECOND AND COMPLETE COPY OF THE PETITION, CONTAINING THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN LAW AND

JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED ITS 26 MARCH 2010 RESOLUTION, DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON ACCOUNT OF MERE TECHNICALITIES.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT
LOOK INTO THE MERITS OF THE CASE, WHERE IT WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS
PROBABLE CAUSE TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR TRIAL FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3601 AND
3602 IN RELATION TO SECTION 2530, PARAGRAPHS (E), AND SECTION 3604 (D), (E), (F), AND (H) OF
THE TCCP, AS AMENDED.28

The petition is partly meritorious.

Although the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not raised at bench by either of the parties, the
Court will first address such question before delving into the procedural and substantive issues of the instant
petition. After all, it is the duty of the courts to consider the question of jurisdiction before they look into other
matters involved in the case, even though such question is not raised by any of the parties.29 Courts are bound to
take notice of the limits of their authority and, even if such question is neither raised by the pleadings nor
suggested by counsel, they may recognize the want of jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying pleadings,
dismissing the action, or otherwise noticing the defect, at any stage of the proceedings.30 Besides, issues or errors
not raised by the parties may be resolved by the Court where, as in this case, the issue is one of jurisdiction; it is
necessary in arriving at a just decision; and the resolution of the issues raised by the parties depend upon the
determination of the unassigned issue or error, or is necessary to give justice to the parties.31cralawrednad

On the issue of whether or not the CA has certiorari jurisdiction over the resolution of the Acting Secretary of
Justice, affirming the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for violation of provisions of the TCCP due to lack of
probable cause, the Court rules in negative.

The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of the DOJ through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.32 However, with the enactment33 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9282, amending R.A. No. 112534 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership
and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, it is no longer clear which between
the CA and the CTA has jurisdiction to review through a petition for certiorari the DOJ resolution in preliminary
investigations involving tax and tariff offenses.

Apropos is City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo35 where the Court en banc declared that the CTA has appellate
jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax
case, despite the fact that there is no categorical statement to that effect under R.A. No. 1125, as well as the
amendatory R.A. No. 9282. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals,
Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is
provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA
includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority
to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the
CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be
considered as partial, not total.

xxxx

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer.

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA,
this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over
basically the same subject matter - precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly
administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that
the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the
role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus,
the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for
tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an
absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the
very same case.

Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction
to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving
to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to
the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in
consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax
cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of
such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by
appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to
make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder
effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit
or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in
cases pending before it.

Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have
powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as
powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of
practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all
the inherent powers of a court of justice.

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and
functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and
suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and
render it effective in behalf of the litigants.

Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate
its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every
regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates." Hence, demands,
matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority
over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as
original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take
cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is
included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.36

Since the Court ruled in City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo31 that the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil
action for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of the RTC in a local tax case via express constitutional
mandate and for being inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it can also be reasonably concluded
based on the same premise that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ
resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses.

If the Court were to rule that jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing such DOJ resolution lies with the
CA, it would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically
the same subject matter - precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration
of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative intent, especially considering that R.A. No. 9282
expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of
judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such
power.38cralawrednad

Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the amendatory R.A. No. 9282, let alone in the
Constitution, that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari. By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established
by law, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, in relation to Section 5(5), Article VIII thereof, vesting upon it the power to
promulgate rules concerning practice and procedure in all courts, the Court thus declares that the CA's original
jurisdiction39 over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax
and tariff offenses was necessarily transferred to the CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282,40 and that such
petition shall be governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA,
which has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the BOC's
complaint-affidavit against private respondents for violation of the TCCR
On the procedural issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the sole ground of lack
of verification and certification against forum shopping, the Court rules in the affirmative, despite the above
discussion that such petition should have been filed with the CTA.

In Traveno, et al. v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al.,41 the Court restated the
jurisprudence on non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non- compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served
thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification,
is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule
on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise,
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.' Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with
the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power
of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.42

While it admittedly filed a petition for certiorari without a certification against forum shopping on March 11, 2010,
the BOC claimed to have subsequently complied with such requirement by filing through registered mail a
complete set of such petition, the following day which was also the last day of the reglementary period. The
problem arose when the CA failed to receive such complete set of the petition for certiorari with the verification
and certification against forum shopping. In support of the motion for reconsideration of the CA's March 26, 2010
resolution which dismissed outright the petition, the BOC asserted that it filed a complete set of petition by
registered mail. It also submitted an affidavit of the person who did the mailing as required by Section 12,43 Rule
13 of the Rules of Court, including the registry receipt numbers, but not the receipts themselves which were
allegedly attached to the original copy mailed to the CA. Instead of ordering the BOC to secure a certification from
the postmaster to verify if a complete set of the petition was indeed filed by registered mail, the CA -after
examining the whole case rollo and finding that no other set of petition with a certification against forum shopping
was duly submitted - denied the motion for reconsideration.

Faced with the issue of whether or not there is a need to relax the strict compliance with procedural rules in order
that the ends of justice may be served thereby and whether "special circumstances or compelling reasons" are
present to warrant a liberal interpretation of such rules, the Court rules -after a careful review of the merits of the
case - in the affirmative.

Despite the BOC's failed attempt to comply with the requirement of verification and certification against forum
shopping, the Court cannot simply ignore the CA's perfunctory dismissal of the petition on such sole procedural
ground vis-a-vis the paramount public interest in the subject matter and the substantial amount involved, i.e., the
alleged illegal withdrawal of oil products worth P181,988,627.00 with corresponding duties and taxes worth
P35,507,597.00. Due to the presence of such special circumstances and in the interest of justice, the CA should
have at least passed upon the substantive issue raised in the petition, instead of dismissing it on such procedural
ground. Although it does not condone the failure of BOC to comply with the said basic requirement, the Court is
constrained to exercise the inherent power to suspend its own rules in order to do justice in this particular case.
Given that the petition for certiorari should have been filed with the CTA, the mistake committed by the BOC in
filing such petition before the CA may be excused. In this regard, Court takes note that nothing in R.A. No. 1125,
as amended by R.A. No. 9282, indicates that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed with the CTA.
Despite the enactment of R.A. No. 9282 on March 30, 2004, it was only about ten (10) years later in the case of
City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo44 that the Court ruled that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of
such petitions is included in the powers granted by the Constitution, as well as inherent in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. While the rule on perfection of appeals cannot be classified as a difficult question of law,45
mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful question of law, as in this case, may be considered as a
mistake of fact, excusing the BOC from the consequences of the erroneous filing of its petition with the CA.

As the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari solely due to a procedural defect without resolving the issue of
whether or not the Acting Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion in affirming the dismissal of the BOC's
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause, the Court ought to reinstate the petition and refer it to the CTA for
proper disposition. For one, as a highly specialized court specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax and
customs cases,46 the CTA is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of revenue-related problems, and
has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject.47 For another, the referral of the petition to the CTA is in
line with the policy of hierarchy of courts in order to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
overcrowding of its docket.48cralawrednad

Be that as it may, the Court stressed in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections49 that the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and that it has full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. Recognized exceptions to the
said doctrine are as follows: (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression
where no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on the matter; (d) the constitutional issues raised
are better decided by the Court; (e) where exigency in certain situations necessitate urgency in the resolution of the
cases; (f) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (g) when petitioners rightly claim that they had
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious
effects of respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression; and (h) the petition includes
questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as
clearly an inappropriate remedy.50 Since the present case includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and
the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, as well as to avoid multiplicity of
suits and further delay in its disposition, the Court shall directly resolve the petition for certiorari, instead of
referring it to the CTA.

On the substantive issue of whether the Acting Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion in affirming the
dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause, the settled policy of noninterference in the
prosecutor's exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. As the Court explained in Unilever Philippines,
Inc. v. Tan:51cralawrednad

The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is essentially an executive
function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice.
The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigation; and their findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not
subject to review by the Court.

Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor's exercise of discretion requires
the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause. Courts can neither override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that
of the latter. They cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the prosecutor has not found a prima
facie case.

Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution itself allows (and even
directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely abused. In other words, the court may intervene
in the executive determination of probable cause, review the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the
existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice.52
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.53 As explained in Sy v. Secretary of Justice,54 citing Villanueva v. Secretary of
Justice:55cralawrednad

x x x [Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not
mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.56

To find out if there is a reasonable ground to believe that acts or ommissions complained of constitute the offenses
charged, the Court must first examine whether or not the allegations against private respondents in the BOC's
complaint-affidavit constitute the offenses of unlawful importation under Section 3601 and various fraudulent
practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP.

In Jardeleza v. People,57 the Court discussed the concepts of unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the
TCCP, and various fraudulent practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 thereof,
thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 3601 of the TCC was designed to supplement the existing provisions of the TCC against the means leading
up to smuggling, which might render it beneficial by a substantive and criminal statement separately providing for
the punishment of smuggling. The law was intended not to merge into one and the same offense all the many acts
which are classified and punished by different penalties, penal or administrative, but to legislate against the overt
act of smuggling itself. This is manifested by the use of the words "fraudulently" and "contrary to law" in the law.

Smuggling is committed by any person who: (1) fraudulently imports or brings into the Philippines any article
contrary to law; (2) assists in so doing any article contrary to law; or (3) receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any
manner facilitate the transportation, concealment or sale of such goods after importation, knowing the same to have
been imported contrary to law.

The phrase "contrary to law" in Section 3601 qualifies the phrases "imports or brings into the Philippines" and
"assists in so doing," and not the word "article." The law penalizes the importation of any merchandise in any
manner contrary to law.

The word "law" includes regulations having the force and effect of law, meaning substantive or legislative type
rules as opposed to general statements of policy or rules of agency, organization, procedures or positions. An
inherent characteristic of a substantive rule is one affecting individual rights and obligations; the regulation must
have been promulgated pursuant to a congressional grant of quasi-legislative authority; the regulation must have
been promulgated in conformity to with congressionally-imposed procedural requisites.

xxxx

Section 3602 of the TCC, on the other hand, provides:cralawlawlibrary

Sec. 3602. Various Fraudulent Practices Against Customs Revenue. — Any person who makes or attempts to make
any entry of imported or exported article by means of any false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter,
paper or by any means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by any means of any false or fraudulent practice
whatsoever, or knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares or merchandise, at less than the true weight or
measures thereof or upon a false classification as to quality or value, or by the payment of less than the amount
legally due, or knowingly and wilfully files any false or fraudulent entry or claim for the payment of drawback or
refund of duties upon the exportation of merchandise, or makes or files any affidavit, abstract, record, certificate or
other document, with a view to securing the payment to himself or others of any drawback, allowance or refund of
duties on the exportation of merchandise, greater than that legally due thereon, or who shall be guilty of any wilful
act or omission shall, for each offense, be punished in accordance with the penalties prescribed in the preceding
section.
The provision enumerates the various fraudulent practices against customs revenue, such as the entry of imported
or exported articles by means of any false or fraudulent invoice, statement or practice; the entry of goods at less
than the true weight or measure; or the filing of any false or fraudulent entry for the payment of drawback or
refund of duties.

The fraud contemplated by law must be intentional fraud, consisting of deception, willfully and deliberately dared
or resorted to in order to give up some right. The offender must have acted knowingly and with the specific intent
to deceive for the purpose of causing financial loss to another; even false representations or statements or
omissions of material facts come within fraudulent intent. The fraud envisaged in the law includes the suppression
of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose. Fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent
concealment are of the same genre.

Fraudulent concealment presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and that disclosure was not made when
opportunity to speak and inform was present, and that the party to whom the duty of disclosure as to a material fact
was due was thereby induced to act to his injury. Fraud is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may
consist as well of deeds, acts or artifice of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow one to obtain an
undue advantage.58

In unlawful importation, also known as outright smuggling, goods and articles of commerce are brought into the
country without the required importation documents, or are disposed of in the local market without having been
cleared by the BOC or other authorized government agencies, to evade the payment of correct taxes, duties and
other charges. Such goods and articles do not undergo the processing and clearing procedures at the BOC, and are
not declared through submission of import documents, such as the import entry and internal revenue declaration.

In various fraudulent practices against customs revenue, also known as technical smuggling, on the other hand, the
goods and articles are brought into the country through fraudulent, falsified or erroneous declarations, to
substantially reduce, if not totally avoid, the payment of correct taxes, duties and other charges. Such goods and
articles pass through the BOC, but the processing and clearing procedures are attended by fraudulent acts in order
to evade the payment of correct taxes, duties, and other charges. Often committed by means of misclassification of
the nature, quality or value of goods and articles, undervaluation in terms of their price, quality or weight, and
misdeclaration of their kind, such form of smuggling is made possible through the involvement of the importers,
the brokers and even some customs officials and personnel.

In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court holds that private respondents cannot be charged with unlawful
importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP because there is no allegation in the BOC's complaint-affidavit to the
effect that they committed any of the following acts: (1) fraudulently imported or brought into the Philippines the
subject petroleum products, contrary to law; (2) assisted in so doing; or (3) received, concealed, bought, sold or in
any manner facilitated the transportation, concealment or sale of such goods after importation, knowing the same to
have been imported contrary to law.

The said acts constituting unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP can hardly be gathered from the
following allegations in the BOC's complaint-affidavit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

19.1 From May 23, 2007 to February 10, 2008, UNIOIL is not an accredited importer of the BOC;
19.2 From the time UNIOIL was accredited on February 11, 2008 until the time of its request to withdraw its oil
products on 02 May 2008, they did not import Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas Gasoline;
19.3 The Terminalling Agreement allegedly executed between OILINK and UNIOIL was obviously for the purpose
of circumventing the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued against the shipments of OILINK aside from the fact
that it was only executed on 02 January 2008 after the decision of the Commissioner finding OILINK liable to pay
an administrative fine of Two Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand
Three Hundred Four Pesos and 80/100 (Php2,764,859,304.80);
19.4 Only base oil should have been withdrawn by UNIOIL since it is the only product subject of its request and
approved by the Commissioner;
19.5 UNIOIL withdrew Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas which were not covered by importations;
19.6 Finally, the illegal release/withdrawal of the oil products deprived the government of the supposed partial
payment on the Php2.7 billion liability of OILINK in the" approximate amount of Phpl81,988,627 representing the
customs value of the released/withdrawn oil products and estimated duties and taxes of Php35,507,597 due thereon
or the total amount of Php217,496,224.00.59cralawrednad

xxxx

21.1 When UNIOIL withdrew Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas without filing the corresponding Import Entry, the
shipment becomes unlawful per se and thus falls under unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended;

21.2 The fact that UNIOIL and OILINK executed a belated Terminalling Agreement after the issuance of the
Warrant of Seizure and Detention showed the fraudulent intent of the respondents whereby UNIOIL can still
withdraw the oil products stored at OILINK's depot likewise in clear violation of section 3601 and 3602 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended;
21.3 The fact that the UNIOIL make [sic] it appear that they are the owner of Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas when in
truth and in fact they did not import said products make them liable for [violation of] Section 3602 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended and falsification;60

Since the foregoing allegations do not constitute the crime of unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the
TCCP, the Acting Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she affirmed the State
Prosecutor's dismissal the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause.

Neither could private respondents be charged with various fraudulent practices against customs revenue under
Section 3602 of the TCCP as the above allegations do hot fall under any of the following acts or omissions
constituting such crime/s: (1) making or attempting to make any entry of imported or exported article: (a) by means
of any false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means of any false statement,
written or verbal; or (b) by any means of any false or fraudulent practice whatsoever; or (2) knowingly effecting
any entry of goods, wares or merchandise, at less than the true weight or measures thereof or upon a false
classification as to quality or value, or by the payment of less than the amount legally due; or (3) knowingly and
wilfully filing any false or fraudulent entry or claim for the payment of drawback or refund of duties upon the
exportation of merchandise; or (4) making or filing any affidavit, abstract, record, certificate or other document,
with a view to securing the payment to himself or others of any drawback, allowance or refund of duties on the
exportation of merchandise, greater than that legally due thereon.

Related to various fraudulent practices against customs revenue by means of undervaluation, misclassification and
misdeclaration in the import entry is the following provision of R.A. No. 7651 - An Act to Revitalize and
Strengthen the Bureau of Customs, Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines, as amended:61cralawrednad

Sec. 2503. Undervaluation, Misclassification and Misdeclaration in Entry. - When the dutiable value of the
imported articles shall be so declared and entered that the duties, based on the declaration of the importer on the
face of the entry, would be less by ten percent (10%) than should be legally collected, or when the imported articles
shall be so described and entered that the duties based on the importer's description on the face of the entry would
be less by ten percent (10%) than should be legally collected based on the tariff classification, or when the dutiable
weight, measurement or quantity of imported articles is found upon examination to exceed by ten percent (10%) or
more than the entered weight, measurement or quantity, a surcharge shall be collected from the importer in an
amount of not less than the difference between the full duty and the estimated duty based upon the declaration of
the importer, nor more than twice of such difference: Provided, that an undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight,
measurement or quantity of more than thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight, measurement, or quantity
declared in the entry, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or measurement shall constitute a prima facie evidence
of fraud penalized under Sec. 2530 of this Code: Provided, further, that any misdeclared or undeclared imported
articles/items found upon examination shall ipso facto be forfeited in favor of the Government to be disposed of
pursuant to the provisions of this Code.

When the undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration in the import entry is intentional, the
importer shall be subject to the penal provision under Sec. 3602 of this Code.62

A careful reading of the BOC's complaint-affidavit would show that there is no allegation to the effect that private
respondents committed undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of more than thirty
percent (30%) between the value, weight, measurement, or quantity declared in the entry, and the actual value,
weight, quantity, or measurement which constitute prima facie evidence of fraud. Nor is there an allegation that
they intentionally committed undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration in the import
entry. Since the allegations in the BOC's complaint-affidavit fall short of the acts or omissions constituting the
various fraudulent acts against customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP, the Acting Secretary of Justice
correctly ruled that there was no probable cause to believe that they committed such crime/s.

While it is true that the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include a correction of the
public respondents' evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon, it is sometimes necessary to delve into
factual issues in order to resolve the allegations of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil action
of certiorari63 In light of this principle, the Court reviews the following findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice
in affirming the State Prosecutor's dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable
cause:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondents are being charged for unlawful importation under Section 3601, and fraudulent practices against
customs revenues under Section 3602, of the TCCP, as amended. For these charges to prosper, complainant must
prove, first and foremost, that the subject articles were imported. On this score alone, complainant has miserably
failed.

Indeed, except for complainant's sweeping allegation, no clear and convincing proof was presented to show that the
subject petroleum products (gasoil and mogas) withdrawn by Unioil from the oil depot/terminal of Oilink were
imported. For, only when the articles are imported that the importer/consignee is required to file an import entry
declaration and pay the corresponding customs duties and taxes. The fact that complainant's record fails to show
that an import entry was filed for the subject articles does not altogether make out a case of unlawful importation
under Section 3601, or fraudulent practices against customs revenue under Section 3602, of the TCCP, without
having first determined whether the subject articles are indeed imported. Thus, in this case, complainant still bears
the burden of proof to show that the subject petroleum products are imported, by means of documents other than
the import entry declaration, such as but not limited to, the transport documents consisting of the inward foreign
manifest, bill of lading, commercial invoice and packing list, all indicating that the goods were bought from a
supplier/seller in a foreign country and imported or transported to the Philippines. Instead[,] complainant merely
surmised that since the subject products were placed under warrant of seizure and detention[,] they must
necessarily be imported. Regrettably, speculation and surmises do not constitute evidence and should not,
therefore, be taken against the respondents, x x x Taken in this light, we find more weight and credence in
respondent Unioil's claim that the subject petroleum products were not imported by them, but were locally
purchased, more so since it was able to present local sales invoices covering the same.

Even assuming gratia argumenti that the subject petroleum products were imported, it still behooves the
complainant to present clear and convincing proof that the importation was unlawful or that it was carried out
through any fraudulent means, practice or device to prejudice the government. But again, complainant failed to
discharge this burden.

As can be culled from the records, the warrant of seizure and detention docketed as Seizure Identification No.
2008-082, which covers various gas tanks already stored at Oilink's depot/terminal located at Lucanin Pt,
Mariveles, Bataan, was issued pursuant to Section 2536, in relation to Section 1508, of the TCCP because of
Oilink's failure to pay the administrative fine of P2,764,859,304.80 that was previously meted against the company
for its failure/refusal to submit to a post entry audit. In fact, the delivery of all shipments consigned to or handled
directly or indirectly by Oilink was put on hold as per order of the Customs Commissioner dated April 23, 2008
pursuant to Section 1508 of the TCCP, also for the same reason. There was nothing on record which shows, or from
which it could be inferred, that the warrant of seizure and detention or hold order were imposed pursuant to Section
2530 of the same Code which relates, among others, to unlawfully imported articles or those imported through any
fraudulent practice or device to prejudice the government, much less due to non-payment of the corresponding
customs duties and taxes due on the shipments/articles covered by the warrant of seizure and detention. Again,
what complainant's evidence clearly shows is that Oilink's failure to pay the administrative fine precipitated the
issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention and hold order.64

After a careful review of records, the Court affirms the dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause, but partly digresses from the reasoning of the Acting Secretary of Justice in arriving at such
conclusion. While the Acting Secretary of Justice correctly stated that the act of fraudulent importation of articles
must be first proven in order to be charged for violation of Section 3601 of the TCCP, the Court disagrees that
proof of such importation is also required for various fraudulent practices against customs revenue under Section
3602 thereof.

As held in Jardeleza v. People,65 the crime of unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP is complete,
in the absence of a bona fide intent to make entry and pay duties when the prohibited article enters Philippine
territory. Importation, which consists of bringing an article into the country from the outside, is complete when the
taxable, dutiable commodity is brought within the limits of the port of entry.66 Entry through a customs house is
not the essence of the act.67 On the other hand, as regards Section 3602 of the TCCP which particularly deals with
the making or attempting to make a fraudulent entry of imported or exported articles, the term "entry" in customs
law has a triple meaning, namely: (1) the documents filed at the customs house; (2) the submission and acceptance
of the documents; and (3) the procedure of passing goods through the customs house.68 In view thereof, it is only
for charges for unlawful importation under Section 3601 that the BOC must first prove that the subject articles
were imported. For violation of Section 3602, in contrast, what must be proved is the act of making or attempting
to make such entry of articles.

The Court likewise disagrees with the finding of the Acting Secretary of Justice that the BOC failed to prove that
the products subject of the WSD were imported. No such proof was necessary because private respondents
themselves presented in support of their counter-affidavits copies of import entries which can be considered as
prima facie evidence that OILINK imported the subject petroleum products. At any rate, the Acting Secretary of
Justice aptly gave credence to their twenty (20) sales invoices70 covering the dates October 1, 2007 until April 30,
2008 which tend to prove that UNIOIL locally purchased such products from OILINK even before the BOC
rendered the Decision dated December 14, 2007 imposing a P2,764,859,304.80 administrative fine, and holding the
delivery or release of its subsequently imported articles to answer for the fine, any revised assessment and/or
penalty for failure to keep records.

The Court also finds as misplaced the BOC's reliance on the Terminalling Agreement dated January 2, 2008 and the
Certification71 that UNIOIL made no importation of Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas gasoline from January 2007 up to
June 2008 in order to prove that it illegally imported the said products. Such documentary evidence tend to prove
only that UNIOIL was engaged in the importation of petroleum products and that it did not import the said
products during the said period. Such documents, however, do not negate the evidence on record which tend to
show that OILINK was the one that filed the import entries,72 and that UNIOIL locally purchased from OILINK
such products as indicated in the sales invoices.73 Not being the importer of such products, UNIOIL, its directors
and officers, are not required to file their corresponding import entries. Hence, contrary to the BOC's allegation,
UNIOIL's withdrawal of the Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas gasoline without filing the corresponding import entries
can neither be considered as unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP nor as a fraudulent practice
against customs revenue under Section 3602 thereof.

Moreover, the fact that private respondent Paul Chi Ting Co is both the Chairman of UNIOIL and OILINK is not
enough to justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. In fact, mere ownership by a single
stockholder or by another corporation of a substantial block of shares of a corporation does not, standing alone,
provide sufficient justification for disregarding the separate corporate personality.74 In Kukan International
Corporation v. Hon. Judge Reyes, et al.,75 the Court explained the application of the said doctrine in this
wise:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In fine, to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, it must be shown by clear and convincing proof that
the separate and distinct personality of the corporation was purposefully employed to evade a legitimate and
binding commitment and perpetuate a fraud or like wrongdoings. To be sure, the Court has, on numerous
occasions, applied the principle where a corporation is dissolved and its assets are transferred to another to avoid a
financial liability of the first corporation with the result that the second corporation should be considered a
continuation and successor of the first entity.

In those instances when the Court pierced the veil of corporate fiction of two corporations, there was a confluence
of the following factors:cralawlawlibrary
1. A first corporation is dissolved;
2. The assets of the first corporation is transferred to a second corporation to avoid a financial liability of the first
corporation; and
3. Both corporations are owned and controlled by the same persons such that the second corporation should be
considered as a continuation and successor of the first corporation.76

Granted that the principle of piercing the veil of corporate entity comes into play only during the trial of the case
for the purpose of determining liability,77 it is noteworthy that even the BOC itself virtually recognized that
OILINK and UNIOIL are separate and distinct entities when it alleged that only the base oil products should have
been withdrawn by UNIOIL, since they were the only products subject of its request and approved by the Customs
Commissioner. As discussed above, however, private respondents were able to present sales invoices which tend to
show that UNIOIL locally purchased Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas gasoline products from OILINK. Hence, the BOC
cannot invoke the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity in this case.

On a final note, the Court stresses that OILINK, its directors or officers, and Victor D. Piamonte, the Licensed
Customs Broker, may still be held liable for various fraudulent practices against customs revenue under Section
3602 of the TCCP, if the final results of the post-entry audit and examination would show that they committed any
of the following acts or omissions: (1) making or attempting to make any entry of imported or exported article: (a)
by means of any false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means of any false
statement, written or verbal; or (b) by any means of any false or fraudulent practice; or (2) intentional
undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration in the import entries; or (3) undervaluation,
misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of more than thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight,
measurement, or quantity declared in the entries, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or measurement. This is
consistent with Section 230178 (Warrant for Detention of Property-Cash Bond) of the TCCP which states that
nothing therein shall be construed as relieving the owner or importer from any criminal liability which may arise
from any violation of law committed in connection with the importation of articles, which in this case were placed
under a WSD for failure of the importer, OILINK, to submit the required post-entry audit documents under CAO
No. 4-2004.
In addition, OILINK and its directors or officers may be held liable under Section 16 of R.A. No.
9135:79cralawrednad

SEC. 16. A new section to be known as Section 3611 is hereby inserted in Part 3, Title VII of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended, which shall read as follows:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 3611. Failure to Pay Correct Duties and Taxes on Imported Goods. - Any person who, after being subjected
to post-entry audit and examination as provided in Section 3515 of Part 2, Title VII hereof, is found to have
incurred deficiencies in duties and taxes paid for imported goods, shall be penalized according to three (3) degrees
of culpability subject to any mitigating, aggravating or extraordinary factors that are clearly established by the
available evidence:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Negligence - When the deficiency results from an offender's failure, through an act or acts of omission or
commission, to exercise reasonable care and competence to ensure that a statement made is correct, it shall be
determined to be negligent and punishable by a fine equivalent to not less than one-half (1/2) but not more than two
(2) times the revenue loss.

(b) Gross Negligence - When a deficiency results from an act or acts of omission or commission done with actual
knowledge or wanton disregard for the relevant facts and with indifference to or disregard for the offender's
obligation under the statute, it shall be determined to be grossly negligent and punishable by a fine equivalent to
not less than two and a half (2 1/2) but not more than four (4) times the revenue loss.

(c) Fraud - When the material false statement or act in connection with the transaction was committed or omitted
knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally, as established by clear and convincing evidence, it shall be determined to
be fraudulent and be punishable by a fine equivalent to not less than five (5) times but not more than eight (8) times
the revenue loss and imprisonment of not less than two (2) years but not more than eight (8) years.
The decision of the Commissioner of Customs, upon proper hearing, to impose penalties as prescribed in this
Section may be appealed in accordance with Section 2402 hereof.80

With respect to the directors or officers of OILINK, they may further be held liable jointly and severally for all
damages suffered by the government on account of such violation of Sections 3602 and 3611 of the TCCP, upon
clear and convincing proof that they willfully and knowingly voted for or assented to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing its corporate affairs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated March 26, 2010 and
August 4, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No. 113069, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated December
28, 2009 of the Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanedera, which upheld the State Prosecutor's dismissal
of the complaint-affidavit filed by the Bureau of Customs for lack of probable cause, is AFFIRMED. This is
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal and administrative charges under Sections 3602 and 3611
of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended, against private respondents OILINK, its officers
and directors, and Victor D. Piamonte, if the final results of the post-entry audit and examination would show that
they violated the said provisions.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

[G.R. NO. 168771 - July 25, 2012]

ROBERTO DIPAD and SANDRA DIPAD, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ROLANDO OLIVAN and BRIGIDA
OLIVAN, and BRIGIDA OLIVAN, and RUBIO GUIJON MADRIGALLO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is a Rule 45 Petition, seeking to review the 6 May 2005 Regional Trial (RTC) Decision in Special
Civil Action No. RTC 2005-0032. In the Decision, the RTC dismissed petitioners Rule 65 Petition, which assailed
the directive of Judge Marvel C. Clavecilla requiring Roberto Dipad to submit the latter s Income Tax Returns
(ITRs) for the years 2001 to 2003.

The pertinent facts are as follows:1ςrνll

Due to a collision between the car of petitioner spouses Dipad and the passenger jeep owned by respondents, the
former filed a civil action for damages before the sala of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge Clavecilla.
During trial, Roberto Dipad mentioned in his direct testimony that because he was not able to make use of his
vehicle for his buy-and-sell business, he suffered damages by way of lost income for three months amounting to
P40,000.2 Then, during cross-examination, the defense required him to produce his personal copy of his ITRs for
the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.3ςrνll

Dipad vehemently objected on the ground of confidentiality of the ITRs. He also claimed that the demand therefor
was incriminatory and in the nature of a fishing expedition.

By reason of the opposition, Judge Clavecilla suspended the trial and required petitioners to show their basis for
invoking the confidentiality of the ITRs. After the parties submitted their respective Comments on the matter, the
MTC in its 3 February 2005 Order required the production of the ITRs.

Aggrieved, the spouses Dipad filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Clavecilla.
Thereafter, they instituted a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the RTC, assailing the 3 February
2005 Order of the MTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In that Petition, they opposed Judge Clavecilla s ruling in this wise:4ςrνll

x x x The respondent Judge stated in his order dated February 3, 2005 (Annex "G") in Civil Case No. 11884 that
the cited provision does not apply, stating that "what is being requested to be produced is plaintiffs copy of their tax
returns for the years 2001 to 2003 x x x," thereby ordering the plaintiffs therein, now the petitioners, "to furnish
defendants counsel within five (5) days from receipt of this order copy of their income tax returns for the years
2001 to 2003, inclusive."

We beg to differ to such holding, because if a copy of a taxpayer s return filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
can be open to inspection only upon the order of the President of the Philippines, such provision presupposes the
confidentiality of the document; and with more reason that the taxpayer cannot be compelled to yield his copy of
the said document. (Emphasis in the original)

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, it is indubitable that compelling the petitioners to produce petitioner Roberto Dipad s Income Tax Returns
and furnish copies thereof to the private respondents would be violative of the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code on the rule on confidentiality of Income Tax return as discussed above x x x. (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary

In its 6 May 2005 Decision,5 the RTC dismissed the Rule 65 Petition for being an inappropriate remedy. According
to the trial court, the errors committed by Judge Clavecilla were, if at all, mere errors of judgment correctible not
by the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but by ordinary appeal.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC.6ςrνll

Hence, this appeal.

The issue presented in this case is straightforward. Petitioners insist that that the RTC committed reversible error in
dismissing their Rule 65 Petition as an improper appeal, since grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction was committed by MTC Judge Clavecilla when he required the production of their ITRs.7ςrνll

In support of their claim and to prove the confidentiality of the ITRs they cite Section 71 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, which reads:8ςrνll

Section 71. Disposition of Income Tax Returns, Publication of Lists of Taxpayers and Filers After the assessment
shall have been made, as provided in this Title, the returns, together with any corrections thereof which may have
been made by the Commissioner, shall be filed in the Office of the Commissioner and shall constitute public
records and be open to inspection as such upon the order of the President of the Philippines, under rules and
regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner.

The Commissioner may, in each year, cause to be prepared and published in any newspaper the lists containing the
names and addresses of persons who have filed income tax returns.

They also quote from National Internal Revenue Code (2001) authored by Epifanio G. Gonzales and Celestina M.
Robledo-Gonzales: 9ςrνll
The general rule is that despite a court order, copies of the income tax returns cannot be furnished in view of the
prohibition contained in Section 332 (now Section 286) of the Tax Code.

However, under Section 11 of Regulation 33 of the Department of Finance the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
may furnish copies of income tax returns for use as evidence in court litigation "when the government of the
Philippine Islands is interested in the result."

Thus, in the case of Cu Unjieng v. Posadas, 58 Phil. 360, which involves the production of income tax returns in a
criminal case, the Supreme Court held that copies of the returns can be furnished therein because a criminal case is
a sort of a case in which, above all others, the government, as a corporate representative of all society, is highly and
immediately interested.

But in a civil case where the government is not interested in the results, no income tax returns or tax census
statements may be furnished the courts even if the production thereof is in obedience to the court order (see BIR
Ruling No. 4, S. 1971).

RULING OF THE COURT

The appeal is lacking in merit.

Upon perusal of the reference, we find that petitioners inaccurately quoted the commentary.10 The portions they
lifted from the annotation purport to explain Section 270 of the NIRC.11ςrνll

The provision prohibits employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) from divulging the trade secrets of
taxpayers. Section 270 obviously does not address the confidentiality of ITRs. Thus, petitioners cannot rely on the
inappropriate provision, the Decisions including the cited Cu Unjieng v. Posadas,12 the rulings of the BIR, or
issuances of the Department of Finance that apply that provision.

Furthermore, in contrast to the interpretation by petitioners of the commentary that ITRs cannot be divulged, their
very reference characterizes Section 71 as an exception to the rule on the unlawful divulgence of trade
secrets:13ςrνll

Exceptions or acts which do not constitute unlawful divulgence of trade secrets.

(a) Section 71 of the Tax Code makes income tax returns public records and opens them to inspection upon order
of the President of the Philippines. x x x.

This Court then reminds the counsels of their duty of candor, fairness and good faith when they face the court.
Canon 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility instructs that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper; the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment; or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.

Nevertheless, we proceed to the contention of petitioners against the RTC s dismissal of their Rule 65 Petition. In
this regard, we stress that it is basic in our jurisdiction that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a mode of
appeal.14 The remedy, which is narrow in scope,15 only corrects errors of jurisdiction.16 Thus, if the issue
involves an error of judgment, the error is correctible by an appeal via a Rule 45 petition, and not by a writ of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.17ςrνll

As defined in jurisprudence, errors of jurisdiction occur when the court exercises jurisdiction not conferred upon it
by law.18 They may also occur when the court or tribunal, although it has jurisdiction, acts in excess of it or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.19ςrνll

On the contrary, errors of judgment are those that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. They
include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court s findings20 based on a mistake of law or of fact.21ςrνll

Here, it is patently clear that petitioners do not question whether the MTC has jurisdiction or authority to resolve
the issue of confidentiality of ITRs. Rather, they assail the wisdom of the MTC s very judgment and appreciation
of the ITR as not confidential. Specifically, they claim that the ruling violated the provisions of the NIRC on the
alleged rule on confidentiality of ITRs.

Based on the definitions above, we conclude similarly as the RTC that if there is an error to speak of the error
relates only to a mistake in the application of law, and not to an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The only error petitioners raise refers to Judge Clavecilla s mistake of not
applying Section 71, which allegedly prohibits the production of ITRs because of confidentiality. Certainly, as
correctly posited by the court a quo, if every error committed by the trial court is subject to certiorari, trial would
never come to an end, and the docket will be clogged ad infinitum.22ςrνll

Therefore, given the issues raised by petitioners in their plea for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the RTC did
not grievously err in dismissing the Rule 65 Petition as an improper appeal. This ruling is only in keeping with the
proper conduct of (xxx unread text) before the courts and the prompt administration of justice at every level of the
judicial hierarchy.23ςrνll

IN VIEW THEREOF, the assailed 6 May 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action No.
RTC 2005-0032 is AFFIRMED. The 25 July 2005 Petition for Review filed by petitioners is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129098 December 6, 2006

AMELIA CABRERA, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL LAPID, FERNANDO BALTAZAR, REYNALDO F. CABRERA and DIONY VENTURA,
respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Resolution1 dated 13 May 1996 and the
Order2 dated 21 March 1997, both issued by the Office of the Ombudsman. The Resolution dismissed the
complaint-affidavit filed by petitioner against respondents and the Order denied her motion for reconsideration.

The instant petition originated from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed in November 1995 by petitioner Amelia M.
Cabrera with the Office of the Ombudsman ("Ombudsman"). Named respondents were Manuel Lapid, Fernando
Baltazar, Reynaldo F. Cabrera and Superintendent Diony Ventura, respectively, in their capacities as Governor of
Pampanga, Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, Vice-Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga and Superintendent of the
Philippine National Police (PNP)-Region 3, Pampanga. In her three(3)-page affidavit, petitioner accused
respondents of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In her Complaint-Affidavit, petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of
Sasmuan over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. According to petitioner, she had
spent approximately P5,000,000.00 for its construction before the fishpond operations commenced in August 1995.
A month later, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond as it was
purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Thus, petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to
dissuade respondents from destroying her property.4

Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond. The property was
demolished on 10 October 1995 by dynamite blasting. Petitioner alleged that the demolition was purposely carried
out in the presence of media representatives and other government officials to gain media mileage. Petitioner
imputed evident bad faith on respondents Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor Cabrera in allowing the destruction of
the fishpond despite their prior knowledge of the existence of the lease agreement. She also charged respondents
Governor Lapid and Senior Superintendent Ventura with gross inexcusable negligence for ordering the destruction
of the fishpond without first verifying its legality.5

At the preliminary investigation, respondents, except Senior Superintendent Ventura, submitted counter-affidavits,
denying the accusations against them. In the counter-affidavit jointly filed by Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor
Cabrera, they insisted that contrary to petitioner's claim, the fishpond was an illegal structure because it was
erected on the seashore, at the mouth of the Pasak River, and sat on an inalienable land. They claimed that the
demolition was done by the Task Force Bilis Daloy upon the directive of then President Fidel V. Ramos.6
In his Counter-Affidavit,7 Governor Lapid averred that the contract of lease between petitioner and the
Municipality of Sasmuan, represented by then Mayor Abelardo Panlaqui, was executed two weeks before
respondent Mayor Baltazar took his oath of office in 1995. Governor Lapid also argued that under the law, the
Department of Agriculture (DA) is the government agency authorized to enter into licensing agreements for
fishpond operations, and as per certification by the DA Regional Director, petitioner's fishpond operation was not
covered by a fishpond lease agreement or application. Governor Lapid also referred to the certification by the
Municipal Health Officer of Sasmuan issued before the actual demolition of the fishpond, describing it as a
nuisance per se and recommending its abatement.8

On 13 May 1996, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The dismissal
was based on the declaration that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in the
exercise of the police power of the State.9

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution, arguing that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is
vested in the municipalities. Petitioner also questioned the certification by the Municipal Health Officer, alleging
that the same was issued before the ocular inspection of the property which took place only on the day of the
demolition. Petitioner also contended that a judicial proceeding was necessary to determine whether the property
indeed had caused the flooding.10 Respondents filed separate oppositions to petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.11 Petitioner filed a reply to the opposition12 and respondent Governor Lapid filed a rejoinder to
the reply.13

In the Order dated 21 March 1997, the Ombudsman affirmed its 13 May 1996 Resolution. It ruled that the
repealing clause of R.A. No. 7160 expressly repealed only Sec. 2, 6 and 29 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704
so that in harmonizing the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 704 and the provisions of R.A. No. 7160 applicable to
the grant of fishery privileges, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) is the government agency
authorized to grant fishpond license or permit in areas not identified as municipal waters or not declared as
alienable or disposable by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Since it appears from
DENR records that the subject property has not been declared disposable or included in areas devoted for fishpond
development, the Ombudsman concluded that the lease agreement entered into by petitioner was void ab initio. In
view of the illegality of the lease agreement, the Ombudsman ruled that its demolition was justified. The
Ombudsman described the demolition as a valid exercise of police power and in accordance with the provision of
Sec. 28 of P.D. No. 704 directing the removal of any fishpen or fishpond that obstructed the free navigation of a
stream or lake. It also upheld the authority of the district health officer to determine the abatement of a nuisance
without need of judicial proceedings.14

Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to assail the 13 May 1996 Resolution and 21 March 1997 Order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner subsequently
filed an amended petition for review on certiorari to implead the Ombudsman as respondent, although in a petition
for review on certiorari, the tribunal whose issuance is assailed need not be impleaded as respondent.

The petition imputes the following errors on the Ombudsman:

I.

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED AND EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN RULING THAT THE
LEASE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SASMUAN AND PETITIONER IS NULL AND
VOID.

II.

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEMOLITION OF THE FISHPOND
WAS VALIDLY MADE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECLARATION BY THE HEALTH OFFICER THAT IT WAS A
NUISANCE PER SE.

III.

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEMOLITION IS PART OF THE
PROPER EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE.

IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS GIVEN DUE NOTICE
AND HEARING BEFORE THE FISHPOND WAS BLASTED.

V.

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN RULING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE DOES NOT EXIST
TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF THE SUBJECT OFFENSES.15

Clearly, this is an appeal from the questioned issuances of the Ombudsman. However, such direct resort to this
Court from a resolution or order of the Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure.

Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 2716 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. The
provision allowed direct appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court. The right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases.17 The provision does not cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. More
importantly, Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 insofar as it allowed a direct appeal to this Court was declared
unconstitutional in Fabian v. Hon. Desierto.18

However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable
cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.19 The remedy from resolutions of the
Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.20

But in this case, petitioner has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary
to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a
reading of the assignment of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute grave abuse of discretion to the
Ombudsman in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his findings and
conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is not
sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright.

Even if the Court treats the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, its dismissal is nevertheless
warranted because petitioner failed to present, much more substantiate, any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Ombudsman.

A careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's criminal
complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State when they effected the
demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se. Thus, the
Ombudsman was of the opinion that no violation of Section 3(e)21 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or
of Article 32422 of the Revised Penal Code was committed by respondents. In the words of the Ombudsman,
"those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve the best
interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good."23

By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.24

Grave abuse of discretion should be differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. As long as
the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to
nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.25

The other errors raised by petitioner pertain to the Ombudsman's opinion on the lack of probable cause to indict
respondents. These are purported errors in judgment which can be corrected by an appeal, although not via a direct
appeal to this Court. Direct resort to this Court may be had only through the extraordinary writ of certiorari and
upon showing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, which petitioner failed to demonstrate.

Absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting it, the courts will not interfere with the Ombudsman's supervision
and control over the preliminary investigation conducted by him.26 It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review
the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it.27 The rule is
based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.28

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

- versus -
LARRY M. ALFONSO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 179452

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the May 21, 2007 Decision[1] and August 23, 2007 Resolution[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97284, which reversed Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution Nos.
061821[3] and 061908[4] dated October 16, 2006 and November 7, 2006, respectively, as well as its Order[5]
dated December 11, 2006, formally charging respondent Larry Alfonso with Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and preventively suspending him from his position as Director of the
Human Resources Management Department of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP).

The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Respondent Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of PUP. On July 6,
2006, Dr. Zenaida Pia, Professor IV in PUP-Sta. Mesa, and Dindo Emmanuel Bautista, President of Unyon ng mga
Kawani sa PUP, jointly filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Alfonso for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713,
charging the latter with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and violation of
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The affidavit-complaint was lodged before the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). In their affidavit, Dr. Pia and Bautista alleged, among others, that respondent repeatedly abused his
authority as head of PUPs personnel department when the latter prepared and included his name in Special Order
Nos. 0960 and 1004 for overnight services, ostensibly authorizing him to work for 24 hours straight from May 16
to 20, May 22 to 27 and May 29 to June 2, 2006. As a result thereof, Alfonso made considerable earnings for
allegedly working in humanly impossible conditions 24 hours straight daily, for three consecutive weeks.[6]

In support of their complaint, Dr. Pia and Bautista submitted the following documentary evidence:

1. Special Order No. 1004, s. 2006;

2. Special Order No. 0960, s. 2006;

3. Daily time records of Saturday and Overnight Services of Alfonso;

4. PUP Perm-OT overnight May 2006 payroll register;

5. Xerox copy of check no. 162833 dated May 31, 2006;

6. Summary of Alfonsos Saturday, overnight and overtime schedule;

7. Computation of the number of hours, days and weeks that Alfonso allegedly served; and

8. Explanation of official time, night service, Saturday overtime and overnight services rendered by Alfonso for
the month of May.[7]

On August 10, 2006, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) of the CSC issued an order directing Alfonso to submit his
counter-affidavit/comment within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit[8] dated August 30, 2006, respondent averred that he only rendered overnight work on
May 17, 19, 22, 24, 26, 29 and 31, 2006. He explained that his daily time record explicitly indicates that it covers
overnight services pursuant to S.O. No. 1004, series of 2006, and that an entry such as Day 17, arrival 8:00 PM;
Day 18, departure 8:00 AM connoted only a day of overnight work and not continuous two (2) days of rendition of
services.[9]

The CSC, however, found Alfonsos explanation wanting. On October 25, 2006, it issued Resolution No. 061821
formally charging Alfonso with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and
imposing a 90-day preventive suspension against him.[10]

Aggrieved, respondent filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the preventive suspension order and
requested a change of venue[11] from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR). In
the motion, he argued that it is the CSC-NCR regional office that has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to
Section 6 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, and that to hold otherwise may deprive him of his right to appeal.[12]
The motion was denied.[13]

Undaunted, Alfonso filed another motion for reconsideration on November 20, 2006, accompanied by a motion to
admit his supplemental answer.[14] This time, however, respondent argued that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear
and decide the administrative case filed against him. According to him, it is the PUP Board of Regents that has the
exclusive authority to appoint and remove PUP employees pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 8292[15] in
relation to R.A. No. 4670.[16]

Without ruling on the motion, Assistant Commissioner Atty. Anicia Marasigan-de Lima, head of CSC-NCR, issued
an Order[17] dated December 11, 2006 directing the Office of the President of PUP to implement the preventive
suspension order against respondent.[18]

Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief before the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On May 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision[19] in favor of Alfonso. The pertinent portion of the decision
declares:

Applying the foregoing provisions, it appears that the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case in two
ways: (1) through a complaint filed by a private citizen against a government official or employee; and (2)
appealed cases from the decisions rendered by Secretaries or heads of agencies, instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities in cases filed against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.

Indisputably, the persons who filed the affidavit-complaint against petitioner held positions in and were under the
employ of PUP. Hence, they cannot be considered as private citizens in the contemplation of the said provision. It
is likewise undisputed that the subject CSC resolutions were not rendered in the exercise of its power to review or
its appellate jurisdiction but was an ordinary administrative case. Hence, the present case falls short of the
requirement that would otherwise have justified the CSCs immediate exercise of its jurisdiction over the
administrative case against petitioner.

Even assuming that the CSC may directly entertain the complaints filed with it, the doctrine of exhaustion [of]
administrative remedies still prevents it from entertaining the present administrative case. If a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted.

The circumstances in this case do not justify the disregard of the doctrine. Hence, the administrative complaint
should have been lodged with the PUP board of regents.

xxx

The CA ratiocinated that since Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, the law creating PUP, is the special law
governing PUP, then it is the Board of Regents (BOR) that should carry out the duties of the investigating
committee and has the proper authority to discipline PUP personnel corollary to the BORs general powers of
administration.[20] According to the CA, the power of the BOR to hire carries with it the corresponding power to
discipline PUP personnel pursuant to Section 7(c) of P.D.1341, to wit:

Section 7. The Board of Regents shall have the following powers and duties in addition to his general powers of
administration and the exercise of all the powers of a corporation as provided in Section 13 of Act Numbered
fourteen hundred fifty-nine as amended, otherwise known as the Philippine Corporation Law:
xxxx

(c) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and
other members of the faculty, and other officials and employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours
of service, and such, other duties and conditions as it may deem proper, any other provisions of the law to the
contrary notwithstanding; to grant to them in his discretion, leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other conditions of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had;

xxx
This provision in the PUP Charter is substantially in accord with Section 4(h) of R.A. 8292,

Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. The governing board shall have the following specific powers
and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board
of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation
Code of the Philippines:
xxxx
(h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees subject to the
provisions of the revised compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget and compensation laws
governing hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its
discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process of law.

Given the foregoing antecedents, the pivotal issue we have to resolve is whether the CSC has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the complaint filed against Alfonso.

We find in favor of petitioner.

Section 2(1) and Section 3, Article IX-B of our Constitution, are clear, as they provide that:

Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career
service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy
in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It
shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

As the central personnel agency of the government,[21] the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance of
and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether
they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost,
civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen
against them as public servants. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by
government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC,
and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a department or
an agency to conduct the investigation. Specifically, Sections 9(j) and 37(a) of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the
Civil Service Law of 1975, provide:

SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and
shall have the following powers and function:
xxxx

(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or
brought to it on appeal;

xxxx

Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be
filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it
may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to
conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.[22]

We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary committees and governing
bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide
administrative complaints against their respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the
creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for the creation of such
disciplinary bodies as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline government
employees, including those in the academe. To hold otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which
the CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would
also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[23] we explained that it is error to contend that R.A. No. 4670 conferred
exclusive disciplinary authority on the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS, now Department of
Education or DepEd) over public school teachers and to have prescribed exclusive procedure in administrative
investigations involving them.[24] Hence, it is equally erroneous for respondent to argue that the PUP Charter and
R.A. No. 8292 in relation to R.A. 4670 confer upon the BOR of PUP exclusive jurisdiction to hear disciplinary
cases against university professors and personnel.

In Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,[25] an administrative case was filed against a state university president.
There, we struck down the argument that the BOR has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide an administrative
case filed against the respondent. We said:

In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondents argument that the BOR has exclusive power to
remove its university officials must fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty
members, employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR in addition to its general powers of
administration. This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292,
demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of the new law. x x x

xxxx

Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not
exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employee and officials.

Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and
officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.[26] (Emphasis supplied)

But it is not only for this reason that Alfonsos argument must fail. Equally significant is the fact that he had already
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit[27] and his motion for
reconsideration and requested for a change of venue, not from the CSC to the BOR of PUP, but from the CSC-
Central Office to the CSC-NCR.[28] It was only when his motion was denied that he suddenly had a change of
heart and raised the question of proper jurisdiction.[29] This cannot be allowed because it would violate the
doctrine of res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable to administrative cases as well.[30] At the very least,
respondents active participation in the proceedings by seeking affirmative relief before the CSC already bars him
from impugning the Commissions authority under the principle of estoppel by laches.[31]

In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees. These complaints were not lodged before
the disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but were instead filed before the CSC, with averments detailing respondents
alleged violation of civil service laws, rules and regulations. After a fact-finding investigation, the Commission
found that a prima facie case existed against Alfonso, prompting the Commission to file a formal charge against the
latter.[32] Verily, since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may, however, choose to deputize any department or agency or
official or group of officials such as the BOR of PUP to conduct the investigation, or to delegate the investigation
to the proper regional office.[33] But the same is merely permissive and not mandatory upon the Commission.

We likewise affirm the order of preventive suspension issued by the CSC-NCR against respondent.
There are two kinds of preventive suspension of government employees charged with offenses punishable by
removal or suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation; and (2) preventive suspension
pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the
respondent is exonerated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to
enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from
intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is
not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If
after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.[34]

The first kind, subject of the CSC Order against the respondent, is appropriately covered by Sections 51 and 52 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which provide:

SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons
to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension. Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case
against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority
within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Respondent was charged with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. A person
charged with grave misconduct is put on notice that he stands accused of misconduct coupled with any of the
elements of corruption or willful intent to violate the law or established rules.[35] Meanwhile, conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave offense with a corresponding penalty of suspension for six
(6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense.
[36]

In addition to the gravity of the charges against Alfonso, and equally relevant, is the opportunity available to him to
use his position as Director of the Human Resources Management Department of the university to exert undue
influence or pressure on the potential witnesses that the complainants may produce, or to tamper with the
documentary evidence that may be used against him. Preventive suspension is, therefore, necessary so that
respondents delicate yet powerful position in the university may not be used to compromise the integrity and
impartiality of the entire proceedings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 21, 2007 Decision[37] and August 23, 2007 Resolution[38] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97284 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Service
Commission Resolution Nos. 061821[39] and 061908[40] dated October 16, 2006 and November 7, 2006,
respectively, as well as its Order[41] dated December 11, 2006 placing respondent under preventive suspension are
hereby REINSTATED. The CSC is ordered to proceed hearing the administrative case against respondent with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 168766 May 22, 2008

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. HENRY A. SOJOR

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

IS the president of a state university outside the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and officials?
Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state university violate academic freedom?

The twin questions, among others, are posed in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which annulled two (2) CSC Resolutions2 against respondent Henry A. Sojor.

The Facts

The uncontroverted facts that led to the controversy, as found by the CSC and the CA, are as follows:

On August 1, 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of the Central
Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete City. In June 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292, or the
"Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997," was enacted. This law mandated that a Board of Trustees (BOT)
be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed respondent as president,
with a four-year term beginning September 1998 up to September 2002.3 Upon the expiration of his first term of
office in 2002, he was appointed president of the institution for a second four-year term, expiring on September 24,
2006.4

On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU).5 A Board of Regents
(BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.

Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty members before
the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City, to wit:

1. ADMC DC No. 02-20(A) – Complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service filed on June 26, 2002 by Jose Rene A. Cepe and Narciso P. Ragay. It was alleged that
respondent approved the release of salary differentials despite the absence of the required Plantilla and Salary
Adjustment Form and valid appointments.6

2. ADM DC No. 02-20 – Complaint for dishonesty, misconduct and falsification of official documents filed on July
10, 2002 by Jocelyn Juanon and Carolina Fe Santos. The complaint averred that respondent maliciously allowed
the antedating and falsification of the reclassification differential payroll, to the prejudice of instructors and
professors who have pending request for adjustment of their academic ranks.7

3. ADM DC No. 02-21 – Complaint for nepotism filed on August 15, 2002 by Rose Marie Palomar, a former part-
time instructor of CVPC. It was alleged that respondent appointed his half-sister, Estrellas Sojor-Managuilas, as
casual clerk, in violation of the provisions against nepotism under the Administrative Code.8

Before filing his counter-affidavits, respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, bar by prior judgment and forum shopping.

He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee. Being part of the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Office of the President (OP). He argued that CSC had no authority to entertain, investigate and resolve charges
against him; that the Civil Service Law contained no provisions on the investigation, discipline, and removal of
presidential appointees. He also pointed out that the subject matter of the complaints had already been resolved by
the Office of the Ombudsman.9

Finding no sufficient basis to sustain respondent’s arguments, the CSC-RO denied his motion to dismiss in its
Resolution dated September 4, 2002.10 His motion for reconsideration11 was likewise denied. Thus, respondent
was formally charged with three administrative cases, namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Falsification of
Official Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
and (3) Nepotism.12

Respondent appealed the actions of the regional office to the Commission proper (CSC), raising the same
arguments in his motion to dismiss.13 He argued that since the BOT is headed by the Committee on Higher
Education Chairperson who was under the OP, the BOT was also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was
appointed by the BOT, then he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the jurisdiction granted to

CSC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 80714 enacted in October 1975, respondent contended that this
was superseded by the provisions of R.A. No. 8292,15 a later law which granted to the BOT the power to remove
university officials.
CSC Disposition

In a Resolution dated March 30, 2004,16 the CSC dismissed respondent’s appeal and authorized its regional office
to proceed with the investigation. He was also preventively suspended for 90 days. The fallo of the said resolution
states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Henry A. Sojor, President of Central Visayas Polytechnic College, is hereby
DISMISSED. The Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, is authorized to proceed with the
formal investigation of the cases against Sojor and submit the investigation reports to the Commission within one
hundred five (105) days from receipt hereof. Finally, Sojor is preventively suspended for ninety (90) days.17

In decreeing that it had jurisdiction over the disciplinary case against respondent, the CSC opined that his claim
that he was a presidential appointee had no basis in fact or in law. CSC maintained that it had concurrent
jurisdiction with the BOT of the CVPC. We quote:

His appointment dated September 23, 2002 was signed by then Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
Chairman Ester A. Garcia. Moreover, the said appointment expressly stated that it was approved and adopted by
the Central Visayas Polytechnic College Board of Trustees on August 13, 2002 in accordance with Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8292 (Higher education Modernization Act of 1997), which explicitly provides that, "He (the
president of a state college) shall be appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees, upon recommendation of a duly
constituted search committee." Since the President of a state college is appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees
of the college concerned, it is crystal clear that he is not a presidential appointee. Therefore, it is without doubt that
Sojor, being the President of a state college (Central Visayas Polytechnic College), is within the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Commission.

The allegation of appellant Sojor that the Commission is bereft of disciplinary jurisdiction over him since the same
is exclusively lodged in the CVPC Board of Trustees, being the appointing authority, cannot be considered. The
Commission and the CVPC Board of Trustees have concurrent jurisdiction over cases against officials and
employees of the said agency. Since the three (3) complaints against Sojor were filed with the Commission and not
with the CVPC, then the former already acquired disciplinary jurisdiction over the appellant to the exclusion of the
latter agency.18 (Emphasis supplied)

The CSC categorized respondent as a third level official, as defined under its rules, who are under the jurisdiction
of the Commission proper. Nevertheless, it adopted the formal charges issued by its regional office and ordered it
to proceed with the investigation:

Pursuant to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sojor, being a third level official, is
within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Commission Proper. Thus, strictly speaking, the Commission has the sole
jurisdiction to issue the formal charge against Sojor. x x x However, since the CSC RO No. VII already issued the
formal charges against him and found merit in the said formal charges, the same is adopted. The CSC RO No. VII
is authorized to proceed with the formal investigation of the case against Sojor in accordance with the procedure
outlined in the aforestated Uniform Rules.19 (Emphasis supplied)

No merit was found by the CSC in respondent’s motion for reconsideration and, accordingly, denied it with finality
on July 6, 2004.20

Respondent appealed the CSC resolutions to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that the
CSC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions; that CSC encroached upon the academic freedom of CVPC; and
that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president of CVPC was exclusively lodged in the BOT of
CVPC.

CA Disposition

On September 29, 2004, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing the CSC to cease and desist from
enforcing its Resolution dated March 30, 2004 and Resolution dated July 6, 2004.21 Thus, the formal investigation
of the administrative charges against Sojor before the CSC-RO was suspended.

On June 27, 2005, after giving both parties an opportunity to air their sides, the CA resolved in favor of respondent.
It annulled the questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with the
administrative investigation. The dispositive part of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding that the respondent Civil Service Commission acted
without jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution Nos. 040321 and 040766 dated March 20, 2004 and July 6,
2004, respectively, the same are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on September 29, 2004 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.22

The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline. It declared that the
enactment of R.A. No. 929923 in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the BOT of the power
to discipline and remove its faculty members, administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was appointed
as president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292.24 The
power of the BOT to remove and discipline erring employees, faculty members, and administrative officials as
expressly provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of NORSU under Section 7 of
R.A. No. 9299. The said provision reads:

Power and Duties of Governing Boards. – The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties
in addition to its general powers of administration and exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors
of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the
Philippines:

xxxx

to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees x x x; and to remove them
for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis added)

The CA added that Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,25 which grants disciplinary jurisdiction to the CSC over all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, is a general law. According to the appellate court, E.O. No. 292 does
not prevail over R.A. No. 9299,26 a special law.

Issues

Petitioner CSC comes to Us, seeking to reverse the decision of the CA on the ground that THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING RESOLUTION NO. 040321 DATED MARCH 30, 2004 AND RESOLUTION NO. 04766 DATED
JULY 6, 2004.27

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

I. Jurisdiction of the CSC

The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service.28 As defined, the civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-
owned or controlled corporation.29 It is further classified into career and non-career service positions. Career
service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2)
there is opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. These include:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed
by the President;

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as
the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary

functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.30

Career positions are further grouped into three levels. Entrance to the first two levels is determined through
competitive examinations, while entrance to the third level is prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.31
The positions covered by each level are:

(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which involve non-
professional or subprofessional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of
collegiate studies;

(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional,
technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college
work up to Division Chief level; and

(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.32

On the other hand, non-career service positions are characterized by: (1) entrance not by the usual tests of merit
and fitness; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, coterminous with the appointing authority
or subject to his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
made.33 The law states:

The Non-Career Service shall include:

(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their
personal or confidential staff(s);

(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential
staff;

(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the
specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency; and

(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.34

It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil
service positions in the government service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of general jurisdiction,
the CSC promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.35 We find that the
specific jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not depart from the general jurisdiction granted to it by
law. The jurisdiction of the Regional Office of the CSC and the Commission central office (Commission Proper) is
specified in the CSC rules as:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. – The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and
shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and
upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.

Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. – The Civil Service Commission Proper shall have
jurisdiction over the following cases:

A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;

2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities,
imposing penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary brought
before it on appeal;

3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper personnel;

4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential appointees;

5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are not acted upon by the agencies and such
other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice;

6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil Service Regional Offices;

7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and

8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with the foregoing enumerations.

B. Non-Disciplinary

1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices brought before it;

2. Requests for favorable recommendation on petition for executive clemency;

3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions, involving third level officials; and

4. Such other analogous actions or petitions arising out of or in relation with the foregoing enumerations.

Section 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. – The Civil Service Commission Regional Offices shall
have jurisdiction over the following cases:

A. Disciplinary

1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service Commission Regional Offices provided that the
alleged acts or omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office, including Civil Service
examination anomalies or irregularities and the persons complained of are employees of agencies, local or national,
within said geographical areas;

2. Complaints involving Civil Service Commission Regional Office personnel who are appointees of said office;
and

3. Petitions to place respondent under Preventive Suspension.

B. Non-Disciplinary

1. Disapproval of appointments brought before it on appeal;

2. Protests against the appointments of first and second level employees brought before it directly or on appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of
the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the
governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the
jurisdiction of the CSC.

II. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive. CSC has concurrent jurisdiction
over a president of a state university.

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, under which law respondent was
appointed during the time material to the present case, provides that the school’s governing board shall have the
general powers of administration granted to a corporation. In addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the board the
power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and employees for cause:

Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. – The governing board shall have the following specific
powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to
the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the
Corporation Code of the Philippines:

xxxx

h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees subject to the provisions
of the revised compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget and compensation laws governing
hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves
of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the contrary not
withstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis
supplied)

The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the succeeding law that converted CVPC into
NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. Notably, and in contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now provides that the
administration of the university and exercise of corporate powers of the board of the school shall be exclusive:

Sec. 4. Administration. – The University shall have the general powers of a corporation set forth in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 68, as amended, otherwise known as "The Corporation Code of the Philippines." The administration of the
University and the exercise of its corporate powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Regents and the
president of the University insofar as authorized by the Board.

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, there is no question that administrative power over the school exclusively
belongs to its BOR. But does this exclusive administrative power extend to the power to remove its erring
employees and officials?

In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondent’s argument that the BOR has exclusive power to
remove its university officials must fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty
members, employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of
administration." This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292,
demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of the new law. For clarity,
the text of the said section is reproduced below:

Sec. 7. Powers and Duties of the Board of Regents. – The Board shall have the following specific powers and
duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the Board of
Directors of a corporation under existing laws:

xxxx

i. To fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees, subject to the
provisions of the Revised Compensation and Position Classification System and other pertinent budget and
compensation laws governing hours of service and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant
them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provision of existing law
to the contrary notwithstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process
of law.36 (Emphasis supplied)

Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not
exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials.

Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and
officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.37

All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a
non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil
service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.
This is not a case of first impression.

In University of the Philippines v. Regino,38 this Court struck down the claim of exclusive jurisdiction of the UP
BOR to discipline its employees. The Court held then:

The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative
disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have
the power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with
Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a) provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal
all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30)
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from office." (Emphasis supplied)

Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the manner of their
creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution, only government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B,
Section 2(1), which states:

"The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."

As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973
Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a
component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the
discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.39 (Emphasis
supplied)

In the more recent case of Camacho v. Gloria,40 this Court lent credence to the concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC
when it affirmed that a case against a university official may be filed either with the university’s BOR or directly
with the CSC. We quote:

Further, petitioner contends that the creation of the committee by the respondent Secretary, as Chairman of the USP
Board of Regents, was contrary to the Civil Service Rules. However, he cites no specific provision of the Civil
Service Law which was violated by the respondents in forming the investigating committee. The Civil Service
Rules embodied in Executive Order 292 recognize the power of the Secretary and the university, through its
governing board, to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. Of course under EO 292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed either
with the university’s Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission, although the CSC may
delegate the investigation of a complaint and for that purpose, may deputize any department, agency, official or
group of officials to conduct such investigation.41 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed before the regional office,
concerning violations of civil service rules against respondent.

III. Academic freedom may not be invoked when there are alleged violations of civil service laws and rules.

Certainly, academic institutions and personnel are granted wide latitude of action under the principle of academic
freedom. Academic freedom encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach, who may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.42 Following that doctrine, this Court has recognized that
institutions of higher learning has the freedom to decide for itself the best methods to achieve their aims and
objectives, free from outside coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires.43 They have the
independence to determine who to accept to study in their school and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to
enroll a student.44

That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the matters traditionally
held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints filed against Sojor
involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official
documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are classified as
grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.45

This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to
perform acts without any statutory basis.46 For that reason, a school official, who is a member of the civil service,
may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free to do so
under the principle of academic freedom.

Lastly, We do not agree with respondent’s contention that his appointment to the position of president of NORSU,
despite the pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts
imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.47 and Aguinaldo v. Santos48 are
inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike
respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people.49 Under
the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending
administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign
will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

EVANGELISTA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 163267
May 5, 2010

To be guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, one does not have to be in actual physical
possession thereof. The law does not punish physical possession alone but possession in general, which includes constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to the owners control.[1]

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] assails the October 15, 2003 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21805 which affirmed the January 23, 1998 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 109 convicting petitioner Teofilo Evangelista for violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1866,[5] as
amended, as well as the April 16, 2004 Resolution which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

In an Information[6] dated January 31, 1996, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of January 1996, at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following items:

1. One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine;

2. One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two (2) magazines;

3. Nineteen (19) 9mm bullets.

without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

After posting his bail, petitioner filed on February 14, 1996 an Urgent Motion for (a) Suspension of Proceedings and (b) the
Holding of A Preliminary Investigation.[7] The RTC granted the motion and, accordingly, the State Prosecutor conducted the
preliminary investigation.

In a Resolution[8] dated March 6, 1996, the State Prosecutor found no probable cause to indict petitioner and thus
recommended the reversal of the resolution finding probable cause and the dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, a Motion
to Withdraw Information[9] was filed but it was denied by the trial court in an Order[10] dated March 26, 1996, viz:

Acting on the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by State Prosecutor Aida Macapagal on the ground that
[there exists] no probable cause to indict the accused, the Information having been already filed in Court, the
matter should be left to the discretion of the Court to assess the evidence, hence, for lack of merit, the same is
hereby denied. Let the arraignment of the accused proceed.
When arraigned on March 26, 1996, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

In the morning of January 30, 1996, Maximo Acierto, Jr. (Acierto), a Customs Police assigned at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) District Command, was informed by his superior that a certain passenger of Philippine Airlines
(PAL) Flight No. 657 would be arriving from Dubai bringing with him firearms and ammunitions. Shortly after lunch,
Acierto, together with Agents Cuymo and Fuentabella, proceeded to the tube area where they were met by a crewmember
who introduced to them herein petitioner. Acierto asked petitioner if he brought firearms with him and the latter answered in
the affirmative adding that the same were bought in Angola. Thereupon, Acierto was summoned to the cockpit by the pilot,
Capt. Edwin Nadurata (Capt. Nadurata), where the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to him. Petitioner was then
escorted to the arrival area to get his luggage and thereafter proceeded to the examination room where the luggage was
examined and petitioner was investigated. In open court, Acierto identified the firearms and ammunitions.

During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos (Bustos) that he bought the subject items
in Angola but the same were confiscated by the Dubai authorities, which turned over the same to a PAL personnel
in Dubai. Upon inquiry, the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) in Camp Crame certified that petitioner is neither
registered with said office[11] nor licensed holder of aforesaid firearms and ammunitions. Bustos likewise verified from the
Bureau of Customs, but his effort yielded no record to show that the firearms were legally purchased. Among the documents
Bustos had gathered during his investigation were the Arrival Endorsement Form [12] and Customs Declaration Form.[13] A
referral letter[14] was prepared endorsing the matter to the Department of Justice. Bustos admitted that petitioner was not
assisted by counsel when the latter admitted that he bought the firearms in Angola.

SPO4 Federico Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc), a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and representative of the
FEO, upon verification, found that petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm holder. His office issued a certification[15] to
that effect which he identified in court as Exhibit A.

After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner, with leave of court, filed his Demurrer to Evidence, [16] the resolution of which
was deferred pending submission of petitioners evidence.[17]

Version of the Defense

The defense presented Capt. Nadurata whose brief but candid and straightforward narration of the event was synthesized by
the CA as follows:

x x x On January 30, 1996, he was approached by the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, who informed him
that a Filipino contract worker from Angola who is listed as a passenger of PAL flight from Dubai to Manila,
was being detained as he was found in possession of firearms; that if said passenger will not be able to board
the airplane, he would be imprisoned in Dubai; and that the Arabs will only release the passenger if the
Captain of PAL would accept custody of the passenger [herein petitioner] and the firearms. Capt. Nadurata
agreed to take custody of the firearms and the passenger, herein appellant, so that the latter could
leave Dubai. The firearms were deposited by the Arabs in the cockpit of the airplane and allowed the
appellant to board the airplane. Upon arrival in Manila, Capt. Nadurata surrendered the firearms to the airport
authorities.

Meanwhile, in view of the unavailability of the defenses intended witness, Nilo Umayaw (Umayaw), the PAL Station
Manager in Dubai, the prosecution and the defense agreed and stipulated on the following points:

1. That PAL Station Manager Mr. Nilo Umayaw was told by a Dubai Police that firearms and
ammunitions were found in the luggage of a Filipino passenger coming from Angola going to
the Philippines;

2. That he was the one who turned over the subject firearms to Captain Edwin Nadurata, the Pilot in
command of PAL Flight 657;

3. That the subject firearms [were] turned over at Dubai;

4. That the said firearms and ammunitions were confiscated from the accused Teofilo Evangelista
and the same [were] given to the PAL Station Manager who in turn submitted [them] to the PAL Pilot,
Capt. Edwin Nadurata who has already testified;
 5. That [these are] the same firearms involved in this case.[18]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On February 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions: (One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with SN-931864 with two (2)
magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm bullets) and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Seventeen (17)
Years and Four (4) Months to Twenty (20) Years.

The above-mentioned firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and is
ordered transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.[19]

On April 4, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial[20] which the RTC granted.[21] Forthwith, petitioner took the
witness stand narrating his own version of the incident as follows:

On January 28, 1996, he was at Dubai International Airport waiting for his flight to the Philippines. He came
from Luwanda, Angola where he was employed as a seaman at Oil International Limited. While at the airport in Dubai,
Arab policemen suddenly accosted him and brought him to their headquarters where he saw guns on top of a table. The
Arabs maltreated him and forced him to admit ownership of the guns. At this point, PAL Station Manager Umayaw came
and talked to the policemen in Arabian dialect. Umayaw told him that he will only be released if he admits ownership of the
guns. When he denied ownership of the same, Umayaw reiterated that he (petitioner) will be released only if he will bring the
guns with him to the Philippines. He declined and insisted that the guns are not his. Upon the request of Umayaw, petitioner
was brought to the Duty Free area for his flight going to the Philippines. When he was inside the plane, he saw the Arab
policemen handing the guns to the pilot. Upon arrival at the NAIA, he was arrested by the Customs police and brought to the
arrival area where his passport was stamped and he was made to sign a Customs Declaration Form without reading its
contents. Thereafter, he was brought to a room at the ground floor of the NAIA where he was investigated. During the
investigation, he was not represented by counsel and was forced to accept ownership of the guns. He denied ownership of the
guns and the fact that he admitted having bought the same in Angola.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After new trial, the RTC still found petitioner liable for the offense charged but modified the penalty of imprisonment. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated January 23, 1998 reads:

In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions: One (1) Unit 9mm Jerico Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine; One (1) Unit
Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with SN-931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm
bullets and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day to Eight (8) Years and a
fine of P30,000.00.

The above-mentioned firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and [are] ordered
transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.[22]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its Decision dated October 15, 2003. It ruled that the
stipulations during the trial are binding on petitioner. As regards possession of subject firearms, the appellate court ruled that
Capt. Naduratas custody during the flight from Dubai to Manila was for and on behalf of petitioner. Thus, there was
constructive possession.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[23] but it was denied by the appellate court in its April 16, 2004 Resolution.
 Hence, this petition.

Issues

Petitioner assigns the following errors:

a. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the charge of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, Illegal Possession of Firearms.

b. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Evangelista was never in possession of any firearm
or ammunition within Philippine jurisdiction and he therefore could not have committed the crime
charged against him.

c. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Evangelista committed a continuing crime.

d. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the results of the preliminary investigation.[24]

We find the appeal devoid of merit.

At the outset, we emphasize that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari shall only
raise questions of law considering that the findings of fact of the CA are, as a general rule, conclusive upon and binding on
the Supreme Court.[25] In this recourse, petitioner indulges us to calibrate once again the evidence adduced by the parties and
to re-evaluate the credibility of their witnesses. On this ground alone, the instant petition deserves to be denied
outright. However, as the liberty of petitioner is at stake and following the principle that an appeal in a criminal case throws
the whole case wide open for review, we are inclined to delve into the merits of the present petition.

In his bid for acquittal, petitioner argues that he could not have committed the crime imputed against him for he was never in
custody and possession of any firearm or ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines. Thus, the conclusion of the
appellate court that he was in constructive possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions is erroneous.

We are not persuaded. As correctly found by the CA:

Appellants argument that he was never found in possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions within
Philippine jurisdiction is specious. It is worthy to note that at the hearing of the case before the court a
quo on October 8, 1996, the defense counsel stipulated that the subject firearms and ammunitions were
confiscated from appellant and the same were given to PAL Station Manager Nilo Umayaw who, in turn,
turned over the same to Capt. Edwin Nadurata. Such stipulation of fact is binding on appellant, for the acts of
a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. Granting that Nilo Umayaw was merely told by the
Dubai authorities that the firearms and ammunitions were found in the luggage of appellant and that
Umayaw had no personal knowledge thereof, however, appellants signature on the Customs Declaration
Form, which contains the entry 2 PISTOL guns SENT SURRENDER TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINE, proves
that he was the one who brought the guns to Manila. While appellant claims that he signed the Customs
Declaration Form without reading it because of his excitement, however, he does not claim that he was
coerced or persuaded in affixing his signature thereon. The preparation of the Customs Declaration Form is a
requirement for all arriving passengers in an international flight. Moreover, it cannot be said that appellant
had already been arrested when he signed the Customs Declaration Form. He was merely escorted by
Special Agent Acierto to the arrival area of the NAIA. In fact, appellant admitted that it was only after he
signed the Customs Declaration Form that he was brought to the ground floor of NAIA for
investigation. Consequently, appellant was in constructive possession of the subject firearms. As held
in People v. Dela Rosa, the kind of possession punishable under PD 1866 is one where the accused
possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the
same. Animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on into the mind of the accused, as his real
intent, could be determined solely based on his prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding circumstances
explaining how the subject firearm came to his possession.

Appellants witness, Capt. Nadurata, the PAL pilot of Flight No. PR 657 from Dubai to Manila on January
30, 1996, testified that he accepted custody of the firearms and of appellant in order that the latter, who was
being detained in Dubai for having been found in possession of firearms, would be released from custody. In
other words, Capt. Naduratas possession of the firearm during the flight from Dubai to Manila was for and
on behalf of appellant.[26]
We find no cogent reason to deviate from the above findings, especially considering petitioners admission during the
clarificatory questioning by the trial court:
Court: So, it is clear now in the mind of the Court, that the firearms and ammunitions will also be with you
on your flight to Manila, is that correct?
A: Yes, your honor.

Court: [You] made mention of that condition, that the Dubai police agreed to release you provided that you
will bring the guns and ammunitions with you? Is that the condition of the Dubai Police?
A: Yes, your honor.

Court: The condition of his release was that he will have to bring the guns and ammunitions to
the Philippines and this arrangement was made by the PAL Supervisor at Dubai and it was Mr.
Umayaw the PAL Supervisor, who interceded in his behalf with the Dubai Police for his flight in
the Philippines.[27]

To us, this constitutes judicial admission of his possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions. This admission, the
veracity of which requires no further proof, may be controverted only upon a clear showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no admission was made.[28] No such controversion is extant on record.

Moreover, we cannot ignore the Customs Declaration Form wherein it appeared that petitioner brought the firearms with him
upon his arrival in the Philippines. While there was no showing that he was forced to sign the form, petitioner can only come
up with the excuse that he was excited. Hardly can we accept such pretension.

We are likewise not swayed by petitioners contention that the lower court erroneously relied on the Customs Declaration
Form since it is not admissible in evidence because it was accomplished without the benefit of counsel while he was under
police custody.

The accomplishment of the Customs Declaration Form was not elicited through custodial investigation. It is a customs
requirement which petitioner had a clear obligation to comply. As correctly observed by the CA, the preparation of the
Customs Declaration Form is a requirement for all arriving passengers in an international flight. Petitioner was among those
passengers. Compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial investigation is, therefore, not applicable in this
case. Moreover, it is improbable that the customs police were the ones who filled out the declaration form. As will be noted,
it provides details that only petitioner could have possibly known or supplied. Even assuming that there was prior
accomplishment of the form which contains incriminating details, petitioner could have easily taken precautionary measures
by not affixing his signature thereto. Or he could have registered his objection thereto especially when no life threatening acts
were being employed against him upon his arrival in the country.

Obviously, it was not only the Customs Declaration Form from which the courts below based their conclusion that petitioner
was in constructive possession of subject firearms and ammunitions. Emphasis was also given on the stipulations and
admissions made during the trial. These pieces of evidence are enough to show that he was the owner and possessor of these
items.

Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case filed against him. He claims that his alleged possession
of the subject firearms transpired while he was at the Dubai Airport and his possession thereof has ceased when he left for
the Philippines. He insists that since Dubai is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and his situation is not one
of the exceptions provided in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, our criminal laws are not applicable. In short, he had not
committed a crime within the Philippines.

Indeed it is fundamental that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction.[29] In order for the courts to acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases, the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. If
the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.[30]

Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he was charged was committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs
Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms
in the Philippines.

And more than mere possession, the prosecution was able to ascertain that he has no license or authority to possess said
firearms. It bears to stress that the essence of the crime penalized under PD 1866, as amended, is primarily the accuseds lack
of license to possess the firearm. The fact of lack or absence of license constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of
illegal possession of firearm. Since it has been shown that petitioner was already in the Philippines when he was found in
possession of the subject firearms and determined to be without any authority to possess them, an essential ingredient of the
offense, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was perpetrated and completed in no other place except the Philippines.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. In this case, the information specifically and categorically alleged that on or about January 30, 1996 petitioner
was in possession, custody and control of the subject firearms at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay
City, Philippines, certainly a territory within the jurisdiction of the trial court.

In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present charge happened in Dubai. It
may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner, even in a situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and
ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having been filed against petitioner
in Dubai in connection with the discovered firearms. Since there is no pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to
reason that there was no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegation applies.[31]

Petitioner finally laments the trial courts denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the investigating prosecutor
due to the latters finding of lack of probable cause to indict him. He argues that such denial effectively deprived him of his
substantive right to a preliminary investigation.

Still, petitioners argument fails to persuade. There is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the trial court in
disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation it itself ordered. Judicial action on the motion rests in the sound
exercise of judicial discretion. In denying the motion, the trial court just followed the jurisprudential rule laid down in Crespo
v. Judge Mogul[32] that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court. The court is not dutifully bound by such
finding of the investigating prosecutor. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc v. Judge How[33] we held:

It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since
the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or
disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine prima
facie case.

Consequently, petitioner has no valid basis to insist on the trial court to respect the result of the preliminary investigation it
ordered to be conducted.

In fine, we find no reason not to uphold petitioners conviction. The records substantiate the RTC and CAs finding that
petitioner possessed, albeit constructively, the subject firearms and ammunition when he arrived in
the Philippines on January 30, 1996. Moreover, no significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked
or disregarded which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case.

In the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the Court has reiterated the essential
elements in People v. Eling[34] to wit: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or
owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime. The existence of the subject
firearms and the ammunition were established through the testimony of Acierto. Their existence was likewise admitted by
petitioner when he entered into stipulation and through his subsequent judicial admission. Concerning petitioners lack of
authority to possess the firearms, SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. testified that upon verification, it was ascertained that the name of
petitioner does not appear in the list of registered firearm holders or a registered owner thereof. As proof, he submitted a
certification to that effect and identified the same in court. The testimony of SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. or the certification from the
FEO would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.[35]
A final point. Republic Act (RA) No. 8294[36] took effect on June 6, 1997 or after the commission of the crime on January
30, 1996. However, since it is advantageous to the petitioner, it should be given retrospective application insofar as the
penalty is concerned.

Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 provides:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition

or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. x x x
 The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall
be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms
but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with
firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.
Prision mayor in its minimum period ranges from six years and one day to eight years. Hence, the penalty imposed by the
RTC as affirmed by the CA is proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21805
affirming the January 23, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated January 23, 1998,
convicting petitioner Teofilo Evangelista of violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six years and one day to eight years and to pay a fine of P30,000.00
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.