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G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS
SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO,
JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their
alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the
exclusion of all others.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married
Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim
to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's
mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The
action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and
partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The
complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo
were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they
were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same
evidence.

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,

1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by
virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030,
holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision
dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and
Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court
is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent
law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson.

The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel
had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9,
1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of
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the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."

Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the
child that she was her natural mother. 6

The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of
Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time
but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of
adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the
petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.

As the respondent court correctly observed:

When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order
of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps
withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of
the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or
rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having been
revoked or rescinded.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be
faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not
disqualified.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption
cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing
the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not,
cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the
validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:

Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75,
p. 922, thus:

An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party
attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance
is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next
of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this
does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon
proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction,
and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If
this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence
might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different
tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court would
hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the
respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one
of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of
filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly
suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement
in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never
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offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in
line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents
must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for
that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It
serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that
civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)

In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the
intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:

Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child.

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is
also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children
as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised
to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented.
The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented
would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the
former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of
her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have
directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.
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But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the
adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no
obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct,
however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her
grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the
deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-802 July 5, 1993

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
HON. GENARO C. GINES, as Presiding Judge, Branch 26; MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES, Court
Interpreter and Officer-in-Charge, Branch 26; ROSIE M. MUNAR, Stenographic Reporter, Branch
26, PACITA B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ,
Staff Assistant I, Branch 26, and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR., Staff Assistant II, Branch 26, all of
the RTC, San Fernando, La Union, respondents.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for respondent Diazes.
Benigno M. Puno for respondents Munar, Flores & Lacsamana.

PER CURIAM:
This case was initiated by the Office of the Court Administrator with the filing of an administrative
complaint which reads:

Pursuant to the Resolution of the Court En Banc, dated July 30, 1991, the undersigned hereby institutes
this administrative complaint against Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding Judge, Branch 26; Ma. Gorgonia
L. Flores, Court Interpreter and Officer-in- Charge, Branch 26; Rosie M. Munar, Stenographic Reporter,
Branch 26; Pacita B. Diaz, Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz, Staff
Assistant I, Branch 26; and Mr. Alfredo V. Lacsamana, Jr., Staff II, Branch 26, all of the RTC, San
Fernando, La Union, for Dishonesty; Violation of par. (e), Sec. 3 of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) as amended; and Violation of Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975, Circular
No. 7, dated September 23, 1974, and Administrative Order No. 1, dated January 28, 1988, by virtue of
their collective illegal acts involving deliberate and surreptitious assignment of cases at the Docketing
and Receiving Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, San Fernando, La Union.

1. This complaint is substantially anchored on the Report submitted by Atty. Aurora P. Sanglay, Clerk of
Court, RTC, San Fernando, La Union, relative to her investigation of the alleged anomaly in the non-
raffling of cases in the said Court, and the Affidavit-complaint of Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz dated
September 19, 1991, implicating other court personnel involved in the aforestated irregularity;

2. Atty. Sanglay, in her Report, averred that:

2.1. From April 3, 1989 to April, 1991, there were forty-four (44) Special Proceedings cases, twenty-
seven (27) Land Registration cases, six (6) Civil Cases, and three (3) Criminal Cases which were directly
assigned to the RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, without passing through the mandatory,
raffling procedure, of cases except for three (3) special proceedings cases which were assigned to
Branch 27, which anomaly had been going on since 1986;

2.2. Pacita Diaz, Ma. Concepcion Diaz and Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. were the court employees in-charge
in (sic) the receiving and docketing of the Land Registration Cases, Special Proceedings cases and Civil
Cases, respectively; and

2.3. There is a probability that the aforesaid clerks, who were in-charge of receiving the cases, did not
submit deliberately to the Officer-in-Charge, some of the cases received from mandatory raffling in
compliance with the Administrative Orders/Circulars of the Supreme Court.

3. In the Affidavit-Complaint dated September 19, 1991, of Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz, which was received
by the Office of the Court Administrator on September 20,1991, she asserted, inter alia, that:

3.1. She blamed Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union,
Ma. Gorgonia Flores, Court Interpreter and Officer-In-Charge, same Court, and Rosie Munar,
Stenographic Reporter, same Court, for applying pressures and intimidations to her in order that the
cases of their choice may no longer be forwarded to the proper Officer-in-Charge;

3.2. Several petitions have been prepared by the (sic) Judge Gines himself in coordination with his
Stenographer Rosie Munar and Court Interpreter Ma. Gorgonia Flores, some of which are as follows:

3.2.1. Special Proceeding No. 1965 where the petitioner, who alleged himself to be a resident of San
Fernando, La Union, is actually a resident of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and the Aunt of Judge Gines. The
required bond of P500.00 therein has not yet been posted: and

3.2.2. Special Proceeding No. 1967 where the Office of the Solicitor General and other parties were not
furnished with copies of the petition upon the instruction of Judge Gines.

The respondents were then required to answer the complaint.

Separate motions for an extension of time to file their answers were made by the respondents, but only
respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma. Concepcion Diaz filed their Answer within the extended period. The
Resolution which granted the others the extension warned them that no further postponements would
be granted. Notwithstanding such caveat, however, they again asked for another extension. In the
Resolution of 28 May 1992, this Court ruled, inter alia, that:

It appearing that said respondents have not taken this case seriously, and considering the prior warning
in the Resolution of 7 May 1992, the above motions for another extension of time to file the Answers are
hereby DENIED. The respondent Judge and respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana are deemed to
have waived the filing of their Answer.

As it turned out, respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana were able to post their joint Answers on 15
May 1992 the last day of the additional period they had prayed for in their second motion which was
eventually denied in the aforementioned Resolution.

Respondents then filed a motion to reconsider the Resolution of 28 May 1992; the same was denied in
the Resolution of 14 July 1992. This latter resolution likewise denied the respondent Judge's motion to
reconsider the 7 May 1992 Resolution wherein he prayed that his answer (actually a Comment), dated 14
May 1992, be admitted. However, this Court resolved that the said comment be attached to the record
of the instant case.

In the same 14 July 1992 Resolution, the instant case was referred to Mr. Justice Nathanael P. De Pano,
Jr. of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation.

On 31 March 1993, Justice De Pano, Jr. submitted his 26-page REPORT. It appears therefrom that on 2
September 1992, he issued an order (a) requiring the parties to file respective affidavits which shall serve
as their direct testimonies in this case subject, however, to cross-examination by the adverse parties and
(b) setting the initial hearing of the case for 28 September 1992. Respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma.
Concepcion Diaz submitted their joint affidavit, dated 9 September 1992, as well as the affidavits of
Fortunata Gualberto, retired branch clerk of court of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San
Fernando, La Union, and Consolacion M. Dulay, Clerk III of the same Branch 27. Respondents Gorgonia
Flores, Rosie Munar and Alfredo Lacsamana likewise submitted their individual affidavits which are all
dated 14 September 1992. Respondent Judge Gines, for his part, filed a manifestation dated 17
September 1992, adopting his 14 May 1992 Comment as his direct testimony as well as the aforesaid
affidavits of respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana.

At the hearing on 28 September 1992, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts. They agreed on the
status and personal circumstances of the parties as stated in the affidavits, as well as the descriptions of
their respective positions in the RTC in San Fernando, La Union; the assumption into office of the
respondent Judge in January of 1987; the non-membership of the respondent Judge and the other
respondents in the raffle committee; and the procedure prescribed for the raffling of cases filed with the
RTC in San Fernando, La Union. The respondents then marked as exhibits their affidavits and other
documents.

It further appears from the REPORT that no testimonial evidence was offered by the parties. While the
complainant wanted to present Atty. Sanglay, the respondents admitted her report and agreed to
dispense with her testimony. The complainant then marked in evidence the following documents: (1) the
undated Report of Atty. Aurora Sanglay to the Executive Judge, as Exhibit "A"; (2) the 17 June 1991
Letter of Atty. Aurora Sanglay addressed to the Executive Judge, with annexes, as Exhibit "B"; (3) the
Joint Affidavit of Pacita and Ma. Concepcion Diaz dated 11 September 1992, as Exhibit "C"; (4) the
Compliance of respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana, Jr., as Exhibit "D"; (5) the Affidavit of
respondent Flores dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit "E"; (6) the Affidavit of Romeo Hermosura dated
14 September 1992, as Exhibit "F"; (7) the Affidavit of Teodorico Basilio dated 14 September 1992, as
Exhibit "G"; (8) the Affidavit of respondent Munar, dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit "H"; (9) the
Affidavit of respondent Lacsamana, Jr. dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit "I"; and (10) the
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Manifestation of respondent Judge Gines dated 17 September 1992, as Exhibit "J". It appears that
counsel for the complainant expressed a desire to cross-examine respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana but that the latter's counsel objected on the ground of possible self-incrimination. These
three respondents further manifested that they were not presenting any evidence against the other
respondents. Respondents Pacita Diaz and Concepcion Diaz likewise manifested, through counsel, that
they will not present evidence on account of the possibility of self-incrimination. Respondent Judge
Gines did not present his evidence.

Justice De Pano, Jr. then made the following observations, findings and conclusions in his REPORT:

Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon of the San Fernando, La Union Regional Trial Court, in a letter dated
June 20, 1991, transmitted to the Court, the report dated June 17, 1991, of Attorney Aurora Sanglay, the
said Court's Clerk of Court, on the subject of cases that had not been raffled by the appropriate
committee on raffle but which nevertheless, found their way mostly, to Branch 26 of the said Court
(presided over by respondent Genaro Gines from January 1987) and Branch 27 (the letter and its
annexes were later marked Exhibit B). In 1986, the report states, 6 criminal cases, 9 civil cases, 51
special proceeding cases and 9 land registration cases, (a total of 75 cases) did not pass through the
raffle committee but went directly to the branch which apparently acted on the cases without question.
In 1987, 8 criminal cases, 9 civil cases, 13 special proceedings cases, 2 land registration cases (a total of
32 cases) did not pass through the raffle committee. In 1988, 9 civil cases, 18 special proceedings cases
and 2 land registration cases (a total of 29 cases) went directly to the branches mentioned. A total of 136
cases from 1986 to 1988, Attorney Sanglay reports, went from filing/docketing direct to two branches
without undergoing the mandated raffle by the raffle committee.

The more germane report, one which demonstrates the continuing perpetuation of the above obviously
illegal and nefarious system of directing cases filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La
Union to Branches 26 and 27 of that court, is the undated report of Clerk of Court Aurora P. Sanglay to
Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon, and received by his office on June 6, 1991. The letter, uncontroverted,
is marked Exhibit A, Court Administrator, and it reads thus:

In compliance to (sic) your memorandum dated May 23, 1991, directing the undersigned to make an
investigation re the matter of cases filed before my office (Office of the Clerk of Court), which did not
undergo the mandatory raffle procedure, herewith are my findings:

The period covered by my investigation is from April 3, 1989 to April 1991. In summary, during this
period, there were FORTY-FOUR (44) Special Cases, TWENTY-SEVEN (27) Land Registration Cases, SIX
(6) Civil Cases, and THREE (3) Criminal Cases which did not pass through raffle, but which were instead
directed to specific RTC Branches, particularly Branch 26 and Branch 27. A great majority of these
cases however were assigned to Branch 26.

Attached is the list of these cases mentioned for your reference. This data obtained (sic) by
counterchecking the Minutes of previous raffles covering the period of my investigation vis-a-vis the
corresponding docket books.

Until your memorandum dated May 24, 1991, the following persons were in-charge of receiving and
docketing the following kinds of cases:

Mrs. Pacita Diaz — Land Registration Cases

Miss Ma. Concepcion Diaz — Special Proceedings Cases

Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana — Civil Cases

Criminal Cases were docketed by Mr. Vicente Tatunay of the Prosecutor's Office and received by either
Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., the person handling all cases filed for raffle, or Mr. Oscarlito Fantastico or
any of the clerks in the OCC, in his absence.

Supposed to be, all these filed cases are to be turned over to Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. for raffle, but as
per my findings, some of these cases were not at all included in the mandatory raffle, but were instead
directed to specific RTC Branches. The possibility is not remote that these clerks in-charge of receiving
their respective cases deliberately did not submit some of their received cases for raffle.

A lapse in the system and poor monitoring also provided for this thing to happen. Instances are common
where a client/lawyer is allowed possession of the papers to be filed at certain critical stages of the
receiving process, specifically after the docketing and payment of filing fees, and after said stages, the
possibility is not likewise remote that these papers are not submitted to the person in-charge of the
raffle.

The undersigned had already instituted procedures, i.e. centralized receiving, payment of filing fees,
docketing, and has strengthen (sic) monitoring of the cases and the number of cases filed to prevent
occurrence (sic) of similar nature. (Exhibit A, Court Administrator, pp. 76-77, rec., 3rd Folder.)

Clerk of Court Sanglay's report includes 44 special proceedings cases, 27 land registration cases, 6 civil
cases and 3 criminal cases or a total of 80 cases that did not pass through raffle from April, 1989 to
April, 1991 but found their way directly to Branches 26 and 27 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, La union. Of these 80 cases, all, except 3, found their way to Branch 26, occupied by
respondent Judge Genaro Gines who, as he admits, was assigned in (sic) that branch since January,
1987.

The respondents here are Judge Genaro Gines, the incumbent presiding judge of Branch 26 of the RTC
in Judicial Region No. 1 based in San Fernando, La Union; Pacita Diaz, a staff member in that court now
retired in the period covered by the Sanglay report, in charge of filing and docketing of land registration
cases; Pacita Diaz's daughter, Ma. Concepcion Diaz, another staff member in Branch 26, during the
period covered by the Sanglay report, the clerk in charge of the filing and docketing of special
proceedings cases; Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., in the period covered by the Sanglay report the clerk in-
charge of the filing and docketing of civil cases; Rosie Munar, court stenographic reporter; and Ma.
Gorgonia Flores, court interpreter and the Officer-in-Charge of Branch 26. Francisco Lacsamana, Jr.,
additionally, was assigned to gather all cases filed and docketed in the week — civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land — one day before the weekly raffle, and to transmit these newly filed cases to the
Committee on Raffle. Ma. Gorgonia Flores, Officer-in-Charge of Branch 26, oversees the administrative
machinery of Branch 26 (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., September 28, 1992).

The respondents felt that since the Court Administrator limited himself to the sworn statement and report
of Clerk of Court Attorney Aurora Sanglay, they were not called upon to present evidence in their behalf
as it would amount to self-incrimination. They refused to testify; they refused to be cross-examined. Your
investigator informs the Court that the Sanglay affidavit and report are uncontroverted. Admissions in the
sworn statements forming part of the record are utilized in this report in addition to the stipulated facts.

The respondents are charged in the administrative complaint:

(1) for dishonesty, in violation of paragraph (e), section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended;

(2) for violation of Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975;

(3) for violation of Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974; and

(4) for violation of Administrative Order No. 1, dated January 28, 1988.

The last three, Supreme Court issues, have to do with the creation of a raffle committee in multi-branch
Regional Trial Courts, with supervision of the raffle of newly-filled cases; with the manner of raffling
cases, and establish the policy that no case, in multi-branch trial courts, may be assigned to any branch
or sala unless it had undergone the raffle process.

Supreme Court Circular No. 7, September 23, 1974 mandates that in courts with several branches,
cases shall be assigned to the different branches only by raffle. "No case may be assigned to any branch
without being raffled." (Part I) And immediately after raffle, the Executive Judge is mandated by the said
Circular to indicate the particular branch to which the case is raffled, "the same to be written in words
and in figures on the cover of the Rollo and on the first page of the original complaint or information and
initialled by the Executive Judge and the two other officers who attended said raffle." (Part III). The same
circular created a raffle committee of three, composed of the Executive Judge and two other judges of
the court. The Executive Judge, supervises the Raffle. Administrative Circular No. 1, (January 28, 1988)
reiterates strict compliance with Administrative Order No. 6 (June 30, 1975) and Circular No. 7
(September 23, 1974 Raffle of cases, this later Circular required, must be "in open session in the
presence of lawyers and spectators . . . . ." (Section 8.1). The Court in this later Circular restated the res
ipso loquitor (sic) rule regarding the conduct and removal of judges (Section 5.2).

It is therefore, beyond cavil, that under the rules governing the administration of courts, all cases filed in
court must go through the raffle committee for assignment. No case must be assigned, in multi-branch
courts, unless it is raffled by the Raffle Committee. The 80 cases involved in this case, filed from April
1989 to April 1991, were not raffled, but were directly assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26 (except 3)
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under respondent Judge Gines. Respondent Judge Gines must know, under the above Supreme Court
acts, at a simple glance on the cover of the rollo and the first page of every such record, whether a case
was assigned to him after going through raffle or not. Cases assigned to his branch, after going through
the required raffle, show on the face of the rollo, in words and in figures, the branch to which the case is
assigned, authenticated by the initials of the Executive Judge and the two other members of the
Committee. From January 1987, when respondent Judge Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the
respondent judge had received unraffled cases, considered them and decided them. He had done so,
apparently, not because he was a maniac of a worker, nor because he loved his work but for reasons
unspoken in this case. Why should a sane judge accept additional cases for study and decision, in
addition to his regular load, without any benefit or consideration? Here obviously, the res ipso loquitor
(sic) doctrine applies.

Among the administrative officers charged here, Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., as stipulated, gathers all the
cases filed and docketed in any particular week, for transmittal to the Committee on Raffle. He prepared
the cases for raffle, including the preparation of the pieces of paper properly written on, to be picked in
the raffle. It was his job to do so. He was assigned to do so; he admitted so. That he did not do so is
obvious from the Sanglay Report — from 1989 to 1991, he failed to transmit 80 cases — and these
cases found their way (except for 3) to respondent Judge Gines. The Sanglay report is not controverted.
It was Lacsamana's job to collect all cases docketed, and to transmit them to the Raffle Committee. 80
such cases he did collect and failed to report to the Raffle Committee from April, 1989 to April, 1991.

The Diazes, in the period covered by the Sanglay report had apparently fallen out with respondent Judge
Gines and respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana. In an affidavit dated September 18, 1991
executed by respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz, the following passages appear, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

The conflict between the Diazes and the other respondents deem (sic) to have arisen from the suspicion
the respondent Judge entertained that the Diazes had 'squealed' on him to the Executive Judge, the
Honorable Braulio Yaranon. This is contained in the Diazes Joint Affidavit dated September 9, 1992
(Marked C-Diaz), in the following passage:

xxx xxx xxx

As to the two other respondents, respondents Ma. Gorgonia Flores, who is officer-in-charge of Branch
26 and Rosie Munar, court interpreter, there appears to be no evidence. The record shows that when the
Court Administrator's lawyers rested their case with the presentation of the Sanglay report, the
respondents refused to be cross-examined on their sworn statements. Consequently, each sworn
statement lost value as evidence against the other respondents. However, it may be easily inferred that
as court officer-in-charge, respondent Flores was in (sic)-duty bound to supervise the work of her
subalterns. The non-raffling of 80 cases during the period covered from April, 1989 to April 1991 reflects
her failure to do her job.

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court orders and circulars complained of as having been violated, are directed to district
judges, while Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 is inclusive in scope, penalizing public officers for
causing undue injury to any party . . . . or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative a (sic) judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. . . .

The prosecution had limited itself to presenting the Sanglay report. It is apparent that we must take the
Diazes' statement that they were pressured to do that which they had to do, and whatever it was, was
done without consent, and against their will. However, under the facts here, all the cases filed docketed
in Branch 26 were collected by respondent Lacsamana, Jr., who was in (sic) duty bound to forward the
cases to the Raffle Committee. That 80 such cases did not find their way to the Committee, but ended
up as 80 extra cases (except 3) in the docket load of the respondent judge, means at the very least that
Lacsamana, Jr., failed to perform his job. The respondent judge in accepting or securing, such 80 cases,
(minus 3) that did not pass through raffle, for his action and resolution, and which he eventually resolved
violated all the Supreme Court circulars on the matter with the help and cooperation of respondent
Lacsamana, Jr. Evidently, respondent judge must have received undue benefits and advantages (which
 9

have not been demonstrated in this case) in securing this extra load of cases, benefits and advantages
coming from the party benefited (sic) by his action, and at the same time, granted the parties involved in
the some (sic) 80 cases that did not undergo raffle, undue and unwarranted benefits resulting from the
bias and partiality in their favor coming from the respondent judge. As earlier observed, a single glance
at the cover and first page of each of the 80 or so rollos would show that they were unraffled, and yet,
the respondent judge knowing that such cases were unraffled, secured the said cases, considered them
and decided or resolved them, in violation of law.

It would appear, therefore, that the respondent judge is guilty of the charges in the administrative
complaint. Along with him as guilty, is respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. This conclusion is bolstered
by, among other things, the Diazes' statement that cases were indeed directly secured by the
respondent judge without their undergoing raffle.

With respect to the other respondents, it could be deduced that the respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores, as
officer-in-charge of Branch 26, would have known that Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. was not doing his job of
forwarding all docketed cases to the Raffle Committee faithfully.

He then recommends:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended:

1. That respondent Judge Genaro C. Gines be appropriately penalized for violation of all the Supreme
Court orders and circulars mentioned in the Administrative Complaint for the period covered from April
1989 to April 1991, plus apparent violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019;

2. That respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. for his apparent failure to do his job, be, likewise
appropriately penalized, at least with a 6-month suspension without pay; and

3. That respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores be likewise penalized with a 3-month suspension without pay;
and

4. That the other respondents be warned against committing any such violations.

The continuing deliberate violations of Administrative Order No. 6 (dated 30 June 1975), Circular No. 7
(dated 23 September 1974) and Administrative Order No. 1 (dated 28 January 1988) for the years
reported in Atty. Sanglay's report, and their belated discovery boggle our minds. The irregularities should
have been easily discovered by the respondent Judge either because the fact that a case has not been
properly raffled off is at once discernible on the cover of the records and on the first page of the original
of the initial pleading (complaint, information, etc.), or because plain common sense would have told him
that something was wrong somewhere as an unusual number of cases of the same class had been
"assigned" to his sala. That he had failed to appreciate the physical evidence or, at the very least, exhibit
surprise at the unusual number of cases is quite amazing. Thus, we are loathe to grant him the benefit of
the doubt and conclude that he had no interest whatsoever in having those cases raffled off to him and
that he only loved to work more than the others. Given the circumstances of this case, we cannot merely
cut him some slack and assume good faith on his part; he deserves no such treatment. As the
investigating Justice himself assessed the situation:

. . . . The 80 cases involved in this case, filed from April 1989 to April 1991, were not raffled, but were
directly assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26 (except 3) under respondent Judge Gines. Respondent
Judge Gines, must know, under the above Supreme Court acts, at a simple glance on the cover of the
rollo and the first page of every such record, whether a case was assigned to him after going through
raffle or not. . . . From January 1987, when respondent Judge Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the
respondent judge had received unraffled cases, considered them and decided them. He had done so,
apparently, not because he was a maniac of a worker, nor because he loved his work but for reasons
unspoken in this case. Why should a sane judge accept additional cases for study and decision, in
addition to his regular load, without any benefit or consideration? Here, obviously, the res ipso loquitor
(sic) doctrine applies.

The irregularity and violations of the aforementioned administrative orders and circular could not have
been committed so blatantly, brazenly and openly for an unusually long period of time if the respondent
Judge did not have the cooperation of some of the court employees. We therefore agree with the
investigating Justice that such support and cooperation were extended by subordinates who likewise
 10

had something to do with the raffle of cases. Hence, the findings on the degree of participation, either by
commission or omission, of respondents Flores and Lacsamana are sustained.

In his report, the investigating Justice absolves the Diazes and Munar from responsibility in the aforesaid
irregularities.

With respect to respondent Pacita Diaz, the case has become moot as she died on 10 February 1993. 1
Thus, the case is dismissed insofar as she is concerned.

On the other hand, while we find no evidence to link respondent Munar to the aforementioned
irregularities, we hold that respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz is not entirely blameless. In her affidavit of
18 September 1991, the relevant portions of which are quoted in the REPORT of Justice de Pano, she
explicitly admitted:

11. In my explanation dated May 27, 1991 to the Memorandum of Judge Yaranon, while I might have
made an admission that I was the clerk receiving cases that later turned out to be unraffled, I placed the
direct blame on Judge Gines and my two officemates, namely, Mrs. Ma. Gorgonia L. Flores and Mrs.
Rosie Munar who had applied all sorts of pressures upon me, including series (sic) of intimidation and,
insinuations in order that cases of their choice receive (sic) by me may no longer be forwarded to the
proper officer-in-charge of the raffle, but to them directly in Branch 26. 2

It is to be noted that Ma. Concepcion did not elaborate on the nature of such intimidation and
insinuations. In view of the fact, however, that she was in charge of receiving and docketing special
proceedings cases, and that out of the controversial 80 unraffled cases, 44 were special proceedings
cases, her participation could, by no means, be considered as insignificant. And even if the alleged
"intimidation" and "insinuations" were true, they still would not exculpate her in view of the length of time
involved, the number of cases questioned and the absence of proof that such intimidation and
insinuations were persistent, continuous and irresistible. It is thus clear that she had, by neglecting her
duty, allowed herself to be used by the other respondents.

A far more serious matter which has escaped the attention of the investigating Justice involves the
charges set forth under paragraph 3 of the Administrative Complaint, particularly on the preparation by
the respondent Judge, allegedly in coordination with respondents Munar and Flores, of petitions in
certain cases, some of which are (a) Special Proceeding No. 1965 wherein it is made to appear that the
petitioner therein an aunt of the respondent Judge and a resident of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur — resides in
San Fernando, La Union, and (b) Special Proceeding No. 1967 wherein the Office of the Solicitor General
and the other parties were not furnished with copies of the petition upon order of the respondent Judge.
Not having undergone the prescribed raffle procedure, these two cases were directly assigned to the
respondent Judge who then acted thereon. The said petitions, the pertinent orders issued in the course
of the proceedings therein and the minutes thereof were attached by the respondent Judge to his 14
May 1993 Comment, which he had adopted as his direct testimony pursuant to his 17 September 1992
Manifestation (Exhibit "J"). These documents provide conclusive proof of more serious irregularities
amounting to either gross ignorance or malicious disregard of applicable procedural laws, grave
misconduct, grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
respondent Judge made a mockery of the judicial process as it is obvious that he had displayed a
special interest in these cases; in fact, he even caused the cases to be excluded from the raffle. A careful
review of the abovementioned petitions will reveal that the designation "Branch 26," indicating the
branch presided over by the respondent Judge, has been originally typewritten as part of the caption,
and not merely entered in the blank space reserved for the branch to which the case may subsequently
be raffled off. It is to be further observed that the petition in Special Proceeding No. 1965 was
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Flores in her capacity as the Officer-in-Charge of the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Branch 26.

Special Proceeding No. 1965 involves a petition for guardianship over the person and property of a
certain Juan R. Lagmay. The said petition was filed by Regina Lagmay Valdez — who claims to be a
resident of Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union3 — on 24 September 1990, and alleges that Juan R.
 11

Lagmay is "presently residing at No. 2579 Pamintuan Village, Mabalacat, Pampanga." Upon its filing, the
respondent Judge immediately issued an order (a) giving due course to the petition, (b) directing that
notices be served to Juan Lagmay's nearest of kin, namely Bonifacia Lagmay, Lilia Gumangan and
Mariano Lagmay, all residents of Las-ud, Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and (c) directing the latter to submit their
opposition to the petition, if any, on or before 8 October 1990 at 8:30 a.m.4 No order setting the case for
hearing at that particular date, time and place was issued. It would appear, however, that this 24
September 1990 order was considered by the respondent Judge as the order setting the case for
hearing on 8 October 1990 because respondent Flores prepared the Minutes of the alleged proceedings
conducted on 8 October

1990. 5 The said Minutes show that the following exhibits were offered for jurisdictional purposes,: (1)
Notice of hearing, as Exhibit "A" and (b) the dorsal side of Exhibit "A," purportedly to show that Juan
Lagmay's nearest of kin were furnished with the notice of hearing, as Exhibit "A-1. " Said Minutes further
disclose that the petitioner therein was not assisted by counsel; that respondent Flores acted as
Interpreter while respondent Munar acted as Stenographer; and that since no opposition was filed
therein, the testimony of the petitioner was received. The latter then allegedly declared that she is a
resident of Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union; she is Juan Lagmay's niece as he is her father's brother;
and Juan Lagmay is an American citizen, single, childless, a resident of 2579 Pamintuan Village,
Mabalacat, Pampanga and a retired seaman receiving pension from the Social Security Administration of
the United States of America in the amount of $550.00 a month. Thereafter, the respondent Judge
issued an order appointing petitioner Regina Valdez as the guardian of the person and property of Juan
R. Lagmay, and directing her to take her oath as such upon the filing of a bond of P500.00, after which
she would be issued letters of guardianship. Without the bond having first been filed, however,
respondent Flores administered the oath to Regina Valdez. 6 Thereafter, or on 18 October 1990,
respondent Flores issued to the latter her letters of guardianship. 7

A closer examination of the so-called proofs of notice of hearing to the nearest of kin, consisting
supposedly of "registry return receipts," reveals that there are no entries in the blanks reserved for
information on the name of sender, name of post office, municipality or province where the same post
office is located, registry number and case number. It is not likewise indicated therein when the
addressees received the "registered" letter. In view thereof, the conclusion that the so-called notices
were not sent at all is inevitable.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to have known that his court was not the proper venue for the case
because the person sought to be placed under guardianship was alleged to be a resident of Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor or incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First
Instance of the province, or in the justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the municipal court
of the chartered city where the minor or incompetent resides,. . . . (emphasis supplied).

Worse, the aforesaid Order of 24 September 1990 did not even direct that notice be served on Juan
Lagmay, the very party sought to be placed under guardianship. Such an omission, therefore, clearly
violated Section 3, Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court which directs the court to fix the time and
place for hearing and cause reasonable notice to be given to the person named in the petition, including
the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself. We have ruled that service of notice to the
minor above 14 years of age or the incompetent is jurisdictional. 8 Failing to have notice sent to Juan
Lagmay, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing on 8 October 1990, receive
the petitioner's testimony, if he did at all, and thereafter appoint her as Juan Lagmay's guardian. Nor was
the respondent Judge justified in issuing on 22 January 1990 — pursuant to the petitioner's 17 January
1990 motion9 — an order appointing deputy sheriffs Oscar Fantastico and Romualdo Baladad as special
sheriffs to take custody over the person of Juan Lagmay from one Florencio "Boy" Cortes of Bolinao,
Pangasinan. In the said order, respondent Judge further directed Boy Cortes "to release from his
custody and deliver the person of said Juan R. Lagmay, a.k.a. John R. Lagmay to the aforementioned
special sheriffs immediately upon receipt of this Order, under pain of contempt." 10 Based on the special
sheriffs' report, 11 however, Boy Cortes did not release Juan Lagmay because the latter was too weak
 12

and sickly to travel. This refusal prompted the respondent Judge to order Boy Cortes' arrest (for
contempt) and confinement until he shall have complied with the said order. 12 It was respondent Flores
who forwarded the warrant of arrest to the PNP Regional Command at San Fernando, La Union for its
service. 13

Having acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case and appoint Regina Valdez as Juan Lagmay's guardian,
respondent Judge acted clearly beyond his authority when he designated special sheriffs to take
custody of Juan Lagmay, directed the person who had custody over the latter to deliver him to the said
special sheriffs and ordered the arrest of the said person who refused to surrender custody. And even if
we are to assume, for the sake of argument, that the respondent Judge had validly acquired jurisdiction
over the case and appointed Regina Lagmay as guardian, and that Boy Cortes did in fact refuse to
deliver Juan Lagmay to the special sheriffs, he (respondent Judge) would still be guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for ordering Cortes' arrest and confinement. In such a situation, the petitioner's
remedy would be to file a petition for habeas corpus, and not to have Boy Cortes cited for contempt,
much less arrested.

We shall now focus our attention to Special Proceeding No. 1967. It is very strange proceeding. The
case involves a petition for the "judicial confirmation of the de facto adoption" of Cecilia Averion filed on
11 October 1990. The petitioner therein alleges that she and her late husband, Fernando Averion — who
died in 1987 — "adopted" Cecilia Averion in 1967; only 1 year and 3 months old at the time, Cecilia was
supposedly given up by her natural parents, the whereabouts of whom remain unknown. Petitioner
further avers that she and her husband, during his lifetime, reared the child and gave her all their love,
attention, care and understanding. They also provided her with an education and considered her as their
own child. Hence, the petition was filed "for the purpose of judicially confirming the de facto adoption of
Cecilia Averion by herein petitioner and her late husband."14 The said petition was not accompanied by
the written consent of Cecilia Averion who, at the time of filing, was already of legal age. On the very day
the petition was filed, respondent Judge forthwith issued a Notice of Hearing which provided that the
petition would be heard on 31 October 1990; it was likewise ordered therein that "a copy of this notice
be published once a week for three consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioner in a newspaper
of general circulation in La Union and in the Philippines." 15

From the so-called Minutes of the proceedings of 31 October 1990, 16 as prepared by respondent,
Flores, it appears that the following exhibits were offered to establish the jurisdiction of the court: (1) the
affidavit of the Editor of the North Tribune, "a newspaper of general circulation in La Union and Northern
Luzon provinces," published in San Fernando, La Union, as Exhibit "A"; (2) clippings of the published
order in the 10, 17 and 24 October 1990 issues of the North Tribune, as Exhibits "A-l," "A-2" and "A-3,"
respectively; and (3) the entire issues of the North Tribune for 10, 17 and 24 October 1990, as Exhibits
"B," "B-1" and "B-2," respectively. It may further be gleaned from the said Minutes that since no
opposition was registered by any other party, the petitioner's testimony was received by the court. On 6
November 1990, the respondent Judge handed down a decision 17 granting the petition and decreeing
as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the petition and hereby confirms the de facto adoption of
Cecilia Averion by herein petitioner and her late spouse Fernando Averion retroactive to the year 1967.

The remedy pursued in Special Proceeding No. 1967 is certainly unusual as we are not aware of any
prescribed action that may be instituted for the judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption. Nor do our
adjective and substantive laws on adoption provide for such a proceeding. In fact, the only proper and
authorized procedure relative to adoption is outlined in the rule on adoption itself. 18 That Cecilia Averion
had been treated by the petitioner and her husband as their own child during the former's minority may
only provide compelling reasons to grant the decree of adoption notwithstanding her (Cecilia's) having
attained the age of majority. This is one of the exceptions provided by the Family Code to the rule that a
person of legal age cannot be adopted. 19

In "confirming" the so-called de facto adoption and decreeing the same to be "retroactive to the year
1967," respondent Judge has carved a name for himself in history for, as already pointed out, no action
or proceeding for judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption is authorized in this jurisdiction.
 13

Furthermore, by its very nature and purpose, a decree of adoption can never be made to retroact. Lastly,
considering that the petitioner's husband had died in 1987, or three years before the petition was filed,
he could not now be resurrected for purposes of the adoption, be in fact declared an adopter and be
subsequently bound by the decree to the prejudice of his heirs.

Then too, respondent Judge completely disregarded the fact that Cecilia Averion had submitted no
written consent to the adoption at the time of the filing of the petition or at any subsequent date — a
manifest infirmity. Nor was Cecilia called to testify in the case. Moreover there seems to be an irregularity
in the publication of the notice of hearing. It is to be observed that as indicated in the upper right hand
corner of the first page of the petition, the proceeding was instituted on 11 October 1990. If this were so,
the notice of hearing which was issued by the respondent Judge on that same date 20 could not have
been published in the North Tribune in its 10 October 1990 issue. In his affidavit, the Editor of the said
newspaper disclosed that the notice was indeed published on 10 October 1990.

All told, respondent Judge completely ignored the procedural rules on adoption and promulgated
guidelines for himself to suit his own purpose and design.

Hence, it is evident that Special Proceeding No. 1965 and Special Proceeding No. 1967 were not only
directly filed with the court of the respondent Judge without passing through the raffle procedure, the
two cases were also resolved by the latter in a manner that may be characterized by gross ignorance or
the brazen and blatant disregard of the applicable procedural laws, grave misconduct, palpable abuse of
authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He is therefore unfit to continue in
the service a day longer. He has evidently forgotten that the administration of justice is a sacred task.
Upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He becomes "the visible
representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice." 21 A judge must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence, 22 and should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. 23

As shown in the above disquisitions, respondent Flores was a willing participant in the commission of
the irregularities in both proceedings. On the other hand, however, respondent Munar's participation has
not been substantiated.

Before closing, we would like to point out that per our Resolution of 2 March 1993, we referred to Justice
De Pano for inclusion in his investigation the 29 January 1993 letter of Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon
which was addressed to Deputy Court Administrator Juanito Bernard. 24 In his letter, Judge Yaranon
informs the latter about matters discovered in the course of the audit which are more serious than the
"illegal raffling" of cases. He then exposes alleged case fixing and illegal office practices committed on a
large scale by a syndicate composed principally of court officers and personnel, and describes the
modus operandi of those involved as follows:

The operation in a particular case, starts with "AMBULANCE CHASING"; after arrangements are made
with a prospective applicant/petitioner, a petition is prepared by the syndicate; the same is then signed
personally by the petitioner/applicant; and the oath for purposes of verification, is administered also by
the syndicate.

The petition/application is then filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court, where syndicate members
receive and docket the case in the docket book of Branch 26; the case is deliberately separated from the
cases that are turned over to the Raffle Committee, and is directly turned over to Branch 26. Care is
taken that the date of filing is made to coincide with the scheduled day for raffling of cases (Tuesdays).

On the same date of filing, the ORDER setting the case for initial hearing, is issued by Branch 26. On the
date of initial hearing, a lawyer-contact of the syndicate enters an appearance for the petitioner/
applicant, and he then presents jurisdictional facts.

On the very same day of initial hearing (in special proceedings) and without any ACTUAL HEARING (in
special proceedings and land registration cases), for the reception of evidence on the material
allegations of facts in the application/petition, a DECISION is forthwith issued.

Judge Yaranon then partly concludes:

Just one aspect of the matter is herein submitted for consideration. The issuance of a DECISION without
any previous hearing being held for the reception of evidence by the applicant/petitioner, constitutes
FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT by a public officer, under Article 171, Revised Penal Code
committed by:

 14

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate; . . . (par. 2, Art. 171, Revised Penal Code).

According to Justice De Pano, he received the 2 March 1993 Resolution just as he was about to write his
report in this case. He then suggests that the matter subject thereof be treated separately and that
"appropriate, charges be leveled against the respondent Judge principally, and his cohorts with the
Tanod Bayan, for criminal prosecution." 25 Indeed, the referral of Judge Yaranon's letter to Justice De
Pano may have been too late. In any event, the charges proffered therein may be separately dealt with.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) DISMISSING from the service respondent Judge GENARO C. GINES with prejudice to re-
employment, in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all benefits except earned leave credits. This dismissal shall be immediately executory and
said respondent Judge is hereby ordered to forthwith vacate his position and desist from performing any
further official function;

(2) SUSPENDING from office respondents MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA,
JR. for a period of six (6) months each, without pay;

(3) SUSPENDING from office respondent MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, for a period of three (3) months,
without, pay.

The foregoing suspensions shall take effect immediately upon the service of a copy of this Decision on
the aforenamed respondents MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES, ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR. and MA.
CONCEPCION B. DIAZ. The periods of their respective suspensions shall not be charged against their
leave credits, if any;

(4) DISMISSING this case as against respondent PACITA B. DIAZ in view of her demise; and

(5) DISMISSING this case as against respondent ROSIE M. MUNAR for lack of substantial evidence.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to evaluate the 29 January 1993 letter of
Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon — subject of the 2 March 1993 Resolution of this Court in this case
and to submit to this Court appropriate recommendations thereon within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
a copy of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

 15

G.R. No. 167405             February 16, 2006

ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO
SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special
Administrator, CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO
ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2004 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated May 14, 2005 denying the motion for
reconsideration. In the assailed judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the September
18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac,
Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from dismissing the petition for letters of administration
and settlement of estate on the ground that petitioner must first prove that she was legally adopted by
the decedent, Elena Lising.

On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where
it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was the
niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were
Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo
Lising and respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.

According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalities of Ramos and
Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession
of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be
appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of
Lising’s properties to the legal heirs.1

On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition, claiming that she was an
adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970.
She asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was
unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. She
further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve as administrator of Lising’s estate because of her
"antagonistic interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs have questioned the
decedent’s title to a piece of real property which forms a large part of the estate.

On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition3 attaching thereto the
Certification4 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No.
01 of the Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos
pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.

Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City, stating that
a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioner’s
adoption by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No. 436
indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the
dispositive portion of the adoption decree was recorded as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for adoption and therefore grants the
same. Consequently, the Court declares that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all
legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural parents Orlando Zalzos and
May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and purposes the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos
and Elena Lising.7

Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution8 issued by the Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his
 16

widow, Elena Lising, and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.

On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary evidence to prove the
jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on petitioner’s opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos
appears to have filed a Comment/Reply to Oppositor’s Opposition,10 after which the RTC ordered the
parties to submit memoranda thereon.11 On July 22, 1999, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.12

Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No. 53457.13 They claimed that no
proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioner’s natural
mother supposedly connived with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by
the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in a weekly
newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings.

Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension of hearings in Spec.
Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No. 53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals
dismissed15 SP No. 53457 for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court.16 The said dismissal became final and executory on March 8, 2000.17

Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC praying that the opposition to
Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and that the petition be dismissed.18 This was followed by an
Urgent Ex Parte Motion19 filed by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate resolution of
her opposition.

On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts
have been cast on petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of
fraud." Respondents also informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint against petitioner
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the adoption decree
and Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.

Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000 deferring resolution of
petitioner’s opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against
the latter. In the meantime, the parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all of the
properties included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from this Court.

On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special Administrator22 before the
RTC on the ground that there was yet no true determination and appraisal of the decedent’s universal
estate. It was prayed therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed special
administrator as he was "an experienced and able person in the management of properties" and is
"honest, impartial, competent and acceptable to the majority of the interested parties."

In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge petitioner with falsification of
public documents per resolution dated January 5, 2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to
the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.

On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’ motion for the appointment of a special administrator
and appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty. Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the
grounds that the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the task of special administrator,
and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated
that the petition should be dismissed because she is the sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2001.26

On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the findings of the Provincial
Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint against petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a
petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin
petitioner from conducting business in a property belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco
alleged that petitioner converted the basement of Lising’s residence into a billiard hall without authority
of the special administrator.28

Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the dispositive part of which
reads:

 17

WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from conducting business activity in
any of the properties left by the decedent. The Special Administrator is also empowered to take control
and possession of the listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those that may be found
to be owned or registered in the name of the same.

SO ORDERED.29

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was denied by the RTC on
November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued a resolution dismissing respondent Chichioco’s
petition for review in the criminal case.30

Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the
RTC. Petitioner alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to possess and use the decedent’s
property, title over which automatically passed on to her upon the latter’s death. Moreover, the special
administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit an inventory of the decedent’s estate.

Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed since the dismissal by the
Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid
challenge to her adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she
stressed that there was no need for the appointment of an administrator or for the settlement
proceedings.

In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the trial court. It
held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his
branch clerk of court as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez,33 the appellate court
reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk are in cahoots in
milking the decedent’s estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond
and inventory and could not therefore take control and possession of any of the decedent’s properties.

However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the dismissal of SP No.
53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not operate as res judicata to the former. It was also
incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos
Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating the
adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15, 2005,34 hence this petition on
the following assigned errors:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY
OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE
39.35

B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT
A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS.36

The petition is meritorious.

On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal adoption by any
evidence other than those which she had already presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner
submitted a certification from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered
therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the
decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued under
the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed to have
been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform.37

It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document38 required by law to be entered
into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements
affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which rendered
the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.39 As such, the certifications issued by the local civil
registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records
kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These
certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
 18

contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a
"cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until
proof to the contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action
brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed
collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate, as categorically held in Santos v.
Aranzanso.40 Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption
decree in order to defeat petitioner’s claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical
pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications
regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real.
Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has
been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioner’s adoption is considered
valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate. For this reason, we agree with
petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.

As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like them x x x, claim an interest
in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in
view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles
979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be - as in the instant
case - considered valid. (Emphasis added)

Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from
inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the
proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant
case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our pronouncement
relative to the presumed validity of petitioner’s adoption.

Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of the petitioner’s
opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the petition for letters of administration and settlement
of the estate, is a matter of record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for resolution
before the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only pending incident before the RTC. The
parties have likewise amply ventilated their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings
filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter,
only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The
remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court
is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it.42 This is in keeping with the
avowed purpose of the rules of procedure which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for the dismissal of
Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is no cogent reason to remand the case to the
RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner’s second assigned error.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204 pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

 19

G.R. No. 155733             January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND
GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS
DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE
DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO
and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO
CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO
ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG,
Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R.
DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R.
CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF
ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN
RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set
aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The
main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful
heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1)
the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces,
and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his
sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-
ampunan) of the decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and
Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and
her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon
Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which
was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa
Delgado’s union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio
and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-
blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his
heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they
assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date
or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So
did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14
stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly
 20

omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now
respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no
marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and
some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia
executed an affidavit of self-

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage in
fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and
wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the
contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado
as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate
did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the
death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were
known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition,
oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos
P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active
Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo
J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa
Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took
into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally
adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,19 the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo
Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado’s
obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their
children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate
estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend
that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she
cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic
writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition
for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition
was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother
Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio
Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

 21

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition
for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters
of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs
of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia
Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other
claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa
Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was
the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the
oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC
insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the
interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed
out upon submission of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de
Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both
estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late
Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared
as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September
8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions
referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the
late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of
the oppositors and the other parties hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J.
Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered
consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper
and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the
appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX
of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J.
RUSTIA.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix
all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal
was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the
interest of substantial justice.32

 22

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance
of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of
substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the
administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the
denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.

xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should
not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated
November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private
respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV
Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the
amended decision read:

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently,
the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED
declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado
(Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance
with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late
Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion
referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late
Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate
estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of
the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers,
records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of
his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia
Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of
the administrator’s qualification and posting of the bond.

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15,
1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of
Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said
adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

 23

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to
draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions
of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their
family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that
even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975
referred to them as "spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested
marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate
which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other
evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish
the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as
Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to
Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents
which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to
support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and
that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen
the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest
who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no
hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this
jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society
and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation
of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her
mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may
overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of
marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

 24

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in
the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon
Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de
Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood
siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51
were her natural children.52

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural
brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same
parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different
from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that

succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood.
The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate
families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference
in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children
are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the
same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that
the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood
illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and
if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in
the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and
sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a
vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the
trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado
at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-
half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication
by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the
sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only
one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

 25

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such,
she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59
She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in
effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no
hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted
certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of
the following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with
that of the conception;

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother)61 by
the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. 62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in any authentic writing.63

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition
through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until
the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a
mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and
the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing,
for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in
this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father
to be his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s
obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code?
Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia.
The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no
participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on
September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law.
What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary.
The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in
accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to
fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to
inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the
statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The
 26

fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of
the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his
sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent.
Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one
to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates,72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de
de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila,
Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The
remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the
children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at
the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In
this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita)
and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective
shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such
amount as may be determined by the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

 27

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege.
It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone -
either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of
the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?

The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and
reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of
laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,"
initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -
first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his
claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified
photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a
case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the
 28

Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National
Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that
no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of
Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e)
copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900
until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on
26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC
before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled
"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824

In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or
cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a
natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election
Code -

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party"
to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule
64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article
IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before
it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
 29

submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required
by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could
well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected
to occupy the highest government post in the land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the
petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests,
has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or
disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines
and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed
revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have
one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in
Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for
quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.

Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[5] In
such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could
file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.

 30

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et
al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The Citizenship Issue

Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of
citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to
322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State,"
which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a
self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed,
for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to
deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.[8] In
its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests
to the general interest of society.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept
was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual
freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th
century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of
citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An
ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well
be the internationalization of citizenship.[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or
"Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the
inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th
century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14]

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16
July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of
differing views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to
Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23
August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express
mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country
was included, would be governed by special laws.[19]

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came
out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.[20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the
 31

United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while
resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which
would remain virtually intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States.[21]
Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present
treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom,
retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property
or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and
professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they
remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court
of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress."[22]

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject,
the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become
American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the
Congress of the United States on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects
on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."[23]

Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and
a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-
born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902,
during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view,
articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born
in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."[26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the
Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916,
the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

 32

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other
country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could
become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the
Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting,
once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the
time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of
their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women
from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of
Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this
anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the
framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect
such concerns -

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her
act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection
(3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

 33

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[27]

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata
and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person
to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did
not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan
F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years
old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F.
Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol
mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same
certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and
Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years
old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before
the COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two
documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference
to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage
of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those
material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

x x x x x x x x x

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

 34

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section
44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:

Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be
grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which
is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements,
and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.[31]

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the
year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was
not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no
existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however,
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the
father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child,
FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must
be used.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the
day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was
required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary.
Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative
parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document.[32]
Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5
thereof, that -

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents
of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to
state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give
therein any information by which such father could be identified.

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such
requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.[33] In
Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether
or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied
upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment,
may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed
the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might
have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document
wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131.
True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own."

 35

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some
other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a
document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials
by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which
recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took
place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially
declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child
had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last
during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.

Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an
authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing
of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public
or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.

x x x x x x x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article
278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition
of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity
of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate
and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child.
 36

The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little,
if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his
political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could
be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain
of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the
regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate
the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist
among members of a society for the protection of private interests."[37]

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside
in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the
validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as
between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division
of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter,
the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and
properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the
husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil
Code,[39] such as on successional rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted
child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his
political status.

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights
of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the
monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly
according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the
invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own
Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not
unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The
Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

 37

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and
(e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children
(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California,
U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:

1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.

x x x x x x x x x

7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same
year.

8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge
Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.

10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan
Poe.

x x x x x x x x x

18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural
born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas

Declarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up
filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification
and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)
DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate
to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."

Petitioners Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita
 38

Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate
child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could
be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself,
consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ
was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother,
Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43]
citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing;
he states -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of
the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting
doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I
therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a
stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue
was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there.
The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was
about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935
Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.

Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a
Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious
jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin
Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the
illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his
citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that
Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a
natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said
obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin
was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely
unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum
in Morano vs. Vivo.

x x x x x x x x x

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it
would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would
make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would
make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child
of a Filipino mother.

The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I
would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real
differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may
justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.

x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state
interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the
fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights
for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to
punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
 39

neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection
clause and must be reprobated.

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben
Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,
unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so
for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in
line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the
duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against
him.

The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law
prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing
neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No.
161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails
the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in
SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation
in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634
both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential
and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can
directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it
is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in
the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation
to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove
whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission
on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R.
No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

 40

[G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003]

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR. MELVIN
S. LAHOM), respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization
could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care
Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose
Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed,
for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple
decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that
made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with
the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin
Lahom.

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City.
In her petition, she averred -

7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his
surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondents adoption, but was
prevented by petitioners supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.

x x x x x x x x x

10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein
petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in
connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

x x x x x x x x x

13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to
attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.

14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more
frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care
and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent
towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.

15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioners nephews and nieces whenever they
would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some
material benefits from petitioner.

16. That in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship
between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondents
only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner
and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against
petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of
adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated
for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation.[1]

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also
known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.

Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on
 41

the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
(emphasis supplied)

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted
provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A.
No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption
vested under the regime of then Article 348[2] of the Civil Code and Article 192[3] of the Family Code.

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:

On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers
jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.

On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).

Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption
earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of
cause of action.

Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the Family Code
should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the
adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period
allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the
petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of
the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule
100 Revised Rules of Court)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed.[4]

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the
following questions; viz:

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed?

A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In ancient
times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family.[5] The continuity of the
adopters family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on
the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted.[6] Countries, like
Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed
nor recognized adoption.[7] It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still
later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern.[8] Spain itself which previously
disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which,
subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own
ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding
consideration.[9] In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal
attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948,[10] followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child,[11] were written
instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the
Philippines[12] of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code[13] and then by
the Family Code of the Philippines,[14] gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the
adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines,
a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and
moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552
secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of
the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the
 42

right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever
the legal ties created by adoption.

Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the
adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under
the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.

The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process[15] that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action;[16] it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.[17] Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,[18] absolute, unconditional, and
perfect[19] or fixed and irrefutable.

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on
02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an
adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision
and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that
the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by
the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been
filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file
the petition, without being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In
Republic vs. Miller,[21] spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag.
On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michaels adoption having theretofore been taken
into their care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the
decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into
law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for
the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme
Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,[22] had already abrogated and repealed the
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of
the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no
longer could be pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear
bar rule under Rule 100[23] of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could
not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has
no vested right in statutory privileges.[24] While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a right, the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.[25] It is a
privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of
the child.[26] Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to regulation by the State.[27] Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken
away at anytime before it has been exercised.[28]

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the
law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and,
by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

 43

[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother
as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.

The facts are undisputed.

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie
was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been
using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:

After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any
opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to
the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that
the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than
enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to
her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal
heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration[5] praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no
law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.

Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her
mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of
adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case
there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the
surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for
the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be
violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the
stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by
either the Catindig or Garcia families.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie
should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following
reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under
Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any
 44

confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the
mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law
Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.[7]

We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in
the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by
which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he
bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It
is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family
name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of
surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or
illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

x x x

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the
surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden
name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname
employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word
Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

x x x

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article
176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing
 45

Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may
use.

The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case
there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the
Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189
of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

x x x

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of
the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus

Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and
that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason
he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also
use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his
name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be
mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the
surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely
because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct
surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice
David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be
mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the
mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for
inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating
the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.

x x x

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the
surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American
tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by
the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

x x x

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they
should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so
that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is
really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a
matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of
the decree of adoption.[14]

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the

 46

Adopted Child

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.[16]
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed,
confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No.
8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19] secures these rights and privileges for
the adopted.[20]

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA
8552.[23]

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia)
as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family
Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights
from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner
for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is
closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one
normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not
only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of

Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

Adoption

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27]

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of
right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to
avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28]

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that
Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

 47

 DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN G.R. No. 164948

Petitioner,
Present
 
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. June 27, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
DECISION
 
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
 

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner
herein.

The Antecedents

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition[3] for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon
Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;[4] Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;[5]
and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.[6] The minors are the natural children of
Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.

Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,[7] the children
were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy,
re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with
her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the
minors have given their written consent[8] to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact
that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed
and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired
citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the
minors; her children gave their written consent[9] to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the
minors while in petitioners custody.

Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and hearing,
judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor childrens name follow
the family name of petitioner.

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.[10]

 48

On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to
conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to
submit a report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition.[11]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance[12] but deputized the City Prosecutor of
Tarlac to appear in its behalf.[13] Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her
evidence ex parte.[14]

The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to
testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings.[15] The petitioner marked in evidence the
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all
surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.[16]

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac,
submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:

In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible
for adoption because of the following reasons:

1.          Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal
aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support
they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.

2.          The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be adopted and
joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The
minors developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.

3.          The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after.
As young adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their
protection and well being.

In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D.
Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is
hereby further recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that
close attachments was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.[17]

Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation.
This is to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the
death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who
attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors.
While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and
act as their temporary guardian.

The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption
to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance
and support which she could not provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing
also that the petitioners & her children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care
 49

for them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position to
provide a secured and bright future to her children.[18]

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove
that Amelia assents to the adoption.

On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting
said petition. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos,
Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural
parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos
Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children relationship has long been
established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed
from Dizon-Ramos to Ramos-Landingin.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the
corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The OSG appealed[20] the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief[21] for the
oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF
CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE
WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.

On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision[22] reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner
failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother.
Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in evidence as
the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine
consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution
dated August 12, 2004.[25]

 50

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari[26] on September 7, 2004, assigning the
following errors:

1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED
WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.

2.                                  THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.[27]

The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled
to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or
not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies
with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,[28]
that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person
of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.[29]

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court
treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure
the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper
context and perspective. The Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend
to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve
adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due
regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.[31]

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of
his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to
the adoption is hereby required:

(a)     The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b)      The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c)        The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;

 51

(d)      The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said
adopter and the latters souse, if any;

(e)     The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.[32]

Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained
before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this
case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived
in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and
Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to
present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary
because when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were
then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including
petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had
effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12
years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second
marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her,
and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her
three children by the petitioner.

Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No.
8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have
adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties.[33] The term means neglect and refusal to
perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the
opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child.[34]

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment.[35] To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption.[36]

In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that
Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that matter follows:

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.

 52

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she communicated with the
family?

A None, sir.

Q How about with her children?

A None, sir.

Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?

A I do not know, sir.

Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?

A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.

Q From whom did you learn that?

A From others who came from Italy, sir.

Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?

A Yes, sir, she got two kids.[37]

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?

A In Italy, sir.

Q When did your mother left for Italy?

A After my father died, sir.

Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?

A Two years old, sir.

Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?

A No, sir.[38]

However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:

IV.              Background of the Case:

x x x x

Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their maternal
grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves
as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been
supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that they were still living with their natural
parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very minimal.[39]

x x x x

V.                 Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:

x x x x

As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in their
lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns
 53

and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and
petitioner-aunt.[40]

x x x x

In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a
happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had
continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of her
husbands relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they
are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going
to Italy and worked as domestic helper.

When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her
mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on November 2000.

While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since
1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian
residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is
amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support.

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents who
share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal
relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to present.
[41]

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever
their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints.
Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the
children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother,
Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the
children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing
all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be
vested on the adopter.[42] It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to
be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/
her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and
that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent.[43] Again, it
is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of
evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence
for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not
confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.[44]

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly
executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written
consent of petitioners children[45] was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated
by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with
Section 2 of Act No. 2103,[46] which states:

 54

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be

considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the
following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the
same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to
keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary
public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister,
secretary of legation, charg de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the
authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at
the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office
by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and
that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.

As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law,
the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved
either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the makers.[47]

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written
consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the
children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her
siblings.[48] Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in
Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than
$1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial
backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home
Study Report that petitioner has limited income. Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial
backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states
that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the
family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial
capacity of prospective parents should also 

be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the
would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report[49] forwarded by the Department of Public Health & Social
Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate
children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the
petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour
and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to bring the
 55

latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being
amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption
proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the
financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of
age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings,
the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as
adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able and that
they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on
this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew,
there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not
prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

 56

G.R. No. 159374               July 12, 2007

FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of the minor
children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is the case
here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally charged.

Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7, 1993 in
Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.

Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994; Phillip,
born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on December
12, 2000.

After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three
sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the help
of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then
brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of
Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to
Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed
that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they
should not be returned to her custody.

Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially agreed that
petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change
of heart1 and decided to file a memorandum.

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum2 alleging that respondent was unfit to take
custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in
the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a
mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent who left, taking their
daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a tricycle
driver. He submitted a certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by
respondent.3

For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was driven out
by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict.
Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of
violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their home was
adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their personal problems.4

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals5 rendered a decision6 asserting its authority to take
cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled
to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four, respectively,
subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the
court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on
custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this
recourse.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and
insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He invokes Section
5(b) of RA 8369:

 57

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases:

x x x           x x x          x x x

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;

x x x           x x x          x x x

Petitioner is wrong.

In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked
its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

x x x           x x x          x x x

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot
be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA
8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus
in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with
RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.8
(emphases supplied)

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M.
No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors:

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20
of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner
resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.9
(emphases supplied)1avvphi1

We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice
transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what the Thornton
interpretation of RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:

[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of
their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another,
which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal
remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they
passed [RA 8369].10

 58

Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may
be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy
that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the
family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting
decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.11
Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all
other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

 59

[G.R. No. 144763. September 3, 2002]

REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES* D. LAXAMANA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is another sad tale of an estranged couples tug-of-war over the custody of their minor children.
Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in 1983.
Petitioner, who came from a well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while respondent, a
holder of a degree in banking and finance, worked in a bank. After a whirlwind courtship, petitioner, 31
years old and respondent, 33, got married on June 6, 1984.[1] Respondent quit her job and became a
full-time housewife. Petitioner, on the other hand, operated buy and sell, fishpond, and restaurant
businesses for a living. The union was blessed with three children twin brothers Joseph and Vincent,
born on March 15, 1985, and Michael, born on June 19, 1986.[2]

All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. In October 1991, he was confined at the
Estrellas Home Care Clinic in Quezon City. He underwent psychotherapy and psychopharmacological
treatment and was discharged on November 16, 1991.[3] Upon petition of respondent, the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, ordered petitioners confinement at the NARCOM-DRC for treatment
and rehabilitation.[4] Again, on October 30, 1996, the trial court granted petitioners voluntary confinement
for treatment and rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation-TRC.[5]

On April 25, 1997, the court issued an order declaring petitioner already drug-free and directing him to
report to a certain Dr. Casimiro for out-patient counseling for 6 months to one (1) year.[6]

Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug
dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner
allegedly became violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically assaulted respondent.
Thus, on June 17, 1999, respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the
house of her relatives.

On August 31, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, the instant
petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children.[7] Respondent opposed the petition,
citing the drug dependence of petitioner.[8]

Meanwhile, on September 24, 1999, respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage with Branch
102 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[9]

On September 27, 1999, petitioner filed in the habeas corpus case, a motion seeking visitation rights
over his children.[10] On December 7, 1999, after the parties reached an agreement, the court issued an
order granting visitation rights to petitioner and directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and
psychological examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. The parties further agreed to
submit the case for resolution after the trial courts receipt of the results of their psychiatric examination.
The full text of said order reads:

The parties appeared with their respective lawyers. A conference was held in open Court and the parties
agreed on the following:

Effective this Saturday and every Saturday thereafter until further order the petitioner shall fetch the
children every Saturday and Sunday at 9:00 oclock in the morning from the house of the sister of
respondent, Mrs. Corazon Soriano and to be returned at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same days.

That the parties agreed to submit themselves to Dr. Teresito Ocampo for psychiatric/psychological
examination. Dr. Ocampo is hereby advised to go over the records of this case to enable him to have a
thorough background of the problem. He is hereby ordered to submit his findings directly to this Court
without furnishing the parties copies of his report. And after the receipt of that report, thereafter, the case
shall be deemed submitted for decision.[11]

On January 6, 2000, Dr. Ocampo submitted the results of his psychiatric evaluation on the parties and
their children. Pertinent portions thereof state:

SINGLY and COLLECTIVELY, the following information was obtained in the interview of the 3 children:

(1) THEY were affected psychologically by the drug-related behavior of their father:

a. they have a difficult time concentrating on their studies.

b. they are envious of their classmates whose families live in peace and harmony.

c. once, MICHAEL had to quit school temporarily.

 60

(2) THEY witnessed their father when he was under the influence of shabu.

(3) THEY think their father had been angry at their paternal grandmother and this anger was displaced to
their mother.

(4) THEY hope their father will completely and permanently recover from his drug habit; and their criteria
of his full recovery include:

a. he will regain his easy-going attitude.

b. he wont be hot-headed anymore and would not drive their van recklessly.

c. he would not tell unverifiable stories anymore.

d. he would not poke a gun on his own head and ask the children who they love better, mom or dad.

(5) At one point one of the sons, became very emotional while he was narrating his story and he cried. I
had to stop the interview.

(6) THEIR mother was fearful and terrified when their father quarreled with her.

(7) THEY hope their visits to their father will not interfere with their school and academic schedules.

x x x x x x x x x

(3) MARILOU is one of 4 siblings. She graduated from college with a degree in banking and finance. SHE
was a carreer (sic) woman; worked for a bank for ten years; subsequently quit her job to devote more
time to her family.

(4) REYMOND is one of 5 siblings in a well-to-do family. His father was a physician. During his
developmental years, he recalled how his mother complained incessantly about how bad the father was;
only to find later that the truth was opposite to the complaints of his mother; that his father was nice,
logical and understanding. He recalled how he unselfishly served his father --- he opened the door when
he arrived home; he got his portfolio; he brought the days newspaper; he removed his shoes; he brought
his glass of beer or his shot of whisky. In short, he served him like a servant. His father died of stroke in
1990.

REYMOND graduated from college with a degree in LAW in 1984; he did not pass the bar.

His work history is as follows:

a. 1985 to 1989 he operated fishponds.

b. 1976 to 1991 simultaneously, he operated restaurant.

c. 1991 he engaged in the trading of vegetable, cooking oil, and mangos.

d. HE handled the leasing of a family property to a fast food company.

The findings on the examination of the MENTAL STATUS and MENTAL PROCESSES OF MARILOU
showed a woman who showed the psychological effects of the trauma she had in the past. She is
slightly edgy and fidgety with any external noise. SHE answered all my questions coherently. Her
emotional state was stable throughout the interview. She is of average intelligence. She was oriented to
person, place and date. Her memory for recent and remote events was intact. She could process sets of
figures and sets of similarities and differences. Her content of thought was negative for delusions,
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal ideation. She could process abstract ideas and general
information. Her attention span was adequate. There was no evidence of impaired judgment.

The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such as man touching a woman, 2 people on a hi-five , 2
women chatting, beast, stuffed animal, etc. Her past reflected on her psyche. There is no creative
process. There were no bizarre ideas.

The ZUNG anxiety/depression test highlighted I get tired for no reason; I feel that I am useful and needed
(re, son). There is moderate depression. However, she could still make competent decisions.

The Social Adaptation Scale scored well in her capacity to adapt to her situation. There is no evidence of
losing control.

The findings on the examination of the MENTAL STATUS and MENTAL PROCESSES of REYMOND
showed an individual who presented himself in the best situation he could possibly be. He is cool, calm
and collected. He answered all my questions coherently. He is of average intelligence. He was oriented
to person, place and date. His memory for recent and remote events was intace (sic). His content of
thought was negative for delusions, hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal ideation. His
attention span was adequate. He could process abstract ideas, sets of figures, and general information.

The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such as distorted chest , butterfly with scattered color, cat
ran over by a car, nothing 2 people, monster etc. There is no central theme in his responses. There were
no bizarre ideas.

 61

The Zung anxiety/depression test: My mind is as clear as it used to be (most of the time). There was no
evidence of brain damage. There is no significant affective response that would affect his rationality.

The Social Adaptive Scale scored well in his capacity to adapt to his situation. He reached out well to
others. He is in very good control of his emotions.

BASED ON MY FINDINGS I MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS:

I. The CRITERIA for cure in drug addiction consist of:

1. 5-years and 10-years intervals of drug-free periods.

2. change for the better of the maladaptive behaviors of the addict consisting of telling lies, manipulative behavior,
melodramatic and hysterical actions.

3. constructive and reproductive outlets for the mental and physical energies of the addict.

4. behavior oriented towards spiritual values and other things.

II BASED on such scientific and observable criteria, I do not yet consider REYMOND LAXAMANA completely cured
even though his drug urine test at Medical City for shabu was negative. (Emphasis supplied)

III I DO NOT DETECT any evidence that the paternal visits of the sons would be harmful or they would be in any
danger. The academic schedules of the sons has be taken into account in determining the length and frequency of
their visits.

x x x x x x x x x.[12]

On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed decision awarding the custody of the three
children to respondent and giving visitation rights to petitioner. The dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. The children, Joseph, Michael and Vincent all surnamed Laxamana are hereby ordered to remain
under the custody of the respondent.

2. The visitation arrangement as per Order of December 7, 1999 is hereby incorporated and forms part
of this Decision. The parties are enjoined to comply with the terms stated therein.

3. The petitioner is hereby ordered to undergo urine drug screen for shabu for three times (3x) per month
every ten (10) days, with the Dangerous Drugs Board. The said Board is hereby ordered to submit the
results of all tests immediately as directed to this Court.

4. The petitioner is hereby referred to undergo regular counseling at the Free-Clinic at the East Avenue
Medical Center, Department of Health Out Patient Psychiatry Department until further order. For this
purpose, it is suggested that he should see Dr. Teresito P. Ocampo to make arrangements for said
counseling.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Dangerous Drugs Board and the Free-Clinic, Out Patient
Psychiatry Department, East Avenue Medical Center, Department of Health for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
based on the following:

THE COURT A QUO HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT CONDUCTING A TRIAL TO
DETERMINE FACTUAL ISSUES.

II

THE COURT A QUO HAS RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE PARAMOUNT INTEREST AND
WELFARE OF HEREIN PARTIES THREE (3) MINOR CHILDREN.

III

THE ASSAILED DECISION IS NULL AND VOID AS IT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH SECTION 14 ARTICLE
VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.[14]

The core issue for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not the trial court considered the
paramount interest and welfare of the children in awarding their custody to respondent.

In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor children, the contending parents
stand on equal footing before the court who shall make the selection according to the best interest of
the child. The child if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers
to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the
 62

sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the
opposing parents.[15]

In Medina v. Makabali,[16] we stressed that this is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal
institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death)
of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically
different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now
supreme. There is no power, but a task; no complex rights of parents but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.

Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding
the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric
report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering
that said psychiatric report, which was the courts primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is
insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the
welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the
family and the youth.[17] While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are
inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation
showing that he is not yet completely cured may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but
there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support,
education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case
were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain
their choice as to which parent they want to live with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court
merely stated that: The children were asked as to whether they would like to be with petitioner but there
are indications that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a
drug dependent.[18] There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children.
These inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of Dr.
Ocampos report and the capacity of both parties to raise their children. The trial court was remiss in the
fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the parties to submit the case for decision on
the basis of sketchy findings of facts.

In Lacson v. Lacson,[19] the case was remanded to the trial court with respect to the issue of custody. In
the said case, the court a quo resolved the question of the childrens custody based on the amicable
settlement of the spouses. Stressing the need for presentation of evidence and a thorough proceedings,
we explained

It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes,
much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-
so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the
courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to
him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A
careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court
relied merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis
to determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children.

Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the eldest is now eleven years of age and should be given
the choice of the parent he wishes to live with. x x x.

In the instant case, the proceedings before the trial court leave much to be desired. While a remand of
this case would mean further delay, the childrens paramount interest demand that further proceedings
be conducted to determine the fitness of both petitioner and respondent to assume custody of their
minor children.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 107, for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner and
respondent to take custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of this case, custody shall
remain with respondent but subject to petitioners visitation rights in accordance with the December 7,
1999 order of the trial court.

SO ORDERED.

 63

G.R. No. L-23482           August 30, 1968

ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-23767           August 30, 1968
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ALFONSO LACSON, defendant-appellee.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-24259           August 30, 1968
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, petitioner-appellant.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent-appellant Carmen San Jose-Lacson. 

Norberto Quisumbing for petitioner-appellee Alfonso Lacson.
CASTRO, J.:

These three cases (G.R. L-23482, L-23767 and L-24259) involving the same parties pose a common
fundamental issue the resolution of which will necessarily and inescapably resolve all the other issues.
Thus their joinder in this decision.

The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent spouse) were married on February 14, 1953. To them were
born four children, all alive.

On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod
City, and commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint docketed as civil
case E-00030 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as the
JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself.

However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys, succeeded in reaching an
amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of property. On April 27,
1963 they filed a joint petition dated April 21, 1963, docketed as special proceeding 6978 of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental (hereinafter referred to as the CFI).

The important and pertinent portions of the petition, embodying their amicable settlement, read as
follows:

3. Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963 when petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson left their
conjugal home at the Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, did not return, and decided to reside in
Manila.

4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal partnership subject to judicial
approval as required by Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines — the particular terms and
conditions of their mutual agreement being as follows:

(a) There will be separation of property — petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson hereby waiving any and
all claims for a share in property that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson since they have acquired
no property of any consequence.

(b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy such separate estate as
they may acquire without the consent of the other and all earnings from any profession, business or
industry as may be derived by each petitioner shall belong to that petitioner exclusively.

(c) The custody of the two elder children named Enrique and Maria Teresa shall be awarded to petitioner
Alfonso Lacson and the custody of the younger children named Gerrard and Ramon shall be awarded to
petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson.

(d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance of
P300.00 for the support of the children in her custody.

 64

(e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of the children in the custody of the other at
their respective residences and, during the summer months, the two children in the custody of each
petitioner shall be given to the other except that, for this year's summer months, all four children shall be
delivered to and remain with petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson until June 15, 1963 — on which date,
she shall return the two elder children Enrique and Maria Teresa to petitioner Alfonso Lacson — this
judgment of course being subject to enforcement by execution writ and contempt.

5. Petitioners have no creditors.

WHEREFORE, they respectfully pray that notice of this petition be given to creditors and third parties
pursuant to Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and thereafter that the Court enter its judicial
approval of the foregoing agreement for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and for separation
of property, except that the Court shall immediately approve the terms set out in paragraph 4 above and
embody the same in a judgment immediately binding on the parties hereto to the end that any non-
compliance or violation of its terms by one party shall entitle the other to enforcement by execution writ
and contempt even though the proceedings as to creditors have not been terminated.".

Finding the foregoing joint petition to be "conformable to law," the CFI (Judge Jose F. Fernandez,
presiding) issued an order on April 27, 1963, rendering judgment (hereinafter referred to as the
compromise judgment) approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. In compliance
with paragraph 4 (e) of their mutual agreement (par. 3[e] of the compromise judgment), the petitioner
spouse delivered all the four children to the respondent spouse and remitted money for their support.

On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged that she "entered
into and signed the ... Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of
the ... minor children who are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed that she "be considered
relieved of the ... agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor children ... and that
since all the children are now in her custody, the said custody in her favor be confirmed pendente lite."
On May 24, 1963 the petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and moved to dismiss the complaint
based, among other things, on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. The JDRC on May 28, 1963,
issued an order which sustained the petitioner spouse's plea of bar by prior judgment and lis pendens,
and dismissed the case. After the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the respondent spouse
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32608-R) wherein she raised, among others,
the issue of validity or legality of the compromise agreement in connection only with the custody of their
minor children. On October 14, 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the said appeal to the Supreme Court
(G.R. No. L-23767), since "no hearing on the facts was ever held in the court below — no evidence,
testimonial or documentary, presented — only a question of law pends resolution in the appeal." .

The respondent spouse likewise filed a motion dated May 15, 1963 for reconsideration of the
compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 rendered in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI, wherein she
also alleged, among others, that she entered into the joint petition as the only means by which she could
have immediate custody of her minor children, and thereafter prayed the CFI to reconsider its judgment
pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor children and to relieve her from the said agreement.
The petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and, on June 1, 1963, filed a motion for execution of the
compromise judgment and a charge for contempt. The CFI (Judge Jose R. Querubin, presiding), in its
order dated June 22, 1963, denied the respondent spouse's motion for reconsideration, granted the
petitioner spouse's motion for execution, and ordered that upon "failure on the part of Carmen San
Jose-Lacson to deliver the said children [i.e., to return the two older children Enrique and Maria Teresa in
accordance with her agreement with Alfonso Lacson] to the special sheriff on or before June 29, 1963,
she may be held for contempt pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 sections 9 and 10, and Rule 64
section 7 of the (old) Rules of Court." From the aforesaid compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 and
execution order dated June 22, 1963, the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32798-R) wherein she likewise questioned the validity or legality of her agreement
with the petitioner spouse respecting custody of their children. On February 11, 1965 the Court of
Appeals also certified the said appeal to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-24259), since "no evidence of
any kind was introduced before the trial court and ... appellant did not specifically ask to be allowed to
present evidence on her behalf." .

The respondent spouse also instituted certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
32384R), now the subject of an appeal by certiorari to this Court (G.R. No. L-23482). In her petition for
 65

certiorari dated June 27, 1963, she averred that the CFI (thru Judge Querubin) committed grave abuse of
discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of the compromise
judgment in its order of June 22, 1963, thus in effect depriving her of the right to appeal. She prayed for
(1) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein and any person
acting under them from enforcing, by contempt proceedings and other means, the writ of execution
issued pursuant to the order of the respondent Judge Querubin dated June 22, 1963 in special
proceeding 6978 of the CFI, (2) the setting aside, after hearing, of the compromise judgment dated April
27, 1963 and the order dated June 22, 1963, and (3) the awarding of the custody of Enrique and Maria
Teresa to her, their mother. As prayed for, the Court of Appeals issued ex parte a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the enforcement of the order dated June 22, 1963 for execution of the compromise
judgment rendered in special proceeding 6978. The petitioner spouse filed an urgent motion dated July
5, 1963 for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte which urgent motion was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 9, 1963. The petitioner spouse likewise filed his
answer. After hearing, the Court of Appeals on May 11, 1964 promulgated in said certiorari case (CA-
G.R. No. 32384-R) its decision granting the petition for certiorari and declaring null and void both (a) the
compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 in so far as it relates to the custody and right of visitation
over the two children, Enrique and Teresa, and (b) the order dated June 22, 1963 for execution of said
judgment. The petitioner spouse moved to reconsider, but his motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 31, 1964. From the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the
resolution dated July 31, 1964, the petitioner spouse interposed an appeal to this Court, as abovestated,
and assigned the following errors:

(1) The Court of Appeals erred in annulling thru certiorari the lower court's order of execution of the
compromise judgment.

(2) The Court of Appeals erred in resolving in the certiorari case the issue of the legality of the
compromise judgment which is involved in two appeals, instead of the issue of grave abuse of discretion
in ordering its execution.

(3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the compromise agreement upon which the judgment is
based violates article 363 of the Civil Code. 1äwphï1.ñët

As heretofore adverted, the aforecited three appeals converge on one focal issue: whether the
compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said
agreement, are conformable to law.

We hold that the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement
are valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership.

The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil Code provides:

In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (Art. 190, emphasis
supplied)

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the
conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests.
Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. (Art. 191, par. 4, emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they have creditors who will be
prejudiced by the said arrangements.

It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years - the wife's
residence being in Manila, and the husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch
as a lengthy separation has supervened between them, the propriety of severing their financial and
proprietary interests is manifest.

Besides, this Court cannot constrain the spouses to live together, as

 66

[I]t is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. .. At best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouse to live under the same roof; and the experience of those
countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married couple shows
that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54, 60).

However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership, this Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto
separation of the spouses, which again in the language of Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, supra — is a
"state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned." We would like to douse the
momentary seething emotions of couples who, at the slightest ruffling of domestic tranquility — brought
about by "mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention
and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion" without more — would be minded to separate
from each other. In this jurisdiction, the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support (art. 109, new Civil Code). There is, therefore,
virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married couples — impelled by no better cause than their
whims and caprices — to abandon each other's company.

'... For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial
cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individuals, yet it must be carefully remembered that
the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that
they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and
good wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in
teaching the duties which it imposes ..." (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)
(Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, Id., pp. 58-59).

We now come to the question of the custody and support of the children.

It is not disputed that it was the JDRC which first acquired jurisdiction over the matter of custody and
support of the children. The complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the JDRC was filed by the
respondent spouse on March 12, 1963, whereas the joint petition of the parties docketed as special
proceeding 6978 in the CFI was filed on April 27, 1963. However, when the respondent spouse signed
the joint petition on the same matter of custody and support of the children and filed the same with the
CFI of Negros Occidental, she in effect abandoned her action in the JDRC. The petitioner spouse — who
could have raised the issue of lis pendens in abatement of the case filed in the CFI, but did not do so -
had the right, therefore, to cite the decision of the CFI and to ask for the dismissal of the action filed by
the respondent spouse in the JDRC, on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. And the JDRC
acted correctly and justifiably in dismissing the case for custody and support of the children based on
those grounds. For it is no defense against the dismissal of the action that the case before the CFI was
filed later than the action before the JDRC, considering:.

... [T]hat the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending
action. They provide only that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. 1

We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI erred in depriving the mother, the respondent
spouse, of the custody of the two older children (both then below the age of 7).

The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its article 363 that "No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure." The rationale of this new provision was explained by the Code Commission thus:

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby
torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the
child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as
in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who
is as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12).

The use of the word shall2 in article 363 of the Civil Code, coupled with the observations made by the
Code Commission in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. It
 67

prohibits in no uncertain: terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless such
separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.

The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it awarded custody of the two older children who
were 6 and 5 years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to separate them from their mother. To
that extent therefore, it was null and void because clearly violative of article 363 of the Civil Code.

Neither does the said award of custody fall within the exception because the record is bereft of any
compelling reason to support the lower court's order depriving the wife of her minor children's company.
True, the CFI stated in its order dated June 22, 1963, denying the respondent spouse's motion for
reconsideration of its order dated April 27, 1963, that .

... If the parties have agreed to file a joint petition, it was because they wanted to avoid the exposure of
the bitter truths which serve as succulent morsel for scandal mongers and idle gossipers and to save
their children from embarrassment and inferiority complex which may inevitably stain their lives. ..

If the parties agreed to submit the matter of custody of the minor children to the Court for incorporation
in the final judgment, they purposely suppressed the "compelling reasons for such measure" from
appearing in the public records. This is for the sake and for the welfare of the minor children.".

But the foregoing statement is at best a mere hint that there were compelling reasons. The lower court's
order is eloquently silent on what these compelling reasons are. Needless to state, courts cannot
proceed on mere insinuations; they must be confronted with facts before they can properly adjudicate.

It might be argued — and correctly — that since five years have elapsed since the filing of these cases in
1963, the ages of the four children should now be as follows: Enrique — 11, Maria Teresa — 10, Gerrard
— 9, and Ramon — 5. Therefore, the issue regarding the award of the custody of Enrique and Maria
Teresa to the petitioner spouse has become moot and academic. The passage of time has removed the
prop which supports the respondent spouse's position.

Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the couple's agreement regarding the custody of the children.
1äwphï1.ñët

Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides:

Every child:

(1) Is entitled to parental care;

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;

(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.

It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision grants to every child rights which are not and should not
be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare
should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the
parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child
can better be assured the right granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding
this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was
introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To
be sure, this was not a sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the
children.

Besides, at least one of the children — Enrique, the eldest — is now eleven years of age and should be
given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with. This is the clear mandate of sec. 6, Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court which, states, inter alia:

... When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the question
as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of
First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing testimony as
may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody and control of each such child as will be for its best
interest permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age,
unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty... (Emphasis supplied).

One last point regarding the matter of support for the children — assuming that the custody of any or
more of the children will be finally awarded to the mother. Although the spouses have agreed upon the
monthly support of P150 to be given by the petitioner spouse for each child, still this Court must speak
out its mind on the insufficiency of this amount. We, take judicial notice of the devaluation of the peso in
 68

1962 and the steady skyrocketing of prices of all commodities, goods, and services, not to mention the
fact that all the children are already of school age. We believe, therefore, that the CFI may increase this
amount of P150 according to the needs of each child.

With the view that we take of this case, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other errors assigned in
the three appeals.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated July 31, 1964 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 32384-R (subject matter of G.R. L-23482), and the orders dated May 28, 1963 and
June 24, 1963 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (subject matter of G.R. L-23767) are
affirmed. G.R. L-24259 is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for
further proceedings, in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ., concur. 

Sanchez and Fernando, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes

1Teodoro vs. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150, 153.

2"In common or ordinary parlance and in its ordinary significance the term "shall" is a word of command,

and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative
or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of operating to impose a duty which may be enforced,
particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or when public interest is involved, or where the
public or persons have rights which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent appears.
People v. O'Rourke, 13 P. 2d. 989, 992, 124 Cal. App. 752, (30 Words, and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p.
90).

"The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used in an imperative, and not in a directory,
sense. If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon something in the character of the
legislation or in the context which will justify a different meaning. Haythron v. Van Keuren & Sons, 74 A
502, 504, 79 N.J.L. 101; Board of Finance of School City of Aurora v. People's Nat. Bank of
Lawrenceburg, 89 N.E. 904, 905, 44 Ind. App. 578. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed. P. 93.)"
Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, G.R. No. L-4712, July 11, 1952, 91 Phil. 608) (emphasis
supplied).

 69

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ
Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA
No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care
and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and
his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling
with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate
of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe,
Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that
petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate
reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the
second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-
Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission
which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth
in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her
Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.)
in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she
earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of
being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after
the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11

 70

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her
two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on
10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport
No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's
candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her
youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon
learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually
expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral
arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.18

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In
her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing
for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester;20 coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine
authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.22 As early
as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25
while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the
sale of their family home there.26

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased
a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the
second half of 2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and
parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20
February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of
the family's remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March
2006.30

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change
and abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32
Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006
and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.33

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon
City where they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their children have
been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the
same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10
July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's
petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her
children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification
Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She
also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was
renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner
executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
 71

American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the
legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner
submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From
then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/
Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a
sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as
MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S.,
specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States" effective 21 October 2010.52

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her
COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines
up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May
2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny
due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the
COMELEC Second Division.59 She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition.60
Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she
stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does
not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning,
petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.64 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-
born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American citizen.65
According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.66

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn
declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the
country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted
that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225,
she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only
be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act.
Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of
the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo
warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her
part;

 72

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and residency
qualifications for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where they
are found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for
President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not been
withdrawn or recanted;

e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as
May 24, 2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. No.
9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not
binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;

i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a
purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68

After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for
resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's
COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May
2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations which are false. The fallo of the
aforesaid Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P.
Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were
consolidated and raffled to its First Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as
SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify
her for the Presidency.72

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown
parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood
relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that
what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in
the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.74
Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that
foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-
executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed
by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers
natural-born status to foundlings.78

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and
petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79

Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year
residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the
time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad
 73

questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her
husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82

In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No.
15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status
of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated
under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as
natural-born citizens.84

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a
resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections
operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was
that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No.
15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for
President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency
required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be
from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.
87 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid

evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen
and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did
not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-
born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a
candidate to an elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on
establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93
Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No.
9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine
Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI
declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree
of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98

Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of
choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country,
purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even
before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of
domicile are complied with.100 She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of
foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a
mistake made in good faith.102

In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner
is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that
 74

she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a
resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the
elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT

the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection
with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's
Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari
with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/
or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the
Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in
these cases.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET
ASIDE the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated cases
SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE
for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or
cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The
exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into
the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet
undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section
2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

 75

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of
the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which
seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive,
order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI,
Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-
President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the
Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which

was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in
Fermin reads:

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate
as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which
the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot
do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide
cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]

 76

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in
their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of
"ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12
and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public
office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its
progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration
of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is
not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice
versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the]
disqualifications provided in §4.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in
Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very
acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in
his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will
not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this
case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after
the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to
certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial
duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of
candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving
charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The
purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.106

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the
amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15
February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate
as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of
a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.

 77

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall
be summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court
that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from
any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the
other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a
prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications,
without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the
necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can
be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions.
Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be
determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with,
as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced
the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of
citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral
arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry.
Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner
possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is
indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her
natural filiation with a Filipino parent."

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted
in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110
That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a
natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's
parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such
status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where
there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether
such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from
1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census
statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos
and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were
1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%.
In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were
 78

270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740
Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures.
Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was
found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features
is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the
province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that
petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of
the Solicitor General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can
get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is
such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a
foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone
born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were
1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the
Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural
born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total
number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino
children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that
decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident
that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not
be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have
a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or
perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking
those infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical
paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever
considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a
theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one,
but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense.
Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental
political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of
common sense are not separate disciplines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there
is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this
Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
 79

given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following
exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural
children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.

x x x x

President:

[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to
natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?

Sr. Rafols:

To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola:

For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is,
I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the
Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...

Sr. Rafols:

There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:

But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:

The amendment should read thus:

"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of
unknown parentage."

Sr. Briones:

The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:

The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.

President:

Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:

I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a
foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of
overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as
Filipinos.

President:

The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.

Sr. Busion:

Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:

Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution
need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of
unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision
on the subject exhaustively.116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the
notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and
constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

 80

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino
citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines,
and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that
the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them,
should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law
were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that
foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral
Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for
a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional
silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more
need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a
constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They
can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able
to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings
as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under
Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice
Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane
society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a
discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument
that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on
those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution
really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization."

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to
render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II,
Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to
defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on
account of their unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the
first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on
citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a
child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over
the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code
(Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
 81

citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.120 (Underlining
supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the
Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on
the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to
"Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under
Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly, the object
of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.
Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under
the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as
evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May
1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively
affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international
law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles
of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law
include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part
of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in
Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of
Rights.129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the
UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:

Article 7

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1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the
right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law
and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child
would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or
social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as
a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality
from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and
it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18)
years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted
principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality
of the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's
parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the
parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in
which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is
found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is
not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of
the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article
15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or
ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance."
Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was
nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise
notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed
the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was
content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin
America, and State Practice in the United States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134
where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in
2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had
acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition
 83

of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted
principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph
(c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are
fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally,"136
support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign
judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe
have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the
jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2
February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis
countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as
having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption,
expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could
be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by
law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution.
The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents
are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings
were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their
own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized
and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings
renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status
or to accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since
the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain
"Philippine citizenship."

The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation
statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They include
Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which cited
Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143 where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
 84

recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner
reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that
natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A.
No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may
be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even
if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already
rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of
birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET,
this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born
citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed
by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may
always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In
Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the
condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a
doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected."148

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood
when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the
names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It
has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely
unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of
adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to
an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and
which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that
"[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department
[of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption
proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her
adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway.
And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose
that she was an adoptee.

Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case
for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole
process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

On Residence

 85

The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false
material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day
before the 2016 elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines
before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner
must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the
requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016,"
she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a
beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2.
an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.153

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S.
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S.
passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled
abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to
arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-
mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for
succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and
parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006;
receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items
from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of
address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S.
home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where
petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa
Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with
affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that
the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S.
only to finish some work and to sell the family home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in
its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24
May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the
first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus
non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on
the basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the
Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this
regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v.
COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158
Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be
counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free
entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7
July 2006 cannot be counted.

 86

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation. In
Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the
candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not
involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the
candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the
candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent
vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not
even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She
was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month
stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone
is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition
of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of
petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools,
getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their
address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually
re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine
schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines
visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act
Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as
temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been
naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country"164 in line with the
government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into
society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave
after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements
of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her
children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation
shortly thereafter.

No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive
and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is
unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner.
There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the
Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue
of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC
ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her
2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before
May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a
Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true
the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013
COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she
 87

reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her
husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that
residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May
2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change
which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did
not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the
return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such
evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive
admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means
conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a
COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put
seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We
said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was
telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of
residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically
returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position
that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006.
However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here
to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.

For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a
petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event
from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July
2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner
recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the
United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press.
Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep.
Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and were not
hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto.
Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the
2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question and
could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public
record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could
not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which
was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012
statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this
Court's pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation
of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only
refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate
 88

intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must
be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of
evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to
the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as
dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her
COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that
her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this
declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as
already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of
the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of
residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of
residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in
number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we
consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator
which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator.
When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of
six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference
the residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of
residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for
Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that
the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for
President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial
candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator.
Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the
USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian
in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika
was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to
school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family
home in Corinthian Hills was completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who
handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a
new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald
Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March
2006.

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's
abandonment of their address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4
May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually
built their family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the
exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in
her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one
and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

 89

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent,
stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby
GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases
SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT

the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection
with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of
the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of
the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local
Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.