RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. JUDGE HERNANDO C.

DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996, ROMERO, J.

While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.

Facts:

Municipal Mayor Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by MCTC
Judge Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, that
respondent Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Tagadan and Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife without institution of summary proceeding for the declaration of
wife’s presumptive death; and second, that the judge performed a marriage ceremony between Sumaylo and del
Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction upon the written request of del Rosario only. Judge Domagtory holds office
and has jurisdiction in the MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 km away from the municipality of Dapa.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the marriage between Tagadan and Borga is valid.

(2) Whether or not the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario is valid.

Ruling:

(1) No. Article 41 of the Family code provides that for the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains
married to his first wife.

(2) Yes. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability. Hence, while it was only the latter who made the written request where it
should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code, their non-compliance did not invalidate
their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.

ENGRACE NINAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NINAL, INGRID NINAL,
ARCHIE NINAL & PEPITO NINAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG
 G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

Facts:

Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones in 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her in 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. In 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the second marriage is null and void ab initio

(2) Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person can file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death

Ruling:

(1) Yes. At the time Pepito and Norma’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time
when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as "husband and wife.”

(2) Yes. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Void marriages can be questioned even after the death
of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is
why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
 HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all
the more when the separation is merely de facto.

Facts:

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife David Manzano, having been married to him in 1966. In 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.

On the other hand, respondent Judge averred that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao
he did not know that Manzano was legally married. However, in his later Manifestation, he maintained that the
affidavits of both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years, and that since
their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never
cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Hence, on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the solemnization of a marriage between Manzano and Payao who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is valid.

Ruling:

No. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge Sanchez take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of Manzano and Payao stating that they
had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation
for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize
a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, QUISUMBING, J.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree.

Facts:

On May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido (Cipriano) married Villanueva. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Villanueva, the wife left for the US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cirpriano learned that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the
trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same.

The OSG now contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC is not applicable because it only applies to a valid
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Hence, Orbecido cannot
remarry.

Issue:

Whether or not Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC applies in the case at bar.

Ruling:

Yes. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In
this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained
a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
 ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO,

JOHN DOE and JANE DOE

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO

v. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO

G.R. No. 139789 and G.R. No. 139808 May 12, 2000, PARDO, J.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a
matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

Facts:

Erlinda and Potenciano were once married but were separated for undisclosed reasons. When Potenciano
returned from the US, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo where their children claimed that Erlinda gave Potenciano
an overdose of his antidepressant drug which caused Potenciano’s health to deteriorate. Erlinda filed with the RTC
for guardianship over Potenciano due to his failing health. After a meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to
Antipolo and lived in Makati thus Erlinda filed for a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano.
She alleged that the other respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibit Potenciano
from returning to Antipolo.

Issue:

Whether or not spouses can furnish a writ of habeas corpus to compel one another to live with each other.

Ruling:

No. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition,
the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years
of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not
hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot
be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is
a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA v. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916, TRENT, J.

The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife.
The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except
when he removes to a foreign country.

Facts:

Eloisa and Jose were married and after a month, Eloisa left to return to her parents. It was alleged in
Eloisa’s complaint that Jose had her do unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals and other obscene demands
to which Eloisa did not agree to thus Jose treated him harshly. Jose even did not comply with the marital duties of a
husband. Eloisa thus filed for an action of support against her husband.

Issue:

Whether or not Eloisa can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

Ruling:

Yes. She may claim for support. The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created
merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this
option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to
support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar,
the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband,
she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his
wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence,
except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his
option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home.

MARIANO B. ARROYO v. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921, STREET, J.

Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and
accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal
cruelty

Facts:

Mariano and Dolores lived together as husband and wife in Iloilo with a few short intervals of separation.
There came a time when Dolores went away to be separated from Mariano on the ground that she was cruelly
treated by Mariano. Mariano opted for her to return home to resume their married life but Dolores wanted to be
legally separated from him. The trial court ruled in favor Dolores ruling that it was Mariano’s ill treatment that
caused Dolores to leave.

Issue:

Whether or not the Dolores may choose not to cohabit with respect to Mariano’s cruelty towards Dolores.

Ruling:

No. Dolores must cohabit. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy
towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many
miseries that have attended their married life. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife,
which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal
wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become involved and would have little
significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife.
 Cruelty has been defined as what merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where
they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of
manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if
they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state
undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can
relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the
suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent
resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence. .

Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is
under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with him.

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA v. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916, TRENT, J.

The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife.
The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except
when he removes to a foreign country.

Facts:

Eloisa and Jose were married and after a month, Eloisa left to return to her parents. It was alleged in
Eloisa’s complaint that Jose had her do unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals and other obscene demands
to which Eloisa did not agree to thus Jose treated him harshly. Jose even did not comply with the marital duties of a
husband. Eloisa thus filed for an action of support against her husband.

Issue:

Whether or not Eloisa can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

Ruling:

Yes. She may claim for support. The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created
merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this
option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to
support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar,
the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband,
she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
 The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his
wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence,
except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his
option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home.

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO v. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA

G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002, KAPUNAN, J.

The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.

Facts:

An advertisement was posted by the spouses Camaisa with regard to the property they are selling. After seeing the
Ad petitioner Jader-Manalo became interested and offered to buy the property to the spouses Camaisa. An initial
negotiation took place in which the spouses Camaisa and Jader-Manalo was present. In their second meeting
Manalo paid a down payment to Edilberto Camaisa (husband) who received it, based on the latter’s promised of the
follow up consent of her wife Norma Camaisa. When Norma was later on informed of the payment she did not
consent and did not sign the contract. Consequently, the initial down payment was returned then to Manalo.
However, Manalo now claims that the sale was already perfected and valid.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property without the wife’s written consent is valid.

Ruling:

No. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give
her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma Camaisa actively participated in negotiating
for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its
validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma
may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of
a transaction is not consent.

Finally, Manalo argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to sell,
court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted. The argument is bereft of merit. Manalo is
correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being
withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the same is warranted by the
circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases
where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, Manalo failed to allege and prove that
respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the
wife’s incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO v.

COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING

G.R. NO. 118305, February 12, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.

When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity agreement by the husband redounded to the benefit
of his family, the undertaking is not a conjugal debt but an obligation personal to him.

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50, 300, 000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching,
Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable
with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against
PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. As a result the conjugal property of spouses Ching was sought to
answer.

Issue:

Whether or not the conjugal property is liable for the husband’s obligation as a surety of PBM.

Ruling:

No. The evidence of Ayala Investment indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the
P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. Ayala should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Chings acting
as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, we underscored the requirement that: there
must be the requisite showing of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses or benefits to
his family or that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the family. Unfortunately, the petition did not
present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many
months or years; and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of stock appreciated, if
so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of the Ching family.
Ayala Investment (AIDC) insist that the corporate debt in question falls under the exception laid down in said Article
122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan procured from AIDC was for the sole advancement and benefit of
Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Appellee-husband derives
salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine Blooming Mills (the debtor corporation), only because said husband is
an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits, are not the benefits contemplated by Articles 121 and 122
of the Family Code. The benefits contemplated by the exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is that benefit derived
directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM
itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband Ching or his family. The alleged benefit, if any, continuously harped by
respondents-appellants, are not only incidental but also speculative.