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LIST OF CASES

2017

January

1. MALAYAN INSURANCE vs. LIM


2. TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY vs. PAJARON
3. FCD PAWNSHOP vs. UNION BANK of the PHILIPPINES

Fenruary

1. SPOUSES PAJARES vs. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY

March

1. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS vs. SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC.

April

1. HERMA SHIPYARD, INC, and MR. HERMINIO ESGUERRA vs. DANILO OLIVEROS
2. WILLIAM ANGIDAN SIY vs. ALVIN TOMLIN
3. RODANTE F. GUYAMIN, LUCINIA F. GUY AMIN, and EILEEN G. GATARIN vs. JACINTO G. FLORES and
MAXIMO G. FLORES
4. DUTCH MOVERS, INC. CESAR LEE and YOLANDA LEE vs. EDILBERT0 LEQUIN

June

1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPS SALVADOR


Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Em Ma Concepcion L. Lin
G.R. No. 207277, January 16, 2017
By: Gerard Bernardo

Facts:

Lin alleged that she obtained various loans from RCBC secured by six clustered warehouses located at Plaridel,
Bulacan; that the five warehouses were insured with Malayan against fire for ₱56 million while the remaining
warehouse was insured for ₱2 million; that on February 24, 2008, the five warehouses were gutted by fire; that on
April 8, 2008 the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) issued a Fire Clearance Certification to her (April 8, 2008 FCC)
after having determined that the cause of fire was accidental; that despite the foregoing, her demand for payment
of her insurance claim was denied since the forensic investigators hired by Malayan claimed that the cause of the
fire was arson and not accidental; that she sought assistance from the Insurance Commission (IC) which, after a
meeting among the parties and a conduct of reinvestigation into the cause/s of the fire, recommended that
Malayan pay Lin's insurance claim and/or accord great weight to the BFP's findings; that in defiance thereof,
Malayan still denied or refused to pay her insurance claim; and that for these reasons, Malayan's corporate officers
should also be held liable for acquiescing to Malayan's unjustified refusal to pay her insurance claim.

As against RCBC, Lin averred that notwithstanding the loss of the mortgaged properties, the bank refused to go
after Malayan and instead insisted that she herself must pay the loans to RCBC, otherwise, foreclosure proceedings
would ensue; and that to add insult to injury, RCBC has been compounding the interest on her loans, despite
RCBC's failure or refusal to go after Malayan.

Lin thus prayed in Civil Case No. 10-122738 that judgment be rendered ordering petitioners to pay her insurance
claim plus interest on the amounts due or owing her.

Some five months later, or on June 17, 2010, Lin filed before the IC an administrative case against Malayan,
represented this time by Yvonne. In this administrative case, Lin claimed that since it had been conclusively found
that the cause of the fire was "accidental," the only issue left to be resolved is whether Malayan should be held
liable for unfair claim settlement practice under Section 241 in relation to Section 247 of the Insurance Code due to
its unjustified refusal to settle her claim; and that in consequence of the foregoing failings, Malayan's license to
operate as a non-life insurance company should be revoked or suspended, until such time that it fully complies with
the IC Resolution ordering it to accord more weight to the BFP's findings.

On August 17, 2010, Malayan filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 10-122738 based on forum shopping. It
argued that the administrative case was instituted to prompt or incite IC into ordering Malayan to pay her
insurance claim.

Issue:

Whether or not the case should be dismissed for Forum Shopping.

Held:

NO forum shopping.

In the present case, petitioners basically insist that Lin committed willful and deliberate forum shopping which
warrants the dismissal of her civil case because it is not much different from the administrative case in terms of the
parties involved, the causes of action pleaded, and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners also posit that another ground
warranting the dismissal of the civil case was Lin's failure to notify the RTC about the pendency of the
administrative case within five days from the filing thereof. These arguments will not avail.

Go v. Office of the Ombudsman stated distinctions vis-a-vis the principles enunciating that a civil case before the
trial court involving recovery of payment of the insured's insurance claim plus damages, can proceed
simultaneously with an administrative case before the IC.
Petitioner's causes of action in Civil Case are predicated on the insurers' refusal to pay her fire insurance claims
despite notice, proofs of losses and other supporting documents. Thus, petitioner prays in her complaint that the
insurers be ordered to pay the full-insured value of the losses, as embodied in their respective policies. Petitioner
also sought payment of interests and damages in her favor caused by the alleged delay and refusal of the insurers
to pay her claims. The principal issue then that must be resolved by the trial court is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the payment of her insurance claims and damages. The matter of whether or not there is unreasonable
delay or denial of the claims is merely an incident to be resolved by the trial court, necessary to ascertain
petitioner's right to claim damages, as prescribed by Section 244 of the Insurance Code. On the other hand, the
core, if not the sole bone of contention in Adm. Case No. RD-156, is the issue of whether or not there was
unreasonable delay or denial of the claims of petitioner, and if in the affirmative, whether or not that would justify
the suspension or revocation of the insurers' licenses.

Moreover, in Civil Case No. Q-95-23135, petitioner must establish her case by a preponderance of evidence, or
simply put, such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
it. In Adm. Case No. RD-156, the degree of proof required of petitioner to establish her claim is substantial
evidence, which has been defined as that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify the conclusion.

In addition, the procedure to be followed by the trial court is governed by the Rules of Court, while the [IC] has its
own set of rules and it is not bound by the rigidities of technical rules of procedure. These two bodies conduct
independent means of ascertaining the ultimate facts of their respective cases that will serve as basis for their
respective decisions.

If, for example, the trial court finds that there was no unreasonable delay or denial of her claims, it does not
automatically mean that there was in fact no such unreasonable delay or denial that would justify the revocation or
suspension of the licenses of the concerned insurance companies. It only means that petitioner failed to prove by
preponderance of evidence that she is entitled to damages. Such finding would not restrain the [IC], in the exercise
of its regulatory power, from making its own finding of unreasonable delay or denial as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence.

While the possibility that these two bodies will come up with conflicting resolutions on the same issue is not far-
fetched, the finding or conclusion of one would not necessarily be binding on the other given the difference in the
issues involved, the quantum of evidence required and the procedure to be followed.

Moreover, public interest and public policy demand the speedy and inexpensive disposition of administrative cases.

Turks Shawarma Company vs. Pajaron


G.R. No. 207156, January 16, 2017
By: Gerard Bernardo
Facts:

Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as service crew and Larry A. Carbonilla (Carbonilla) in
April 2007 as head crew. On April 15, 2010, Pajaron and Carbonilla filed their respective Complaints for
constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day
premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners. Both Complaints were consolidated.

Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010, Zeñarosa asked him to sign a piece of paper stating that he was receiving
the correct amount of wages and that he had no claims whatsoever from petitioners. Disagreeing to the
truthfulness of the statements, Pajaron refused to sign the paper prompting Zeñarosa to fire him from work.
Carbonilla, on the other hand, alleged that sometime in June 2008, he had an altercation with his supervisor
Conchita Marcillana (Marcillana) while at work. When the incident was brought to the attention of Zeñarosa, he was
immediately dismissed from service. He was also asked by Zeñarosa to sign a piece of paper acknowledging his
debt amounting to ₱7,000.00.
Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they averred that they actually abandoned their work.
They alleged that Pajaron would habitually absent himself from work for an unreasonable length of time without
notice; and while they rehired him several times whenever he returned, they refused to rehire him this time after
he abandoned work in April 2009. As for Carbonilla, he was reprimanded and admonished several times for
misbehavior and disobedience of lawful orders and was advised that he could freely leave his work if he could not
follow instructions. Unfortunately, he left his work without any reason and without settling his unpaid obligation
which compelled them to file a criminal case for estafa and slander.

The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them constructively and illegally
dismissed by petitioners. The Labor Arbiter found it suspicious for petitioners to file criminal cases against Pajaron
and Carbonilla only after the complaints for illegal dismissal had been filed.

In NLRC, due to alleged non-availability of counsel, Zeñarosa himself filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum
and Motion to Reduce Bond ith the NLRC. Along with this, Zeñarosa posted a partial cash bond (appeal bond) in the
amount of ₱15,000.00, maintaining that he cannot afford to post the full amount of the award since he is a mere
backyard
micro-entrepreneur. He begged the NLRC to reduce the bond.

The NLRC, in an Order dated March 18, 2011, denied the motion to reduce bond. It ruled that financial difficulties
may not be invoked as a valid ground to reduce bond; at any rate, it was not even substantiated by proof.
Moreover,
the partial bond in the amount of ₱15,000.00 is not reasonable in relation to the award which totalled to
₱197,936.27. Petitioners' appeal was thus dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection.

Petitioners insist that the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's dismissal of their appeal for the following reasons: first,
there was substantial compliance with the Rules on perfection of appeal; second, the surrounding facts and
circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the appeal bond; third, they exhibited willingness and good
faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period; and lastly, a liberal interpretation of the
requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits.
Petitioners claim that there is a necessity to resolve the merits of their appeal since the Labor Arbiter's Decision
declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally terminated from employment was not based on substantial evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not court may reduce the appeal bond (liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond).

Held:

NO. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal
is lost.

It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure that there is legislative and administrative
intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard to this intention. The
posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with this requirement
renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This indispensable requisite for the perfection of an
appeal ''is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case[,] the monetary award will be given to them
upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal [and] is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal
to delay or evade payment of their obligations to the employees.

In the case at bar, petitioners filed a Motion to Reduce Bond together with their Notice of Appeal and posted a cash
bond of ₱15,000.00 within the 10-day reglementary period to appeal. The CA correctly found that the NLRC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reduce bond as such motion was not predicated
on meritorious and reasonable grounds and the amount tendered is not reasonable in relation to the award. The
NLRC correctly held that the supposed ground cited in the motion is not well-taken for there was no evidence to
prove Zeñarosa's claim that the payment of the full amount of the award would greatly affect his business due to
financial setbacks. Besides, "the law does not require outright payment of the total monetary award; [the appellant
has the option to post either a cash or surety bond. In the latter case, appellant must pay only a] moderate and
reasonable sum for the premium to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail." the
absence of counsel is not a valid excuse for non-compliance with the rules. As aptly observed by the CA, Zeñarosa
cannot feign ignorance of the law considering that he was able to post a partial bond and ask for a reduction of the
appeal bond. At any rate, petitioners did not advance any reason for the alleged absence of counsel except that
they were simply abandoned. Neither did petitioners explain why they failed to procure a new counsel to properly
assist them in filing the appeal. The absence of counsel is not a valid excuse for non-compliance with the rules. As
aptly observed by the CA, Zeñarosa cannot feign ignorance of the law considering that he was able to post a partial
bond and ask for a reduction of the appeal bond. At any rate, petitioners did not advance any reason for the
alleged absence of counsel except that they were simply abandoned. Neither did petitioners explain why they failed
to procure a new counsel to properly assist them in filing the appeal.

FCD Pawnshop and Merchandising Company vs. Union Bank Of The Philippines
G.R. No. 207914, January 18, 2017
By: Gerard Bernardo
Facts:

Together with Felicitas Dionisio-Juguilon and Adelaida Dionisio, petitioners Fortunato C. Dionisio, Jr, (Fortunato)
and Franklin C. Dionisio (Franklin) owned FCD Pawnshop and Merchandising Company, which in turn was the
registered owner of a pared of fond in Makati under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (168302) S-3664, or TCT
(168302) S-3664.

In 2009, Fortunato and Franklin entrusted the original owner's copy of TCT (168302) S-3664 to Atty. Rowena
Dionisio. It was later discovered that the said title was used as collateral by Sunyang Mining Corporation (Sunyang)
to obtain a ₱20 million loan from from respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP).

Fortunato and Franklin filed against UBP, Sunyang, the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and several others Civil Case
No. 11-116, a Petition to annul the Sunyang mortgage and claim for damages, based on the premise that TCT
(168302) S-3664 was fraudulently mortgaged. The case was assigned to Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati (Branch 57). Meanwhile, UBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property, and it
bought the same at the auction sale.

On account of perceived irregularities in the foreclosure and sale proceedings, Fortunato and Franklin filed in
December 2011 another Complaint against UBP, the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and several others for annulment
of the extrajudicial foreclosure and certificate of sale issued, with injunctive relief The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. l 1 -1192 and assigned to Branch 133 of the Makati RTC (Branch 133).

In a written opposition, UBP claimed that the filing of Civil Case No. 11-1192 violated the rule against forum
shopping.

Petitioner contends that as between Civil Case No. 11-116 (annulment of mortgage) and Civil Case No. 11-1192
(annulment of foreclosure and sale proceedings), there is no identity of causes of action, subject matter, issues,
and reliefs sought; that both cases require different evidence as proof; and that judgments obtained in the two
cases will not be inconsistent with each other, and any decision obtained in one will not constitute res judicata on
the other.
Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation of forum shopping.

Held:

YES. Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting causes of action, where the ground for
dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed. Cause of
action is defined as 'the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.’

In one case the court ruled that: The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM
(due to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodland's right to the mortgaged
property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM. The Injunction Case involves the
same cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. While the main relief
sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the
Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title), the cause
of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same - the alleged nullity of the REM. Thus,
what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action, but with different prayers.

There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the propriety of injunction in the
Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM, which is already the subject of the Annulment
Case. The identity of the causes of action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled
upon in both, and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other. This is precisely what is
sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping.

The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the parties should add different grounds or legal theories
for the nullity of the REM or should alter the designation or form of the action. The wellentrenched rule is that 'a
party cannot, by varying the form of action, or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

Petitioners maintain that Civil Case No. 11-1192 (case for annulment of foreclosure and sale) is grounded on
specific irregularities committed during the foreclosure proceedings. However, their Complaint in said case
reiterates the supposed illegality of the Sunyang mortgage, thus presenting the court in said case with the
opportunity and temptation to resolve the issue of validity of the mortgage. There is therefore a danger that a
decision might be rendered by the court in Civil Case No. 11-1192 that contradicts the eventual ruling in Civil Case
No. 11-116, or the annulment of mortgage case.
Spouses Romeo Pajares and Ida T. Pajares vs. Remarkable Laundry And Dry Cleaning
G.R. No. 212690, February 20, 2017
By: Gerard Bernardo

Facts:

On September 3, 2012, Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning (respondent) filed a Complaint denominated as
"Breach of Contract and Damages"6 against spouses Romeo and Ida Pajares (petitioners) before the RTC of Cebu
City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-39025 and assigned to Branch 17 of said court. Respondent alleged
that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract7 with petitioners whereby the latter, acting as a dealer
outlet, shall accept and receive items or materials for laundry which are then picked up and processed by the
former in its main plant or laundry outlet; that petitioners violated Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties)
of said contract, which required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week, when, on April 30,
2012, they ceased dealer outlet operations on account of lack of personnel; that respondent made written demands
upon petitioners for the payment of penalties imposed and provided for in the contract, but the latter failed to pay;
and, that petitioners' violation constitutes breach of contract. Respondent thus prayed, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, by reason of the above-mentioned breach of the subject dealer contract
agreement made by the defendant, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to order the said
defendant to pay the following incidental and consequential damages to the plaintiff, to wit:

a) TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PHP200,000.00) plus legal interest as incidental and consequential [sic] for
violating Articles IV and XVI of the Remarkable Laundry Dealer Contract dated
08 September 2011.
b) Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as legal expenses.
c) Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
d) Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) as cost of suit.

The RTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 for lack of jurisdiction. The total amount of
₱280,000.00 is the amount totally claimed. Under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, the amount of demand or claim in the complaint for the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction shall exceed ₱300,000.00.

Petitioner argued that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the civil case. According to
respondent, said case is one whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation and that the damages
prayed for therein are merely incidental thereto. Hence, such case falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC

Issue:

Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction.

Held:

NO. The RTC was correct in categorizing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 as an action for damages seeking to recover an
amount below its jurisdictional limit. Respondent's complaint denominated as one for "'Breach of Contract &
Damages" is neither an action for specific performance nor a complaint for rescission of contract.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal trial courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

An analysis of the factual and material allegations in the Complaint shows that there is nothing therein which would
support a conclusion that respondent's Complaint is one for specific performance or rescission of contract. It should
be recalled that the principal obligation of petitioners under the Remarkable Laundry Dealership Contract is to act
as respondent's dealer outlet. Respondent, however, neither asked the RTC to compel petitioners to perfom1 such
obligation as contemplated in said contract nor sought the rescission thereof. The Complaint's body, heading, and
relief are bereft of such allegation. In fact, neither phrase appeared on or was used in the Complaint when, for
purposes of clarity, respondent's counsels, who are presumed to be learned in law, could and should have used any
of those phrases to indicate the proper designation of the Complaint. To the contrary, respondent's counsels
designated the Complaint as one for "Breach of Contract & Damages," which is a misnomer and inaccurate. This
erroneous notion was reiterated in respondent's Memorandum herein it was stated that "the main action of CEB
39025 is one for a breach of contract. There is no such thing as an "action for breach of contract." Rather,
"[b]reach of contract is a cause of action, but not the action or relief itself.”

dasdasd

ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS, Petitioner vs SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., (SODACO),


ROLANDO SANCHEZ, LEONARDO DALWAMPO and CARIDAD C. ALMENDRAS, Respondents
G.R. No. 198209 March 22, 2017.
By: DONNA BIGORNIA

FACTS: petitioner filed an Amended Complaint4 seeking to annul the Deed of Sale (DOS) executed by and among
respondents Caridad C. Almendras (Caridad), Rolando C. Sanchez (Rolando) and Leonardo Dalwampo over a parcel
of unregistered land. Petitioner alleged that he owned and had occupied said parcel of land since September 21,
1978 until he was forcibly dispossessed by respondent South Davao Development Company, Inc. (SODACO) on
April 23, 1994. Petitioner claimed that Caridad sold the property to Rolando, a purported dummy of SODACO.
Rolando filed a Request for Admission addressed to petitioner concerning several matters concerning the case. To
this, the petitioner failed to file a sworn statement specifically denying the matters therein or setting forth in detail
the reasons why he cannot either deny or admit said matters. Thus, Rolando filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
He alleged that there being no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the issue of ownership raised by
petitioner being sham or fictitious, except as to the issue of damages, he is entitled to a summary judgment.
Rolando prayed that the complaint be dismissed, that the validity of the DOS as well as his ownership and
possession of the subject property be upheld, and that a hearing be conducted solely for the purpose of
determining the propriety of his counterclaim for damages.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondent, and proceeded to dismiss the case, concluding that by petitioner's
failure to respond to the Request for Admission, he was deemed to have admitted or impliedly admitted the
matters specified therein. In particular, petitioner is deemed to have admitted the fact that the property in question
had been validly sold to Rolando thereby rendering the complaint without any cause of action. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, however, denied by the same court. Hence, this present
case, petitioner filed to the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in dismissing
the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to annul or modify the
decision of the RTC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

HELD: NO.

RATIO: The instant Petition denominated as a petition for review, wrongfully alleged grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is glaringly different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. "A petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited only to questions of law or errors of
judgment. On the other hand; a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of to correct errors
of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction."
Here, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the RTC claiming that contrary to the lower
court's ruling, he could not have received the motion. It must be stressed that only questions of law
may be properly raised in a petition for review. Whether or not petitioner received a copy of the motion
on March 24, 2010 is a factual issue and such is not within the ambit of a petition for review.
As the instant Petition was filed without resorting to a more appropriate remedy before the CA, the
same should be dismissed.

HERMA SHIPYARD, INC, and MR. HERMINIO ESGUERRA, Petitioner, vs. DANILO OLIVEROS, JOJIT BASA
ARNEL SABAL, CAMILO OLIVEROS, ROBERT NARIO, FREDERJCK CATIG, RICARDO ONTALAN, RUBEN
DELGADO, SEGUNDO LABOSTA, EXEQUIEL OLlVERIA, OSCAR TIROL and ROMEO TRINIDAD, Respondent
G.R. No. 208936 April 17, 2017
By: DONNA BIGORNIA

FACTS: The respondents, as the employees of Herma Shipyard (petitioner), filed before the Regional Arbitration
Branch III a Complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization, and non-payment of service incentive leave pay with
prayer for the payment of full backwages and attorney's fees against petitioners. Respondents alleged that they are
Herma Shipyard's regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks usually necessary and desirable
in its business. On various dates, however, petitioners dismissed them from employment.
Respondents further alleged that as a condition to their continuous and Uninterrupted employment, petitioners
made them sign employment contracts for a fixed period ranging from one to four months to make it appear that
they were project-based employees. Per respondents, petitioners resorted to this scheme to defeat their right to
security of tenure, but in truth there was never a time when they ceased working for Henna Shipyard due to
expiration of project-based employment contracts. For their part, petitioners argued that respondents were its
project-based employees in its shipbuilding projects and that the specific project for which they were hired had
already been completed, In support thereof, Herma Shipyard presented contracts of employment, some of which
are written in the vernacular and denominated as kasunduang Paglilingkod.
Laborer Arbiter rendered a Decision Dismissing respondents’ Complaint. The Laborer Arbiter held that respondents
were project-based employees whose services were validly terminated upon the completion of the specific work for
which they were individually hired. NLRC rendered its Decision7 denying respondents' appeal and affirming in toto
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the labor tribunals in finding that they were
project-based employees and in not awarding them service incentive leaves. Respondents contended that the labor
tribunals grievously erred in relying on the project employment contracts which were for a uniform duration of one
month. the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting respondents’ Petitions for Certiorari and setting aside the
labor tribunals’ Decision. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. However, the CA denied their Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Decision and Resolution of the CA,

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may take cognizance of the Petition for review by Certiorari under rule 45 of the
Rules of Court notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner raised an issue which is a question of law.
HELD: YES

RATIO: The issue of whether petitioners were project-based employees is a question of fact that,
generally, cannot be passed and ruled upon by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari filed
under Rule 45 of the rules of Court. It is settled that the jurisdiction of this Court in a Rule 45 petition
is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. Nevertheless, in view of the opposing views of the
tribunals below, this Court shall take cognizance of and resolve the factual issues involved in this case.

WILLIAM ANGIDAN SIY, Petitioner vs. ALVIN TOMLIN, Respondent


G.R. No. 205998 April 24, 2017
By: DONNA BIGORNIA
FACTS: Petitioner William Anghian Siy filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession with Prayer for Replevin5 against Frankie Domanog Ong (Ong), Chris Centeno (Centeno),
John Co Chua (Chua), and herein respondent Alvin Tomlin. He alleged that he entrusted his range rover 2007
model to Ong, a businessman who owned a second-hand car sales showroom. However, after the latter claimed
that he had a prospective buyer therefor, failed to remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle
to petitioner. Later on, the petitioner found out that the vehicle had been transferred to Chua. As such, petitioner
filed a complaint before the Quezon City Police District's Anti-Carnapping Section. Upon learning of the complaint,
the respondent met with petitioner to arrange the return of the vehicle. However, respondent still failed to
surrender the vehicle. Thereafter, petitioner learned that the vehicle was being transferred to respondent and that
the vehicle was later impounded and taken into custody by the PNP-Highway Patrol Group (HPG) at Camp Crame,
Quezon City after respondent attempted to process a PNP clearance of the vehicle with a view to transferring
ownership thereof.
After the payment of the required bond which was approved by the trial court. A Writ of Replevin was then issued
in favour of the petitioner. As a result, the sheriff seized the subject vehicle. Proceeding from this, the respondent
filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the Writ of Replevin, dismiss the Complaint, and turn over or return the
vehicle to him. Particularly, the respondent posits that the petitioner failed to allege the actual market value of the
vehicle, and instead, he intentionally understated its value in order to avoid paying the correct docket fees. Finally,
respondent allege that the sheriff implemented the writ against the HPG, which is not a party to the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner failed to allege all the material facts in the complaint for replevin and
affidavit of merit under sections 2 & 4, rule 60 of the revised rules of court.

HELD: YES

RATIO: In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or
clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is
in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same. Rule 60 allows a plaintiff, in an
action for the recovery of possession of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be
shown that he is 'the owner of the property claimed ... or is entitled to the possession thereof. The
plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the
property and his legal basis therefor.
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond. - Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show...
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof;
From petitioner's own account, he constituted and appointed Ong as his agent to sell the vehicle,
surrendering to the latter the vehicle, all documents of title pertaining thereto, and a deed of sale
signed in blank, with full understanding that Ong would offer and sell the same to his clients or to the
public. In return, Ong accepted the agency by his receipt of the vehicle, the blank deed of sale, and
documents of title, and when he gave bond in the form of two guarantee checks. All these gave Ong the
authority to act for and in behalf of petitioner. Under the Civil Code on agency, Art. 1869. Agency may
be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to
repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the owner thereof.
Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his ownership, petitioner lost his right
of possession over the vehicle. His argument that respondent is a buyer in bad faith, when the latter
nonetheless proceeded with the purchase and registration of the vehicle on March 7, 2011, despite
having been apprised of petitioner's earlier November, 2010 "Failed to Return Vehicle" report filed with
the PNP-HPG, is unavailing. Petitioner had no right to file said report, as he was no longer the owner of
the vehicle at the time; indeed, his right of action is only against Ong, for collection of the proceeds of
the sale.
Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle at the time he
filed Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 in July, 2011, petitioner may not seek a return of the same through
replevin. Quite the contrary, respondent, who obtained the vehicle from Chua and registered the
transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is the rightful owner thereof, and as such, he is entitled to
its possession. For this reason, the CA was correct in decreeing the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-11-
69644, although it e1red in ordering the return of the vehicle to the PNP-HPG, which had no further
right to hold the vehicle in its custody. As the registered and rightful owner of the subject vehicle, the
trial court must return the same to respondent.

RODANTE F. GUYAMIN, LUCINIA F. GUY AMIN, and EILEEN G. GATARIN, Petitioners vs. JACINTO G.
FLORES and MAXIMO G. FLORES, represented by RAMON G. FLORES, Respondent
G.R. No. 202189 April 25, 2017
By: DONNA BIGORNIA
FACTS: Respondents Jacinto G. Flores and Maximo G. Flores, represented by their brother and attorney-in-fact
Ramon G. Flores, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioners Rodante F. Guyamin (Rodante),
Lucinia F. Guyamin (Lucinia), and Eileen G. Gatarin (Eileen) alleging that petitioners are their relatives who for
many years have been occupying the subject property by mere tolerance of respondents' predecessors and
parents, the original owners of the same. However, when they were requested by the respondents to vacate the
property, petitioners failed to vacate; that respondents made several attempts to settle the matter through
conciliation before the Punong Barangay but the same proved futile, hence, they were issued a Certification To File
Action. Thereafter, summons and a copy of the Complaint were served upon petitioners through Eileen, who
nonetheless refused to sign and acknowledge receipt thereof. So, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendants
in Default considering that petitioners failed to file their answer. The RTC issued an order granting the motion of
the respondents, thereby proceeded to receive respondents’ evidence ex parte.
On the merits of the case, the RTC ruled in favour of the respondents and ordered the petitioners to vacate the
property. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner contends that the filing of their Answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default, and
the latter's filing of a reply to their answer, cured the defective answer, and that the lower courts erred when they
ruled in favor of respondents in spite of the fact that the latter made no formal offer of their evidence; that
respondents' evidence cannot therefore be considered, since it is a settled maxim that "courts will only consider as
evidence that which has been formally offered.

ISSUE: a) Whether or not court of appeals erred in finding that the regional trial court was correct in declaring the
petitioners in default and proceeding to receive respondents' evidence ex parte.
b) Whether or not court of appeals erred when it ruled that the regional trial court validly rendered its
decision favorable to the respondents without the filing of the formal offer of evidence.

HELD: a) NO; b) NO

RATIO: a) The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default, and
the latter's filing of a reply, do not erase the fact that petitioners' answer is late. Respondents' reply
filed thereafter is, like the belated answer, .a mere scrap of paper, as it proceeds from the said answer.

b)the Court supports the CA's pronouncement that since respondents' exhibits were presented and
marked during the ex parte hearing of August 7, 2008, the trial court judge committed no error when
he admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case notwithstanding that no formal offer of
evidence was made. The pieces of evidence were identified during the ex parte hearing and marked as
Exhibits "A" to "F" for respondents and were incorporated into the records of the case. As a matter of
fact, the RTC Judge referred to them in his October 21, 2008 Decision. If they were not included in the
record, the RTC Judge could not have referred to them in arriving at judgment.
The Court notes that petitioners raise purely procedural questions and nothing more. In other words,
petitioners aim to win their case not on the merit, but on pure technicality. But in order for this Court to
even consider their arguments, petitioners should have at least shown that they have a substantial
defense to respondents' claim.
While it is true that the rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of
justice, and the swift unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be
met at the expense of substantial justice. This Court has time and again reiterated the doctrine that the
rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its
frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert
the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities
should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Considering that there was substantial compliance, a liberal interpretation
of procedural rules in this case is more in keeping with the constitutional mandate to secure social
justice.
DUTCH MOVERS, INC. CESAR LEE and YOLANDA LEE, Petitioners, vs. EDILBERT0 LEQUIN, CHRISTOPHER
R. SALVADOR, REYNALDO L. SINGSING, and RAFFY B. MASCARDO, Respondents.
Gr 20032 April 25, 2017
By: DONNA BIGORNIA

FACTS: The respondents obtained a judgment against the petitioners from the NLRC adjudicating that the
respondents were illegally dismissed by the petitioner. This decision became final and executory, as such, an Entry
of Judgment on the case was issued by the NLRC. Consequently, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Execution.
However, pending resolution of these motions, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implead stating that
upon investigation, they discovered that DMI no longer operates. Given these developments, respondents prayed
that petitioners, and the officers named in DMI's AOI, which included spouses Smith, be impleaded, and be held
solidarily liable with DMI in paying the judgment awards.
Labor Arbiter Savari issued an Order holding petitioners liable for the judgment awards. Labor Arbiter Savari
decreed that petitioners represented themselves to respondents as the owners of DMI, and were the ones who
managed the same. Later, respondents filed anew a Reiterating Motion for Writ of Execution. LA Savari issued a
Writ of Execution.
Petitioners moved to quash the Writ of Execution contending that the April 1, 2009 LA Order was void because the
LA has no jurisdiction to modify the final and executryy NLRC Decision, and the same cannot anymore be altered or
modified since there was no finding of bad faith against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment, which has already became final and executor, may be altered or modified.

HELD: YES

RATIO: The principle of immutability of judgment, or the rule that once a judgment has become final
and executory, the same can no longer be altered or modified and the court's duty is only to order its
execution, is not absolute. One of its exceptions is when there is a supervening event occurring after
the judgment becomes final and executory, which renders the decision unenforceable. a supervening
event refers to facts that transpired after a judgment has become final and executory, or to new
situation that developed after the same attained finality. Supervening events include matters that the
parties were unaware of before or during trial as they were not yet existing during that time.
supervening events transpired in this case after the NLRC Decision became final and executory, which
rendered its execution impossible and unjust.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPS SALVADOR
GR No. 205428 June 07, 2017
By: Corona, Jose Enrico V.
DOCTRINE: If a pleading is filed by registered mail, x x x the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of
filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading.
FACTS: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with a total land area of 229 square meters,
located in Kaingin Street, Barangay Parada, Valenzuela City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.V-
77660.
On November 9, 2011, the Republic, represented by the Department of - Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed
a verified Complaint before the RTC for the expropriation.
On February 10, 2012, respondents received two checks from the DPWH representing 100% of the zonal value of
the subject property and the cost of the one-storey semi-concrete residential house erected on the property
amounting to ₱l61,850.00 6 and ₱523,449.22,7 respectively. The RTC thereafter issued the corresponding Writ of
Possession in favor of the Republic. The RTC likewise directed the Republic to pay respondents consequential
damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject
property in the Republic's name.
Republic filed for MR which was denied by the RTC for being filed out of the prescribed period.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC correctly denied the Republic's Motion for Partial Reconsideration for having been filed
out of time?
HELD & RATIO: No.
"Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is filed by registered mail, x x x the date of
mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed
pleading."
In this case, the records show that the Republic filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration before the RTC via
registered mail on September 28, 2012. Although the trial court received the Republic's motion only on October 5,
2012, it should have considered the pleading to have been filed on September 28, 2012, the date of its mailing,
which is clearly within the reglementary period of 15 days to file said motion, counted from September 13, 2012,
or the date of the Republic's receipt of the assailed Decision.

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