Libi vs IAC

Libi vs. IAC

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after
she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not
granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a
single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private
respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:

The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art
2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-
delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when
the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety
deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise
admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not
have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free
access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the
required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

LIBI VS IAC
Posted by kaye lee on 3:00 AM
G.R. No. 70890 September 18 1992

FACTS:
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he turned the firearm on himself. As a result, the
parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover damages. The trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.

RULING:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor children is imposed by Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code, which covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The parents'
liability as being primary and not subsidiary and liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all
the diligence of a good father to prevent damage.

In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the activities of their son. It was only at the
time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was drug informant of CANU and that the gun used in
the shooting incident was missing from the safety deposit box. Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell
from having access to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said
minor who was living in their company.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
En Banc
G.R. No. 70890 September 18, 1992
CRESENCIO LIBI* and AMELIA YAP LIBI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTEMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY
GOTIONG, respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone
of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still
in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While
we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly
prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of
an extended judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated
by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of
respondent court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the
following decretal portion:
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby
reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and
solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed.” 1
Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are
the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which
took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year
commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the
parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell
after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second
weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation
but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her.
In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the
corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13,
1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound
inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem
streets of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death
of both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective
theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports,
documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell
caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun
on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, petitioners, puzzled and likewise
distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his
work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have
caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid
identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court
below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise
denied for lack of sufficient merit.” 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against
defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for
resolution the following issues in this case:
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with
established decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent
court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of
Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or
not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However,
undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing
around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that
this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it
was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of
an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private
respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral
parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the
occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of
Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his
autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test
on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendell’s hands was
forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell
Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20)
minutes based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral
Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor
mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect
examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he
see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which he
examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he
had earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and
the exit of the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and
that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot
wound of entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On
direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:
“Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no
black residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what we call
clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications
that you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that
correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the
singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own
sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim
himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear and point
of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is
concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been
fired by the victim.” 7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the
crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi,
respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the
right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:
xxx xxx xxx
“Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly
by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8
cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward,
upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the
temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the
brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0
x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left
external auditory meatus.
xxx xxx xxx
“Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of
entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or
bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying
tissue, are absent.” 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record, thus:
“Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the
wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24
inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for
Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length.
ATTY. SENINING:
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm
almost straight towards his head.” 11
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an
apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house
adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a “shadow” of a person at the
gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces
the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly
the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas
station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans,
she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with
James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his
rooftop. 13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a “shadow” on top of the gate of the
Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that
he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe
Gotiong’s house; and he further gave the following answers to these questions:
“ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your house?
WITNESS:
A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high.” 14

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not
inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the
visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in
relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo
Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou
Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo
climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first
shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he
went down from the fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolo’s
direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia
Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the “shadow” of a man at the gate of the Gotiong
house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was
another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not
even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any
alleged “John Doe.” Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi did
not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence testimonial, documentary
and pictorial the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his
motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation.
Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family,
hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not
borne out by the evidence on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi,
owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of
these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her
bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell
taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no
longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts
that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family
by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one
of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access
to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were
gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their
son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that
Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting
in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who,
for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or
even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell,
with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what
clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as
explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of
diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say:
“. . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in
this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been
diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his
reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore,
appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.’
“Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun
which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily
liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the
Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas vs. Cadano, et. al.
(L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:
‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses.”
‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who
acted with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and
under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his
or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA
361-362).
“. . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow
got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-
spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978
when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and
dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi
was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU
agent . . .”
xxx xxx xxx
“Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower
court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because as
preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this
crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell
Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned
that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed.”
(Emphases ours.) 19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for
the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their
minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination
therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court
cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al 20 which supposedly holds that “(t)he subsidiary liability of
parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,” followed
by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180
of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume
subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are
set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion
hereunder.
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the
categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard
second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant
comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the
parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can
neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability
imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a
valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we
apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in
case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental
liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that
“(t) he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.”
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor
children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.
xxx xxx xxx
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed
by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age,
who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under
their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part.” ( Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision
the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct
and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that
is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is
buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall
be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of
insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the
Civil Code states that “(i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor
. . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad
litem shall be appointed.” For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is
found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
“Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law.”
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in
the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of
cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., 22 Araneta vs.
Arreglado, 23 Salen, et al. vs. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et al., 25 and
Elcano, et al, vs. Hill, et al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the
issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but
under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of age or
over, since these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both
instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well
expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the
civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses
would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be
liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however,
there are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s
determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or
quasi-delicts of their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through
reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his
father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a
good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was
imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who
was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code
providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the
conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article
2180 but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as
already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with
Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for
serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan,
the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from
his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is
likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although
the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to “lack of intent, coupled with mistake,” it
was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for
damages, since the son, “although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence,” but “is now of age, as a matter of
equity” the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability
only for persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in
industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their
co-accused in the other classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present
case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the
parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its
decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the
syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of “subsidiary” liability. However, such
categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after
reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said
cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
this Court concluded its decision in this wise:
“Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence
submitted therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for
fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the
Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore
stated, any discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of no moment.”
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and
should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed
by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9
years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment;
and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and
Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon
the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend
of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without
such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise
parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182
of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a
felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding
petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of
the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein
explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Romero, Nocon
and Bellosillo, Jr., JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Davide, Jr., J., No part. I used to be counsel of one of the parties.
Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Libi vs. Intermediate Appellate

Court, 214 SCRA 16
Facts:

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot wound
from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents, parents of Julie
Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann’s parents.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent Court to
make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

Held:

Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the
activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and
knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by means of the gun which was
freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly checked whether the gun was still
under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been
committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in
Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.

TAMARGO VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 3:00 AM
G.R. No. 85044 June 3 1992 [Parental Authority]

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's natural
parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November
1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since
parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo
contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by
mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at
bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident
happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, at the
time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody
over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child.

Tamargo vs CA
Tamargo vs CA
GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a
complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of
the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition
was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual
custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their
parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at
bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural
parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and
guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil code”.

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody
over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody
however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time
of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

TAMARGO vs. CA et al
MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ

TAMARGO vs. CA et al
G.R. No. 85044
June 3, 1992
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur by petitioners, parents of
Jennifer, against respondent spouses, Adelberto’s natural parents with whom he was
living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto,
who was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad
acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto before the then CFI of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was
granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer
In their Answer, respondent spouses, Adelberto’s natural parents, claimed that not
they, but rather the adopting parents were indispensable parties to the action since
parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
The trial court ruled against the adopting parents, who filed an MR which was later
denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners went to the CA on
a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court’s decision. The CA
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. Hence this
petition for review
ISSUE: Who should be responsible for the tortuous act of the minor Adelberto, his
natural parents or adopting parents?
HELD: Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision
of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners’ complaint filed before
the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for
further proceedings
Natural parents.
It is not disputed that Adelberto’s voluntary act of shooting Jennifer with an air rifle
gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor
child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)

The natural parent spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8
which reads as follows:

Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the Department of
Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted
before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and
educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best
interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be
entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree
shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known.
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation
to Article 39 of the same Code:

Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is
the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx

and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the
time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of
parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the
parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the
parents exercise supervision and control.
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines insisted upon the requisite that the
child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents
sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable
for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act
that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they
were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto
was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

NOTES:
(On why this petition was accepted by the SC) In view, however, of the nature of the
issue raised in the instant petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served,
the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent
manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed
before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration
filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for
appeal.

Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of
the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.

TamargovsCA

GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air riflecausing
injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaintfor damages against
the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragicincident. In December 1981,
the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition wasgranted on November
1982 after the tragic incident.
ISSUE:
WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents
the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual
custodywas lodged with the biological parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their
parentalauthority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at
bar, during theshooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It
followsthat they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
“Parents and guardians are responsible for
the damage caused by the child under their parent
al authority in accordance with the civil code”.
 SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose aliability upon
the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody overthe adopted
child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage infavor of the adopted
child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trialcustody period either
had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shootingincident. Hence, actual custody was then
with the natural parents of Adelberto.
DOCTRINE:
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them,
may be seento be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law
assumesthat when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents werenegligent
in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in theircustody and control.
Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parentaldereliction is,
of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of theCivil Code by proof
that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to preventthe
damage.The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption was
issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the
latter asadopting parents as of the time of the filing the petition for adoption that is, before
Adelberto had shotJennifer with an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were
therefore free of any parentalresponsibility
for Adelberto’s allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan,
Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil
Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses
Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In
addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted
and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982,
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption
was filed.

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption.

The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural
parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day
reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed
by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however, that the
motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that
notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing
of said motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both motions were
denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice
of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this time
ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December
1987.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the
trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988,
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses Bundoc
are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child,
Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not
petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant Petition; conversely,
whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been
filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when
actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed
before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section
4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt
and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not having
contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not
interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the
service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2

In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical
rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably
filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by
petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the Court
held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3

Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of
the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure
ought not be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only
to help secure not override, substantial justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement of
the rules is made their aim would be defeated. 4

2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .

Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)

This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or
the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable
for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which
includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of
vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following
terms:
 With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or
omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so
elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public
policy. to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions
are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code
has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions
— to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care
in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control
of one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their
status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for
their conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them,
may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability
is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article
2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.
It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption was
issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the
latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that
is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were
therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.

Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as
follows:

Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the Department of
Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted
before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and
educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best
interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be
entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree
shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to
Article 39 of the same Code:
 Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is
the spouse of the surviving natural parent;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the
Petition for adoption was filed.

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for
the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living
with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article
58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:

Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by
the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the
child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable
for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their companyand under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps
be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with
the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently,
no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses,
could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35
provides as follows:
 Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and
until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of
at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal
union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the
adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during
the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the
adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case,
the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air
rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the
adopting parents.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the
trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court,
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings consistent with this
Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, concur.

Castilex Industrial Corp. vs. Vicente Vasquez & Cebu Doctors’ Hospital (Gr no. 132266) Facts:
Romeo Vasquez who was driving his motorcycle collided with a company car owned by Castilex
driven by Abad who is the manager of which. The parent of Romeo filed a case for damages against
Abad and Castilex Corporation. The rtc ruled in favor of the Vasquezes holding that Abad and
Castilex are jointly and solidary liable. On appeal the CA affirmed holding that the driving by a
manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the
time and circumstances. Issue: Whether or not an Castilex may be held vicariously liable for the
death resulting from the negligent operation by their manager of a company-issued vehicle  Ruling:
The SC Held that Castilex is not liable for the act committed by Abad for Abad was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties and it was beyond the normal working hours when the
accident happened. Abad was in a place which is a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers
and addicts which had no connection to CASTILEX business; neither does it have any relation to his
duties as a manager. In the absence of some special benefit to the employer, the employee is not
acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle.
Furthermore, since Abad was not in the scope of his functions, CASTILEX had no duty to show that
it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999]

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE

VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS
HOSPITAL, INC., respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held

vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a
managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:

On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez,

was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was
traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without
any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Students Permit to
Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of
Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux
Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the
said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea
rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with
each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and
brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors
Hospital.

On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was there
that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein
he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental
charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case
was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So,
the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and
Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to
collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.[1]

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa
Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner
Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and
solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of P8,000.00 for burial
expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorneys fees;
and P778,752.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctors Hospital, the
sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly interest
from 27 July 1989 until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation.[2]
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
In its decision[3] of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of
the latter is only vicarious and not solidary with the former. It reduced the award
of damages representing loss of earning capacity from P778,752.00
to P214,156.80; and the interest on the hospital and medical bills, from 3% per
month to 12% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.
Upon CASTILEXs motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
modified its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages from P50,000
to P30,000 in view of the deceaseds contributory negligence; (b) deleting the
award of attorneys fees for lack of evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on
hospital and medical bills to 6% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully
paid.[4]
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of
Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial
employee, ABAD was deemed to have been always acting within the scope of his
assigned task even outside office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to
him by petitioner; and (3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the
employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned task.
Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner
which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of the deceased.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their sons death
was caused by the negligence of petitioners employee who was driving a vehicle
issued by petitioner and who was on his way home from overtime work for
petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent
death of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the
fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability
therefor. They moreover argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the
amount of compensatory damages when the award made by the trial court was
borne both by evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceaseds wages and
by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out that the petition is
procedurally not acceptable on the following grounds: (1) lack of an explanation
for serving the petition upon the Court of Appeals by registered mail, as required
under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a
statement of the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and of
the filing of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.
For its part, respondent Cebu Doctors Hospital maintains that petitioner
CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death of
Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home from taking
snacks after doing overtime work for petitioner.Although the incident occurred
when ABAD was not working anymore the inescapable fact remains that said
employee would not have been situated at such time and place had he not been
required by petitioner to do overtime work. Moreover, since petitioner adopted
the evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latters employer, inveigle itself
from the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by the records of the case, which
it failed to refute.
We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding
some alleged procedural lapses in the petition.
Private respondents contention of petitioners violation of Section 11 of Rule
13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure holds no water.
Section 11 of Rule 13 provides:

SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. -- Whenever practicable, the
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except
with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not
filed.

The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of
Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of the petition. Thus,
there has been compliance with the aforequoted provision.
 As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section 4
of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates required to be stated in the
petition are the following: (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject of the petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of
the motion. Contrary to private respondents claim, the petition need not indicate
the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and the filing of a
motion for extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the
material dates required under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also
stated in the first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for extension of
time to file the petition.
Now on the merits of the case.
The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner
CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable
for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or
industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply.
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the
fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the
employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence
of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.[5]
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is
applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to
employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The
fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the
service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth
paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of
their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer
coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the
employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were
acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in
the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly,
employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are
beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within
the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was
engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators[6] and banks.[7] The Court
of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code to this case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees
within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the
employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to
hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the
employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee.[8]
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner
CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within
the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the
Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This
rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded
on speculations, surmises, or conjectures.[9]Such exception obtain in the present
case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that
since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his
duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within
the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other reason invoked by
the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for
ABADs negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD
was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor
vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not
incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner
CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties;
petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff,
upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense.[10]
 Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently
established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of
the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name
of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and
had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner.
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete
answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in
his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability
upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction; but rather, the
result varies with each state of facts.[11]
In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[12] this Court
had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the employees
assigned tasks includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damages.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the
driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his
assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the
time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with
liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was
operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers
liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of
an employers motor vehicle:

I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going
from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a
meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence
of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by
using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to
reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties
supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his
employment while so driving the vehicle.[13]
 II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a
personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his
employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other
than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is
needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even
though he uses his employers motor vehicle.[14]
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit
from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the
employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably,
spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employees duties require him
to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and
from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him
with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has
been called the special errand or roving commission rule, under which it can be
found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually
reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the
scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle, the
employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the
employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a
personal errand of his own.

III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters
personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the
employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use,
even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle
will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there
is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal
purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return
trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has
not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees
negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. [15]
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction
albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle
of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the
employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or
merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the
employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his
employers business or within the scope of his assigned task.[16]
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioners office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter,
he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seven
kilometers away from petitioners place of business.[17] A witness for the private
respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmea is a lively place even
at dawn because Goldies Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people
were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the
place.[18]
At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in
question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified that at
the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then
shouted: Daddy, Daddy![19] This woman could not have been ABADs daughter,
for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured
in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way
beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime
work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it,
was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had
no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a
manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form
of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of
the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a
service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of
vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its
vehicle.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that
petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for the
damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO
PINEDA, defendants-appellees.

Angel A. Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for defendants-appellees.

AQUINO, J.: ñé+ .£ª wph!1

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure questions of law from the
order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, dismissing their complaint against Archimedes J.
Balingit.

The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an action based
on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the manager of an establishment contemplated in article
2180 of the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).

In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove
recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the
bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of
earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's
employer.

Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and
the bus driver had no cause of action against him. As already stated, the lower court dismissed the
action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver appealed.

The Civil Code provides: têñ.£îhqw â£

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
 there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible

for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)

The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the terms "employers" and
"owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" (dueños o directores de un establicimiento
o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the
manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage arose.

We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version)
is used in the sense of "employer".

Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened
on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident
already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his
employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la responsabilidad subsidiaria establecida
en el num 3.0 del (art.) 1903, el director de un periodico explotado por una sociedad, porque cualquiera que sea su jerarquia y aunque
Ileve la direccion de determinadas convicciones politicas no por eso deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de la Empresa"
(Decision of Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6, 1912 cited in 12 Manresa, Codigo Civil Español 5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia
Juridica Española 992).

The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue which was not
alleged in their complaint. They argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business
conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife
had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their subscription, while the other incorporators,
namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.

That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in the lower court. The case
has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses.

The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was raised
in the lower court and which is within the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of
Court).

When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal because, to permit him to do so,
could be unfair to the adverse party (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur. 1äw phï1.ñët

190 SCRA 477 – Labor Law – Labor Standards – Human Resources Development – Torts
– Section 14, Rule X, Book III, IRR (Labor Code)
NOTE: This case reversed Filamer vs IAC (October 16, 1990)
Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute. He was assigned
as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of
the school president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service driver. On
October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned
to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch
the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually
go home together. Funtecha had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s
seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his
hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action
based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the
tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180
which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the
decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR,
working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-
employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was
due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being
the school janitor. The CA denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with
Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this
time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions
on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way
affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the
provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of
the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person
during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school
itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between
an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for
damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-
employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to
void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s
position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the
act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the school because
this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the
fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial
duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that
there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his
capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and
POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., respondents.
Bedona & Bedona Law Office for petitioner.
Rhodora G. Kapunan for private respondents.

DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the
decision rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the appellate court’s conclusion that there exists an
employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The
Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the
grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be
directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who,
under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner.
The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the present case call for
the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of
the petitioner. The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party
shall have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the
incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit
of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride
without the knowledge of the school authorities.
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial court and the
appellate court, the Court reconsiders its decision. We reinstate the Court of Appeals’
decision penned by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C.
Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Applying Civil Code provisions, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court decision which ordered the payment of the P20,000.00 liability in the
Zenith Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages, P4,000.00 litigation and
actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney’s fees.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar
of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was
assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school
day.
Having a student driver’s license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was
allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It
is significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the
school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed
free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a
sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79)
According to Allan’s testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that
they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the
Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his
lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha
followed his advise to swerve to the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.)
in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-
school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after
driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then
drive home using the same vehicle.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and
Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan’s job
demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the
morning of the next school day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the
jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the
school president also had knowledge of Funtecha’s possession of a student driver’s license
and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan’s house,
Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of
his enjoyment or for a “frolic of his own” but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was
intended by the petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577,
80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v.
Fieldmen’s Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained
to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and
in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility
by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause “within the
scope of their assigned tasks” for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an
employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the
employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a
presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or
not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his
master’s business. (Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v.
Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the
petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on
conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the
manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what records
should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working
scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as
compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and
wages, is concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor.
The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person
during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school
itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between
an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for
damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-
employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to
avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual
obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person “whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over (him).” (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for
a driver’s position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the
benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not
acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of
rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed
to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over
its employees Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations
through his employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix
Construction, v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987])
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for
in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their
employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and
guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if
one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from
authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has
failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its
vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled
manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768,
772 [1918]). In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the
vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263
[1976]; Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176
SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989];
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer
is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse
against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a
party defendant in the civil case for damages. This is quite understandable considering that
as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was
Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the
school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without
simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor
doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short while. For the purpose of recovering
damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private
respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship
between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act
not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of his
employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been
satisfactorily demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is
hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court
decision is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.

FELICIANO, J:

In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During
the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving
his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street,
when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump
truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was
parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person
facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming
traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-
called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump
truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular
driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early
the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left
but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio
suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which
Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and
Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due
rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and
ordered the latter:

(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for hospital bills and
the replacement of the lost dentures of plaintiff;

(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected
income for plaintiff brought about the accident in controversy and which is the result
of the negligence of the defendants;

(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as moral damages
for the unexpected and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a
marketing man; mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious anxiety, social humiliation,
besmirched reputation, feeling of economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and
frustration in life experienced by plaintiff and his family since the accident in
controversy up to the present time;

(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as damages for the
wanton disregard of defendants to settle amicably this case with the plaintiff before
the filing of this case in court for a smaller amount.

(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00 due as and for
attorney's fees; and

(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)

Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R. No.
65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages to the following
extent:

1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced

to P6,460.71, the latter being the only amount that the appellate court
found the plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;

2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was

reduced to P100,000.00, basically because Dionisio had voluntarily
resigned his job such that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his
loss of income "was not solely attributable to the accident in
question;" and
 3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the
appellate court as excessive and unconscionable and hence reduced
to P50,000.00.

The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as

attorney's fees and costs remained untouched.

This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for review.

Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact relating to the
manner in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna Street on the basis of which both
courts drew the inference that there was negligence on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver,
and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note,
however, that both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the
true legal and proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been
parked but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed
into the dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court in its questioned decision casually conceded
that Dionisio was "in some way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio's
negligence and made no further mention of it. We have examined the record both before the trial
court and the Intermediate Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the record
sufficient evidence on the basis of which the trial court and the appellate court could have and
should have made findings of fact relating to the alleged reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his
car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the
manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient
cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. The need to administer
substantial justice as between the parties in this case, without having to remand it back to the trial
court after eleven years, compels us to address directly the contention put forward by the petitioners
and to examine for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence which must bear
upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.

There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent
Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was
driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had
purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those
headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was
intoxicated at the time of the accident.

As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found on the
person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car. Phoenix's evidence
here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the
Makati Medical Center for emergency treatment immediately after the accident. At the Makati
Medical Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along with the contents of
pockets together with Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the
trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two years
after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, which was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was to the effect that
private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or period of
effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass
during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. The
relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other related issues: whether
Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and
possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night — both the trial court
and the appellate court were completely silent.

The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene
of the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police station where he was based being
barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of
the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights
on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30
kilometers per hour and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna
Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. 3

Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay and did not fag
within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not
acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to
any duty to do so. Private respondent's objection fails to take account of the fact that the testimony
of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but
rather as part of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule
consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling
in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and
hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective
thought. 6

We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object
in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective,
reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman
Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the
trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it
did not, as it could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at winch
Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.

A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or whether his
headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The Intermediate Appellate
Court expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the intersection but
was non-committal as to why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut
off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in
the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the
intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered
by private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment,
these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded
in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.

A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The
evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent
Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati
Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the
admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that
night. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under
the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless
imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken
and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are
also aware that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster
than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked
askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel.
That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand
and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different
manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and
that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the
accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are
drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we
are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We
note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which
the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and
Keeton make this quite clear:

Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active
"cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If
the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage
possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important
part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the
result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills
gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has
done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk
which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even
the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to
another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where
the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of
apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the
risk and the character of the intervening cause. 9

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck
and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not
been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street
and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to
the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as
an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver
had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private
respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck
driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to
cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from Professor
and Keeton:

Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary

human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has
reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the
defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be
required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later wig
spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to
prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material
exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source.
... In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's
conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists
in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.

Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a
substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the
plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the
scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite
generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not
supersede the defendant's responsibility.

Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual
weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or
rain, or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on
the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; ...

The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable
negligence of others. ... [The standard of reasonable conduct may require the
defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of
the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a
defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where
the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the
plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who
parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it. --- 10

We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate
and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory
here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio
had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having
failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine
of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate whether,
or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to
do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15

Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law
matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do
not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose
negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That
task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to
imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of
the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such
act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore
his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the
unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid
the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this
proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must
respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-
delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of
society.

Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer Phoenix 16in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly
in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck
driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to
show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an
affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private
respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we
believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages
awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and
costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who
shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by
the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced
award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate
amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent
Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
157 SCRA 757 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Application of Laws – Publication of Laws –
Publication of Supreme Court Decisions in the Official Gazette
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the
death of Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but
that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s
counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to
the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable
because said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It
is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as
the SCRA and law journals.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as
required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did
not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still
resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view
of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by
the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987,
a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987,
the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate
court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October
27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when
it denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied
the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en
banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be
filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R.
No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to
restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986
of the Court’s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as
yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within
the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No.
73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners’ motion for extension of time was filed on
September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30,
1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length
of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the
Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of
their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within
the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active
law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the trial court’s decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil
Code, which provides that “the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the “last
clear chance” to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
of “last clear chance,” which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this
case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Article 2180 – Liability of Schools of Arts and Trades and
Academic Schools – Liability of Teachers and Heads of School
In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the
school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora.
Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
because of the school’s negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of
boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it
averred that when the incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora
argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to
complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts
and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last
paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to
the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade
and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools,
academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not
be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be
directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-
academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer administration over their students
than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the
tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends
or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the
school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within
its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of
the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over
the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the
ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the
discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid
subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of
a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was
no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the
direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held
subsidiarily liable too.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A.
YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA,
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners ,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR
LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO
DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN,
and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement
exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends
receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it
turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13,
1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos,
a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations
and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim’s parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal,
the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students,
through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the
plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning
capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees . 3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed
and all the defendants were completely absolved . 4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at
the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the
necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on
April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate.
On the implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as
a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private
respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their
custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider
important because of an earlier incident which they claim underscores the negligence of the
school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that
on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an
unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking
any further action . 6 As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired
the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had
been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it had not
been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the
gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180
which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The
pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted
provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v.
Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at
bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a
Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. After
the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it
turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of
double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action filed against them,
his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article
2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29, 1957, exculpated
the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was
not a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla
and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who should
be held liable under this rule. Liability, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and
(2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause “of
establishments of arts and trades” should apply only to “heads” and not “teachers.”
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a
classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon
City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages. Through Justice
Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued
that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and trades.
Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this “contemplates a situation
where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents.” Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take
part but the other members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30,
1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a
classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although the
wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not boarding in the school, the head thereof
and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through
Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article — “so long as (the students) remain in their custody” —
means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to
attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school,
as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age were
covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and subject to
its discipline. Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining the custody
interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed
by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes’ dissent in the Exconde
Case but added that “since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school, the
question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have
to await another case wherein it may properly be raised.”
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly
impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not
a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein have
also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments
which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student
is supposed to be “in its custody.”
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that
the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.
Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for
the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments
of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts
of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis “teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and “heads of
establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices.”
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and
trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them insofar
as concerns the proper supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously
contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do
not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons, so long as they are in a position to
exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase “teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades” used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the
words “arts and trades” does not qualify “teachers” but only “heads of establishments.” The
phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms “preceptores y artesanos” used in
the Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art.
1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places
the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very
reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with
the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there
is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever
the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado
Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts
and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort were
committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school
head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the academic
school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school
would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There does not seem
to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic
in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the
injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result
of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by
any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should
not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school
where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case
of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof
instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school
of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a
master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and influence.
By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and
exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly
dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a
vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted
for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer
ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of
the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must
be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature,
taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive
with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as
contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the
injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the
case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises. In the view of
the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not
yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only
upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and
thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon
the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be
satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers,
clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary
authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of
its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed,
even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the
company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities
under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his
students’ torts, in practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child
when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time
of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does
not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted
on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the
injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if
the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority
could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall
directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school
itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but
then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of
a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which
also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when
he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of
minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher
is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the
student’s age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head of
the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180
treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his
dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under this
article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause violence
and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it
should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the school that will be held
directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to
be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its
employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers
and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils
pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In
almost all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of an
adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon the
students. This should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to
prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to
hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they are in
the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is
disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the
parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can
expect more obedience from the child because the latter’s dependence on him is greater
than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child’s
support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher’s influence, besides being
coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the students’
desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child than the
teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort
committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice
even if he is already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor — then there
should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less accountability
as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the
parent himself is no longer liable for the student’s acts because he has reached majority
age and so is no longer under the former’s control, there is then all the more reason for
leniency in assessing the teacher’s responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities
of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally
ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment
or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his
friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought
him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because
none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising
only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence
exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus
immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the
teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had
gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the
physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo’s killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon
was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the
rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when
the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or
required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was
still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the
tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in
enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved
that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held
liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not
necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated
and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners’ son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the
offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such
custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by
Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter’s death at the auditorium of
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here related, we
nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their
grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
 Salvosa v. IAC

G.R. No. 70458 [October 5, 1988]

Facts of the Case:

Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an institution

of arts and trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department
offering Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well
as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses.

Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio

Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not
being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as well as
orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of
the BCF.

On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon
shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the
BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and
convicted of the crime of Homicide.

Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B.
Abon and the BCF .

Issue:

WON BCF is subsidiarily liable.

Ruling of the Case:

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are liable for “damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” The rationale of
such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher,
the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called
upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.” Likewise, “the
phrase used in [Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time.” Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at
attendance in the school,” or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held
solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988

BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO,
VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents.

Edilberto B. Tenefrancia for petitioners.

Leonardo L. Cocjin Jr. for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the
decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 7 December 1984, in AC-G.R. No. CV 69876, in so far as it affirmed the
decision 2 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court), which held, among others, petitioners solidarily
hable with Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.

The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court and adopted by reference by the respondent Court,
are:

... Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution ... [However], it is also an
institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised itself, as its own evidence shows. Its brochure (Exh.
2) shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offer Communication,
Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive
Mechanics courses... these courses divest BCF of the nature or character of being purely or
exclusively an academic institution. 3

Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. 4 The ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), pursuant to Department Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department of Education and
Culture, 5 is provided by the BCF an office and an armory located at the basement of its main
building. 6

The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. 7 As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an
employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, 8 as well as orders from Captain
Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent
Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP. 9 Jimmy B. Abon
was also a commerce student of the BCF. 10

On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon
Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from
the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. 11 As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon
was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. 12

Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto
C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF),
Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of
Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party
defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B.
Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private
respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death of Napoleon Castro, (b)
P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, (c) P5,000.00 as moral
damages, (d) P6,000.00 as actual damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs; (2)
absolving the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of
merit. 13 On appeal by petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of the
Trial Court. The modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and increasing the
indemnity for the death of Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

The central issue in this case is whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of
Jimmy B. Abon.

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments
of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the
student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
[student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time." 15

In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was stin in the protective and supervisory custody
of the Baguio Colleges Foundation when he shot Napoleon Castro, the respondent Court ruled that:

it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the
shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening; but considering that
Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he
must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was
just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within
the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case,
supra. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"
thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school,"
contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still
remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within
which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. 18 Likewise,
the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute
"attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.

Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been
"at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit
Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory]
well guarded." 19 Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the
school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable, this
circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the armorywith definite
instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.

Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, a school which offers both
academic and technical/vocational courses cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a student
enrolled only in its academic program; however, considering that Jimmy B. Abon was not in the
custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such
other issue. 20

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds petitioners
solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act in the killing of Napoleon Castro. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE, SR. G.R. No. 182353

JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and
ROSALINDA TABUGO, Present:
Petitioners,
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
 NACHURA,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his Promulgated:

father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA,
Respondent. June 29, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in toto the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in Civil
Case No. Q-95-22889.

The facts, as found by the CA, follow:

On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph
Colleges [SJCs] premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson Val
Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of
sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner]
Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of
[petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jaysons] class is x x x Estefania Abdan.

Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the
middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one
of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into
the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one
of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson].
At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several
particles of which hit [Jaysons] eye and the different parts of the bodies
of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jaysons] eyes were
chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo
surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in]
the lower court, [Jaysons] wound had not completely healed and still had
to undergo another surgery.

Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances,
[Jaysons] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for
which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary
from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least P40,000.00.

Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to
[petitioners] fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence
incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for
moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter to [petitioners] for
the payment of his medical expenses as well as other expenses incidental
thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was constrained
to file the complaint for damages. [Petitioners], therefore, should
likewise compensate [Jayson] for litigation expenses, including attorneys
fees.

On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and
Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the school
year 1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30 in the afternoon,
the class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was conducting a science
experiment under the guidance and supervision of Tabugo, the class
science teacher, about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings by
combining these elements in a test tube and heating the same. Before the
science experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were
given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the
experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated compound
had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient age and
discretion and completely capable of understanding the English language
and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for the heated
compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the
experiment and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such
instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked at the compound,
 which at that moment spurted out of the test tube, a small particle hitting
one of [Jaysons] eyes.

Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and
thereafter transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center for treatment. At the
hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to
his teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube
until the compound had cooled off.

After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an
eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected. In
order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in [Jaysons]
discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jaysons] father, requested SJC to
advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing [Jaysons] hospital bill
until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC
acceded to the request.

On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through

counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the
medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred
further arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. In a
letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr.
Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the
demand because the accident occurred by reason of [Jaysons] failure to
comply with the written procedure for the experiment and his teachers
repeated warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less
look into, the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has
cooled.[3]

Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jaysons father, on Jaysons
behalf, sued petitioners for damages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of [Jayson] and against [petitioners]. This Court orders and holds
the [petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay [Jayson] the
following amount:

1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of P77,338.25 as actual

damages; However, [Jayson] is ordered to reimburse
[petitioner] St. Joseph College the amount of P26,176.36
 representing the advances given to pay [Jaysons] initial
hospital expenses or in the alternative to deduct said
amount of P26,176.36 from the P77,338.25 actual damages
herein awarded by way of legal compensation;

2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as mitigated

moral damages;

3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as

reasonable attorneys fees;

4. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously adverted to, the
CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the

RTC of Quezon City, Branch 221 dated September 6, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against [petitioners].[5]

Undaunted, petitioners appealed` by certiorari to this Court, adamant that the CA

grievously erred, thus:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF JAYSONS INJURY
WAS HIS OWN ACT OF LOOKING AT THE HEATED TEST TUBE
BEFORE THE COMPOUND HAD COOLED IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR TO THE
EXPERIMENT.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT, IN

LIGHT OF THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ST. MARYS COLLEGE V.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS, x x x JAYSONS CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING INTO THE TEST TUBE WAS IN FACT
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FOR WHICH THE
PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE.
 III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF PROOF TO SUPPORT THE SAME.

IV. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING

MORAL DAMAGES TO [JAYSON].

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO [JAYSON].

VI. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING

THE PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM.[6]
We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts that
petitioners were negligent since they all failed to exercise the required reasonable
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students.

Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are
considered conclusive between the parties.[7] A review of such findings by this
Court is not warranted except for highly meritorious circumstances when: (1) the
findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) a lower courts inference from its factual findings is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of
the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the
findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which
they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by
evidence on record.[8] None of the foregoing exceptions which would warrant a
reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance.
Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was his own
negligence in disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo prior to the
experiment and peeking into the test tube. Petitioners invoke our ruling in St.
Marys Academy v. Carpitanos[9] which absolved St. Marys Academy from liability
for the untimely death of its student during a school sanctioned activity, declaring
that the negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of
the accident.
We are not convinced.

Contrary to petitioners assertions, the lower courts conclusions are borne out by the
records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to Jayson was the sudden and
unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The
assailed Decision of the CA quotes with favor the RTC decision, thus:

In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson]

was the proximate cause of the latters injury. We find that the immediate
cause of the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he
curiously looked into the test tube when the chemicals suddenly
exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected
explosion of the chemicals independent of any intervening cause.
[Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher
degree of care, caution and foresight. The court a quo correctly ruled
that:

All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for
negligence because all of them are responsible for
exercising the required reasonable care, prudence, caution
and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students.
The individual [petitioners] are persons charged with the
teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the
supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the
facts presented before this Court, these [petitioners] were
remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of
vigilance expected of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class
undertook the science experiment although [Jayson]
insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No
evidence, however, was presented to establish that
[petitioner] Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole
duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the ordinary
course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the school
clinic for immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject
teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court
is inclined to believe that [petitioner] subject teacher
Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time the
accident happened. The Court is also perplexed why none
of the other students (who were eyewitnesses to the
incident) testified in Court to corroborate the story of the
[petitioners]. The Court, however, understands that these
other students cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson]
is no longer enrolled in said school and testifying for
[Jayson] would incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania
Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in
charge because she exercised control and supervision over
[petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her
obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and that
the science experiment would be conducted safely and
without any harm or injury to the students. [Petitioner] Sr.
Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine
of command responsibility because the other individual
[petitioners] were under her direct control and supervision.
The negligent acts of the other individual [petitioners] were
done within the scope of their assigned tasks.

xxxx

The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family

raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate
it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty
of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers
(despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and
in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and
secured environment for conducting dangerous
experiments. [Petitioner] school is still liable for the
wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had
full information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert
damage and injury to students. The fact that there has never
been any accident in the past during the conduct of science
experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just
preserving the status quo and do away with creative
foresight to install safety measures to protect the students.
Schools should not simply install safety reminders and
distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly,
schools should provide protective gears and devices to
shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
 Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the
school or university itself, although an educational
institution may be held liable under the principle of
RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the
liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or
negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct
and immediate and not conditioned upon the insolvency of
or prior recourse against the negligent employee.[10]

Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the findings of
the RTC, which the CA affirmed.

Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed
her students, including Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look into the
heated test tube before the compound had cooled off. Petitioners would allocate all
liability and place all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student,
herein respondent Jayson.

We disagree.

As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred
during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing
to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the
school, its administrators and teachers.

Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
bestows special parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding
obligation, thus:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities

whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be

liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.

Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and
caution is demonstrated by the following:

1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury
to its students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments conducted by the students during class;

2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students
who conduct experiments in class;

3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically
goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and

4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class
conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson
occurred. In any event, the size of the classfifty (50) students conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor.

Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by

insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class not
to look directly into the heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St.
Marys preclude their liability in this case.
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Marys is not in point. In that case, respondents
thereat admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the
accident was a mechanical defect and not the recklessness of the minor, James
Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We held, thus:

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. x x x.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It
was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who
had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence
of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep.[11]

In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap
which happened during the science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its
officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury and damage
equates to neglect in exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools,
its administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of the
damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Marys, for petitioner [St.
Marys Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.[12]

As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we see no need to disturb the

lower courts identical rulings thereon:
 As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of [Jaysons] injury was the
explosion of the heated compound independent of any efficient
intervening cause. The negligence on the part of [petitioner] Tabugo in
not making sure that the science experiment was correctly conducted
was the proximate cause or reason why the heated compound exploded
and injured not only [Jayson] but his classmates as well. However,
[Jayson] is partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be
entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise bear the
consequences of his own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be
held liable only for the damages actually caused by their negligence.[13]

Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts
award of actual and moral damages, and grant of attorneys fees. The denial of
petitioners counterclaim is also in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]

ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and

LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II,
JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The Case
 The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals as
well as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages
arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a
campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.

The Facts

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses
William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James
Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.

On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered
its decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the

following manner:

1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs
William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:

a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of

Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by
plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages;
and to pay costs.

2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada
Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated
in the event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;

3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort
and who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is
ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against
defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His
counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby
DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).

From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St.
Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year
1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from
where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy,
Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful
day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep
owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and
a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner
and as a result the jeep turned turtle.

Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.[2]

In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the
actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.[4]
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.[5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]

The Issues

1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against
the petitioner.

The Courts Ruling

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

 The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that
petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged
in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers.[9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. [11]

In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words,
the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter
in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of
the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.[12]

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of
the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel
II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident
was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of
Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the
deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic
investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the
steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
 Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family
Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall
be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James
Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva,
grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the
jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be
pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy
was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury,
there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.

The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.[13]

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over
which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause
of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. [14] In this case,
the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of
the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent
Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages
is the exception rather than the rule.[15] The power of the court to award attorneys fees
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification.[16] Thus, the grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was
respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held
that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. [17] Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that
the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court
for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys
Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., in the result.

258-A Phil. 612

CRUZ, J.:
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she
died because she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied
this, claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the
Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the
court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us.
They ask us to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to
reinstate that of the trial court.
On July 29, 1975, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father
of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the
Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated
wounds on the forehead"[1] and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio
Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week
later due to "vomiting of saliva."[2] The following day, on August 15, 1975,
the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.[3]
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils
were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and
eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting
that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame
animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After
trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint.[4]
The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was
appealed.[5] It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the
dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for
the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result
of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the
appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in
the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for
medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the
owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet
been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the
logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held
responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's
heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the
possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question,
regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or
be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come
from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole,[6] a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored
him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for
damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the
caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one,
including himself.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house
is hardly credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father
were related to him ("one way or the other") and maintained themselves
out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which, however,
she did not elaborate).[7] She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives
who had stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not
appear to be close kin.[8] She at least implied that they did not pay any rent,
presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding
that she herself did not seem to know them very well.
There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house were boarders
(or more of boarders than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing
them with meals and accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil
had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in
the said house for its occupants.[9] Her mother, Pacita, who was a
nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were
maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a
dog.[10] Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder
and that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business
purposes.[11] And although Purita denied paying the water bills for the
house, the private respondents submitted documentary evidence of her
application for water connection with the Cebu Water District, which
strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question.[12]
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still
part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her
husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was
the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care
of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own
house.[13] Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family
regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one
witness,[14] and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own
daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was
bitten by the dog.[15] The dog itself remained in the house even after the
death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in
question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist
the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew
them only casually.[16]
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors
of the dog that bit Theness, there was no clear showing that she died as a
result thereof. On the contrary, the death certificate[17] declared that she
died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for
which she had been previously hospitalized.
The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the
causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death
except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of
rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-
pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of
rabies.
That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is
established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:
I think there was mention of rabies in the report in
COURT:
the second admission?

Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I

referred to Dr. Co earlier in the morning and then the
father, because the child was asking for water, the
father tried to ¦ give the child water and this child
A:
went under the bed, she did not like to drink the water
and there was fright in her eyeballs. For this reason,
because I was in danger there was rabies, I called Dr.
Co.

Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?

A: Yes, sir.[18]
As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the
following to say under oath:
Now, as I said before, broncho-pneumonia can result
from physical, chemical and bacterial means, x x x It
A: can be the result of infection, now, so if you have any
other disease which can lower your resistance you can
also get pneumonia.

xxx xxx xxx

Would you say that a person who has rabies may die
Q:
of complication which is broncho-pneumonia?
 A: Yes.

For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown

the witness is known as CURRENT DIAGNOSIS &
TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon
Q: Margen and Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your
attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book under the
title "Rabies." There is on this page, "Prognosis" as a
result of rabies and it says:

Once the symptoms have appeared death inevitably

occurs after 2-3 days as a result of cardiac or
respiratory failure or generalized paralysis.

After a positive diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a

suspected animal if the animal cannot be observed or
if the bite is on the head, give rabies vaccine (duck
embryo). Do you believe in this statement?

A: Yes.

Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies

Q: may die of respiratory failure which leave in the form
of broncho-pneumonia?

Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of

A:
rabies.[19]
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link
between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been
satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada,[20] that the death certificate is not
conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed,
the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she
died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a
different cause of death.
The petitioners' contention that they could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil
Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost"
and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as
the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by
the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but
covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at
the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might
have done to the animal.
It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an
implied rejection of their original posture that there was no proof that it
was the dog in their father's house that bit Theness.
According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil
Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of
the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage
which such animal may cause.[21]
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary
awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which
are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no
recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they
have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to
which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified.
The petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grino-Aquino, and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.
Heirs of Miranda v. Pablo Miranda G.R. No. 179638, 08 July 2013.
[DEL CASTILLO, J.]
FACTS:
Petitioners’ Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance was decided by the RTC against
their favor on August 30, 1999. Without any appeal, the Decision became final and executory. On
December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution but was not implemented. On July 8, 2005,
respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a “Break-Open and Demolition Order” in
order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five years have elapsed from
the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in its Order dated
August 16, 2005. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which
was granted.
On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by respondent on the
ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory. Petitioners, in turn,
moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, insisting that respondent’s
opposition is without merit. Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of
Appeal in its Order dated October 10, 2006. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus
with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given due course, but was denied on June 14, 2007 for
being filed out of time. Petitioners assert that an action to revive judgment is appealable, and that their
appeal was perfected on time. They insist that the Notice of Appeal, which they filed on the 15th day via
LBC, was seasonably filed since the law does not require a specific mode of service for filing a notice of
appeal. Besides, even if their appeal was belatedly filed, it should still be given due course in the interest
of justice, considering that their counsel had to brave the storm and the floods caused by typhoon “Florita”
just to file their Notice of Appeal on time.

ISSUE:
Was the Notice of Appeal filed on the 15th day via private courier like LBC considered to be belatedly
filed?

HELD: YES.
It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from.Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may
be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of
receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel
for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules.
Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC
timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-
forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;” instead, “the date of
actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.” Records show that the
Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day
beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of
time.
Neither can petitioners use typhoon “Florita” as an excuse for the belated filing of the Notice of Appeal
because work in government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on July 13, 2006, the day
petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was mailed via LBC. And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due
course to the appeal despite its late filing, the result would still be the same. The appeal would still be
denied for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 30, 1999 is already final and executory

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997

NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON MIRANDA, SPS. RICARDO and VIRGINIA DE LA
VICTORIA, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the Regional Trial Court's award of damages to private respondents for the death of
relatives as a result of the sinking of petitioner's vessel.

In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc.
four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife, daughter, son and niece
who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of
the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980.

The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule.

At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in
Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don
Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the
victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents' families were
never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita de la
Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la Victoria,
26.

In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased ticket numbers 74411, 74412,
74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger manifest; and that the Don
Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank that night after being rammed by
the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision, some of the passengers of the
M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private respondents
actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner
further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and competent crew, and
that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.

On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a
compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and
satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC and
the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the trial court to be
binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not join in the agreement.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on February 21, 1991, the dispositive portion of which leads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs, ordering all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs damages as
follows:

To Ramon Miranda:

P42,025.00 for actual damages;

P152,654.55 as compensatory damages for loss of

earning capacity of his wife;

P90,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful

death of three (3) victims;

P300,000.00 as moral damages;

P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total

amount of P634,679.55; and

P40,000.00 as attorney's fees.

To Spouses Ricardo and Virginia de la Victoria:

P12,000.00 for actual damages;

P158,899.00 as compensatory damages for loss of

earning capacity;

P30,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful

death;

P100,000.00 as moral damages;

P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total

amount of P320,899.00; and

P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals1 affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court with modification
—

1. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff-

appellee Ramon Miranda the amount of P23,075.00 as actual damages instead of
P42,025.00;
 2. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff-
appellee Ramon Miranda the amount of P150,000.00, instead of P90,000.00, as
compensatory damages for the death of his wife and two children;

3. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-

appellees Dela Victoria spouses the amount of P50,000.00, instead of P30,000.00, as
compensatory damages for the death of their daughter Elfreda Dela Victoria;

Hence this petition, raising the following issues:

(1) whether the members of private respondents' families were actually passengers of the Don Juan;

(2) whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals,2 finding the crew members of petitioner to be
grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;

(3) whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner's liability; and

(4) whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and
unwarranted.

First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the M/V Don Juan was
sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased tickets
numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati office of petitioner for
Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22, 1980. This was
corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) on which the numbers of the tickets and the names
of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear.

Petitioner contends that the purchase of the tickets does not necessarily mean that the alleged
victims actually took the trip. Petitioner asserts that it is common knowledge that passengers
purchase tickets in advance but do not actually use them. Hence, private respondent should also
prove the presence of the victims on the ship. The witnesses who affirmed that the victims were on
the ship were biased and unreliable.

This contention is without merit. Private respondent Ramon Miranda testified that he personally took
his family and his niece to the vessel on the day of the voyage and stayed with them on the ship until
it was time for it to leave. There is no reason he should claim members of his family to have perished
in the accident just to maintain an action. People do not normally lie about so grave a matter as the
loss of dear ones. It would be more difficult for private respondents to keep the existence of their
relatives if indeed they are alive than it is for petitioner to show the contrary. Petitioner's only proof is
that the bodies of the supposed victims were not among those recovered from the site of the mishap.
But so were the bodies of the other passengers reported missing not recovered, as this Court noted
in the Mecenas3 case.

Private respondent Miranda's testimony was corroborated by Edgardo Ramirez. Ramirez was a
seminarian and one of the survivors of the collision. He testified that he saw Mrs. Miranda and
Elfreda de la Victoria on the ship and that he talked with them. He knew Mrs. Miranda who was his
teacher in the grade school. He also knew Elfreda who was his childhood friend and townmate.
Ramirez said he was with Mrs. Miranda and her children and niece from 7:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m.
when the collision happened and that he in fact had dinner with them. Ramirez said he and Elfreda
stayed on the deck after dinner and it was there where they were jolted by the collision of the two
vessels. Recounting the moments after the collision, Ramirez testified that Elfreda ran to fetch Mrs.
Miranda. He escorted her to the room and then tried to go back to the deck when the lights went out.
He tried to return to the cabin but was not able to do so because it was dark and there was a
stampede of passengers from the deck.

Petitioner casts doubt on Ramirez' testimony, claiming that Ramirez could not have talked with the
victims for about three hours and not run out of stories to tell, unless Ramirez had a "storehouse" of
stories. But what is incredible about acquaintances thrown together on a long journey staying
together for hours on end, in idle conversation precisely to while the hours away?

Petitioner also points out that it took Ramirez three (3) days before he finally contacted private
respondent Ramon Miranda to tell him about the fate of his family. But it is not improbable that it took
Ramirez three days before calling on private respondent Miranda to tell him about the last hours of
Mrs. Miranda and her children and niece, in view of the confusion in the days following the collision
as rescue teams and relatives searched for survivors.

Indeed, given the facts of this case, it is improper for petitioner to even suggest that private
respondents' relatives did not board the ill-fated vessel and perish in the accident simply because
their bodies were not recovered.

Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the
findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court,4 which case was brought for the
death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the proximate cause of the
mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was
equally negligent as it found that the latter's master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing
mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera,
admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This
Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to prevent
the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the ship.

Petitioner Negros Navigation was found equally negligent in tolerating the playing of mahjong by the
ship captain and other crew members while on board the ship and failing to keep the M/V Don
Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank within 10 to 15 minutes of its impact with the
M/T Tacloban City.

In addition, the Court found that the Don Juan was overloaded. The Certificate of Inspection, dated
August 27, 1979, issued by the Philippine Coast Guard Commander at Iloilo City stated that the total
number of persons allowed on the ship was 864, of whom 810 are passengers, but there were
actually 1,004 on board the vessel when it sank, 140 persons more than the maximum number that
could be safely carried by it.

Taking these circumstances together, and the fact that the M/V Don Juan, as the faster and better-
equipped vessel, could have avoided a collision with the PNOC tanker, this Court held that even if
the Tacloban City had been at fault for failing to observe an internationally-recognized rule of
navigation, the Don Juan was guilty of contributory negligence. Through Justice Feliciano, this Court
held:

The grossness of the negligence of the "Don Juan" is underscored when one considers the
foregoing circumstances in the context of the following facts: Firstly, the "Don Juan" was
more than twice as fast as the "Tacloban City." The "Don Juan's" top speed was 17 knots;
while that of the "Tacloban City" was 6.3. knots. Secondly, the "Don Juan" carried the full
complement of officers and crew members specified for a passenger vessel of her class.
Thirdly, the "Don Juan" was equipped with radar which was functioning that night. Fourthly,
 the "Don Juan's officer on-watch had sighted the "Tacloban City" on his radar screen while
the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away. Visual confirmation of radar contact was
established by the "Don Juan" while the "Tacloban City" was still 2.7 miles away. In the total
set of circumstances which existed in the instant case, the "Don Juan," had it taken seriously
its duty of extraordinary diligence, could have easily avoided the collision with the "Tacloban
City." Indeed, the "Don Juan" might well have avoided the collision even if it had
exercised ordinary diligence merely.

It is true that the "Tacloban City" failed to follow Rule 18 of the International Rules of the
Road which requires two (2) power-driven vessels meeting end on or nearly end on each to
alter her course to starboard (right) so that each vessel may pass on the port side (left) of the
other. The "Tacloban City," when the two (2) vessels were only three-tenths (0.3) of a mile
apart, turned (for the second time) 15° to port side while the "Don Juan" veered hard to
starboard. . . . [But] "route observance" of the International Rules of the Road will not relieve
a vessel from responsibility if the collision could have been avoided by proper care and skill
on her part or even by a departure from the rules.

In the petition at bar, the "Don Juan" having sighted the "Tacloban City" when it was still a
long way off was negligent in failing to take early preventive action and in allowing the two (2)
vessels to come to such close quarters as to render the collision inevitable when there was
no necessity for passing so near to the "Tacloban City" as to create that hazard or
inevitability, for the "Don Juan" could choose its own distance. It is noteworthy that the
"Tacloban City," upon turning hard to port shortly before the moment of collision, signalled its
intention to do so by giving two (2) short blasts with its horn. The "Don Juan" gave no
answering horn blast to signal its own intention and proceeded to turn hard to starboard.

We conclude that Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation are properly held liable for gross
negligence in connection with the collision of the "Don Juan" and "Tacloban City" and the
sinking of the "Don Juan" leading to the death of hundreds of passengers. . . .5

Petitioner criticizes the lower court's reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this case
arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was
conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be based on the
allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the record of this case.

The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be true with respect to the merits of
the individual claims against petitioner but not as to the cause of the sinking of its ship on April 22,
1980 and its liability for such accident, of which there can only be one truth. Otherwise, one would be
subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other!

Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court's policy of maintaining stability in
jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (Follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issue.6 In Woulfe v. Associated Realties Corporation,7 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that where substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and
applicable principles declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare
decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill,8 it was held that under the doctrine of stare decisis
a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the
judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: "Stare
decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different."9 Thus, in J.M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other cases
involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title on the principle of "stare decisis et
non quieta movere."

Indeed, the evidence presented in this case was the same as those presented in the Mecenas case,
to wit:

Document Mecenas case This case

Decision of Commandant, Exh. 10 10 Exh. 11-B-NN/X

Phil. Coast Guard
in BMI Case No.
415-80 dated 3/26/81

Decision of the Minister Exh. 11 11 Exh. ZZ

of National Defense
dated 3/12/82

Resolution on the Exh. 13 12 Exh. AAA

motion for reconsideration (private
of the decision of the respondents)
Minister of National
defense dated 7/27/84

Certificate of Exh. 1-A 13 Exh. 19-NN

inspection dated
8/27/79

Certificate of Stability Exh. 6-A 14 Exh. 19-D-NN

dated 12/16/76

Nor is it true that the trial court merely based its decision on the Mecenas case. The trial court made
its own independent findings on the basis of the testimonies of witnesses, such as Senior Third Mate
Rogelio de Vera, who incidentally gave substantially the same testimony on petitioner's behalf before
the Board of Marine Inquiry. The trial court agreed with the conclusions of the then Minister of
National Defense finding both vessels to be negligent.

Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the total loss of
its ship. The issue is not one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that
a shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and
hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner. 15

In Mecenas, this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship
captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel
seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry.
Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for damages to the full extent.

Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents
should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenas case,
the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Under
petitioner's formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43,857.14, while the De la Victoria spouses
should receive P97,714.28.

Here is where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the personal
circumstances of the victims. For that matter, differentiation would be justified even if private
respondents had joined the private respondents in the Mecenas case. The doctrine of stare decisis
works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case. Where the issue involved was not
raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the
decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presently presented. 16 The decision
in the Mecenas case relates to damages for which petitioner was liable to the claimants in that case.

In the case at bar, the award of P300,000.00 for moral damages is reasonable considering the grief
petitioner Ramon Miranda suffered as a result of the loss of his entire family. As a matter of fact,
three months after the collision, he developed a heart condition undoubtedly caused by the strain of
the loss of his family. The P100,000.00 given to Mr. and Mrs. de la Victoria is likewise reasonable
and should be affirmed.

As for the amount of civil indemnity awarded to private respondents, the appellate court's award of
P50,000.00 per victim should be sustained. The amount of P30,000.00 formerly set in De Lima
v. Laguna Tayabas Co., 17 Heirs of Amparo delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, 18 and Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19as benchmark was subsequently increased to
P50,000.00 in the case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 20which involved the sinking of
another interisland ship on October 24, 1988.

We now turn to the determination of the earning capacity of the victims. With respect to Ardita
Miranda, the trial court awarded damages computed as follows: 21

In the case of victim Ardita V. Miranda whose age at the time of the accident was 48 years,
her life expectancy was computed to be 21.33 years, and therefore, she could have lived up
to almost 70 years old. Her gross earnings for 21.33 years based on P10,224.00 per annum,
would be P218,077.92. Deducting therefrom 30% as her living expenses, her net earnings
would be P152,654.55, to which plaintiff Ramon Miranda is entitled to compensatory
damages for the loss of earning capacity of his wife. In considering 30% as the living
expenses of Ardita Miranda, the Court takes into account the fact that plaintiff and his wife
were supporting their daughter and son who were both college students taking Medicine and
Law respectively.

In accordance with the ruling in Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 22 we think the life
expectancy of Ardita Miranda was correctly determined to be 21.33 years, or up to age 69. Petitioner
contends, however, that Mrs. Miranda would have retired from her job as a public school teacher at
65, hence her loss of earning capacity should be reckoned up to 17.33 years only.

The accepted formula for determining life expectancy is 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the
deceased). It may be that in the Philippines the age of retirement generally is 65 but, in calculating
the life expectancy of individuals for the purpose of determining loss of earning capacity under Art.
2206(1) of the Civil Code, it is assumed that the deceased would have earned income even after
retirement from a particular job. In this case, the trial court took into account the fact that Mrs.
Miranda had a master's degree and a good prospect of becoming principal of the school in which
she was teaching. There was reason to believe that her income would have increased through the
years and she could still earn more after her retirement, e.g., by becoming a consultant, had she not
died. The gross earnings which Mrs. Miranda could reasonably be expected to earn were it not for
her untimely death was, therefore, correctly computed by the trial court to be P218,077.92 (given a
gross annual income of P10,224.00 and life expectancy of 21.33 years).

Petitioner contends that from the amount of gross earnings, 60% should be deducted as necessary
living expenses, not merely 30% as the trial court allowed. Petitioner contends that 30% is
unrealistic, considering that Mrs. Miranda's earnings would have been subject to taxes, social
security deductions and inflation.

We agree with this contention. In Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court allowed a
deduction of P1,184.00 for living expenses from the P2,184.00 annual salary of the victim, which is
roughly 54.2% thereof. The deceased was 29 years old and a training assistant in the Bacnotan
Cement Industries. In People v. Quilation, 24 the deceased was a 26-year old laborer earning a daily
wage. The court allowed a deduction of P120,000.00 which was 51.3% of his annual gross earnings
of P234,000.00. In People v. Teehankee, 25 the court allowed a deduction of P19,800.00, roughly
42.4% thereof from the deceased's annual salary of P46,659.21. The deceased, Maureen Hultman,
was 17 years old and had just received her first paycheck as a secretary. In the case at bar, we hold
that a deduction of 50% from Mrs. Miranda's gross earnings (P218,077.92) would be reasonable, so
that her net earning capacity should be P109,038.96. There is no basis for supposing that her living
expenses constituted a smaller percentage of her gross income than the living expenses in the
decided cases. To hold that she would have used only a small part of her income for herself, a larger
part going to the support of her children would be conjectural and unreasonable.

As for Elfreda de la Victoria, the trial court found that, at the time of her death, she was 26 years old,
a teacher in a private school in Malolos, Bulacan, earning P6,192.00 per annum. Although a
probationary employee, she had already been working in the school for two years at the time of her
death and she had a general efficiency rating of 92.85% and it can be presumed that, if not for her
untimely death, she would have become a regular teacher. Hence, her loss of earning capacity is
P111,456.00, computed as follows:

net earning = life x gross less reasonable

capacity (x) expectancy annual & necessary

income living expenses

(50%)

x = [2(80-26)] x [P6,192.00 - P3,096.00]

————

= 36 x 3,096.00

= P111,456.00

On the other hand, the award of actual damages in the amount of P23,075.00 was determined by
the Court of Appeals on the basis receipts submitted by private respondents. This amount is
reasonable considering the expenses incurred by private respondent Miranda in organizing three
search teams to look for his family, spending for transportation in going to places such as Batangas
City and Iloilo, where survivors and the bodies of other victims were found, making long distance
calls, erecting a monument in honor of the four victims, spending for obituaries in the Bulletin
Today and for food, masses and novenas.

Petitioner's contention that the expenses for the erection of a monument and other expenses for
memorial services for the victims should be considered included in the indemnity for death awarded
to private respondents is without merit. Indemnity for death is given to compensate for violation of
the rights of the deceased, i.e., his right to life and physical integrity. 26 On the other hand, damages
incidental to or arising out of such death are for pecuniary losses of the beneficiaries of the
deceased.

As for the award of attorney's fees, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of
P40,000.00 for private respondent Ramon Miranda and P15,000.00 for the de la Victoria spouses is
justified. The appellate court correctly held:

The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the award for attorney's fees.
The award would naturally vary or differ in each case. While it is admitted that plaintiff-
appellee Ramon Miranda who is himself a lawyer, represented also plaintiffs-appellees Dela
Victoria spouses, we note that separate testimonial evidence were adduced by plaintiff-
appellee Ramon Miranda (TSN, February 26, 1982, p. 6) and plaintiffs-appellees spouses
Dela Victoria (TSN, August 13, 1981, p. 43). Considering the amount of work and effort put
into the case as indicated by the voluminous transcripts of stenographic notes, we find no
reason to disturb the award of P40,000.00 for plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda and
P15,000.00 for plaintiffs-appellees Dela Victoria spouses. 27

The award of exemplary damages should be increased to P300,000.00 for Ramon Miranda and
P100,000.00 for the de la Victoria spouses in accordance with our ruling in the Mecenas case:

Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour
that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents
against such behaviour. In requiring compliance with the standard of extraordinary diligence,
a standard which is in fact that of the highest possible degree of diligence, from common
carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law seeks to compel
them to control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to force them to take
adequate care of human beings and their property. The Court will take judicial notice of the
dreadful regularity with which grievous maritime disasters occur in our waters with massive
loss of life. The bulk of our population is too poor to afford domestic air transportation. So it is
that notwithstanding the frequent sinking of passenger vessels in our waters, crowds of
people continue to travel by sea. This Court is prepared to use the instruments given to it by
the law for securing the ends of law and public policy. One of those instruments is the
institution of exemplary damages; one of those ends, of special importance in an
archipelagic state like the Philippines, is the safe and reliable carriage of people and goods
by sea. 28

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification and petitioner is
ORDERED to pay private respondents damages as follows:

To private respondent Ramon Miranda:

P23,075.00 for actual damages;

 P109,038.96 as compensatory damages for loss of
earning capacity of his wife;

P150,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful

death of three (3) victims;

P300,000.00 as moral damages;

P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total

amount of P882,113.96; and

P40,000.00 as attorney's fees.

To private respondents Spouses Ricardo and Virginia de la Victoria:

P12,000.00 for actual damages;

P111,456.00 as compensatory damages for loss of

earning capacity;

P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful

death;

P100,000.00 as moral damages;

P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total

amount of P373,456.00; and

P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Petitioners are further ordered to pay costs of suit.

In the event the Philippine National Oil Company and/or the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation pay or are required to pay all or a portion of the amounts adjudged, petitioner Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. shall reimburse either of them such amount or amounts as either may have
paid, and in the event of failure of Negros Navigation Co., Inc., to make the necessary
reimbursement, PNOC and/or PNOC/STC shall be entitled to a writ of execution without need of
filing another action.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.