3 The Question of Ethno-nationalism in Sri Lanka

The challenge of ethno-nationalism and ethnic political mobilization is being equally

experienced by developed and developing states (Phadnis, Ganguly, 2001). So the projection of
ethno- crisis is visible throughout the globe with a multiple impact due to its intensity in the
mother countries. But the manifestation of ethno-nationalist sentiments and related conflicts vary
throughout the world as per the physical differentiation factors such as geographical location,
religion, language, race, customs, nationality and political identification; decide the type, form
and intensity of the ethno-nationalist feelings in the host countries.

In Europe every separatist movements are based itself on ‘ethnicity’, linguistic or not; this is not
the way, the case in most of Asian countries (Hobsbawm, Kertzer, 1992). The Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are the disintegrated multi-ethnic states in Eastern Europe, with
ethnic conflict within and among many of the new sovereign states (Adam, 1994). In the scene of
post cold war period, the collapse of Yugoslavia is hardly the first or ever the bloodiest instance
of ethnic warfare, seen in the international scenario (Woodward, 2003). So that, it is clear the
violent mode of ethnic turbulence was existed everywhere as a global phenomenon, sometimes it
had dressed with a silent version of ethnic-tensions too. The ethnic conflict in the former
Yugoslav state, resulted thousands of causalities, millions of refugees and it brought a very real
possibility of war spreading to the other parts of Balkans (Gagnon, 1995). It is seen, the countries
of former Yugoslavia still suffer from the legacy of the 1990 war(s), and most seriously it affects
the present and future of social integrity in Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia (Franovic,
2008). So that, one point is noteworthy here that the complete disposal of ethnic tensions from an
ethnic-rooted country is largely challengeable even after the demonstration of a bloody ethnic
war and it causes some times for continual or occasional ethno-centric tenseness as a part of the
political mobilization of the suppressed ethnic-minorities.

Highlighting their own experience in to the rest of the world, Americans generally down grade
the role of ethno-nationalism in politics (Muller, 2008). But the Latin American face is quite
different from this; there the people are linked with the gradual organizing ethnic groups, which
claim political and territorial autonomy. In Venezuela, Bosnia, Peru and Ecuador seen this much
trend largely. Elizabeth Burgos a Venezuelan analyst defines the ‘Venezuelan’ process as
‘national ethno-populism with the neo-fascist face’, a type of racism sponsored by Chavez as a
part of his revolutionist motives (Manrique, 2005). In fact, the Latin American face of ethno-
nationalism was an aftermath to the poor democratic structure stationed there without being
applying proper manifestation in order to address the racial and other ethno-basic factors
rampant there.

Comprising the largest share of ex-colonial states in the world, Africa experienced a bundle of
intra and inter-state conflicts, since independence (Shibru). South Africa has set itself on a course
of racial and national re-union, a civic nation without nationalism based on equal rights for equal
citizens (Adam, 1994). The contributions of Nelson Mandela are beyond the purview of words in
the promotion and protection of the blacks in South Africa, while ethnic conflict was there on the
bases of racial discrimination. It was one of the peaceful conflict management that the ethnic
history had ever seen yet today. In Nigeria, ethno-national organizations epitomize the conflicts
inherent there to seek greater political and economic equalities (Olayode). So that, it is clear that
the organized sub-national groups were the larger motives in Nigeria for their campaigns to gain
needs and wants in the map of ethnic equality. Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999,
there has been growing consideration about the rise of identity politics, most importantly
negative form of identity politics and the denationalization pressures of the state (Uduma, 2013).
This shows the continuing ethno-identity troubles in the dark corridors of Nigeria.

The Asian canvas of ethno-crisis is something different from Europe, in terms of nature and
form. The central Asian countries have been pulled in to a major identity crisis, after the collapse
of USSR. The main complexity faced by them was based on ethnic or religious margins and it
accordingly divided the nations in to various sectors such as ‘Russian- Kazakh’, ‘Tajik-Uzbek’,
‘Muslim-non Muslim etc (Fedorenko, 2012). Besides this internal division, now the central
Asian republics are facing external disturbances also from US, Russia, China and Islamic states,
due to their rivalries to extend their influence in the region. Three main separatist minorities in
South-east Asia are the Moros of the southern Philippines, the Acehenese on the island of
Sumatra in Indonesia and the Thai-Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. They fought in disputes
over ancestral land, socio-economic opportunity, exclusion from participation and lack of
recognition by state. Gradually, members of these minority groups took arms against the state
(Bowman, 2005). In the island of Indonesia, ethno-nationalism has motivated the west Papuan
separatists to defend their political and socio-economic rights (Trajano, 2010). Shortly, south-
east Asia has experienced with a larger amount of ethnic disparities and movements along side,
as an output of various minority measures.

South Asia is one of the few regions which are experiencing high level of ethnic disturbance
(Inayathullah). Among the south Asian countries India is the most notable adversary as it is
considered in terms of various teasing ethnic groups, it includes importantly-Nagas, Mizos,
Kashmiris, Bodos, Assamese, Tripuris and Meiteis (Bukhari and Ahmad, 2013). The serious
ethno-nationalist challenges to India have arisen from the Indian north-east, Punjab and Kashmir.
As a vast country, the mapping of ethnic groups and communities in India has to connect with
two facts: its long civilization convention with thoughts of unity on the one hand and the
recognition of diversities on the other (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2002). North-east India- a dense
region made of seven sub-national states- has historically staged intensive mode of violence,
spreading mostly from ethnic and separatist conflicts (Hassan, 2007). Basically, the social
landscape of the region has been characterized by the deal of ethnic, linguistic and racial
diversity that caused ethnic disturbances and conflict across the individual states of the region
and national boundaries (Zehil, 2008). One of the major issue prevailing/prevailed in the region
is that the tribal people have not been assimilated in the main stream Indian culture nor
integrated in to the national polity due to various reasons such as British policies towards them,
their socio-linguistic and religious specialties and above all, their social structures with tribal
variety made them more or less self-relined and self contained (Inayathullah). Within the region
various tribal groups move dramatically in to the phase of ethnic community such as Mizo or
Meiti community and Naga, with a special ‘identity’ wishing to protect and nurture it by the
needed interventions in the neglecting attitude of the both state and central governments.

The concept of Kashmir nationalism initially began in the early 20th century as a reaction to the
excessive misrule of Dogra rulers, who were seen as foreign and illegitimate (Arakotaram). The
Kashmir crisis expresses a complex combination of religious, nationalist and political factors
which are deeply rooted in history, starting from, the application of British adopted policy-
‘divide and rule’. The result has been a wider range of conflicts that have created in the entire
south Asian region (Navalakha, 2009). Religious nationalism can be seen in the peak of ethno-
nationalist movements in Kashmir. Punjab ethno-nationalism is a combination of religious and
linguistic motives. Punjabi agitation of the 1960s was a quest for a separate Punjab-speaking
homeland. When the central government granted language based states to major linguistic groups
of the country within the federation, due to the State Reorganization Act in 1956; Delhi refused
to give the Punjabi Sikhs demands for a separate state until 1966 (Bakke, 2008), Religious
nationalism is seen in Punjab as a response to Hindu Majoritarianism, intending to protect a
culturally homogenous minority from the violent and hegemonic clutches of majority
(Chandhoke). Unfortunately, the sword of Kashmir crisis is hanging today above the head of the
country, as a crucial ethno-religious sentiment.

Pakistan is a multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society (Laif and Hamza). After the
separation of East Pakistan also, there was no decline in ethno-nationalism in Pakistan
(Inayathullah). As far as Pakistan is concerned, its society has remained Muslim majority, even
though ethnically diverse. Punjabis, Pathans, Baluchis, and Sindhis are the diversified ethnic
communities in Pakistan, having tribal and non-tribal divisions (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001).
The intensity of ethno-nationalism in Pakistan experiences varying degrees. It is very high in
Sindh and relatively low in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where autonomous separatist
tendencies exist (Inayathullah). In numerical terms Baloch remains as the smallest ethnic
minority in Pakistan. Yet its impact is much greater than other ethnic minorities existing there.
The main goals of Baloch national movement include the demands for autonomy, confederation
and secession to irredentism (Phadnis and Ganguly).

Bangladesh has developed its own ethnic problems, as a result of its succession from Pakistan.
Ethno-movements led by the tribal people are the main internal disturbance to the national
integration of Bangladesh, the inhabitants of the Chittagong Hills Tact (CHT) Chakma tribe,
along with other tribal groups had been demanding autonomy and occasionally independence
also (Inayathullah). As one of the most disturbed laps of ethno-nationalist crisis in the south
Asian region Sri Lanka should be passing through a detailed postmortem in the coming phases of
the chapter, as it is the focus of the study. Like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, south
Asia’s other smaller states have also been faced/facing much more ethnic clouts in their
nationalist and democratic journey.

3.1 Understanding Ethnicity, Nationalism and Ethno-nationalism

Ethnicity has been a major subject in the social science for the past several decades. First
appearing in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1972, it has recently become a source of debate in
the field of political economy, where many scholars have investigated the relationship between
ethnicity and ethnic conflict, using economic and political tools of measurement (Green 2006).
The word ethnicity is a new term in the social science comparatively, even though the word
‘ethnic’ has been used in the English language since the mid fourteenth century. Its meaning has
changed radically throughout history: it acquired racial characteristics in the 19th century and was
used in the 20th century U.S as a way to refer to those immigrants of non-northern or western
European descent (Green 2006). So, it is essential to identify the connectedness and the inter-link
between the terms ethnicity, nationalism and ethno-nationalism.

Eller claims that rather than being “a single unified social phenomenon”, ethnicity is actually a
family of “related but analytically distinct phenomena”. Authors like Stuart Hall, Etienne Balibar
and Immanual Wallerstein claim that, ethnicity must be viewed as a plastic and malleable social
construction, deriving its meanings from the particular situation of those who invoke it; it has no
essence and centre and no underlying features or common denominator (Green 2006). As per in
words of Chandra, ethnic groups are fluid and endogenous to a set of social, economic and
political processes.

Nationalism has been one of the great motivating factors of the modern world, yet it lacks a
precise definition. According to Carlton J.H Hayles, nationalism is, “the fusion of patriotism
with nationality and the predominance of national patriotism over all other human loyalties”
(Sivarajah 1996). John Kennedy who differentiated between the nationalism in the West and
Asian nationalism argued that the nationalist in Asia “worked for revival of the traditional virtues
and accomplishments of an Asian society untarnished by the insidious effects of the West
(Sivarajah 1996). Marxists believe that it is a phenomenon peculiar to the capitalist era and
would vanish with the demise of capitalism itself. However, this does not mean that they deny
the existence of a national question (Sivarajah 1996). Thus, the ethno-based sub-nationalist flag
holders too, underline their radical political movements as the pure form of nationalist
movements.
In terms of definition, there is a relationship between nation and ethnic groups that is not found
with other forms of cultural identities (Smith, 2009).So an ethnic nation that expresses
sentiments of loyalty towards the nation, can be said to demonstrate the spirit of ethno-
nationalism. As the sociologist Ernest Gellner has explained, the rise of ethno-nationalism was
not some historic mistake; rather it was propelled by some of the deepest currents of modernity
(Muller, 2008). Ethnic pluralism can be traced back in history, to three main factors: Firstly,
conquest and annexation, secondly, European colonialism and de-colonization and lastly
enormous migration and related movements (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001). By the critical
understanding on the ethnic conflicts, it is clear that the members of ethno-nationalist groups
share a common identity, language, cultural tradition, and kinship ties, they view themselves as
the members of nationality first and state only secondarily.

3.2 Sri Lanka: Basics and Demography

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is a small island republic, covering
approximately 62,000 square km and lying in the Indian Ocean. Colombo, situated on the
western coast of the island is the largest city and the commercial capital of Sri Lanka. Sri
Jayawardenapuram (Kotte) is the administrative capital of the island, located about 16 km east of
Colombo (Sri Lanka Country Report). For the administrative purpose the country is divided in to
8 provinces, 25 districts, and over 300 divisional areas (Abeykoon). The island stretches over
435 km from north to south and 225 km from east to west (Pinto and Samarkoon). Moreover, on
location-wise, Sri Lanka has divided into three major regions: a lowland dry zone in the north
and east, a mountainous region in the central part of the island and a lowland wet zone in the
south and west (Schrikker, 1976).

The demographic sketch of Sri Lanka has caused as an eventful stage for debates and conflicts
there. As per July, 2014 estimate the population of the island reaches 21,866,445 (CIA World
Fact Book). While the urban residents of the island account only for 15 percent of the total
population, the majority of its 21 million people; live in rural areas1. The population grew 8.8
percent from 1994 to 2004 at an average of 1.2 percent per year (Sri Lanka Country Report).
This shows a constant population growth in the island nation, during the last decades.

1
COUNTRY OVERVIEW: SRI LANKA.
Based on 2001 census provincial data, the ethnic diversity of the island measured percentage-
wise. The majority Sinhalese constitutes 73.8 percentage of the total population followed by Sri
Lankan Moors with 7.2 percent, Indian Tamils 4.6 percent, Sri Lankan Tamils 3.9 percent, other
0.5 percent and finally unspecified 10 percent (CIA World Fact Book). As one of the major
provoker of ethnic crisis, religious diversities in Sri Lanka have fixed the tag of religious-
minorities to all, other than the Buddhism. The official religion Buddhist has the larger amount
of followers with 69.2 percent of the population, Muslim 7.6, Hindu 7.1, Christian 6.2, and
unspecified 10 percent (CIA World Fact Book). Language plays a major role in the ethnic
manifestation of conflict-torn Sri Lanka. 74 percent of the total population of the island country
speaks the official and national language Sinhala, Tamil-the national language spoke by 18
percent and other language users constitute 8 percent (CIA World Fact Book). By about 10
percent of the total population English used competently, commonly used in government and
referred to as the link language in the constitution.

3.3 The Pre-independence Ethnic History of Sri Lanka

To understand the ethnic specialties of the post-independent Sri Lankan scene, it is essential to
see the historical sketch of Sri Lankan majority-minority relations emerged during colonial and
pre-colonial periods. The frequent conquests of south Indian Tamil kings since 145BC up to 10th
century have been evaluated by the Sinhalese as the attempts of Tamils to bring the island
country under their control. However the major incident in the pre-colonial scenes of Sri Lanka
was the Elara-Dutta Gamini War in the 2nd century BC. In this rivalry, the Sinhalese King Dutta
Gamini defeated and killed the Tamil king Elara who ruled Anuradhapura from 145 BC to 101
BC (Sivarajah, 1996). This historic success of the Sinhala King in the island state of Sri Lanka
covering the prevailing-challenge of Tamil administrative over-hand there, resulted an entire
shift within the administrative equations and political others of the island state.

Some other scholars concluded that much before the arrival of Sinhalese, the Tamils had settled
in Sri Lanka. In words of Mahavamsa, the Sinhalese were originated in the island with the
arrival of Vijaya and his 700 companions in the 5th century BC, from the various parts of
northern India. Earlier, Buddhism also considered as an Indian contribution to the island, during
the time of Ashoka the Great, his son or brother Mahendra visited the island and converted the
king Devanamapiya Tissa (250-210) BC to Buddhism. With the royal influence Buddhism
spread in the island accordingly (Ghosh, 2003). Based on some other historical records, the
origin of Tamils in Sri Lanka can be traced in to the 3rd century BC earlier than that of the
Sinhalese. As a part the existed commercial contacts between the Sri Lankans and the south
India’s ports attracted the Tamils to come to the island as traders, invaders or peaceful
immigrants, from the early centuries itself (Ghosh, 2003). This historical back-up fueled the
Tamil demands for autonomy and separation of state in the post-independent scene of Sri Lanka.

The first two colonial powers in Sri Lanka, the Portuguese (1597-1658) and the Dutch (1658-
1796) introduced the track of proselytization by Christian missionary organizations. In this
effort, the Roman Catholic missions under the Portuguese become much more success than the
Protestants under the Dutch (Sivarajah, 1996). The common factor that attracted both the
Portuguese and the Dutch was the high quality of Cinnamon, to involve themselves in the
politics of Sri Lanka (Schricker, 1976). The Portuguese wanted to control the commerce of the
island, with the use of its naval power. The Dutch ruled the island longer than that of the
Portuguese did. But they not leave much memory in Sri Lankan soil, especially on the
administrative structure (Ghosh, 2003). Underlining this historic fact, the ethnic identities of the
major communities of the island was strengthened by the British rule (1796-1948) latter. The
British introduced a process of modernization altogether, while utilizing the differences between
the various ethnic communities. In the new economic structure propagated by them, a middle
class emerged there accordingly. This led to an open competition between the middle class of the
Sinhalese and the Tamils, later on this competition; it began to worsen the relations between the
two communities in Sri Lanka (Sivarajah, 1996). There for, this Middle class based competition
among the Sinhalese and Tamils led them in to a complex mode of ethnic-based political elites.

The British had more significant impact on Sri Lanka than the other two colonizers, the
Portuguese and the Dutch. Firstly, the British colonized the coastal regions of Ceylon conquering
it from the Dutch in 1796 and it then captured the whole island by 1815 (Wickramasinghe and
Cameron). They focused mainly on the tea and coffee plantation in Sri Lanka. As a part of this,
they fulfilled their requirements to skill full and indigenous labors for plantation work, from
India, offering them so cheap wages (Wickramasinghe and Cameron). This facilitated, migrating
larger amount of labors from both northern and southern provinces of India in to the coast of the
island. Interestingly, this considerable amount of Tamil immigration in to the coastal zones of the
island state-Sri Lanka as labors facilitated them to gather socially with the Tamils already settled
there. Eventually, the Tamils become as one of the major ethnic identity there in Sri Lanka, in
terms of language and other cultural assimilation.

3.3 (a) Interrogating Socio-Economic Profiles in Ethnic History of Sri Lanka

The grass roots of present ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka were hold tightly during the colonial
period. Colonialism in Sari Lanka had a long history. It continued about four centuries or in other
words until the country became independent in 1948. The western rule in the island nation paved
way to took place some important developments in the socio-economic lives of the inhabitants.
Historically, 16th century onwards, Sri Lanka came under the influence of western colonial
powers. The Portuguese was the first arrived in the island in the colonial period. The era of
Portuguese signed the end of medieval Sri Lanka and began the reel of modern Lanka
(Jayasuriya, 1998). During their short span of rule, the Portuguese could not bring many changes
in the present form of government. They ruled the island, due to the local customs (Sivarajah,
1996). Later on, the Burghers, a new social group came in to existence in the social graph of Sri
Lanka, due to inter-marriages between the Portuguese and the local people (Sivarajah, 1996). A
new language too evolved there, by the interaction of the Portuguese and the Sri Lankans, which
known as Sri Lanka Portuguese Creole. In the present Lanka, the Creole is a limited form of the
spoken language. At present, the major speakers of the language are the Burghers in the eastern
province (Batticaloa and Trincomalee) and the Kaffirs (the people of African origin) in the north
western province (Puttallam). Since the Portuguese era ended, the Creole speakers have been
marginalized due to socio-political changes occurred in the Sri Lankan soil (Jayasuriya, 1998). In
actual sense, these Creole speakers are one of the minor-most ethnic minority; in the current
ethnic map of the island state.

Based on the census data of 1901, the number of ethnic-minority Burghers in the island was 0.7
percent of the population, where as it marked as 0.6 percent in 1946. But in the years since
independence it has lessened dramatically, by 0.3 percent in 1971 and 0.2 percent in 2001.
However it is widely accepted by the intelligentsia that many Burghers have immigrated to
Australia (McGilvary, 2007). In 1908, a dramatic instance happened in the Burghers history,
with the formation of the Dutch Burghers Union of the Ceylon (DBUC). The DBUC
concentrated/concentrating to promote the welfare of the Dutch Burghers, to revive their
language and customs among the members etc (McGilvary, 2007). To propagate and inculcate
the visions and ideologies of the minority-Burghers, they started the Journal of Dutch Burghers
Union of Ceylon (JDBUC) in 1908 and continue even today. Although, the Burghers haven’t any
socio-political significance, in the present ethno-centric political canvas of Sri Lanka.

Tamils are extremely important minority in the social platform of Sri Lanka, they can be divided
at least two distinct groups. Firstly, the Sri Lankan Tamils settled in the north and the east of the
island, today also they are a major linguistic minority; they are the descendents of their migrated
ancestors over 2000 years ago. Secondly, the Indian Tamils-the inhabitants of the south-central
‘up-country’ highlands, when British starts an export-oriented economy based on tea, coffee and
rubber in Sri Lanka their ancestors immigrated largely to the island shore (Little, 2007). But, by
contrast with Sri Lankan Tamils, a major portion of the Indian Tamils are from low cast groups.
Though, the first group of labors from India to work on plantations in Sri Lanka, had been
entered to the island as early as 1818 and by 1830 large numbers entered (Sivarajah, 1996). Most
of these migrated Tamils were the followers of Hindu religion. This is evident from the present
Tamil population In Sri Lanka, most of whom are Hindu with a smaller amount of Muslim
minority.

Buddhism was introduced in Sri Lanka in 250 BC. Before the introduction of Buddhism during
the rule of the king Devanampiya Tissa (250-210 BC), there was no other single influential
religion in the country. The major notable feature of the Buddhist religion of Sri Lanka that it
was a combination of beliefs and practices of the Aryans from India (Perera, 1998). In Sri
Lankan scene there was a huge mutual understanding in between the Sinhalese and Buddhists.
The Sinhalese kings kept providing their mental imprint to Buddhism. All the wars of Sinhalese
kings against the Tamil invaders were fought under the badge of Buddhism. But, this system of
mutual understanding was questioned and ultimately collapsed, with the arrival of European
colonizers. Yet, this re-established largely since the independence of the island. So it is
apparently evident that the ethnic-driven conflicts and the social badges of religious-centric
polarization was not a mere Sri Lankan experience only after the independent ethnic history of
the island state.
When analyzing India’s emotional touch with the Sri Lankan Tamils, it is noticeable that the
establishment of Buddhism in Sri Lanka made an intimacy between the island and northern
India. As a part of these sentiments, several kings of Sri Lanka married Indian Princesses and
granddaughters of the Sakya clan, which follow the Buddhist ideology (Dhammananda). The
influence of Buddhism in governance of Sri Lanka has been different from that of India. In India,
even in the reigns of Buddhist monarchs like Bimbisara and his son Ajatasatru, there was not
much relation in between the political power and Buddhism. But in times of Ashoka’s rule
Buddhism became the state religion. However, in case of Sri Lanka Buddhism was one of the
gearing factors between the political and formal authorities, unlike India (Ghosh, 2003). No other
Buddhist countries had not there, much more mutual cultural linkages, as Sri Lanka had with
India.

Compared to Buddhism, Hinduism played an insignificant role in generating Tamil chauvinism

in the political scene of Sri Lanka. As s minority-religion, Hinduism was never threatened by
Buddhism, in the religious ground of Sri Lanka. But Christian missionaries were a visible threat
it has to face. Though, one of the major challenges that the Hindu Tamil community has to face
from the Sinhalese Buddhists was in the range of social institutions. Because, the pioneer of
Hindu renaissance in the island nation- Arumuga Navalar had focused mainly in orthodoxy, not
in social reform. As a result, the hazards of caste system and the burden of Untouchability also
remained there among the Hindu Tamils (Ghosh, 2003).

The Muslim Moors are an arch religious minority in Sri Lanka, who speak Tamil and practice
Islam. The term ‘Moors’, was given to the Muslim minority of Sri Lanka, by the Portuguese in
the 16th century. They used it to denote Arab Muslim immigrants and their descendents. At the
beginning the Muslims mainly settled in the coastal areas of the island, but subsequently some of
them moved in to the interior. Now most of them (62 percent) live in the south of the country,
among the Sinhalese. The remaining 38 percent settled in the north-east province, the region
claimed by Tamils as their traditional homeland. It should be mentioned that the Muslims had
became a majority even though a religious minority, in the Amparai district of the eastern
province in Sri Lanka, which has the Tamil influence. Later, when the Tamil activism out-broke
in 1980s, most of the Muslims kept aside without supporting them. This was one of the main
reasons, that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), to refuse the Muslim participation in
any of the peace talks on the sword of Sri Lankan ethnic crisis (Imtiyaz and Hoole, 2011).
Furthermore, Muslims were not interested with the ethnic-driven Tamil demand for a separate
statehood and they were attentive too to mingle with the Sinhalese majority in order to attain the
socio-economic and political others of them accordingly. The given elaborate study of the Sri
Lankan religions highlights the basic factors behind the universal intimacy and enmity between
them and it also outlines the scope and significance of religious-galvanized ethnic conflicts in the
island state.

3.4 Ethnic Dichotomy and the Nationalist Movement

The history of nationalism in Sri Lanka can be traced back to the second half of the 19 th century
(Smits, 2011).The English-educated elite class belonging to both the Sinhalese and the Tamils
were the major motivators in the Sri Lankan nationalist movement. But this elite concept of
nationalism was highly inspired by the influence of ethnic identity in which both the Sinhalese
and the Tamils counted one’s advantage as another’s disadvantage. However, this early staged
dichotomy did not caused much debate in politics except in a limited sense. Three kinds of
political associations were formed during this period; communal, provincial and open.
Communal organizations such as the Dutch Burgher Union (DBU) focused to protect the
confined interests of the Burgher community, where as Provincial associations like the Jaffna
Association, consisted of Tamils only highlighted the demands of a defined province. Here it
should be mentioned that, the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) and the Ceylon Social Reforms
Society (CSRS) were among the social societies composed a larger-amount of multi-communal
elites. Therefore, these organizations strongly opposed the idea of communal representation
strongly (Ghosh, 2003). With the fear being marginalized under the majority interests, the
communal consciousness has grown among the minority communities, to become self-sufficient
and to protect their needs and owns. Bur in case of Sri Lanka the situation was something
different. Though less in count, the Tamils had relatively safer positions in the government and
other professions. As a result, the Tamils enjoyed the major positions, even being a minority, in
the absence of dangerous communalist thoughts during the British colonial period.

The notion of ethnic dichotomy was so severe in the island nation by the nationalist movements
led by the Sinhalese Buddhists and the Tamils. Among these nationalist forwards, the Sinhalese
Buddhist movements sowed the seed to emerge the other, Tamil nationalism in the ethnic scene
of Sri Lanka. Actually Buddhism is famous in the name of peace throughout the world.
Although, historically- Buddhism as other religions associated with violent episodes. In case of
Sri Lanka, some Buddhist monks and especially Buddhist political elites highlighted wrongly,
the Buddhist mytho-history to justify the violence. The planned assassination of the Prime
Minister S.W.R.D Bandaranaike in Sep, 1959 is a living example showing the intensity of
Sinhala-Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka (Votta, 2007). As a part of their self-identical motives,
the Sinhala Buddhist took efforts to rescue Buddhism and to save their culture and values. The
Sinhala Maha Sabha played an important role in the promotion of the Sinhala nationalism,
formed by S.W.R.D Bandaranaike in 1936. It became quickly as a political organization, after
being started as a cultural society. The Sinhalese nationalism focused in the traditional, cultural
and religious initiatives of Buddhism, as well as the Sinhalese language (Jayarajah, 1996).

The discriminatory linguistic, educational and economic policies of Sinhalese rulers, in the island
nation promoted the bitter discontent of Tamils against the state and this led to a nearly quarter
century violent ethnic conflict called as “the civil war” between the Sri Lankan government and
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Tamil militants. The roots of Tamil nationalism
could be traced, to the Hindu revivalist movement of the 19th century and the protest movements
during the British colonial rule, such as the Jaffna Association, the Tamil Maha Jana Sabhai, the
Jaffna Youth Congress and the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (Sivarajah, 1996). In the early terms
of the 20th century, many associations together with books, journals and other prominent socio-
political figures contributed much in the promotion of the Tamil nationalist movements in Sri
Lanka. Although the Tamil nationalism in the island nation has emerged earlier, but its growth
had accelerated gradually since its independence in 1948 firstly with the demand for political
autonomy and then it shifted towards an aggressive mode with an appeal for a separate Tamil
state.

3.5 From Majority-Minority Gap to Ethnic Disturbances: Post-Independent Sri Lankan

Scene

Almost all sovereign states of the world have faced/facing the problem of minorities. Many of
the Asian countries have not yet found an ultimate solution to the minority problems through the
political process. The majority-minority conflicts in the south Asian region resulted mainly by
under development and by the burden of colonial and pre-colonial heritages. As I mentioned
earlier, the ethnic complexity of the island nation is shown most importantly in both linguistic
and religious dimensions. In terms of language Tamils is the most important ethnic minority
there in Sri Lanka.

The Tamil minority in Sri Lanka constitute 8.5 percent (Indian Tamils, 4.6 and Srilankan Tamils
3.9) of the total population of the country. However, the Sri Lankan Tamil minority forms a
majority in the northern and eastern parts of the country. They were in a better position in all
spheres of life than Indian Tamils. These Indian Tamils live with the Sinhalese in the central
highlands of the island, cooperating with them. The Sri Lankan Tamils enjoyed good
designations in the time of British colonial rule and till the early 1950s after independence. After
the Sinhalese language was made the official language of the island in 1956 the S.W.R.D
Bandaranaike government, standard positions of the Sri Lankan Tamils declined dramatically
due to the Sinhalese favor-policies made by the government (Sivarajah, 1996). This much
political partiality of the Sinhalese led governments in the post-independent Lankan scenes,
caused for the political mobilization of the Tamils there. It is noteworthy here that, as a contrast
to the early conditions of the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, they become more reliant with political
and economic impetuous than that of the Sri Lankan Tamils after the introduction of the
Sinhalese Only Act in 1956. Actually, this political and economic set back of the Lankan Tamils
was the major motive behind the Tamil demand for political autonomy and the subsequent
separate Tamil statehood.

3.6 Political Mobilization and the Ethno-based Minority Party Politics

Sri Lanka was the first among the British colonies benefited by the track of universal adult
franchise. Due to the expansion of education and the integration of transport and
communications, gradual political mobilization took place dramatically, in the post-independent
Sri Lankan politics. Since independence, it followed a democratic system (1948-77), in a
parliamentary pattern. Then it has changed the parliamentary form of democracy in to an
executive presidency, 1978 onwards (O.T.I, 2013). This continues today also. Competitive
political system of Sri Lanka, after the independence, generated a proper ground for politicians to
employ religion and other ethnic identities for their political purpose. Moreover, the post
independent Sri Lankan party politics showed a gradual rise in the ratio of people participation
within the parliamentary/executive presidency system of the country.

Judging from the performance of the major political parties in Sri Lanka, there can be
little doubt that Sri Lanka has built up a successful electoral system. Especially the
alternations in power by the two major parties- the UNP and the SLFP-since 1956
suggest a degree of political sophistication and maturity of the Sri Lankan voters. This is
evident from the decline of independents and its replacement by the party as a visible unit
in Sri Lankan politics. Furthermore, there has been a steady rise of voting percentage
from 55 in 1947 to 87 in 1977 (Sivarajah, 1996:46, 47).

The symbolic politics based on ethnic sentiments firstly appeared in the political screen of the
island state, in the early parts of 1950s, by the formation of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP),
to oppose the United National Party (UNP) in 1952 (Imtiyaz). The growth of Sinhala-Buddhist
extremism with an ethnic muscle caused to weaken the secular ground of the island state.
Prominent political figures never made serious efforts to discourage these extremist forces; rather
they promoted these forces to win power.

As a result of this growing Sinhala-Buddhist sentiments, the ’Sinhala only’ Act introduced in
1956, by the Bandaranaike government; in which English replaced as the official language of
Ceylon (present Sri Lanka) with Sinhala. The act neglect the Tamil language to give this much
status (Orjuela, 2010). The Tamils reacted boldly with a huge amount of discontent against this
Sinhala Only Act, lining behind the leaders of the Federal Party (F P), the principal Tamil party.
Although, the first political organization formed in the island state, to protect the welfare of the
Tamil minority, was the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) in 1944. The ACTC attempted to
secure constitutional safeguards to Tamils before the independence itself. But, after
independence-the discontent groups with the policies of the ACTC formed the FP in 1949 (Ross
and Savada, 1990). Later, the F P demanded an official status to the Tamil language, as similar to
Sinhala language. The Prime Minister Bandaranaike responded so tricky towards this growing
Tamil mobilization, with a dual stand. On the one hand, he expressed his willingness to go ahead
with the Sinhalese sentiments, while on the other he demonstrated his goodness to accommodate
Tamil demands calmly. As an outcome of continues demands without any compromise, the
Bandaranaike government passed the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act in 1958. As per
the act provisions, Tamil will continue as one of the medium of instruction in schools and
universities, and Tamil has to be used for the purpose of correspondence and for other
administrative purposes in the northern and eastern provinces of the country (Ghosh, 2003).
After the declaration of the act also, the Tamils in Sri Lanka were not much satisfied, because
their argument was not recognized by the government, to upgrade Tamil as a national language.

The major consequence of the Sinhalese-only language policy was that Tamils were denied
access to the legal lessons, and it also reduced their status as citizens with equal access to the
law. As an attempt to limit the aftermaths of this policy, in 1977 Tamil was made as ‘national
language’ and ten years later it was made as ‘official language’ also (Kingsbury, 2012).
However, Sri Lanka’s ethnic divide continued/ continues by then also so complicatedly, wearing
the suites of religion and language; along with the demand to a separate state by the LTTE
militants until the defeat of LTTE in 2009 and later too with a massive political push during the
elections especially.

The preference of the Sri Lankan Tamils was to support the political parties, serving the interests
of the Tamil community. Eventually, they followed a competitive strategy of party politics in the
Sinhalese dominant areas; to feature a community based political mobilization, in those areas.
The fact was that, the majority population of both the Sinhalese and the Tamils were residents of
geographically different areas, has made it impossible for a Sinhala candidate to win in a Tamil
majority constituency and vice versa; because of the deep rooted ethnic emotions among the
people.

Tamils in Sri Lanka, most of them are Hindu but include a Muslim minority too, live mainly in
the north and on the east coast of the island state. Sri Lankan Muslims largely began to involve
in the political movements of the country in the 1970s and 1980s. The two major Muslim
organizations, in the process of political mobilization of the Muslims were the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) and the Muslim United Liberation Front (MULF).The SLMC began as a
social movement in 1981, latter in 1986 it became as a political party. The leaders of the party
did not count that the Tamil struggle for an independent state as an issue for Muslims, being
Tamils (Johansson). This stand of the SLMC with the Tamil fighters for a separate state caused a
number of conflicts between Muslims and the Tamils. The party’s popularity as a political force,
led to violence between the LTTE and the Muslim groups. In 1996, the Muslim-Tamil riot
reached in its peak and approximately 100,000 Muslims were forced to leave their country by the
interventions of the LTTE. As a result of the widespread Muslim conflicts with the Tamils, they
empowered the Muslim identity and the ideology of SLMC. This is clear, in the parliamentary
election held in 1988 the party won four seats, and 29 seats in provincial (eastern) elections.
During 1989-92, the SLME supported the UNP government and the leader of the party Ashraff
received the portfolio of minister, port development, rehabilitation and re-construction. The other
major Muslim political movement in Sri Lanka, the MULF joined the Tamil United Liberation
Front (TULF) and supported their political sentiments, later it merged with it also in 1996
(Johansson). This widen political gap between the Tamil and Muslim political parties continued
with a varied range of fluctuation till the recently held presidential election in Sri Lanka on
January 2015.

The first party in the Sri Lankan party political map, to raise the voice of ‘anti-state sentiments’
was the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (J V P), founded in 1965. The party followed the Marxist-
Leninist-communist ideology as a motive to reach their goals. The party’s major two uprisings
against the ruling governments were held in 1971 (SLFP) and in 1987-89 (UNP). As part of this
violent agenda, in 1971, the party recruited and trained thousands of young militants to launch
the country’s first anti-state movements. This rebellion gathering was quickly suppressed in the
same year itself. However the JVP continued this much violent arrangements further, in the
disturbed ethno-centric political ground of the island nation (Venugopal, 2010). After the
launching of the two anti state insurrections, as mentioned above, the party entered to the mode
of democratic politics, participating in the 1994 parliamentary elections. Latter, the JVP became
as the part of government, joining with the United People’s Freedom (UPF) alliance during the
legislative elections held on April, 2-2004.

The Tamil political mobilization in Sri Lanka reached on its peak, when the Tamil United Front
(UNF) party was formed in 1972. Later it changed his suite as, the Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF), which advocated Tamil political autonomy (PERI). In the first general election
contested by the TULF in 1977, it won. 6.4 percent of the popular vote and 18 out of 188 seats in
the Sri Lankan parliament, including all seats in Northern Province. Throughout 1970s and
1980s, TULF was continuously blamed by the Sinhalese nationalists for its acts of violence
joining with militant group such as LTTE. In fact, the TULF represented a non-militant political
ideology unlike the LTTE. However, during the course LTTE also began to see the TULF as a
rival in its desire; consequently the LTTE has assassinated several TULF leaders. As a Tamil
political party, TULF had won only 0.11 percent of the popular vote and no seats in the Sri
Lankan parliamentary election, held on April, 2010. From the above political analysis on the
minority party politics, it is observable that the actual course of Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka is
an obvious offshoot of the minority-based Tamil political mobilization against the Sinhala-
Buddhist driven nationalist measures.

Tamil Nationalism

The notion of Tamil nationalism evolved as a counter sentiment against the Sinhalese
nationalism. Its foundation had laid by the Hindu revivalist movement of the 19th century and the
pre-independent protest movements held in the ethnic-circle of Sri Lanka. When the notion of
‘nation’, promoting the idea of majority Sinhala people’s interests was developed by the Sinhala
nationalism, Tamil nationalism raised the voice of their own nation-state to promote their culture
and language as a counter hit towards it.

Like the Buddhist revivalist movement in the south, Hindu revivalism was mainly
directed against the Christian missionary activities. The man who single-handedly
spearheaded this movement was Armuga Navalar, a great exponent of Saivite Hinduism,
and a Tamil scholar, who had contributed much to the development of the modern prose
literature and had made modern Tamil culture a living force in the North province. Above
all Navalar was thus able to combine his interest in the religious field with practical
actions that were vital to the community and mingle both socio-politics and religion. This
was a major contribution to the subsequent emergence of Tamil national consciousness in
Sri Lanka (Sivarajah, 1996: 103,104).

Underling the above historical background, it is specifically remarkable that the idea of Tamil
nationalism hold a deeper clutch, when the All- Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) formed in 1944
with its 50-50 demand in the allocation of religious/language based constituencies. Even though,
Tamil nationalism lost its quality and social integrity until the emergence of the F P in 1949. The
F P was a co-product of Tamil nationalism, raising the flag of a separate identity to the Tamil-
speaking people in Sri Lanka (Sivarajah, 1996).

The F P became within seven years the leading instrument for the implementation of
Chelvanayagam’s solution for the Tamil people. He saw his task as building a new
nation, giving the Tamil people a sense of pride in their homeland, and educating them to
rely on their own strengths and not on the favors and caprices of an alien Sinhala
government. He has regarded by the public, Sinhala and Tamil alike, as the Moses who
would lead his people to the Promised Land (Wilson, 1994: 8).

The notion of Tamil national consciousness became stronger aftermath the contributions of
Navalar, as I mentioned earlier, joining with the vibrant political efforts of the F P in the
Northern and Eastern provinces of the island nation.

In Sri Lanka both Tamils and Sinhalese have a diversified cultural heritage which led them to the
formation of distinct nationalist movements, to protect and propagate their “owns”. The Concern
of Tamil language and culture in Sri Lanka, always been affected by the growths in south India.
However, The Sri Lankan Tamils began to show their own individuality, 1950 onwards. Then, it
was claimed by the Sri Lankan Tamils that the Tamil language spoken there, is the clearest form
of the Tamil. They put forward this argument because the Tamil language used in Jaffna
advanced a variant dialect nearer to the written Tamil, due to complete separation from other
linguistic forms. This is an explicit example to the cultural and linguistic differences of the Sri
Lankan Tamils with some other basic similarities with the Tamils in South India altogether.

Later on the concept of Tamil nationalism changed dramatically in the decades of 1970s. Till
1972, the Tamil nationalist ideology was a counter movement of Tamil nationalists, to protect
their rights and concerns from the negligible rule of the Sinhala-motivated governments. But, the
political aspirations of the Tamils in Sri Lanka transformed from autonomy to that of separation
of state, by 1972. As a result of this the discontent Tamils with the government policies, they
resorted to violence without any compromise. Among these violent groups with a Tamil militant
strategy, five groups can be recognized as major contributors in the armed struggle of the island
nation. They are, LTTE, the People’s Liberation Organization (PLOT), The Tamil Eelam
Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)
and the Eelam Revolutionary Organization (EROS) (Sivarajah, 1996). The discussion on Tamil
nationalism and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is meaningless without bringing the LTTE on centre
stage.

LTTE

The Tamil New Tigers (TNT), formed in 1972 was the initial step in the formation of the LTTE.
The youth believed in armed struggle attracted by the TNT, worked against the faulty initiatives
of the Sri Lankan state government and the Tamils who cooperated with the government. Latter,
on May 1976, it renamed as LTTE under the leadership of Veluppillai Prabhakaran (Sivarajah,
1996). Earlier, the emergence of ethno-crisis in the island country was an obvious result of the
failure of a democratic system, in the absence of a dispute settlement and justice formation
system (Nadarajah and Vimalarajah, 2008). Due to this much failure of democratic measures by
the governing bodies of the country, the Tamils changed the mode of protest with a demand for a
separate state from that of political autonomy, under the flag of politico-military strategy
implemented by the LTTE.

The theory and practice of Marxism and Leninism was adopted as the ideology of the LTTE,
believing in the paths of armed struggle to attain their ultimate goals. In 1980, a theoretical frame
has published by the LTTE, to highlight their ideology and strategy for the Tamil liberation. The
politico-military strategy of the LTTE was to foster the national emotion and socialist revolution.
As a part of this, LTTE framed their political and military wings across the Tamil majority areas
of the country. When its military cell engages with fight to attain the national freedom, the other,
its political units initiate in socio-economic segments such as education and employment. “A
single party system would be the mode of political set up, in a socialist state of Tamil Eelam”
(Sivarajah, 1996), this statement of the founder of the LTTE-Veluppillai Prabhakaran shows the
inner core of the pre-framed political intention of their separatist movements.

Equal rights for the all, was announced and inculcated by LTTE without drawing any margin of
division based on gender. But from the decades of 1970 and 1980, it started to recruit and train
women too, to incorporate them as active members and fighters in order to achieve their violent
goals and historically it was one of the first organizations recruited the women to support their
gains and plans, with an argument that this is the only way would be possible to further and
assure their emancipation and socio-political empowerment. Therefore, always a ratio of 30-40
percent of the LTTE cadres was women and they had separate battalions under female
leadership. More than, 4000 women cadres of LTTE have been killed since 1987; including over
a larger amount of Black Tiger’s suicide squad. The noteworthy suicide attacks launched by the
female LTTE cadres (Black Tigers) includes the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the
assault on President Chandrika Kumaratunga and attempt on the Sri Lanka army commander in
2006 (Stokke, 2006). The overwhelming women military recruitments of LTTE show the depth
of Tamil social participation within their ethnic-driven violent mode of nationalism in the ethnic-
diverse political soil of Sri Lanka.

Suicide attacks are the sharpest weapon of the terrorist organizations to fulfill their major
political motives. Groups such as the LTTE and al-Qaeda depends/depended on this to secure
their demands and needs from their counter partners, Sri Lankan government and the US (Pape,
2003). Attack on the Iraqi embassy in Beirut was the first major suicide attack in contemporary
era, which caused for the death of 27 dead and more than 100 injured in the same. In the
observation of Robert Pape, 188 suicide attacks occurred and most of them were by non-
religious motives during the period- 1980 to 2001 (Atran, 2004). This notable observation of
Pape proves that the political motives were the major accelerating factors behind most of these
suicide attacks than that of religious impulses, as it clearly evident in all suicide attempts of the
LTTE. The trend of suicide terrorism reached on its peak from 1990 onwards, after being its
initial stage developed in 1980s. The terrorist organizations are interestingly relying on this form
of attack, by religious, linguistic and other ethnic parameters. Contemporary suicide terrorism is
not confined only to the Islamic fundamentalism. Interestingly, the LTTE is the king maker of
the modern suicide terrorism. It is noteworthy that the LTTE alone has added 75 out of the 188
suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2001, in its account (Pape, 2003). This shows the image of
LTTE’s terrorist face, against the state authority in Sri Lanka by propagating an unwanted and
illogical mode of demand and further attacks.

Female suicide bombers also created the lightening of fear in the global political mirror. In
1985, the first female suicide attack held when a truck driven in to an Israeli Defense Force and
killed 2 soldiers, by a 16-year old girl-. Khyadali Sana. Later, women exploited as bomber-
vehicles in the conflict scenes of Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Israel, and Turkey. Terrorist
groups which have publicized their use of females include The Syrian Socialist National Party,
the LTTE, the Kurdistan Workers Party, al-Qaeda, Chechen rebels, Al Aqsa Martyrs, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which have recruited the female suicide bombers to attain their
confined goals and needs (Zedalis, 2004). The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 is one of
the most debatable suicide attacks committed by LTTE, by its Black Tiger woman cadre
‘Dhanu’. Consequently, LTTE has banned by the governments of many countries, including US
and UK, while India is the first country in the world to ban the group as ‘terrorists’ in May-1992.

The war between LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces occurred in three different phases
commonly referred to as Eelam wars in the Sri Lankan conflict history. The Ealam War- 1
(1983-87), given an obvious grip to the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the
country. By the intervention of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), in 1987, the intensity of the
internal war between the militants and the government has decreased until 1990. Following the
failure of peace talks by the state government, the Eelam War 11 (1990-94) arisen and it
disturbed the relationship between India and Sri Lanka after the assassination of Rajeev Gandhi,
by the LTTE suicide bomber. The Eelam War 111 (1995-2002), was strategically profitable
fighting to the LTTE militants; they widened their territory and power during this period (Ghosh,
2003). The third phase of the Eelam wars was frightened the government’s confidence,
accordingly the state readied to accept the Norwegian peace intervention, as a design of
prevention to the emerging Tamil ethnic-power calculations through the military strategy of
LTTE.

In the battle of 2000-01, the LTTE used a conventional military structure and captured
large tracts of territory from the state. Thus the armed struggle, “having started as a
guerrilla war, by 1998 had intensified in to a guerrilla-cum-semi-conventional conflict
with the LTTE (controlling) large areas of the North and East” (Arunatilake, Nisha,
Jayasuriya and Kelegama, 2001:1484).

Ultimately the 21st century politics of Sri Lanka is highly linked and influenced with the notion
of ‘LTTE-centrism’. Indeed in the internal and external political tabulation of the island state
since its independence, the Tamil-centric ethnic minority politics and the LTTE have an
indispensable role with a massive political signature. The Tsunami of 26 December 2004 was a
major hindrance to the two blocks-the LTTE and the state government, from being involving
with war just after the third phase of the violent ethnic strife of the island state-Sri Lanka. Even
though, the discontent over the allocation and distribution of funds and aids in the post-Tsunami
scene, with a marginal approach by the authority further widened the already built gap between
the two. Later on the majority party politics of the country too focused high and large with the
anti-Tamil sentiments after the hit of Tsunami over the coasts of island state. In the election of
2005, Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected as the president of the island nation, as a result of his rigid
pledge on the LTTE defeat and his provoking speeches and statements against the Tamil
autonomy.

President Rajapaksa done his job, as explained during the election campaign of 2004, by killing
the most wanted terrorist and criminal Veluppillai Prabhakaran in May-2009. After the death of
Prabhakaran, LTTE lost its courage and spirit, even though they are conducting small and less
harm attacks to inform its physical presence rather than its active involvement in the Tamil
separatism, as it was earlier. In 2010 presidential election also, Rajapaksa elected as the president
in the name of ‘LTTE’. He led his election campaign, quoting his military win against the
separatist LTTE terrorists, after remembering its violent movements over than three decades. In
the recent held Sri Lankan presidential election too Rajapaksa tried to play the ‘LTTE card’ but
he failed to succeed the presidentship third time in front of his main opponent Maithripala
Sirisena.

Government Response

It is highly relevant and important to draw the analysis of the response of the government and the
people on the demand for a separate state led by LTTE, in the ethnic-conflict scenes of Sri
Lanka. When the LTTE intensified its military targets, attacking police officials and politicians
widely, the government of Sri Lanka responded towards this, forming the Prevention of
Terrorism Act in 1979. Following the act, the state authority strengthened its counter-terrorism,
deploying the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) in Jaffna, the major Tamil centre in the state. The
government further declared LTTE as a terrorist organization, to control its spread and violence
in the island nation (Kingsbury, 2012). Under the act, Tamils were arrested without any warrant,
and their applications to consider writs of habeas corpus were also rejected. It is also noteworthy
that after the adoption of the act Tamil violence increased rapidly, as a reaction of their mentality
toward the oppressive stand of the government, up on their fight for a separate Tamil eelam.

When the Tamil militants became more dangerous with their violent attacks, both in the
provinces of North and East under the banner of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government initiated
peace talks with the proponents of Tamil militant groups and political parties. This array of peace
talks were targeted a peaceful and an integrated Sri Lanka, beyond the limits of its ethnic-
diverse.

In June 1986, President Jayawardene convened a Political Parties Conference (PPC) to

discuss the proposals which emerged as a result of talks between the government of Sri
Lanka on the hand and the representative of the government of India and the TULF on
the other (Sivarajah, 1996:153).

The proposals of the Sri Lankan government in the PPC concentrate on the principles that
involve the proper accommodation of unity, integrity and sovereignty of the Sri Lankan state. It
also focuses on the unitary character of the constitution, emphasizing the aspect of
decentralization of power up on the provincial council. The president Jayawardene sent copies of
the proposals to the government of India and all Tamil militant groups (Sivarajah, 1996). The
proposals were welcomed warmly by all participated parties other than the TULF. Earlier, all
political parties were invited to the PPC except JVP. It is essential to mention here that the
refusal of TULF with the proposal was an offshoot of its demand for a separate Tamil state, but it
followed a calm political design to attain the demand unlike the LTTE militancy.

The Lankan government made an effort to satisfy the Tamils by passing the Provincial Council
Bill (PCB) in 1987.But it was also not much success as expected by the government. The TULF
has pointed that the executive powers are very limited to the Governor, in the PCB. The party
demanded again the elimination of the emergency power of the president based on his mere wish
rather than having any war or external threats, as mentioned in the bill. Yogendra Duraiswamy
opined that, the provincial councils can never share the power with the local bodies, without
being framed the concept of regional autonomy (Sivarajah, 1996). As a probable solution to the
ethnic-fever of the island nation, the government approved the devolution of power to provinces,
through the provisions added in the 13th constitutional amendment held in July-1987
(Uyangoda). This was a clever step of the government in its politico-strategy to counter terrorism
and the subsequent Tamil ethno-based political mobilization. But, the full implementation of the
amendment in consideration of all provisions discussed in it; is not yet occurred and the Tamil
political parties are continuously demanding the same with a massive appeal now days too.

After being tensed more than two decades of Tamil violent disturbances, the Sri Lankan
government defeated the LTTE through its well polished strategies of with an admixture of
‘define’, ‘isolate’ and ‘defeat’ (Uyangoda). As I mentioned earlier the government has prescribed
LTTE as a terrorist group in 1979. Later onwards, government continued its restless army protest
on the rising Tamil separatist violence in the ethnic-ground of Sri Lanka. But, more often it was
a mere defense than to destroy terrorism. While all the peace- making efforts initiated by the
government became failure, the Norwegian mediated peace effort which began in 2002,
introduced a possible solution in the issue. In fact, the Norwegian peace intervention was a result
of mutual understanding between the government and LTTE, to establish an interim government
in the Tamil dominated North and East provinces of the island country. But the LTTE denied
from the talk, as a result of their discontent with the government, as it failed to work out the
agreements already signed (Nadarajah and Vimalarajah, 2008). After a larger amount of LTTE’s
violence, at last the government succeeded in isolating the LTTE by 2006. India, as a prominent
neighbor of the country involved interestingly, in the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis and terrorist
turbulence due to its strategic interest in the island state and its ethno-nationalist feelings with
the Tamils settled there in the island altogether.

The LTTE was widely internationally regarded as a terrorist group and India was firmly
in favor of the Sri Lankan government’s politically led approach to resolve the ethnic
crisis. The government’s pro-Indian approach led to this favorable Indian support to Sri
Lanka (Uyangoda).

Apart this, all south Asian countries have contributed their physical or mental assistance to the
Tsunami-torn Sri Lanka in its re-construction and its war against terrorism too. Furthermore the
Indian backing Pakistan, China, Eastern Europe and Russia also contributed military hardwires
and military supplies to Sri Lanka, to bring its campaigns against terrorism easy and courageous
one. Utilizing all these influential backing the SLA liberated the Eastern province of the island
state with a joint-effort of all forces-navy, land and air. After being liberated the east, the
government framed a full clutch democratic mode there. Factually, the nominal democracy and
the liberalization of the East facilitated credibility in the government’s fight against terrorism in
all nook and corners of the region. As a part of the government’s bitter policies toward the
terrorism spread in the Northern Province of the country, it introduced Humanitarian Military
Operation (HMO) in March, 2007. But the liberation of the North was not an easy task. The
LTTE reacted strongly to this and they force fully taken the civilians with them. The crisis
became so worse. International eye eagerly turned towards the ill conditions of the emerald
island of Sri Lanka. Lastly, by the help and support of a wider network of state communities on
May 19-2009 the army completed the HMO. On the day, the security forces liberated 295,000
civilian people by killing the LTTE leader Veluppillai Prabhakaran and other major leaders in an
open fight (Uyangode). After the death of Prabhakaran, LTTE became a militant organization for
the sake of ‘name’, even though it is showing its presence, more often in the present ethno-
political scenes of Sri Lanka.
The President Rajapaksa has contributed with his wisely and enthusiastic initiatives in the
success of HMO, by utilizing Sinhala-Buddhist support and anti-Tamil sentiments. In the 2010
presidential election held in Sri Lanka, he selected second time as the head of state, only because
of his first term merit defeating the terrorist mobilization of LTTE in 2009. In the present day
politics also he is repeating the echoes of his great merit, as a keen political Chanakya, he dreamt
the Presidential chair third time too, but suffered a notable setback in the recently held
presidential election. As a part of his dream, he stated a little ahead of the election understanding
the possible Tamil ethnic-flow that, “we never fought against the Tamils, but it was a fight
without any compromise against the terrorist movement of LTTE, if it was a war against the
Tamil, they never cannot live cheerfully in the southern parts of the country with the Sinhalese” 2.
All these realities undoubtedly disclose that the party politics of the island nation will continue

2
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/sri-lanka-only-fought-ltte-not-tamils-
rajapaksa/article5779904.ece. (Accessed 2014 Sep, 18).
its journey across the highway of ethic sentiments, because its roots have grounded with the
motives of two nationalist feelings, the Sinhala and the Tamil.

The Tigers have manifested their violent movements for a separate Tamil eelam in the name of
Tamils (Fagerlund, 2011). Here, it is noteworthy that the LTTE claimed itself as a rights-
protector of the Sri Lankan Tamils and as a full-tanked vehicle in their journey for a separate
Tamil state. But the people of Sri Lanka reacted on LTTE’s repeated armed struggle in a diverse
pitch. The armed struggle of the LTTE got the full support of a minor amount of Tamils only
compared to its opponents and partial supporters, because the Tamils in Sri Lanka were largely
discontent on the government’s miserable responds towards these violent instances. A portion of
Tamils were only the partial supporters to this LTTE-led struggles. The Indian Tamils also were
not much interested in these impatient and unethical attempts of the Tamil tigers, as they were
cooperating with the Sinhalese majority to be blessed with governmental concessions in their
socio-economic outfits. Today also many Tamils are absolute critical of the unscientific mode of
Tamil militants in their terrorist baggage, disturbing the unity and integrity of the state.
Moreover, a remarkable portion of the Tamil minority had recognized that the reason behind the
poor developmental conditions of the Tamil dominated provinces in Sri Lanka and the driving
factor at the heels of the underprivileged socio-economic and political position of the ethnic
Tamil minority too, is the Sinhala-Buddhist-driven political equations. So that the active and
violent political strategy of the LTTE-led ethnic Tamil militancy had become significantly less-
aggressive aftermath the killing of the LTTE-founder Prabhakaran in 2009, however it is
announcing its presence with unusual and less destructive political targets in the ethnic-fertile
soil of Sri Lanka.

The LTTE built its foreign policy to be stronger and courageous with the physical and the mental
support of global terrorist movements and its proponents. This effort of the Tigers was motivated
by their extreme discontent with the state initiatives, regarding their separatist demand.
Consequently, the LTTE realized the need of a wider network of global terrorist linkages, and
Gaddhafi, Assad, and Khomeni become their Prophets, in their terrorist mobilization against the
state (Gunaratna, 1999). Later, the Tigers advanced roads of mutual understanding with the
above mentioned terrorist movements, aiming the fulfillment of its pre-defined goals. In this
context, India involved in the complicated ethnic crisis of her neighbor-Sri Lanka when it
became as an internationally known curse of extreme terrorism.