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Lumantas vs. Calapiz FACTS: Sony had engaged Torres-Madrid Brokerage Inc (TMBI) in facilitating, processing,
FACTS:
The 8-year old son (Hanz) of respondent spouses Hilario and Herlita Calapiz was brought to the
Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital for an emergency appendectomy. Petitioner Lumatas who
was the one attending their son suggested he also should undergo circumsicion with no added
cost.
After the operation, Hanz complained of pain of his penis and the parents noticed that the kid
is urinating abnormally. However, he was still discharged over his parent’s protestations against
the hospital. The kid came back to the hospital because of the abscess formation in his penis.
The diagnosis was the kid was suffering from a damaged urethra. Hanz underwent cycstostomy
and other three operation to repair his damaged urethra.
A criminal charge was filed against Lumatas for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries. However, he was acquitted due to the insuffiency of evidence from the prosecution.
Still, he was compelled to pay moral damages worth 50K.
Petitioner contends that he cannot be liable of moral damages because he was acquitted from
the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether Lumatasa is still liable from moral damages considering that he was acquitted from the
crime.
RULING:
Petitioner is still liable. Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an
accused does not automatically mean the acquittal from civil liability. If the court found that the
accused did not do the crime, then he is not also civilly liable as he is completely innocent.
However, If he is acquitted because there is insufficiency of evidence from the prosecution, civil
liability is still present as there is only acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
The failure of the prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid
a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly
liable. The injury or trauma of Hanz was sustained in the hands of petitioner.
Thus, petitioner was compelled to pay the moral damages plus interests (6%).
TORRES-MADRID BROKERAGE INC VS FEB MITSUI
withdrawing and delivering the shipment of various electronic goods (from Thailand and
Malaysia) from the port of Manila to its warehouse in Binan, Laguna.
TMBI subcontracted BMT Trucking services since it did not own any delivery truck which Sony
did not object to the arrangement.
4 trucks left BMT’s garage but only 3 arrived at the warehouse. One truck was found abandoned.
Both the driver and the shipment were missing. TMBI filed a complaint for “hijacking”.
Sony filed an insurance claim with the Mitsui, the insurer of the goods. After being subrogated
to Sony’s rights, Mitsui sent a demand letter to TMBI for payment of the lost goods.
TMBI impleaded BMT as it was due to BMT’s negligence as the proximate cause of the loss.
Also, it added that in the event it is held liable to Mitsui for the loss, it should be reimbursed by
BMT.
RTC and CA- found TMBI and BMT jointly and solidary liable to pay Mitsui.
ARGUMENTS OF TMBI- Denies being a common carrier because it did not own a single truck
and the service that it offered was limited to the processing of paperwork and blames BMT as it
had the full control and custody of the cargo when it was lost. And BMT being a common carrier
is presumed negligent and shall be responsible for the loss.
ARGUMENTS OF BMT That it observed the required standard of care and hijacking was a
fortuitous event.
ARGUMENTS OF MITSUI: The incident cannot be considered force majeure; that TMBI is a
common carrier and its brokerage service includes the eventual delivery of the cargo to the
consignee.
ISSUE: Whether or not TMBI and BMT are solidarily liable
RULING:
BROKERAGE MAY BE CONSIDERED COMMON CARRIER
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their
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services to the public. They are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and in the safety of their passengers.
For all other cases- such as theft or robbery- a common carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless it can prove that it observed extraordinary diligence.
Simply put theft or robbery is not considered fortuitous event.
A common carrier to be absolved of its liability for a resulting loss:
1. If it proves that it exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting and safekeeping
the goods;
2. If it stipulated with the shipper or owner of the goods to limit its liability for the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods to a degree less than extraordinary
diligence.
However, a robbery attended by “grave or irresistible force” is a fortuitous event that absolves
the common carrier from liability.
TMBI failed to successfully establish that it had acted with extraordinary diligence and TMBI’s
current theory that hijacking was attended by force is untenable.
TMBI AND BMT ARE NOT SOLIDARILY LIABLE TO MITSUI
Article 2194. The responsibility of
two or more persons who are
liable for quasi delict is solidary.
However, TMBI and BMT cannot be solidarily liable as TMBI’s liability did not stem from a quasi-
delict but from its breach of contract or culpa contractual while Mitsui’s action against BMT could
only rise from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
THIRD PARTY MAY RECOVER FROM A
COMMON CARRIER FOR QUASI-DELICT
BUT MUST PROVE ACTUAL NEGLIGENCE
Since there is no direct contractual relationship existed between Sony/Mitsui and BMT, the
former’s cause of action against the latter could arise only from quasi-delict, a third party
suffering damage from the action of another due to the latter’s fault or negligence.
In culpa contractual, the plaintiff only needs to establish the existence of the contract and its
failure to perform the obligation and it can only free from liability by proving that observed
extraordinary diligence.
In culpa aquiliana, the plaintiff must establish the defendant’s fault or negligence because this
is the very basis of the action. The defendant may absolve by proving that he observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In this case, Mitsui did not sue BMT, much less prove any negligence on its part. If BMT has
entered the picture at all, it is because TMBI sued it for reimbursement for the liability that TMBI
might incur from its contract of carriage. Accordingly, no basis to hold BMT liable to Mitsui.
So, TMBI is liable to Mitsui. In turn, TMBI is entitled to reimbursement from BMT due to the
latter’s own breach of contract with TMBI.
R TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. LUISITO G. YU, G.R. No. 174161, February 18,
2015
FACTS: At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta J. Yu, after having alighted
from a passenger bus in front of Robinson’s Galleria along the north-bound lane of Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven by Antonio P. Gimena, who
was then employed by petitioner R Transport Corporation. Loreta was immediately rushed to
Medical City Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.
Due to this, the husband of the deceased filed a Complaint for damages before the RTC against
petitioner R Transport Corporation, Antonio Gimena and Metro Manila Transport Corporation
(MMTC) (the registered owner of the bus). The MMTC interposed the defense that it cannot be
held liable as it is merely the registered owner of the bus and was not actually operating the
bus nor was the employer of Gimena. The petitioner R Transport Corporation stated that it
exercised diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent Yu and ordered the payment of damages. In the decision,
the liability of Antonio Gimena is merely subsidiary to the liability of R Transport and MMTC. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC on appeal but modified the liability of Gimena and held him
solidarily liable with R Transport and MMTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner R
Transport liable for the damages caused by the negligence of its employee, which was not
supported by the evidence on record.
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RULING: NO. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court’s jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing errors of law unless it falls under the exceptions. This Court ruled however
that there was no cogent reason to reverse the rulings of the courts for none of the exceptions
are present herein.
As to the liability of the driver of the bus
Negligence has been defined as "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.” Verily, foreseeability is the fundamental
test of negligence. It is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In this case, the records show
that Gimena was running at reckless speed. As indicated in the Autopsy Report, not only were
the deceased’s clothes ripped off from her body, her brain even spewed out from her skull and
spilled over the road. Also, as borne by the records, the bus driven by Gimena bumped the
deceased in a loading and unloading area of a commercial center. The fact that he was
approaching such a busy part of EDSA should have already cautioned the driver of the bus. In
fact, upon seeing that a bus has stopped beside his lane should have signalled him to step on
his brakes to slow down for the possibility that said bus was unloading its passengers in the
area. Unfortunately, he did not take the necessary precaution and instead, drove on and bumped
the deceased despite being aware that he was traversing a commercial center where pedestrians
were crossing the street. Ultimately, Gimena should have observed due diligence of a reasonably
prudent man by slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing the area.
As to the liability of the employer (R Transport Corporation)
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on the part of the
employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was remiss in the
selection and/or supervision of the negligent employee. In this case petitioner merely denied
the negligence of its employee and imputed negligence to the bus from which the victim alighted.
It reiterated its argument that since it is not the registered owner of the bus which bumped the
victim, it cannot be held liable for the damage caused by the same. Nowhere is there any
evidence offered to prove that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its driver.
The petitioner relied on the ruling in the case of Tamayo. However, it must be noted that the
case at hand does not involve a breach of contract of carriage, as in Tamayo, but a tort or
quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. As such, the
liability for which petitioner is being made responsible actually arises not from a pre-existing
contractual relation between petitioner and the deceased, but from a damage caused by the
negligence of its employee. Petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on the ruling in Tamayo and
escape its solidary liability for the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of its
subordinate is direct and primary, subject only to the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee.
RODOLFO N. REGALA vs. FEDERICO P. CARIN
[G.R. No. 188715. April 6, 2011.]
Facts:
Regala and Carin are adjacent neighbors. Under the guise of merely building an
extension to his residence, Regala approached Carin for permission to bore a hole through a
perimeter wall shared by both their respective properties, to which the latter verbally consented
on condition that the former would clean the area affected by work. However, Regala’s real
intention was to build a second floor, with a terrace atop the dividing wall.
During the construction, Carin and his wife suffered from dust and dirt which fell on
their property. Failing to address such problem, he filed a letter-complaint Office of the City
Engineer and Building Official, alleging among others that Regala lacked the building permit for
the construction of the second floor. Soon, several complaints were filed by Carin before the
Office of Barangay Talon Dos. A complaint for damages against Regala before the RTC was
thereafter filed as no satisfactory agreement was reached at the last barangay conciliation
proceedings, and Regala having continued the construction work despite issuance of several
stop-work notices from the City Engineer's Office for lack of building permit.
In his complaint, respondent alleged in the main that, instead of boring just one hole
as agreed upon, petitioner demolished the whole length of the wall from top to bottom into five
parts for the purpose of constructing a second floor with terrace; and that debris and dust piled
up on respondent's property ruining his garden and forcing him to, among other things, shut
some of the windows of his house. Respondent thus prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages.
The trial court, applying Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts, ruled that Regala
was at fault and negligent for failing to undertake suf cient safety measures to prevent
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inconvenience and damage to respondent to thus entitle respondent to moral and exemplary
damages.
Issue:
Whether Carin is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
Held:
No. Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and
alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person.
To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered
damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219
and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result
of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of the damages
and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.
In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence of
besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant;
2) a culpable act or omission factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the
proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219
and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of petitioner's act or omission. It thus
becomes necessary to instead look into the manner by which petitioner carried out his
renovations to determine whether this was directly responsible for any distress respondent may
have suffered since the law requires that a wrongful or illegal act or omission must have
preceded the damages sustained by the claimant.
It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights
to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and may
have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondent's consent, the lack of
the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions
or penalties.
The damage in inflicted upon respondent's property was not malicious nor willful, an
element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, the Court is not inclined to award exemplary damages.
However, Carin and his family's rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their property have,
at the very least, been inconvenienced from the incident borne of petitioner's construction work.
Nominal damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, respondent
herein, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, petitioner herein, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.
Francisco v. Chemical Bulk Carriers, Inc., G.R. 193577, 7 September 2011
Facts:
Antonio Francisco owned a gasoline station. Sometime in 1993, Gregorio Bacsa came to his
gasoline station, introduced himself as an employee of Chemical Bulk Carriers, Inc. (CBCI), and
offered to sell to Francisco a certain quantity of CBCI’s diesel fuel
After verifying the identity of Bacsa, Francisco agreed to purchase CBCI’s fuel. He however
interposed the following conditions: (1) that Petron should deliver the diesel fuel to Francisco at
his business address which should be properly indicated in Petron's invoice; (2) that the delivery
tank is sealed; and (3) that Bacsa, for and in behalf of CBCI, should issue a separate receipt to
Francisco. All of the 17 deliveries complied with Francisco’s condition.
Thereafter, CBCI sent a demand letter to Francisco regarding the diesel fuel delivered to him
but which had been paid for by CBCI. It demanded that Francisco pay CBCI ₱1,053,527 for the
diesel fuel, or CBCI would file a complaint against him in court. Francisco rejected CBCI's
demand.
CBCI alleged that Francisco should have known that only Petron, Shell and Caltex are authorized
to sell and distribute petroleum products; otherwise, the diesel fuel came from illegitimate, if
not illegal or criminal, acts.
In his Answer, Francisco explained that he operates the gasoline station with the help of his
family because already completely lost his eyesight due to sickness. Francisco claimed that he
asked Jovito, his son, to look into and verify the identity of Bacsa. Francisco maintained that
Bacsa assured him that the diesel fuel was not stolen property.
The RTC ruled in favor of Francisco, thus, dismissing the complaint. It considered Francisco as
a buyer in good faith who paid in full for the merchandise without notice that some other person
had a right to or interest in such diesel fuel. The trial court pointed out that good faith affords
protection to a purchaser for value.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. CA ruled that since Francisco had
been in the business of selling petroleum products for a long time, his blindness was not a
hindrance for him to transact business with other people. Francisco should have verified whether
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CBCI was indeed selling diesel fuel and if it had given Bacsa authority to do so. Francisco cannot
feign good faith since he had doubts as to the authority of Bacsa yet he did not seek confirmation
from CBCI and contented himself with an improvised receipt. The receipts issued by Bacsa also
showed his lack of authority because it was on a plain sheet of bond paper with no letterhead
or any indication that it came from CBCI.
Issue:
Whether Francisco exercised the required diligence of a blind person in the conduct of business.
Ruling:
No, Francisco failed to exercise the required diligence of a blind person in the conduct of
business.
Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and place. One who is
physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably careful person
who has the same physical disability would use. The standard of conduct for a blind person
becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind.
In this case, despite being blind, Francisco had been managing and operating the gasoline
station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance for him to transact business. However,
Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is
blind. First, Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa to determine if he was
authorized by CBCI. Francisco did not do any other background check on the identity and
authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings about the diesel fuel,
fearing that they might be stolen property, yet he did not verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa
to sell the diesel fuel. Third, Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were
typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper. If Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he
should have asked for an official receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as
indicated in Petron's invoice, does not show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to
Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable
person who is blind.
Villareal v. People
Facts: This case is a revisit to the death of Lenny Villa dye to fraternity hazing. Before the court
are respective motions for reconsideration or Clarifications filed by the OSG, Gerarda Villa
(mother of Lenny), and the respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug and Tecson (Tecson et al). In
the original case the court rendered the decision finding Tecson et al guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries. The factual antecedents of the present case are as follows:
In February 1991, Lenny Villa and several other neophytes signified their intention to
join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). On the night of Feb 8, 1991 the
neophytes were brief on what to expect during the initiation rites that it included physical
beatings and that they could quit at any time. The initiation rites would last for three days. The
neophytes were subjected to the traditional forms of Aquilan “initiation rites” which included the
“Indian Run”, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans,
each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the “Bicol Express”, which obliged the neophytes
to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the “Rounds”, in which the neophytes were held at the
back of their pants by the “auxiliaries” (The Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance
to neophytes during the initiation rites), while the latter were being hit and fist blows on their
arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the “Auxies’ Privilege Round”, in
which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During
this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
The neophytes survived the first day. On the second day, the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and rough basketball and were made to undergo the same initiation rites
on the first day. A few hours after the end of the initiation of the second day, the alumni fraternity
members Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villaral demanded to reopen the rites. At first, they were
refused but because of their insistence the initiation rites were reopened. Dizon and Villareal
subjected the neophytes to “paddling” and additional rounds of physical pain. When they all
were sleeping, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings. At first they thought that he was overreacting but when his condition worsened,
they rushed him to the hospital in which Lenny was declared dead on arrival.
26 of the Aquilans were accused in the RTC and were convicted by the trial court of
the crime of homicide. On appeal, the CA set aside the decision of the RTD and modified the
criminal liability of each accused on their individual participation thus 19 of the accused were
acquitted since their guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, 4 of the
accused including Tecson were convicted on the crime of slight physical injuries and 2 accused,
Dizon and Villareal were convicted on the crime of homicide.
Several motions for reconsideration were made. One of which was from the Office of
the Solitor General (OSG). The OSG claims the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to
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that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues
that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was so
gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpa by considering the act as one
committed with malicious intent.
Issue: Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies
Ruling: No. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally
inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done
as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient
in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony
of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with
the infliction of injuries. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent
– but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless
or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide. Thus, we have ruled in a number of
instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a
person automatically liable for intentional felony.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous
results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
The accused Dizon and Tecson et al had neither animus interficendo nor animus
iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule the imposable penalty is what
is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ochoa v. G & S Transport
Facts: On March 10, 1995, Jose Marcial Ochoa boarded a taxi operated by G & S Transport
and was driven by the driver, Bibiano Padilla Jr. At 11:00 pm when the taxicab was cruising
along EDSA, it overtook another cab and tried to pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler truck.
Because of the narrow space between the left-side railing of the fly-over and the ten-wheeler
truck, the taxicab was unable to pass and because of its high-speed, the taxicab ram the
railing throwing itself off the fly-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. The Padilla
and Ochoa were rushed to the hospital but Ochoa was declared dead on arrival from the
accident.
The heirs of Ochoa demanded indemnification from G & S Transport for the loss of
earning capacity and funeral expenses to the total amount of 15 Million. Since G & S failed to
heed the demand, the heirs filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig City.
In the trial court, the heirs claims that G & S, as common carrier filed to observe
extraordinary diligence since Ochoa was not able in arrived at his destination safely.
And they are likewise asserting for damages based on quasi-delict thus they are asking for
actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation. G & S transport on the other hand, that the accident was because of a fortuitous
event and/or negligence of the driver of the delivery van that hit the taxicab and that they
exercised extra-ordinary diligence in the selection of its employees.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the heirs and ordered the payment of
the loss of earning capacity P6,537,244.96, attorney’s fees and cost of litigation but denied the
damages for lack of legal basis. Upon the motion of reconsideration of the heirs. The decision
was amended to include moral damages of P300,000, exemplary damages of P50,000 and
attorney’s fees and the cost of litigation. G & S Transport made an appeal to the CA.
The CA ruled in favor of the heirs since G & S was not able to established that the
proximate cause of Jose Ochoa is a fortuitous event/or the fault or negligene of another and
not of its employee. This fact was bolstered when the MTC trying the case for criminal
negligence convicted Bibiano Padilla Jr for the said charge. However, the CA deleted the award
for loss of earning capacity since the evidence presented by the heirs, a certificate by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is self-serving. The moral
damages was reduced to P200,0000.
Issue:
1. Whether CA erred in not finding that the cause of death by Mr. Ochoa was a
fortuitous event, not finding that G & S Transport exercised good diligence of a good
father in the selection f its employees particularly Mr Bibiano Padilla Jr.
2. Whether CA erred in not taking note of the acquittal of the employee for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
3. Whether CA erred in deleting the award of the trial court for loss of earning capacity
Ruling:
1. These issues are questions of fact. Determination of the issues would entail re-
examination of the facts and because the case doesn’t fall in any of the exceptions
then the court would not disturb any findings and conclusions of the CA.
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2. No. There is a contract of carriage between G & S and Jose Marcial Transport. In a
contract of carriage, the carrier is bound to safely transport the passenger as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. Unfortunately, Ochoa, the
passenger died before he arrived in his destination. There is presumption that the
common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.
Unfortunately, G & S Trasnport miserably failed to overcome the presumption.

The Acquittal of Mr. Bibiano Padilla Jr is immaterial to the instant case for breach of
contract. As we declared in Cancio Jr. v. Isip “a ruling on the culpability of the offender
will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause
of action, i.e culpa contractual”. In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for
the recovery of damages arising from the breach of contract of carriage allegedly
committed by G & S Transport. Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising from
contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same incident.
Hence, regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, the same has no
bearing in the resolution of the present case.

3. Yes. The CA erred in deleting the award. A research on USAID reveals that it is the
principal US agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying
to escape poverty and engaging in democratic reform. It is an independent federal
government agency. Given this background, it is highly improbable that such agency
will issue a certification containing unreliable information regarding an employee’s
income. Besides, there exist a presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed. Hence, the USAID certification cannot be said to be self-serving and can
be used for reasonable estimation of the loss of earning capacity.

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