ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS P.D. No.
P.D. No. 1866 which state that "the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
First, you must TN what person is being referred to here, natural or juridical persons.
However, with respect to juridical persons, what is protected here is only the right to
property because they cannot be protected in terms of life or liberty as their existence
is determined by law. Another thing that you should TN/(BAR), hierarchy in the
protection insofar as the right of life, liberty or property. So you have, according to how
it is being phrased, you have the right to life and then you have liberty and then, finally,
the least protected is the right to property. TN in the case of Social Justice Society et
al vs. Atienza where the SC said, essentially the oil companies are fighting for the right
to property, they alleged that they spend billion of pesos to force to relocate. However,
based on the hierarchy on the constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
precedence over the right to property, the reason is obvious, life is irreplaceable while
property is not. So you TN of this guys.
Social Justice Society vs Atienza G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008
“Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that
they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over
the right to property.171 The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right
to property, the former should prevail.”
Insofar as the matter of life, liberty and property as to definition, you know that already. But to
emphasize on the right to property, what is being covered it does not include the right to possess
firearms, that is not included. It is neither a property right nor property subject to the protection
of due process and equal protection clause. As well as, to operate a mobile/a car/vehicle is not
covered by the protection under the right to property. Like the right to bear firearms, is neither
a property nor a property right covered by the protection of due process and equal protection
clause. TN of that guys.
We have the cases of:
Garin vs. MMDA G.R. No. 130230 April 15, 2005
“The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a
property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked
by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and
welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with
our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal8 on the license to operate a
cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry9 and Oposa v. Factoran10 on timber licensing
agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao11 on a legislative
franchise to operate an electric plant.”
Chavez vs Romulo G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004
“In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize
lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence." Following the American
doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right
protected under our Constitution.”
Now, another point you should TN on Sec. 1, the concept of due process of law. Due
process of law applies only to government exercising its powers. This does not apply
to private entities exercising its powers.
There are two kinds of due process. We have the substantive and procedural due
process. On substantive due process, you must comply with the requirements for the
valid exercise of this power: subject matter is to be lawful, and the means of achieving
is, likewise, legal or lawful.
Now then, what about procedural due process, there is more questions on the
procedural aspect of due process. The essence of the procedural due process of law
is simply giving the opportunity of hearing before one is condemned for whatever
judgment. So, when we say, opportunity of hearing, case in point is Pichay Jr. vs. Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs et al this was decided on July 24,
2012 where the SC, in all proceedings of the government, may be criminal or
administrative or civil, we have specially in the Pichay case, the administrative
proceedings the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person
charged to answer the accusation against him, continue as the minimum requirements
of due process. Which simply means having the opportunity to explain one’s side.
That’s the bottomline of the procedural due process of law.
“… his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance
of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to
oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings,
the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process, which simply means having the opportunity to explain one's side. Hence, as
long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence,
the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law
abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The records show that petitioner
was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath with
respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit
his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due
process.||| (Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-
IAD, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012)”
Minimum Requirements of Procedural Due Process (TN)
Procedural due process in civil cases
“5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS. — As applied to judicial
proceedings, due process of law implies that there must be a court of tribunal clothed
with the power to hear and determine the matter before it, that jurisdiction shall have
been lawfully acquired, that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, and
that judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing.”|| (El Blanco Español - Filipino vs
Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918)
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Procedural due process in criminal cases
“2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; COURT OF COMPETENT
URISIDICTION CAN NOT BE QUESTIONED ON GROUND OF INJUSTICE
AS DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED. — A due process question would have arisen
if the decision arrived at the endds of justice were not served. Such is not the case,
however. It is an admitted fact in this case that respondent Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, presided by then Judge Jose T. Surtida, was vested with jurisdiction to
try and decide the case against petitioners. As admitted in the petition, the decision
reached by him, thereafter affirmed with modification by respondent Court of Appeals,
was "duly rendered and signed" on July 25, 1966 at a time before his retirement; though
it was not until after his retirement on August 23, 1966 that said sentence was read to
petitioners. had it been promulgated then and there, this particular question raised in
this petition would not have risen.
3.ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS MEANT TO EMBODY CANON OF FAIRNESS AND
AVOIDANCE OF ARBITRARINESS. — What gave petitioners' cause plausibility, was
that it was not until after his retirement on August 23, 1966 that such a sentence was
read to petitioners. Considering all the circumstances detailed above and the Tijam
doctrine on which reliance could be had, it cannot be said that injustice was thereby
committed against petitioners. They were given all the opportunity to defend
themselves not only before the respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
but likewise before respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioners cannot rightfully complain
of having been the victims of arbitrary governmental action. They tried to have this
Court, in an earlier petition for certiorari, to review the judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals, but they did not meet with success because of their inability to demonstrate
that they failed to receive the protection that due process accords every accused. What
was said by Justice Cardozo fits the occasion: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous
in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of
the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in
every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men
will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of
incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to
keep the balance true.” (Vera v. People, G.R. No. L-31218, February 18, 1970)
Procedural due process in administrative proceedings
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. — There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of
these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or
any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
2
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.||| (Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940)
Procedural due process in disciplinary cases
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, contrary to
petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which
must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.||| (Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. L-68288, July 11, 1986)
What is important here guys is the opportunity of hearing, where there is total absence
of hearing that is what is abhorred. For as long as there was opportunity of hearing
there cannot be a violation of due process of law. However, there are instances where
hearing is not required and it cannot be a violation of due process, regardless of the
lack of hearing.
Q. What are the exceptions? (see Admin notes) *****
A.
1. When administrative agencies are exercising quasi-legislative function no
need for a hearing;
2. abatement of nuisance per se, also no need of hearing;
3. granting of court of provisional remedies, such as the writ of preliminary
attachment or a temporary restraining order, it can be issued ex parte by the
court, provided that the defendant is notified and simultaneous with service of
the writ;
4. you have removal of a temporary employee in the government service
because they do not enjoy security of tenure;
5. we have preventive suspension, no need to first notify the erring public
respondent. He can be suspended right away, preventively, because after all
it is not a penalty, it is merely a precautionary measure;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraints or levy by BIR commissioner, no need of
hearing because there was already a notice of delinquency or inefficiency prior
to the distraint; and,
7. the cancellation of passport of the person charged with the crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders/ judicial orders which prevents an accused
from travelling abroad.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
9. Judicial orders which prevent an accused from travelling abroad – this is
what we call, the hold departure order, if the accused has not been arrested
yet. Or you have what they call in the DOJ, the watchlist. You need not be
notified prior to placing you into watchlist.
10. And then you have suspension of bank operations by the Monetary Board
upon a prima facie finding of liquidity problems in such bank.
11. you have extradition proceedings – there’s no need first to notify the
extradite before he is being (inaudible) in court.
12. Then of course you have reinvestigation of criminal cases already subjected
to a preliminary investigation. where it merely reiterates its earlier finding of
probable cause against the accused – there’s no need of notifying there.
Equal Protection of Laws
That all persons should be treated alike by the law, insofar as they are situated under
the same circumstances. It does not guarantee absolute equality. What is being
guaranteed under this – only legal equality, that, in terms of rights that may be
conferred by law and obligations imposed – here it should be treated alike if you’re
situated under the same circumstances.
TN however of valid classification that you must memorize.
Q: What are the requisites for valid classification as an exception to equal protection
clause?
A:
1. First there has to be a substantial distinction
2. and it must be relevant to the purpose, or germane to the purpose of the law.
3. It applies to all persons who are situated under the same circumstances
4. not only for existing conditions but also for future conditions.
TN of those guys and some of the examples on this, you have the case of Trillanes
relating to the case of Jalosjos relating to classification in terms of the enforcement of
the law. There shouldn’t be any classification. Because of the condition of Jalosjos,
he wanted to continue to attend sessions in Congress, SC was saying, “you are
already a convicted felon and the rule should be applied equally to you as applied to
all convicts”.
Insofar as Trillanes, the SC was saying “while not convicted, but the same; Election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinction which lifts one from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement.
Also you TN of the case of Fariñas v. the Executive Secretary with respect to
appointive officials who may run for public office. If you’re appointive you’re
3
automatically considered to have resigned. If you’re elective it does not apply. There’s
valid classification here because elected officials are elected for a definite term
whereas an appointive is accountable only to the appointing authority. SC was saying
here, “there is valid classification”.
People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 03, 2000 also cited in
Trillanes IV vs Pimentel
8.ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; PERFORMANCE OF
LEGITIMATE DUTIES BY PUBLIC OFFICER IS NOT AN EXCUSE TO FREE A
PERSON VALIDLY IN PRISON. — The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives,
not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION TO POSITION OF CONGRESSMAN IS NOT A
REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION IN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. — The Court
cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. We, therefore, find that election to
the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 146494 July 14, 2004
“The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
Another point you should TN is PAGCOR. PAGCOR was assessed with taxes and
they were saying, “we are a government corporation, we should not be taxed by the
BIR”. PAGCOR, according to the SC, cannot find support in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution, because it was granted a franchise subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by the Constitution. So, equal protection of laws does not apply.
(See Tax Case)
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The right to privacy. If you’re asked in the BAR, “cite a provision in the Constitution
that protects the right to privacy”.
TN of this, this is applicable not only to Filipino Citizens but as well as to Foreigners.
It’s demandable as a matter of right.
This is guaranteed also under the writ of Amparo insofar as protecting your right to
privacy, your right to life, liberty or security. While Section 1 includes property, Section
2 applies insofar as your right to privacy insofar as liberty and security against
intrusion into your person.
Q: Who is protected?
A: Your person, your houses, your papers and effects.
Should there be any search and seizure of these things, there has to be a warrant
whatever the reason or purpose. Without the warrant, then it is unreasonable
therefore unconstitutional. Should there be any arrest or seizure of a person or search
of a person it has to be with a warrant – a warrant of arrest or a search or seizure
warrant. Without such warrant then it is unreasonable whatever is the reason or
purpose therefore unconstitutional. TN of that.
Now, the next question would be,
Q: How do you acquire a search warrant or a warrant of arrest?
A: The requirements are enumerated in Section 2.
Let’s first take up on the Search Warrant.
SEARCH WARRANT
Q: What would be covered by your search warrant? Why do you apply for a search
warrant?
A: First of all, you apply for a search warrant to search what?
1. The things that are used in the commission of the crime.
2. when the things are the fruits of the crime or used as a means in committing a
crime. So you apply for a search warrant.
Q. what are the requirements?
A. There has to be determination of probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge. It should be in a searching question and answer.
4
Q. what is probable cause? what else that do you need to establish here?
A.aside from probable cause to be determined by the judge, there has to be a summary
hearing ex parte through a searching question and answer. If the judge is convinced
then the court issues the warrant.
Microsoft v. Maxicorp – software – probable cause – such reasons, supported by
facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and
the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper; OATH must refer to the
truth of the facts WITHIN THE PERSONAL KNOLEDGE OF THE PETITIONER OR
HIS WITNESSES; probable cause deals with probability and not absolute certainty
Q. what are the requirements in the issuance of the warrant?
A. you have to state that particularly what was the crime committed and what are the
things or items that are to be searched and seized including the place that are to be
searched. Without the particularity as required in the constitution the warrant is general
and therefore it is unconstitutional. There should be one warrant for every crime or
offense. This is to prevent a scrattered shot warrant. A scattered shot warrant is a
general warrant prohibited by law.
Q. On particularity, do you need a tax declaration or a title that would define technically
the place to be searched and seized?
A. you dont have to as long as it can be identified by the searching party.
As a genral rule there has to be a warrant for every search. There are exception you
have to memorize them. TN
Q. What are the exception? For even without a warrant the search is valid.
A. first is when there is consent. When there is a waiver.
To make it a valid waiver TN of the requirements. The person subject of the search
knew that he has that right,either actually or constructively and despite having known
that he has that right, he intelligently and voluntarily relinquished that right. This must
concur otherwise there cannot be a valid waiver.
Q. what else?
A. when the search is made incidental to a lawful arrest. Search is incidental so
therefore the arrest must be lawful to make the seacrh also lawful. So that if the arrest
is in the first place unlawful then there cannot be a valid search.
In this particular case you should TN on the lawful arrest there has to be a warrant, if
not then it false under the exceptions provided under RULE 113 of the RULES OF
COURT,
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Otherwise if the search is not made under any of the circumstances then the search is
likewise invalid. Another point, it must be done within the area or premises under the
control of the person being arrested. You cannot make a separate search after the
arrest of the accused. Like you arrest him here in the AVR while one will search his
place at the 4th floor. It has to be in the same premises where the accused is arrested.
TN of that.
By the way, you have to compare the search incidental to lawful arrest with stop and
frisk search under the terry search. The Terry search refers to the stop and frisk. This
is limited only to protective search for one is suspected to be engaged in illegal activity
or is committing a crime.
Q. What would the police do?
A. the police may ask him to stop and if he does not stop then it is a justification for
extensive search, not just frisking. In the stop and frisk, you are stopped and then you
are frisked, however the frisking is limited only to protective search which means only
to outer garments and not extensive but if probable cause is established that you are
commiting a crime then in the course of the search they found a contraband in your
possession then search ca be made now after lawful arrest because here it will be as
if you are commiting a crime in the presence of the arresting officers search conducted
is incidental to that lawful arrest. So then on mere suspicion you can stop and frisk but
if you are to make an arrest and make a search incidental to that arrest you must
establish probable cause, otherwise there is no justification for further extensive search.
Q. another exception?
A. the search of a moving vehicles, especially at the check points. TN moving vehicle
is limited only to visual search unless when probable cause is established that would
justify an extensive search. Check point also limited to visual search unless proabable
cause is established.
5
Customs search, limited only on warehouses but not residential houses where there is
a suspicion that the smuggled goods are kept for non-payment of taxes, you cannot
search without a warrant. In a warehouse, you may even without a search warrant.
Then you have on Armed conflict , check points, exigent and emergency
circumstances the conduct of area target zone and saturation drives
Routine airport security is now one of its exceptions.
Then you also have evidence in plain view.
TN: Requirements of evidence in plain view:
1. The searching party must have justification to be in the premises to the search.
Q: How do you justify presence in the premises?
A: By virtue of a search warrant or otherwise they are there because of a buy bust
operations, there is a commission of the crime in the presence of the arresting
officer
So, first of all, the presence of the officer must be legitimate.
2. The evidence is immediately apparent to the eye or the hand of the searching
party without need of further search.
Then in this case, you can seize it even without a search warrant.
TN: Del Rosario vs. People (taken up in Evidence)
The Supreme Court enumerated the requirements.
1. There has to be a valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest.
2. The evidence is discovered by accident or inadvertently discovered by the
police who have the right to be present as to where they are.
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent and plain view justifies the
seizure without further search conducted.
TN: Manalili Case (taken up in Evidence)
Q: What would be the consequence if the right of a person against an
unreasonable search is violated?
A: The evidence is inadmissible. TN: Under the principle or rule on exclusionary.
[BAR]: Q: What does it mean as being the fruit of the poisonous tree?
A: It’s a poisonous free. Therefore, inadmissible.
You have the right to recover the things searched and seized unless they are
contraband or prohibited by law. Then they shall remain in custody by law. If not
returned you can always ask for a Writ of Replevin.
Summary to Execptions of Prior Issuance of a Search Warrant:
1. Consented Search
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law) 6

2. Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest

3. Stop and Frisk Then in which case, you can make an arrest even without a warrant.
4. Search of Moving Vehicles
5. Customs Search If it is based only from an information of an informant or from a source
6. Armed conflict , exigent and emergency circumstances the conduct of area eventhough reliable, but not personal to the police, he cannot make an
target zone and saturation drives (Justifications for the conduct of a arrest under the hot pursuit.
checkpoint)
TN: There should be no interruption from the time of the commission of
7. Routine Airport Security
the crime to the actual apprehension of the accused. The immediacy of
8. Evidence in Plain View the arrest, no gap. Because if there is gap, then there is no more hot
pursuit. In which case, you have to file a case in court to issue the warrant
if there is an interruption in the chain of events from the commission of the
WARRANT OF ARREST
crime to the actual apprehension of the accused.
First, there has to be a warrant of arrest. But unlike in a search warrant, it is not
TN: [BAR] Luz vs. People
necessary that its application has to be done summarily. There’s this PI conducted by
SC: If the offense charged the penalty is a fine, not imprisonment, you cannot
the fiscal and then if there is probable cause or it is established, the case is filed in
make an arrest. So there is no justification to a search incidental to an arrest.
court.
Ang nahitabo gidakop nila ni ang suspect for violation of traffic laws. Wa mani siguro
siya nag helmet. Then, he was advice to go with the law enforcer didto sa police station.
Q: What does the judge do?
At the police station, he was asked to remove all the things from his pants and they
A: The judge within 10 days from receipt of the records must determine probable
found out the contraband. He was then put to jail thereafter. What was the justification
cause, not for the purpose of indicting, but for the purpose of determining whether there
of the police? It was kuno a search and seizure incidental to a lawful arrest. In traffic
is basis to believe that a crime was committed and the person to be arrested must have
violation, the penalty is only fine.
committed the crime. He must immediately be place in the custody of law.
“The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only
Here, the court may base on the finding of probable cause of the fiscal for as long as it
subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at
is personally examined ang records of the PI by the judge and he makes his own
that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of
personal judgment. Unless, he needs for more clarifications, then he may call for a
his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the
hearing ex parte.
functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be
considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
If the court finds that there is no basis, the court can dismiss the case outright and not
issue the
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by
warrant of arrest.
petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by
a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
*** Q: What are the exceptions to the rule on the issuance of warrant?
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated
A: Rule 113
as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
1. Caught in the act or in flagrante delicto. When the person to be arrested
must have committed a crime, in the process of committing a crime and
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly,
about to commit the crime in the presence of the arresting officer.
when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty,
or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the
When you say in the presence, doing those within the hearing distance of
motorist. In this case, however, the officer's issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation
the arresting officer.
ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even an ordinary citizen can make an arrest. Provided that, he surrenders
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
him to the nearest police station before the expiration of the period of
"arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
detention under Article 125 of the RPC.
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
2. Hot Pursuit
with.” (Luz y Ong v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)
He was not present when the crime was committed but he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that this person to be arrested must have
committed the crime. Q: Can there be a search incident to a lawful arrest for violation of traffic rules?
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: No. In traffic violations, the penalty is only a fine. And therefore, he cannot be
arrested. And if he cannot be arrested, there cannot be a search incidental to a lawful
arrest because in the first place, there was no arrest. There cannot be an arrest when
the penalty for the offense charged is only fine.
Q: What is an Administrative Arrest?
A: In some instances, you can arrest even without a warrant
Q: What are examples of these instances?
A: If you breach the peace and order in the locality, when you disrupt a court hearing,
if you’re in a drunken state in public highways, in case of blocking traffic without
authorization, refusing to give your ID and you’re in that country illegally
Summary of Exceptions to Prior Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
1. In flagrante delicto
2. Hot Pursuit
3. Arrest of an Escapee
4. Apprehension of a violator of a crime punished with a fine
5. Administrative Arrest
Section 3.
1.The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
2.Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Q: What is covered by this protection?
A: It covers everything, including electronics communication now. Emails, texting,
cellphone calls, etc.
Q: Is evidence obtained in violation of this protection admissible? What are the
Exceptions?
A: Any evidence in violation of this right is inadmissible. The only exception are when
there is a warrant or a lawful order of the court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as may be prescribed by law.
What you must consider then in the privacy of communication and correspondence is:
Q: With respect to prisoners, do they have privacy of communication and
correspondence?
7
A: They have no right. According to the Supreme Court, under the law, the right of one
who is detained, their expectation of privacy is not as much as those who are outside
of jail or the public at large. If they are detained, there is their loss of right to privacy.
But take note of the case of Alejano et al vs. Cabujay on letters of prisoners.
CASE: Alejano v. Cabujay (case of Trillanes)
- Regarding the privacy of communication enjoyed by prisoners or detainees,
including one who has already been convicted of final judgment or only a
preventive detention prisoner (pending case)
- The fact that a person is facing criminal charges in court, he does not enjoy
the same privacy with those who are free or the public at large
ISSUE: WON the letter should be opened and read by the officers of the prison
- Complained that it was a violation against their privacy of communication and
correspondence
RULING OF THE SC:
- While it is true that it is guaranteed under the Constitution, however, insofar
as detention prisoners are concerned, the right is limited
- The letters can be opened, for as long as they are not privileged
communication between lawyer and client
- The prison officers can open, however, without reading them. Unless it is
stated that the letter is confidential, then it can be read.
“8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
IS NOT VIOLATED EVEN WHEN THERE IS AN INSPECTION OF
FOLDED LETTERS OF DETAINEES; RATIONALE; APPLICATION IN
CASE AT BAR. – Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that
the opening and reading of the detainees' letters in the present case
violated the detainees' right to privacy of communication. The letters were
not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid
measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters
for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by
the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees
and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees'
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for
mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of
the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are
marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open
the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a law
is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen's privacy
rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to
persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations
inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights. In assessing the regulations imposed in
detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the
constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts
"balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns
of prison administrators." The deferential review of such regulations
stems from the principle that: [s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of
prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously
hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration.”| (Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005)
TN: Remember also the case of Zulueta, even private letters cannot be used as
evidence if they violated the privacy of communication and correspondence.
TN: You have to read this case in relation to the Waterous Drugs case.
TN: You have the protection under RA 4200 or the Anti-Wire Tapping Law and it
provides for exceptions.
TN: Also take note of the human security act where it provides for exceptions as
regards the intrusion of privacy of communication and correspondence.
TN: Read these in relation to Writ of Habeas Data where the government may order
the production of information that may violate the privacy of a particular individual.
Q: As between Privacy of Communication and Corresprondence and Public Interest,
which shall prevail?
A: ALWAYS accommodate public interest.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Case in point, you have the most recent decision of Chavez vs Secretary Gonzales
“Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast
media, let us go to its application to the case at bar. To recapitulate, a governmental
action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies
equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out
the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to
discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the
records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts
8
do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present
danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the
airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records
of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents' evidence
falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press
Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a "complete" version
and the other, an "altered" version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the
who's and the how's of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the
tape's different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission
and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly,
given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would
violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless,
some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse
effect on a person's private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are
laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot
support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine,violation of law is just a
factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the
violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status
accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom
of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the
circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present
danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law.
By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they
breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation
cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right
whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to
offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to
uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared
violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the
State.”
||| (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)
Take note of the possibility that this might be violated – the chilling effect of people
afraid of expressing themselves because of laws limiting the exercise of their freedom
of expression. And even before its application,
Q: Can a law allegedly infringing on the freedom of expression be challenged even
before its application?
A: Yes, it can be questioned on its face, as what happened in the Cybercrime Law.
Relevant excerpts on the Cybercrime SC Ruling Disini vs Secretary of Justice:
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
“Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that
this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the
freedom and right mentioned.
Computer data 99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as
well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go
into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that
computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal
property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures,
whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider's
systems. aEcAD
H applied. 36 TADCSE
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one's
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the
Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for
judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section
19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly
not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds,
declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize
content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him
to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him
judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one. 100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three
tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and
present danger rule. 101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be
blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of thecybercrime law. Taking
Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal
provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned
above. EHSIcT
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
XXX
The very public structure of the Internet and the nature of traffic data per se undermine
any reasonable expectation of privacy in the latter. The Internet is custom-designed to
frustrate claims of reasonable expectation of privacy in traffic data per se, since the
latter are necessarily disclosed to the public in the process of communication. DTEAHI
9
Individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the data they disclose to the
public and should take the risks for that disclosure. This is the holding of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland.
XXXX
A facial challenge refers to the call for the scrutiny of an entire law or provision by
identifying its flaws or defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation on the
attendant facts raised by the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that the
very existence of the law or provision is repugnant to the Constitution. 35 This kind of
challenge has the effect of totally annulling the assailed law or provision, which is
deemed to be unconstitutional per se. The challenge is resorted to by courts, especially
when there is no instance to which the law or provision can be validly
In a way, a facial challenge is a deviation from the general rule that Courts should only
decide the invalidity of a law "as applied" to the actual, attending circumstances before
it. 37 An as-applied challenge refers to the localized invalidation of a law or provision,
limited by the factual milieu established in a case involving real litigants who are actually
before the Court. 38 This kind of challenge is more in keeping with the established
canon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied." 39 Should the petition
prosper, the unconstitutional aspects of the law will be carved away by
invalidating its improper applications on a case-to-case basis. 40 For example,
in Ebralinag v. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 41 the Court exempted
petitioner-members of the religious group Jehovah's Witness from the application of
the Compulsory Flag Ceremony in Educational Institutions Act on account of their
religious beliefs. The Court ruled that the law requiring them to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge cannot be enforced against them at the
risk of expulsion, because the law violated their freedom of religious expression. In
effect, the law was deemed unconstitutional insofar as their religious beliefs were
concerned.
Because of its effect as a total nullification, the facial invalidation of laws is deemed to
be a "manifestly strong medicine" that must be used sparingly and only as a last
resort. 42 The general disfavor towards it is primarily due to the "combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-
line analysis of detailed statutes." 43 Claims of facial invalidity "raise the risk of
'premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records.'" 44”
||| (Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February
18, 2014)
Q: What acts are within the scope of the protection to freedom of expression?
A: Freedom of speech is not limited to oral utterances, it could also be acts which
conveys message to the public (including picketing)
Q: Are there speeches that are NOT PROTECTED by law?
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: Yes, they are those that are libelous, violent, seditious statements.
36:51 – 43:50
You have private speech, commercial speech or general speech. And then you
have government speech.
On private speech, there is more leeway for the protection of your freedom of
speech. TN that on so many principles on this, speeches the content of which are
general speeches like political, religious, historical, YOU HAVE THE LEEWAY to say
anything you want to say. You can say whatever you want.
However, if it is a government speech or commercial speech, it is LIMITED.
There may be a restriction on what you should say about the stance of the
government.
Example: The government is for the promotion of the reproduction health. So if you
have to speak about it, it should AWAYS be for the promotion if you are
speaking as a connection of the government. You have no choice, especially in its
implementation.
So then, if you are restricted or even punished for what you should say against what
the government stands for, you cannot invoke freedom of speech since it is limited
here in government speech.
Therefore, be an ordinary individual so that you can speak whatever you want about
the law which you are against. Otherwise, shut your mouth.
On commercial speeches, it may also be restricted by government, especially when
it involves an interest protected by the government and you are defrauding the public
insofar as the item or property or transaction that you are promoting is concerned. If it
is against the law, there may be a restriction on commercial speeches involving
advertisement of goods or services.
Another thing you should take note on speeches like Heckler’s Veto.
There may be a restriction on your delivery of your speech publicly if it disturbs
the peace and order. That is called Heckler’s Veto because of the ‘heckle’ to the
public. You may be stopped right away from continuing the delivery of the speech so
that it will not disturb the peace and order. That is Heckler’s Veto.
Another point, you have to consider the restrictions on your freedom of expression,
may it be freedom of speech, press or assembly.
Q: What are the restrictions? Because corollary to that, you have what?
A:
1. The Clear and Present Danger Rule
2. Dangerous Tendency Rule
10
3. Balancing of Interests
Q: In the determination of the restriction, you have what? What are the Prior
Restrictions?
1. Content-based Restrictions
2. Content-neutral Regulations
The Content-based Restrictions are restrictions on the content of the speech itself.
It can be restricted only when there is a clear and present danger of a substantial
evil to happen which the state has the obligation to prevent.
On Content-neutral Regulations, it has nothing to do with the content of the speech.
It has something to do with the time, place and the circumstances in the delivery of
the speech that can be regulated.
e.g the permit to use a public place can be a form of content-neutral regulation. BP
880 requiring a permit before using public place. What they apply there is not content-
based, only content-neutral regulations; regulating only the time and place and
manner of the exercise of the freedom of expression.
You already mastered clear and present danger, dangerous tendency and balancing
of interests. Just go over that.
Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales (supra)
- Example of content-based regulations
- Hello Garci Tapes
- The DOJ Secretary and NTC threatened ABS-CBN that should they
continue to publish or replay the Garci Tapes, the franchise of ABS-CBN will
be cancelled.
- SC: This violated the freedom of expression of the petitioner in that case
because it goes to the content already of the speech or the expression here
of the petitioner and that is prohibited under the law because that can only
be regulated when there is a clear and present danger of any substantial evil
to happen which the state has the obligation to prevent.
Also, you have to relate on the Freedom of Expression such limitations as Void-For-
Vagueness and the Overbreadth Doctrine. They also apply to freedom of expression.
Where the basis for the question on the constitutionality ‘on the face’ of the law is on
two grounds:
1. It is void because it is vague and therefore violative of due process of law, or
it can be
2. Overbreadth (Overbroad?)
Know that there are differences between the two. They are exact opposites of each
other.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
This Overbreadth and Void for Vagueness Doctrines can only be used to challenge
the constitutionality of a law affecting freedom of expression, particularly freedom of
speech ON THE FACE (need not be AS APPLIED) in actual cases.
FACIAL CHALLENGE (Overbreadth/Void for Vagueness Rule) vs AS APPLIED
CHALLENGE
“A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256”
“In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights.
The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on
a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as
the prohibition against third-party standing.” (Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No.
204819 April 8, 2014)
And then you have the rule on the MTRCB. You know that already. MTRCB only has
supervision over the TV personality. They do not have any control over them. They
only have supervision and monitoring of programs of TV and movies and films. They
cannot suspend a TV personality. That is clear in the case of Soriano vs. Laguardia.
Soriano vs Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010
Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does
not, under the factual milieu of the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the
nature of subsequent punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the
course of the broadcast of the program on August 10, 2004. To be sure, petitioner
has not contested the fact of his having made statements on the air that were
contextually violative of the program’s "G" rating. To merit a "G" rating, the program
must be "suitable for all ages," which, in turn, means that the "material for television
[does not], in the judgment of the [MTRCB], x x x contain anything unsuitable for
children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision." 3 As
previously discussed by the Court, the vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time
television can in no way be characterized as suitable for all ages, and is wholly
inappropriate for children.
(TN) Also take note on commenting on acts of government officials. You must read
the case of Borjal vs. CA, US vs. Bustos.
11
Doctrine of Fair Comment in Borjal vs CA G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999
citing US vs Bustos
“Indisputably, petitioner Borjal’s questioned writings are not within the exceptions
of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court,
they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments
or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To
be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise
privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's
penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech
and of the press.[19] As early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete,[20] this Court ruled
that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be
abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the
statute punishing libels.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the
press. As held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez[21] and reiterated in Santos v. Court of
Appeals[22] -
To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged
offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged
communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice
Malcolm in Bustos: ‘Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration
of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.’
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged
communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This closely
adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-
determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of self-
expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss, [23] makes its
appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political culture. It
is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on
the penal provision exempting from liability only private communications and fair and
true report without comments or remarks defeats, rather than promotes, the objective
of the rule on privileged communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the
healthy effloresence of public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly
democratic societies.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.[24]”
But the same principle do not apply to the members of the Supreme Court, as this might
affect the sub judice rule. It is stricter in so far as criticizing the Supreme Court.
But not so much as the present political scenario. They’re not afraid anymore of the
courts. So they can just criticize, starting with the President, they’re not afraid anymore.
You cannot put him in contempt. You cannot put him in jail. He is immune from suit.
That is in so far as the freedom of expression. Just take note of that.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
On Section 5, that is on freedom of religion or the non-establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The thing you should take note on this…the cases
you need to take note…more recent decision, Escritor (supra); still a prevailing
principle. This can only be intruded by the state when there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil to happen which may take the form of compelling state
interest. That is the Escritor case.
In the Ebralinag case (supra), the saluting of the flag is no longer mandatory insofar
as the members of the Jehovah’s Witness, as it may violate the freedom of religion.
There are 3 things you should take note in Section 5:
(1) non-establishment of religion, (2) freedom of religion, and (3) the religious test.
All of these will apply only to the government; not against private entities that would
require religion as a requirement for one to be allowed to exercise a particular act. So
this applies only to the government entities. (TN) Just take note of that.
The bottom-line there, should there be any interference by the State, you can only be
justified by Clear and Present Danger Rule.
Another one that is related to the religious test: Conscientious Objector Test. That is
respected by the State. Like for example in some states they allow this - you cannot be
compelled to defend the state, to serve the military if it is against your religion. In the
Philippines, we don’t have that. There is no exception to serving the defense of the
State here. You cannot use that Conscientious Objector Test.
I think they use Conscientious Objector Test with the RH Law. The Conscientious
Objector Test is applied with the RH Law. Like it’s against your religion. You are working
with PopCom. You are working to promote population control through use of
contraceptives. That is against your Catholic beliefs. In that RH Law, you can be
punished. It can be a crime or you can be charged administratively. And that was
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court being violative of your freedom of
12
religion, taking to consideration the Conscientious Objector Test. You read this case.
That’s the most recent decision of the SC where there is a discussion on the respect
for religion. However, whatever your beliefs are you should also not impose that on the
state. That was the bottom line in the RH Law. So read that case Imbong vs. the
Executive Secretary. (TN) You take note of that case. There is the application of the
Conscientious Objector Test. That one has not been asked in the bar exam but that is
included in the bar exam of 2014. How it was applied in the RH Law. [If you got time,
read this RH Bill case of Imbong vs Ochoa, it’s discusses so many rights under the Bill
of Rights]
A good example of a Conscientious objector is if you’re released from the obligation
to serve in the armed forces or to participate in selective service registration. That is a
good example of Conscientious Objector test. The same with the liability of a
government employee who does not promote the RH Law if it’s against his religion –
there should be no criminal liability or administrative liability. That would be a violation
of his freedom of religion.
Relevant excerpts from Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
“Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the
Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained
that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion." 216 "What is sought under
the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially
neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether
by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state
interest test is proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that
free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning
with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court
mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this
test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case
then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates
the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately,
the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona
rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled
the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and
present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly,
all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate
danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used
in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases
set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society
and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been
overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test .
Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and
Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects.
The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent
with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar
to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut
of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or
delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to
prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the
Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional
order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher
sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just
and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is
therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail
over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which
shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be
the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious
liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the
state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount
interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will
not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
xxxx
13
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the
use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing
with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of
the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court
stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
xxxx
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality,
their beliefs should be respected.
xxxx
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government.
They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is
not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it
will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands
that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that
are God's.221
xxxx
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government
legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal
of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the
conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a
more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to
religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense
tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to
the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a
clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the
predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what
the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.
As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis
of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a
false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in
conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal,
but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.”
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
LIBERTY OF ABODE & RIGHT TO TRAVEL
On Section 6, on liberty of abode and the right to travel. What you must take note on
the liberty of abode is that you also have the right to change the same within the limits
prescribed by law.
00:50:01-00:57:50 Ortezuela
TN: You also have the right to change the same within the limits described by law.
What are the limitations, exceptions when there is a lawful order of the court, then you
cannot demand where you want to reside.
Q:But the right to travel, what are the restrictions?
A:In the interest of national security, public health or public safety.
Q:Who determines?
A: It’s not the court. It could be administrative agencies exercising its functions that
may have the responsibility to make sure that there is no violation of the state’s public
health, or public safety, or national security.
14
Q: And thus the question of the right to travel of the Arroyo couple they are going
abroad. Can it be restrained because there is an impending investigation conducted
on them? Of course not. What is the limitation?
A: Only in the interest of national security, public health, public safety. Which was not
established by the DOJ nonetheless they refiled for the TRO.And so they were not
able to go abroad because eventually there was a filing of an election case against
them where it became nonbailable as far as the president is concerned and then
after, the plunder case, which is an even more nonbailable offense.
Q:But what about the requirement of judges and court personnel?
A: To first secure a permit to travel before going abroad.
Q:Does this violate the right to travel?
A:TN the case of the Office the Administrator services, office of the court
administrator in Judge Ignacio Makarili, where the supreme court said the right to
travel guaranteed by the constitution should by no means be construed as limiting the
supreme court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. The
law does not restrict but merely regulates by providing guidelines to be complied by
the judges and court personnel before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To
restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something to regulate however is
needed to govern or direct according to rule. There is no prohibition but merely a
regulation.
“It has been argued that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) on vacation leave to be spent
abroad unduly restricts a citizen's right to travel guaranteed by Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. 10 Section 6 reads:
Sec. 6.The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall theright to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law. [Emphases
supplied]
Let there be no doubt that the Court recognizes a citizen's constitutional right to travel.
It is, however, not the issue in this case. The only issue in this case is the non-
compliance with the Court's rules and regulations. It should be noted that respondent,
in her Comment, did not raise any constitutional concerns. In fact, she was apologetic
and openly admitted that she went abroad without the required travel authority. Hence,
this is not the proper vehicle to thresh out issues on one's constitutional right to
travel. Cdasia
Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of one's right to travel or the
freedom to move from one place to another, 11 as assured by the Constitution, is not
absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right
to travel. Section 6 itself provides that "neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law."
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those that naturally emanate from
the source. These are very basic and are built-in with the power. An example
of such inherent limitation is the power of the trial courts to prohibit persons
charged with a crime to leave the country. 13 In such a case, permission of
the court is necessary. Another is the inherent power of the legislative
department to conduct a congressional inquiry in aid of legislation. In the
exercise of legislative inquiry, Congress has the power to issue
a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the
country, signed by the chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or
acting Speaker of the House; 14 or in the case of the Senate, signed by its
Chairman or in his absence by the Acting Chairman, and approved by the
Senate President. 15”aEcHCD |||
(Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA v.
Heusdens, A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011)
Q:Does this right to return to the country part of the right to travel?
A:The answer is NO. what is the applicable to law on the right to demand that you’d be
allowed to return to the country after going abroad? We have article 13 paragraph 2,
and article 12 paragraph 4. Of the universal declaration of human rights … civil and
political rights respectively. Where it guarantees that you have the right to return to the
country of origin if you live there.
Now they are considered as accepted principles of the international law and under the
incorporation clause part of the legal system, they should be applied as if they are
part of the ordinary statutes.
And then you have on the human security act where (1) if you violate suspected
terrorism you can be placed under house arrest, travel and communication is
restricted, under section 26 of the human security act.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Section 7, the right to information.
What is important? Section 7. This is a political right. This is not demandable by
some matter of right.
Two things that you should TN on the right to information:
1. The right to information and
2. The right to access to information
This is relevant because of the pending approval of the FOI. The Freedom of
Information bill. This is self-executing but you will notice that if you demand information
15
from government, it is for the government to determine whether it should considered as
a public information or confidential information. And since there is no law defining what
may be considered as information as a public concern, it is now the supreme court that
legislates by way of jurisprudence. Defining what may be considered as a public
information that must be readily accessible to the public or information that must remain
confidential.
We can only rely on jurisprudence and they don’t want that. They want congress to
formulate the law that would state as a fact on the information that are accessible to
the public as a matter of right.
The right to information is absolute. The access however to this information is subject
to such limitations as may be prescribed by law.
Q:Now TN to the exceptions of this: what are information that cannot be made
accessible to the public? What are these information?
A:You have, first of all, the executive privilege of the president. The executive
privilege example, the operational proximity test. communication between the
president and his subordinate. That is consultative in nature, not accessible.
Negotiation made by the president not accessible to the public. Anything that pertains
to the performance of function of the president that might undermine his authority he
can invoke the privilege which cannot be the subject of compulsion on the part of any
court for them to disclose that is considered as an accepted privilege.
“Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable
power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. 45 Second, the communications are "received" by
a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity"
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.”|||
(Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
Q:What else that is not covered by the right to information?
A: You have military secrets, of course. Obviously, that cannot be disclosed to the
public. Otherwise it will be too dangerous if it goes into the wrong hands. What else?
Intelligence reports on what? crime investigations. Even if it’s wrong, and therefore
not too intelligent, cannot be accessed by the public because these are confidential.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law) 16

National security matters, trade secrets, banking transactions –TN except when it is a sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional
subject of a court litigation or impeachment. You notice that already when we had the rights. These twin provisions are essential to the
impeachment. Diplomatic correspondence, executive sessions of congress, closed exercise of freedom of expression. . . . Armed with the
door meetings are confidential. right information, citizens can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation of government policies and their
SUMMARY OF MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN SCOPE OF FREEDOM OF effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to
INFORMATION the existence and proper functioningof any democracy. 46
This right to information, however, is not without limitation. Fr. Joaquin Bernas S.J.
1. Executive Privilege notes that the two sentences of Section 7 guarantee only one general right, the right
2. Judicial Privilege to information on matters of public concern. The right to access official records merely
3. Military Secrets implements the right to information. Thus, regulatory discretion must include both
4. Intelligence Reports on Crime Investigations authority to determine what matters are of public concern and authority to determine
5. Matters of National Security the manner of access to them. 47
6. Trade Secrets We have sufficiently elucidated the matter of right to information in Chavez, where We
said: DCISAE
7. Banking Transactions EXCEPT if subject to court litigation and in
We must first distinguish between information the law on public
impeachment cases bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the
8. Diplomatic Correspondence constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the
9. Executive Sessions and Closed – door meetings of Congress public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must,
on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the
public matters relating to the disposition of its property.
These include the size, location, technical
description and nature of the property being disposed of,
TN of the following cases: the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties
qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information.
> Chavez vs. PEA – ongoing contract negotiation of Government, the people have PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public
the right to know. Treaty negotiation that’s executive privilege, so try to spot out the at the startof the disposition process, long before the
difference, do not be misled. consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing
Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this
Latest jurisprudence on Freedom of Information citing Chavez vs PEA disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA
this information at any time during the bidding process.
“The people's right to information is based on Art. III, Sec. 7 of the Constitution, which Information, however, on on-going evaluation or
states: review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding
Sec. 7.The right of the people to information on or review committee is not immediately accessible under the
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its
government research data used as basis for policy official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right
limitations as may be provided by law. to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-
The policy of public disclosure and transparency of governmental transactions proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.
involving public interest enunciated in Art. II, Sec. 28 of the Constitution In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court ruled as follows:
complements the right of the people to information: "Considering the intent of the framers of the
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
its transactions involving public interest. representatives, to disclose sufficient
The purpose of these two constitutional provisions, as we observed in Chavez v. public information on any proposed settlement they
Public Estates Authority, is: have decided to take up with the ostensible
to promote transparency in policy-making and in the owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
operations of the government, as well as provide the people Suchinformation, though, must pertain to definite
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-
agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or
are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course,
to observe the same restrictions on
disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier
— such as on matters involving national security,
diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligenceand other
classified information." (Emphasis supplied.)
The right covers three categories of information which are
"matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2)
documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions and decisions; and (3) government research
data used in formulating policies. The first category refers to
any document that is part of the public records in the
custody of government agencies or officials. The second
category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining
official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or
officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw,
collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
formulating government policies.
xxx xxx xxx
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right
to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however,
must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar
matters affecting national security and public order. Congress
has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in
several legislations. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
We further explored the matter of right to information in Chavez v. NHA, where We
ruled that:
. . . [G]overnment agencies, without need of demand from
anyone, must bring into public view all the
steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transactionand the contents of the perfected contract.
Such information must pertain to "definite propositions of the
government," meaning official recommendations or final
positions reached on the different matters
subject of negotiation. The government agency, however, need
not disclose "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
exploratory stage." The limitation also covers privileged
communication like information on military and diplomatic
secrets; information affecting national security; information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before
17
the prosecution of the accused; information on foreign
relations, intelligence, and other classified information. 48
Even without any demand from anyone then, it behooved PSALM to publicly
disclose, information regarding the disposition of Angat Hydro-Electric Power
Plant|||(AHEPP). Here, PSALM routinely published news and updates on the
sale of AHEPP on its website. 49 It also organized several forums where various
stakeholders were apprised of the procedure to be implemented in the
privatization of AHEPP. As there is yet no sufficient enabling law to provide the
specific requirements in the discharge of its duty under the Constitution, these
unilateral actions from PSALM must be construed to be a sufficient compliance of its
duty under the Constitution.”
||| (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc.
v. PSALM Corp., G.R. No. 192088, October 09, 2012)
> Request for copy of 2008 SALN,PDA and Curriculum Vitae of Supreme Court
Justices. This case was decided 2013. This issue was brought about by Kim
Henares. The Supreme Court did not categorically declare that it is prohibited from
giving out said documents but it asked Kim Henares to “state your legal basis first.”
The SC in this case said that the right to information goes hand in hand with the
Constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service under
Sec. 17 ART XI has classified information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public
interest hence there is a duty on the part of members of the government to disclose
their SALN to the public in the manner provided by law. While the public officers in the
custody and control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in
which records may be inspected or copied by interested parties, such discretion does
not carry with it the authority to prohibit access to inspecting these records. After all, a
public office is a public trust. In this case, what they wanted was detailed disclosure,
not just the summary.
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE
OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY. A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC June 13, 2012
“Corollary to the above pronouncements, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution is
relevant in the issue of public disclosure of SALN and other documents of public
officials, viz:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and paperspertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Emphasizing the import and meaning of the foregoing constitutional provision,
the Court, in the landmark case of Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,[50] elucidated on the
import of the right to information in this wise:
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information
on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey
to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office is a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from
abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty
words if access to such information of public concern is
denied x x x.
x x x The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in
the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of
the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government. (Emphases supplied)
In Baldoza v. Dimaano,[51] the importance of the said right was pragmatically
explicated:
The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information
in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public
of the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-
making if they are denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
“Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for
both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.” However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by law.
Thus, while “public concern” like “public interest” eludes exact definition and
has been said to embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because such matters directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen, [52] the Constitution itself,
under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a
matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a “duty to disclose” sprang from
the “right to know.” Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command while the
latter is a permission.”
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
18
On Sec.8: The right to form unions. It does not allow the right to strike. And it does not
form an integral part on the right to information.
The right to an association includes the right not to be compelled to be a member. But
TN of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, that is an exception. You can be
compelled to be a member for reasons of public interest.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
On Sec. 9: Eminent Domain. The power of the State to take private land for public
use upon the payment of just compensation.
The things you should TN, in expropriation cases, what are the requirements?
1.) Private Property
2.) Entry to the property in the Constitutional sense
3.) For public use
4.) Payment of just compensation
5.) Observance of Due process
Private property is property owned by an entity or individual in its private capacity.
This includes patrimonial properties of Government. If taken (by Government, for
public use), it is compensable.
Entry into the property in the Constitutional sense, TN the case of Republic vs.
Castillve, that there must be:
a. Actual entry in the property that is the subject of expropriation, either legally
or under the color of title.
b. That the entry must be for public purpose.
c. That it must be more or less permanent, not only for a momentary period.
d. That the owner of the property is deprived of the use and concession of his
property.
“We hold, therefore, that the "taking' of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned
as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract
of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not
be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court
did not commit an error when it held that the "taking" of the property under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.”|||(Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi,
G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974)
If from the very beginning, if the entry of the Government is without color of title, then
there is no valid entry for purposes of determining just compensation. It must be
reckoned from the time expropriation case was filed not from the time of actual
occupancy by the government, because for entry to be lawful it must be under the
color of title.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
But generally the basis for determining just compensation should be reckoned from
the time of taking of possession by the Government, even if this is before the filing of
the expropriation case.
It must be for public use, defined as anything that redounds to the benefit of the
public. Even if only a greater number of the people or the public may be benefited
from it. TN of the case of Vda. De Ouano vs. The Republic. This was decided just last
2011, this is the IT Park case I think. Public use, according to the Supreme Court,
includes any use that is of usefulness, utility or advantage.
“In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really
without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other
words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal,
the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the
state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take
private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible
from the complaint.
DTAIaH
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning
to include any use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit [of the public]." 41 If the genuine public necessity – the very reason or
condition as it were – allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land
ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government's retention
of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government
devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or
deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said
that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their
productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen's
own private gain, is offensive to our laws. 42
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose.
If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner,
if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it
expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of
expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play.
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires
unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer
tenable. We suggested as much in Heirs of Moreno and in Tudtud and more recently
in Lozada, Sr. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land,
ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase
and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the
other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into
play. There is really no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is
conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always
conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary,
once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if
he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least,
of the just compensation received.
19
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter
pill to swallow for the owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield
ownership to the government which reneges on its assurance that the private property
shall be for a public purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if the power of
eminent domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit another with
influence and power in the political process, including development firms. The mischief
thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery. Even as
the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted
allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question
to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added dimension to abandon Fery.”
(De Ouano v. Republic, G.R. No. 1687702, 168812, February 09, 2011)
Specific v. General Purpose of Expropriation.
Here you must qualify whether the expropriation was for a specific or general purpose.
If the purpose is general, it is a general conveyance, then the owner cannot recover
from the government the property expropriated if it is now being used for a different
public purpose. On the other hand, if it is for specific purpose then the owner may
recover in this particular scenario.
When we say general purpose, it is an absolute conveyance; there is this even what
they call as fee simple.
In the case of Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation vs DOTC, 2008. SC said that the
State thru the expropriation proceedings may take private property even if admittedly it
will transfer the said property again to another private entity as long as there is public
purpose to the taking.
“In recognizing the right of AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT III project, would the
public purpose of the expropriation be defeated by the government's taking over a
privately owned structure, only to turn over its operation to another private entity
(AEDC)? The answer is no.
To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term "public use"
has evolved over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use
which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual "use by the public" has
already been abandoned. 128 "Public use" has 'now been held to be synonymous with
"public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare" and "public convenience." 129 It
includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.130 Whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use. 131
(Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and
Communications, G.R. No. 169914, 174166, April 18, 2008)
Here in this case, it appears that the conveyance was of general in nature because
there was no specific purpose specified.
Payment of Just Compensation
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Q: In payment of Just Compensation, what rule or laws should you consider?
A: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court as basis for the compensation, and also RA 8974.
In the Local Government Code, it is 50%.
Insofar as Rule 67, it is 10% while
In RA 8974, it is 100%
TN: In rule 67, the base is the assessed value of the property for taxation purposes.
Under Rule 67, it must be based on the market value or the zonal value of the property
whichever is higher.
RA 8974 applies only to “National Infrastructure”.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation
“The LBP disputes this ruling, maintaining that while the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function, courts should take into serious consideration the
facts and data gathered by the DAR, through the LBP, as the administrative agency
mandated by law to make an initial determination of the valuation of the parcels of
agricultural land acquired for land reform.
We agree.
That it is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just
compensation for parcels of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform
program, is made clear in Section 57 of RA 6657”
||| (LBP v. Honeycomb Farms Corp., G.R. No. 169903, February
29, 2012)
“To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors that
have to be taken into consideration to accurately determine just compensation. “ xxx
Here, it is expressed that just compensation is a judicial power. Whatever law there is,
it is just a guideline, and determination of just compensation still clearly lies in the sound
discretion of the court—discretionary power of the court.
Q: (Bar) If a Water District expropriates, what is the requirement?
A: It must be a BOARD RESOLUTION subject to the approval of the Local Water
Utilites Administration.
Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., G.R. No. 175983,
April 16, 2009
“Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation. 25 The power of eminent domain is inseparable in
sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government.
Its exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that there must
20
be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. 26
As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains to the
legislature. However, Congress may, as in fact it often does, delegate the exercise of
the power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities. Petitioner
is one of the numerous government offices so empowered. Under its charter, P.D. No.
198, as amended, 27 petitioner is explicitly granted the power of eminent domain.
On 7 November 2000, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8974, entitled "An Act to Facilitate
the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure
Projects and for Other Purposes". Section 2 thereof defines national government
projects as follows: SDHA
EC
Sec. 2.National Government Projects. — The term "national
government projects" shall refer to all national government
infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including
projects undertaken by government-owned and -controlled
corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary
activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of
equipment and materials, implementation, construction,
completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair and
rehabilitation, regardless of source of funding". (emphasis ours)
R.A. No. 8974 includes projects undertaken by government owned and controlled
corporations, 28 such as petitioner. Moreover, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly includes water supply, sewerage, and waste
management facilities among the national government projects covered by the
law. 29 It is beyond question, therefore, that R.A. No. 8974 applies to the expropriation
subject of this case.”IHETS
||
There is a deadline in the payment of just compensation. It should be paid within 5
years from the finality of the decision in the expropriation case, otherwise the owner
has the right to recover the property and file a case for reconveyance.
Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005
“In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of
the expropriated lots, 26 however, in cases where the government failed to
pay just compensation within five (5) 27 years from the finality of the judgment
in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right
to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the
principle that "the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment." 28 To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with
justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just
compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, 29 we defined just
compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just."||| (Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005)
From the finality of the judgment in the expropriation case otherwise, the owner of the
property shall have the right to recover it. This is already settled.
Q. What would be the just compensation?
A. Money. Money should be the payment except regarding on the implementation of
the Agrarian Reform Program. In this program it could be through bonds. It could also
be through tax credit – in so far as the taking of income because of the implementation
of VAT. The payment is in a way of expropriation because it is beneficial to the public.
The payment of the government to the owner of the stores or companies granting VAT
is through tax credit.
Again, the manner of payment could be in Money, Bonds, or Tax Credit.
TN: By the way another definition of public use; Socialized Housing is considered public
use. “Tourism purposes” is also public use.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The rule is, Congress is prohibited from passing a law that would modify or change the
terms of an agreement of an existing contract affecting rights and obligation of the
parties.
TN: Take note of the exceptions. Despite of an agreement it may be superseded by the
State’s exercise of Police Power, Eminent Domain, Taxation, or when the parties
themselves stipulate in the contract that is subject to future laws that may change the
terms of the agreement. There is a waiver against non-impairment clause.
TN: The exception regarding on Taxation, just take note of this, if the exemption from
taxation is based on valuable consideration that cannot be repealed or changed, as it
would violated the non-impairment clause. But if the exemption is based on gratuitous
consideration, then it can be repealed any time without violating the non-impairment
clause.
Let’s go directly to Civil Liberties
Section 18.
1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
TN: Take note of the other exceptions to Section 18 where you can be compelled to
serve: punishment of a crime, service in the defense of the State, Naval enlistment,
21
(Fosi Comitatus {I don’t know how to spell Luj. Not so familiar with this}), return to work
order, patria potestas.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Non-imprisonment for debt or for non-payment of poll tax; the only thing you should
take note for non-imprisonment of debt is “a debt arising from contract” and not from
the commission of a crime. It has to be contractual obligation in order for you not to be
imprisoned.
BAR: This applies to non-payment of rentals. You cannot be put be put to jail for non-
payment of rentals. Case in point Vergara vs. Vigorio. This has been asked in the bar
exam many times.
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No.
154037, April 30, 2003
Quick Facts: At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which denied for
lack of merit petitioners' petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners
were arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the probate court. Among other,
petitioners contended that the appellate court erred in affirming the Decision of the
probate court finding them guilty of indirect contempt for non-compliance with its
October 5, 1999. Order which required petitioners, as recognized lessees of the
estate of the deceased Anselma P. Allers, to pay rentals to the administratrix, herein
private respondent, and directed their imprisonment until they comply with the probate
court's order. According to petitioners, they did not comply with the order for the reason
that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals because
it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to
them.|||
“4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; NO PERSON SHALL BE
IMPRISONED FOR DEBT; PAYMENT OF RENTALS COVERED BY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE; CASE AT BAR. — In Philippine jurisdiction, Section
20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person shall
be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not
arising from a criminal offense. It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract,
express or implied. In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of the
estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the
administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal reason that
they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals because it
was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them.
Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against
imprisonment.|||
Non-payment of Poll Tax means non-payment of community tax. You cannot be put to
jail for that.