LEGAL FORMS: POINTERS FOR MIDTERMS (ANSWERED) / EH403
EFFICIENT USE OF PAPER RULE (5) A CD or an e-mail shall contain only electronic documents
APPLICABILITY
This rule shall apply to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies under the
administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
FORMAT AND STYLE
All pleadings, motions, and similar papers intended for the court and quasi-
judicial body’s consideration and action (court-bound papers) shall be
written:
 In single-space
 With a one-and-a-half space between paragraphs
 Using an easily readable font style of the party’s choice
 Of 14-size font
 On a 13-inch by 8.5-inch white bond paper
All decisions, resolutions and orders issued by courts and by quasi-judicial
bodies under the administrative supervision of Supreme Court shall comply
with these requirements.
Similarly covered are the reports submitted to the courts and transcripts of
stenographic notes.
RULES TO FOLLOW ON FORMAT, STYLE AND MARGINS
The parties shall maintain the following margins on all court-bound papers:
 Left hand margin: 1.5 inches from the edge;
 Upper margin: 1.2 inches from the edge;
 Right hand margin: 1.0 inch from the edge;
 Lower margin: 1.0 inch from the edge
FILING WITH SC OF SOFT COPIES AND ANNEXES
(1) Soft copies of all SC-bound papers and their annexes must be
submitted:
 If by compact disc (CD): simultaneously with the hard
copy;
 If by e-mail: within 24 hours from the filing of the hard
copy
It must be understood, however, that the paper shall be deemed to have
been filed on the date and time of filing of the hard copy and not the soft
copy.
(2) The soft copy must be in PDF and individually saved, as well as
individually attached to the e-mail, if applicable. The filename of
the soft copy must be the same as the document title.
Examples:
Petition for Review should have a file name “Petition for Review.pdf”
Annex A should have a file name “Annex A.pdf”
(3) Soft copies submitted by e-mail must be addressed to the
appropriate docketing office
(4) The e-mail shall use the following format:
To: [e-mail address of the appropriate docketing office]
From: [filer’s e-mail address]
Subject: GR No. 123456 (John Doe vs. Juan Dela Cruz)
Attachments: Petition for review.pdf Annex A.pdf Annex B.pdf
pertaining to one case. In the same manner, all soft copies of SC-
bound papers and their annexes pertaining to the same case shall
be saved in one CD or attached to one e-mail.
In case the total size of the electronic documents exceeds the maximum size
of the CD or the maximum size allowed for uploading by the e-mail service
being used by the filer, the electronic documents may be saved in different
CDs or e-mailed in batches, but must be clearly marked and/or follow the
format prescribed above.
(6) The filer shall also attach to the CD or the e-mail a verified
declaration that the pleading and annexes submitted
electronically are complete and true copies of the printed
documents and annexes filed with the SC.
SERVICE OF ANNEXES
A party required by the rules to serve a copy of his court-bound paper on the
adverse party need not enclose copies of those annexes that based on the
record of the court such party has in his possession/
In the event a party requests a set of the annexes actually filed with the
court, the party who filed the paper shall comply with the request within 5
days from receipt.
RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
JUDGES AS NOTARIES PUBLIC EX OFFICIO
CIRCULAR NO. 1-90, February 26, 1990
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges
are empowered to perform the function of notaries public ex officio under
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code.
But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of
this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the
notarization of documents connected only with the exercise of their official
functions and duties.
They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of
conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges.
The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their
judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice
of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still
municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC
and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or
notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform
any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that:
(1) All notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government
and turned over to the municipal treasurer; and
(2) Certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the
lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.
FUENTES v. BUNO
FACTS:
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Geronimo Fuentes filed a complaint wherein he alleged that he is one of the (a) To promote, serve, and protect public interest;
nine heirs of Bernardo Fuentes, their father, who owned an agricultural land (b) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules governing notaries
located at San Jose, Talibon, Bohol. public; and
(c) To foster ethical conduct among notaries public.
He also alleged that respondent judge prepared and notarized an "Extra-
Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale" of the said WHO IS A “PRINCIPAL”
agricultural land, executed by complainant’s mother Eulalia Credo Vda. de
Fuentes, widow of Bernardo Fuentes, and Alejandro Fuentes, on his own “Principal” refers to a person appearing before the notary public whose act is
behalf and on behalf of his brothers and sisters, including Geronimo Fuentes, the subject of notarization.
as heirs/vendors and one Ma. Indira A. Auxtero, as vendee.
Sir’s discussion:
In the aforesaid document, the aforementioned agricultural land was sold, It depends on the circumstances –
transferred and conveyed by the heirs/vendors to the vendee despite the a) Whether married or not
fact that in his Special Power of Attorney (SPA), he merely appointed his b) Whether it’s a corporation
brother, Alejandro Fuentes to mortgage said agricultural land but not to
partition, much more to sell the same. (Wala ko’y sure ani )

According to complainant Geronimo Fuentes respondent judge notarized

said document as ex-officio Notary Public, thereby abusing his discretion and
authority as well as committing graft and corruption.
In defense, respondent judge contended that he could not be charged of
graft and corruption, since in a municipality where a notary public is
unavailable, a municipal judge is allowed to notarize documents or deeds as
ex-officio notary public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge has authority to notarize the
documents
RULING:
NO. While Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and Section 242
of the Revised Administrative Code authorize MTC and MCTC judges to
perform the functions of notaries public ex officio, the Court laid down the
scope of said authority.
SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other deeds of
conveyances which have no direct relation to the discharge of their official
functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted that he prepared both the
document itself, entitled "Extra-judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute
Deed of Sale" and the acknowledgment of the said document, which had no
relation at all to the performance of his function as a judge. These acts of
respondent judge are clearly proscribed by the aforesaid Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within
respondent judge’s territorial jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications
issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and the Municipal Mayor of Talibon, Bohol,
SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a certification attesting to the
lack of any lawyer or notary public in the said municipality or circuit be made
in the notarized document. Here, no such certification was made in the Extra-
Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Deed of Sale. Respondent judge also
failed to indicate in his answer as to whether or not any notarial fee was
charged for that transaction, and if so, whether the same was turned over to
the Municipal Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge,
who was the sitting judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, failed to
comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC Circular No. 1-90, even
if he could have acted as notary public ex-officio in the absence of any lawyer
or notary public in the municipality or circuit to which he was assigned.
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY
The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of
an individual based on at least one current identification document issued by
an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual
such as but not limited to:
 Passport
 Driver's license
 Professional Regulations Commission ID
 National Bureau of Investigation clearance
 Police clearance
 Postal ID
 Voter's ID
 Barangay certification
 Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card
 Social Security System (SSS) card
 Philhealth card, senior citizen card
 Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID
 OFW ID
 Seaman's book
 Alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of
registration
 Government office ID
 Certificate from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons (NCWDP)
 Department of Social Welfare and Development certification
(Section 12 of Rule II, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended
by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008); or
 The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to
the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of
two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows
the individual and shows to the notary public documentary
identification.
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATES
“Notarial Certificate” refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized
instrument or document that is completed by the notary public, bears the
notary's signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary
public in a particular notarization as provided for by these Rules.

2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF NOTARIES PUBLIC

PURPOSES POWERS

These Rules shall be applied and construed to advance the following 1. A notary public is empowered to perform the following notarial
purposes: acts:

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a) Acknowledgments;
b) Oaths and affirmations;
c) Jurats;
d) Signature witnessings;
e) Copy certifications; and
f) Any other act authorized by these Rules.
2. A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a signature
by thumb or other mark on an instrument or document
presented for notarization if:
a) The thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the
notary public and of two (2) disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument or document;
b) Both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the
thumb or other mark;
c) The notary public writes below the thumb or other mark:
"Thumb or Other Mark affixed by (name of signatory by
mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of witnesses)
and undersigned notary public"; and
d) The notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other
mark through an acknowledgment, jurat, or signature
witnessing.
3. A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is
physically unable to sign or make a mark on an instrument or
document if:
a) The notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or
make a mark to sign on his behalf;
b) The signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence
of two disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the
instrument or document;
c) Both witnesses sign their own names;
d) The notary public writes below his signature: “Signature
affixed by notary in presence of (names and addresses of
person and two [2] witnesses)”; and
e) The notary public notarizes his signature by
acknowledgment or jurat.
PROHIBITIONS:
1. A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his
regular place of work or business; provided, however, that on
certain exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act may be
performed at the request of the parties in the following sites
located within his territorial jurisdiction:
a) Public offices, convention halls, and similar places where
oaths of office may be administered;
b) Public function areas in hotels and similar places for the
signing of instruments or documents requiring notarization;
c) Hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an
instrument or document is confined for treatment; and
d) Any place where a party to an instrument or document
requiring notarization is under detention.
2. A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved
as signatory to the instrument or document –
a) Is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
b) Is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
Notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
a) Is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;
b) Will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee,
advantage, right, title, interest, cash, property, or other
consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law; or
c) Is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or
relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the
fourth civil degree
REFUSAL TO NOTARIZE: A notary public shall not perform any notarial act
described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he
tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
a) The notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial
act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;
b) The signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the mind of
the notary public reasonable doubt as to the former's knowledge
of the consequences of the transaction requiring a notarial act;
and
c) In the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or her
own free will.
FALSE OR INCOMPLETE CERTIFICATE: A notary public shall not:
a) Execute a certificate containing information known or believed by
the notary to be false;
b) Affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is
incomplete.
IMPROPER INSTRUMENTS OR DOCUMENTS: A notary public shall not
notarize:
a) A blank or incomplete instrument or document;
b) An instrument or document without appropriate notarial
certification.
CASES:
MARIA vs. CORTEZ
Secretaries’ assurance not given credence by the SC; no personal appearance
FACTS:
Spouses William and Ermita Maria bought a land from Emmanuel and Ethel
Biteng, who presented an SPA allegedly signed by Gundaway and Namnama,
appointing him as their attorney-in-fact in all transactions pertaining to the
subject properties. The SPA was notarized by respondent Atty. Cortez.
The complainant, however, doubted the authenticity of the document as it
appeared to be a mere photocopy. He also learned that both Gundaway and
Namnama were living abroad, who allegedly never came home to execute an
SPA in favor of Emmanuel.
Spouses Biteng, however, promised to send Spouses Maria a duly signed SPA
notarized in the USA. Relying on their word, Ernita affixed her signature on
the Deed of Sale. When Spouses Maria were back in Australia, they received
a communication from the Philippines together with a General Power of
Attorney (GPA) signed by Gundaway and Namnama executed in Daly City,
California, USA; but said document was allegedly not authenticated by the
Philippine Embassy. The document is also notarized by the respondent. The
complainant got in touch with Gundaway and Namnama in the USA who told
them that they did not execute any SPA in favor of Emmanuel.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent Atty. Cortez is administratively liable for notarizing a
document in the absence of the affiants
RULING:
The Supreme Court reprimanded and disqualified Atty. Cortez as Notary
Public for 6 months.
In the respondent's defense, he asserted that he had no active participation
in the sale nor did he exert any influence over the parties into agreeing to
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said sale; that his two well-trusted secretaries carefully scrutinized every
document, specifically the identities of the parties involved and the
authenticity of their signatures, before they were brought to him for his
notarial signature. The respondent also averred that the SPA he notarized
was not the one used in the registration of the subject properties.
SC in its ruling said that, it should be noted that a notary public's function
should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and
duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A
notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness.
Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of
illegal transactions.
ISENHARDT vs. REAL
Complainant was not in the personal presence of respondent at the time of
notarization (Evidence is German passport)
FACTS:
Respondent notarized a Special Power Attorney (SPA) supposedly executed
by her. The SPA authorizes complainant's brother to mortgage her real
property located in Antipolo City. Complainant averred that she never
appeared before respondent. She maintained that it was impossible for her
to subscribe to the questioned document in the presence of respondent on
14 September 2000 since she was in Germany at that time.
To support her contention, complainant presented a certified true copy of
her German passport and a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) indicating that she arrived in the Philippines on 22 June
2000 and left the country on 4 August 2000. The passport further indicated
that she arrived again in the Philippines only on 1 July 2001.
Complainant submitted that because of respondent's act, the property
subject of the SPA was mortgaged and later foreclosed by the Rural Bank of
Antipolo City.
In his answer, respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He
narrated that sometime in the middle of year 2000, spouses Wilfredo and
Lorena Gusi approached him to seek advice regarding the computer business
they were planning to put up. During one of their meetings, the spouses
allegedly introduced to him a woman by the name of Nesa G. Isenhardt,
sister of Wilfredo, as the financier of their proposed business.
Respondent further narrated that on 14 September 2000, spouses Gusi,
together with the woman purporting to be the complainant, went to his
office to have the subject SPA notarized. He maintained that the parties all
signed in his presence, exhibiting to him their respective Community Tax
Certificates (CTCs). He added that the complainant even presented to him
the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the property
subject of the SPA evidencing her ownership of the property.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is guilty of gross negligence as a notary public
RULING:
Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he made it appear that complainant personally appeared
before him and subscribed an SPA authorizing her brother to mortgage her
property.
It cannot be overemphasized that a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signs it is the same person who executed it,
personally appearing before him to attest to the contents and the truth of
what are stated therein. This is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the party's free act.
Respondent insists that complainant appeared before him and subscribed to
the SPA subject of the instant case. His contention, however, cannot prevail
over the documentary evidence presented by complainant that she was not
in the Philippines on 14 September 2000, the day the SPA was allegedly
notarized. Respondent may have indeed met complainant in person during
the period the latter was allegedly introduced to him by Spouses Gusi but
that did not change the fact established by evidence that complainant was
not in the personal presence of respondent at the time of notarization. It is
well settled that entries in official records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.
AMORA vs. COMELEC
A defective notarization is not a ground to disqualify.
FACTS:
Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay,
Bohol. At that time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had
been twice elected to the post in 2007 and in 2007. Olandria, one of the
candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed before the COMELEC
a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amora’s
COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria
pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada
(Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.
Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered
as not filed.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding
Olandria's claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of
a ground for disqualification
RULING:
YES. In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim
that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an
additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the
Omnibus Election Code in Section 68.
It is quite obvious that the Olandria's petition is not based on any of the
grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would
uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to
disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds
for disqualification."
Competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is
personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.
In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied
with the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty.
Granada personally knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the
League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as
distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by
Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this
instance.
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BAYLON vs. ALMO
FACTS:
Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife,
Rosemarie Baylon, conspired in preparing an SPA authorizing his wife to
mortgage his real property located in Signal Village, Taguig. He said that he
was out of the country when the SPA was executed on June 17, 1996, and
also when it was notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To support
his contention that he was overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a
certification from the Government of Singapore showing that he was
vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a certification from
the Philippine Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the country
from March 21, 1995 to January 28, 1997. To prove that his signature on the
SPA was forged, the complainant presented a report from the National
Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned signature on
the SPA was not written by him.
The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property
was mortgaged to Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was
subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his wife to settle her mortgage
obligations.
In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued
that he initially refused to notarize it when the complainant’s wife first came
to his office on June 17, 1996, due to the absence of the supposed affiant
thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the complainant’s wife
came back to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a person whom she
introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He further contended that he believed
in good faith that the person introduced to him was the complainant because
said person presented to him a Community Tax Certificate bearing the name
Charles Baylon. To corroborate his claims, the respondent attached the
affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.
The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to commit
fraud, deceit or falsehood.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent had been negligent in the performance of his duties as
a notary public in this case
RULING:
YES. Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the
nature of the SPA which in this case authorized the complainant’s wife to
mortgage the subject real property, the respondent should have exercised
utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person who
represented himself and was represented to be the complainant.
He should not have relied on the Community Tax Certificate presented by the
said impostor in view of the ease with which community tax certificates are
obtained these days. As a matter of fact, recognizing the established
unreliability of a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a person
who wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in the list
of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in
ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them to have their
documents notarized.
REYES vs. GLAUCOMA
FACTS:
The instant petition arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
petitioner against respondents with the NLRC, National Capital Region,
Quezon City.
Petitioner alleged that: on August 1, 2003, he was hired by respondent
corporation as administrator of the latter's Eye Referral Center (ERC);
beginning February 2005, respondent withheld petitioner's salary without
notice but he still continued to report for work; on April 11, 2005, petitioner
wrote a letter to respondent Manuel Agulto (Agulto), who is the Executive
Director of respondent corporation, informing the latter that he has not been
receiving his salaries since February 2005 as well as his 14th month pay for
2004; petitioner did not receive any response from Agulto; on April 21, 2005,
petitioner was informed by the Assistant to the Executive Director as well as
the Assistant Administrative Officer, that he is no longer the Administrator of
the ERC; subsequently, petitioner's office was padlocked and closed without
notice; he still continued to report for work but on April 29, 2005 he was no
longer allowed by the security guard on duty to enter the premises of the
ERC.
On their part, respondents contended that: upon petitioner's representation
that he is an expert in corporate organizational structure and management
affairs, they engaged his services as a consultant or adviser in the
formulation of an updated organizational set-up and employees' manual
which is compatible with their present condition; based on his claim that
there is a need for an administrator for the ERC, he later designated himself
as such on a trial basis.
The LA assigned to the case rendered a Decision dismissing petitioner's
complaint. However, on appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision
of the LA. Respondents filed an MR but were denied. They later on filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
Petitioner contends that respondents' petition for certiorari filed with the CA
should have been dismissed on the ground that it was improperly verified
because the jurat portion of the verification states only the community tax
certificate number of the affiant as evidence of her identity. Petitioner
argues that under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended by a
Resolution of this Court, dated February 19, 2008, a community tax
certificate is not among those considered as competent evidence of identity.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred and abused its discretion in not dismissing respondents'
petition for certiorari on the ground that respondents submitted a
verification that fails to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
RULING:
NO. The Court does not agree.
This Court has already ruled that competent evidence of identity is not
required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the notary public.
Thus, as earlier stated, if the affiant is personally known to the notary public,
the latter need not require the former to show evidence of identity as
required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended.
Applying the above rule to the instant case, it is undisputed that the
attorney-in-fact of respondents who executed the verification and certificate
against forum shopping, which was attached to respondents' petition filed
with the CA, is personally known to the notary public before whom the
documents were acknowledged. Both attorney-in-fact and the notary public
hold office at respondents' place of business and the latter is also the legal
counsel of respondents.
NEVADA vs. CASUGA
FACTS:
In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo
Casuga. Nevada alleged the following:
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1. That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the
jewelries include diamond earrings and diamond rings amounting
P300,000.00. and a Rolex gold watch worth $12,000.00; that
Casuga assured her that he will sell them; but despite repeated
demands, Casuga never remitted any money nor did he return
said jewelries.
2. That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship
with Nevada (they belong to the same religious sect), Casuga
represented himself as the hotel administrator of the hotel (Mt.
Crest) that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga was able to enter
into a contract of lease with one Jung Chul; that he negotiated an
office space with Chul in said Hotel for P90,000.00; that Casuga
notarized said agreement; that he forged the signature of Edwin
Nevada (husband); that he never remitted the P90k to Nevada.
In his defense, Casuga said:
1. That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that
she later advised Casuga’s wife to redeem said jewelries using
Mrs. Casuga’s wife; that Casuga can sell said jewelries and
reimburse herself from the proceeds; that he still has possession
of said jewelries.
2. That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a
certain Pastor Oh; that he was authorized as an agent by Edwin
Nevada to enter into said contract of lease.
ISSUE:
Whether Casuga had been negligent in his performance as a notary public
RULING:
YES. He signed a document (contract of lease) in behalf of another person
without authorization. His forgery made him an actual party to the contract.
In effect he was notarizing a document in which he is party in violation of the
notarial rules (Secs. 1 and 3, Rule IV).
COQUIA vs. LAFORTEZA
FACTS:
Atty. Laforteza was a former Clerk of the RTC, Branch 68, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, having assumed office in November 17, 2004 until January 31,
2011.
On February 6, 2012, this Flordeliza E. Coquia filed a petition for disbarment
against Atty. Laforteza, for Conduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer due to the
unauthorized notarization of documents.
Coquia asserted that under the law, Atty. Laforteza is not authorized to
administer oath on documents not related to his functions and duties as
Clerk of Court of RTC. Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment for conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer.
On January 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant referred the complaint
to Atty. Cristina B. Layusa, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Office of
the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
On March 19, 2012, the Court resolved to require Atty. Laforteza to comment
on the complaint against him. In compliance, Atty. Laforteza submitted his
Comment where he denied the allegations in the complaint. Atty. Laforteza
recalled that on January 7, 2009, while attending to his work, fellow court
employee, Luzviminda Solis, wife of Clemente, with other persons, came to
him. He claimed that Luzviminda introduced said persons to him as the same
parties to the subject documents.
Luzviminda requested him to subscribe the subject documents as proof of
their transaction considering that they are blood relatives. Atty. Laforteza
claimed that he hesitated at first and even directed them to seek the services
of a notary public but they insisted for his assistance and accommodation.
Thus, in response to the exigency of the situation and thinking in all good
faith that it would also serve the parties' interest having arrived at a
settlement, Atty. Laforteza opted to perform the subscription of the jurat.
He, however, insisted that at that time of subscription, after propounding
some questions, he was actually convinced that the persons who came to
him are the same parties to the said subject documents.
Atty. Laforteza likewise denied that there was conspiracy or connivance
between him and the Solis. He pointed out that other than the subject
documents and Coquia's bare allegation of conspiracy, no evidence was
presented to substantiate the same. Atty. Laforteza lamented that he was
also a victim of the circumstances with his reliance to the representations
made before him.
In a Joint-Affidavit of Clemente and Luzviminda, both denied to have
connived or conspired with Atty. Laforteza in the preparation and execution
of the subject documents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Laforteza acted in abuse of his authority in committing
an unauthorized notarial act
RULING:
In the instant case, we find that Coquia failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence to show that Atty. Laforteza had direct and
instrumental participation, or was in connivance with the Solis' in the
preparation of the subject documents. The Court does not thus give credence
to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation.
Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to perform acts
within the competency of regular notaries public under the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice is now more of an exception rather than a general rule.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza notarized and
administered oaths in documents that had no relation to his official function.
The subject documents are both private documents which are unrelated to
Atty. Laforteza's official functions. The civil case from where the subject
documents originated is not even raffled in Branch 68 where Atty. Laforteza
was assigned. While Atty. Laforteza serve as notary public ex officio and,
thus, may notarize documents or administer oaths, he should not in his ex
officio capacity take part in the execution of private documents bearing no
relation at all to his official functions.
It is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza failed to comply with the rules of notarial
law.
Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein.
While Atty. Laforteza was merely an ex-officio notary public by virtue of his
position as clerk of court then, it did not relieve him of compliance with the
same standards and obligations imposed upon other commissioned notaries
public. However, this Court can no longer acquire administrative jurisdiction
over Atty. Laforteza for the purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions over
erring court employees since the instant complaint against him was filed
after he has ceased to be a court employee.
GAMIDO vs. NEW BILIBID PRISON
FACTS:
The Supreme court required Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for making it appear in the
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jurat of the petition in this case that petitioner Gambino subscribed the
verification when in truth and in fact the petitioner did not.
In his explanation, Atty. dela Rea admitted having executed the jurat without
the presence of petitioner, who was imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prisons at
the time of notarization.
He said he did it in the honest belief that since it is jurat and not an
acknowledgement, it would be alright to notarize without the petitioner’s
presence since he knew the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether executing a jurat without the presence of the person swearing is
proper
RULING:
NO.
A jurat is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the
instrument was subscribed and sworn to before him.
Accordingly, in a jurat, the affiant must sign the document in the presence of
and take his oath before a notary public or any other person authorized to
administer oaths.
An acknowledgment, on the other hand, shall be made before a notary
public in which the notary public shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person
who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed.
It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear before the
notary public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents.
The claim or belief of Atty. dela Rea that the presence of petitioner was not
necessary for the jurat because it is not an acknowledgment is patently
baseless.
His prior acquaintance and friendship with petitioner provides no excuse for
non-compliance with his duty. If Atty. dela Rea were faithful to his duty as a
notary public and if he wanted to accommodate a friend who was inside a
prison, he could have gone to the latter's cell.
Thus, Atty. dela Rea committed grave misconduct when he agreed to prepare
the jurat in the petition in this case in the absence of petitioner, making it
appear that the latter personally signed the certification of the petition and
took his oath before him when in truth and in fact the said petitioner did not.
TIGNO vs. SPS. AQUINO
FACTS:
The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single
document, a deed of sale involving interest over real property, notarized by a
person of questionable capacity.
Spouses Aquino filed a complaint for enforcement of contract and damages
against Isidro Bustria. The complaint sought to enforce an alleged sale by
Bustria to the Aquinos of a fishpond. The property was not registered.
The conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.
Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby
Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn
agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same property after
the lapse of seven (7) years.
Bustria died and he was substituted by his daughter, the petitioner, Zenaida
B. Tigno. Tigno attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for
Consignation. The Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing that the right to
repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to make a
tender of payment. The Motion for Consignation was denied.
Tigno filed an action for revival of judgement. The spouses in their answer
alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a
deed of sale.
During trial, two witnesses were presented, the instrumental witness to the
deed of sale, and former Judge Franklin Cario (Judge Cario), who notarized
the same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution
and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria.
RTC RULING:
A Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing
the testimonies of De Francia and Cario as conflicting. The RTC likewise
observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement
that it was acknowledged by Bustria, that it was suspicious that Bustria was
not assisted or represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation
and execution of the deed of sale.
CA’S RULING:
Reversed RTC Ruling. The absence of the acknowledgment and substitution
instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-
assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the
document null and ineffective. It was noted that a notarized document
carried in its favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due
execution, and that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant evidence to contradict the same.
ISSUE:
Whether former Judge Cario has the capacity to notarize the alleged
document in this present case
RULING:
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos,
Pangasinan both parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing
instrument.
FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan
There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is
certified by way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment.
A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is
the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part
of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before
him. Under Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, which has been
replicated in Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Deed of Sale
should have been acknowledged before a notary public.
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As to the authority of the former judge:

It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed
of Sale, was a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos.
Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis, that municipal judges may not
undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,
contracts, and other acts of conveyance which bear no relation to the
performance of their functions as judges. In response, respondents claim that
the prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from notarizing
documents took effect only in December of 1989, or four years after the
Deed of Sale was notarized by Cario.

Respondents’ contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and

Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the
functions of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No.
296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section
242 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, as far back as 1980 in
Borre v. Moya, the Court explicitly declared that municipal court judges such
as Cario may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their
official duties. The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties
of Judge Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it.

There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as
Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform
any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided that
certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when
there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies.

The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Carios
improper notarial activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of
Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity
of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city, was even
then not an isolated backwater town and had its fair share of practicing
lawyers.

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