ST.

LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE’S FOUNDATION AFW

v.
NLRC
Facts:
Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the “Radiologic Technology Act
of 1992.” Said law requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or
x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of registration
from the Board of Radiologic Technology. Petitioner Maribel Santos was hired as X-Ray
Technician in the Radiology department of private respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc.
(SLMC).

Pursuant to RA 7431 the assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of

private respondent SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to
comply with the requirement otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area
which does not require a license to practice if a slot is available.

The Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another memorandum to petitioner Maribel S.
Santos advising her that only a license can assure her of her continued employment at the
Institute of Radiology of the private respondent SLMC and that the latter is giving her the last
chance to take and pass the forthcoming board examination scheduled in June 1998; otherwise,
private respondent SLMC shall be constrained to take action which may include her separation
from employment. On November 23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a
notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos informing the latter that the management of private
respondent SLMC has approved her retirement in lieu of separation pay. SLMC issued a “Notice
of Separation from the Company” to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective December 30, 1998 in
view of the latter’s refusal to accept private respondent SLMC’s offer for early retirement.

Petitioner Maribel Santos files a complaint against private respondent illegal dismissal and non-
payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits. She
further contends that her failure to pass the board licensure exam for exam for X-ray
technicians did not constitute just cause for termination as it violated her
constitutional right to security of tenure. The appellate court finds this contention
untenable, hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is legally dismissed pursuant to R.A. 7431
exercising police power of the State?

Held:
Yes, the petitioner dismissal is valid due to her inability to secure a certificate
of registration from Board of Radiologic Technology.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its
exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to
safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the
people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to
engaging in their chosen careers. The state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for
x-ray technicians and/or any other professions connected with the health and safety of its
citizens. Respondent being engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject
of the cited law; thus, having in mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close
its eyes and complainant private interest override public interest. The law is clear that the
Certificate of Registration cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a person to
practice as a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist (Technician
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VIRON
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC
Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard
G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem,
questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the
closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain:
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus
terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient
access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass
transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport modes, namely the buses,
the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel
through the improved connectivity of the different transport modes;
Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. – In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. – The Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing Agency for the project.
As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro
Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the
different transport modes; and the MMDA had “recommended a plan to decongest traffic by
eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and
providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public
through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities”which plan is referred to under the
E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking
body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the
Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the
establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus
terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory
relief before the RTC of Manila. Chairman Fernando, was “poised to issue a Circular,
Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along
EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation.” This
impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and
two others in Quezon City.
The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924,
which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manila’s basic services including those of
transport and traffic management.

ISSUE: W/N EO is unconstitutional

HELD: YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project
notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may
not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC,
and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the
one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or
cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the
Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra
vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant
of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process
exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within
Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning
purely local matters
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been
validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot
validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at
solving the pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are
commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in
and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be
reiterated that it is the DOTC ─ as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of
transportation and communications ─ which has the power to establish and administer a
transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.
Meralco v Lim (2010) GR No 184769
J. Carpio-Morales

Facts:
A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative
clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She
complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter
stating that:
“It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or
are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of the management supposedly
extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.” She
asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data
in the Bulacan RTC due to meralco’s omission of provding her with details about the report of the
letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the
data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in
order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home

Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?

Held: No, petition dismissed

Ratio:
“Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party”
It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response to killings
and enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns
nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her employment,
one that can be solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy. Respondent even said that the letters were
mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to “real
intent of management”.
IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
 vs.
 HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the
Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other
rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted
a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.”
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view,
the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually
shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand
independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the
word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already
has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made
available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must
keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA.
Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether
or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of
any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into
martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the
basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State
to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which
reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of
their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions
of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n)
of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care
institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service
provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information
and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted
from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of
the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the
RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do
not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL


1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules
have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a
proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance
of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It
has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the
Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs,
such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit
they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis
of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood”
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.