Fule vs.

CA other things, that Amado Garcia was elected as Constitutional

No. L-40502, No. L-42670 | Nov. 29, 1976 Delegate for the first district of Laguna, and that his last place of
Martin, J. residence was at Calamba, Laguna.
Summary: Fule filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of o Preciosa filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
Amado before the CFI of Calamba, Laguna. She alleged that the decedent, petitions for letters of administration
who died in Manila, had properties in Calamba and that it was the last place o CFI, however, granted the supplemental petition and denied
of his residence. Preciosa, spouse of the decedent, opposed the petition, the MR filed by Preciosa earlier.
alleging, among other things, that the CFI does not have jurisdiction and - Eventually, CFI ruled in favor of Fule, and ordered for her, as special
that the last place of residence of the decedent is in QC. administratix, to be furnished with the statements of account of the
estate, etc.
Doctrine: Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a o CA: annulled the proceedings before the CFI Calamba, Laguna,
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence and also intention to for lack of jurisdiction.
make it one’s domicile. Hence, this petition.
Held:
Facts (see below for the longer version of the facts):
- What does the term “resides” mean? (as used in Section 1, Rule 73)
- Virginia Fule (Fule) filed with the CFI Laguna a petition for letters of
o Section 1, Rule 73: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
administration over the estate of Amado Garcia, who had properties
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
in Calamba, Laguna, and died in the City of Manila. At the same time,
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratix over
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
the same.
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death…”
o Granted by the CFI.
o “Resides” connotes actual residence, as distinguished from
o MR filed by Preciosa Garcia (Preciosa), the surviving spouse of
legal residence or domicile.
the deceased Amado. She contended that the order
o Some cases make a distinction between the terms
appointing Fule as administratix was issued without
“residence” and “domicile”, but as generally used in statutes
jurisdiction.1
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous and convey the same
o While MR was pending, Preciosa filed a motion to remove
meaning as the term “inhabitant”.
Fule as special administratix.2
o Resides the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
- Fule then filed a supplemental petition for the appointment of regular
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
administrator which modified the original petition, alleging, among
presence in a place and actual stay thereat;
o Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
1
Since no notice was served upon all persons interested in the estate; that there has
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence and also
been no delay or cause of delay for the appointment of a regular administrator and that
as the surviving spouse, she is the preferred choice; and that Fule is in fact a debtor of intention to make it one’s domicile.
the estate of Amado. - WoN the last place of residence of the deceased is in Quezon City—
2
Alleging that she was appointed because of misrepresentations; that the latter’s
YES
interest was adverse to the estate; and that she has shown herself to be an unsuitable
administratix.
 o Divergent claims are maintained by the two on the residence
of the deceased at the time of his death:
 Fule only stated in her original petition before the CFI
of Calamba, Laguna, that “on April 26,1973, Amado
G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court”. In her amended petition, she would then
categorically allege that Amado’s last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna.
 Preciosa claimed that as appearing from the death
certificate presented by Fule herself, the last
residence of Amado Garcia was in Quezon City.
o SC: Amado’s last place of residence was at Quezon City, not at
Laguna, as evidenced primarily by the death certificate.
 Other pieces of evidence that points to QC: 1.
Deceased’s residence certificate obtained 3 months
before his death; 2. The Marketing Agreement and
Power of Attorney turning over the administration of
his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; 3.
The Deed of Donation transferring part of his interest
in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to
Agustina Garcia; 4. And certificates of title covering
parcels of land in Laguna, show in bold documents
that Amado’s last place of residence was at QC.
o The conclusion then becomes imperative that the venue for
Fule’s petition for letters of administration was improperly laid
in the CFI of Calamba, Laguna.
- WoN Preciosa waived her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the CFI of Calamba, Laguna—NO
o Section 4, Rule 4: “When improper venue is not objected to in
a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived.”
o In asking to substitute Fule as special administratix, Preciosa
did not necessarily waived her objection to the jurisdiction or
venue assumed by the CFI, but availed of a mere practical
resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing
the proper venue at the last residence of the decedent.
Petition Denied.
(Longer version of the facts of the case, as pasted from a scribd digest.)
- On May 2, 1973, Virginia Fule filed with the CFI of Calamba, Laguna, presided
over by Judge Severo Malvar, a petition for letters of administration for the
estate of Amado Garcia. She alleged that Amado died in Manila, and left
property in Laguna. She moved for appointment as special administratrix,
which Judge Malvar granted.
- on May 8, Preciosa Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration contending that
the order appointing Virginia as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate; and that Preciousa, as the surviving spouse of
Amado, should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix.
- While the MR was pending resolution, Preciosa a motion to remove Virginia
as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in
the MR that her appointment was obtained through erroneous
misrepresentations.
- Virginia then filed a supplemental petition. Among others, she alleged that
during Amado's lifetime, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the
First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna;
and that Carolina Carpio is the surviving spouse of Amado, and that Carolina
renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of
Virginia.
- On July 19, Preciosa filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia in
the estate of Amado, and disqualification of Virginia as special administratrix.
- Virgina filed an omnibus motion praying for authority to take possession of
properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons.
- Judge Malvar already issued an order on July 2 which was only received by
Preciosa on July 31. It denied Preciosa's MR and admitted Virginia's
supplemental petition.
- On August 31, Preciosa moved to dismiss the petition, again raising 1) lack
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties; 2) venue was improperly laid;
and 3) Virginia is not a party in interest.
- Preciosa then filed other motions with respect to Virginia's functions as
special administratrix.
- On November 28 Judge Malvar resolved all the motions. With respect to the
motion to dismiss, the judge ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already
been resolved in the order denying Preciosa's MR, and that the failure of
Virginia to allege in her original petition the place of residence of the
decedent at the time of his death was cured when the supplemental petition
was admitted. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court, and had waived her objections thereto by praying to
be appointed as administratrix.
- Preciosa's filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
- Preciosa filed a petition for certiorari with CA. It rendered judgment in favor
of Preciosa, annulling the proceedings before Judge Malvar for lack of
jurisdiction.
- Virginia filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied. Thus, she filed an
appeal by certiorari with the SC. It was docketed as one of the petitions
currently under consideration.
- However, even before Virginia could receive the decision of the CA, Preciosa
had already filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFI of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch over the estate of Amado. Upon motion, Judge Ericta
appointed Preciosa as special administratrix.
- Preciosa later informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of the other case. The
judge ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court. However,
Preciosa still filed “Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations.”
- Judge Ericta was later replaced by Judge Paño, who granted Preciosa's
petition.
- Virginia filed with the SC a petition for certiorari to restrain Judge Paño for
further acting on the case. This was consolidated with the appeal earlier made
by Virginia.
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen
Summary: Elise filed a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
her father, Eliseo before RTC-Las Pinas City. This was opposed by Amelia, to
whom Eliseo was married, on the ground of improper venue. Amelia claimed
that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac at the time of his death.
Ruling: Venue was properly laid. While the recitals in death certificates can be
considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the
contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Eliseo had been living
with Lourdes (the common law wife and Elise’s mother), deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action
for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC-QC on the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the
extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in
Tarlac with Amelia and her children.
Facts
 Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo) before the RTC of Las Piñas
City. Lourdes was the common-law wife of Eliseo. This petition was
opposed by petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quiazon (to whom Eliseo was
married) and her children.
 In Elise’s petition, she claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo
having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were
both capacitated to marry each other.
 Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that
it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of
the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
 Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the
issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
 Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. They asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las
Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s
estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas
City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
 RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. It also ruled that the venue of the
petition was properly laid in Las Pinas City. CA affirmed.
Issues
1. WoN the venue was properly laid
 YES
 “Resides”
o Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant."
o In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
o Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus
defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.
 It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at
No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this
reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the
said city.
 Petitioners: The entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate states that he is a
resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be
settled.
o SC: While the recitals in death certificates can be considered
proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the
contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
o Both the RTC and the CA found that Eliseo had been living
with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for
judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
marriage is void for being bigamous.
o That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with
Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life
in Tarlac with Amelia and her children.
2. WoN Elise has the right to impugn the existence of the marriage of
Amelia and Eliseo
 YES
 Ninal v. Bayadog: In a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and
it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which
may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
 Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even
after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned
directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally
by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
 Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
 Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
3. WoN Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous
 YES
 The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by the Certificate of Marriage issued by the
Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of
San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate
is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the
National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage
exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein.
 SC took judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record
of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the
interval of time, is not completely remote.
 Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was
solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
4. WoN Elise has shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration
 YES
 An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.
 In this case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested
party.
San Luis v. San Luis G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029 Feb. 6 2007
Facts:
- Case involves the settlement of the estate of Felcisimo San Luis
(former governor of Laguna)
- Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime
o 1st marriage with Virginia, they had 6 children.
o 2nd marriage with Merry Lee, they had 1 son: Tobias. Merry
filed complaint for divorce in Hawaii.
o 3rd marriage with Felicidad (respondent), they had no
children but Felicisimo lived with her for 18 years until his
death.
o Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a
petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708
- Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence
prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
Trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati
City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file
the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
 Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree
of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was
not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
- CA ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person
as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters
of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
o CA also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code. It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and
Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article
26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent.
o “The Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between
the deceased and petitioner should
not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.”
o Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as
the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Issues:
(1) whether venue was properly laid
(2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration.
Held/Ratio:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed
in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of
his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. While petitioners
established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982
up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the
Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family
Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show
that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in
Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved.
 Therefore, this case should be remanded to the
trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Respondent Felicidad’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family
Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-
owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
JAO V. CA
Summary: Perico filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the RTC of QC over the estate of his parents. His brother Rodolfo
moved for the dismissal of the petition, alleging that their parents resided in
Angeles, Pampanga at the time of their death. He also argued that venue for
purposes of special proceedings is different from venue for purposes of
ordinary civil actions. RTC dismissed the motion to dismiss, CA affirmed, SC
affirmed.
Doctrine: The venue provisions in the Rules refer to residence, not domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile. The definition of venue for purposes of ordinary civil
actions and venue for purposes of special proceedings is one and the same.
Facts:
● Rodolfo and Perico Jao- sons of Ignacio and Andrea, who died
intestate in 1988 and 1989.
● Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the RTC of QC over the estate of his parents. He also moved to
be appointed as special administrator, alleging that his brother,
Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate (removing
rentals from real properties without rendering accounting, forcibly
opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and disposing the
cash and valuables therein).
● Rodolfo moved for the dismissal on the ground of improper venue:
○ Their parents did not leave in QC at the time their death;
rather, their actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga;
they stayed in QC solely for the purpose of obtaining medical
treatment and hospitalization.
○ Submitted documentary evidence such as income tax returns,
voter’s affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, etc to
support his claim.
● Perico filed an opposition:
○ Their parents’ death certificate actually show that their last
residence before they died was in QC and this fact was
supplied by Rodolfo himself.
● Rodolfo filed a rejoinder:
○ This was an honest mistake on his part; it was only with
reference to the fact that their parents lived and were treated
in QC during their later years, but that their stay was merely
transitory.
● RTC: Dismissed Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss.
● CA: Likewise dismissed Rodolfo’s petition for certiorari and
subsequent MR.
Issue and Held:
● Where should the testate proceedings be held- QC.
○ Rodolfo: In Eusebio v. Eusebio, the SC held that in
determining residence at the time of death, the ff. factors
must be considered: capacity to choose and freedom of
choice, physical presence at the place chosen, intention to
stay therein permanently. While their parents were physically
present in QC, they did not adopt it as their permanent
residence.
○ SC: The facts in Eusebio are different from the case at bar:
■ The stay of the deceased was merely temporary, only
for the purpose transferring his belongings to a
house.
■ In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the
decedents have transferred to Rodolfo’s QC house
(stayed for some 3-4 years before they died). Rodolfo
himself stated QC as his parents’ death certificate. He
did not contest this entry, which was given a year
earlier.
■ The recitals in the death certificates, which are
admissible in evidence, were thus properly
considered and presumed to be correct. Since they
were accomplished even before this quarrel over
inheritance began, they may be relied upon to reflect
the true situation.
○ Also, the documentary evidence presented by Rodolfo show
not residence at the time of death, but the permanent
residence or domicile of the deceased.
■ Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile.
○ Rodolfo: Venue provisions on ordinary civil actions and venue
provisions on settlement proceedings pertain to different
meanings of venue. The former pertains to residence because
it is for service of summons, while the latter pertains to
domicile because it is the place where the records of the
properties are kept and where most of the decedent’s
properties are located.
○ SC: No generalizations can be formulated on these matters.
Also, the court has already previously ruled that venue for
ordinary civil actions and special proceedings have one and
the same meaning.
Ruling:
● Petition denied.
PALAGANAS V. PALAGANAS
Summary: Ruperta, a naturalized US citizen, executed a will in the US, but left
properties in the US. Her brother Ernesto filed for the probate of the will. Her
nephews opposed, arguing that the will should be probated in the US, where
it was executed. RTC admitted it into probate, CA affirmed, SC affirmed.
Doctrine: A foreign will can be given effect in our jurisdiction. To do this, the
Rules do not require proof that the will has already been allowed and
probated in the country of its execution. They merely require that the petition
for the allowance of the will show, among others, the jurisdictional facts.
Facts:
● Ruperta Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen,
died single and childless. She named her brother Sergio as executor of
her will since she left properties in the Philippines.
● Respondent Ernesto, another brother of the deceased, filed with the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will
and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.
● Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin, nephews of the deceased, opposed
the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated
in the Philippines, but in the US, where she executed it.
● RTC: Admitted the will to probate; appointed Ernesto as special
administrator at Sergio’s (US based) request; issued letters of
administration to Ernesto.
● CA: Affirmed the RTC.
Issue and Held:
● WoN a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed
in the country where it was executed- YES.
○ Petitioners: Wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be
probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it
can be probated here.
○ SC: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction (Art.
816, NCC).
○ The ROC provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an
estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
○ Our rules merely require that the petition for the allowance
of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
■ The jurisdictional facts- the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left
in such province.
■ Names, ages, residences of the heirs, legatees,
devisees
■ Probable value and character of the property of the
estate
■ Name of the person for whom the letters are paid
■ If the will has not been delivered to the court, the
name of the person having custody of it
○ The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has
already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
■ This refers to reprobate of a will. This is different
from probate of will, since the former refers to
reauthentication of a will already probated, while the
latter refers to the presentation of a will before a
competent court for the first time.
Ruling:
● Petition denied.
Agtarap v. Agtarap G.R. 177099 & 177192 June 8 2011
● Eduardo Agtarap filed for the judicial settlement of the estate of the
esatate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap.
● Joaquin died intestate. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two
marriages:
1. Lucia Garcia- Jesus, Milagros and Jose(children)
2. Caridad Garcia-Eduardo, Sebastian and Mercedes(Children)
● Joaquin left two parcels of land.
● Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint
him as special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a
regular administrator.
● Joseph, Gloria and Teresa(Children of Jose/grandchildren of Joaquin
with Lucia) filed their opposition alleging that the lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia and that upon the death of
Lucia, they became pro indiviso owners of the properties. They
opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator.
● RTC
o Issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator of Joaquin’s estate.
o Issued an Order of Partition
● Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their MRs.
● RTC- denied the motions and declared that the real estate belonged
to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia.
● However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition,
Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA
● Eduardo alleged
o CA erroneously settled Joaquin’s estate with Lucia, Jesus,
Jose, Mercedes, Gloria and Milagros’ estates in a single
proceeding.
o Milagros’ estate cannot be distributed, by virtue of the last will and
testament observing the doctrine of precedence of testate proceedings
over intestate proceedings
o RTC as intestate estate court had no jurisdiction to resolve
ownership of real property
● CA- Dismissed the appeals and affirmed the assailed resolution.
ISSUES:
1. WON the RTC as intestate court had the jurisdiction to resolve ownership of
real property. YES.
2. WON CA erred in settling Joaquin’s estate with the other heir’s estate. NO.
3. WON CA erred in distributing Joaquin’s estate pertinent to the share allotted
in favor of Milagros. YES.
HELD:
1. YES. The RTC, as intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
● GR: the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate
of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.
o The rationale is that such court merely exercises special ad
limited jurisdiction.
o All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator.
● Exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
o First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in,
or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a
separate action.
o Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.
● Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination
of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
● The general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that
the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties
will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More
importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are
conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle
the estate of Joaquin.
● Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died,
the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.
o Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether
the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the
conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the
decedent.
o Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of
Lucia.
● Therefore, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo conclusively show that
the owners of the properties covered therein were Joaquin and
Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap
(married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant consideration.
2. NO. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes and Gloria in the
distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the
settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his legal heirs.
3. YES. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was instituted
for the probate of the will allegedly instituted by Milagros before the RTC
Alipio v. CA
Summary: Respondent sued the Alipio spouses for unpaid rentals. Purita
Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband died. The
case must be dismissed. A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse for the
collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains. It
should be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the
powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the
administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement
of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto
administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging
to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership
property is void.
Facts
• Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond
in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years
ending on September 12, 1990.
• In 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his
lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido
and Remedios Manuel.
• The rent was payable in two installments. The first installment was
duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only satisfied a
portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance.
• Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their
obligation. Private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the
collection of the said amount before the RTC-Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the
alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the
defendants fail to pay the balance.
• Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988. She
based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court:
o "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon,
and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it
shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
these rules."
o This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, 20 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
o When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in
the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall
not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting
claims against the estate of a deceased person.
• The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since
petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be
independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and
that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.
The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were
declared in default.
• RTC ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay the unpaid
balance plus attorney’s fees. CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. WoN a creditor (respondent) can sue the surviving spouse (Purita) for
the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains
NO (It should be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the decedent)
On the dismissal of the collection suit under Rule 3
• Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten
months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on
October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, S21
which deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the
defendant during the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure to
be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, 20 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the
Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. The
issue to be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file
this case against petitioner.
• Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses,
signed the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of
stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the
Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under
Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
• When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the
settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, S2 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall
be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either.
• Calma v. Taedo: After the death of either of the spouses, no
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim
must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the
conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse,
the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to
the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a
de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void.
• For marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains,
an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its
repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an
obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors
such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not
apply.
• Therefore, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the
present suit against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the
Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner's
husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for the
issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of will, depending on
whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate.
• Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his
claim against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that,
aside from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the
inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim
chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively
pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's
estate and not to any other court.
2. WoN the liability is joint
YES
• Based on Article 1207 of the Civil Code, if from the law or the nature
or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is
presumed to be only joint.
• Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides
that when there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the
latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or
sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the
lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly
and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their
solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they
have become joint tortfeasors.
• In this case, there is no allegation that the sublessees refused to
vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed,
the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private respondent in his
collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before the sublease expired
on September 12, 1990.
• Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that
when there are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary.
Cortes vs. CA
G.R. no. 117417 Sept. 21, 2000
Buena, J.
- Petitioner Milagros Cortes, private respondent Menandro Reselva,
and Florante Reselva are the children of the deceased Spouses
Teodoro and Lucrecia Reselva.
o During their lifetime, the spouses acquired a property in
Tondo measuring 100 sq meters.
o Lucrecia died ahead of Teodoro, and when the latter died, he
left a will which was then probated. Milagros was appointed
as executrix.
- As the executrix, Milagros filed a motion before the probate court
praying that Menandro, the occupant of the said property in Tondo,
be ordered to vacate and to turn over to said Executrix the possession
thereof.
- RTC granted the motion.
o CA set aside the motion for being issued beyond the
jurisdiction of a probate court.
Hence, this petition.
Petition Granted; Court of Appeals’ decision set aside, to be remanded back to
the Court of Origin for further proceedings.
Held:
- WoN the assailed order was issued beyond the jurisdiction of a
probate court—NO
o General rule: probate courts (or those in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate) cannot adjudicate
title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which
are claimed to belong to outside parties. In other words,
claims for title to, or right of possession of, personal or real
property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to
that of the deceased, or made by third persons, cannot be
entertained by the probate court.
o In the present case, however, Menandro cannot be
considered an outside party for he is one of the compulsory
heirs.
 By way of exception to the rule mentioned, “when
the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional
upon them to submit to the probate court the
question of title to property.”
o In addition, Menandro’s claim s not at all adverse to, or in
conflict with that of, the decedent since the former’s theory
merely advances co-ownership with that of the latter.
o Lastly, when the controversy is whether the property belongs
to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the
same is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court,
which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in
order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among the heirs.
 If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings either.
DILLENA v. CA
July 28, 1988 | Bidin, J. | Rule 73, Sec. 3 – Process
SUMMARY: An estate which was the subject of a special proceeding was
administered by Aurora. While under her administration, she sold three
fishponds to Dillena without the authority of the probate court. Acting on the
claim of a lawyer for atty’s fees on account of his legal services to the estate,
the probate court approved the payment of the said fees to be taken from the
properties of the estate. Because of that, the probate court ordered that the
liens be annotated on the TCTs covering the said fishponds. Dillena went to
court questioning the propriety of said order. SC held that it is well within the
power of the probate court to issue such order.
DOCTRINE: The subject properties are under the jurisdiction of the probate
court which according to our settled jurisprudence has the authority to
approve any disposition regarding properties under administration
FACTS:
1. When Spouses Carreon died, they left an adopted daughter, Aurora
Carreon (Resp). Fausta Carreon Herrera, sister of one of the deceased
instituted a special proceeding entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Spouses Rufino B. Carreon and Dolores Sebastian
– Petition for Letters of Administration.”
2. The court then appointed Fausta as Special Administratrix only for the
purpose of receiving and collecting all sums of money due and payable to
the estate, in addition to the powers and duties found in Sec 2, Rule 80
3. Aurora subsequently executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
of the deceased spouses, adjudicating to herself al the real properties
4. She also filed a motion to revoke the letters of administration issued to
Fausta. This motion was granted by the lower court and allowed Aurora to
administer the properties of the estate.
5. While being the administratrix, she executed an extrajudicial adjudication
of the 3 fishpond properties (in Bulacan) of the deceased. TCTs were
issued in the name of Aurora.
6. Aurora sold said fishponds to Dillena without the knowledge and approval
of the probate court. Prior to the sale, Dillena has been leasing the
fishpons for several years. As a result of the sale, TCTs were issued in his
name.
7. Aside from these, Aurora previously sold properties to the estate of Luisa
Rodriguez and also to Starlight Industrial Co., Inc. also without the
approval of the probate court.
8. Having learned of the aforesaid transfers, the probate court issued an
order requiring the three vendees to appear and explain why the deeds of
sale and the TCTs should not be cancelled for having been executed
without court approval.
9. Only Starlight appeared and offered an explanation. The probate court
approved and confirmed the sale. However, vendees Luisa and petitioner
Dillena neither appeared at the hearing nor submitted their explanations.
10. Afterwards, acting on the claim of Atty. Balatbat for attorney’s fees on
account of his legal services rendered to Aurora and to the estate, the
probate court approved the payment of said fees to be paid out of the
properties of the estate. It was annotated as a lien on the TCTs of the real
properties of the estate, including those properties transferred by Aurora
without court approval.
11. The lower court issued a definitive ruling on the sale between Aurora and
Luisa and Dillena. It ruled that these transgers were null and void and
without force and effect for having been made without court authority
and approval.
12. After 7 months fom the time the order was received by Dillena, the latter
filed a petition before the probate court by way of special appearance
alleging that said court, in view of its limited jurisdiction as a probate
court, has no power to annul the sale of the fishponds and that the orders
annulling the sale are void because he is not a party to the case, and that
the lower court has no jurisdiction over the res, which are located in
Bulacan.
13. Lower court denied the petition.
14. CA also dismissed.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Dillena was deprived of the fishponds without due process – NO
2. WON probate court may nullify the sale – YES
3. WON the order allowing the annotation of liens on the TCT was valid – YES
RATIO:
1. The probate court issued the said order in the exercise of its probate
jurisdiction (Sec. 3, Rule 73), which required Dillena to appear before it.
a. Dillena, despite receipt of the order, failed to appear on the
scheduled date. However, the probate court still gave him 15 days
to submit the required explanation and the case was re-set. But
then again, he chose not to appear and ignored the order.
b. One who was given full opportunity to present his evidence and
who failed to do so cannot complain that he was denied due
process when the court rendered its decision.
c. Dillena was afforded every opportunity to present his explanation
but he repeatedly failed to appear on the two scheduled hearings
for the purpose. As held by the SC, there is no denial of due
process where petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present
his case.
d. Moreover, Dillena filed a petition before the probate court, by
way of special appearance, precisely questioning the power of the
said court to declare null and void the sale of the fishponds
involved herein. As has been stated, the lower court after hearing
the petition and the opposition thereto denied the same.
2. On the second issue, Dillena avers that the probate court, in view of its
limited jurisdiction, cannot declare as null and void the sale of the
questioned properties.
a. The fishponds were included in the inventory of properties of the
estate submitted by then administratrix Fausta. Aurora was
appointed as administratrix in lieu of Fausta. After which, the
questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed between
Dillena and Aurora without notice to and approval of the probate
court. Even after the said sale, Aurora still included the 3
fishponds as among the real properties of the estate in the
inventory she submitted. In fact, Dillena, at the time of the sale of
the fishponds in question, also knew that the same were part of
the estate under administration. The CA found that he himself
had knowledge that the fishponds are included in the inventory of
properties in the estate of the deceased spouses and that they
are under special proceedings, hence, no singular act of Aurora
could bind these fishponds more so as Dillena had been leasing
these fishponds for years. The properties were sold without court
approval, the same were under administration.
b. The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the
probate court which according to our settled jurisprudence has the
authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under
administration.
c. An administratrix of an estate already subject of a special
proceeding pending before the probate court cannot enjoy
blanket authority to dispose of real properties as she pleases. In
decided cases, the SC stated that when the estate of the deceased
person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding,
the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it
without prior approval of the probate court.
d. In Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the SC held that the
sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a
decedent, in a special proceeding, needs court approval, thus:
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of
an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a
special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court,
this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate
court.
e. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or
approve the sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, it is said court
that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had
not been closed or terminated.
3. The third issue raised does not deserve any consideration because it is
already settled that the application to fix attorney's fees may be made
 before and passed upon by the probate court in the same proceedings
where attorney's services were rendered.
Note: The Court also points out that the order nullifying the deed of sale
between Dillena and Aurora was received by the former. However, Dillena did
not appeal from said order to the appellate court. Instead, about seven
months thereafter, he filed a petition before the probate court questioning
the power of the said court to nullify the deed of sale which petition was
likewise denied. In view thereof, the order nullifying the deed of sale had long
become final and executory for failure of petitioner to appeal therefrom within
the reglementary period. On this score alone, the petition for certiorari which
was belatedly filed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals should have
been dismissed outright because the remedy of certiorari does not lie where
appeal has been lost.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED.
Valdez v. People G.R. 180863 Sept. 8 2009
Summary: Valdez married Polborosa. After Polborosa disappeared for 10
years, Valdez married Reyes and fled for a petition to declare Poloborosa
presumptively dead. The RTC dismissed on the grounds that Valdez did not
meet the well-founded belief requirement require by the FC. SC reversed and
applied the CC.
Doctrine: The CC did not have the requisite of “well-founded belief”. The
presumption arose by declaration of law and there was no need for judicial
approval.
Facts:
• Angelita Valdez married Sofio Polborosa on January 11, 1971 in
Pateros. In March 1972, Sofio left the conjugal dwelling and never returned.
In May 1972, Valdez returned to her hometown in Tarlac.
• 3 years later, the 2 met and eventually agreed to go on their separate
ways without doing anything as regards their marriage and executed a
document to that effect.
• On June 20, 1985 or 10 years after the agreement with Sofio, Valdez
married Virgilio Reyes.
• Virgilio’s application for naturalization in the United States was denied
because of Angelita’s first marriage which is still subsisting. Therefore,
Angelita Valdez filed for a petition to declare Sofio Polborosa presumptively
dead under the provisions of the Civil Code.
• The RTC dismissed the petition because she had no well-founded
belief that her first husband is really dead.
o Under Art 41 FC, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her
spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead. Such belief must be the result of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse
o In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that she did not try to find her
husband anymore in light of their agreement and Nancy, Angelita’s daughter
with Sofio, testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her father
• Angelita appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that it is the Civil
Code provision that is applicable, not the Family Code because her marriage
to Polborosa was under the regime of the former. She also argued that she
had acquired a vested right under the Civil Code provisions. Art 384 and 390
of the CC was not expressly repealed by the FC.
• The OSG sided with Angelita. Angelita could not be expected to
comply with the “well-founded belief” requirement because such was not yet
in existence during her marriage to Virgilio.
WN Polborosa can be declared presumptively dead by the court? No, because
the presumption under the Civil Code does not need any court approval and
arose from law.

• The marriages of petitioner to Sofio (Jan 11, 1971) and Virgilio (June
20, 1985) were both celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code.

• Art. 83 of the Civil Code only requires that the absentee be absent for
at least seven years and the present spouse has received no news about the
absentee on whether such person is dead or alive, or when such absentee is
generally considered dead and believed to be dead by the present spouse.
There is no provision under the Civil Code that requires judicial action.

• Citing In re Szatraw, the Court said that the petition is not for the
settlement of the estate of Szatraw. Independently of such an action or
special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be
made the subject of an action or special proceeding.

• The court also pointed out that this declaration, even if judicially
made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that
effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption
only. It is still disputable.