THE ARGUMENT FOR THE AUTHORITY OF IJMĀ'

Author(s): AHMAD HASAN

Source: Islamic Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (MARCH 1971), pp. 39-52
Published by: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20833013
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THE ARGUMENT FOR THE AUTHORITY OF IJM?*

AHMAD HASAN

Religion at the stage of its maturity requires a discipline which

maintains it. The embroynic and formative phases of religion are undoub
tedly important inasmuch as it owes its birth and growth to them. Yet
the final stage of the growth of religion gives it the perfect shape which
survives until its end. Of course, religion takes its roots from early stages
and cluminates in a full grown tree with a deep rooted and mighty system.
This sort of discipline strengthens its foundations, constitutes its mainstay
and gives it a lasting form. This formatory discipline is the basic authority
in religion responsible for accepting, rejecting and assimilating the extr
aneous elements. This authority, visible or invisible, stands high in every
religion. This is a pivotal point around which the whole machinery of
religion revolves. Religion can hardly stand without such a discipline.
This foundational and formatory discipline in Islam is the Ijm?' of the
community. In the light of these prefatory remarks one can understand the
statements made by the medieval legal thinkers of Islam about the signi
ficance of the doctrine of Ijm?'. Al-Bazdaw? (d.482 A.H.) observes: "One
who rejects the doctrine of Ijm?', rejects religion at large. This is because
the orbit of all the fundamentals of the religion and their returning point
is the Ijm?' of Muslims, -Sarakbs? (d. 483 A.H.) remarks that one who
denies the validity of Ijm?6 seeks indirectly to demolish religion per se"2.
'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynl (d. 478 A.H.) makes the Shar?ah dependent
on Ijm?6 by saying: "Ijm?6 is the strap and support of the Shar?ah and
to it the Shar?ah' owes its authenticity'^. Al-Qar?fi (d. 684 A.H.) pre
sumes that Ijm?6 has priority in respect of certainty to the other three
sources of law, namely, the Qur'Hn, the Sunnah and Qiy?s*. It should
be noted that such an important doctrine of Islam has been subject to a
ceaseless controversy since its inception for its religious sanction. This
constitutes the theme of this article.

Ijm?* has been justified on the basis of the Qur'?n, the Prophetic
traditions and reason. The jurists, though they establish the validity of
of Ijm?' by the Quranic verses, are almost agreed on the fact that such
verses, are not clear texts to prove the authority of Ijm?6. The traditions
of the Prophet have been quoted endlessly in this connection. The tra

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40 AHAMAD HASAN

ditions are considered an evidence, more clear and strong, on the subject.5
Efforts were also made to substantiate Ijm?' on the basis of reason along
side of traditional sanction. We think that the principle of Ijm?6 in
Islam was introduced as a result of socio-political necessity and justified
afterwards by the religious sanctions. Hence it became the subject of
controversy among the jurists in the Middle Ages.

It appears that Ijm?' was legalized primarily on the basis of ?Jadlth

and then on the basis of the Qur'an. But almost all the medieval jurists
think that the procedure was reverse. They assert that al-Shafi'? (d. 204
A.H.) justified the authority of Ijm?' for the first time on the basis of the
Qur'?nic verse 4:15. This assertion is untenable because al-Shafi'? dis
cusses the doctrine of Ijm?' in his works in detail, but he does not quote
any Quranic verse. He established its authority on the basis of the Pro
phetic traditions. The extant works of al-Shafi'? and of the early jurists
show that Ijm?' was not justified on the basis of the Qur'?n until al-Shafi'? 's
time, i.e. during the first two centuries of the Hijrah. It is also
difficult to trace, for want of information, as to who argued for the first
time on the basis of the Qur'an to justify' Ijm?'. We shall, therefore,
first deal with the traditions adduced in support of Ijm?'.

Al-Shayban? (d. 189 A.H.) seems to be the first Jurist who justified
Ijm?' on the basis of the Prophetic traditions. Discussing the question of
tarawlh prayer he remarks that this prayer is lawful because the Muslims
have agreed upon it and considered it good. Further, he substantiates the
authority of the agreement of Muslims by quoting a tradition from the
Prophet. It says: "whatever the believers consider good is good in the
eyes of Allah, and whatever they consider evil is evil in the eyes of Allah"6.
This hadith has been reported by Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241 A.H.) in his
Musnad as a statement of 'Abd Allah b. Mas'?d and not from the Prophet?.
The hadith quoted by al-Shayba'n? is a part of this lengthy statement
which runs as follows:

"'Abd Allah b. Mas'?d says: God looked into the hearts of His
servants. He found the heart of Muhammad (peace be upon him)
the best of all. He chose it for Himself and sent him with His
message. Again, he looked into the hearts of His servants after
the heart of Muhammad. He found the hearts of his Companions
the best of all. He, therefore, chose them as the ministers of His
Prophet. They will fight for (the defence) of his religion. What
ever the Muslims consider good is good in the eyes of Allah, and what
ever they consider evil is evil in the eyes of Allah"?

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 THE ARGUMENT FOR THE AUTHORITY OF IJM?' 41

The hadith under discussion has also been recorded by al-Sarakhs? in

a different context as a saying of the Prophet. He justifies Ijm?\ inter
alia, on the basis of this hadith. It says : "The Prophet was asked about the
leaven (khamirah) which people give to and take from each other. He
replied: "Whatever the Muslims consider good is good in the eyes of Allah,
and whatever they consider evil is evil in the eyes of Allah."9 One can
hardly make out the meaning of this hadith grafted in the statement of Ibn
Mas'ftd. It has no relevance to the former portion of the statement.
The other version mentioned by al-Sarakhs? is, of course, important
because it shows the context in which the hadith in question was pronoun
ced. This hadith cannot, however, be generalized because customs which
are contrary to the teachings of Islam can be legalised on the basis of this
authority. This can be interpreted in a limited sense. Al-Shayb?ni does
not discuss the question of Ijm?6 by itself. We, therefore, fail to under
stand whether he was aware of the traditions quoted by al-Sh?fi'i in support
of Ijm?6, and particularly the oft-quoted tradition 'my community will not
agree in error." It seems that the idea of the 'infallibility' of practice or
agreement of the Muslim community was in existence in al-Shayban?'s
time. The hadith quoted by him is a clear evidence of our presumption.

The notion of the infallibility of the agreement of the Muslim com

munity further developed during the latter half of the second century of the
Hijrah. Al-Sh?fi'? cities a number of traditions from the Prophet to prove
the authority of Ijm?6. The common theme of these traditions is the adhe
rence to the community. Here we quote the relevant portion of these tradi
tions:
".....The heart of a Muslim shall never harbour vindictive
feelings against three: sincerity in working for God; faithfulness
to Muslims, and conformity to the community of believers ? their
call shall protect the believers and guard them from (the Devil's)
delusion".

".only those who seek the pleasure of Paradise will follow

the community, for the devil can pursue one person but stands far
away from two. "10
Al-Sh?fi'i discusses these traditions at length and arrives at the
conclusion that adherence to the community means adherence to the
agreed view of the community on legal matters. The traditions in quest
tion do not mean physical conformity to the community because there is
no use of such gathering. The believers and unbelievers, the pious and
impious, may get together physically, but the gathering of bodies will cons

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 42 AHMAD HASAN

titute nothing unless they follow the community in respect of its agreed
opinion concerning lawful and unlawful matters. He, therefore, interprets
these traditions, in clear terms, as a direction from the Prophet to follow
the agreement of the Muslim community. Concluding, he says: "He who
holds what the Muslim community holds shall be regarded as following
the community, and he who holds differently shall be regarded as opposing
the community he was ordered to follow. So the error comes from separa
tion: but in the community as a whole there is no error concerning the
meaning of the Qur'?n, the Sunnah, and analogy".H

From al-Sh?fi'?s emphasis on strict conformity to the community

in respect of legal matters it is clear that at this stage the idea of the 'infalli
bility' had fairly crystallized. But the concept 'the community cannot
agree in error' was not yet supported by any traditional authority. We
first meet with this notion in the form of al-Sh?fi'?s own opinion during the
course of his reasoning on Ijm?\ His opponent inquires from him about the
authority of the consensus of Muslims on problems not expressly mentioned
in the Qur'?n or reported from the Prophet. He also questions him whether
the agreement of Muslims will always stand on the established sunnah,
even if it be not reported so by the people. Al-Sh?fi'? replies that the point
on which people are agreed and which, according to their statement, is re
ported from the Prophet, that is then really so. But if they do not state
that the agreement is based on the Sunnah of the Prophet,then its attribution
to the Prophet becomes doubtful. Nothing can be ascribed to the Prophet
unless one hears clearly from him. Al-Sh?fi'? further says that he recogni
nizes the validity of the consensus of people in conformity with them.
For this he gives the reason that the people at large cannot ignore Sunnatf
of the Prophet, while individuals may do so. Finally, he remarks: "And
we know that the people at large cannot agree on what contradicts the
Sunnah of the Prophet and on error".l2 The notion of infallibility of the
consensus of the Muslim community brought forward by al-Sh?fi'? was
supported later by a host of traditions from the Prophet.

To demonstrate the development of the traditions about Ijm?*

since al-Sh?fi'? onward one should go through the works on Islamic Juris
prudence produced in the third century of the Hijrah. Unfortunately, we
have no works on this subject belonging to this period. This is a period
when Hadith was formally compiled and the six canonical collections came
into existence. Henceforth iJadlth came into wide circulation and was
quoted by the jurists in support of the Islamic doctrines. This is the reason
why Ijm?' was justified on the basis of Hadith progressively in post-Sh?fi'?
period. The earliest extant work on Islamic Jurisprudence after al-Sh?fi'?'s

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 THE ARGUMENT FOR THE AUTHORITY OF IJM?' 43

Ris?lah is Kit?b Usui al-Fiqh by Abu Bakr al-R?zi al-Jass?s (d. 370 A.H.)
He opens the chapter on Ijm?' with the remarks that the early Jurists
were agreed on the validity of the Ijm?', and that the principle of Ijm?'
is an authority from God. He thinks that the later generations cannot
change it. Further, he remarks that the authority of Ijm?' can be establi
shed only on the basis of traditional knowledge and not on rational
grounds, for reason allows that a community, like the Jews and the Chris
tians, may agree on error. 13

Al-Jass?s substantiates the authority of Ijm?' primarily on the basis

of the Qur'?n and then on the basis of Hadith. We shall first deal with
Hadith. He mentions the following traditions of the Prophet in support
of Ijm?':

(1) He quotes the speech of 'Umar which he made at al-J?biyah.

It contains the tradition of the Prophet which exhorts Muslims
to conform to the Community. (It should be noted that al
Sh?fi'? argued on the basis of this hadith earlier).

(2) "My Community will always follow truth. One who opposes
them will not do any harm to them until the command of
Allah comes down."

(3) "My Commuity will not agree in error."

(4) "The hand of Allah is over the Community."

(5) ".Three things on which the heart of a Muslim will not

be stingy: sincerity of action to seek the pelasure of Allah,
well-wishing of political authorities, and adherence to the
Muslim Community ? their call emcompasses them from
behind."
(This hadith, was earlier cited by al-Sh?fi'? with a little
difference of versions.)

(6) "Whoever separates from the Muslim Community even a span,

throws away the tie of Islam from his neck."

(7) Hudhayfah is reported to have asked the Prophet: "What can

save me from it (schism)"? He replied: "The Community
of Muslims and their leader".14

These are seven traditions citied by al-Jass?s to justify the authority

of Ijm?'. Two of them were earlier cited by al-Sh?fi'L Al-Jass?s belongs
to the period in which the collections of Hadith were increasing day by day.

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44 AHMAD HASAN

In an earlier article we have shown how the Muslim Community fell a

prey to the Great Schism in the Middle Ages and how Hcdith played a
vital role in respect of integration. Al-Jass?s mentions almost the same
traditions which exhort the Muslims to unity, and ask them to abstain
from disunity and disagreement. The famous hadlth 'my community
will not agree in error' primarily appeared in the third century of the
Hijrah in the context of political integration. This was earlier reported
by Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241 A.H.), Ibn M?jah (d. 273 A.H.), and al
Tirmidhi (d. 279 A.H.) in their respective collections. But in the context
of Ijm?' this hadith appears in al-Jass?s for the first time. It seems that
until the time of al-Jass?s such traditions as quoted by him were not gene
rally quoted in the context of Ijm?'. Hence he concludes his discussion of
these traditions with the remarks: "These traditions are clear and well
known. They have been reported from different quarters. It is
impossible that they are all a conjecture and a lie because they have been
reported continuously (taw?tur). These traditions were well known in
the times of the Companions who argued on their basis to support the
authority of Ijm?' and asked the people to follow them. None of them
rejected them. Traditions which have such a standing, must be a source
of knowledge for action".l5 It is difficult to agree with al-Jass?s because
the doctrine of Ijm?' developed gradually, and thefe was no question of
the Companions justifying it on the basis of the Prophetic traditions.

Al-Jass?s puts the question that if people individually are apt to

commit error, how is it possible that the Community which is composed of
individuals is immune from error? To this he replies that 'individuals' and
'whole' are two different entities. One cannot apply to the other by ana
logy. This he proves by giving several illustrations. He says, for instance,
that a body of individuals can lift a heavy stone, but the same people cannot
lift it individually. By giving such examples he seeks to distinguish the
characteristic of individuals from that of a whole. Ijm?\ thus, according
to him, is a method of deciding matters collectively.16

The word 'ummah' or 'jam?'ah' occuring in the traditions of Ijm?'

gave rise to a controversy about its connotation. There is a difference of
opinion among the jurists with regard to its indentification. According
to one point of view, it means the 'overwhelming majority of Muslims!
This interpretation is supported by a number of statements of the Com
panions. Ab? Mas'ad al-Ans?r? is reported to have been asked, on the
occasion of the assassination of 'Uthm?n, about fitnah (schism). He
replied: "Adhere to the Community because God will not let the commu
nity of Muhammad agree in error. Beware of separation because separa

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 THE ARGUMENT FOR THE AUTHORITY OF IJM?' 45

tion is error." A similar report has been attributed to Ibn Mas'?d.

When al-Husayn was enquired about the validity of the caliphate of Abll
Bakr, swearing by God he reportedly said : "God will not let the community
of Muhammad agree in error.17 These reports show the historical context
of hadlth 'My Community will not agree in error'. On the basis of such
reports the word 'Jama*ah has been interpreted as the Overwhelming
majority'.

Another interpretation says that the word jam?'ah means the 'body
of the learned and jurists'. To support this interpretation it is contended
that whoever differs from the agreement of the learned, dies the death of
ignorance. Laymen, it is argued, are subordinate to the learned, because
they get their knowledge of religion from them. Therefore, it is said con
clusively that hadlth 'my community mil not agree in error* means 'the
learned of my community will not agree in error9. This interpretation has
been attributed to 'Abd Allah b. al-Mub?rak, Ish?q b. R?hwayh, and to
some other jurists. 18.

A third group construes the word 'ummaW as the 'body of the

Companions' with the reasoning that they are the founders of Islam, and
they are really the people who cannot agree in error. This interpretation
is substantiated by a number of traditions from the Prophet. One of them
says: "The Prophet was once asked to pinpoint the sect who will get deli
verance. He replied : (The sect who follows) the way which I and my com
panions follow". Another tradition runs: "Follow my Sunnah as well
as the Sunnah of the rightly -guided Caliphs". This interpretation is also
supported by a speech of 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'AzIz d. (101 A.H.) It goes:
"The Prophet introduced many Sunnahs (practices) and the political autho
rities did so after him. Adherence to these Sunnahs is a belief in the
Qur'?n, perfect obedience to God, and reinforcement to Islam. Nobody
can change or modify them. Whatever contradicts them is not worth
consideration. Whoever seeks guidance from these Sunnahs is on the
right path; likewise whoever seeks help by virtue of them is helped (by
God). But whoever opposes them, follows the path other than that of
believers and God appoints for him to which he himself has turned and will
admit him to hell". From these statements al-Sh?tib? concludes that the
term 'jam?'ah9 in the hadlth means the Companions of the Prophet.19

Another opinion says that the word 'UmmaK or jam?'ah* stands for
'the Muslim community at large'. The privilege of 'infallibility' endowed
by God, according to this view, is confined to the Muslim community
as a whole and not to any group.

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46 AHMAD HASAN

The last interpretation is attributed to al-Tabar?. He thinks that

the word 'jama*ah' means 'the community of Muslims who are agreed on
a political leader'. He brings forward a number of traditions to prove that
disunity and disagreement are forbidden by the Prophet. He condemns
sects like Khaw?rij who separated from the community. He identifies
'jam?'ah with Orthodoxy (majority group) who were united by choosing
their political leader and followed the Qur'?n and the Sunnah.M

These are different shades of opinion about the meaning of 'jam?'ah*

or 'Ummah' which occur in the hadlth of Ijm?'. It is, however, clear that
the traditions on the basis of which the principle of Ijm?' is substantiated
are not definite in their connotation. They may mean Ijm?' or something
else. Their historical context shows that they are all political traditions.
All of them emphasize integration and condemn chaos and anarchy. Some
of them are predictory, and others circumstantial. Therefore, the argument
to establish the authority of Ijm?'is definitely subjective. We doubt whether
Ijm?' can be justified purely on traditional grounds as the medieval jurists
sought to show. We have the following contention. In the first place,
there existed no idea o? Ijm?' as a theoretical doctrine of Islam in the early
generations, let alone in the times of the Prophet. Secondly, the jurists
could not determine a definite meaning of the word 'ummaW or jam?'ah9
whom the Prophet ordered to follow. Thirdly, traditions bearing general
meaning cannot be restricted to a particular point of view. Hence, al
Shawk?nl refutes the argument to justify Ijm?' on the basis of the Prophetic
traditions. All such traditions, according to him, mean that a group
among the Muslim Community will always follow truth.22 Ijm?' however,
ean be justified on the basis of these traditions only by implication.

Let us now discuss the jusyification of Ijm?' on the basis of the

Qur'an. We have shown earlier that al-Sh?fi'? did not substantiate Ijma'
on the authority of the Qur'?n. We find that this was done in the post
ShafV? period when the doctrine fully developed. We meet with the
Qur'?nic justification of Ijm?' for the first time in Abu Bakr al-Jass?s who
might have been influenced by his predecessors in the third century of the
Hijrah, or he himself argued originally. He quotes the following verses
in support of Ijm?':

(1) "And thus We have made you an exalted (equitable) nation

that you may be the bearers of witness to the people and (that)
the messenger may be a bearer of witness to you" (2:143).

(2) "And whoso opposeth the messenger after the guidance (of
Allah) hath been manifested unto him, and follows other

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 THE ARGUMENT FOR THE AUTHORITY OF IJM?? 47

than the believers' way, we appoint for him that unto which
he himself hath turned, and expose him unto hell ? a hope
less journey's end" (4:115).
(3) "Do you think that you would be left alone while Allah
has not yet known those of you who struggle hard and take
not anyone as an intimate friend besides Allah, His messenger
and the believers? And Allah is aware of what you do"
(9:16).
(4) "You are the best nation raised up for men: You enjoin
good and forbid evil and your believe in Alllh" (3:109).
(5) "And follow the way of him who turns to me" (31:15).
Al-Jass?s argues on the basis of these five verses followed by the'
later jurists. Quoting verse 2:143 he remarks that Ijm?' can be justified
on the basis of this verse in a in a two-fold way. Firstly, the Muslim
Community bears the quality of being a people in the middle. The words
'was?f literally means upright and equitable. The quality of uprightness,
therefore, requires the recognition of the agreed decisions of the community
and rectitude of its way. Secondly, the judgement of the Prophet is an
authority over the community because he is the bearer of witness to them.
On the same analogy the agreement of the community should be an autho
rity over the people.23
Advancing the same argument al-Sarakhs? states that the merit
of bearing witness to the people is an honour (kar?mah) bestowed by God
on the Muslim Community by vitue of its piety. The judgement of the
community is, therefore, an authority as good as that of the Prophet
himself.24

Al-Jass?s concludes from Verse4:115 that the Qur'?n makes adhe

rence to the way of Muslims binding on people, and forbids them to diverge
from it. This proves, he thinks, the authority of their agreement, because
God commands to follow what is right. The Qur'?n also lays emphasis
on adhering to the way followed by the Muslims at large because it
threatens those who swerve from their line.

Verse 9:16, according to him, gives the friendship of the Prophet

and that of the Muslims an equal status. From this he infers that
opposing the Muslims is as serious as opposing the prophet and thus
leaving truth aside.
Interpreting verse 3:109 he remarks that the Qur'?n mentions three
important merits of the Muslim community, viz. excellence, enjoining good
and forbidding evil. If the community, he contends, agree on error, the
Qur'an would have never praised it in terms of these qualities.

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48 AHMAD HASAN

On verse 31:15 al-Jass?s comments that the Qur'?n commands to

follow a single person from the Muslim community who is devoted to
God. But one cannot know such a person definitely. The Muslim com
munity as a whole must comprise such a person. Therefore, the agree
ment of the community includes the opinion of such a person ordered by
God to be followed. Hence the cansensus of Muslims at large, according
to him, is a decision from God.25

Al-Ghaz?l? (d. 505 A.H.) adds a few more verses to substantiate

the authority of Ijm?* on the basis of the Qur'?n. These are as follows:

(6) "And of those whom We have created is a community who

guide with the truth and therewith do Justice" (7:181).

(7) "And hold fast by the rope of Allah all together and be not
disunited. (3:102).

(8) "And in whatever you differ, the judgement thereof is with

Allah" (42:10).
(9) ".then if you quarrel about anything, refer it to Allah
and the messenger" (4:59).

Commenting on these Qur'?nic, verses al-Ghaz?l? observes that they

are not clear on the subject. Ijm?( can be justified on their basis only by
implication. He interprets verse 4:115 as asking people to give up
opposing the Prophet and to help him as the true Muslims do. This
verse, according to him, does not mean the agreement of the Muslims
as generally construed.26

Fakhr al-D?n al-R?z? (d. 606 A.H.) seeks to establish the authority
of Ijm?' on the basis of the Quranic verse 4:59 . Here we sum up his line
of argument. God commanded unquestioning obedience to 'those in
authority' (ul?l-amr). The judgement of a person whose obedience is
commanded by God must, therefore, be immune from error. This is because
God cannot command to obey a person who is apt to fall in error; for com
mitting an error is prohibited by God Himself. As such both command
and prohibition about the same thing are combined in a single injunction.
But it never so happens in divine commandments. It is, therefore, defi
nitely proved that 'those in authority" mentioned in the verse in question
are infallible. Now the merit of infallibility applies either to the' com
munity as a whole' or to ' individuals'. But this cannot apply to the latter
because it is prerequisite for obedience to a person that he should be defi
nitely known. Such an individual is generally identified with the 'infallible

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 THE ARGUMENT FOR THE AUTHORTIY OF IJM?* 49

Imam* of the Shi'?h. But it is not possible now to approach him and re
ceive religious knolwedge from him. Therefore, the term 'those in autho
rity' occuring in the verse in question definitely means 'people who bind
and loose' and they represent the Muslim community.27 it is evident
from this argument that al-R?zi justifies Ijm? 'on the grounds of the doctrine
of infallibility. His contention that the person whose unquestioning
obedience is commanded by God must be infallible in his judgement is
untenable. The merit of infallibility should be restricted to the prophets
alone because they are protected from error through Revelation from God.
But others cannot stand on a par with them. Further, it should be poin
ted out that nothing is 'infallible' in this world in the true sense of the term.
Terms like 'infallible', immune to error, or 'protected' mean confidence in
a thing or a person for their respective proper working. Infallibility,
thus, is a functional concept. Ijm?' in this sense shows reliability in the
judgement of the 'community at large' or of 'those in authority', but not
the absolute infallibility as al-R?z? contends. The notion of 'infallibility',
therefore, emerged as a working necessity for having trust and confidence
in an 'authority'. Had there been no confidence in 'authority', in any
sphere, the whole functioning of society would have collapsed.

We have quoted above a number of the Qur?nic verses on the basis

of which the medieval jurists sought to establish the authority of Ijm?'.
Al-?midi (d. 631 A.H.) covered almost all these verses and made his com
ments on them. His concluding remarks show that he is not convinced
by such an argumentation. He says that justification of Ijm?' on the
basis of these Qur?nic verses may be a conjecture, but not a definite proof.
One who thinks, he adds, that these Qur?'nic verses definitely establish the
authority of Ijm?', seeks to prove a definite matter on the basis of an inde
finite authority.28 It is important to note that the Qur?'nic verses quoted
by the jurists in support of Ijm?' do not directly justify this doctrine. The
concept of Ijm?' was not present in the times of the Prophet, how can this
doctrine be justified directly on the basis of the Qur'?n or the traditions of
the Prophet?

The rational justification of Ijm?' started since al-Sh?fi'i. He justi

fies Ijm?' on the basis of tradition as well as on reason. He contends
that people in general cannot ignore the Sunnahs of the Prophet, while
individuals may do so. Similarly, people in general cannot agree on a
point which contradicts the sunnah of the Prophet and on error.29 By
such statements he tends to show the irrationality of the agreement of the
Muslim community at large in error. That is why he recognizes Ijm?'
on the fundamentals of Islam transmitted from the Prophet by the people

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50 AHMAD HASAN

in general to the people in general. This he describes as 'ilm al-'?mmah.M

This sort of transmission of legal knowledge, i.e. from the people at large
to the people at large, was termed later as taw?tur. Taw?tur is defined as
'transmission of legal knowledge from the Prophet by such a large number
of people as cannot reasonably agree in falsehood for their huge number
and living at different places4. The number of prayers and rates of zak?h
are said to have been established on the basis of taw?tur. Reports coming
through taw?tur are recognized as coming directly from the Prophet.31
It is worthy of note that the mechanism of taw?tur is based on reason.
The doctrine of Ijm?' is justified by al-Sh?fi'? by the same logic, namely,
that the Muslim community at large cannot agree on error.

Al-Sara^hs? also justifies Ijm?' on rational grounds. He contends

that the Revelation was closed with the death of the Prophet. But the
Islamic Shari'ah is eternal. This implies that the Muslim community at
large has been protected from committing error in its agreement. In case
the Muslim community agree on error, this will contradict the eternity of
the Sh?ri'ah. Further, he argues that there is a difference between the
judgement of an invidual and the judgement of a whole. Hence the agree
ment of the community cannot be compared with the judgement of an indi
vidual. Finally, he proves the authority of Ijm?' by giving an illustration
of the judicial judgement in legal matters. He remarks that a judge imple
ments his personal judgement and that becomes binding on people beyond
doubt. From this he infers that Islam believes in the infallibility of the
judgement of a single person in legal cases. Ijm?', being the agreement of
the Muslim community at large, should, therefore, be superior to the in
dividual judgement and hence an infallible authority32.

Al-Juwayn? (d. 478 A.H.) follows a different course to justify the

authority of Ijm?*. He refutes the justification of Ijm?' on the grounds
of both tradition and reason. He seeks to justify it in a two-fold way. In
the first place he argues that it is difficult for the intellectuals to agree
even on points which are definite (qat'?) because their points of view differ
from each other. Therefore, when the relegious scholars are agreed on a
point which is indefinite, it may be concluded that they have some tradition
al authority on which they rely. Ijm? ' becomes thus an indirect authority.

Secondly, when religious scholars agree on a point which is inde

finite (zanni), this agreement becomes a definite proof. This is because
we find taht in the past ages and among the nations which have gone by,
it has been customary to silence the opponents where the latter oppose the
scholars. Such opposition to the religious scholars was considered heresy

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 THE ARGUMENT FOR THE AUTHORITY OF DMA* 51

and disobedience. This tradition has come down to our society also. So
that if some one opposes the agreement of the religious shcolars, his posi
tion is condemned. As such Ijm?' has been recognized as a definite reli
gious authority through condemnation of its opposition33.

In the foregoing we have analysed the justification of Ijm?' both on

traditional and rational grounds. We have shown previously that the doc
trine of Ijm?' emerged in Islam as a socio-political necessity. Its religious
sanction, therefore, is an after-thought. But this principle can strongly
be justified on rational grounds. Ijm?' by its definition, is a collective
endeavour of thinking to arrive at a decision on a disputed point. 'Collec
tive thinking' carries more weight than the 'individual thinking'. There
fore, apart from its religious sanction, Ijm?'is an authority by itself.

Notes:

1. Al-Bazd?wi, Us?l al-Bazd?w? Karachi, 1966, p. 247.

2. Al-Sarakhs?, Us?l al-Sarakhst, Cairo, 1372 A.H., Vol. I, p. 296.
3. 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwayn?, al-Burh?nf? Us?lal-Fiqh, MS. A-us?l, D?r al-Kutub
al-Misriyah Cairo, fol. 192
4. Al-Qarsf?, Shark Tanq?h al-Fus?l, Cairo, 1306 A.H., p. 146.
5. Al-Ghaz?l?, al-Mustasf?, Cairo, 1937, vol. I, pp. Ill, p. 12 Cf. Al-Xmid?, al-Ihk?m
f? us?l al-Ahk?m, cairo, 1914, vol. I, pp. 312-13.
6. Al-Shayb?ni, al-Muwatta', Deoband, n.d. pp : 143-44.
7. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad, Cairo (old edition) n.d. vol. I, p. 379.
8. See the comments of various traditionists on this had?th in the annotations of al
Shaybsn?s' al-Muwatta' by 'Abd al-Hayy, p. 144.
9. Al-Sarakhsi, op. cit., vol. I, p. 299.
10. Majid Khadduri, Islamic Jurisprudence (Eng. tr. of al-Shsfi'fs Ris?lah), Baltimore,
1961, pp. 252-53, and 286. ef. Fazlur Rahmsn, Islamic Methodology in History,
Karachi, 1965, pp. 50-51.
11. Ibid.. p. 287.
12. Al-ShSfi'?, al-Ris?lah, Cairo, 1321 A.H. p. 65 cf. Majid Khadduri, op. cit., pp. 285-86.
13. Al-Jassss, Kit?b us?l al-Fiqh, Ms. 229, usui Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyah, Cairo, fol.
215(b).
14. Ibid., fol. 217(b), 218 (a).
15. Ibid., fol. 218 (a).
16. Ibid., fol. 218 (a).
17. Al-Sh?tib?, aUVtisdm, Cairo, 1913, vol. III, p. 136.
18. Ibid., p. 137.

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 52 AHMAD HASAN
19. Ibid., pp. 138-139.
20. Ibid., p. 140.
21. Ibid., pp. 141-42.
22. Al-Shawk?n?, Irsh?d aUFuh?, Cairo, 1347 A.H. p. 69'
23. Al-Jass?s, op. cit., fols. 215 (b) ? 217 (a).
24. Al-Sarakhsi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 298-99.
25. Al-Jass?s, op. cit., fols. 217(a) ? 217 (b).
26. Al-Ghazal?, op. cit., vol. I, p. III.

27. Fakhr al-D?n al-Rsz?, Maf?tih al-Ghaybe, Cairo, 1308 A.H. vol. III, pp.|241-42.
28. Al-?mid?, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 312-13.
29. Al-Sh?fi'?, op. cit., p. 65.
30. Ibid., p. 50.
31. Al-Sarakhs?, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 282-83.
32. Ibid., p. m.
33. 'Abd al-Malik al-Jawayn?, op. cit., fols. pp. 192-93.

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